[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
UNITED NATIONS CHAPTER VII MANDATES AND THE U.S.-IRAQ BILATERAL
AGREEMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, California TED POE, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BARBARA LEE, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Human Rights and Oversight
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DANA ROHRABACHER, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota RON PAUL, Texas
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey TED POE, Texas
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Cliff Stammerman, Subcommittee Staff Director
Paul Berkowitz, Republican Professional Staff Member
Brian Forni, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Michael J. Matheson, Esq., Visiting Research Professor of Law,
The George Washington University Law School.................... 6
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle East Affairs,
Congressional Research Service................................. 18
Stephen G. Rademaker, Esq., Senior Counsel, BGR Group (former
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation).............................................. 32
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Michael J. Matheson, Esq.: Prepared statement.................... 9
Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 22
Stephen G. Rademaker, Esq.: Prepared statement................... 35
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 51
UNITED NATIONS CHAPTER VII MANDATES AND THE U.S.-IRAQ BILATERAL
AGREEMENT
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Human Rights and Oversight,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Delahunt
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Delahunt. The hearing will come to order. Recently I
noted that my friend and colleague from Massachusetts who
chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--that is
obviously Senator John Kerry--noted that Iraq had become the
forgotten war.
Well, I agree. Iraq no longer commands daily headlines and
here in Congress the debate now focuses on health care reform
and there are multiple briefings and hearings on Afghanistan,
but just because something is forgotten does not mean that it
has gone away.
As former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned former
President George W. Bush before the invasion of Iraq, you break
it, you own it. He was right. This hearing is about the status
of that ownership, our responsibility, if you will.
In December of last year, the United States and Iraq signed
an agreement that is commonly known as the Status of Forces
Agreement or SOFA being the acronym. I refer to it simply as
the U.S.-Iraq Bilateral Agreement because it was much more, in
my opinion, than a typical SOFA. This subcommittee had held a
number of hearings as it was being negotiated, and I believe
that those hearings influenced and improved the ultimate
agreement that was signed by Prime Minister Maliki and
President Bush.
I continue to have concerns about it, however, and one of
those concerns is the subject of today's hearing. One purpose
of the bilateral agreement was to replace the United Nations
Security Council mandate for United States troops and other
international forces in Iraq. This mandate was what is known as
a Chapter VII mandate.
Chapter VII of the U.N. charter concerns, and I am quoting,
``action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression.'' In effect, a Chapter VII
mandate means that the international community via the Security
Council has passed legally binding resolutions regarding the
particular country irrespective of what that country's people
or government might wish.
Now, the U.S.-Iraq Bilateral Agreement effectively ended
the Chapter VII mandate regarding international forces in Iraq.
This was welcomed in Iraq as an acknowledgement of its
sovereignty and national dignity. After all, a Chapter VII
mandate essentially says that you are a ward of the
international community, that you are not capable or
trustworthy enough to run your own country, and for anyone, but
especially a people as proud as the Iraqi people, this is
profoundly insulting.
However, a number of other Chapter VII mandates still
remain in force regarding Iraq. Most of them stem from the
Saddam Hussein era. Article 25 of the bilateral agreement
committed the United States to working with Iraq to address
these remaining Chapter VII mandates and restoring Iraq to full
sovereignty in the family of nations.
Unfortunately, this is not as easy as it sounds. These
mandates cover a range of issues from border disputes to
compensation claims, from the first Gulf War to the bank
account which protects Iraq's oil revenue from lawsuits to now
obsolete provisions regarding weapons of mass destruction.
Depending on how they are defined, there are almost 20
different mandates. Many of them require Iraq to take certain
steps, some of which they have not accomplished, for them to be
eliminated.
Each of these mandates must be discussed, debated and voted
on in the Security Council, and the reality of the Security
Council is that Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom,
as well as the United States, can veto any resolution for any
reason. Thus, it is clear that this will require the
expenditure of considerable political capital by the United
States at the United Nations.
Some might say that we have enough on our plate. It is time
to move forward and address other pressing issues. But let me
suggest that we have given our word in a formal document and,
as Secretary Powell observed, we have a moral obligation to the
people of Iraq, and that simply cannot be denied.
I would also especially note, and I think this is
particularly important, that while it might be off the front
page in many ways, Iraq, its stability and its potential
prosperity are essential in the Middle East and the entire
region, and a stable Middle East is essential to our national
security as well as world peace. So Iraq is as important as
ever, albeit it may be forgotten by some.
So this hearing is an effort to find out what needs to be
done to terminate these mandates. What are the mandates under
discussion? What is the process for eliminating them? What do
the Iraqis have to do to help us help them? How does this
affect Iraq's internal politics and its relations with its
neighbors? What are the prospects for a possible referendum in
January if we do not eliminate at least some of these mandates?
What are the implications for American forces remaining in
Iraq?
This hearing and I think a most important briefing in which
two distinguished parliamentarians from Iraq will come before
this committee and give us their perspective will explore all
of these issues.
But before I introduce this distinguished panel let me turn
to my friend from California and the ranking member of this
committee, Dana Rohrabacher, for any opening comments he might
have.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
note that the chairman has taken special interest in the
various legal and diplomatic agreements that have been made
concerning the ongoing conflict in Iraq. The chairman was the
first one to take notice of the Status of Forces Agreement.
It could be the reason he was the first one to take notice
is the fact that Congress had been totally left out of the loop
that we were going to have a Status of Forces Agreement and
what the meaning of that was, so the chairman did make sure
that we looked at that issue and demanded that Congress play
its rightful role during the last administration as that
agreement went forward.
So I am here to learn about where we stand now, now that
decisions have been made that our troops will be withdrawing
and are currently actually involved in withdrawing and what
legal documents and agreements and mandates that we have. I am
here to listen and to learn.
I do know one thing; that we all need to ponder what the
whole Iraqi episode in American history means to us as people
and as a nation. We have lost 4,300 of our young people. Well,
some of them weren't young. Some of them were in their fifties
probably I am sure or sixties.
Male Voice. That is still young.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Still young. But we lost 4,300 of our
American people. Forty-three hundred died in Iraq. Forty-three
hundred people.
And tens of thousands more wounded. Many of them will live
lives for the rest of their life they will live in misery,
perhaps without a leg, perhaps half of their face has been shot
off, perhaps they won't be able to walk or have children.
Thousands of Americans and 4,300 killed.
One trillion dollars of Treasury--American. One trillion
dollars. Now, what does this all mean? What is it all about?
That trillion dollars, I might add, had it not been spent for
that purpose may well have prevented us from going into the
magnitude of the economic crisis that we are facing today.
Think of the price that we have paid. It is an incredible
price, and we need to ponder what this all means to us as
Americans, what commitments we will make in the future.
I believe that the decision to go into Iraq in the first
place was a decision based on a benevolent intent, and I
believe the benevolent intent was that the American people, all
of us who participated in that decision, because we did as a
Congress, believed that the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was
a vicious and bloody and evil, evil regime and that we were
willing to commit ourselves and risk the price that we paid in
order to free the people of Iraq from this dictatorship.
Again, we need to ponder to see if that is indeed the case.
Was that worth it? We got rid of Saddam Hussein, and then of
course more and more casualties, more and more treasure trying
to prevent radical Islamicists from taking advantage of the
chaos and the confusion of what happens after the transition
after a dictatorship into some other kind of government.
