[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE RESET BUTTON HAS BEEN PUSHED: KICKING OFF A NEW ERA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 28, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, California TED POE, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BARBARA LEE, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida, Chairman
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York TED POE, Texas
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California
Jonathan Katz, Subcommittee Staff Director
Eric Johnson, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Richard Mereu, Republican Professional Staff Member
Mariana Maguire, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Philip H. Gordon, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, United States
Department of State............................................ 12
The Honorable Celeste A. Wallander, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, United States
Department of Defense.......................................... 21
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe:
Prepared statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 5
The Honorable Philip H. Gordon, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........ 15
The Honorable Celeste A. Wallander, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.... 24
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
THE RESET BUTTON HAS BEEN PUSHED: KICKING OFF A NEW ERA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS
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TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Wexler
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Wexler. The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.
First and foremost, I want to welcome our two outstanding
witnesses, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs, Philip Gordon; and Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Policies, Celeste
Wallander.
The President's recent Moscow summit and the
administration's effort to reset relations between the United
States and Russia comes at a critical juncture as we grapple
with several major foreign policy challenges, of which one of
the most difficult, complex, and consistently frustrating is
America's relations with Russia.
I agree with President Obama that there is an opportunity--
certainly there is--for increased dialogue, cooperation, and
progress between the United States and Russia, if we especially
reject and put to rest, to quote, in President Obama's words,
``old assumptions, old ways of thinking,'' that the United
States and Russia are destined to be ``antagonists,'' or that
we are in a power struggle where a zero sum game is played and
one side is the loser.
Although there remain serious disagreements between
Washington and Moscow on many issues, at the summit the Obama
administration and Russian officials successfully began the
process of resetting relations and agreed to a new strategic
framework for United States-Russian military-to-military
cooperation, reaffirmed a common commitment to prevent
proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, and
signed an agreement allowing United States military personnel
and equipment to transit across Russia to Afghanistan.
Presidents Obama and Medvedev also signed a joint
understanding of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that will
guide negotiations and commits both America and Russia to
reduce strategic warheads and strategic delivery vehicles.
Finally, a bilateral Presidential commission coordinated by
Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, with 13 high-
level working groups, will meet for the first time this fall to
focus on a range of issues including civil society, terrorism,
common threat assessment, economic relations, nuclear energy
and nuclear cooperation, and space cooperation.
As the administration pursues a more robust relationship
with Russia, it will undoubtedly carefully navigate and make
sense of the internal political dynamics and power struggles in
the Kremlin and Russia, a weakened Russian economy and a
growing values gap between the United States and Russia in
terms of human rights, democracy, rule of law, corruption,
economic transparency, and freedom of the press.
It is hard to be overly optimistic about United States-
Russian relations as we approach the 1-year anniversary of the
Russian-Georgian war, Russia's military and political presence
in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and of Abkhazia is
hardening, President Medvedev has renewed threats to place
short-range missiles on Russia's border with Poland, and
another prominent Chechen human rights activist has been
brutally murdered without judicial recourse.
There is no more pressing issue on the United States-
Russian reset agenda than Iran's development of nuclear
weapons. To date, Russia's actions suggest anything but a real
partner in deterring Iran's nuclear program. In fact, Russia
has failed to implement Security Council resolutions and their
accompanying sanctions, continues to build the Bashir nuclear
power plant, and provides the Iranian Government with lethal
weapons, even signing an agreement to sell the S-300
antimissile defense system to Tehran.
Twenty years after the revolutions in 1989 and the fall of
the Iron Curtain, many Central and Eastern European nations
feel increasingly threatened by a resurgent Russia. America
must take these concerns seriously, continue to unequivocally
reject a Russian sphere of influence, assist Europe in its
quest for energy security, expand the visa waiver program to
include allies, and consult closely with European governments,
including Poland and the Czech Republic, on missile defense. We
must also strengthen NATO follow-through on efforts to provide
credible defense plans for Alliance members, and state
unequivocally America's unwavering obligation to our Article 5
commitments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler
follows:]Wexler statement deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wexler. With great pleasure, I would now like to invite
the ranking member, Mr. Gallegly from California, to give his
opening remarks.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I could
just yield to Mr. Wilson, I have my statement that I will have
for the record, but if I could have a couple minutes.
Mr. Wexler. Certainly. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman,
thank you for calling this meeting. I studied Russian history
at the Citadel when I was in college. I have had the
opportunity to visit Moscow and St. Petersburg for the last 20
years, and I have seen the restoration of cities that were run
down, now restored to be beautiful centers of culture.
I have had the opportunity to visit Western Siberia and the
Yekaterinburg, and Tomsk, Novosibirsk. The city I represent,
Columbia, is the sister city of Chelyabinsk. We are very proud
of the relationship. Having grown up in Charleston, South
Carolina, we had a significant number of citizens who had
emigrated from Russia. So I grew up with a great appreciation
of the Russian culture which has had such a positive impact on
American culture. And when we visit, my experience has been
extraordinarily friendly people who want to have a positive
relationship with the United States.
I also work very closely to promote Rotary Clubs to be
developed in Russia. This is obviously nonpolitical. It is
where business people can network. And there are over 100 clubs
today in Russia and the people--members can network by
attending clubs in Japan, India, Germany, United States, around
the world, thousands of clubs. And it is a way for the Russian
business leaders, men and women, to understand the benefits of
free market democracy.
