[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-28]
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 24, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 24, 2009, Security Developments in the Areas of
Responsibility of the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European
Command, and U.S. Forces Korea................................. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 24, 2009.......................................... 35
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2009
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Craddock, Gen. Bantz J., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command,
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe........................... 5
Keating, Adm. Timothy J., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command... 4
Sharp, Gen. Walter L. ``Skip,'' USA, Commander, United Nations
Command, Commander, Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces
Command, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.......................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Craddock, Gen. Bantz J....................................... 81
Keating, Adm. Timothy J...................................... 42
Sharp, Gen. Walter L. ``Skip''............................... 161
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 196
Mr. Larsen................................................... 195
Mr. Wilson................................................... 195
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 24, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Welcome. Today the Committee will continue
its annual series of posture hearings with combatant
commanders. I am pleased to welcome Admiral Timothy Keating,
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (U.S. PACOM); General
Bantz Craddock, Commander of the U.S. European Command (U.S.
EUCOM) and Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO); and General ``Skip'' Sharp,
Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), who we visited with
in Korea not so long ago. Thank you very, very much for being
with us, and thank you for your leadership.
Over the last several years, we have been so focused on
Iraq and Afghanistan that a broad range of security challenges
and potential flashpoints elsewhere in the world have not
gotten the attention that they merit.
Let me review a few of the challenges ahead in the Asia-
Pacific. The rebasing of American Marines from Japan to Guam is
one of the largest movements of military assets in decades,
estimated to cost over $10 billion. In my estimation, that is
openers. Yet it is not clear that the Department of Defense
(DOD) has fully thought through all the plans to support the
Marines on Guam or those remaining in Okinawa.
As Admiral Keating knows, a delegation from this committee
recently returned from Okinawa and Guam. The changes being
planned as part of that move affect not only our bilateral
relationship with Japan, they shape our strategic posture
throughout the critical Asia-Pacific region for at least 50
years to come. I am deeply concerned that the current plans do
not address all the concerns that would impact our ability to
train fully and also to operate and fight in the region if we
must. We must get that right.
In Korea, the plans for relocation appear solid, but there
are remaining questions about how the upcoming transformation
of the U.S.-South Korean Command relationship will account for
the range of scenarios that could emerge on the Korean
Peninsula. General Sharp went into this with us when we had the
chance to visit with him.
At the same time, North Korea has threatened to test a
missile that could theoretically reach the west coast of the
United States, and serious concerns remain about the regime's
nuclear capabilities.
China has just announced another double-digit increase in
its military budget. And security relations with China remain
strained following the harassment of an American naval vessel
by Chinese ships in the South China Sea.
India's relations with Pakistan remain strained following
the terrorist bombing last year. Throughout Indonesia, the
Philippines, and much of Southeast Asia, the threat of
terrorism, violence and instability remain extraordinarily
high. And while we have been preoccupied in the Middle East,
China and others have been expanding their influence in Latin
America, Africa, as well as around the globe.
In Europe, the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia
was a stark reminder that our security challenges in the region
are still very real. It is a region with real and latent
frictions, including the ever-present instability in the
Balkans. EUCOM plays an important role in the stability and
security of the continent, and NATO is also as important as
ever. Still, we have come to regard NATO chiefly as a resource
to be employed elsewhere. We shouldn't forget its original
purpose. While closer ties with Russia are to be encouraged,
Russia's actions in Georgia, its ties with Venezuela, and its
involvement in the natural gas crisis this winter remind us
that NATO is first and foremost an organization for collective
security in Europe.
I remain deeply concerned about NATO's mission in
Afghanistan. The administration will shortly put forward a
strategy for Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. What is clear to
me, while additional American investment and leadership is
needed, our allies must do more as well. The problems from that
region affect us all. I know NATO allies have increased their
contributions to that mission in recent years, but I remain
concerned about the restriction some nations put on the
employment of their forces. In some cases, it is a question
about national will, but to the extent those decisions reflect
concerns about capability, I encourage EUCOM to continue to do
the sorts of capacity-building efforts that have shown such a
positive impact over the years, both with our NATO allies as
well as other regional partners.
This is a time when we should be proactively engaged in the
Asia-Pacific region and in Europe on multiple fronts, and
realize that our own actions may well influence the choices and
actions of others. I am pleased to see the Department of
Defense and the Obama Administration already taking a number of
positive steps in that direction, and I hope to see more as we
move forward.
We look forward to hearing from you, gentlemen. Before we
begin our testimony, I turn to the Ranking Member, my friend,
my partner, John McHugh, the gentleman from New York, for any
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my words of welcome to our three distinguished
guests. If my math is correct, we have three outstanding
individuals who wear, collectively, six different hats. And
although we are here today for a very specific discussion with
three of those hats, clearly their other responsibilities, both
individually and collectively, distinguishes their leadership
as some of the best on the planet today. And, gentlemen, thank
you.
And, of course, as always, please carry back with you all
of our--the Chairman's, mine, all of the Members' greatest
compliments to those brave men and women that you lead every
day, meeting the challenges of securing freedom and democracy
across the planet.
We do have some votes coming up at about 1:30, and as much
as the Chairman and I like to hear ourselves talk, we are
really here to listen more than that. But let me just make a
couple of points. For those who are interested, they can read
my full statement at their leisure.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. McHugh. Let me start off with our discussions in recent
days about the so-called ``Russia reset policy.'' And as the
Chairman noted, since the Georgia conflict, it has been a time
of challenge for us, for our NATO allies, as to what EUCOM has
called a ``reevaluation of the strategic environment,'' which
includes a U.S. strategy for Russia and evaluation of U.S.
force presence in Europe. And I am sure we would all like to
better understand how this engagement with Russia will affect
EUCOM's strategic revaluation.
I would just caution, as we proceed toward discussions with
Russia--and I fully support that--I would be greatly concerned
that our rush toward what has been described as a grand bargain
with Russia may unnecessarily--hopefully not--but unnecessarily
risk the viability of the very security architecture that has
kept the European continent peaceful for some six decades now.
Russian misdeeds and provocations over the past year, as well
as their planned security treaty with Europe, suggests the
Kremlin, in my judgment, seeks to weaken NATO, marginalize U.S.
influence in Europe, and gain a veto over European security
affairs.
I think, as the Chairman indicated, we need a focused eye
on what I would call a ``NATO first'' policy, which would make
clear to our allies in NATO that U.S. bilateral engagement with
Russia will not foster collective insecurity amongst those very
important partners.
Let me note, with regard to Admiral Keating and General
Sharp, first of all, you have traveled great distances to be
here. Thank you for that effort.
And in terms of your responsibilities, let me note, as the
Chairman again noted, that earlier this month the Chinese
fishing vessels' aggressive harassment of the USNS Impeccable
in the South China Sea should merit our most careful attention.
Sadly, this isn't the first time we have seen China attempt to
exert its sovereignty rights with very grave implications to
U.S. military operations. The January 2000 anti-satellite
(ASAT) test is another example. And at the end of 2008, China
sent naval forces to the Gulf of Aden to protect its economic
interests there, demonstrating what I think can be fairly
described as a demonstrative shift in deploying military assets
further away from China's territory, and, of course, its
territorial waters. Your gentlemen's assessment of China's
military objectives and activities around the region and around
the world as to how they affect U.S. policy and security
interests will be greatly valued.
Moving on. In testimony before the Senate last week, some
of our witnesses expressed uncertainty as to whether North
Korea plans to launch a communications satellite or test an
offensive missile next month. The Taepodong-2 long-range
missile could reach as far as Hawaii and Alaska, as well as
impact our allies in the region. In my mind, this great
uncertainty underscores the necessity for an effective
operational missile defense system that places a priority on
protecting the United States and our allies. It seems to me
this should also be a serious indicator that perhaps now is not
the most effective time for the United States to make cuts to
missile defense capabilities as at least some reports have
suggested may indeed happen.
In that regard, I would appreciate, both Admiral Keating
and General Sharp, any comments you might wish to make on our
capabilities to shoot down the long-range missile, should it
become necessary.
Lastly, terrorist activity in the region is an issue of
grave concern. Many of our allies in the region are impacted by
transnational terrorism threats, including the Philippines, who
are cooperating with U.S. forces to reduce the footprint of the
Abu Sayyaf group, and in India, in which the recent Mumbai
attack highlighted the continued presence of terrorist
activity. And I know we are all interested in hearing how PACOM
is cooperating with our allies in the region, as well as U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM), to address incidents of terrorism in South Asia.
The Chairman outlined a number of other initiatives that
indeed merit our greatest attention. We look forward to your
comments.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
We look forward to your testimony, and we will go right
down the line.
We are blessed to have folks of your caliber and your
ability in your positions, and we thank you again for your
service as well as your appearance today.
Admiral Keating.
STATEMENT OF ADM. TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McHugh, thank you for
the privilege of testifying before your committee. I am honored
to represent the 325,000 men and women in uniform in your
United States Pacific Command.
We just revised our command strategy to reflect as closely
as we can the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National
Military Strategy (NMS). In that revision, we have emphasized
partnership, readiness, and presence. We think these are
essential to sustaining and enhancing stability and security in
our region.
A couple of the issues that you mentioned, Chairman, you
and I have had a fairly candid conversation about the Defense
Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Our department remains
committed to implementing the DPRI writ large and the agreed
implementation plan, which is concentrating on the movement of
the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. There are challenges ahead,
to be sure, Chairman, but I am confident that the larger issue
of security in the Asia-Pacific region is well served by the
movement of the Marines to Guam. It is our territory, and any
and all efforts that we can use to enhance the training we
receive there are beneficial to us.
We enjoy five alliances in our Area of Responsibility
(AOR); Japan, Thailand, South Korea, Australia, and the
Philippines. Congressman McHugh, you mentioned the Philippines.
We have around 650 Special Operations forces (SOF) there now as
we speak, training the Armed Forces of the Philippines. And the
AFP are making great strides in reducing the maneuverability
and the sustainability of the Abu Sayyaf group and Jemaah
Islamiyah terrorists that had been trying to secure a foothold
in the southern Philippines.