Was all of that worth it? What it is all about, and what
are the remnants that are left behind that we have to deal with
now? Today we are going to hear about the legal remnants and
some of the agreements, and I am here, as I say, to learn about
that because that is something we have to deal with as well. We
have to deal with some of the relationships and some of the
situations that existed before our intervention in that
situation, and we now have to deal with that.
One of the I think major issues is Camp Ashraf where we
have people who have committed themselves to pose the Islamic
dictatorship in Iran, and we have a group of people who were
permitted to stage themselves from Iraqi territory and they are
now caught in a situation that had we not intervened wouldn't
exist, so the fact is it is up to us to confront the issue of
Camp Ashraf and what happens to those people.
I would hope that considering that we spent all of this
money and all of this blood trying to establish a country that
would be more democratic and have more concern for human rights
that the Government of Iraq would operate with some of those
values instead of with an iron fist and trying to exert its
authority in situations like Camp Ashraf.
I would hope that the 43 prisoners that they have taken
from Camp Ashraf will be treated well, which I doubt, but that
their human rights will be respected and the human rights of
those people will be respected. How the Government of Iraq acts
from now on will determine for the people of the United States
whether or not it was worth us to go in and spend the lives of
our children and spend the treasure that we could have used in
our own families here at home.
If it is a democratic government and they treat people with
respect and human rights and they perhaps try to solve their
own problems, respecting the rights of various peoples within
Iraq--the Kurds, the Christians, other minorities--and as they
treat each other, the Sunnis and the Shiites treat each other,
that will determine whether or not the American people will
look back and say yes, it was worth giving my son's life to see
that that vicious dictatorship was removed.
If they make the wrong decisions in these areas, Mr.
Chairman, I believe that there will be a deep resentment of the
American people to the leaders and our Government who sent them
there, but also to the people of Iraq who have not lived up to
the opportunity that we paid such a dear price to give them.
With that, I am very interested in the testimony. Thank you
for holding this hearing today.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. Thank you, Dana.
Well, let me begin by introducing our witnesses. They have
become regulars before this particular subcommittee. They are
all distinguished in their own right, and we welcome them back.
First we have Professor Mike Matheson. He is a member of
the International Law factory--faculty rather, not factory; is
that some sort of Freudian slip there--of the George Washington
University Law School here in Washington. He served from 2003
to 2006 as the American member of the U.N. International Law
Commission.
From 1972 to 2000, he worked in the Legal Advisor's Office
at the Department of State, including 2 years as Acting Legal
Advisor of the Department. While at the State, he led efforts
to create the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia
and Rwanda and the U.N. Compensation Commission for Gulf War
Claims, and he headed the U.S. delegation with the rank of
Ambassador to the U.N. Negotiations on Conventional Weapons.
He has written a book on the U.N. Security Council in the
post Cold War period and on international humanitarian law in
recent conflicts, as well as multiple articles and other
pieces.
I would note that Professor Matheson currently has a
consulting contract with the State Department in the amount of
$20,000 concerning the Kosovo case before the International
Court of Justice. However, he is appearing here today in his
own capacity and not as a representative of the United States
Government.
Next we have Dr. Ken Katzman of the Congressional Research
Service. He serves as a Senior Middle East Analyst for the U.S.
Congress with a special emphasis on Iran, Iraq and the Persian
Gulf States, Afghanistan and terrorist groups operating in the
Middle East and South Asia. He is a busy guy these days.
He has also written numerous articles and various outside
publications, including a book entitled The Warriors of Islam:
Iran's Revolutionary Guard, and has given numerous official
presentations and briefings at conferences worldwide.
And last, but certainly not least, Steve Rademaker. He
currently serves as Senior Counsel for the BGR Consulting
Group. He joined BGR in 2007 following a distinguished career
in all three branches of government.
What is particularly interesting for the purposes of this
hearing is that he served from 2005 to 2006 as a member of the
College of Commissioners of the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission, commonly known as
UNMOVIC, which was a U.N. mandated operation regarding Iraq
that has since been terminated.
He continues to serve on the U.N. Secretary General's
Advisory Board in disarmament matters and has joined the U.N.
Commission on the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Terrorism.
In 2002, he became an Assistant Secretary of State, and
from then until 2006 he headed at various times three bureaus
of the Department of State, including the Bureau of Arms
Control and the Bureau of International Security in
Nonproliferation, and we have to note, of course, for the
record that he has also held positions on the staff of the
Committee of International Relations of the House of
Representatives, including Deputy Staff Director and Chief
Counsel.
We welcome you all. Steve, we welcome you back. Let us
begin with Mike Matheson.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MATHESON, ESQ., VISITING RESEARCH
PROFESSOR OF LAW, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
Mr. Matheson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
submitted a written statement. I suggest it be included in the
record and that I give a summary at this point.
My statement attempts to describe where matters stand with
respect to the various Chapter VII measures which are still in
effect with respect to Iraq and particularly in light of the
provisions of the United States-Iraq agreement from last year.
You have already noted that Article 25 of that agreement
does recognize that the situation of Iraq is fundamentally
different now than it was in 1991. It acknowledges that Iraq
should return to the legal standing that it had before the Gulf
War, and it pledges the United States to use its best efforts
toward that objective.
The Security Council itself has agreed with this general
objective, and in fact over the past few years it has itself
taken a number of steps to revoke or to modify some of the more
onerous Chapter VII measures that had been applied to Iraq
after the Gulf War: In particular, a lifting of the trade and
financial sanctions, an easing of U.N. control over Iraqi oil
and gas revenues, and the expiration of the multinational force
mandate.
Now, in July of this year the U.N. Secretary General issued
a report which reported on where matters stood with respect to
those measures that remained, and it noted that progress had
been made on a number of points with respect to these matters.
It supported the gradual restoration of Iraq to its prior
status, but it also noted that there were some unresolved
matters which still had to be dealt with.
Now, the first area of these unresolved matters relates to
the compensation for the losses suffered by Kuwait and other
countries during the Gulf War. As you know, in 1991 the
Security Council created a U.N. Compensation Commission to
provide compensation to the various victims of the Gulf War and
to make payments for that purpose from Iraqi oil export
revenues.
Ultimately the Commission awarded a total of about $52
billion to claimants of various nationalities, including
Americans. To date, about $28 billion of that has been paid,
which leaves about $24 billion representing unpaid claims by
Kuwait for damage to the Kuwaiti environment and to the Kuwaiti
oil industry.
Originally for this purpose deductions were being made from
Iraqi oil exports to the tune of 30 percent. This was reduced
in recent years to 5 percent, and Iraq has now proposed that it
be reduced to 1 percent if not eliminated altogether. Since the
remaining claims against the fund are Kuwaiti, hopefully this
can be resolved by some kind of accommodation reached between
Iraq and Kuwait.
One suggestion that apparently has been considered is that
these unpaid amounts be used to fund investments in
infrastructure projects in Iraq. In any event, Article 26 of
the U.S.-Iraq agreement says that the United States is going to
support Iraq in achieving a final resolution of these
compensation issues.
The second area of unresolved issues relates to other Iraqi
debts and assets. At the end of last year, the Security Council
decided at Iraq's request to continue in effect a number of
measures that had been put in place to handle Iraqi funds and
assets: Specifically the deposit of Iraqi oil export funds into
a development fund, which is now administered by Iraq, and the
operation of an international advisory and monitoring board to
monitor the accounting and use of those funds.
