[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-65]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES' OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
FUNDING
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 20, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROB BISHOP, Utah
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GLENN NYE, Virginia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Megan Putnam, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, May 20, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for the Military Services'
Operation and Maintenance Funding.............................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, May 20, 2009.......................................... 35
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE MILITARY SERVICES' OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Readiness Subcommittee................................. 2
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 1
WITNESSES
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 8
Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.... 4
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 7
Walsh, Adm. Patrick M., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Amos, Gen. James F........................................... 104
Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W...................................... 43
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 41
Fraser, Gen. William M., III................................. 86
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P........................................ 39
Walsh, Adm. Patrick M........................................ 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Chief of Naval Operations memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense, dated May 14, 2009, detailing Navy's Fiscal Year
2010 (FY10) Unfunded Program List.......................... 123
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Fallin................................................... 128
Mr. Forbes................................................... 127
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 128
Mr. Rogers................................................... 128
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 127
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 135
Ms. Giffords................................................. 137
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 131
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE MILITARY SERVICES' OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 20, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. The subcommittee will come to order, but before
we move any further I would like to recognize my good friend
from the great state of Georgia for an introduction. He was so
impressed that he said, ``I have got to do it this morning.''
Marshall, go ahead.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have with us members of the German Bundestag. In fact,
they are members of the Defense Committee of the German
Bundestag. And I would like the chairlady of the Defense
Committee to rise, Mrs. Merten.
[Applause.]
Mr. Marshall. We all know that Germany is a very, very
important ally of ours on a number of different fronts, and
certainly military is one. And to the extent that we can
increase our coordination development with our sister country,
we are interested in doing that. And we appreciate you visiting
with us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
And welcome. And if anything gets out of order, call Mr.
Marshall.
Today the Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear testimony on
the military services' fiscal year 2010 operation and
maintenance (O&M) budget request. I want to thank our
distinguished witnesses from each of the military services for
appearing before this subcommittee today to discuss funding for
the services' readiness programs.
The operation and maintenance account is the single most
largest component of the Department of Defense (DOD) annual
budget request. The military services' O&M accounts provide
funding for such readiness areas as operating forces,
mobilization, training, and recruiting, and administration and
service-wide activities.
For fiscal year 2010 the O&M portion of the budget request
comprises $185.7 billion, or 35 percent of the Department of
Defense's total $533.8 billion baseline request. The fiscal
year 2010 request increases the O&M account by 3.7 percent, or
$6.6 billion over fiscal year 2009.
However, increases in the defense health account for $3
billion, or nearly half of the overall O&M funding increases in
fiscal year 2010. Additionally, the Department has requested
another $74.1 billion for O&M in overseas contingency
operations (OCO) funding for fiscal year 2010.
O&M is the largest portion of the OCO request, at 57
percent, for military operations, subsistence and logistics,
including predeployment, deployment, and redeployment. The
fiscal year 2010 O&M budget request basically leaves training
at a steady state, signaling that the Department would remain
focused on the counterinsurgency mission vice resourcing full-
spectrum training.
The fiscal year 2010 budget request relies on the OCO
funding to achieve air, ground, and sea training at levels
required to maintain military standards. The fiscal year 2010
budget request decreases tank training miles to 550 from a high
of 608 in the fiscal year 2009 budget request, but keeps them
above the low of 459 in fiscal year 2008.
Flying hours slightly increase for the Navy in the base
budget from 17.2, in fiscal year 2009, to 19.0 in fiscal year
2010, and with the OCO funding climb to 22. The Air Force
flying hour program has been reduced in the fiscal year 2010
base budget by $67 million, but Air Force budget documents
state the budget fully funds the flying hour program at 1.4
million hours due to the retirement of the roughly, about 250
aircraft. Additionally, the Navy will rely upon the OCO funding
to achieve 58 ship steaming days per quarter, compared to a
steady state level of 45 days in the base budget, putting it
above the deployed force goal of 51 days per quarter.
What the subcommittee needs to hear from our witnesses
today is where each of your services is taking risks in the
budget request and how this budget request improves readiness.
And we are very fortunate to have our witnesses today,
distinguished military leaders, General Peter Chiarelli, Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, Vice
Chief of Naval Operations; and General James F. Amos, Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and General William M. Fraser,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
And we want to thank you so much for joining us today. And
now I would like to recognize the distinguished gentleman from
Virginia, the ranking member, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks that
he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
time today for us to examine the budget request from the
services as it pertains to readiness.
I would like to welcome each of our witnesses. And
gentlemen, we first of all thank you all for being here today,
but also thank you for your service to our Nation.
As the chairman mentioned, the operations and maintenance
budget accounts for over a third of the $534 billion defense
budget request. And if you factor in the additional $91 billion
in operations and maintenance requested for the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan, that percentage rises even further.
The amount of funding in this budget request demonstrates
the considerable oversight responsibility this subcommittee
has, particularly when your Federal Government is spending
beyond its means and when our economy is struggling. American
taxpayers expect that every dollar we direct toward defense is
spent in the most effective way to protect the Nation.
But the dollars are not the only component in this budget
request. The strategic risks we accept in this proposal are
equally important because there is no bailout or stimulus that
will help us recover if our Nation is tested in battle and we
discover that we have not provided the equipment, training, or
resources that our men and women in uniform need for victory.
So we need you to help us understand what risks we are
accepting in the proposed budget, particularly this year, when
one, the budget was formulated in an accelerated manner; two,
when the budget proposes major changes to force structure a
year before the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); three, when
the details of the budget were released just a couple of weeks
ago; and four, when we have access to only the first year of
the five-year budget. Your professional input is critical to
understanding the consequences of this budget request.
When Secretary Gates testified last week he said that
everyone who signed the nondisclosure agreement was free of its
restrictions. And he assured us that we could expect candor in
the witnesses that came over and testify on the budget. And we
look forward to a robust dialogue between the witnesses and the
members of this panel today.
What is particularly concerning to me in this year's budget
cycle is this: Over the next few years the Federal budget will
be in desperate and obvious need of savings because of the
current expected cost of the bailout and stimulus packages. And
at a time when adequate defense investment is most vulnerable,
we are receiving less and less information on the status of our
forces and the plans for the future from the new
administration.
We have not yet been given a 30-year shipbuilding plan in
this year's budget even though it is required by law. We have
not been given a naval aviation plan even though that is also
required by law. And we cannot discuss the results of Navy
ships readiness reports even though they were unclassified
through the entire Cold War.
While I understand the Navy's concern that the detailed
information contained in those reports could be useful to those
wishing to do us harm, I can assure you that the American
people would be surprised to know the state of repair of our
surface Navy.
The American people rightfully expect that when it comes to
our national security members of this committee and officials
in the Pentagon will keep them informed of the threats we face
and what we are doing to prepare for those threats. And so it
is our obligation to share with the American people not only
what is in this budget to keep us safe, but what is not in the
budget that presents risks that we are assuming as a Nation.
As my good friend from Texas, the chairman, Mr. Ortiz,
likes to say, we want to help you and we can't help you if you
don't--if we don't know what you need.
So Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this
hearing, for your leadership, and I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
You know, all of us here--we are in the same boat. We work
for the same government, and I see ourselves, even though we
are sitting up here, we are part of your team. And we
appreciate what you have done, not only yourselves--putting
yourselves in harm's way--but our young men and women who serve
our country. So thank you so much.
And now, we will begin with General Chiarelli.
Your testimony, sir, whenever you are ready to begin.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Chiarelli. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Forbes,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current
readiness of U.S. ground forces. This is my first occasion to
appear before this esteemed subcommittee, and I pledge always
to provide you with honest and forthright assessment and my
best military advice, as requested. I submitted a statement for
the record, and I look forward to answering your questions at
the conclusion of my opening remarks.
As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our
Nation's military. We are at war. We have been at war for the
past seven-plus years. During this period, demand has continued
to grow and the Army's level of responsibility has expanded
considerably.
At the same time, our force has become smaller in terms of
the number of available personnel. The combined effect has been
increased deployments, shorter dwell, and insufficient recovery
time for our soldiers and sometimes our equipment.
Today, it has been previously reported to this
subcommittee, the Army remains out of balance, and overall we
are consuming our readiness as fast as we are building it.
Unfortunately, the Army cannot influence demand, and the
current level does not appear likely to improve significantly
for the foreseeable future.
The Army is expecting to gain some savings over the next
couple of years, as the last of the units deployed for 15
months as part of the surge return in September 2009, and as we
begin the drawdown of forces in Iraq in 2010. If executed as
planned, these reductions in demand will help to increase dwell
times for many of our soldiers.
However, if these plans are delayed or postponed due to
unforeseen events or a resurgence of tensions in hot spots
around the world, we will have to find other ways to relieve
the strain on the force. In the meantime, it remains a top
priority for the Army's senior leaders, including me, to do
everything we can to help alleviate some of the stress on
soldiers and family members.
In particular, we are committed to improving and expanding
available behavior health and mental health services. Equally
important is removing the prevailing stigma associated with
seeking and receiving help.
This is going to take time. In the interim, we are trying
to make it easier for soldiers and family members to take
advantage of the resources and services that are available as
discreetly as they deem necessary.
These are challenging times for our Nation and for our
military, and with the support of Congress we have deployed the
best manned, equipped, trained, and led forces in the history
of the United States Army. I am sure of that.
It is my personal opinion that if the demand does not go
down or if expected savings from Iraq are not realized, we
simply cannot continue to meet the current high level of demand
and sustain the force, including soldiers and equipment,
without making some course-mining adjustments. I assure the
members of the subcommittee that is what the Army's senior
leaders are focused on right now; we are working through these
issues and determining the needs of the Army for the future,
and we will continue to coordinate with senior DOD officials
and Congress to identify both short- and long-term solutions.
Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again
for your continued and generous support and demonstrated
commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United
States Army and their families. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found
in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, General.
The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Walsh.
STATEMENT OF ADM. PATRICK M. WALSH, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Walsh. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, and
distinguished members of the readiness subcommittee, I have
submitted my written remarks and request your consideration to
enter them into the record.
It is a privilege to appear before you today, sir, to
testify on the readiness of our naval forces. The talented men
and women, sailors and civilians, of the United States Navy
continue to perform exceptionally well under demanding
conditions. Your support has been and continues to be
fundamental to their success.
The Navy provides our country a global expeditionary force
committed to preserving the security and prosperity of the
Nation, but today 45 percent of the Navy is underway. Our
sailors are operating with the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and Maritime Coalition partners.
Additionally, over 13,000 serve ashore in the Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. The Navy is agile, it
is flexible, it is capable, it is competent to do what no other
navy in the world can do.
Combatant commanders want a full-spectrum and responsive
naval force, and the demand for those forces remains high. The
Navy is in a forward-deployed posture to represent the enduring
national interest in the world stage. It deters aggression,
assures allies, and fosters cooperative relationships to
enhance global security.
Our charge is to act as the Nation directs in whatever
role, in whatever place, at whatever time, whether it is to
serve as a first responder or as a full-spectrum strategic
reserve force. Our operating assumption is that we must sustain
this posture to ensure freedom of access and freedom of action
on, under, and above the seas to present true options for
national leadership.
Therefore, we need continual, critical self-assessments to
review the balance of issues that affect our ability to sustain
a forward-deployed full-spectrum force. Today we see the risk
in warfighting readiness, personnel, and force structure
programs as increasing, which requires our focus, attention,
and priority resourcing. While the fiscal year 2010 budget
aligns with the goals of our maritime strategy, we are assuming
an increasing level of risk because of challenges associated
with fleet capacity, increasing operational requirements, and
growing manpower, maintenance, and infrastructure costs.
The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) optimizes our ability to
provide forces to support the maritime strategy by maximizing
availability, return on investment, and flexibility of
missions. Specifically, the plan for fiscal year 2010 will
enable us to deploy three carrier strike groups continuously,
surge an additional carrier strike group in 30 days, and if
required, have another ready for deployment in 90 days.
This year's budget allows us to maintain continued forward
presence, but as we balance priorities, we have had to adjust
the overall capacity of our forces in reserve and their
readiness to surge. It is an adjustment from previous force
levels, but this adjustment demonstrates the flexibility of the
Fleet Response Plan because we can tailor our surge response
capacity and timing for the levels of risk acceptable to the
combatant commanders, consistent with the prevailing threat and
geopolitical environment.
A substantial percentage of the future force is in service
today--69 percent. The foundation of the Navy's plan for a
forward-deployed, surge-ready naval force is our ability to
reach the expected service life for each of our ships. Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) is committed to executing the
technically-determined required maintenance necessary to ensure
all platforms reach their expected service life.
We conduct a board of inspection and survey (INSURV)
material inspection of our ships. These inspections, by design,
are rigorous, critical, candid, direct, and conducted to
determine the health of our fleet. I would be concerned with
the rigor of our inspection regime if we did not see
discrepancies identified. I echo the CNO's commitment to
provide this committee the annual report that comes from the
board of inspection and survey.
Our people continue to deliver on their commitment to the
Nation. Retention rates continue to rise across the force. In
the officer corps, we continue to pay special attention to the
medical and naval nuclear propulsion communities. While
incentives and bonuses have contributed to increased retention,
selective sub-specialties continue to require attention.
In the enlisted force we are exceeding retention goals and
continue to see a significant reduction in attrition. Your Navy
remains ready and capable of meeting challenges today, but the
stress on the force, our ships, and aircraft is increasing.
While we can meet operational demands today, we have
pressurized and stretched the respective resource accounts.
Achieving the right balance of discipline within our resources
is essential, otherwise we will not be able to meet our
responsibilities to respond to additional operational demand,
take care of our people, conduct essential platform
maintenance, ensure our fleet reaches its full service life,
and procure the fleet for tomorrow.
Thank you for your continued support of our Navy, and I
look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Walsh can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Admiral.
Now, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General
William Fraser.
Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes,
distinguished members of this committee, it is indeed a
privilege to appear here this morning and to share with you the
state of your Air Force's readiness.
In today's national security environment, with challenges
across the spectrum of conflict, your Air Force has put
readiness first. I am proud to report this morning that the
over 660,000 men and women of America's Air Force are all in.
We are ready to do whatever it takes to fight and win America's
wars.
Despite a continuous high operations tempo and sustained
deployments for almost two decades now, our Air Force stands
ready to execute its missions with precision and reliability.