I would like to introduce two gentlemen who have
accompanied me from Pacific Command, our foreign policy
advisor, Ambassador Gene Christy, who is of inestimable value
as we develop and improve on our strategy. He is great at
telling us how to use smart power; that is to say, all of the
tools of the interagency. And Gene has become an indispensable
member of our team.
And finally, Chief Master Sergeant Jim Roy, our Senior
enlisted leader, who has traveled far and wide throughout our
area. He has done remarkable work to enhance the position that
we enjoy with many of our allies and friends throughout the
theater.
I look forward to your questions. And I thank you for the
opportunity, Chairman.
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Keating can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. General Craddock.
STATEMENT OF GEN. BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
General Craddock. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that my written
statement be submitted to the committee for the record?
The Chairman. Yes. All the statements that are proposed
will be admitted in the record, without an objection.
General Craddock. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to represent the
dedicated men and women of the United States European Command.
Here with me today are my EUCOM policy advisor, Ambassador
Kate Canavan, sitting behind me; and my battle buddy, Command
Sergeant Major Mark Farley. Both bring perspective, experience,
and great wisdom to the command; and we are very appreciative
that they are on the team.
Also, if I may, I would like to thank my wingmen here
today, Tim Keating and Skip Sharp. I can't imagine having two
better wingmen on my flank; longtime friends, great
professionals, and true commanders. So thank you.
I am proud of the day-to-day work and the great
achievements of the members of the U.S. European Command. Their
endeavors daily range from planned partnership capacity events,
such as airwing training with the Polish counterparts on C-130
Hercules aircraft, all the way to crisis response actions, such
as last summer's 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC)
facilitating humanitarian support to the people of Georgia.
In today's world we believe nations are repeatedly called
on to do more. It is in this call that EUCOM's efforts in
building partner capacity are indeed so important. The
multinational operations of today and tomorrow succeed only if
allies work together, and they must do that effectively.
Interoperability and increased partner capacity are indeed
essential, and our force presence is indispensable toward that
end.
Since 1952, the dedicated men and women of the United
States European Command have remained committed to the security
and defense of this great Nation. Your continued support allows
us to sustain this proud tradition.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentleman.
[The prepared statement of General Craddock can be found in
the Appendix on page 81.]
The Chairman. General Sharp.
Will the gentleman suspend?
We ask that the protesters leave right now. Please remove
yourself.
I want their names as they go out.
General Sharp, please.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WALTER L. ``SKIP'' SHARP, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-U.S.
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA
General Sharp. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, and
distinguished members of this committee, on behalf of the
outstanding men and women who serve in the Republic of Korea
(ROK), thank you for your continued commitment to improving the
readiness of our forces and the quality of life for our
servicemembers, DOD civilians, and families. Your vital support
ensures the security of the Republic of Korea, promotes
prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia, and protects our
shared national interests in the region.
The Republic of Korea is our partner in one of the most
successful alliances in history, an alliance that is forged in
blood and maintained by an enduring commitment and friendship
of the Korean and the American people. The Republic of Korea
Armed Forces have fought alongside Americans in Vietnam,
participated in Operation Desert Storm, and deployed forces to
Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Republic of Korea is participating today in six United
Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions around the world, and
recently deployed a 4,500-ton destroyer and an antisubmarine
helicopter to the waters off of Somalia to help conduct
antipiracy operations.
I want to thank you, the Members of Congress, for passing
legislation that elevated the Republic of Korea foreign
military sales to a NATO plus 5 status. This legislation will
go a long way in ensuring and enhancing the alliance's combined
warfighting capabilities.
North Korea remains the primary threat to stability and
security in Northeast Asia. Regime survival remains the North
Koreans' overriding focus. North Korea remains the world's
leading supplier of ballistic missiles and related technology,
and remains a major proliferator of conventional weapons as
well. North Korea's most recent provocative actions are all an
attempt to ensure the regime's survival and improve its
bargaining position at international negotiations to gain
concessions.
We continue to be concerned with the threat posed by North
Korea's large conventional military, artillery, ballistic
missiles, and Special Operations Forces, all that are located
very near the north-south Korean border.
My first priority as commander is to ensure that we have
trained, ready and disciplined Combined and Joint Command that
is prepared to fight and win against any potential conflict.
The second priority is to continue to strengthen the
alliance. In addition to improving military capabilities, the
U.S. and the Republic of Korea forces are transforming into a
more modern and capable force, allowing the Republic of Korea
Armed Forces to retain wartime operational control until the
17th of April, 2012. A U.S. force presence in Korea after
operational control (OPCON) transition in 2012 will ensure an
enduring and strong alliance. I am absolutely confident that
this alliance will be successful both for the United States and
the Republic of Korea, and will serve as a key foundation for
future regional stability.
My third priority is improving the quality of life for
servicemembers, DOD civilians and their families in Korea. Our
goal is to make the Republic of Korea the assignment of choice.
Our implementation of tour normalization, normal three-year
accompanied tours for the majority of our servicemembers, will
significantly increase our warfighting capability and improve
the quality of life for our personnel, while eliminating long
and unnecessary separation for our servicemembers and their
families.
The U.S. presence in Northeast Asia is a long-term
investment in regional stability, and the Republic of Korea-
U.S. alliance today is more relevant to the national interests
of the United States than it has ever been before. The alliance
will remain essential to the protection and advancement of the
U.S. interests in this strategically vital part of the world
well into the future.
The Republic of Korea sits at the nexus of a region
influenced by and influencing an emerging China, a resurgent
Russia, and a prosperous Japan.
The Army declared the year 2009 as ``The Year of the Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO),'' and it is my great privilege to
have the dedicated professional NCOs from all services
defending this great alliance. Without them, none of the
advances we have made in the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance
would have been possible.
I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, DOD civilians and families serving in the Republic of
Korea who selflessly support the alliance and help maintain
stability throughout the region. On behalf of them, I want to
thank you and this committee for your continued support, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. General Sharp, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in
the Appendix on page 161.]
The Chairman. I understand that we have a Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) unit from a university in the State of
Missouri. Would they please stand? Northwest Missouri State. To
the future Army leaders of our country, thank you for joining
us today.
I make note for the committee, we are under the five-minute
rule, with the exception of the Ranking Member and me, And we
will do our best to keep within that.
Let me ask just one question of each one of you. What is
the deepest concern that you have for your area of operation?
What bothers you the most?
Admiral Keating.
Admiral Keating. Chairman, we don't lose sleep over many
things at our headquarters. The area of most concern is the
spread of radical terrorists and those who would support them.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, Chairman, I think
we are making reasonable to good progress in our efforts to
make life difficult for them, to reduce their number, and to
reduce their support base.
So that would be my answer, the spread of radical
terrorism, sir.
The Chairman. General Craddock.
General Craddock. For me, what keeps me up at night is the
concern of some NATO nations that there must be a solidarity in
the Alliance in the call for an Article 4 or Article 5 force to
guarantee sovereignty or to repel attack has to be answered in
a positive way quickly. That also transcends into my European
Command hat, because obviously, as the leader of NATO, the
United States would have to respond accordingly.
The Chairman. General Sharp.
General Sharp. Sir, it is Kim Jong-Il and the North Korea
regime, and his absolute desire to be able to do a military-
first policy, the fact that he has not taken care of his
people, and the willingness to be able to do everything he can
for his regime's survival in North Korea to include all the
provocations that he has done recently.
The Chairman. Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Craddock, let me begin with you, sir, and the
comments you just talked about, the future of our Transatlantic
Security Agreement, principally through NATO.
From what I have read and from what I have heard, there are
several amongst that Alliance who have become concerned about
our commitment and our ability--NATO writ large--to actually
make good on the Article 5 assurances. You may have heard in my
opening comments, I fully support engagement with Russia, but I
do believe we should be, at the same time, equally focused on
our relations with our NATO partners and ensuring that, in our
efforts to approach the Russian issue and the Russian leaders,
we don't fully undermine our NATO partners' confidence in those
abilities.
So I would ask you simply first, is that a legitimate
concern on my behalf? And if so, what can we, as a Nation, do
to underpin the NATO security agreements and the confidence in
our NATO partners that those strategic alignments that have
endured over the last 60 years will continue?
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman.
I think as a result of August of last year with the Russian
incursion into Georgia, the geopolitical situation changed;
that for 15, 16 years the assumption made in our focus on
Europe was that there would be no invasions of anyone's land
borders. That turned upside down, and that created an angst, a
sense of tension among many of the NATO nations.
So I think that as we now understand it better, and as we
move towards the future, the key here is to find and strike
balance between Russia and the NATO members and NATO partners.
In life, I think balance is a difficult thing to find, the
tension between this and that. And we have got to strive to be
able to accommodate the viewpoints of both, to the extent that
we can, and then understand. And I believe we need to open up a
dialogue and an engagement, both bilaterally--the United States
with Russia--and also from an alliance perspective.
What can the United States do? Presence. We are the leaders
of the alliance. We must be in the alliance; we must be present
for duty, visible, and that means with forces. That means in
the diplomatic mode, the economic mode. We have to show that
leadership day in and day out. We have to build partners',
member nation confidence and capabilities. And also, we have to
build non-NATO partners who, in the coming years, want to be a
part of the Alliance. That means, again, there, present,
engaging, building their capacities, building their
capabilities day in and day out.
Mr. McHugh. Is it fair to say that our NATO partners are
looking very cautiously at our overtures towards Russia, and we
need to balance the approach there? I mean, is that a
reasonable statement?
General Craddock. It is. I think that some of the NATO
members are looking cautiously at what we are doing. Others are
welcoming what we are doing. So, indeed, inside the Alliance
there are perspectives based upon history, tradition, location,
economic impacts, energy provisos. So I think there is a split
in the Alliance, but overall, I think that the Alliance--my
judgment, this is a political issue, but from where I sit, my
observation would be that there would be a welcoming aspect to
that.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you.
Admiral Keating, both the Chairman and I spoke about the
USNS Impeccable and what happened there in the South China Sea
off Hainan Island. What does that do downstream with respect to
the rules of engagement you are going to put in place, if any,
changes, as a result of that aggression?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, it doesn't change anything.
We were fully in accord with international rules of the road,
with United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions. Our own rules
of engagement were well rehearsed, and our guys and girls who
were on the Impeccable were sufficiently trained and equipped.