These funds and Iraqi oil assets generally are made immune
from attachments by Security Council decisions with some
exceptions. Now, in the Secretary General's July report it said
that Iraq was now basically ready to assume these oversight
responsibilities, but it did note that there were certain
unresolved technical questions outstanding with respect to
Iraqi internal controls and the deposit of certain funds into
this development fund.
It is also important to resolve the large volume of claims
against Iraq and debts of Iraq that date back to the Saddam
regime. This includes claims of U.S. nationals, and this is
necessary so that Iraq can resume its normal responsibility of
a sovereign state for its assets and liabilities. Again,
Article 26 of the U.S.-Iraq agreement says that the United
States will assist Iraq in trying to resolve these matters as
well.
Next is the area of weapons of mass destruction. As you
know, after the Gulf War the U.N. Security Council required the
elimination of Iraqi WMD and also imposed some significant
constraints on Iraqi activities and Iraqi capabilities that
might be used in the future for WMD purposes. This includes
chemical and biological weapons. It includes long range
ballistic missiles and, most importantly, it includes all
nuclear items and activities except for certain limited medical
and other purposes.
Now, at the time Iraq was required to accept a
comprehensive and unusual regime of international inspections
to verify its compliance with these provisions. In 2007, the
Security Council decided that these extraordinary inspection
regimes were no longer necessary.
But it did keep in effect the restrictions on Iraqi nuclear
and other activities, and the resolutions say that these will
continue until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in
compliance with Council resolutions and the International
Atomic Energy Administration or Agency decides that Iraq is in
full compliance with nuclear safeguards agreements. Neither of
these steps has yet occurred.
Apparently there is some further work required on technical
issues, particularly with respect to possible future Iraqi
peaceful nuclear activities, and I think probably there is also
a policy, or perhaps it is a tactical question, about how the
complete lifting of all of these restrictions at this point,
how it would relate to United States and other nonproliferation
objectives in the region, particularly with respect to Iran.
Then there are a series of other issues on which Chapter
VII measures remain in effect. For example, after the Gulf War
the Security Council created a Boundary Commission to resolve
the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute which had been one of the
ostensible causes for the Gulf War, and when that process of
demarcation was completed the Council guaranteed the newly
demarcated boundary. So the question arises as to whether it
might be desirable to continue that guarantee of the boundary
in force.
There are also a series of measures to locate and to
repatriate the remains and the property of Kuwaiti and third
country nationals who were missing during the Gulf War. The
embargo on arms shipments to nongovernmental entities in Iraq
remains. There are measures to facilitate the return of Iraqi
cultural property and so on. The Secretary General's report
this year identified a number of unresolved issues with respect
to each of these items, so it may be necessary to continue
these in effect until those remaining issues are resolved.
In conclusion, I think all parties are agreed on the
principle that Iraq should be restored to the legal and
international status that it enjoyed prior to the Gulf War,
but, as you said, it is not quite so simple. Some measures
apparently need to continue in effect for an interim period
until technical questions are resolved. That includes, for
example, the administration of the oil proceeds and their
protection from attachment.
Some issues probably could only be eliminated when
questions between Iraq and other states are resolved, and a
good example of this is the compensation issue with respect to
Kuwait. And it might be that the Council decides that certain
other matters should be kept in force for a temporary period
for policy reasons, and the WMD and the boundary questions may
fall into that category.
What I would stress on the whole is that this process of
orderly resolution of these remaining Chapter VII issues need
not be taken as any kind of derogation from Iraqi sovereignty,
nor should it be taken as any kind of statement that Iraq is
not a full, equal state on a par with others in the
international community.
The Security Council has used Chapter VII on many occasions
in the past to deploy peacekeeping forces and other missions,
and to take other measures, without derogating from the
sovereignty of states that might be involved, and in fact all
states have certain duties under Chapter VII, including the
United States: For example, a duty to prosecute or extradite
international terrorists found in our territory.
So my point would be that Iraq has already been relieved of
the great burden of the onerous restrictions from the Saddam
era, and there is no reason why the remaining issues can't be
dealt with and resolved in an orderly manner with the objective
of restoring Iraq to its full status prior to the Gulf War.
That is the end of my presentation. Of course, I would be
glad to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Matheson.
Next we will go to Dr. Katzman.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE EAST
AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Katzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having me back;
Mr. Rohrabacher, for asking me to appear today.
Mr. Delahunt. Can you hit the button, Ken?
Mr. Katzman. Thank you very much for asking me to appear.
My primary responsibilities at CRS are on Iraqi politics,
culture, history, United States policy toward Iraq rather than
specifically the legalities of the U.S.-Iraq agreement or the
United Nations. I will summarize my comments and ask that the
remainder be submitted for the record. Thank you very much.
In evaluating the implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement, including these provisions committing the United
States to support lifting the remaining Chapter VII resolutions
mandate, it is useful I think to assess where Iraqi politics
stand, and that I think addresses the broader questions in
several opening statements about where the U.S. mission stands,
the implications of the United States decision to intervene in
Iraq in 2003.
In general, Iraq's political system can be characterized by
peaceful competition rather than violence. However,
sectarianism and ethnic and factional in-fighting continue to
simmer, and many Iraqi views and positions are colored by
efforts to outflank, outmaneuver and constrain rival factions.
These tendencies will only grow in the run up to the
January 16, 2010, national elections in Iraq, which may also
concurrently include a vote, a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq
agreement subject to that would have to be approved by the
National Assembly to have the referendum. That decision has not
been taken yet.
Compounding the factional tensions is the perception that
Prime Minister Maliki is in a strong position politically. This
is largely a result of the strong showing of his Da'wa Party in
the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. His showing in
those elections was in turn a product of his benefitting from
an improved security situation, his positions in favor of
strong central government as opposed to local tendencies or
regionalism and his March 2008 move against Shiite militias who
were virtually controlling Basra and Umm Qasr Port.
Although Maliki's coalition was the clear winner in these
elections, the subsequent efforts to form provincial
administrations demonstrated that he still needs to bargain
with rival factions, including that of the radical young Shiite
cleric, Moqtuda Al Sadr, who is studying Islamic theology in
Iran with the intention of trying to improve his standing in
the clerical hierarchy.
Possibly as a result of his strength in position, Maliki is
seen by rivals as increasingly authoritarian. He is widely
assessed by United States and Iraqi experts as attempting to
gain control of the security services and build new security
organs loyal to him personally rather than to institutions.
Some have accused him of purging security officials he
perceived as insufficiently loyal.
He has also reportedly been using security forces to
politically intimidate opponents, including in Diyala Province,
for example. Four thousand Special Operations Commandos, part
of the Iraqi Security Forces, the official forces of Iraq,
report to Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief and not to
the Defense or Interior Ministries. Some of Maliki's opponents
and critics say these political tactics mimic the steps taken
by Saddam Hussein when he was rising to power to centralize his
rule.
Maliki has also used the U.S.-Iraq agreement for his own
political interest to some extent. Contributing toward the
perception of him as a strong leader was his insistence on
certain concessions from the United States in the negotiations
on the security agreement. First and foremost was his demand
that the agreement include a firm timetable for the United
States to withdraw from Iraq. That was included in the security
agreement, and President Obama has delineated a draw down plan
that comports with the agreement.
There is a specific stipulation in the security agreement
which Maliki had wanted that by June 30 of this year the United
States would withdraw forces from Iraq's cities. U.S. military
leaders had advised Maliki that there are certain areas of
Iraq, particularly Mosul in the north and Sadr City, the Sadris
neighborhood of Baghdad, a very large neighborhood, where U.S.
forces should remain beyond June 30.