Now, and into the foreseeable future, we will continue to face
a wide range of threats to our Nation's security. These threats
require new solutions, innovative military capabilities, and
the unwavering resolve of our airmen.
From advancing our work in irregular warfare and
counterinsurgency operations to sustaining and maintaining our
Nation's nuclear deterrent capabilities, we have continued to
answer the Nation's call. And yet, these challenges have
brought new stresses on the readiness of our systems, including
our most important weapons system, our airmen.
Prioritization readiness means organizing--prioritizing
readiness means organizing, training, and equipping a force
capable of meeting our commitments. Through your support, we
have been able to recruit and retain the individuals necessary
to meet these sustained and emerging missions, a collective
force that is properly developed and trained to execute the
mission, and one that is provided the support programs that
they and their families so richly need and deserve.
Our platforms are exhibiting signs of stress, evidence of
the uncertainties we face by operating them beyond their normal
service lives. While we continue to extend the service life and
work to better understand the implications of these extensions
on the systems, the groundings of multiple aircraft in recent
years illustrate the need for both continued recapitalization
and modernization programs.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Forbes, members of this committee, we are
grateful for your steadfast support of our efforts to organize,
train, and equip the total force. We have stood ready
throughout our rich history; we proudly stand ready today. And
through the continued support of this committee and the
incredible resilience of America's airmen, we will stand ready
in the future to deliver the capabilities in air, space, and
cyberspace that our joint and coalition partners expect and
that our Nation deserves.
Thank you again for your time this morning, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in
the Appendix on page 86.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, General.
Now the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
Amos.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz, Representative
Forbes, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to talk to you a little bit about the
readiness of your Marine Corps.
As we sit in this hearing room today, there are more than
30,000 Marines deployed across the globe supporting exercises,
security cooperation activities, and overseas contingency
operations. Within the CENTCOM theater of operations alone
there are 16,000 Marines still left in Iraq and another 6,000,
going up to 10,000, establishing a presence in Afghanistan.
Despite high operational tempo, your Marines are resilient,
they are motivated, they are a happy lot, and they are
performing superbly in missions across the globe. For the past
seven years they have been fully engaged in winning in combat.
This sustained effort and performance has not come without cost
to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic
programs, and most importantly, to our Marines and their
families.
Our forward-deployed units are manned, trained, and
equipped to accomplish their assigned missions, and they report
the highest levels of readiness. We have taxed, though, our
nondeployed forces and strategic programs to be the bill-payers
for that forward-deployed high readiness.
The majority of our nondeployed forces are reporting, as a
result, degraded readiness. Because our equipment, personnel,
and training priorities have been necessarily focused on
counterinsurgency operations, we have experienced degradation
in some of our six traditional core competencies.
Although the current security environment has justified the
tradeoffs, we must maintain a balanced force capable of
responding to crises across the globe and across the full range
of military operations. These operations are supported by the
fiscal year 2010 baseline and OCO budget request. The $26.5
million in baseline request and $5.7 billion, which pays for
operations and maintenance activities, supports equipment
repair, family support programs, and all the day-to-day
activities of your Marine Corps.
The $3.8 billion in O&M funding in our fiscal year 2010 OCO
request will support both our drawdown in Iraq and our
increasing operations in Afghanistan. It will support
transportation costs, repair of equipment, reset, and the day-
to-day operating costs.
With your continued and consistent support, we will no
doubt succeed in current operations, take care of our Marines
and their families, reset and remodernize our equipment, and
train the Marine Air Ground Task Force for the future security
operations.
Sir, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the
Appendix on page 104.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
One of my questions this morning is going to be, if you
all, the witnesses, could describe the specific areas in your
fiscal year 2010 budget request where you have knowingly taken
risks and why you believe it was acceptable to take risks in
those areas. Now, we are not here to, you know, point fingers
at anybody, but I know that sometimes you have to make some
very, very hard decisions.
But if you would like to tell us why you have to take those
risks, maybe we, the committee and my good friend, Mr. Forbes,
and I, and the rest of the members of the committee could be in
a position to, you know, really help you. We can start with
General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. Mr. Chairman, if I had to look at where
I feel we are taking the most risk, I would have to say that it
is on the assumption that demand will go down. That is my
biggest concern.
We are planning on a drawdown from Iraq, which, if it
happens as planned, will take pressure off the force. I often
say that my job is to worry about things, and my--and when I
worry about things, what I worry about is that for some reason
that will not occur, and that might be if we take forces out of
Iraq, but there may be something else that occurs, either
additional requirement for forces in Afghanistan or some other
hot spot, which puts us in a situation where we have to
maintain the minimum amount of dwell we are maintaining right
now for our forces, and that concerns me the most.
Mr. Ortiz. Admiral Walsh.
Admiral Walsh. Sir, the lesson that we learned on 9/11 was
that we did not have a fleet that was available to deploy. So
the Fleet Response Plan that we put together since then is one
that gives national leadership a construct in which we present
forces that are prepared and ready across a full spectrum of
capabilities.
The tension that I see is the pressure to drive into the
baseline, now, effectively, predictions on something that
describes a world that we just can't predict. And so, the risk
that we have to begin with, before I get into the specifics, is
shooting behind the target before 10 ever becomes executable.
So the challenge that we have is now trying to articulate
for national leaders what the operating tempo of the new normal
is for the fleet. In earlier remarks we heard references to
steaming days, and frankly, the steaming days is a construct
that we used to have, but the Fleet Response Plan really
presents to national leadership an availability of forces that
are either deployed or are surge ready.
Where you will see us take risks, specifically in the 2010
budget, is how much capacity we hold in reserve. What we have
looked at when we have reviewed the utilization of that
construct since 2003 and 2004, when we first introduced it, is
that the predominant use of forces is for deployed forces who
are already underway.
Now, this doesn't fit into a neat accounting scheme, in
terms of whether or not we are actually operating in support of
a war or not, so trying to describe routine in this kind of
world that we are in since 9/11 becomes especially problematic
for those who are trying to exert discipline in the baseline as
well as trying to define, now, in the maritime sphere, what the
wartime overseas contingency operations really involve. So the
accounting can sometimes get in the way of actually being
responsive as the construct that we presented to national
leadership.
We think, when we look at the use of the FRP over time,
that on several occasions, both Katrina or in non-combatant
evacuation operation (NEO) operations in support of Lebanon, we
have relied on a cold start for ships that were in this surge
capacity. Predominantly, we will use forces that are already
underway and extend those forces as required in order to meet
new national demand.
So what you are seeing now is a reflection of cutting back
on some of the surge capacity that we have. To Representative
Forbes' comments earlier about concerns about overall ship
maintenance, I see this as an opportunity to get time, which is
not very well articulated in any of this other than that we
have an operating capacity of about 45 percent underway today.
And I do think this will allow us time to do the deep sort of
maintenance work and inspections that are required in order to
reassess, again, where we are today in terms of the overall
health of the fleet.
Mr. Ortiz. General Amos.
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, we have successfully, as a
Nation, misjudged what the future holds almost consistently.
Our record--our track record--for many, many years, not through
lack of effort or through lack of skilled Americans trying to
determine what the future holds, we have nonetheless misjudged
it more often than not.
My point is, we don't know what the future holds.
Specifically, in the Marine Corps we have worked hard in the
last couple of years to try to push as much into the baseline
and make those hard decisions--for instance, manpower, cost of
manpower, and those types of things--and we have worked hard at
that. So the risk for this year in 2010 is--and really the 2009
and 2010 OCO--resides in the supplemental and the reset, the
reconstitution, of your Marine Corps forces.
We have a significant amount of money hinged in the OCO
requirements for deeper level maintenance for all that
equipment that is in the process of retrograding out of Iraq
now and will continue to be over the next 12 to 15 months. That
equipment has to be rebuilt. It has to be triaged; it has to be
redistributed. And that that is cost-ineffective, we will
disregard it. We will get rid of it. But we have a significant
amount of money in the supplemental for 2010 and 2009 that
deals with modernization.
The other point I would make that we are taking risk in,
sir, is, because we are singularly focused, as an institution,
on counterinsurgency operations, we, as a Marine Corps for you,
are taking risks in these other core competencies that we--that
you expect, and in some cases by law task the Marine Corps to
be able to do--forcible entry operations, other operations that
we would call full-spectrum. So all that is kind of tied with
this thing called the current fight that we are in. We are not
grousing about it, and as I said in my opening statement, we
are performing well in it.
But the reset of the Marine Corps is hinged almost
exclusively on the supplementals. And we are taking risks
there, should the supplemental not find its way into our
coffers. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. General Fraser.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir.
As an institution, I think the biggest challenge that we
have had is trying to come up with the right balance--the right
balance across all the core competencies that we, as an
institution, provide for this Nation. And as my colleagues have
already stated here, it is not being able to predict what the
future is going to hold is to make sure that we stay focused on
today's fight and do everything that we can with the
capabilities that we have, while bringing on new capabilities
as we see them evolve, bring them into the baseline.
But we can't take our eye off the future, and we don't want
to sacrifice the future for today. So finding that right
balance is something that is very important for us.
The other thing that I would say is, we are finding out
more and more about our aircraft as the fleet continues to age.
And so, we have had to do some things that we had not
anticipated with our aircraft fleet as they do get closer to a
service life extension program--establishing a fleet viability
board, where we can better understand the stresses upon the
aircraft that we have, and then what is that right balance,
from a technical standpoint, to either go for recapitalization
or modernization of a particular fleet.
We think there is an opportunity here that we can take, a
bit of a strategic pause and some additional risk, which is why
you will see in our budget we have recommended for a combat air
forces reduction so that we can utilize those savings, both in
dollars and in manpower, for both emerging missions, but yet,
setting ourselves on what we think is the right path for the
future.
So it is the challenge of striking that right balance
across the myriad of missions and our core competencies that we
have, and then bringing that into the base budget as we look to
the future is our biggest challenge right now. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. Well, thank you so much for being candid with
you--with us, because this is the only way we can help you. And
I know there is a lot of problems out there, but we want to see
what we can do to help you.
Now I yield to my good friend for questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here today and for your
expertise. I want to begin by telling you something I think you
already know, and that is the tremendous amount of respect that
the members of this subcommittee have for one another, the
tremendous amount of respect we have for each of you.
But we each have to come here each time we have a meeting
and we have to wrestle with the difficulty of asking tough
questions and then going back and saying, ``Was that question
embarrassing? Did I ask it too harshly?''
Or, we walk back and say, ``Did I not ask a question that
could have impacted the national defense of this country?'' So
this morning the questions that I ask you--if I ask anything
that catches you off guard or is embarrassing or whatever, you
don't have to answer it. Just tell me, ``I don't want to answer
it,'' and maybe come back and get it for the record for us,
because that is not our intention; it is just our intention to
try to get at facts that are there.
Admiral Walsh, I want to first of all thank you for your
testimony, and I want to preface this by saying, when Secretary
Gates was here he told us that we could rely on you being able
to say whatever any of you felt was the correct answer. You
didn't have to come in here with the Department position or
service position--that we could ask you your opinions.
And so all of my questions this morning to all four of you
are for your opinions, because we have enormous confidence in
you and in your integrity and what you are saying to us.
Admiral, I am concerned because, as you know, the law
requires that when the budget is sent over to us that the
Secretary must send a shipbuilding plan over. And he also then
needs to give a certification. That certification needs to be
that the budget that is sent over will meet the plan, so that
the Chairman, and I, and other Members of Congress can say,
``This is our plan. We have got a plan, and we know that the
Secretary believes that this budget will meet the plan.''
If it won't meet the plan, he has to submit to us the risks
that we are taking for not fully funding that budget that will
meet the plan. As you know, the Secretary has not submitted
that plan. Based on the testimony that we have, he doesn't
intend to submit that plan until next year.
I would like to ask you--and again, if you can't answer
today, please come back to the record--what legal right does
the statute provide to simply not comply with that statute?
Admiral Walsh. I wouldn't pretend to be a lawyer, nor could
I be able to offer you a legal interpretation. I will give you
a common sense answer, sir, if that is okay.
Mr. Forbes. Sure.
Admiral Walsh. First of all, there is a new team on board.
The new team has, in my view, placed greater emphasis on a QDR
that is far sooner than I would have expected with the new
administration. So in terms of following the Secretary's
guidance, it seems to me one of the challenges that we have and
the rule set that we are given, in terms of presentation of a
budget, is that we don't have an understanding of what the out
years look like largely because of the unanswered questions and
insights derived from the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is a
priority established by our national leadership, and we can
simply--I don't see how we have any room for interpretation on
that.
The challenge with the 30-year shipbuilding plan
historically has been the lack of stability and predictability
for those in the ship building industry to have some reliable
document to refer to, so when they make their plans for their
labor force, for the skills and when they work with sub-
vendors, that they have got an understanding of what the future
looks like. If we were to go forward with a presentation of a
30-year shipbuilding plan without having an understanding of
what fiscal year 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 look like, then I run
the risk of creating further problems for the industry.
So the stability at the industry is part of the covenant
that we have in order to be able to come before the committee,
and I think we would do more harm than good to try and submit
something without the full understanding of what the
administration and the team want to do in the out years for the
Department of the Navy. I simply do not have those insights.
I acknowledge the requirement by law. I don't think there
is an intent here to work around the law. I do think there are
some practical implications of where we are today with a new
team that is on board that is still trying to find where it
wants to go in terms of overall national security strategy,
Quadrennial Defense Review, and other documents here that are
critically important to the overall alignment of resources and
the direction that the country wants to go in.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, I would just ask if you would,
after looking at this, maybe respond back for the record on
anything else that comes before you. But if you look at that
statute, it covers exactly the situation that you have raised,
and it says until we get a new shipbuilding plan, we are to use
the existing shipbuilding plan that is in effect.
So what the law required was that the Secretary submit to
us the existing shipbuilding plan. If he wants to change it,
that is okay--change it down the road, okay. But then, at least
to say, ``This budget will not meet that shipbuilding plan, and
here are the risks that we take.''
It isn't just for the industry. It is for us to be able to
see it too, because if we don't have a plan and we just hear
goals of 113 ships but we don't have a plan to link it up, we
don't have a clue whether we are getting there or not.
So I would ask, as you go back, if you could look at that
and perhaps give us whatever the Navy's justification is for
not submitting that, other than just, ``We don't want to do
it.''