The escort vessel that we sent down, the USS Chung-Hoon, got
there in short order, resumed operations very quickly
thereafter.
So the answer is, Congressman, we wouldn't do anything
different. We are fully in accord with international standards
and will continue to do so.
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, given the bells, I will yield
back.
The Chairman. We have three votes, a 15-minute vote and two
five-minute votes. We can go at least to one gentleman.
I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Texas Mr. Ortiz.
Immediately upon the cessation of the three votes, we will
turn. Gentlemen, we will ask that you remain, and we will
continue the hearing.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, thank you so much for your service to our
country. We really appreciate the fine work that you are doing.
General Craddock, U.S. Army Europe is in the process of
reducing its troop levels from four brigades of combat teams to
two. In your testimony you identified your near- and long-term
objectives for your command. Now, what impact, if any, would
the redeployment of forces have on your near- and long-term
theater objectives? And what additional resources can Congress
provide to assist you in meeting your objectives?
One of the things that came out in Admiral Keating's
testimony was partnership, readiness, friendship. Now, when
those brigades come back home, what kind of relationship are
you going to have, or what kind of joint training are you going
to have with your neighbors in that theater?
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman.
The planned objective, stay at two brigades vice the four
we have now, means that we will reduce significantly, 50
percent or more, our ability to train, exercise and work with
NATO members and partners.
I would submit to you that the presence we have had in
Europe over the years is the reason that 87 percent of the
allied contribution in Afghanistan and 70 percent in Iraq came
from the EUCOM area of responsibility and is directly due to
that engagement, that cross-leveling, that partnership, if you
will, year after year.
I grew up in Europe over multiple tours. Today's chiefs of
land forces were those officers that I knew back when I was a
junior officer and a colonel and a brigadier. So I think there
is, indeed, a payoff there. We need to continue that, and we
need to sustain the current force level for the future to
accomplish the task I have been given by the Secretary and the
Chairman, which is build partner nation capability. A reduction
will minimize and reduce our ability to do that. I think it is
critical that we continue to grow that in the future, and that
we offer every possibility for this engagement. It has paid
off, it will continue to pay off.
Mr. Ortiz. I know that we are running out of time, and
maybe we can let at least another Member ask a question,
because we are going to have a long series of votes. But thank
you very much for being with us today.
The Chairman. At this time, we will go ahead and get the
three votes and return. So stand ready.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will resume, and Mr. Bartlett is
up to bat.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Gentlemen, the Chairman asked you what concerns you in your
area of command, and what kept you awake at night. I will tell
you that, knowing you are there, I have few sleepless nights.
Thank you very much for your service.
General Craddock, I want to thank you for your efforts to
develop a closer working relationship with Russia. I think this
is enormously important.
I would like for a moment for you to imagine with me that
we had lost the Cold War. NATO is gone. The Warsaw Pact is
alive and growing, and the next two countries that are going to
become a part of the Warsaw Pact are Mexico and Canada. How do
you think we would feel?
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman.
Obviously, we are dealing with theoreticals there, and
there is a wide range of how would we feel.
Given what we know about the nature of the Warsaw Pact and
the form of government, we would probably feel quite uneasy.
Mr. Bartlett. I would suggest that when we try to take
countries like Latvia and Ukraine into NATO, that the Russians
probably have similar feelings. And I thank you very much for
your efforts to work more closely with Russia. Considering the
major concerns globally, they ought to be our friends; should
they not?
General Craddock. Well, I would hope that in order to
strike up a friendship, we would have shared ideals and values
and objectives.
I would submit to you, my judgment is that a nation
surrounded by democracy should not worry about its neighbors,
and I think that is the case today with Russia. Those are all
democracies, representative forms of government. And as NATO
continues to enlarge, I don't think it poses a threat to any
other nation anywhere. So we need to probably use that as a
launching port for continued dialogue.
Mr. Bartlett. That is our perception; I am not sure it is
their perception. We need to remember that NATO was established
to counter the Warsaw Pact; was it not?
General Craddock. Indeed, it was an organization for
collective defense against the Warsaw Pact. With the fall of
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it is now an Alliance for
collective security. I think that there is, indeed, a
difference there because security encompasses a wide range of
threats to our interests.
Mr. Bartlett. I have been to Russia a number of times. The
first time was in 1973, when it was part of the Soviet Union. I
kind of went as their guest. I was giving a paper at the
Aeronautical and Cosmonautical Conference in Baku and
Azerbaijan, a city and state that I had never heard of until
they asked me to go there and I found it on the globe. And I
have been there a number of times since.
They are a very interesting mixture of Western and Oriental
philosophies, and I think that face-saving is enormously more
important than we think it is. And I very much appreciate your
efforts for more closely working with them.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder, please.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Craddock, I mentioned to the staff that I think
Little Rock, Arkansas, is a sister city of Mons, Belgium--I
don't know if that is still true or not. But that entitles you
to a standing invitation to come to Little Rock and speak to us
in French or something, I don't know. But I think that
relationship still exists, and there is a pretty good number of
Little Rock folks that have been to Mons and visited. It
started with Wes Clark and being a Little Rock native.
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman. I will be sure to
bring Mayor Di Rupo with me when we come.
Dr. Snyder. That would be wonderful. That would be
wonderful.
I wanted to ask, you started out by introducing your State
Department sidekick there, Ambassador. I am not used to this
before this committee that someone with your job, you know,
formally introduces the ambassador. Tell me how you see you
all's relationship, how you see her role, and have you seen
that as an evolving role over the last several years? Is there
anything different?
General Craddock. Thank you.
Let me answer that based on my two years as Commander of
Southern Command, where I had a policy advisor--three
different, actually, during that time--and now in European
Command. We are increasingly dependent upon the whole-of-
government approach to the issues that are faced today. For
example, right now the policy advisor, there is a myriad of
activities ongoing in State Department, some of which link into
and don't link into very well the Department of Defense. And I
depend upon the EUCOM Policy Advisor, Ambassador Canavan, and
my Shape NATO Policy Advisor, Ambassador Butler, to be able to
provide the linkage between the policy diplomatic developments
and how they will impact, or not, what we are trying to do.
We have got to stay tied in closely to chief submission. We
have to know where they are, what they are thinking, how we can
integrate into a country plan our efforts. And we also have to
know the policy developments and the judgments being made,
diplomatically and politically, in the State Department. So it
is an essential task, and I value it very highly.
Dr. Snyder. Admiral Keating, I have a specific question for
you. India falls under your Area of Responsibility, and
Pakistan is under CENTCOM. Given the tremendous importance of
what goes on in the world and what goes on between India and
Pakistan, does it ever lead to some lack of smoothness, the
fact that they are divided and whose command they fall under?
How do you all deal with that?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, it is not a source of
friction. I think it is more a solution than a problem for
Central Command, their AOR, to extend to the India-Pakistan
border from west to east, and ours to Pacific Command, to
include India, as you state.
I talk to Dave Petraeus with great regularity. I just met
with Ambassador Holbrooke two or three days ago. Dave and I
attended a meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister. Our J-5
has gone with the Central Command J-5 to Islamabad, then they
both went to Delhi. So we have constant cross-AOR dialogue,
Congressman.
I will go to India here in a couple of weeks. India remains
one of our foremost strategic partners for military readiness,
for geographical reasons, for diplomatic reasons, for economic
reasons, and for energy reasons. So the boundary, such as it
is, between Pakistan and India as it applies to Unified Command
plan is very transparent, and I think is an advantage.
Dr. Snyder. India's outgoing Ambassador to the United
States visited Arkansas a month or so ago, and some of us had a
series of meetings with a group of legislators from Pakistan.
And it is very clear that ultimately they are all trying to get
the same things for their people, which is good jobs, economic
stability and security. And it seems like our relationships
would be good ones.
I wanted to ask General Craddock, as you continue
discussion about the ambassador, do you see things in your area
that if we were to have a more robust State Department budget
and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget,
do you see things that would better help America's foreign
policy goals if we did the suggestions of both the previous
administration and the current administration? Do you know any
shortcomings?
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, I do. Let me start with State Department.
I think the Title XXII authorities for foreign military
financing and IMET, International Military Education Training,
increased funds for those programs would be quite helpful,
particularly IMET. We get so great a return on that investment
for this education training, bringing foreign officers and
noncommissioned officers to the United States into our military
institutions. We have seen a drop in that over the last three
years. We need to hold the line and try to focus it. And where
we want to sustain persistent engagement, we have got to do so
in IMET.
I think also USAID, where possible, particularly in
Eurasia, and also in the Balkan area, where it is possible to
focus on development, that would be quite helpful. So I think
those authorities are there. The issue, obviously, is always
funding. And we have a USAID representative in our staff
element; great value, particularly for the disaster teams that
they provide on quick notice. I would support in every way
increases of resources for those authorities.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Randy Forbes, please.
Mr. Forbes. I would like to first thank the Chair and the
Ranking Member for having this hearing, and also share my
appreciation for the service that all three of you have done
over the years and your defense of our Nation.
One of the things that bothers me is that we have a lot of
wonderful men sitting at that desk, a lot of wonderful men and
women sitting in this committee. But I am of the belief that,
no matter what our intentions are, we have kind of painted
ourselves into some holes.
I just point out to the three of you, we heard General
Sharp talk about an emerging China, but if we take just these
last bailouts and stimulus bills that we passed, the interest
that all of us will be paying until our children and
grandchildren get old enough to maybe one day pay them off
would cover the entire budgets for NASA, the National Science
Foundation, the Department of Transportation, the FBI, the
Department of Justice, the Army Corps of Engineers, the White
House, Congress, and Homeland Security combined. That means at
some point in time, whether it is next year or three years from
now, when we come together with the best intentions, and we
talk about robust budgets for the State Department or weapons
systems or whatever else, we can have the greatest intentions,
we are just not going to have the money to do it.
So as we look, some of us feel we are virtually dependent
on China to finance our economy, and, therefore, indirectly,
our military. And I ask the question, how are we going to be
able to afford some of the national defense items we will need
in the future? I don't know the answer to that. But I think we
must examine what we are going to be able to afford to build
and to research, and to keep an eye on what China and some
other nations are doing.