Maliki refused and disagreed with that, and the U.S., in
order to fulfill its commitments under the security agreement,
agreed to pull U.S. forces out of Mosul and Sadr City by June
30, and that was accomplished. There was also a demand
purportedly urged by the Iranians in the security agreement
that there is a provision that facilities in Iraq cannot be
used by the United States to attack other countries,
particularly Iran, and that was a demand that was included also
in the security agreement.
On the other hand, Maliki's political position is not
unassailable, and it is argued that he might sink or swim with
perceptions of changing security situations. His position could
potentially weaken, even dramatically, if the security
situation deteriorates, and there was some thinking that he was
very much embarrassed by major bombings on August 19 which
killed about a hundred Iraqis and severely damaged the Finance
and Foreign Ministries.
Because Maliki still is politically strong, there are
various coalitions that are forming to try to best him in the
January 16, 2010, national elections for a new Parliament, and
of course the Parliament determines the next government. Maliki
would like to continue as Prime Minister after those elections.
A major development came just a few weeks ago when an Iraq
National Alliance formed, which is a coalition of some former
allies of Maliki, particularly the Supreme Council, the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq, a fairly pro Iranian party; the
Sadrist Movement; Fadilah Party, which is a small Shia Party
mainly in Basra; and allies of Ahmad Chalabi Iraq National
Congress. Ahmad Chalabi was part of the new coalition, as well
as former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, who was from the
same party from Maliki, but Maliki ousted him as Da'wa leader
and now Jafari wants to get him back, so to speak.
So these various coalitions are forming, and some question
why former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, who will be part of
the briefing after this hearing, did not join the new alliance.
He has been generally a critic of Maliki and has even been
mentioned over the past few years as agitating to replace
Maliki, but because of Allawi's rivalry with Ahmad Chalabi many
experts attribute that to the fact that Allawi is not part of
this new coalition.
Maliki is negotiating with a lot of different parties to
get his own block to countervail against this new block that
has formed. One person he is allegedly purportedly talking to
is Saleh Mutlaq, who is going to be part of the briefing after
this hearing, other Sunnis. And some would say this is a
positive because now we have Shias allying with Sunnis in some
cases. That was not the case during the civil war period, 2006-
2007, so we now have cross-sectarian alliances forming.
The main problem I think in Iraqi politics is the Arab-
Kurdish dispute that is not getting any better. There have been
some near clashes up in the north. A very, very pro era party
won the provincial elections in the north and would like to
push the Kurds out of disputed villages in Nineveh Province.
Mosul is the capital of Nineveh. That is a huge problem.
General Odierno has now recommended a plan to have some
confidence building measures involving U.S. force.
Just to start concluding, the security agreement gives
Maliki the opportunity to burnish his Iraqi debt, nationalist
credentials. By allowing a Cabinet vote on the referendum he
shows that he is taking other views into account. It is likely,
however, the Maliki--he signed the agreement. It is unlikely I
think that he will try to agitate either for a referendum
necessarily or, if there is a referendum, for it to be voted
down since Maliki did sign onto it and he is to some extent co-
opted by it.
It is unlikely he would agitate to vote down the
referendum. If the referendum is held and voted down, U.S.
troops might be required to withdraw by January 2011 rather
than the December 2011 under the existing security agreement,
and President Obama's draw down plan meets that timeframe.
I would just conclude by saying the Iraq-Kuwait issue is a
major issue. Obviously Kuwait wants all its reparations funds.
The main claims that they are still owed are for the damage to
the oil fields that was done by Saddam's invasion. Iraq wants
to stop paying this compensation, the reparations that cost
Iraq $660 million from January to June of this year, so it is
about $110 million per month that Iraq is paying for this
compensation. Iraq views that as funds that could be used
better for economic development. Kuwait of course wants full
reparations.
I would say President Obama, in his meeting with Maliki on
July 22, made a clear statement supporting the Iraqi position
saying the Iraqi people should not be held to account for what
Saddam did, but the Kuwaitis so far are not backing down, and
this is an irritant in Iraq-Kuwait relations.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]
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Mr. Delahunt. Well, thank you.
Steve Rademaker. Steve?
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, ESQ., SENIOR COUNSEL, BGR
GROUP (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION)
Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rohrabacher,
members of the subcommittee, it is a great pleasure for me to
testify today before you on the continued application to Iraq
of United Nations mandates imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of
the U.N. charter.
I did want to note at the outset for the record that I am a
registered lobbyist for the Kurdistan Regional Government of
Iraq. I believe, however, that I was not invited to appear here
today as a spokesman for the Kurdistan Regional Government, but
rather in my personal capacity, so anything that I say today
will represent my own personal views and not necessarily those
of the Kurdistan Regional Government or anyone else.
As you know, I was a late addition to this panel, and
therefore I have not studied this issue to the same degree as
my distinguished co-panelists. I do, however, share the view
that, as a general proposition, the struggling democracy that
is today's Iraq should, to the maximum extent possible, be
treated as a normal, sovereign nation.
Restrictions that were imposed by the international
community on Saddam Hussein's regime need to be reassessed in
the vastly improved situation that prevails today. I therefore
support the Bush administration's undertaking in Article 25 of
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement to use its best efforts to
help Iraq take the steps necessary to regain its previous
international legal standing.
I believe that the main contribution I can make to today's
hearing is to share with the members of the subcommittee my own
experience as an official of the Bush administration in seeking
to free Iraq from one of the Chapter VII mandates that remained
in place even after the removal of Saddam Hussein.
From 2005 to 2006, I represented the United States as a
member of the College of Commissioners of the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which was
known as UNMOVIC. This Commission was established in 1999 as
the successor to a similar U.N. entity, the United Nations
Special Commission, or UNSCOM, that was established by the
Security Council upon the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf
War in 1991. Both entities were charged, along with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, with inspecting and
dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long range
missile programs.
I think the key point to bear in mind is that UNMOVIC was
financed using Iraqi funds, funds which were held in the U.N.
maintained Oil for Food Program account. This meant that
UNMOVIC operated at no cost to the United Nations and therefore
there was no natural constraint on the size of its budget or
staff. During my time as an UNMOVIC Commissioner, the
organization's budget was in excess of $10 million per year,
which was substantially less than in previous years, but still
a lot of money for an organization that had no real work left
to do.
Shortly after I was appointed as a Commissioner for UNMOVIC
I came to the conclusion that UNMOVIC was no longer necessary
and should be abolished, and I spent the remainder of my time
on the College of Commissioners seeking to build a consensus in
favor of eliminating the organization. I have to tell you,
though, that this proved to be very challenging, and I quickly
discovered that there were a number of competing agendas at
work, and because no country other than Iraq was paying for
UNMOVIC, there was almost no pressure to restrain those
agendas.
One such agenda was that of the management and staff of
UNMOVIC. To be blunt, this was a collection of people who had
very good paying jobs that they wanted to keep, and as a result
they spent a great deal of time coming up with rationales for
preserving the existence of the organization. They were very
good at identifying unfinished tasks that they proposed to
finish, both inside of Iraq and outside of Iraq.