And please don't take that offensively, because I don't
mean it that way. It is just, I don't see the option in the
statute for the Secretary just to come in and say, ``We are
just not going to do it for a year,'' even if he wants to
change that.
Second thing I would like to ask, and then I will move on,
we are told that--not just told; I have a letter here from the
Secretary to each of the Chiefs stating that on unfunded
requirements for 2010, that he expects them to first inform him
of a determination of what they are before they are to meet
with Congress and let Congress know.
Are you aware of that letter?
Admiral Walsh. I am aware of what Navy's unfunded
requirements are. I can speak to those. I don't know that I
have seen, necessarily, that letter.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. And I am going to ask each of you all the
same thing, but the letter was dated--we have a copy of it from
April 30, 2009, and it is basically, from the Secretary, saying
that before you give this to Congress that he says, ``I expect
you to first inform me of such a determination so we can
schedule the opportunity for you to brief me on the details.''
So the question I would ask is, on that unfunded mandates
list, are you aware of whether any such meeting took place with
the Secretary when the Navy carried its unfunded mandates list
to him?
Admiral Walsh. My understanding was that CNO had an
opportunity to discuss this with the Secretary.
Mr. Forbes. Was there a difference between the unfunded
mandates list submitted to the Secretary and the one that has
been submitted to Congress now?
Admiral Walsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Can you tell us what that difference was?
Admiral Walsh. Yes, sir. Back to your previous question, I
understand your question and will get back to you, sir, on the
30-year shipbuilding plan.
And to this question in particular, what we have found
recently is a review of cost estimates associated with the P3
red stripe. In particular, what we have learned is that we had
gone with the contractor's estimate, which was a very
conservative estimate that suggested a much more thorough level
of maintenance was required for the re-winging of P3s affected
by a red stripe issue.
Once we got inside the wings and took another look at it,
we did not find the fatigue level or cracks in the wing box
that the contractor had previously recommended that we review.
So you are seeing a difference of about $465 million between
the original request that went into the office of the Secretary
and what actually came out.
There is an internal memo from us to the Secretary that
requests to delete that. So that was initiated on our part
because we can take care of the P3 maintenance issue through
authorized and appropriated funds.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, I would just ask you, if you don't
mind, if you could submit that for the record so we can see the
difference.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 123.]
Mr. Forbes. And then the last question I would like to ask
you is this: Last year the Navy had a $4.6 billion unfunded
mandate request. This year we have a $395 million request--less
than $0.5 billion. That is over $4 billion different. Was that
unfunded mandate list changed based on risk assessment or
budgetary needs?
Admiral Walsh. I don't know that I witnessed any particular
conversation that took place between comparing the unfunded
list in 2009 to the unfunded list submitted in 2010, nor do I
get a sense of an effort by outside forces to reduce that list
from what the service actually asked for. Instead what I see is
a recognition that a substantial amount of the national budget
is tied up in debt and that the services are really taking a
very disciplined approach about how to sustain themselves.
The idea that we can go forward in 2010 and still receive
aircraft, ships, submarines is critically important to the
future of the Navy, and also recognizes the commitment that
this committee and others have given on behalf of us. So I
think the effort going in now is to sustain the service life of
those accounts, particularly in aviation and shipboard
maintenance. And what you are seeing is an unfunded list that
will bring that level to 100 percent funding.
If the CNO was given an extra dollar that is exactly where
it would go. It would go into the maintenance accounts rather
than for additional procurement, at this point, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, I would just close my questions
with you by just asking if you could submit for the record an
explanation of how we got from $4.6 billion of needs last year
to $395 million of unfunded needs this year, because I don't
think our risk has changed markedly, and second, I know we
didn't fund enough to make up that differentiation. So if you
could give us that for the record, I would appreciate it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Admiral Walsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And General, same question for you. I know that
the Army must have had an unfunded mandate list that it carried
in to the Secretary. I am assuming it complied with this letter
as well.
If you could, at some point in time, just let us know if
there were any differences between what the Army submitted as
its unfunded mandates list and what it then submitted to
Congress, between the meeting with the Secretary and the
meeting here. But then the second thing I would ask: If you can
tell us, last year we had $4 billion of unfunded mandate
requests--unfunded lists, I am sorry--from the Army; this year
less than $1 billion. How did we go from $4 billion to $1
billion?
General Chiarelli. I guess I would have to agree with
General--Admiral Walsh on this. I think all the services are
looking very, very hard, given the economic situation in the
country, to see if we can't do our best to make those lists as
small as possible.
I had the opportunity to be in the meeting with the
Secretary of defense and represent the Chief, and I will tell
you, our list went up. The list that I am told the Chief
submitted last night went up by, I believe, about $600 million.
Mr. Forbes. I am sorry, General, went up from what?
General Chiarelli. It went up from our original list that
we had submitted, which was just over, if I remember right,
$300 million. So we went to just short of $1 billion in the
list that was submitted, I am told, last night.
Mr. Forbes. General, did anyone give any direction to
reduce those sums down based on budgetary concerns?
General Chiarelli. No. I think it is just the understanding
of all of us that as we watch the economy of the country and
see what we, as a Nation, are going through right now, that we,
the services, need to do everything we possibly can to control
those costs.
Mr. Forbes. And General, again--and each of you, please
understand, I am trying to ask these as respectfully as I can
just to get the answers, so this is nothing with you--I fear
that we have shifted from our strategy driving our budget to
our budget driving our strategy.
And the question I am looking at is, last year we had $4
billion of unfunded requests. Undoubtedly, that was based on a
risk assessment that you were looking at and needs that you
felt the Army needed to meet that risk assessment. My question
for you is, is that reduction from $4 billion to less than $1
billion based on a reduced risk assessment that you feel, or
was it driven by budgetary concerns?
General Chiarelli. I believe it was driven by what the
Chief thinks is really needed. I think he has been quite clear,
in working the Army toward an enterprise approach to everything
we are doing, that we have got to control costs. And this has
been a focus of his; it is a focus of all of ours to look at
ways that we can, in fact, control costs.
Mr. Forbes. And the last question I would just ask you,
then, if you would submit for the record for me why the Army
felt they needed $4 billion in unfunded requests last year but
have now determined that they really didn't need those
requests, and submit that for the record so that we can look at
that, General, I would appreciate that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
General Chiarelli. I will do that, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And then, General, if I could ask you on the
Air Force the same thing: We had $18.4 billion of unfunded
requests last year; we are down to $1.9 billion this year. Are
you aware of a list that--of unfunded requests that went to the
Secretary that is different from the one coming to Congress?
General Fraser. Sir, I am aware of the list that went in,
the discussion that was held, and there were not changes, based
on what I was told, that came out of that meeting and what was
actually submitted.
Mr. Forbes. And if that is the answer--and I am sure you
are telling the absolute truth--can you tell us whether the
reduction from $18.4 billion last year to $1.9 billion this
year was a result of a change in risk assessment, or was it
driven by budgetary concerns?
General Fraser. Sir, we looked at the requests that came
over for an unfunded list. We wanted to go into that realizing
that we needed to be fiscally responsible. We wanted to focus
on today's fights and what was underfunded as we built the 2010
budget.
Mr. Forbes. And General, without interrupting, I just need
to ask you--I would assume that you had that same concern last
year, that you wanted to be fiscally responsible last year as
well. Wouldn't that be a fair statement to stay?
General Fraser. Yes, sir. Not being in this position at
that time, I----
Mr. Forbes. Whoever was in that position, I am sure would
have had that same end?
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Do you feel that they were not fiscally
responsible last Congress when they submitted the $18.4 billion
request?
General Fraser. No, sir. It would be inappropriate for me
to comment. I was not a part of that at that particular time.
But I know the guidance that we gave as we looked at 2010,
we wanted to fix the items that we felt like were underfunded
and that we needed to take care of for this fight nowadays. We
also wanted to accelerate some capabilities into the fight to
have a positive impact, so that was another area that we wanted
to focus on, which was something that we certainly took a look
at.
The other guidance that we had given was, no new starts.
And so that is why I say we wanted to take a look, and the
guidance that we gave to the staff as they were bringing this
forward was to fix the things that were underfunded and then
accelerate capabilities to today's fight, realizing, sir, that
as we go to 2011 we are going to be informed, though, by the
results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. We have other
studies and analyses that are going on and that we will utilize
that to then better inform us on what we build in the out
years.
Mr. Forbes. And General, last question I have is for you.
Same thing with the Marines, we were $3 billion unfunded needs
last year; we are $188 million this year. If you could submit
for the record the difference between what the Marines
submitted to the Secretary and what was ultimately submitted to
Congress, and also, if you could tell us if that reduction was
based on a change in risk assessment or if it was based on
budgetary concerns.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
General Amos. Sir, I will do that gladly.
If I could make a anecdotal comment, I also was present,
along with General Chiarelli, and presented the Marines'
unfunded list to Secretary of Defense, and it was very
enlightening when the Secretary said--and I don't want to--I
guess I am speaking for him, so to speak, but he looked at the
service Chiefs and those of us that were representing our
service Chief, and the thrust of his argument--not argument--
the thrust of his statement was not how much or how little this
list can be.
Quite honestly, it was just the opposite. His intentions
were honorable. He looked at all of us and said: As you submit
these lists, is there--my question for you, as service Chiefs,
is there anything that is on this unfunded priority list that
you did not know about when you submitted the program objective
memorandum (POM) 10 bill, when we submitted the budget.
And if you remember, sir, we began building that budget
early last summer and really submitted the final up to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) probably around
October or November timeframe. So his question was: What has
happened, or is there anything that has happened, that now
makes these things on the unfunded priority list--in our case
$188.3--more exigent than those things that you submitted in
the fiscal year 2010?
And his thrust was, if there are then maybe we should go
back and modify the 2010 budget. In other words, let us pay for
those things. Let us be good stewards of those things.
So to be honest with you, sir, we submitted our list of
$188.3 million and didn't even bat an eye, but I came away from
that meeting thinking, ``Boy, his intentions were absolutely
honorable on this, and he wants to make sure that we get what
we need.''
Mr. Forbes. And General, I just want to close by--want to
apologize unto the subcommittee for taking this much time, but
I think this is one of the most important things we will do
this year in asking these questions.
Second, I want you to know, I do not question anybody's
intent or their honor in doing any of this. And we all know
that at some point in time you do have to balance the resources
you have against the risks that you have. The only question I
would say to all four of you, and I open this up for you to
submit it to the record: We are trusting you. We trust your
integrity that you are going to tell us what the risks are that
we are facing, because ultimately this committee doesn't
challenge at all anybody's integrity or their honor. But we
need to know what the risks are. And when we see budgets coming
over to us we are assuming you are telling us, ``This is the
risk and we are meeting the risk.''
If you tell us the risk is greater, and you need more
resources, and we don't get it, that is on our shoulders. But
if you come over here and tell us, ``This is all we need,'' and
we supply that, and we find out later on that that was driven
by budgets and not by the actual risk assessment, then that is
something we all have to carry on our shoulders. And that is
why we are giving you this opportunity to put that in the
record. So if we come back down here a year from now or
whenever, we can say we at least knew the risk, and we made the
decision not to fund this risk adequately.
But thank you all for, again, your service and being
patient with me in asking questions.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, thanks for being here this morning. We
welcome you and we thank you for your service, and certainly
know that you have been wrestling with some very tough issues
with the limitation on budget.
General Chiarelli, I wanted to start with you because you
and I have talked in the past about the stress on the troops
and also their families, and the hope that we have that we are
seeing the troop levels in Iraq hopefully start coming down.
But at the same time, we know we have got the challenge in
Afghanistan, so we are potentially, if things go according to
plan, are going to trade deployments in Iraq for deployments in
Afghanistan.
There have been a number of incidents where--one in my
district at Fort Bliss and one recently in Iraq--where the
stress has led to unfortunate incidents. My concern, and I
would ask you to address this, is in the face of these
deployments and continuing deployments, I think perhaps for the
next decade, and the dwell time limitations on troops coming
out of combat theater, how do we justify going from 48 to 45
Army brigade combat teams?
And then the second part is, what are we doing to help
with--because I know this is a personal interest to you--to
help with military families coping with the stress of constant
deployments? In my visits to our soldiers there in Fort Bliss,
we have got, on a pretty common, regular basis, we have got
troops going back for a fifth deployment. So that is just, from
my perspective, an indicator that we don't have enough troops,
that the operational tempo is too high, and yet we are going
from 48 to 45 combat brigades.
General Chiarelli. Sir, as you well know, we have the
soldiers on board to build those brigades today. I think that
is important to understand. We have 549,000 soldiers in the
active component force. And in fact, we have got to take it
down to 547,400 to get within our end strength.
The three brigades that were going to be built were going
to be built in fiscal year 2011. That is after we should see
savings from the Iraq drawdown. And those soldiers that are on
board today, at 549,000, that delta of 10,300 soldiers are
being used to thicken the formations that are going out today.
I think the Secretary explained that in his decision to go from
48 to 45, and I have got to tell you, to me that makes sense.
He also indicated that if demand does not go down and we
get further into this he would reconsider the decision to go
from 48 to 45. And that is something we are going to look very,
very hard at, because as you well know, that is my biggest
concern. If you want me to tell you where I think we are taking
risks, that is what concerns me.
And that leads into your next question, and that is on
families and stress. I recently went on a trip to take a look
at seven installations in eight days, and I went out to look at
suicide prevention programs, since the Secretary of the Army
has put me in charge of the Army's efforts to try to lower the
number of suicides.
When I was at my fourth installation, I came to the
realization that this isn't about suicide prevention programs;
this is about helping soldiers and families--and I really
emphasize families--improve their mental wellness, their mental
health. And this has to be a multidisciplinary program.
We tend to concentrate on mental health care providers, and
we need more. If you were to ask me how many more we need, I
could not tell you. I can't tell you because I am trying to
determine, after seven years of war with the stress that this
force has been put on, how many do you really know? What I know
now is I don't have enough.
But this is bigger than mental health care workers. It is
supporting our chaplain's programs, his strong bonds programs,
where he takes both deploying and redeploying soldiers'
families on a marriage retreat where they talk about some of
the issues that they have had or are going to have going into
that deployment or coming out of that deployment.
It is substance abuse counselors. We have got an issue that
we have to work. I need more substance abuse counselors, and we
are taking action now to hire more substance abuse counselors.
Again, it is hard for me to tell how many more I need. I
just know the demand is not being met today.