And so, Admiral Keating, with your experience, if you had
to look now at two or three of their weapons modernization
programs that may have the greatest potential against our
vessels, especially our carriers, what would they be that we
should be keeping an eye on?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, that is a great question. I
would like to submit to you for the record some of the
classified aspects of the answer. But writ large, we, as you
know, are not able to conduct military-to-military dialogue
with the Chinese now. They have suspended that aspect of our
security relationship following the November Taiwan arms sales
announcement. So we are looking forward to resumption of that
dialogue so that we can engage in conversations with our
colleagues in the People's Republic of China, their army, navy
and air force, so as to develop a better sense of their way
ahead.
We don't have a clear idea of their broad strategic way
ahead. We are watching carefully the development of certain
weapons systems. We are watching carefully as their Navy
deploys further and further from their shores. We are watching
carefully as they begin to train in a more joint fashion and
operate in a more joint fashion. So on an unclassified level is
this issue of some concern to us. We want to resume dialogue
with them so as to develop a better sense of understanding. I
would be happy to give you a memorandum for the record that
addresses particular aspects of certain weapon programs and
systems they are developing, issues that are of particular
concern to us.
Mr. Forbes. If you could do that at some particular point
in time in a different setting.
Also, if you could let us know what progress you see that
they have made in terms of medium-range ballistic missiles and
the impact that they might have on our carriers.
And then one other questions--and you may need to address
this in a different setting as well. But the Ranking Member, I
believe, asked a question about the Impeccable, and your
comment concerned me a little bit when you said that there was
nothing we would do different, that everybody was equipped
properly.
I would just ask--if you can't address that here, perhaps
address that somewhere else, because that was not my
understanding, that there were things that we may be doing
differently. So I leave that out for you to perhaps--whatever
you can comment on here, or perhaps maybe that you could give
us in a different setting, perhaps, that we could get our arms
around that a little bit better.
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. The tactical particulars are
better left in a response to you in a classified manner. And I
believe I am aware of the brief that you are mentioning,
Congressman, so we will give you a detailed point paper that
outlines where we were that evening when I got the phone call,
and changes that we have made at a tactical level to address
the issue you raised.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis, please.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
of you for your extraordinary service. We appreciate your being
here.
I wonder if I could just turn first to General Sharp, and
thinking about walking through the situation in South Korea for
our families. You mention how important that is that you are
looking at three-year tours with family accompaniment. Where
are we in that, and what do you need? And do you think that you
are being provided with the necessary resources to fully
complement that strategy?
General Sharp. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question.
We currently have about 2,100 what we call command-
sponsored families, those that the government has authorized
and is in Korea right now, 2,100. We have approximately 1,900
other families that have come to Korea to be with their
servicemember for the one-year tour that they are on, basically
saying Korea is safe, I am not going to spend another year
separated from my family member.
General Bell, when he was the Commander, did exactly the
right thing. Those 1,900 do get some money to be able to live
off post as far as housing allowance and get some medical care,
but it is not what it should be. It should be that they can be
command sponsored.
In the beginning of December, the Secretary of Defense
authorized us to move towards three-year accompanied tours. The
Joint Federal Travel Regulation, which is the regulation that
governs this, was just signed the beginning of March, which
allows us to be able to move to--in locations where we have
good services--to be able to move to three-year accompanied
tours for all the servicemembers, and, in areas especially up
north where Second Infantry Division is north of Seoul, to move
to two-year accompanied tours.
Now, we are going to do this the right way. I am not going
to bring more families over than our infrastructure can handle.
Our goal for about a year from now is to go from those 2,100
command-sponsored families to about 4,500. And I have the
infrastructure throughout Korea to be able to handle that.
As we build up towards 2015 and 2016 and the completion of
the new base or the completion of the Base Camp Humphreys, we
should be able to get to about 5,700 command-sponsored
families, and then work all the way through our goal to 14,000,
which will be the general end state.
We are progressing along to be able to have, I am very
confident, as far as the housing for these families because of
the housing initiatives that the Army has started at Camp
Humphreys that we will be able to utilize throughout Korea. The
medical, we are in pretty good shape.
The schools are the issue that we are really working
through right now and figuring out how to get the number of
schools so that we can get to the endstate. We have enough
programs to get to the middle point of about 6,000 command-
sponsored by 2014, 2015. It is the additional schools beyond
that that we are working a combination of burden-sharing money,
of U.S. military construction (MILCON) money, and public-
private ventures in order to be able to get to that.
I just want to say that command sponsorship is very
important for us because it really adds to my capability, it
reduces stress on our military over there, and it really shows
our commitment, too--very, very important to Korea, and to
Northeast Asia in general.
Mrs. Davis. I appreciate that. And perhaps you can join in
on this question as well.
Just assessing the public opinion in your AOR and the
extent to which the work--I think you obviously identified some
partners in the area, but the extent to which you feel that the
commands are able to assess and really act on the shifts and
changes in public opinion that you experienced there, how are
you doing that? How do you maintain that connection? And are
you seeing an ongoing partner always in your area?
General Sharp. I will just start, if I can.
The Republic of Korea is a great alliance. It has been
there for over 50 years. They want us in Korea. They greatly
support our troops and our families. And that is why I am so
confident as we move towards these three-year accompaniment
tours. Our popularity has consistently been in the 60s and 70
percent of wanting the U.S. military to stay in Korea and to
absolutely strengthen this alliance. So from the Korea
perspective, it is a strong alliance. And I am confident that
it will continue to be even stronger in the future.
Admiral Keating. In the two years we have been privileged
to command, Congresswoman, we have been to 28-something
countries in our Area of Responsibility. And in each of those
countries, to a varying degree to be sure, but in each of those
countries, an unmistakable theme of conversations--not just
military to military, but, as John mentioned, it is an
intergovernmental approach. We are regarded, the United States,
not just Pacific Command, as the indispensable partner.
So our presence there is appreciated. Folks want us to be
nearby, if not right in their country. And everywhere we go,
that is an unmistakable theme; we are an indispensable partner.
General Craddock. If I may just add on to that. I would
agree. We have obviously been in Europe a long time with
significant numbers. That has drawn down over the years. My
first tour in 1972, we had about 380,000 servicemembers; now we
are down to 84,000. But everywhere I go, in Germany, Belgium,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, they still, by and large,
want us there at the local level. We are welcomed. There are
strong bonds of friendship and support.
Occasionally, as we saw here earlier, in Italy, there are
some dissidents who think that there are problems there, and
there are environmental issues that, in fact, the government
says, not the case, it is being worked out.
So I think the general notion is we won't stay if we are
not wanted. And right now, I think we are, indeed, wanted
throughout at least the EUCOM Area of Responsibility.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Following through on that, General Craddock, with 84,000 of
our service personnel in your command at the present time, what
would be the effect of a drawdown from that number that has
been proposed?
General Craddock. I thank the chairman. If we take the
assumption, and we must, that whatever forces are in Europe are
still going to be a part of the global force provisioning
process; in other words, I send forces, all my forces, Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine, to Iraq, Afghanistan, wherever the
contingency arises, a drawdown from four land brigades to two,
a drawdown in numbers of fighter squadrons would mean that
there will be engagement, less partner Nation capacity and
capacity will be generated, exercises will go unfunded and
unmet, and we will essentially become absent in the theater
where we have been so present before. Our leadership in NATO
has been, I think, a key steadfast quality there, and we will
lose that to a great extent because there will just not be
presence by U.S. forces.
The Chairman. Are you telling us that a drawdown from
84,000 will cause us to have less ability to be leader, at
least in NATO and Europe.
General Craddock. Mr. Chairman, that is my assessment. It
will indeed, I believe, endanger our leadership, which is firm
and sound now. And also we will not be able to engage with
nations to increase capacity, whether they are NATO members or
partners, the NATO want-to-be's, which is critical now, because
that is what built their capacity and capability and it has
allowed them to join us in these contingency operations.
The Chairman. Is that your recommendation.
General Craddock. My recommendation would be to not draw
down the force levels any further from what they are today.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McHugh. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, you raise an excellent
point, I am encouraged by General Craddock's response. Let me
just add another component to it and, General, I know this
doesn't directly relate to your EUCOM hat, but would it be your
judgment it might also diminish our position vis-a-vis the
economies and our economic strategy whether it be in Europe or
globally as well? A decrease in military presence means
decreased American presence, would that be fair?
General Craddock. Congressman, I think that is a fair
statement. Indeed, where we are in these nations, in these
communities, we provide substantial economic impacts now. If we
are not there, then that will be, I think, a significant
difference in the investment we make, whether it is through
contracts or housing and things like that, the monies our
people spend on the economy of those nations. So I think there
will be some impact.
Mr. McHugh. If I may, General, I am really thinking about
the way in which the way the Europeans view American presence
as also beyond the military, meaning we are economic leaders on
a world stage?
General Craddock. I don't know that the withdrawal or
reduction of American forces will impact upon the commercial
activities of U.S. investment and presence. It may well be the
case. It is not a security issue. So it is a matter of return
on investment, I think, in terms of its commercial aspect.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here and thanks for your leadership right now in
these troubled times.
General Craddock, when it comes to Georgia and the Ukraine,
how do you view admitting these emerging democracies into NATO
when on one hand if they get attacked it draws us into war, but
on the other hand, if they are part of the NATO, our presence
is a deterrent to war; how do you view that?
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman. At the last
summit the NATO declaration as a result said that the Ukraine
and Georgia would be members of NATO. They were not given
membership action plans, which is the standard process that
nations must go through to reform their security sector and
other governmental processes and regulations, but there is a
statement made they were members. So now between the NATO
Ukraine Commission and the NATO Georgia Commission there is in
development a road map, if you will, for that process to bring
those nations into NATO.
From my perspective, I have to assess the security sector
and the military capacities and capability. I think that I
would say that all nations start off in a process far from the
standard at which they would be admitted. It is a long road.
The two invitees that will be, I think, admitted to NATO as
full members here shortly at the summit, Croatia and Albania,
have been in for eight and nine years in that process.
So again, there will be a new construct or road map, and I
am ready to use the NATO military opportunities to be able to
work with those nations.