They also were very quick to propose new missions for the
organization, missions in most cases completely unrelated to
Iraq. At various times they proposed that UNMOVIC could become
a U.N. inspections mechanism for Iran. They proposed that it
could become a standby weapons of mass destruction inspection
mechanism attached to the U.N. Secretariat to be deployed on
short notice anywhere in the world where it might be needed.
At one point they suggested that they should become an
inspections mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. At
another point they suggested that they could take over
responsibility for running Iraq's export control system, which
was something that Iraq and all countries were required under
U.N. Resolution 1540 to establish.
I suppose it is not surprising that the employees of the
organization would have as an agenda preserving their jobs, but
I was surprised to discover that there was a lot of sympathy
for this among some of my fellow Commissioners. The rationale
or the explanation that my fellow Commissioners would provide
varied. In the case of a number of the Commissioners from less
developed countries, I think the bottom line was that they were
eager to ensure the nationals from their countries who had jobs
at UNMOVIC were able to keep their jobs. It was that simple.
Beyond this, there were Commissioners from a number of G8
countries--in other words, large industrialized countries,
allies of the United States--who were ideologically committed
to the idea that the United Nations should have some sort of
weapons of mass destruction inspections capability.
And since UNMOVIC afforded that capability, they were
reflectively attached to the notion that UNMOVIC should be kept
in business and used in the future however it might be
convenient for the U.N. Frankly, for them the rationale made no
difference. They just favored the preservation of UNMOVIC even
if in the near term it had nothing to do.
Then there was Russia. Russia had a very different agenda.
It was determined, as best I would tell, to use UNMOVIC to
underscore that the Bush administration had invaded Iraq on the
basis of faulty intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass
destructions programs, so Russia took the position that it
could only agree to abolish UNMOVIC if the organization were
given about a year to write a final report on Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction programs.
And in their conception, this report was to be essentially
a U.N. review of the so-called Duelfer Report, which was a U.S.
Government-sponsored report on Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction, and the Russians insisted that the UNMOVIC
inspectors be given access to all the information that the
Duelfer Commission had had access to as they prepared their
review of the Duelfer Report.
To me it was remarkable that none of these agendas had
anything to do with the best interests of the Iraqi people, and
very few of the agendas had any serious relationship to
UNMOVIC's original mandate, which was to identify and dismantle
weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq. I was not able
during my time as a Commissioner to make much headway against
these agendas.
Fortunately, after I left the College, after I left the
State Department, I was succeeded by two very able public
servants, Frank Record and then Robert Witajewski, both of whom
shared my commitment to abolishing UNMOVIC. Mr. Record should
be well known to many in this room because, like me, he spent
much of his career on the professional staff of this committee.
Mr. Witajewski is a now retired career Foreign Service Officer
who distinguished himself in this and many other endeavors over
a period of more than two decades at the State Department.
Messrs. Record and Witajewski continued to pursue the
abolition of UNMOVIC during their service on the College of
Commissioners, and with the passage of time they encountered
less resistance to the idea. The United Kingdom and France
eventually joined them in providing leadership on this issue,
and eventually even Russia came around.
Once consensus was achieved among the P5 members of the
U.N. Security Council it became possible for the Security
Council to act to abolish UNMOVIC, and that finally happened in
June 2007 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution
1762.
The main lesson I would draw from this experience for the
remaining Chapter VII mandates that we are discussing today is
that we need to look or we need to expect institutional
resistance to change in these mandates, and we should look
skeptically at rationalizations that may be offered for
continuing to treat Iraq differently than other countries.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks, and I
stand prepared to respond to any questions you or the other
members may have. Thank you.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Rademaker.
I also want to note the presence of our colleague from
Minnesota, Keith Ellison, an individual with great interest in
issues involving the Middle East and obviously clearly what is
transpiring in Iraq.
I want to thank you, Mr. Matheson, for really enumerating
what are the outstanding issues, the outstanding items, if you
will, that still fall under the Chapter VII mandate. From your
vantage point--and this is to everybody on the panel. Let me
begin with you. What kind of progress is being made in terms of
the discussions and the negotiations that are going on? Would
you give it a satisfactory?
Obviously we are going to have an opportunity to hear from
two distinguished parliamentarians from Iraq, but in terms of
the process itself what is the current status? What are the
most difficult issues, the most thorny issues, and is there a
timeframe which is reasonable to assume that most of
particularly the more difficult issues can be resolved?
Mr. Matheson. Well, I think it varies depending upon which
area you are talking about. There are some areas in which the
outstanding issues seem to be technical in question--for
example, in the accounting for deposits into this development
fund and the Iraqi accounting controls and so on--which
hopefully might be resolved simply by a greater, more
concentrated effort by Iraqis and others to resolve the
technical questions.
Some involve more substantial interests; for example, the
compensation question issue, which obviously is a question of
whether the burden of these unpaid claims will lay upon the new
Iraq regime or will be borne by Kuwait. They are hopeful Iraq
and Kuwait could negotiate a resolution of that, but obviously
that involves some serious substantive interests on both sides.
Mr. Delahunt. Are those discussions ongoing?
Mr. Matheson. Well, the Secretary General's report suggests
that there have been discussions and it expresses some kind of
very guarded optimism about the possibilities, but I don't know
whether to endorse that.
Mr. Delahunt. Ken Katzman, do you have knowledge of the
discussions and how they are proceeding?
Mr. Katzman. Well, the report that is referenced, there is
a tantalizing statement in that report about a possible
compromise under which Iraq would not any longer be paying
compensation, but the monies--instead of being compensation, it
would be an Iraqi investment in Kuwait instead of paying money
into this reparations fund.
The same money would go, but it would be an investment that
Iraq could eventually earn a profit on, and Iraq would still
have equity.
Mr. Delahunt. Again, and I know negotiations obviously are
not necessarily transparent, nor should they be, but is anyone
on the panel aware of the American or the U.S. involvement in
terms of encouraging those negotiations?
Mr. Katzman. Well, I would just add the Emir of Kuwait was
here a few weeks ago, and this wasn't reflected in the official
communique. It was a very brief communique after his meeting
with President Obama, but in my discussions around town clearly
this was discussed.
Some compromises along these lines of investment, reducing
the compensation amount, the percentage. These are all under
active discussion is my understanding.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, I think we can welcome that discussions
are going on and there appears to be significant or some
American involvement because clearly according to the bilateral
agreement we do have that obligation to assist Iraq and help
the parties reach an agreement.
I would like to go for a moment to the referendum issue,
and clearly it would appear whether there is a referendum has
not been decided by the Council of Representatives. And I think
it was you, Dr. Katzman, who indicated that that probably will
not be decided until things sort out politically in terms of
the forthcoming election.
Would the referendum and the elections in January be held
simultaneously?
Mr. Katzman. That is what the Iraqi Cabinet has decided.
Now it is for the Parliament to decide whether to endorse that
or not have a referendum at all or have it some different time.
Mr. Delahunt. I think what is fascinating is I hear you
describe the shifting alliances. It is beginning to sound like
a democracy, particularly when coalitions that are
nonsectarian-based are coming together for obviously their own
self-interest, but I daresay that that is a much more
preferable situation and something that might be familiar here
in this particular institution as well.
As I said earlier in my own remarks, and let me just throw
this at you. I think it is really important for the United
States not only to assist in terms of meeting its obligations
under the bilateral agreement, but to continue to stay engaged.
I think it is clear that the elections that will be held in
January are of critical importance in terms of what occurs not
only in Iraq subsequently, but in the entire region.