So I am looking at this thing holistically, but the number
one thing that I need to get this under control is to increase
dwell. I have got to increase dwell. I know that when that
happens many of the issues that we are seeing today will--not
being eliminated, will decrease.
I would just leave you with one quick story. I was briefed
yesterday on the number of nondeployables that are in upcoming
brigades that are going out to the United States Army. And I
saw those nondeployable numbers up in the vicinity--very, very
high, except for one single brigade, which was very, very low--
less than 4 percent of his formation was nondeployable as
compared to 12 to 14 percent in some of these other brigades.
And I asked a question: What is this guy doing right that
the others aren't? And what I found out is that he is on the
Global Response Force, has been in the country for 2-1/2 years,
has got the longest amount of dwell time of any unit in the
United States Army, and his nondeployable rate is down under 4
percent. I think that is illustrative of the fact that time at
home is what we need so that both soldiers and families can
repair themselves.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have talked to Chairman
Skelton about the issues that the General mentions in terms of
doing everything we can to support the family structure as well
as the soldier. This may be an issue that we might want to have
an additional hearing on. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. And we know that we are facing a lot of
decisions that we have to make soon, and I agree with Chairman
Reyes. We might be able to maybe have a separate hearing to
dwell on this specific issue. But with what you have got, we
appreciate what you have done. We really have.
And now I yield to my good friend, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank all of you for being here and for your
service to our country.
General Chiarelli, in looking at the baseline budget for
2010 and the supplemental, I notice there is an $87.4 billion
has been requested, and that is just a 0.7 percent increase
over fiscal year 2009, less than 1 percent. Can you talk a
little bit about how this flat-lining of operation and
maintenance funding will affect the active Army?
It seems inconsistent with the degradation that I know
General Amos talked about in his opening comments, and I am
sure you have got that in your equipment as a result of this
seven years in two theaters of war. It seems like that is an
inconsistent number with the growing amount of maintenance that
we are having on our equipment. Could you talk to me about how
that is going to affect your ability to maintain your
equipment?
General Chiarelli. Well, as you well know, sir, our reset
amount--what we are taking to reset the force--which is a
critical piece of what we are doing with maintenance of
equipment coming out of the force right now, is all in our OCO.
And that is----
Mr. Rogers. It is on what? Is your microphone on? I can't
hear you very well.
General Chiarelli. I am sorry. It is on.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
General Chiarelli. It is in the OCO--the O-C-O--overseas
contingency operations portion of the budget.
Mr. Rogers. Yes, sir.
General Chiarelli. That is a total of $11 billion. That has
gone down. It was a high in fiscal year 2007 of $16.4 billion.
It has gone down to $11 billion.
But we see that as significant--as the amount of money that
we need to reset the forces that are coming back, that we know
are coming back in the fiscal year 2010 period. I would expect
that portion of the budget to go up in fiscal year 2011, and I
would because we are going to be--if we, in fact, have the
forces flow out of Iraq like we are planning on having them
flow out, that reset money will probably go up because of those
forces returning to the United States.
I will remind you that the Army has been consistent in its
position as saying that if hostilities were to end today, we
have still got a two-year period that we feel that we are going
to need to have to reset the force. That will be bills for two
additional years in order to reset the force.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you, sir.
General Fraser, the KC-X program will replace the KC-135s,
hopefully in my lifetime--not been looking good so far. They
are already an average of 47 years old. Given the delays in the
KC-X and the fact that the KC-135 will remain in service for
maybe 30 more years, keeping these airplanes available to
support combat operations around the world is obviously an
important objective.
Currently, the KC-135 program depot maintenance is
performed organically as well as by outside contractors. I
understand that in fiscal year 2010 the Air Force is planning
to increase the number of aircraft inducted into programmed
depot maintenance (PDM) organically from 48 to 54 and reduce
those done by outside contractors from 29 to 23. Can you talk a
little bit about how you are going to be able to handle that
organic increase in work?
General Fraser. Thank you, sir. I will get back to you on
the specifics of that. I know there are some adjustments that
are being made within the schedule as we take a look to ensure
that those aircraft meet the depot schedule, and so I would
like to provide that detail schedule to you and what that
actually looks like.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Mr. Rogers. Great.
General Fraser. Now, I know there are some reductions that
we had planned on with respect to the depot maintenance, and
that is specifically related to the planned retirement and
approved retirement of some of the KC-135Es. They are not
necessary to go into the depot, so we are able to take that
out, so that is one reason that you see some of the reduction,
but the actual specifics of that, I would like to provide that
to you.
Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that.
And then just one statement for the record, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate all of you and, as Mr. Forbes said, respect your
judgment. We do count on you to give us your unvarnished
military opinion when we ask for it.
Unfortunately, in the last several terms that I have been
here, we saw the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld very heavy-
handed with general officers, and they were controlling their
comments to this committee, to the Secretary of Defense and
his--in deference to him, with concerns over career. And this
committee and the full committee, in my opinion--I was a part
of it--we didn't do a good enough job of getting on top of that
sooner.
I fear we are starting to see some of that from the current
Secretary of Defense. I hope that is not the case, and if any
of you don't want to give an unvarnished opinion when it is
asked here, I hope you will talk to us privately and let us
know what you need. Because as Randy has said, we can't fix it
if we don't know about it, and you know a whole lot more than
we do.
So if it is in a private meeting or if it is somewhere
else, let us know if you are getting pressure to make cuts or
do things separate and apart from what you really believe your
military opinion is. I know that oftentimes when you come
before us you have got to click your heels and salute to what
your Chief told you to say, but we want to hear what you have
got to say, because we do respect you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for what you do and for what all of
those you lead do on behalf of our country.
General Chiarelli, you know, to sort of add to your list of
reasons why the reduction in BCTs might be reconsidered is the
fact that a number of different communities have relied upon
what in essence is a promise from DOD to prepare for receiving
those brigade combat teams (BCTs). Creating schools, building
housing, you know, all of the other attendant things that are
necessary in order to adequately take care of an extra 5,000
people and their families is a significant investment for the
communities that have been asked to do that.
Fort Stewart, specifically, I think was the community that
was going to receive the next BCT, and assuming it does, that
is fine, but if it doesn't, so far to date the investment is in
excess of $450 million. That may not be a lot of money from the
Department of Defense's perspective. It is a huge sum of money
for those communities and governments, et cetera, down in the
Fort Stewart area.
And it is a matter of just sort of abiding by your word. I
mean, if our word is not good, then what communities in the
future are going to rely upon our promise that this is coming,
would you please prepare? They just won't prepare, and then we
will show up and families won't be served, et cetera. So I just
add that. You know, everybody knows we enlist a soldier and
then we reenlist the families.
General Fraser, Secretary Young, not too long ago,
suggested that modernization not be taken into account as core
work for depot maintenance purposes, and that caused a flurry
of consternation here because as we have gone through the
process year after year after year of considering that
question, you know, adjusting to 50-50, that sort of thing, we
have always contemplated that modernization was part of the
mix. What is Air Force's current view?
General Fraser. Sir, modernization is a part of that, and
we have got an ongoing stake for new weapons systems that we
are bringing online, and we are actually--that will wind up
within the depots, so that is ongoing.
Mr. Marshall. Because of this little brush with the
Secretary's suggestion of perhaps it is not, we might put
clarifying language in this year's bill. Be happy to work with
you on that clarifying language.
General Fraser. Yes, sir. We would like to work with you.
Mr. Marshall. Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)--Secretary has
proposed--well actually, by agreement between the two Chiefs,
looks like JCA will be transferred to Air Force. I have never
been troubled at all by the notion that Air Force would manage
acquisition, sustainment, modernization, maintenance.
I suspect thus far the understanding between the contractor
and the Army, since the Army has sort of led the way in
acquisition thus far, hadn't really taken into account the
kinds of concerns that Air Force would have if Air Force is
going to be doing long-term maintenance, sustainment,
modernization, you know, data rights acquisition, and then some
discussion concerning how are we going to transition this stuff
from contractor control to--well, actually it should right away
be Air Force control, but then contractor maintenance,
sustainment, modernization to depot sustainment, modernization.
I am convinced we are going to acquire more of these
things. We are not stopping at 38. The Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA) analysis that was published on March 13th says
that for low-intensity conflicts like we are engaged in at the
moment and for the foreseeable future seem to be the kind of
conflicts we are going to be engaged in are the most cost
effective platform--platform mix includes 98 of these JCAs.
And so it seems to me that in--as we consider further sales
as we prepare to--buys, pardon me--as we prepare for more buys,
Air Force really needs to focus on this long-term issue and the
deal with the contractor can be modified. A question is, what
sort of coordination has gone on between Air Force and Army
right now on JCA and the needs of the Army?
Where the Caribou is concerned, something similar was done
during the Vietnam era, and it didn't work out very well. The
Air Force really wasn't able to meet the needs of the Army as
far as the actual utilization of the platform Caribou, in this
instance, was concerned, and I would be pleased to hear from
General Fraser and General Chiarelli about what sort of things
are going on as between the two branches to discuss--in trying
to figure out how we are going to actually meet the Army needs.
General Fraser. Sir, thank you. We are committed to this
mission of direct support for the Army. We have a team that is
put together already that is taking a look at this to ensure
that the program of record that we have on track right now
stays on track, working with the program office to include the
development, the testing, and everything else that is going to
go with that. So we are integrating our people in with the Army
and with the System Program Office (SPO) right now.
The other thing that we are doing is focused with the Air
National Guard and the Army National Guard, so General McKinley
is a part of that. In fact, General Chiarelli, myself, and
General McKinley have held several meetings already as we
provide direction and guidance to that team of individuals that
is taking a look at this entire program. And so we have charged
them by the end of the month to take a look at this, to
periodically report back, seek guidance.
There was recently a meeting that was held at our mobility
command. General Light, out there, was the host of that
meeting, and they had some very good discussions with respect
to the program and the mission and how this is going to be
accomplished.
The other thing that is ongoing is discussions downrange
and what this would look like as it actually gets employed. So
there is a coordination group that is going on right now to
ensure that this stays on track.
Mr. Marshall. Are you heading in the direction of putting
in writing what the Army's expectations are of Air Force to
bring to meet those expectations? Army actually is going to
develop the list, and hopefully it will be a very thorough
list, and guidance can be taken from the experience with the
Caribou, trying to figure out, well, where would it break down
in the past?
General Chiarelli, I am sorry to----
General Chiarelli. That is, in fact, exactly what General
Fraser and I are doing. We just can't talk direct support
because direct support is absolutely key and critical for us,
and the Air Force is fully signed up for direct support. We are
down, now, into the weeds of, you know, when the Army defines
direct support for this particular aircraft, what exactly does
that mean?
And that, to us, is key, and I know it is to General
Fraser, and the Air Force has said all along that they will
provide the Army this aircraft and the capabilities of this
aircraft in a direct support role. We are ensuring that we go
into that with our eyes open on exactly what that means to both
of us.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Ortiz. The chair recognizes Ms. Fallin, from Oklahoma.
Go ahead.
Ms. Fallin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I just want to say how much I appreciate Ranking Member
Forbes' comments about trusting you with the decisions and what
we need to be doing with our military operations and
maintenance, and we appreciate your service to our Nation. I
have a couple of questions.
One deals with the memo that we have about the 2010 Air
Force operation and maintenance baseline budget, and in it we
reduce the organic KC-135 aircraft program depot maintenance by
$68.1 million, and it will result in 10 fewer depot inductions.
And I have a very specific question about how will this
programming change affect the KC-135 depot at Tinker Air Force
Base in Oklahoma?
General Fraser. Thank you, madam, I appreciate that. I will
provide the detailed schedule, as I mentioned before, with
respect to that. I know that that reduction was as a result of
the KC-135E and the not needing to input those aircraft within
the depot maintenance because they are approved and scheduled
for retirement.
We are still on track to ensure that the KC-135Rs continue
to meet their 5-year depot maintenance plan, and we are
definitely committed to ensuring the 50-50 split, as is
mandated too. So we will get you the detailed schedule.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Ms. Fallin. Okay. Thank you very much.
And I have another question for General Chiarelli. I would
like to ask you a couple of questions about the artillery
capacities of the Army, and I know that the Army and Congress
are both very committed to developing--have been committed, I
should say, in the past, to developing a Non-Line-of-Sight
(NLOS) cannon--NLOS cannon--and as part of the future combat
systems (FCS), and there were significant developments that
were made in that. But now we are in a restructuring of the
FCS, and I want to make sure that the Army and our soldiers
have the very best capacity and advantage on the battlefield.
So my question is, with the current Paladin system
approaching nearly 50 years of age, can you tell us how the
Army will continue to modernize the Army's artillery capacity,
and is the Army's commitment to the Paladin more critical,
given the changes in the FCS system programming?
General Chiarelli. Well, we are totally committed to the
Paladin 10 program, which will go a long ways in extending the
life of the Paladin. In addition, I know you know that we are
working and moving out very, very sharply what we are calling
ground combat vehicle and looking to be able to deliver
something in five to seven years.
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is working through,
at this time, whether that will be a single vehicle or a family
of vehicles, but I can assure you that everyone in the Army is
committed toward some type of capability to provide indirect
fires. We think the Paladin 10 program, in the interim, will do
an excellent job of operating the Paladin.
Ms. Fallin. Well, in light of the Army working toward
modernizing the artillery capacities, how will you use those
developments that have already been accomplished through the
work outside the production of the NLOS cannon?
General Chiarelli. Well, that is absolutely critical to us.
There is a lot to be gained from the Manned Ground Vehicle
(MGV) program, not just the NLOS cannon but also the entire MGV
program. And our plan is to harvest those technologies, those
things that we are able to use and apply if they apply to this
new ground combat vehicle.
So we see this as an investment that is not wasted, but one
that will allow us to look at those technologies that have
matured and consider them for incorporation into our new ground
combat vehicles.
Ms. Fallin. And the other thing, Mr. Chairman, I just want
to mention that I know there has been a tremendous amount of
investment put into these technologies, and now the program is
changing, so I want to make sure that the investments that we
spent are going to be used wisely in whatever type of systems
that we put forth in the future with that technology.
General Chiarelli. We are committed to that.
Ms. Fallin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Heinrich?
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would certainly want to thank the four of you for joining
us here today. I also want to commend the work of our service
members for all that they do. I know we are asking a great deal
of them at the current time, and I want to direct my question
today to General Fraser.