Now, with regard to bringing them in and Article 5, again
the call for is a national decision, the decision by the North
Atlantic Council to commit to is a political decision, I think
that again as members they would all be entitled to the same
protection. So that will have to be a judgment made by the
political masters, the North Atlantic Council.
Mr. Hunter. How do you see it? Do you see it more as a
deterrent or do you see it making it worse for us in these
political cases with your military seat?
General Craddock. If those nations are ready and are
requested and they are providers of security, not consumers of
security, I don't see it as a downside. On the other hand, I
think it will be some time before that situation is reached,
and I think there will be changing conditions and there will be
new relations with neighbors of theirs and bilaterally and
multilaterally. So I don't know that I can make a judgment that
concisely of the future.
But again, democracies, representative governments are not
a threat to other nations.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, General. And when it comes to Russia
I have been hearing that the drug use and drugs coming up to
the southern satellite states through all the different stands
from Afghanistan into Russia and radical Islam in Russia is
pushing them towards kind of a semblance of cooperation with us
right now. Is that true?
General Craddock. Good question. Indeed, that is the case
along with the counterdrug issues, the trafficking issues. The
flow of heroin up from Afghanistan through the neighboring, the
stands if you will, the northern countries that border on
Afghanistan through Russia into Europe is significant. Much of
that trafficking, the drugs stay in Russia. It is causing an
increase in addictions, it is causing criminality. The rates of
crime are up. The Russians are concerned. They have provided
some counternarcotic training to the Afghans for some time. We
are appreciative of that, and I think that they want to
continue to work to try to limit the flow of those drugs
through their country.
Mr. Hunter. And radical Islam?
General Craddock. I cannot comment on that. I have not
talked with the Russians about that to the extent I have with
the counternarcotics so I am not in position. I can provide
that to you for the record, if you wish.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Hunter. That would be great. I yield back the balance
of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. General Craddock, the first question for you,
in your testimony you said that with regard to missile defense
our combined efforts to keep the U.S. And NATO collective
security closely linked by providing all members of alliance
with defense against a full range of missile threats,
presumably meaning U.S. is focusing on long-range defense while
NATO systems are directed to handle shorter range threats. In
fact, does NATO have a capability package or are they actually
moving towards some sort of capability to address any short or
medium range threat, I think it is a concern around here that
they are not or it is not.
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman. Well, indeed,
NATO does have a program, albeit it is not moving very fast,
but it is an alternate layered theater ballistic missile
defense, ALTBMD, and the notion of that is that it will be a
layered construct from short range low layer to mid range
higher layer. And that conceptually then that would integrate
in with the U.S. European capability third site for the long
range. So we would have an holistic approach for short southern
shoulder of NATO, intermediate a little farther into the
continent, and then that would tie into it a command and
control integration with the U.S. third site.
Mr. Larsen. I guess the gist of my question you probably
guess this is it probably exists more on paper, it seems, more
than moving towards reality. Can you give an assessment of
that?
General Craddock. Right now it is not a reality. It is a
concept that has got some NATO money against it to develop a
command and control integrated system first. But the assets are
all national assets, whether they be Patriot or whether they be
U.S. Aegis in the region. So there is no----
Mr. Larsen. No NATO asset?
General Craddock. Well, no NATO assets. The NATO asset we
would impose on that would be the integrated command and
control system which national assets, Patriots and others,
would plug into.
Mr. Larsen. Can you--and perhaps this is a different way of
looking at--what are EUCOM's shortfalls in the area of missile
defense to date?
General Craddock. Well, we only have in EUCOM Patriot
short-range capability. We have on a rotating presence and
eastern Med Aegis presence for the Aegis radar to be able to
discriminate and identify. So right now that is pretty much the
extent of what we have got.
Beyond that, I would have to provide it to you, if I could,
in a classified form for the record.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Larsen. Sure, and if you would do that, I would
appreciate it.
General Sharp, I would just ask my good colleague from
Pennsylvania to move to his left. Thanks, Joe.
You mentioned a couple of things. The Republic of Korea, we
elevated them to the NATO plus five status for Foreign Military
Sales (FMS). You discussed the three-year tours for families.
The two other elements I think that your predecessor discussed
with us, one was freezing the drawdown at 28-5 and the other
was wartime operational control moving toward that in 2012. Can
you give us an assessment? It is in your testimony, but
verbally can you give us an assessment of where we are with
transition of wartime operational control, what challenges we
may face to get there?
General Sharp. And on the 28-5 I do think that is about the
right number, it is what Secretary Gates has committed to, and
I believe that as we move into the Quadrennial Defense Review
28-5 will remain about the number and we will look at the
capabilities that we need as the Republic of Korea military
changes their capabilities, but well passed OPCON transfer I
think 28-5 is about the right number for this important part of
the world. OPCON transfer is coming along really very well, and
the bottom line is we are on schedule for 17 April 2012.
We conducted an exercise, Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, last
August where the Republic of Korea stood up the command and
control structure and organizations they will have after OPCON
transfer. So the Chairman, Chairman Kim stood up at
headquarters where he commanded the warfight from. We stood up
as supporting headquarters. The components, Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines, stood up what they will have after 2012,
and they really did a good job. I have stood up headquarters
and deployed to places like Bosnia and into Haiti. It is not an
easy job, but they did a good job.
We are working closely with the ROK Chairman and his staff
on a whole set of tasks that have milestones that we will look
at and certify, yet we have got this capability as we move
forward between now and 2012. A whole set of exercises, a whole
set of initiatives that we have in order to be able to make
sure that we are ready for OPCON transfer. It is the right
thing to do. The Republic of Korea military is extremely
professional, and I am absolutely confident that in the
supporting role that we will end up with after OPCON transfer
it is the right thing for the alliance.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, all three questions
for the record for Admiral Keating as well.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Admiral Keating, before
I call on Mr. Coffman. Admiral Keating, the proposal of moving
8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, will there at some point be
a fully thought out and recommended plan for that effort?
Admiral Keating. I think it is reasonable to assume that I
would predict that there will be significant development of the
existing plan, Chairman, and it may serve to be satisfactory to
your particular question. I know there are folks who are
working hard on the current plan. There is, as you know, the
Joint Guam Program Office in the Department of Navy. I think
likely there will be expanded interest in this topic and we
will remain committed to executing a plan as it develops by
2014.
The Chairman. The reason I ask, there is a proposal to
receive some money for this and a pretty large figure this
year. And we want to get this right. There is no second chance
in doing it. That is why I am hopeful that when the final
product comes over it will have the stamp of approval by the
Congress of the United States because we do have to pay for it.
And I just hope that the devil is always in the details, those
details can be thought out before a great deal of money is sunk
into that.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Sharp, can you review again your estimate of the
North Koreans in terms of the stability of regime? It does seem
like every time they engage in missile testing of any type it
is to acquire foreign aid to sustain their failed economy. What
is your view of the current situation right now in North Korea?
General Sharp. That Kim Jong-il is in control. He will
resort to many different types of provocations to try to ensure
regime survival within North Korea, to include, as he has said
that he is going to do between the 4th and 8th of April, to go
against the U.N. Security Council resolution and launch the TD-
2. Regime survival is his number one and to a degree his only
concern, and I believe he will go to any length to be able to
try to ensure that.
Mr. Coffman. How would you assess our abilities in terms of
missile defense? They seem to be testing longer range systems.
What is our ability in terms of deterring them?
General Sharp. In my AOR in south Korea it is mainly the
shorter range ballistic missiles, the type of defense that we
have with Patriots, that Koreans have recently bought Patriots,
they are installing now. We of course have Patriots that we are
well defended around, specifically the areas that we need if we
had to go to war. As far as the longer range ones, I would
defer those to either missile defense or the people who are
experts in what we are developing for our national ballistic
missile defense.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
General Craddock, how would you define right now the
aspirations of the Russians? It seems to me that they want to
essentially--they see within their sphere of influence a number
of former satellite states of the Soviet Union and it seems
that they want to bring them back into that sphere of
influence.
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman. I tend to agree
with your assessment. I think that what we are seeing here is--
some would call it resurgent, I kind of call it a risen Russia
that over the past few years has benefited immensely from the
high price of oil, filled up their foreign exchange coffers,
now is seeing some of that with the price fall be used up to
support other requirements there inside the country.
I think that they call it the near abroad, which is a term
not well received obviously by the former nations of Soviet
Union. They want that sphere of influence to remain. They want
to be involved in the politics, the decisions in those nations,
so it causes an angst and some tension.
The situation in Georgia last August aggravated that, it
has caused a matter of concern among nations that border the
Russian Federation of potential intentions for the future. So I
think that from that aspect it has caused in the alliance, in
the NATO alliance, some concern as to what the future holds and
what NATO will provide as guarantees.
We obviously bilaterally have had a break in our mil-to-mil
relations, and we are standing by as political aspects develop
to see where that leads us. But it may well be a stretching or
posing, if you will, on the part of the Russians here over the
last couple of years. That may be at the end right now given
other factors in the worldwide economic situation and the price
of energy.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Admiral Keating, what flash points
in PACOM's AOR concern you the most?
Admiral Keating. There are a couple, Congressman. We talked
a little bit earlier about violence extremism throughout our
AOR. There has been significant progress in our view made by
partners and allies of ours, including Indonesia, Philippines,
Singapore. Australia does a good job helping us watch very
carefully the flow of personnel support through the southern
Pacific regions.
China's behavior of late has gotten a little bit of our
attention. Balance what they did in the South China Sea with a
fairly good job they are doing in their anti-piracy operations
with now 15 other nations in the Gulf of Aden. So their
strategy is not clear to us. We are looking forward to
resumption of military-to-military (mil-to-mil) dialogue.
And in Skip's backyard, what North Korea is about, not just
the Taepodong missile but somewhat erratic behavior, including
border access and closure of international air space.
Those areas would be of more concern to us than others,
sir.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Keating, you mentioned you are looking forward to
the assumption of military-to-military dialogue with the
country of China. Would you tell us the status of that or can
you enlarge upon that at all, sir?
Admiral Keating. China suspended mil-to-mil dialogue
following the announcement of our recent series of arms sales
to Taiwan. We have not resumed that mil-to-mil dialogue.