Let me pose to all of you, and this is not directly on
issue, but the possibility of the United Nations with American
support, with United States support, a substantial monitoring
presence and effort in terms of those elections to reassure the
Iraqi people of the integrity of the electoral process.
Clearly what has occurred in Afghanistan is profoundly
disturbing and is potentially destabilizing in Afghanistan. I
had a conversation in fact yesterday--he is not here now--with
our colleague and friend from Indiana, Mr. Burton, and I
haven't had a chance yet to talk to Mr. Rohrabacher, about the
United States and this Congress pressing the administration and
the United States to provide for a substantial presence to
provide for security in terms of the electoral process as it
develops and hopefully culminates in a free and fair and fully
engaged citizenry going to the polls in January.
You know, I think that is something that we should do. I
have discussed with Mr. Burton, and I will obviously with Mr.
Rohrabacher, sending a letter to the administration to that
effect and conveying to the appropriate United Nations
officials how significant that is. Care to comment, Ken
Katzman?
Mr. Katzman. I would just comment that General Odierno's
draw down plan envisions--well, President Obama's plan is to
draw down to approximately 50,000 United States forces by
August next year. There are right now approximately 120,000
United States forces in Iraq.
The current understanding is the U.S. will stay roughly at
that level until the election, so there will be about 120,000
U.S. forces----
Mr. Delahunt. What do you think about deploying them----
Mr. Katzman [continuing]. And withdraw the 70,000 right
after the election.
Mr. Delahunt. What about deploying those forces to ensure
the security of polling places and hopefully enhancing, if you
will, the confidence of the Iraqi people in the integrity of
those elections?
Mr. Katzman. Yes. The U.S. military I don't believe is----
Mr. Delahunt. I don't believe we have that authority under
the bilateral agreement.
Mr. Katzman. The agreement. Well, in previous elections the
Iraqis were in the front line on security for elections with
the United States available if there were a problem.
Under the United States-Iraq pact there is not an exception
for the elections for the United States to redeploy into the
Iraqi cities, so I suspect it will be roughly the same where
the United States is sort of over the horizon, but available if
a problem occurs.
Mr. Delahunt. But again I think my own sense is that there
is so much riding on these particular elections, at least from
my perspective, particularly given what we observed occurring
in Afghanistan where the election results are very much in
doubt.
Maybe pressing both our own administration, as well as the
Maliki government, to ensure that there is a more fully engaged
and visible presence of American military in a backup role
obviously respecting the sovereignty of Iraq because what I see
occurring is if there is not an election that has the
confidence of the Iraqi people there is the potential for
deterioration in terms of what clearly is a very fragile
situation.
While elections certainly are not the essence, if you will,
of democracy, you have to have them to get to the point where
you have institutions that are viable and mature. Any comment?
[No response.]
Mr. Delahunt. None? Seeing that, I am going to recognize my
friend from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
again thank you for calling this hearing.
Again, let me note that you were one of the first Members
of Congress to focus on these types of agreements, the Status
of Forces Agreement, and to draw the attention of the Congress
to the importance of what was being done, those treaties and
agreements that were being made during the last administration.
I also congratulate our panel. I thought Mr. Matheson gave
us a very good understanding of the outstanding issues and Mr.
Katzman, of course, gave us what he always does when he
testifies, a very I would say detailed account of where we
stand at the moment and how the political issues stand in Iraq
and how they affect these outstanding issues.
Of course, Mr. Rademaker, let me just note that your
testimony was very enlightening because it gives us an insight
into some of the unseen challenges that we must overcome in
order to solve and to deal with the outstanding issues, so all
in all this panel really was a top notch panel. Thank you all
for participating.
A couple of specific questions and points. Let me just note
in terms of the Iraqi debt to Kuwait, which seems to be one of
these outstanding issues. I think that when we confront the
issue we must understand that Kuwait was a country that was
destroyed--destroyed--by the invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait caused the equivalent of millions of lives
lost in the United States.
If we would have an analogous situation to our population
size and what happened in Kuwait, it would have been the
equivalent of the killing of millions of Americans and the
destruction of all of our major assets, not to mention all the
buildings that were gutted, the treasure that was looted. It
would be the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of POWs that
would have been taken from the United States and murdered while
in captivity.
I think there is a totally legitimate debt that is owed to
the people of Kuwait, and we should not in our efforts to try
to just close the loop and bring an end to loose ends and to
tie everything together and then move on. We must not do that
at the expense of a very honest and legitimate debt that is
owed to the people of Kuwait. They suffered tremendously and
needlessly. We have visited, those of us who visited that, and
saw the destruction. We are talking about wealth and part of a
compensation.
Let us just put it this way. When the Iraqi troops withdrew
the destruction of the amount of oil that was burned and
destroyed and infrastructure that was destroyed was just an
overwhelming percentage of their national economy, so let us
not discount that.
I don't know. Perhaps maybe the solution lies not in having
the Iraqis now in vest in projects in Kuwait from which the
Iraqis would eventually profit. Maybe the opposite should be
looked at.
Maybe we should look at a situation where the Kuwaitis
agree that the money that they are being repaid could be spent
in Iraq, and then the compensation, then the profit eventually
would go to the Kuwaitis while at the same time building Iraqi
infrastructure. Maybe that is the solution rather than just
suggesting that we in some way diminish the amount of
compensation the Kuwaiti people will receive for what they
suffered.
I think it is philosophical, and let me just ask the panel.
This is not a very detailed philosophical analysis here. When
we look at a debt like this we have a people, Iraq. The people
of Iraq were not in control of their government. This was not a
democratic government that planned this invasion.
How much morally and legally do the people of one country
have when they are controlled by a dictatorship that commits
them to certain actions that end up causing this type of
destruction? Is that a moral obligation and a legal obligation
of one people to repay what their dictatorship has brought upon
them, even though if it had been a democracy at the time Iraq
probably would not have invaded Kuwait?
Mr. Matheson. Well, I think the legal answer is
straightforward. Yes, Iraq is still liable for those amounts of
damage, particularly since the Security Council under Chapter
VII ruled it so.
But that doesn't answer all your questions. Obviously both
sides have equities here. The new Iraqi Government and the
Iraqi people have a certain legitimacy in saying why should we
be held responsible for Saddam's sins. On the other hand, as
you point out, the Kuwaiti people were not responsible for that
either, so should they bear the burden?
In the long run, I think probably there is a need for some
kind of pragmatic solution for this. As a matter of fact, if
the current situation goes on it would take 15 or 20 years for
these amounts to be repaid in any event. So Kuwait has an
interest in a long-term satisfactory relationship with Iraq. So
does Iraq with Kuwait. So logically there should be some kind
of a mutual accommodation.
What you just suggested, as I understand it, is a specific
thing which has been under consideration and that might be
reasonable, but we are talking about $24 billion, which even
today is not a small amount, so obviously this is a matter that
has to be negotiated out with some kind of mutual understanding
and pragmatic attitude.
Mr. Katzman. Just briefly, I think one of the
considerations that some of the international partners are
looking at is some Iraqis are getting resentful of the
compensation process, and this goes back even to Saddam's
invasion of Kuwait. There is a lot of resentment between Iraq
and Kuwait.
A lot of Iraqis view Kuwait as wealthy and sort of getting
very wealthy without a lot of work, needing to work hard, and
there is this resentment. I think what some international
partners want to try to do is avoid a situation where the
Iraqis feel they are sort of continuing to get a bill for
Kuwait's wealth.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let us note this. That is a good
point, and that is a good understanding of the sentiments in
Iraq toward this, but let us note the rebuilding of Kuwait was
not an easy matter.