General it was good to hear you in Albuquerque a couple of
weeks ago. I very much enjoyed your speech and I know the
audience enjoyed your interest in our city. In the last two
hearings with Secretary Gates and Secretary Donnelly I made no
secret of my concerns for the proposed accelerated retirements
of fighter aircraft. And with the Quadrennial Defense Review
underway, I believe that any decision to shut down entire
fighter wings is premature.
But what is incredibly troubling to me is that the Combat
Air Force Restructuring Report that was released on May 15
lists 23 bases across the country, all having future missions
declared with the exception of one, that being the 150th at
Kirtland Air Force Base, which has been selected to lose its
entire flying force without a follow-up mission being
determined.
General Fraser, yesterday I asked about the specific
criteria that were used in determining which wings were
selected for retirement. General Schwartz said that a business
case analysis was used. To me it is still a little bit unclear
as to what the specific criteria of that analysis were, and I
was hoping that you might be able to elaborate on the criteria
that were used to select these wings for retirement,
specifically the 150th Fighter Wing in Kirtland.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir. We see the opportunities
there with other activities that go on in the Kirtland area as
opportunities for a total force initiative. So as we were
looking across the entire spectrum of our combat air forces and
trying to find that right balance and where opportunities
presented themselves for the total force initiatives, that was
one of the areas that we felt like was certainly prime to
participate in one of those total force initiatives, with, say,
the 150th.
In fact, we are in negotiations and discussions with them
about potential opportunities. We have got special forces
training that go on right there, as you know, sir, at Kirtland,
which is something that is a particular area of great interest
to us as we continue to increase that capacity and capability
to provide it to the joint fight.
There are other opportunities that we have also talked
about with other emerging weapons systems as they come online,
because as we provide other capabilities, such as intelligent
surveillance and reconnaissance to today's fight, we need other
units that are willing to participate and want to participate
in those total force initiatives. And so we have had great
opportunities in a number of the other states, too, where they
have taken on these new missions.
And so we felt like that that was one area, as we
modernized and upgraded across the Combat Air Forces (CAF) and
took this particular step with the CAF Reductions (Redux) to
look at those units where there were other opportunities, and
we felt like that that was one of those units that was
certainly viable because there are needs out there for our Air
Force, which would add great capability to the joint fight.
Mr. Heinrich. I hope you understand my trepidation
regarding a report where that mission has not yet been
designated or determined for the 150th. Would you be willing to
comment a little bit, once again, on the criteria that were
used in terms of figuring out who was going to be retired where
and what, and specifically whether or not the--some of the
things were taken into account, such as, I know 10 of the 21
aircraft in the 150th had already just recently gone through
the upgrades that extend their service life for another 8,000
hours on top of their remaining service--or, I am sorry, 2,000
hours on top of their remaining service life.
General Fraser. Sir, we would be happy to come over and
hold some discussions, and get into further details. As we
looked at all the different units and as we went across that,
we would love to come over and spend some time and talk to you
about that.
Mr. Heinrich. Are you able to comment at all on what the
cost difference is between an active duty F-16 wing and a Guard
unit? I know I have seen some figures thrown around that
suggest that Air National Guard units maintain combat ready
status at approximately a third the cost of an equivalent
active duty force. Is that an accurate statement, or do you
know what the ratio there is?
General Fraser. Sir, I will get the specifics, but I too
have seen these same figures.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 128.]
Mr. Heinrich. Okay.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you very much.
These questions are for Admiral Walsh, please, and General
Fraser. I have read reports that the Navy and the Air Force
have cut back on the flying hours for pilots to train, which
could produce a problem of proficiency and leave an impact on
readiness.
In fact, according to the Navy Times article entitled, ``P3
Mishap, Two Pilots Short on Flight Hours,'' the Navy Judge
Advocate General (JAG) manual investigation of the mishaps
found that lack of flying hours was a contributing factor. Two
of the pilots failed to meet the proficiency minimums and serve
the required 10 hours per month. One pilot had 3.8 hours and
the other one had 3.3 hours--less than a third of the
requirement.
Some of the reduction can be replaced by flight simulators,
but surely not all. How concerned are you both about the impact
of the flying hour reductions on readiness, and what steps have
you taken to deal with this problem, if you see it as one?
Admiral Walsh. I can start. I am not familiar with the JAG
manual investigation on the P3. I suspect this is a
investigation of a mishap that took place in Afghanistan a
while ago and involved proficiency issues associated with the
crew. And the question that would come up right to mind is
whether or not we mandated that minimum in terms of flying hour
proficiency, or was that something that was determined by local
commanders as adequate enough, and I don't have the answer to
that.
But in terms of resourcing fiscal year 2010 and how we look
at the flight hour program, we continue to work toward a T-
rating at 2.5, which has proven adequate in combat. In fact, we
are over-executing our flying hour program in Central Command
area responsibility today, and it is forcing some mitigations
in fiscal year 2009 that affect the rest of the fleet, in terms
of operating costs and steps that we are having to take in the
execution.
But the plan for fiscal year 2010 is to continue to fund
this. This is an area that we don't take for granted, that we
continue to self-assess, and we do have statistical data that
will prove out that when we have less than a certain minimum
flight hours per month we will, in fact, see a causal
relationship to accidents. That is something that, at the
headquarters level, we are very much aware of and we are trying
to avoid with resources. But I can dig further and find out, in
fact, whether or not those were local decisions or decisions
that they inherited from us.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. And I also would like to say that--
well, we will let that go and I will let General Fraser answer,
and then I will make a comment.
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am. Our flying hour program for
2010 is fully funded. What you are saying with respect to the
reductions that are in there are directly related to a
restructure and some changes with respect to our undergraduate
pilot training program and the syllabus changes that have been
made there.
The other place that we have managed to have some savings
within the flying hour program, and therefore a reduction this
time that you are specifically talking about, is directly
associated with the CAF Redux. By removing 250 of the older
aircraft as we modernize and change that force structure there,
we get some savings.
We ensure that the experience and inexperience level of our
aviators continues to stay up, and assure that that is fully
funded. The other thing that we have done with the flying hour
program is, we have ensured that we have brought the air
sovereignty mission into the baseline.
This is a change. We see it as an enduring mission, and so
that has also negated any further reductions with respect to
that. So as we continue to do that to support the combatant
commander of the air sovereignty mission, we ensure that that
was also brought in there. So that is what you are seeing, as
far as our changes go.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay, thank you.
And I was referencing the article in the Navy Times, and it
was Sunday, March 1, 2009, if anybody wants to read this: ``PC
Mishap, Two Pilots Short on Flight Hours.''
General Fraser. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Ms. Shea-Porter. All right. Thank you.
And my other question has to do with whistleblowers. This
is a big issue for me, and I want to thank the DOD Inspectors
General for their efforts to protect whistleblowers, but I did
want to talk about the hotline that they have been using.
I understand that fewer than 2,000--to be exact, 1,956
calls out of more than 13,000 resulted in any investigation,
and I just wanted to ask, why such a low rate? Do you have
enough resources? What steps are being taken to improve this so
that whistleblowers who call will feel comfortable utilizing
this service and knowing that there will be some kind of a
response?
General Fraser. I am going to have to take that one for the
record and get back to you on that, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay, thank you. I mean, I really admire
the work that they are doing. I know it is critical, and I
appreciate the fact there is a hotline, but it is important to
actually be able to follow up on the calls once they come in.
So thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
You know, one of the things that I am very concerned with,
that when we talk about dwelling, dwell time, equipment age,
getting old, the losses that we have had on the equipment on
the battlefield, I always worry about another conflict. And if
there was to be another conflict, how are we going to be able
to sustain those troops if we were to send--and I ask that
question because I was in Korea, and when I asked the question
of sustainment, they told me that it would only be a few days.
And because of the prepositioning stock and a lot of issues
that we have, how were we going to respond? I know we are
involved in two conflicts now--two wars--but if there was to be
another conflict, how are we going to be able to sustain those
troops.
I mean, can we manage it somehow, to be able to sustain in
case we have to deploy troops to another conflict someplace
else? I mean, we have got our hands full, but this always
worries me. Any one of you who would like--respond to that
question.
Admiral Walsh. This is precisely what we are concerned
about, why we present ourselves as a full-spectrum force,
because in large measure in our history we have been caught by
surprise. And so when we are forward-deployed and really, in
many respects, alone operating at sea, we have to take a very
suspect approach, in terms of how we approach our concept of
operations so that as we approach traffic in the area, we have
no idea whether these are vessels in distress, legitimate
traffic, or another USS Cole that is about to happen.
So our experience has taught us, and that is one of the
reasons why the full-spectrum capability has been redlined from
my service for many years, and why we argued before the Supreme
Court how important it was to be able to have that full-
spectrum training to include undersea warfare.
The committee's support for our readiness and our ranges is
critically important to us, and one of the reviews that is
underway right now is, how valuable and how appropriate is
simulation training. Because it cannot replace the hands-on
execution and experience, whether it is in the flight hour
program or the actual execution of undersea warfare operations.
That cannot be simulated to the point that we can do away
with training rangers, but continued support in that area is
very valuable to us, and that is exactly the reason why we
approach our business the way we do and why we have described
redlines in training the way we have. Thank you, sir.
General Chiarelli. I would add that our operational ready
rates, quite frankly, astound me every time I look at them,
both in theater and back here. I think nowhere do you see it
more than in Army aviation and the ability of our low
decisions, through use of some contract maintenance for sure,
that provide us unparalleled operational readiness rates not
only across our aircraft, but even the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles (MRAPs), where we took--in our attempt to
try to get them to the field as early as we did and as quickly
as we did, we took some risks with the sustainment packages.
But both in Iraq and Afghanistan we have seen those numbers
extremely high--over 90 percent.
There is no doubt that what we call the enablers--the
logisticians that are conducting this work brilliantly--are
stressed. They are a big portion of our force's stress today.
However, their ability to support us, as they have in two
theaters, I think is unparalleled in modern warfare. And I
suspect there is still capability left to do that, should
another contingency require us to do so, as long as it was not
too large.
Mr. Ortiz. Anybody else?
General Amos. Chairman, right now, with 30,000 Marines tied
up and the balance shifting, now, from the left foot in Iraq to
the right foot in Afghanistan, there is no question that, as I
said in my opening statement, that the--not only is the
readiness forward-deployed very high, but the readiness at home
station has been the bill-payer for that. And that gets to the
crux of your question of--if we assume that we are going to be
tied up in the theater that we are in two fronts, what else
could we do around the world?
And the answer, from the Marine Corps' perspective is, we
would--it would be difficult. We would cobble together the
equipment that we have back at home station. We would empty out
our maritime preposition squadrons.
As you and I talked yesterday, we are running--we have got
three squadron's worth of ships, each one roughly five ships,
and some of those are sitting at about 100 percent, some are
sitting at about 80 percent. We have got caves in Norway that
are just a little over 50 percent of that prepositioned
equipment. We would empty that out to go fight someplace else
in the world, and we would cobble together the Marines just as
we did in Korea when we brought six Marines together from
almost a cadre status and flowed them in----
So it would be difficult; it would be challenging. It can
be done. The sustainment piece, though, is--it would be the
hard part. It would fall on the shoulders of industry and this
Congress to help put that together for us to be able to sustain
the fight someplace else in the world. But I don't think there
is any question it would end up with some give and take on both
theaters.
Mr. Ortiz. General Fraser.
General Fraser. Sir, I would echo a number of those
remarks, too, in that in order to maintain the full spectrum,
it takes time to come back and then get those individuals who
have been deployed in theater back up to their full-spectrum
capability. So it takes additional training, additional time to
reset themselves, because we have seen, as time has gone on,
that our deployment rates have gone up while yet the time has
also gone up that the individuals are deployed.
Back in 2004, 120-day or less deployments--we were only in
the 12 to 14 percent of the force. Now we are upwards of 54
percent of our deployers are over 120 days, and we have even
larger numbers that are picking up the 365s. So naturally, that
adds stress back to those home units to ensure that they
maintain the capabilities should something else arise someplace
else.
The other thing that we see that we are able to do is
continue to deploy in other areas. While there is nearly 40,000
airmen that are deployed--that may be deployed forward, but yet
we have over 200,000 that are engaged in the day-to-day fight
Because of the way that we are able to do business back
here with our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
assets for the PED piece for the processing, exploitation, and
dissemination of the intelligence, a lot of people are able to
do that back here. And so we have got a lot of people that are
deployed in garrison--in place--and actually performing the
mission today and providing a valuable contribution. So it is
all of that that is stressed out there that we need to take a
look at.
We also have several specialty codes that are stressed. The
leveling off of the manpower at 330,000--332,000--is going to
help us. So we have focused that additional manpower into, yes,
some of those stressed career fields, but into those added
capabilities that we continue to bring on to provide for
today's fight.
We are still doing other deployments in the Pacific. Today
we have F-22s that are deployed at Anderson, and in Guam, and
we are going to do another deployment to Kadena here, so there
are other weapons systems that are still picking up and other
areas of the world that continue to be able to deter, dissuade,
and assure our allies and friends that we will be there, but it
will be stressful.
Mr. Ortiz. When I came to the Congress back in the 1980's,
I can remember the reduction of the forces, and I can remember
young men and women calling that had been in the military 12,
14 years, but they were being forced out because we had to
reduce the force. And I guess when I came here we had Army--
something like 900,000 troops. It was reduced drastically. Not
only the Army, but all branches of the military.
And I hope we can learn from the lessons that have stressed
our armed forces in the past. And now, of course, recruitment
is doing fine at this moment, but we have lost sergeants, we
have lost a lot of key personnel, and I know that all of you
are doing your best and you are trying hard, otherwise you
wouldn't be where you are at, and your loyalty and your
dedication to our country. We appreciate that, and when we
say--Mr. Forbes and I, and members of the committee--we really
want to help, and we do not mean to harass anybody or to point
fingers at anybody; we just want to know so that we can be in a
position to help you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Chairman, just one question.
First of all, General, thank you for your comment about
logistics. I think really that probably when all the stories
are ultimately written, they are the true unsung heroes of
everything we have seen, and what they have done has been just
simply fantastic, and we owe them a great deal in all four
areas.
But there was an article on May 14th in the USA Today that
highlighted the number of soldiers in the Army--some 30,000 to
35,000--who are not available for deployment because they are
recovering from wounds or injuries or because they are
supporting the Wounded Warrior program. And I also understand
from the data provided by the committee--to the committee by
the Army--that up to an additional 50,000 military personnel in
the active Army, Army Guard, and Army Reserve may be
nondeployable because they have permanent profiles of three and
four as a result of medical or other conditions.