Secretary Clinton mentioned it while she was in China. I have
used that as a topic of concern in various conversations. So
our Department of State and Department of Defense and I believe
the President himself, they have all included this in a series
of discussions with their Chinese colleagues. So I know the
discussions are ongoing, Chairman. As yet, I am not officially
allowed to engage in dialogue with the Chinese.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I believe Mr.
Coffman and I were on the same wavelength. I am going to follow
up a little bit on the questions he asked.
Admiral Keating, beyond the China, Japan, India, North
Korea aspect, are there any countries radically changing one
way or the other below the radar that we are not hearing about?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, I would not say there are any
changing radically. It is interesting to note perhaps that
there are elections that have been held in half a dozen
countries in our area of responsibility, and there will be
another four or six countries, including India, perhaps Japan
soon, Malaysia. These countries all are embracing democracy in
ways that are reassuring to us, gratifying to us, and I think
are at least of significant interest to us. But writ large, the
kind of bumper sticker we use is the guns are relatively silent
all throughout the Asia Pacific region, and for that we are
grateful.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you. General Craddock, following up on
Russia, one quick question, the movement and interest into
their former countries now that were part of the Soviet Union,
do you think that Russia's interest there is more
imperialistic, yearning for the days of old, or more defensive,
kind of wanting that buffer zone around them?
General Craddock. Thank you, sir. I think it is probably
something in between. I don't think it is imperialistic, but I
think they want to retain a strong sphere of influence with
those nations. And some of which have a stronger relationship
because of economic residuals, political or even demographic,
such as Latvia, which is about 50 percent ethnic Russian.
So I think that it could be a buffer, but again when we
look at a buffer against what, the democracies of those nations
and the democracies around those border nations? I guess what
you see depends on where you stand. But I think it is to retain
a sphere of influence, which gives them status and gives them
what they may feel--and I don't know this, this is my
judgment--that they lost over the years from the days of the
Soviet Union. So there are indeed various linkages back into
those nations, some stronger than others.
Mr. Kissell. The BBC reported last week that the President
of Russia announced $140 billion expenditures over the next
couple of years to build up Russia's military, especially in
areas of strategic nuclear forces. Where do you see this
changing Russia's military presence against the areas of our
interest and how do we respond?
General Craddock. Well, I think we have already seen in the
last couple of years some changing military presence by the
Russian forces. We started seeing it with the strategic bomber
flights over both the North Atlantic and the polar caps in the
Pacific, which hadn't happened in years. So they came out. Why?
Because they made some investments in that force in terms of
readiness and training to get the crews up flying. So that was
something that we saw for the first time.
Maritime force, we have now seen the second or third time
over the past 2 or 3 years a carrier task group move out. We
have seen it in the Mediterranean and now for the second time
it just departed. We have seen it head towards the Caribbean in
training activities with the Venezuelans.
So we have seen the results, the manifestation of
investments there. Investment in the nuclear force is harder to
determine. Basically we can see it in delivery systems, not
necessarily in warheads.
What the announcement was actually, as we understand it
based upon our assessment and study, was really a delay from
the original objectives and the timelines for the investments.
So it is the same programs going to be delayed by a year or two
we think due to the downturn in the economic situation. Not a
surprise in what they are going to do, a surprise in when they
are going to do it.
We have discussed with them, when you are moving your
carrier task groups out, can we exercise, can we engage. We did
this before the cessation of mil-to-mil, both bilaterally U.S.-
Russia and NATO-Russia, and have not gotten a response. So we
are looking for opportunities and hope to have those in the
future.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir. We appreciate what you all do
for us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman, please.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for joining us today and thank you for your service to our
country.
Admiral Keating, looking at the environment we have around
us and the changing and emerging threats having to deal with
missiles, can you tell us a little bit about PACOM's ability
with respect to missile defense and if you think that
capability is up to task with the known threats today and maybe
the emerging threats and, if there are shortcomings, what those
might be and where the challenges lie ahead?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, we are up to task, I believe.
We are ready to defend U.S. territory, our allies, and our
national interests as the President so directs. We are
monitoring all the international threats as closely as we can,
and we are prepared when directed to respond to those crises
whenever and wherever they occur.
We are working closely with Japan, as they have fielded a
defense capability of their own in the form of their Aegis
destroyer. John Craddock mentioned them earlier in his theater.
So, too, does Japan have them. They have demonstrated their
capability recently in a test in waters north of Hawaii.
So across the spectrum we have concerns with missile
activities in North Korea, as Skip mentioned earlier, but I
know we are ready to defend our territory and our allies.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Admiral. A little bit about space
assets, based on the post-Chinese ASAT test experience do you
believe PACOM has sufficient space assets based on some of
these emerging issues that we see?
Admiral Keating. Congressman, we have sufficient, but we
are a little lean in some areas, if you would, and we are
working with General Chilton and the United States Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) to fortify several of those areas where we
might be a little weaker than others. The technical answer
would be better given to you in an off the record, but
classified statement, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thanks, Admiral. How is the growth of regional
associations in the Asia-Pacific area challenging the U.S. role
on security issues and altering U.S. bilateral security
relations in that region? And if there are those issues, what
might PACOM be doing to address that?
Admiral Keating. It is a fertile field, I think,
Congressman. Our policy of partnership and presence lends
itself to application across a fairly broad spectrum of
engagement opportunities, of dialogue, enriched and expanding.
It has been said that there is no country or agency so big that
they can do it alone in the Pacific, nor is there any agency or
country so small that they can't make a significant
contribution.
The Republic of Tonga, a very small Pacific Nation, has
provided troops for the defense of bases in Iraq for almost 3
years. Mongolia has helped us in ways, big and small. Many of
our allies and partners are contributing resources and
personnel in the Iraqi and Afghani areas.
So it is a great opportunity for us. There are occasional
challenges to be sure, but writ large there are terrific
opportunities for us in our strategy in concert with the State
Department, Commerce, Labor, Energy and all the Federal
Government and increasingly the private sector. Several
prominent businessmen are coming to Hawaii just next week to
discuss how they might help us capitalize on the opportunities
that are ahead of us. So it is an area that we think is right
for exploration and potential.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
the balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Bordallo, please.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, thank you and thank you for
your concern about Guam and wanting the buildup to proceed in
the right way.
General Craddock, General Sharp, and Admiral Keating, I
want to thank you for your testimony this afternoon. Admiral
Keating, Hafa Adai.
Admiral Keating. Hafa Adai.
Ms. Bordallo. And thank you for your continued leadership
and your support for Guam.
I have several questions for you, Admiral. You mentioned
that one of the major challenges facing the buildup is the
capacity of local infrastructure. How is DOD, specifically
Pacific Command, working with local officials, the Joint Guam
Program Office, to address these concerns? I am interested in
understanding what processes might have been entertained in the
DOD to see if these local infrastructure projects could have
been addressed in the stimulus bill. Did the Department miss an
opportunity to address these problems by not having something
placed in the stimulus bill?
Admiral Keating. I think, Congresswoman, the shortest
answer I can give you is I don't know whether or not the
Department missed an opportunity. I will check with our friends
in the Joint Program Office. I would be very surprised if they
had intentionally overlooked or passed on an opportunity, but I
will check with them and find out for you.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral.
Also, Admiral, the people on Guam are concerned about the
recent news that North Korea has a weapon, the Taepodong-2
missile, that can apparently reach parts of the United States
and Guam. Some are concerned that future missile tests may be
targeted in such a fashion as to prompt a response from the
United States. What action from the U.S. military can we expect
if such a missile test were targeting a U.S. Territory like
Guam or Alaska? And also what capabilities does a missile
defense system on Guam provide our armed services in the
Pacific AOR?
Admiral Keating. Congresswoman, I will need to give you an
answer to that, certain parts of your question, in a classified
response. But writ large, as I said earlier, we are ready to
defend the United States, its Territories, and its assets.
Specifics attendant to Guam and Alaska I will have to send you
in a classified response. But be assured we are well aware of
our responsibilities all throughout the Pacific region, and in
concert with General Renuart of the United States Northern
Command, General Chilton at United States Strategic Command, we
are prepared to execute our responsibilities.
Ms. Bordallo. This is a concern for the people of Guam.
Admiral Keating. It is ours, too.
Ms. Bordallo. My final question, the Marine training
requirements on Guam and in the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands was an issue discussed in the September 2008
Government Accountability report. What is the rationale for why
the Mariana Islands range complex environmental impact
statement (EIS) did not investigate the requirement for
increased training by Marines in the region. I have a concern
that if this issue of training requirements is not addressed in
a timely manner, it may complicate the environmental impact
statement process on Guam.
Admiral Keating. The terms of agreement for the
environmental impact statement as conducted were a Department
of Navy issue. Congresswoman, as you know, we share your
concern for providing appropriate training venues,
opportunities, and areas for any forces that are stationed in
and around Guam. As you know you and I have discussed, I have
had the great pleasure of doing an awful lot of flying in and
around Guam. So I can attest firsthand to the merits of the
Guam training area writ large, and in our view it will over
time must expand to include areas to the north of Guam. So the
environmental impact statement as it is currently being
conducted, it is our hope that in time will be expanded to
include other areas that would provide better training for any
and all forces that would use Guam as we intend to use it.
Ms. Bordallo. My concern, Admiral, is by not going along
with the EIS in the Northern Marianas that this may be a
detriment to our EIS study for Guam, and I hope that doesn't
happen.
Admiral Keating. So do we.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Sestak, please.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Sharp, the
Quadrennial Defense Review will come over here sometime next
year. Over the last four years we have not had any Army
divisions or brigades that could meet the requirements of the
5,000 series of operating plans (OP plans) for the defense of
South Korea. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said it
was an acceptable risk. So as we sit here in our jobs as dolers
out of the national treasure for what is needed in the future,
from 1953 until about four or five years ago the force posture
of the Army was based upon primarily in the last 15, 20, 30
years of two major conflicts, East and West.
We have had acceptable risk now for quite some period of
time, but not having to have anybody need it from the Army. So
should we look askance at the Quadrennial Defense Review coming
forward and saying we need X amount of Army and part of the
justification is to meet the requirements that have not needed
to be met the last four years for the defense of South Korea by
the Army?
General Sharp. Thank you for the question. Let me first say
that I am absolutely confident if North Korea were to attack
today we, the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance would be
victorious and we would be able to execute our war plan, 5027.