The Kuwaitis, their country was devastated and destroyed.
Rebuilding that infrastructure took an enormous amount of
effort and money to rebuild in Kuwait. Now, they are rich now
because they went through that process.
I could understand where people would just look at the
situation as it is now, but let us not forget that struggle of
rebuilding that country. That would be the equivalent of people
who would come into our major cities and destroy all of our
major cities, et cetera.
Mr. Rademaker, your thoughts on that point?
Mr. Rademaker. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Just a few
thoughts.
I agree with what my co-panelists have said. I think there
is no question under international law about the responsibility
of Iraq for the damage that was inflicted on the Government and
people of Kuwait. I think there may be a question, though, that
should be asked about the timing for payment of that debt.
I think we should all be mindful, and I think the Kuwaitis
should be mindful, of what may be an analogy earlier in the
last century. You know, the historical judgment is that one of
the prime contributors to Hitler's rise to power in Germany was
the insistence of France in particular on the repayment of
onerous war reparations that basically crippled the German
economy and created a situation where someone like Adolf Hitler
could come to power. I don't think it would be in Kuwait's
interest or anyone else's interest for the payment of these
reparations to be so onerous that a similar situation might be
created in Iraq.
Let me point out a further analogy involving Germany, which
is that to this very day 60 years--more than 60 years--after
the end of World War II Germany is still paying reparations to
the state of Israel basically because of Nazi Germany's
treatment of the Jewish people. Again, it is similar to Saddam
Hussein in the sense that it was not exactly a democratic
decision in Germany to launch the Holocaust--it was a decision
made by a dictatorship--but now, 60 years later, Germany is
still in the business of paying reparations.
Let me just make one further comment, a personal reaction I
have to this whole issue, though, and that is to point out that
to the extent it is claimed that this is an issue of Iraq's
ability to develop itself, a constraint on the resources
available to the Iraqi Government, and a complaint that in the
past year they lost $600 million that was basically revenue
from oil exports that otherwise would have been available to
them to develop their economy, yes, they lost $600 million.
On the other hand, they lost billions--probably tens of
billions--of dollars in oil revenue that they would have
generated had they taken some pretty obvious steps to get their
house in order, to attract foreign investment into their oil
industry.
You know, to the extent there is a complaint that Iraq
needs more money and shouldn't have to pay these reparations,
there are some things they could do such as passing an oil law
to make it possible for them to generate a lot more money than
they are losing in making reparations.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you for that point, and let us note
that as we analyze what is not only moral, but practical--
legal, moral and practical--in terms of how to go about
analyzing what we do with the debt and the policies, the
economic policies there, let us note that I believe it is 3
trillion barrels of oil in reserve in Iraq.
Three trillion. I think that is the figure. Mr. Katzman, is
that what I have heard?
Mr. Katzman. I have to check, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is not near that?
Mr. Katzman. That is high.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is high? That was in testimony that
was given to us I think in the full committee. Was it here or
was it the full committee? I remember that testimony at 3
trillion.
Let us say it is 2 trillion barrels worth of oil. Whatever
their reserves are, it is overwhelming. It is huge. It is one
of the countries with a small population that has one of the
biggest oil reserves in the world, whatever exactly what it is.
So let us note that I think Iraq has the second largest oil
reserves in the world, whatever that number is, and that is
trillions of dollars one way or the other. So we need to keep
that in mind, and I think the point Mr. Rademaker makes is
that, yes, even though some of the timing of repaying some of
these debts or dealing with the outstanding issues that are
left might be costly, this is a society if they do what is
right they will be able to meet that challenge.
One last area, Mr. Chairman, of questions I would like to
ask Mr. Rademaker about that, and maybe the panel could come in
as well. Where does it stand? Where do we stand? We know Mr.
Rademaker is representing the Kurdish Regional Government, so
let us put that in perspective.
I personally believe that the Kurds have demonstrated a
certain friendship toward the United States that has not been
demonstrated by other people in Iraq, and we have repaid that
friendship and loyalty while our troops were there by not
having a consulate. We don't even have a consulate in Erbil, in
the Kurdish regional area, when 12 other countries do.
What do you see, and then I will ask the panel what they
see, as the leftover situation that we have to deal with and
will it be dealt with in terms of allowing the Kurds to be able
to understand that they will have some modicum of security once
our troops leave?
If you could just have a couple minutes on each one. I
don't want to prolong it here.
Mr. Rademaker. I think, Mr. Rohrabacher, you were initially
directing that question to me, and let me just respond briefly
because I think Mr. Katzman probably can give us the most
authoritative blow-by-blow description of the situation, but I
do think there is general recognition that one of the biggest
challenges facing the United States during its remaining time
in Iraq is to prevent conflict between the Kurdish people in
Northern Iraq and the rest of the country.
General Odierno and the other U.S. commanders are very much
focused on that problem. That is at the security level. I think
there are also things at the diplomatic level that Ambassador
Hill is committed to trying to work on in order to improve that
relationship and hopefully lay the ground for peaceful, stable
relations within Iraq after the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. A one word answer. Are you optimistic or
pessimistic that we are going to be able to come to a situation
where that challenge is met?
Mr. Rademaker. I think the jury is still out, and I guess I
am concerned.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Mr. Matheson?
Mr. Matheson. I would defer to Mr. Katzman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Katzman?
Mr. Katzman. I would say the evidence would suggest
pessimism on this issue.
Now, the United Nations assistance mission in Iraq
circulated in July a compromise plan on how to resolve the main
issue is the territorial issue. The Kurds believe there are
certain sections of Northern Iraq that are under the Central
Government that should be part of their Kurdish Regional
Government, and this has been the core of the dispute.
The U.N. is trying to have a compromise. They have
circulated a plan. The various parties have said they will use
it as a base to start from, but it really has not jump started
any real serious compromise.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we need to change something in the
status quo in order to have a more optimistic assessment that
we have a chance to succeed here, so we need some changes in
the reality area.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panel.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Let me go to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana, the
ranking member, senior Republican on the committee dealing with
the Middle East.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to sit
in here. I appreciate that.
I think the only questions that I have dealt with the--and
I am not sure you are the ones I ought to be talking to.
Perhaps we should be discussing this at the briefing that is
going to follow, but I would like to get your views as experts
on the long-term stability of Iraq, especially in view of the
fact that Iran is next door and they are still involved in some
of the nefarious activities over there and whether or not Iraq
is going to be able to, with its own military and its own peace
force, defend the new democracy that they have there.
There have been a number of people with whom I have talked
who have some serious reservations and doubts about whether or
not Iraq will be able to survive if we pull out by I think--
when is it--next June and whether or not we ought to adjust
that timetable, although Mr. Maliki I understand is pretty firm
in his desire to have us leave by that time.
So I would just like to get your assessment of that if you
think you are qualified to make that assessment. I know it is a
prognostication, but I would just like to know what you have to
say.
Mr. Katzman. Yes. Thank you. I will start off on that.
According to the U.S. military and the U.S. State Department,
Iran has lost some influence in the past year. Most pro Iranian
parties did not do well in the January 2009 provincial
elections, and the Shia militias in the south that Iran was
supporting have been diminished by Iraqi military operations
and a general sort of rejection of the population of Iraq to
armed factions operating outside of government control.