According to what the Army provided us, the number of
people with these permanent P3 and P4 profiles in the active
Army was 19,300, and the Army Guard 20,770, and in the Army
Reserve 11,150. My question to you is, what effect are these
large number of nondeployable personnel having on the Army's
ability to fully man deploying units? And none of us are
advocating a decrease in the support for the Wounded Warrior
program, but what is the Army doing to address the numbers of
nondeployables in that program?
And among the personnel with P3, P4 profiles, particularly
what can Congress do to assist the Army in increasing the
number of soldiers who are deployable? For example, would
temporarily exempting the numbers of people in the warrior
transition units from counting against Army end strength assist
the Army to increase the number of deployable personnel?
General Chiarelli. There is no doubt that this unavailable
force creates a problem for us. That is a problem we are facing
today. In the active component force I have in the vicinity
of--I saw a report yesterday of 21,000 folks who are
nondeployable. I have just over 9,100 who are in WTUs--warrior
transition units--and the rest are nondeployables who reside in
units.
We are seeing an increase in how many soldiers we are
having to assign to units before they deploy in order to get
them out the door at the acceptable strength of over 90
percent. We are seeing that number go up from 9 percent to over
12 percent, and we are concerned because this is cumulative
over time.
We have seen an increase in the number of soldiers who have
mental health profiles. There is no surprise, I don't think,
for anybody that that would be the case. And when you don't
have the required dwell time back home to allow folks to heal
from muscular-skeletal issues that they have, humping a
rucksack at 10,000 to 12,000 feet in Afghanistan, you will see
those numbers grow, and we are seeing those numbers grow.
What it requires us to do is it requires us to take units
down to a lower percentage than we would like to when they go
through reset and build them up over time. But the problem you
have there is that we--as we get ready for our capstone
exercise in the trained and ready portion of that train-up to
go, many times we don't have upwards of 70 to 80 percent of the
unit available for that training exercise at that particular
time.
So it is creating some great challenges for us. But at the
same time, I can tell you, when those forces got into country
they are trained and ready and the best fighting force that we
have ever had.
Mr. Forbes. And you all do a wonderful job in dealing with
the resources you have, but if there is anything you can see
that we can do to assist you with that concern, please let us
know, because we understand it is a difficulty.
General Chiarelli. Appreciate that.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, I just thank our witnesses and
yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to return to the C-27 and the coordination
between Army and Air Force. I was in Afghanistan a year and a
half ago, and from my perspective, fortunately, Army couldn't
get me out of Chamkani, so I stayed there for about three days,
and it wound up being a better trip as a result of that.
The reason Army couldn't was because Army didn't have the
air assets that it needed in order to deal with the tempo and
also move some Congressmen. So I just said, ``I am last in line
here. Can't have soldiers be last in line.''
And so I wonder what the range of possible options might be
with regard to the coordination between Air Force and Army.
General Fraser, for example, is it conceivable that you could
wind up with Air Force simply providing the platform to the
Army and everything else is relatively the same from the Army's
perspective--Army warrant officers, Army chain of command, Army
complete control--although Army would not be saying, ``Here is
how we are going to be maintaining this, sustaining it, et
cetera.''
That would be one extreme, and I suppose the other extreme,
General Chiarelli, would be that Air Force is providing
absolutely everything and it is totally in control and Army has
to actually go through Air Force channels in order to access
the asset hour by hour, day by day. And then somehow there is
something that is in between that maybe works. From Army's
perspective, obviously, you would rather have the asset and
then all your people--chain of command, et cetera--and I am not
sure what Air Force would prefer to have.
Are both of those extremes, at this point, possible, or are
you much narrower than that?
General Fraser. Sir, that is why we have a group that
involves the Guard, the active duty Army, and active duty Air
Force that are coordinating on this and working with the
theater, working with everyone involved to ensure that we
understand the concepts of employment. And as we mentioned
earlier, that we will get that down in writing.
We see this as--as we step into this this is not going to
be all-in-all one day turned over, let us say, to the Air
Force. There will be a transition period, and that is why we
are working together with respect to the acquisition program to
make sure that there is a smooth transition.
So there is a number of items that are on the table. We
have a task to do out to report back, and we will do so in the
timeframe that is allotted to us. There is a number of things
that are being talked about.
Mr. Marshall. Well, with respect, sir, is the outer range
that I described possible? Could this group that is this task
force that is meeting--could this task force conclude that the
best way to go about this is to simply give the asset to the
Army and let Army National Guard, Army whoever, manage the
asset?
General Fraser. Sir, we are looking at this as, the mission
has been given to the Air Force, and that we are going to pick
up this mission. And that is how we are approaching this, and
to ensure that we get this capability to the theater as fast as
we can.
Mr. Marshall. Would Army personnel migrate--the Army
personnel, perhaps, who would otherwise have been accomplishing
a mission--would they migrate to the Air Force somehow? Would
Air Force take Army Warrant Officer pilots, for example, or
will Air Force be providing its own pilots?
General Fraser. Sir, I think here in the beginning what you
are going to see is there is certainly a mix, and I would not
discount any of that.
Mr. Marshall. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. This has been a very
productive hearing that we have had, and our country and us, we
appreciate your service. We are grateful for what you have
done, putting you, yourself in harm's way and the sacrifices
that not only you but that your families go through. So we are
very appreciative.
Hearing no other questions, this hearing stands adjourned.
And again, thank you so much.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 20, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 20, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 20, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 20, 2009
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Admiral Walsh. The reduction in dollar value of the Navy's
Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) Unfunded Program List of $4.6 billion
to the FY10 submission of $395 million is a recognition that a
substantial amount of the national budget is tied up in debt,
and that the Navy is taking a very disciplined approach about
how to sustain itself.
The idea that we can go forward in 2010 and still procure
aircraft, ships, and submarines is critically important to the
future of the Navy, and recognizes the Congress' commitment to
the Navy.
The effort now is to sustain the service life of those
assets, particularly in aviation and shipboard maintenance. The
Navy's unfunded submission will bring that level to 100 percent
of requirement.
If the CNO was given an extra dollar that is exactly where
it would go. It would go into the maintenance accounts rather
than for additional procurement. [See page 15.]
General Chiarelli. There are many factors that led to the
Army leadership's decision to forward $1 billion in unfunded
requirements to Congress. They focused on Readiness and the
programs where funding above the PB10 submission would provide
the greatest impact to readiness for the operational and
institutional force, including $200 million that carried over
from the FY09 requirements list. Additionally, requirements
change over time and the Army continues to refine and adjust
its requirements as it goes through the budget cycle. [See page
16.]
General Amos. There was no difference between the FY10
Unfunded Programs List that the Marine Corps submitted to the
Secretary of Defense for review and the list the Marine Corps
submitted to Congress. Our list was internally tailored to
focus on warfighter equipment, continued modernization, and
improved reset enablers to highlight the top priorities of our
unfunded programs. [See page 17.]
------
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
General Fraser. Answer 1a. The Air Force IG's at all levels
of the department (i.e., installation, Numbered Air Force,
MAJCOM, and HAF) are capable/available to assist Air Force
personnel. Part of their duties is to receive complaints from
Airmen. However, not all complaints are of reprisal. Complaints
in any given year run the full gamut from pay issues to
reprisal. The IG process calls for the IG to clarify (with the
complainant) the problem and then analyze the complaint to
determine the best way to resolve it. The Air Force IG has four
ways to resolve complaints: ASSIST, REFER, INVESTIGATE and
DISMISS.
In many cases the best way to resolve the complaint is to
assist the member to solve the problem for themselves (e.g.,
the IG will call the local finance office to help the member
resolve his/her pay issue directly). Other complaints are best
resolved by referring the complainant to another agency. In
these cases the IG will send the member to a more appropriate
agency such as Equal Opportunity Office if the complainant is
alleging sexual harassment. For the cases that warrant an IG
investigation, then the IG will submit a letter of appointment
to his/her commander and an investigation into the alleged
wrongdoing will be conducted (reprisal complaints are
investigated through the IG investigative process). Finally, if
the complaint is analyzed and no evidence of wrongdoing is
discovered the Air Force will recommend to DOD, IG the case be
dismissed. DOD IG is the final approval authority for reprisal
complaints.
In calendar year 2008, the Air Force closed 8,904
complaints: 5,123 through ASSIST; 2,351 through REFERRAL, 78
through INVESTIGATION, and 1,352 through DISMISSAL. [See page
29.]
Answer 1b. Yes. The Air Force, in recent years, has been
undergoing a transformation and the Inspector General has not
been immune to this transformation. To that end, the Inspector
General is currently working several initiatives that will make
the process more timely and efficient. One initiative the AF is
working on is the One Base--One IG concept that will allow one
installation IG to be responsible for and respond to all
personnel on a base. To complement this initiative we have
started the process of streamlining the initial investigative
phase for reprisal to allow the individual IG's to quickly
assess the facts in a reprisal complaint during the complaint
clarification phase and quickly move to the investigation phase
on the cases that warrant investigation. These changes will
allow the Air Force to provide better resolution products
quicker, thus keeping our Airmen focused on their mission. [See
page 29.]
Answer 1c. Air Force leadership shares the same concerns
as you do regarding whistleblower rights. To that end, the
identity of all whistleblowers is closely guarded, disclosing
it only to those who need it to resolve the issue.
Additionally, Air Force IGs continually educate commanders,
Airmen, and civilian members on the requirements associated
with whistleblower rights and protections. Finally, for
individuals who still feel uncomfortable, the Air Force allows
anonymous reporting. [See page 29.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
General Fraser. In order to accommodate the planned
increase in KC-135 PDMs at Tinker AFB, an additional 105
maintenance personnel will be hired under a phased approach.
Current Tinker AFB facilities are adequate to support the
planned increased workload. The execution of the organic plan
is underway to increase PDM capacity from 48 to 54 aircraft in
FY10. [See page 21.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. FALLIN
General Fraser. Despite the overall reduction of 10 KC-135
PDMs in FY10, the planned workload at Tinker AFB will increase
from 48 in FY09 to 54 in FY10. [See page 25.]
------
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
General Fraser. The Air National Guard (ANG) plays a
critical role for the Department of Defense, providing a
rapidly responsive force to meet national security
requirements. It is true that some metrics indicate an
apparently large cost advantage for ANG units compared to
active units. One such metric is ``operational cost per total
aircraft inventory,'' which shows ANG unit costs to be 33%
lower than active units. This metric does not take into account
important differences between ANG and active units and how they
calculate costs. For example, ANG units typically leverage the
infrastructure of active duty or commercial facilities through
Joint Use Agreements, yielding efficiencies that are not
available to active duty units. Additionally, lower costs
expressed in this metric are also due to differences in manning
(part-time versus full-time) and significant differences in the
number of flight hours flown by the respective units. As a
result, it is difficult to use this metric to accurately
compare costs of active duty and Air National Guard (ANG)
units.
Another metric, ``operational cost per flight hour''
(CPFH), includes all military personnel and Operations and
Maintenance costs. CPFH is a more appropriate metric to compare
costs between flying units because it scales for differing
levels of operational activity. CPFH data in the Air Force
Total Ownership Cost database permits a comparison of the F-16C
and F-16D for ANG and active units from 1996 through 2006.
During this period, Air National Guard CPFH for the F-16C was
5.2% lower than the active duty costs in the three Air Force
major commands (Air Combat Command, Pacific Air Forces, and US
Air Forces Europe) that operate the F-16C.
For the F-16D, ANG costs were 11.7% lower than active
units. [See page 27.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 20, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Mr. Ortiz. Army combat units are under significant stress and
soldiers are spending little time at home between combat deployments.
This is especially true for the Combat Service and Combat Service
Support (CS/CSS) units. These units, whose duties range from medical to
maintenance, have been heavily taxed due to their unique missions and
limited depth. As troop levels are reduced in Iraq there will be a
greater need for the CS/CSS soldiers. At the same time, operations in
Afghanistan are increasing, and the austere nature of that theater will
require more CS/CSS troops instead of the contractors that provided so
much support for our forces in Iraq. What are you doing to increase the
number and availability of CS/CSS units? Will the Army rebalance itself
to increase the mix of support to combat troops? How will stopping the
growth of the Army's Brigade Combat Teams at 45 improve or exacerbate
the stress on CS/CSS troops? How does this budget request address this
urgent requirement?
General Chiarelli. In 2007, the administration recognized that Army
resources were insufficient to meet current operational demand and that
continued stress on the force would lead to unacceptable strategic
risk. The President, authorized by Congress, approved an end strength
increase of 74.2K across all three components (65K AC, 8.2K ARNG, 1K
USAR). Implementation of the end strength increase, in conjunction with
the rebalancing and right-sizing of structure across and within
components into needed Operating Force capabilities, was intended to
increase Brigade Combat Team (BCT) surge capacity; expand capabilities
for missile defense, Military Police (MP), Engineer, Improvised
Explosive Device threat mitigation, force protection, intelligence, and
communications; and provide key CS/CSS enablers to mitigate persistent
shortfalls. The rebalancing of Army structure is a continuous effort
requiring frequent review and adjustment to meet projected operational
demand within authorized resources. Force structure change is not
immediate, requiring time and resources. Some examples of programmed
growth from FY06 to FY15 include 47 MP Combat Support Companies, 9 Air
Ambulance Companies, 12 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies, 117
Civil Affairs Companies, and 107 Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
Detachments. Stopping the growth of the Army's BCTs at 45 while
maintaining programmed end strength (a key point), will address CS/CSS
unit stress by reducing force structure demand on the Army's end
strength, improving unit manning levels, and eliminating the routine
use of stop loss.
The President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2010 adds additional
Army Force Structure for Echelons above Brigade, with over 100 new Army
units of various sizes (detachments to full-size battalions). These new
units are part of the phased implementation of Grow the Army and other
force structure initiatives. They provide the Army with operational
depth needed to sustain enduring levels of force deployment to meet
global commitments. Included are many high-demand engineer, military
police, signal, intelligence, air defense, and transportation units.
This growth will help reduce the stress for these high-demand units. In
addition, this budget provides increased home station training funding
to support the modular force design which will bring the Army closer to
a balanced training program for the entire Force.