Mr. Sestak. Sir, that is not my question. My question has
to do with if they come over and ask for these forces to meet
the requirements of 5057.
General Sharp. I believe that still is a requirement.
Mr. Sestak. So even though we haven't needed this Army
requirement, we haven't had it for the last four or five years
in testimony here, we still should justify pouring money into
the Army for that requirement in the future?
General Sharp. There are many requirements around and I
believe that the ability to be able to execute a war plan in
Korea for the defense of the Republic of Korea still is a valid
requirement. And I will also say that we do have the forces.
Mr. Sestak. Having the Army.
General Sharp. We do have the forces in the Army to be able
to do it. The Chairman has said in the past it would take
longer and we would have to mobilize, but we would be able to
go over and to be able to, from an Army perspective, do what we
need to do according to the war plan.
Keep in mind that the Republic of Korea military,
especially their army, is set up very well in the defense for
the initial part of the conflict. Now, without getting into
classified what the Army is really needed for is for later
parts of the conflict.
Mr. Sestak. Would that mean the active would be placed in
the reserves then or National Guard, since the requirement is a
delayed requirement?
General Sharp. It is not a delayed requirement. What we
have right now is because of the forces that we have in Iraq
and Afghanistan, in order to be able to get those forces to
Korea, there is still that requirement, and we still have that
capability to be able to do that----
Mr. Sestak. Thank you.
General Sharp [continuing]. And that we would win.
Mr. Sestak. General, ballistic missile defense (BMD) in
Europe, there have been some studies that have come out
recently from Institute for Defense Analyses, CDO Technologies,
Inc. The little bit of knowledge I have when they looked at the
various systems, in particular one of the two, the one that is
in Czech Republic and Poland, is that this is going to give
us--let me just characterize it as minimal capability. But it
does say that the Aegis capability, which is already a sunk
cost, gives you an equivalent capability. Recently there have
been reports--and by the way, we wouldn't have to do this if
Iran was not pursuing a nuclear--we have justified this because
of Iran.
So is there due gist in saying, well, wait a moment here.
These recent reports that have said, let's kind of work with
Russia to work on Iran and this ballistic missile defense
system, maybe we remove let's just say the shooter in Poland,
but we still have the great capability on the our Aegis ships,
it is already a sunk cost. Again, as we look at our national
treasure, the Quadrennial Defense Review comes over, in one
case having a war plan to meet without ready forces. Over here
we have a ballistic missile defense system where we have the
same capability on the Aegis systems we have sunk our cost in.
Is it worth therefore seeing that we can salvage even more
resources by pursuing that means rather than staying the road
with the Czech and Polish, not--we need the expand radar but
doing away from with the shooter in Poland and letting the
Aegis ships pick up that capability.
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman, a very complex
question and I quite frankly am not qualified to answer the
physics of that. The first issue is, is there a threat? And to
date the Intelligence Community and NATO has affirmed there is
a threat. That was recently affirmed by the foreign ministers,
the 3rd of December, 2008, when they said they felt that that
U.S. effort would be helpful in a significant way to Europe.
Now, the ability for an Aegis ship to engage a long-range
ballistic missile depends upon where it is, missile launch,
angle of flight.
Mr. Sestak. Those studies have said that the two
capabilities are absolutely equivalent.
General Craddock. I am not aware of that, and I would yield
to your expertise. So I think I would have to defer your
questions of the technical aspect to the Missile Defense
Agency.
Mr. Sestak. I am more interested in----
General Craddock. Let me finish, sir. If there were
opportunities that the threat would be mitigated or eliminated
by nonmilitary means, read informational, economic, political
diplomatic, that is fine. My task is to secure U.S. forces and
U.S. interests. And if the threat is not there, then I would
say good for us.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. We will have a second
round in just a moment.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Craddock, you
were commenting earlier with respect to Title 22 funding and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and other
programs that are helpful and effective in capacity building
amongst our partners in European theater.
What about 1206 funding? Do you view that as a viable means
by which we can expand our support and build the capacities of
our partners as well?
General Craddock. Thank you, Congressman. I absolutely do.
I think 1206, 1207, the ability to help our allies and partners
to develop capacity against terrorism is critically important.
We have used those authorities, we have used funds an
available. I would be the first to say please continue that
funding because it is very helpful.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Keating. Can I be the second to say?
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely.
Admiral Keating. Let me be the second to pile on to John.
Those two funding streams are of dramatic impact in all of our
area of responsibility. Case in point, we have given a little
bit of money that you have given us to Indonesia and Malaysia.
The incidents of piracy in the Strait of Malacca, a crucial
strategic chokepoint, have gone from upwards of 40 2 years ago
to less than 5 in 2008 as a direct result, we believe, and we
can provide you the measures of effectiveness, due to 1206
funding. Radars, communications capabilities, information
sharing, training that we have been able to give those
countries strictly because of 1206 funding.
Mr. McHugh. There are those who are interested in putting
rather strict ties as to certain qualifications, whether in the
European theater, it is a percentage of their GDP on military
spending, et cetera. I would suspect, but I don't want to put
thoughts or words in your minds and mouths, that you would
support the greater flexibility in the utilization of those
funds; is that a fair assumption on my part?
General Craddock. Absolutely, Congressman, I would. I
looked at two efforts we have ongoing. I can provide this for
the record in detail. In one effort we were using 14 different
programs and funding streams, in another one we used 11. And it
is an enormous, complex effort and takes incredible energy to
go out find all these, to be able to get pieces and parts, put
it together to do this. And what we really need also is
multiyear authority on some of this, because we need to be
consistent and persistent in our approach. But if we are good
one year and then we are absent without leave the next year,
our allies and friends wonder if we are really serious about
this.
Mr. McHugh. Admiral, I trust you would agree with that.
Admiral Keating. Ditto. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHugh. General Sharp, you made a comment that
certainly comports with most of the intelligence reports that I
have seen about Kim Jong-il being in charge. Having said that,
I'd be interested in your assessment, what has the current
global economic crisis done with respect to the stability of
that regime? Are things deteriorating there in terms of the
stability? And if so, what are we or what do you think we
should be doing to try to avert a total collapse, which if
there is one thing worse than Kim Jong-il I guess it would be a
total collapse in a catastrophic manner?
General Sharp. We aren't seeing a huge effect. Kim Jung-il
I think is still in complete control of his military and his
policy of military first, and any resources he gets goes to
improving his military, to keeping them loyal to him continues.
In fact in his most recent, if you will, State of the Union
Address, he called upon his people to sacrifice even more so
that the military could remain strong and to remain in effect
loyal to Kim Jung-il.
So I think what he is doing right now and the provocations
is doing exactly that, seeing to what point can he push the
rest of the world to get concessions to be able to continue the
regime that he is in charge of right now.
Mr. McHugh. That is a hell of a recruiting tool, isn't it?
Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back. But before I do,
let me thank these distinguished leaders for their service. I
don't want to assume anything, but this may be General
Craddock's final appearance before this committee. And sir, as
we do to your comrades as well, we wish you all the best in
this Nation that in fact many nations abroad are much better
for the sacrifices and the great leadership you brought. And to
all of you gentlemen, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Before I ask a final question, Mr. Sestak,
second round.
Mr. Sestak. Admiral Keating, the Secretary of State has
said that China is the most important strategic relationship we
have about a year ago when she was in a different job. She also
has emphasized kind of the strategic future of that area out
there in the world; in fact her first visit was out there. We
have looked at Guam as sort of an emphasis for the Air Force
and some Navy and Marines. And in the General's testimony he
mentions that we want to come out of that theater more naval
and air centric.
The question is that for the Navy to keep one aircraft
carrier in the Persian Gulf you need seven in the force
structure in order to rotate one out there. So it takes seven
aircraft carriers to keep one forward deployed, which has often
been why you have had to explain so much over the years, even
though it was a few forward why it is so important.
Do you think Guam could potentially be a place where an
aircraft carrier battle group, as you look at the honest broker
and the strategic area of the world, we do away with that
requirement to have X amount of force to keep rotating them.
Because the Air Force can fly in very rapidly and the Marines
are already there or will be. Is that something we should be
looking at, particularly since all planning indicates you need
two to defend one. Two carriers, each of them fly--you know, in
a crisis, you always want two there normally.
Admiral Keating. Well, Congressman, parts of your rationale
are interesting to me, shall I say. The seven to make one, I
don't want to disagree with your calculus, but that is a higher
number in the denominator than I am familiar with. Setting that
aside, I don't know that Guam, Andersen Air Force Base, Naval
Air Station (NAS) Guam will ever replace an aircraft carrier.
In my estimation they will not.
Mr. Sestak. I meant put the aircraft carrier there, put a
second carrier out there.
Admiral Keating. If it means more aircraft carriers for the
Pacific Command I am all for it, Congressman.
We have got about the right number out there right now,
Congressman, of carriers in the Pacific. The USS John C.
Stennis is out on a classic West Pac cruise as we speak. USS
George Washington. We enjoy the support of carriers transiting
the Pacific Command to get to the Central Command, and we have
some of John's guys that occasionally get over into our AOR.
The mix is about right. We would certainly like the
opportunity to put carriers into Guam for a refit, refresh and
liberty for the crew. I have done it, it is fabulous. All three
of those, mostly, we could upgrade the core capacity. One way
of saying, we would enjoy the opportunity to bring carriers in
and out of Guam and would anticipate the agreed implementation
plan part of the DPRI to provide for those infrastructure
upgrades.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you. And General, one last question on
NATO. I was curious, over the last couple of years we seem to
flog NATO hard because they hadn't, according to a lot of
comments, provided as much forces as one might believe they
would have to Afghanistan. And each country has its own caveats
of how it operates there. But more to the point, and this is
just a lesson I would be curious about. It seemed to me as
though and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for our
contribution said in Afghanistan we do what we can, in Iraq we
do what we must.
I had been always struck that we never had met our own
commitment as the U.S., as our Nation to NATO's commitment of
how many forces were there to be training the Afghanistan
police and troops. I don't think we ever got above 37 or 38
percent.