However, counterbalancing that, the leading parties in the
Iraqi Government structure are pro Iranian parties, and they
were started by the same ideology really that spawned the
Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile in
Najaf, Iraq, in the 1960s, and a lot of his ideology about
Islamic government, Shiite Islamic government, are the ideology
basically of the ruling parties of Iraq right now, so there is
a very close symbiotic relationship between the Iraqi
Government and the Iranian Government at this point.
Mr. Burton. Do you think that because they have that
relationship there is a danger that that whole area could be
controlled by more radical elements down the road?
Mr. Katzman. Well, anything is possible, but what we are
seeing, what we have seen recently, is there is an Iraqi
nationalism, and the Iraqi public, even the Shias in the south,
do not want to be told what to do by Iran or dictated to or
have their affairs controlled by Iran, so I think that gives
some reason for hope that Iran will not sort of take over Iraq,
if that is the implication.
But still, you know, Maliki is doing a lot of things Iran
would like to see. That doesn't mean Iran is telling him to do
it and he answers, but the two think alike on many issues.
Absolutely.
Mr. Burton. Any other comments?
[No response.]
Mr. Burton. If not, Mr. Chairman, what I will do is wait
until we have the briefing and talk to them about it as well.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
The distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe?
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I direct my questions
first to Mr. Katzman, and the rest of you can chime in if you
wish. I want to zero in on Camp Ashraf.
I want to know what the Iranians really want to do with
those folks in Camp Ashraf. What are their long-range
intentions and what is the United States first doing about it,
and, second, under the Geneva Convention how does the rest of
the world view that situation? I personally am concerned about
what happens to them based upon the fact of what has already
happened to them.
Dr. Katzman, if you would address that issue I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Katzman. Well, the Ashraf situation is obviously a very
difficult situation because the population of Ashraf were
basically invited in by Saddam Hussein.
There was a certain alignment with Saddam Hussein against
Iran at the time, and then the United States overthrew Saddam
Hussein and now the Government of Iraq is not aligned with this
group that is in Ashraf and is more aligned with the Government
of Iran, so Maliki and the Government of Iran see eye-to-eye
really that the population of Ashraf needs to go elsewhere.
Now, that said, Iraq has agreed under our agreement and
under international law to certain stipulations under
international law that there are limits to what the Iraqi
Government can do about the Ashraf situation. They cannot just
simply send them back to Iran. There is a process to try to
find other places for members of the Ashraf to go.
Mr. Poe. Well, why send them to other places? Why can't
they stay in Camp Ashraf?
Mr. Katzman. Well, Iraq is now a sovereign country, and the
view is that the Iraqi Government has a right to decide whether
this group can stay or not stay.
Mr. Poe. And so what is your opinion? Do you think the
Iraqi Government will move them to a place where the current
Government of Iran will have influence over the camp? I mean,
if you were a resident of Camp Ashraf, what do you think is
going to happen to you?
Mr. Katzman. If I were a resident of Camp Ashraf I would be
one pretty nervous person, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. Okay. So what are we doing to make sure that--I
mean, other than saying the Iraqi Government has agreed under
international law and they have told us they are going to be
good guys and treat the Iranians in Camp Ashraf nicely, how do
we see this playing out? Tell me how this is going to play out.
I understand the politics over the years has changed, but
what do you think is going to happen to these folks?
Mr. Katzman. It is very difficult to say. You know, again
at CRS we don't really opine on one way or the other, but if
indeed the United States completes a draw down at 2011,
December 2011, then the Iraqi Government could take various
decisions. Presumably the Iraqi Government is going to meet its
obligations that it has pledged to.
Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Poe. Certainly.
Mr. Delahunt. Iraq is a signatory presumably to the
Convention Against Torture, and dealing with those particular
provisions if there is reason to believe or it is more likely
that sending an individual to a country, even if it is a
country of home origin, where there is a more than likely
chance of torture or inhumane and degrading treatment, wouldn't
the Convention, the treaty, obligate the Iraqi Government to
find another nation that would receive those that express
concern? Am I correct in that statement, Mr. Katzman?
Mr. Katzman. Yes.
Mr. Delahunt. So I think that by international treaty are
we going to accept the assurances put forth by the Iraqi
Government? In many respects that is why the elections, and I
want to get back to that, are so critical in terms of their
integrity, and I am sure these are issues that will be debated
in this nascent democracy.
In fact, we are having a similar problem in terms of
relocating detainees that have been cleared for release from
Guantanamo. I am sure some of you are aware that Mr.
Rohrabacher and I have had a number of hearings on 22 Chinese
Muslims from Northwestern China who are Uighurs and where
because of our obligations under the Convention Against Torture
and given the history of the Chinese Communist Government vis-
a-vis the Uighurs we find ourselves in a position where we
cannot legally by virtue of that treaty and I would suggest
morally return them to Communist China where there is a
likelihood that they would be tortured and even maybe killed.
So these are tough issues that have to be worked out.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, Dr. Katzman, if you were a resident at Ashraf you would
be nervous about your future. What is your opinion of not the
Iraqi Government, but the Iraqi people's kind of sense about
Camp Ashraf? Can you kind of give me something what the people
are thinking?
Mr. Katzman. I would say basically the Shiite Muslims are
probably almost certainly more opposed to the Ashraf staying
there, and Sunni Arabs are considered somewhat more welcoming
and less inclined to try to ask them to leave.
Mr. Poe. All right. Either one of the other two witnesses
want to weigh in on that?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the gentleman yield for a moment?
Mr. Poe. Of course.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Seeing that we do have someone who is
representing the Kurdish Regional Government here on our panel,
might I suggest that one alternative that perhaps hasn't been
examined is the possibility of moving Camp Ashraf into the
Kurdish regional area rather than where it is and that might be
acceptable as compared to leaving them where they are at or
repatriating them to Iran?
Just a thought. The regional government might think about
that and perhaps make an offer in that regard.
Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Rohrabacher, this is the first time I
have heard such a suggestion. I will pass it on to others who
might be interested.
It is true that the Kurdish region has served as something
of a refuge for other groups in Iraq that have worried for
their safety in the southern regions of the country. I think
there is a practical dimension here with Camp Ashraf, which is
that whoever finds themselves with these people in their midst
will probably have a serious diplomatic problem with Iran, and
I think that is true for the government in Baghdad today, and
it would be true of any government that----
Mr. Rohrabacher. It may be easier. The Shiite population of
the Kurdish regional area is what?
Mr. Rademaker. I can't give you the exact percentages. It
is relatively small.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Katzman, would you like to comment on that?
Mr. Katzman. Sir, the Kurds blame the Ashraf residents for
cooperation in Saddam's repression of the Kurds after the 1991
war when there was a Kurdish uprising. They blame the group for
helping Saddam put down the Kurdish uprising, so I would say
the chances of them accepting that are very, very slim to none.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you for putting that in a
historical perspective.
Mr. Poe. Reclaiming my time, I do yield back to the
chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, I thank the gentleman for that rather
interesting discussion.
Let me thank the panel for their testimony. It was, as
always, informative. The formal hearing of today's proceedings
has ended, but we are not finished because shortly we will
welcome and are honored to have with us two of our fellow
legislators from the Iraqi Parliament known as the Council of
Representatives, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and Saleh al
Mutlaq, the leader of the National Dialogue Front.
So we will recess for 3 or 4 minutes and then reconvene for
the briefing.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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