Mr. Ortiz. The budget request includes funding for 550 tank
training miles in FY10. This represents a decrease in miles from the
FY09 budgeted level of 608 miles. Tank miles are a vital part of the
training required to restore the Army's ability to conduct full-
spectrum combat operations. How do you justify a decrease in training
miles considering the current readiness shortfalls and the need to
restore full-spectrum combat capability?
General Chiarelli. The Army's FY09 budget request for 608 miles was
reduced to 547 miles in the FY09 Appropriations bill. The FY10 budget
level of 550 miles acknowledges prior year Congressional actions and
recognizes the associated level of risk inherent in this highly dynamic
period of rotational deployments. The principal challenges impacting
Army training and readiness are a function of current demand for forces
exceeding supply. This high demand shortens dwell time for units and
requires mission-specific focused training which increases readiness to
meet directed missions at the expense of core unit and individual
tasks. The Army will evaluate unit training requirements during the
execution years to reassess and mitigate risks to readiness as
necessary. The Army remains committed to achieving a balanced force
capable of executing a broad range of requirements encompassing
operational themes of peace operations, peacetime military engagement,
limited intervention, irregular warfare and major combat operations.
Mr. Ortiz. A key tenet of the Navy's ability to maintain forward-
deployed and surge-ready naval forces is the proper resourcing,
planning and execution of maintenance needed to prepare and sustain its
ships. The Fleet Response Plan, when fully funded, should enable the
Navy to continuously deploy three Carrier Strike Groups to points
around the globe, surge three more in 30 days and deploy a seventh in
90 days. What happens when sufficient resources are not found and
accounts are not fully funded? What level of strategic risk is Navy
asking the Nation to accept by not fully funding Navy O&M requirements?
Admiral Walsh. When fully resourced, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP)
enables us to deploy three Carrier Strike Groups, surge three more in
30 days, and deploy a 7th in 90 days. When sufficient resources are not
found, the Navy must strike a balance between risk to our future
readiness and current operational requirements. The Navy's baseline
budget does not deliver an adequate FRP posture for FY 2010 projected
security requirements, requiring the Navy to rely on baseline and
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to meet COCOM
requirements. While the Department's FY 2010 baseline and OCO funding
will meet the projected Navy Presence Requirements of three Carrier
Strike Groups (CSGs), it assumes risk in the FRP Surge required to meet
emergent COCOM requirements and Major Combat Operation (MCO) timelines
with the required assets.
Mr. Ortiz. Operational tempo for Navy surface combatants has
increased 19% since 2000. While maintenance and ship operating budgets
also have increased, the focus of those additional maintenance dollars
were aimed at near-term ship readiness, making the surface fleet much
more susceptible to changes in operational tempo. Is the Navy funding
the maintenance it needs or doing the maintenance it has funding for?
When you look at the sharp rise in operational tempo and the slight
rise in maintenance funding, are we funding short-term readiness gains
in operational availability at the expense of maintenance required to
fund long-term readiness?
Admiral Walsh. The Navy makes every effort to fund the maintenance
it needs. In FY10, fiscal constraints and competing requirements
resulted in a budget request that included a $200 million unfunded
requirement in the ship depot maintenance account. The Navy is
completing the maintenance necessary to support operational tasking.
However, there are early signs that surface ship material readiness is
being impacted by three things: the lack of refined and technically
validated Integrated Class Maintenance Plans (ICMP) to define the 100%
maintenance requirement for meeting expected service life, the current
process for executing maintenance, and the amount of surface ship
maintenance funding. PB10 ship maintenance funding is reliant on
baseline budget and OCO funding to meet the surface ship maintenance
requirements for FY10.
In the last several years, the Navy and Surface Warfare Enterprise
have taken specific steps to address these issues. The Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) has allocated more technical resources to
surface ships and is working to establish technical redlines for our
surface ships that will help establish the foundation for each ship
class ICMP. NAVSEA has also chartered the standup of SEA 21 with
assigned responsibilities as the full-spectrum life cycle manager for
surface ships. SEA 21 is leading the effort to conduct a bottom up
review of each ICMP and provide work package development and oversight
similar to what we have today on our submarines and aircraft carriers.
SEA 21 has also established the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management
(SSLCM) activity to manage work package development and ICMP.
Finally, from a resource perspective, ship maintenance must be part
of a balanced approach within our operating accounts to ensure COCOM
demand is being met, with acceptable risk, while at the same time
ensuring that critical maintenance necessary to ensure future readiness
is being accomplished.
Mr. Ortiz. How would failure to achieve the 11-carrier waiver
affect the Navy's ship maintenance cost and schedule?
Admiral Walsh. The extension of CVN 65 until 2015 would also result
in a domino effect of delays in scheduled ship maintenance and docking
periods and reduce overall aircraft carrier availability while
providing only one additional deployment for CVN 65.
Navy has requested a legislative waiver to temporarily decrease the
number of active duty aircraft carriers from 11 to 10 between the
planned November 2012 inactivation of CVN 65 (USS Enterprise) and the
September 2015 delivery of CVN 78 (USS Gerald R. Ford). If the
legislation is not approved, a minimum of $2.8B in funding, which
includes Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OMN), Military Personnel,
Navy (MPN), and Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), would be
required to extend CVN 65 until 2015. If additional funding is not
provided, the Navy would allocate OMN, MPN and SCN funds from other
requirements impacting the Navy's ability to meet operational demands.
Mr. Ortiz. How long will it take the Marine Corps to recover key
core warfighting capabilities following cessation of operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan?
General Amos. Once operations are concluded in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we estimate it would take about 36 months to fully reset
our equipment assets and reconstitute full-spectrum Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) training readiness. This projection assumes that
adequate resources will be provided and sustained to continue our RESET
and modernization plans which are key to restoring current and future
warfighting capabilities. We anticipate the Marine Corps restoration of
training readiness to include: 6-18 months for unit training;
concurrently 24-36 months for integrated combined arms training; and
concurrently 36 months for initial amphibious training. In addition,
large-scale Command and Control training and joint/combined exercises
are also critical to regaining our full-spectrum capability. We are
committed to maintaining our expeditionary capability as the Nation's
force in readiness, and with your continued support we can achieve
these timelines.
Mr. Ortiz. Where in the continental United States does the Marine
Corps have the ability to bring brigade-size force together for a live-
fire training exercise? How important is the 29 Palms facility to
retention of the Marine Corps' warfighting capabilities?
General Amos. The capability for the Marine Corps to bring together
a brigade-sized force for a live-fire exercise does not currently
exist. As captured in detail in the Marine Corps' response to similar
questions contained in Section 2829 of National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, geographical and fiscal constraints
preclude the Marine Corps from addressing existing training space
shortfalls. Currently, major deficits in the Marine Corps' ability to
train to the many missions that it faces; the largest gaps in training
capability include:
The inability to exercise a large-scale (brigade level) MAGTF in a
``live'' training scenario. The reach of modern weapon systems and
tactical doctrine require a much larger land and airspace area than the
Marine Corps currently has available. Only the Marine Corps Air Ground
Combat Center (MCAGCC)/Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command
(MAGTFTC) at Twenty-nine Palms, California comes close but given its
many other missions and its limited size relative to the area required
for Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) training, it cannot fully
accommodate a MEB-size unit.
The USMC has an ongoing project to expand the MCAGCC in order to
enable a large-scale, live-fire and maneuver training exercise capable
of supporting MEB training sufficient to allow 48 to 72 hours of live-
fire and maneuver by three battalions converging on a single MEB-level
objective.
As stated in the Marine Corps' response to questions contained in
Section 2829 of NDAA FY08, MCAGCC Twenty-nine Palms is critical to the
retention of Marine Corps warfighting capabilities. Today, the Combat
Center, as headquarters to the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training
Command (MAGTFTC), provides (1) the principal venue for advanced,
Service-level core capability/core competency training, Service-level
live-fire/fire and maneuver ranges, and training for deploying Marine
Corps forces; (2) the center of excellence for developing and executing
combined arms live-fire training of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF); and (3) multiple ranges replicating the urban environment.
Additionally, Twenty-nine Palms is home station to ground combat,
aviation, and logistics units. The development of this premiere
training installation has been driven primarily by the need to support
the evolving training requirements of the MAGTF resulting from new
doctrine, tactics, weapons systems, and missions. These have steadily
expanded the operational pace and required maneuver space of modern
warfare.
Mr. Ortiz. The Marine Corps has accepted considerable risk in its
fiscal year 2010 depot maintenance accounts. How important is reset to
the Marine Corps' ability to sustain equipment for current operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan and to provide for ongoing training of non-
deployed and next-to-deploy units? What is the O&M funding profile for
reset in the fiscal year 2010 budget request?
General Amos. The funding profile for reset in the USMC FY2010
Overseas Contingency Operations budget includes $950M in organization,
intermediate and depot level maintenance, as well as contractor
logistics support. Reset funding is critical for mission
accomplishment. USMC will always ensure that deploying units have the
best equipment available at the expense of home station inventory if
the availability of a specific piece of gear is limited. (Reset funding
is not included in our operations and maintenance baseline funding
request.) Depot maintenance for aviation is captured in the Navy's
operations and maintenance budgets.
Mr. Ortiz. If the Congress were to impede the retirement of fighter
aircraft as proposed in the FY10 budget request, what would the impact
be on the Air Force's O&M account?
General Fraser. The impact of not allowing the Air Force to retire
250 fighter aircraft in FY10 would result in adding back $328M for
32,183 O&M flying hours; $17M in other O&M support costs for squadron
operations; and realigning 4K positions from critical skills and new
and emerging Air Force missions back to their original career field.
Total O&M funding impact in FY10 is $345M.
Mr. Ortiz. How do readiness rates for deployed units compare to
those within CONUS? What impact are these readiness rates having on
your ability to train your forces when not deployed?
General Fraser. AF training and exercises are aligned with our AEF
rotations and deployments to ensure we deploy mission-ready units from
CONUS. USAF units remain fully ready for their deployed missions while
in the AOR; however, some units' full-spectrum mission readiness erodes
while deployed.
Upon return to CONUS from deployment, this erosion causes many
units to require additional training to get them back to their fully
mission-ready status. This creates additional demands on training
resources. The overall impact is a ``time-lag'' in regaining a unit's
full-spectrum readiness as a result of balancing their training
requirements against the requirement to ensure a unit preparing to
deploy is fully mission-ready in time for their AEF rotation.
Mr. Ortiz. In March, Chairman Skelton and Chairman Ortiz requested
that the Department and the military services halt any pending A-76
studies and conduct a thorough review of the program. What is the Air
Force doing to comply with that request? Have you received any guidance
from OSD on the matter? Will a halt on A-76 activities impact your
fiscal year 2010 budget request?
General Fraser. In accordance with the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations
Act, we have not initiated any new public-private competitions this
fiscal year. We are also currently reviewing three ongoing Air Force A-
76 studies to determine if we should proceed or request OSD
cancellation. Our internal review of these competitions should be
completed by 31 July 2009.
We have received no additional guidance regarding A-76 other than
the OSD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' 15 April 2009 response
to Chairman Skelton and Chairman Ortiz stating DOD will not announce
any new A-76 competitions this fiscal year and is reviewing all ongoing
competitions.
Halting A-76 activity would not impact fiscal year 2010 budget
requests as A-76 programming is performed at the conclusion of the
competition.
Mr. Ortiz. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert many
contract positions to DOD civilian billets. In your fiscal year 2010
budget request, it appears that you are planning to in-source 4,000
positions during the course of the year. How did you arrive at this
number? Was any analysis done to determine which billets would be
converted or were the conversions merely levied across the Department?
General Fraser. OSD levied conversion targets on the Service
Components and subsequently removed contract dollars from the Air
Force. As a result, they assumed a 40% savings and the remaining
dollars were used to fund civilian manpower authorizations for in-
sourcing. The Air Force is in the process of identifying specific in-
sourcing candidates based on mission requirements, Inherently
Governmental and Commercial Activities Review, and individual business
case analysis.
Mr. Ortiz. Although I support the Secretary's efforts to reshape
the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and
capabilities in that workforce, I'm concerned that you may be
implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive and could have a
long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, measuring
the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted in the
execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best
interest of the service or the Department. How can we be assured that
this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just
in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the
services by OSD?
General Fraser. Both public-private competitions and in-sourcing,
when selectively applied, are useful tools for ensuring workload is
performed by the most cost-effective means. In-sourcing candidates will
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In-sourcing decisions will be
based on Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity Review,
mission requirements and business case analysis as appropriate.
Mr. Ortiz. The Air Force has proposed to defer investments in
facilities sustainment and restoration. The Air Force is requesting
funds necessary to support only 59% of the required facility
recapitalization. Why did the Air Force elect to take risk in the
facility accounts and delay critical restoration and modernization
activities? What is the long-term effect of a delay in funding
restoration and modernization activities?
General Fraser. Modernizing the Air Force's aging aircraft fleet is
our toughest challenge; in order to recapitalize and modernize, the Air
Force must take risk in some areas. Because the Air Force invested
heavily in infrastructure in the past (with the outstanding support of
Congress), we decided taking risk in our facility accounts was
acceptable for a short duration.
The Air Force views installations as critical war-fighting
platforms that provide a core AF expeditionary combat capability. We
will ensure our risk taken in our facilities and infrastructure will
not jeopardize our ability to conduct critical operations from our
installation weapon systems. We intend to mitigate potential shortfalls
in MILCON and facility maintenance funding by bolstering our
restoration and modernization programs as much as possible. Using an
enterprise portfolio perspective, we intend to focus our limited
resources only on the most critical physical plant components, by
applying demolition and space utilization strategies to reduce our
footprint, aggressively pursuing energy initiatives, continuing to
privatize family housing and modernizing dormitories to improve quality
of life for our Airmen.
We really appreciate the efforts of Congress with the recent
passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This
legislation will help us reduce our facility restoration,
modernization, and recapitalization backlog of over $16B by $1.5B. To
date, we awarded over $600M worth of these projects and expect to have
the most of the remainder awarded by the end of September 2009.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert many
contract positions to DOD civilian billets. How did you arrive at the
number of billets to be outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any
analysis done to determine which billets would be converted or were the
conversions merely levied across the Department? Do you have any
concerns that the ``cost savings'' anticipated with this in-sourcing
activity as reflected in your FY2010 budget request may not be
realized?