Do you think in retrospect that our efforts were correct to
push them so hard for their contribution when we were just
doing what we can, rather than what we must? And second, we
never met our own commitment for how many troops we had been
assigned for the training of Afghanistan police and troops.
General Craddock. Congressman, there are a couple of
different themes there. First of all, I would submit based on
my studies assessments for the last two years, four-plus
months, the United States has met every commitment it made to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to include
the Afghan national army training.
The original construct was the Group of Eight (G8) nations
came in and took over responsibility for functions. And the
United States accepted the responsibility for training the
Afghan National Army. The Germans accepted the responsibility
for training the police in the beginning. After two or three
years the Army was coming along, better than the police, but we
realized there needed to be an acceleration, we NATO, as did
the United States. So they put more Army trainers on the
ground. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-
Alpha) grew some 3,500 Army trainers at all levels to monitor,
train the ministry all the way down to the kandaks, the rifle
battalions. At the same time there was no increased commitment
for police training. It kind of putted along inefficiently and
not doing very well. The European Union (EU) came in and said
they would help out with a European Police (EUPOL) force that
ultimately about 240, and the United States realized if we are
going to make this work with security forces we have to have
public security police and national security Army, and that is
when the U.S. took over the lead for police training. And CSTC
office said I need another 3,500 and the U.S. was strapped to
provide it. But over time has gotten pretty close, far, far
beyond any other contributions.
Now, the ISAF force is governed by a combined joint
statement of requirements. That is the troop list. There were
no apportioned numbers that every nation had to provide. Every
nation said I will do one of those and I will do this and I
will do that. And the U.S. took over all of the east, Regional
Command East (RC-East), and parts of the south. And the U.S.
provides the lion's share--far the largest share of the
headquarters.
So I would submit the U.S., in its plus-up last year of the
east and its plus-up now of the east and south to the tune of
about 30,000, has gone far beyond, and when this is done we
will have over 50 percent of the force there--58,000 today in
NATO, 26,000 the U.S., the rest are coming. The rest of NATO
has yet to ante up and meet their commitment.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you. And just one comment. I was
responding to some Joint slides over the past two years and the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) study based upon those
slides, of our not meeting our commitment. So they have been
wrong. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Let me follow through on that, if I may. Right after the
United States was attacked, General Craddock, on 9/11, NATO, if
I understand it, invoked Title V of the charter; am I correct?
General Craddock. Correct, Article V.
The Chairman. What action did NATO take under that article?
General Craddock. As I understand, NATO offered NATO AWACS,
Airborne and Early Warning Systems, to the United States.
The Chairman. That was it?
General Craddock. Yes, sir. To my knowledge.
The Chairman. Nothing else?
General Craddock. No, sir. NATO followed up by initiating a
maritime operation, Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), in the
Mediterranean area, which is a contribution to steam around,
interdict aberrant ships' tracks to see if they are carrying
terrorist weapons or terrorists throughout the region. But that
was later on, not under an Article V response.
The Chairman. That was it?
General Craddock. As I said, Chairman, to my knowledge,
that is it. There may be others I am not aware of.
The Chairman. You would know.
General Craddock. I wasn't there then, I was somewhere
else. But that is what I understand the case is.
The Chairman. Admiral Keating, are tensions diffused in the
Taiwan Strait areas or are they as tense as they were two years
ago?
Admiral Keating. Chairman, tensions are reduced. I would
not say they are diffused. It remains an area of concern to us.
Chairman, you may be aware. I will provide to you the
numbers of missile systems that China has on their side of the
strait. We know about them. President Ma, the newly elected
President of Taiwan, has embraced a less aggressive posture
than his predecessor. And dialogue across the strait is richer
today and is more productive than it was in the years preceding
his election. So tensions are reduced, but they have not
vanished, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me again thank you, each one
of you, for your leadership, your dedication, your integrity.
It is certainly good to have you serving our country. I know
every member of this committee appreciates what you have done.
General Craddock, this is your last appearance, as I
understand it. We wish you well. If I remember, it is some 38
years in uniform; is that correct?
General Craddock. It will just be short of 38 years when I
retire, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, congratulations to you on your
successful career.
General Sharp, thank you. And Admiral Keating, thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 24, 2009
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 24, 2009
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC)(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 24, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. I was happy to read in your written statement, that
Pacific Command has identified the need and programmed $8.4 million for
an improved Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) facility. What is
your assessment of JPAC manning? Do you plan to increase JPAC manning
levels, as well?
Admiral Keating. JPAC is authorized 407 billets, 246 military and
161 civilian. Its current manning is 86% with 97% (239) military and
70% (112) civilians onboard. The low percentage is due to two primary
factors: (1) 74 military-to-civilian conversions and (2) the closing of
the Navy Human Resource Service Center (HRSC)-Pacific, its servicing
personnel center. The HRSC-Pacific was part of a base realignment and
closure, which directly impacted JPAC's ability to hire personnel.
However, as of January 2009 HRSC-Northwest has managed JPAC's personnel
actions and made its requirements a top priority.
JPAC is also undergoing a comprehensive manpower survey and
analysis which should be completed by the end of this year. The results
of this process should determine and validate the organization's
manpower requirements, and provide the U.S. Pacific Command and JPAC
the necessary information to make informed decisions on future
personnel structure and requirements.
Mr. Wilson. Based on your written statement regarding Congressional
support for DOD Dependent Schools, you have pointed out the absolute
necessity for a military construction program to recapitalize an old,
worn-out set of school facilities in your command. Can you give us a
better sense of the need for this military construction, why you
consider it so important, and the magnitude of what is needed in FY
2010 and beyond?
General Craddock. For more than a decade, DODEA MILCON funding has
not kept pace with its recapitalization requirement by either industry
standards or DOD facility sustainment standards. As a result, many
DODEA schools, nearly half of which are in Europe, are in poor/failing
condition and in need of repair or replacement. Most notable problems
include fire and life safety deficiencies, overcrowding, and failing
building systems. The condition of these schools is a top quality of
life issue for members and families serving in Europe, where there are
no affordable schooling alternatives. Consequently, the quality of our
schools has also become an important readiness issue. If service
members are dissuaded from serving in Europe by deficiencies in crucial
quality of life programs like DODEA schools, the morale and
effectiveness of the assigned forces will suffer.
To address this problem, we have worked closely with DODEA to
increase their MILCON funding in the coming years. The FY10 President's
Budget includes $142M for school replacements or upgrades in Europe. I
estimate an additional $300-400M in European school requirements will
be included in budget years FY11-15. These projected funding levels
will eliminate the recapitalization backlog; however, DODEA must
continue to invest a minimum of $50M in MILCON per year in Europe to
keep pace with school sustainment needs. This effort is well supported
within OSD; however, Congressional support will clearly he needed as
the enhanced DODEA MILCON program moves through the budget process.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. Earlier this year, Secretary Gates testified to this
committee that he could envision U.S. and Chinese troops serving side-
by-side in a multilateral operation. China's recent Defense White Paper
lays out a concept of ``Historic New Missions'' and focuses heavily on
``Military Operations Other Than War.'' The PLA has recently stepped up
its multilateral efforts by engaging in counter-piracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden and peacekeeping operations around the globe. Could
you share your views regarding the PLA's cooperation with foreign
militaries? Could you discuss potential areas of military cooperation
with China in the PACOM area of responsibility?
Admiral Keating. China has increased its efforts to assist in
global security and stability operations. With its involvement in the
Gulf of Aden, the PLA is now aware of the complexities of working with
multinational coalitions in peacekeeping operations. Key to future
cooperation between the PLA and other foreign militaries, however, is
the realization from the Chinese of the importance of their leadership
responsibilities as well as the multinational framework to achieve
regional security.
Potential areas of military cooperation with China in the PACOM
area of responsibility may include humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, search and rescue, and counter proliferation operations of
which both nations have shared interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. Larsen. I have spoken with you before about our mutual support
for mil-to-mil exchanges with China. These exchanges reduce uncertainty
about strategic intentions and build long-term relationships that will
help us avoid future conflict. As we are all aware, China cut off mil-
to-mil exchanges in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan last year,
and restarted them only recently, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for East Asia Affairs David Sedney made a visit to the country.
Could you discuss the value of mil-to-mil exchanges and let the
committee know what exchanges are currently planned?
Admiral Keating. Although military-to-military relations with China
resumed in May 2009, the details of specific engagements for the
remainder of the year are currently being discussed with Beijing.
Engagements may include visits by U.S. military leaders such as the
commanders from Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, and Pacific Air
Forces, and exchanges at the Mid-Level Officer and Senior Enlisted
Leaders level from both nations.
These military-to-military exchanges are essential not only to
increase transparency and reduce uncertainty about strategic intentions
between the U.S. and China, but also to create venues to discuss
security issues beneficial to both nations as well as others in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. Larsen. Admiral Keating, I would like to ask you about how the
harassment of the USNS Impeccable has affected the U.S.-China military
relationship. Can you give the committee an update on China's response
to the Department of Defense's official protest? Do you anticipate that
this incident will have any long-term effect on U.S.-China military
relationships?
Admiral Keating. To date, we have not received an official response
from the Chinese government on the protest issued by the Department of
Defense regarding the USNS Impeccable incident. I assure the Committee,
however, that the incident has not changed the U.S. perspective on
exercising its rights of maritime navigation.
As such, I do not foresee any long-term effects on the U.S.-China
military relationship resulting from this incident. It is in both the
U.S. and China's strategic interests to maintain a beneficial military-
to-military relationship to effectively address regional security
issues and avoid future conflict.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Are you aware that commercial data providers now have
the capability to allow you, as a combatant commander, to directly task
an imagery satellite and downlink the high-resolution imagery directly
into your theater of operations?
Admiral Keating. U.S. Pacific Command is aware that it can task
commercial imagery satellites and does so as part of its operations.
Mr. Lamborn. Do you believe that such a capability would be useful
in carrying out your mission?
Admiral Keating. Such capability is useful in carrying out the U.S.
Pacific Command mission, especially in the area of Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). The ability to download timely
commercial imagery and provide directly to on-the-scene Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) and host country officials are of great benefit in
coordinating HA/DR efforts. Additionally, as most theater operations
are now conducted with bilateral partners, providing these partners
with timely unclassified commercial imagery is helpful in coordinating
such operations.
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