General Chiarelli. The in-sourcing target was levied by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and not developed by the Army. Although the
Army had started to implement a review of its contractor inventory
established pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 in January 2009, prior to the levying of these targets
in May 2009, this review did not inform the initial targets established
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, 8,379 of the 9,913
positions programmed and budgeted for in-sourcing from FY10-15 were
subsequently validated as of June 26, 2009, by the contractor inventory
review process as implicating acquisition functions, functions closely
associated with inherently governmental functions, inherently
governmental functions, and unauthorized personal services. (As of
August 15, 2009, the contractor inventory review process identified
9,471 out of 11,084 positions programmed and budgeted for in-sourcing
from FY10-15 as involving acquisition functions, inherently
governmental functions, closely associated with inherently governmental
functions, and unauthorized personal services.) Reprogramming may be
required to align initial funding targets to positions where contractor
inventory reviews support in-sourcing. Based on prior Army experience
with in-sourcing about 1162 positions, the savings varied based on
function and location and averaged at 33 percent and not the 40 percent
assumed in the budget request.
Mr. Forbes. Although I support the Secretary's efforts to reshape
the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and
capabilities in that workforce, I'm concerned that you may be
implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive and could have a
long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, measuring
the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted in the
execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best
interest of the service or the Department. How can we be assured that
this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just
in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the
services by OSD?
General Chiarelli. The Army established the contractor inventory
prescribed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 and completed as of June 26, 2009, a thorough review of 52 percent
of the activities on that inventory to identify 1,085 inherently
governmental functions, 12,895 closely associated with inherently
governmental functions and 40 unauthorized personal services. This
review involved detailed analysis of how commands performed contracted
functions within its organizations, looking at the total manpower mix
of military, civilian employee and contractor within that organization.
A comprehensive checklist compiled from the relevant statutory
definitions and criteria for in-sourcing was used by the Commands when
performing this analysis (see checklist at http://www.asamra.army.mil/
insourcing). In addition, Army contracting activities will not process
an action for contract services absent a certification from the
requiring activity with this checklist attached. The Army Audit Agency
is in the process of auditing the application of this checklist
throughout the Army. Based on the above reviews completed as of June
26, 2009, 8,379 of the 9,913 positions programmed and budgeted for in-
sourcing from FY10-15 were subsequently validated by the contractor
inventory review process as implicating acquisition functions,
functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions,
inherently governmental functions, and unauthorized personal services.
(As of August 15, 2009, the contractor inventory review process
identified 9,471 out of 11,084 positions programmed and budgeted for
in-sourcing from FY10-15 as involving acquisition functions, inherently
governmental functions, closely associated with inherently governmental
functions, and unauthorized personal services.) Reprogramming may be
required to align initial funding targets to positions where contractor
inventory reviews support in-sourcing. We have made the case that any
future in-sourcing candidates should be identified based on this
deliberative process and expect that our recommendations may be
followed.
Mr. Forbes. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert may
contract positions to DOD civilian billets. How did you arrive at the
number of billets to be outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any
analysis done to determine which billets would be converted or were the
conversions merely levied across the Department? Do you have any
concerns that the ``cost savings'' anticipated with this in-sourcing
activity as reflected in your FY2010 budget request may not be
realized?
Admiral Walsh. The number of billets to be in-sourced in FY2010
were passed from OSD to the components as goals. Navy is working to
solidify a comprehensive plan to meet our goal. The Budget Submitting
Offices are currently assisting in the analysis to identify specific
functions as in sourcing candidates. Once the analysis is complete we
will have a better understanding of how to achieve the potential ``cost
savings.''
Mr. Forbes. Although I support the Secretary's efforts to reshape
the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and
capabilities in that workforce, I'm concerned that you may be
implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive and could have a
long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, measuring
the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted the
execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best
interest of the service or the Department. How can we be assured that
this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just
in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the
services by OSD?
Admiral Walsh. As we move forward toward implementing requirements
of DOD directed resource management adjustments and Sec 324 FY2008
NDAA, Navy is looking at the workforce from a Total Force perspective.
We are reviewing our core capabilities and skill sets necessary to meet
emerging requirements. In-sourcing provides us an additional avenue to
shape the workforce properly to meet these requirements and maximizes
our ability to carry out the mission with the most cost-effective
workforce.
Navy views in-sourcing as an opportunity. As we look at the
workforce from a Total Force perspective, there are core capabilities
and skill sets required for emerging capabilities. In-sourcing provides
us an additional avenue to shape the workforce properly to meet these
requirements.
Mr. Forbes. How did you arrive at the number of billets to be
outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any analysis done to determine
which billets would be converted or were the conversions merely levied
across the Department? Do you have any concerns that the ``cost
savings'' anticipated with this in-sourcing activity as reflected in
your FY2010 budget request may not be realized?
General Amos. Working with the assigned OSD civilian hire targets,
the Marine Corps has convened a working group consisting of
headquarters activities, contracting officers, HR community, financial
managers and the field to determine where in-sourcing makes sense and
establish the permanent civilian billet requirements to be added,
contracts re-scoped for cost savings or eliminated in FY 2010. The
realignments of funding and civilian labor in FY 2010 were based on the
dollar value of contracts identified in budget justification material.
Those numbers were adjusted to reflect a rebalancing of contracts
versus in-house labor that corresponds with our pre-war levels of
funding and manning. The notional targets distributed by OSD were based
on this premise. Currently, we believe the personnel goals are
attainable in FY 2010 but remain concerned about the savings targets.
Mr. Forbes. Although I support the Secretary's efforts to reshape
the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and
capabilities in that workforce, I'm concerned that you may be
implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive and could have a
long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, measuring
the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted the
execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best
interest of the service or the Department. How can we be assured that
this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just
in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the
services by OSD?
General Amos. The execution plan for Marine Corps has three phases.
First, we will tackle FY10, then FY11 and finally, the third phase will
focus on FY12-15 adjustments. The first phase will focus on
professional administrative and management support product services
contracts. FY11 and out considerations will include all types of
contracts.
USMC will work with the Navy and OSD to realign funding as
necessary during the year of execution if problems arise with in-
sourcing execution. OSD continues to work with the services to prepare
for the manpower and funding shift and has highlighted the need for a
prudent civilian/contractor balance that takes into consideration pay,
training and facilities needed to support the increased civilian
workforce. A critical component to overall execution will be the
ability of the Department of Navy human resources community and
individual managers to handle the volume of personnel actions necessary
to bring a large number of civilians on board.
Mr. Forbes. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert may
contract positions to DOD civilian billets. How did you arrive at the
number of billets to be outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any
analysis done to determine which billets would be converted or were the
conversions merely levied across the Department? Do you have any
concerns that the ``cost savings'' anticipated with this in-sourcing
activity as reflected in your FY2010 budget request may not be
realized?
General Fraser. OSD levied conversion targets on the Service
Components and subsequently removed contract dollars from the Air
Force. As a result, they assumed a 40% savings and the remaining
dollars were used to fund civilian manpower authorizations for in-
sourcing. The Air Force is in the process of identifying specific in-
sourcing candidates based on mission requirements, Inherently
Governmental and Commercial Activities Review and individual business
case analysis. Our preliminary findings are that 40% savings are
possible.
Mr. Forbes. Although I support the Secretary's efforts to reshape
the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and
capabilities in that workforce, I'm concerned that you may be
implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive and could have a
long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, measuring
the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted the
execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best
interest of the service or the Department. How can we be assured that
this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just
in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the
services by OSD?
General Fraser. Both public-private competitions and in-sourcing,
when selectively applied, are useful tools for ensuring workload is
performed by the most cost effective means. In-sourcing candidates will
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In-sourcing decisions will be
based on Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity Review,
mission requirements and business case analysis as appropriate. In-
Sourcing candidates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In-
Sourcing decisions will be based on Inherently Governmental and
Commercial Activity Review, mission requirements, and business case
analysis as appropriate.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. We recently learned from a press release sent by the
Utah delegation that Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah was selected as the
site to establish the Army's Rapid Integration and Acceptance Center
for UAS's. I have not, however, seen this in a formal Army
announcement. The press release states that the Rapid Integration and
Acceptance Center would integrate systems and conduct testing on the
Hunter, Shadow and Sky Warrior Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS's).
Currently a portion of this mission is conducted at Fort Huachuca and
Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona. Moving these missions to Dugway will
force more than 200 hard-working employees near Fort Huachuca alone out
of a job. It is my understanding that the original plan for the UAS
Program Manager was to conduct a series of final visits and site
assessments. From these visits they were to make an informed decision
about where this mission should be established based on the
requirements and available assets at the location. PM UAS subsequently
canceled their scheduled visits to Ft. Huachuca and Yuma just prior to
the announcement by the Utah Delegation. In light of these canceled
site surveys, please explain what criteria were used to make this
decision?
General Chiarelli. Program Manager-UAS has no current activities
being conducted at Yuma Proving Ground (YPG). Yuma was one of the sites
being surveyed. The Warrior-class UAS test activities are currently
being conducted at El Mirage, outside of Victorville, CA. AAI (Shadow)
has about 75 personnel and Northrop Grumman (Hunter) has about 15
personnel supporting their respective programs in the Fort Huachuca
area. The final survey trip was cancelled after Dugway Proving Ground
(DPG) was selected as the site for the RIAC. The last surveys were for
final confirmation of information that had already been gathered during
previous surveys. This data was already obtained from the respective
staffs at the surveyed locations. The selection criteria used to make
the decision included:
(1) Maximum amount of restricted airspace available to fly
unmanned aircraft without requiring a Certificate of Authorization
(COA) from the Federal Aviation Administration. A COA requires a chase
plane for UAS operations, which causes additional costs to the program.
(2) A very clean frequency spectrum, not only for current needs,
but for future data and video links and payloads.
(3) Ability to launch and deploy external stores and weapons.
(4) Ability to support large-scale joint interoperability testing
with multiple aircraft and control stations.
(5) Available facilities or ability to expand with new facilities
to support current and future growth.
(6) High priority with maximum flexibility to fly unimpeded when
needed.
(7) The ability to consolidate all the activities at one location.
(8) During the original analysis of the three most likely
locations (Fort Huachuca, YPG, and DPG), Dugway was the clear lead in
every criteria.
Ms. Giffords. Fort Huachuca owns a significant piece of restricted
airspace that only they control, free of commercial and general air
traffic. It is also home to the Electronic Proving Grounds, free of
excessive electromagnetic interference, ideal for testing
communications systems. How does Dugway's airspace, shared with Salt
Lake International Airport and Hill Air Force Base and with a busy
electromagnetic spectrum give it an operational advantage?
General Chiarelli. Dugway's airspace is restricted and controlled
by the U.S. Army and not shared by Salt Lake International Airport.
Dugway's airspace is as large as that at Fort Huachuca, but
substantially less congested, not having to deal with the Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) Training Center, as well as manned and unmanned
traffic (border patrol missions and other training activities) at Libby
Army Airfield. Additionally, with prior coordination, additional
restricted airspace controlled by the U.S. Air Force could be made
available if needed for weapons firing and long-range datalink testing.
Due to all the UAS efforts (and being home to substantial electronics
testing at the Electronic Proving Grounds) at Fort Huachuca, the
frequency spectrum is challenging with shared frequencies within the
operating bands of UAS programs. According to the Department of Defense
frequency database, all frequencies required for current needs and
future plans are available at Dugway with minimal interference.
Ms. Giffords. While consolidating the mission at one location may
be more economical, with a lack of final surveys do you think your
staff fully considered the costs of this move to Dugway?
General Chiarelli. Surveys were started in March 2008 through April
2009. The final survey was scheduled to validate previous survey
results. Costs were considered during the surveys. In fact, every
location surveyed required additional infrastructure and associated
costs. Fort Huachuca was the most costly due to limited facilities
available for consolidated activities due to its current and planned
missions as indicated by the Garrison staff.
Ms. Giffords. There are already substantial facilities at Fort
Huachuca for the UAS Mission and more facilities under construction and
to begin construction shortly. There are also well embedded and deeply
rooted industry partners in the areas performing the production and
testing prior to final acceptance. Are there similar substantial and
robust facilities and contractor presence at Dugway?
General Chiarelli. There were no existing facilities available at
Fort Huachuca for consolidation of Army UAS activities at that
location. Fort Huachuca RIAC activities would be in three different
locations unless they were to build an entirely new complex, including
runways, office and hangar space, etc.
Dugway offers an airfield that allows for at least three
simultaneous UAS flight activities to occur, one from a 13,000 foot
long runway that has minimal air traffic, one from a taxiway over 8,000
feet long, and another from taxiway of over 2,000 feet. Dugway also has
a 20,000 square foot hangar, almost half of which is being made
available until suitable maintenance buildings can be built.
Additionally, Dugway offers an expansive area for any new facilities
needed, all adjacent to the existing ramp and accessible to the
runways.
Ms. Giffords. What are the plans for relocating the skilled workers
with unique experience on the Shadow and Hunter UAS systems from Fort
Huachuca to Dugway and how many of these employees are expected to
actually relocate to Dugway? How will this potential loss of skilled
employees impact the mission?
General Chiarelli. Each prime contractor has developed their own
incentive packages for moving their existing personnel to Dugway. In
early June 2009, AAI expected more than 50 percent of their Shadow
workforce to move in early June 2009. Subsequently, AAI offered an
incentive package, so the number of AAI personnel who will actually
move will not be known until July 31, 2009. Several of the AAI
employees at Fort Huachuca will most likely accept positions with the
Unmanned Aircraft System Training Brigade (UASTB) located at Fort
Huachuca thereby minimizing the impact to the families that choose to
stay at Fort Huachuca versus moving to Dugway. Fort Huachuca's current
mission will be minimally impacted based on the phased approach to
standing up the activities at Dugway. Northrop Grumman is also moving
in a phased approach, although there are substantially fewer personnel
to be moved. It is expected that over 50 percent of the Northrop
Grumman employees will move to Dugway. There is no expected impact to
the Hunter mission due to the move. The role of the UASTB will increase
with the addition of training for the Extended Range Multi-purpose
(ERMP) UAS that begins this fall with ERMP Quick Reaction Capability-2,
allowing further employment opportunities for AAI and Northrop Grumman
personnel currently located at Fort Huachuca. We are attempting to
mitigate the impact to Fort Huachuca by pursuing a phased approach to
standing up activities at Dugway.
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