So I am very grateful that Rotary now has a very
significant presence, and I am very grateful to be the host to
Rotarians from Russia when they visit here in the United States
or in Washington.
So I want to wish you well on your presentations today, and
I am very hopeful for a positive reset. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly
follows:]Gallegly statement deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wexler. I want to invite the other members who have
been so kind to join us to have some opening remarks, and just
beg the panel's deference just in terms of timing. Take the
time you wish, just so we can get to the witnesses. And I thank
really everyone for coming. We have had a great turnout.
Congressman Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
this hearing. I think it is a very important hearing.
Long an adversary, and now something less, although I dare
not say a friend quite yet, that is the situation with Russia.
Russia presents us with quite a dilemma with respect to
achieving our long-term foreign policy goals as well as long-
term peace and stability worldwide. By that I mean on the one
hand, Russia seems willing to help mitigate the nuclear
proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea. And having just
visited there earlier this month, spending about 1 week, I see
this kind of schizophrenic dichotomy of the mindset of Russia.
On the one hand, they want to help with Iran and North Korea;
but on the other, we have seen them distribute nuclear
technology to Iran and to Syria, both of whom have stated
desires to obtain nuclear weapons and to use them for nefarious
purposes. That one example best illustrates the schizophrenic
dichotomy of mind that Russia is in.
On the one hand, they are willing to mitigate, they seem to
be offering a hand to mitigate, but the reality is they are
sending nuclear technology to these countries, both of whom
which have stated desires to obtain nuclear weapons and, in
fact, to use them.
We have seen them bloviate and threaten over U.S. missile
defense programs. We have also seen Russia use its natural gas
supplies to stick it--with a huge stick to beat the Europeans
and some of their satellite nations about the head and
shoulders. They have cut the gas off in places like Lithuania
and using it political means--and the Ukraine. These are
documented. But what troubles me most, Mr. Chairman, as I
witnessed when I was over there, was Russia's internal actions.
So the question becomes: Can we truly count on Russia as a
partner--or, more to the point, should we--when they seem
content to backslide on the treatment of their own people? We
see opposition voices snuffed out, murderers of journalists and
activists go unpunished. We see rampant corruption and
political cronyism at every level of government, and especially
in the judiciary.
We see expropriation of private sector enterprises. Every
day, it seems, the Russian people lose more and more personal
freedoms, and the government seems to be becoming more and more
authoritarian.
And so I worry, Mr. Chairman, that sooner rather than
later, because of all of this internally, Russia might not be
in a position to help us because of internal strife that
inevitably rises out of such action.
Russia officials, including President Medvedev, have said
that Russia will not agree to limit offensive nuclear weapons
unless the United States suspends its plans to deploy a missile
defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. But even if this
was on the table to negotiate as an item, we still do not know
which hand Russia is playing with.
The fundamental question that the administration has to
answer I think is: Does this reset of relations with Russia
mean that democracy and human rights issues will be placed on
the back burner?
Now, please don't make any mistake, Mr. Chairman, for
saying that Russia is a lost cause. I am not saying that. Far
from it. But I do believe that we have to deal very frankly and
openly and from positions of strength in dealing with the
Russians. Russia has tremendous potential to assist us and the
rest of the world in reaching stability and prosperity.
No other two nations have in their hands the future of this
planet as Russia and the United States. However, I am worried
about the level to which we must help Russia to help itself
before they can help us and the world. And I am just not sure
that we have all of the resources and/or the time to effect the
internal change in Russia so that they are in a better position
to help us in the world.
But that being said--and that is why this hearing is so
important--I for one certainly think we as a Nation must try.
Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Chairman Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you for holding this oversight hearing on the bilateral
relationship between the United States and Russia. I would also
like to welcome Assistant Secretary Gordon and Deputy Assistant
Wallander as well to the hearing this afternoon.
You know, Mr. Chairman, few relationships in the
international arena are as important as our ties with Russia.
At the same time, few relationships have the potential of being
derailed because of misunderstandings and competing interests.
In this regard, I believe that the establishment at the
recent summit in Moscow of the U.S.-Russian Bilateral
Commission, which is intended to improve communications and
diplomacy on a wide range of issues, is definitely a step in
the right direction. This is an essential relationship, one
that has important implications for the U.S. National security
in such critical areas as counterterrorism, the war in
Afghanistan, and certainly the issue of nonproliferation.
Needless to say, despite the progress made at the summit
meeting, there are still differences between the two countries
on issues such as NATO expansion, missile defense, energy
security, development in the Balkans, human rights, and the
best strategy for dealing with the threat of a nuclear armed
Iran.
I look forward to the discussion today, and I would also
like to hear comments from our witnesses today about the recent
statements that were made by Vice President Biden as it relates
to his assessment of the strength and prominence that Russia
plays in the world today. There seems to be some inconsistency,
and I would just like to know whether that is really speaking
on behalf of the administration and maybe some
misinterpretation on my part and the parts of others. And,
again, thank you for calling this hearing today. I look forward
to all our participation. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Just in order of appearance, Mr. Miller. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And I appreciate your
leadership, Mr. Chairman, in holding this hearing. And I hope
that you will continue to provide leadership on this issue,
because our relationship with Russia will go a long way to
determining whether or not our country lives at peace and our
people are secure, and will have a lot to do with American
prosperity and security in the future.
I actually think that Russia is a vital component to
America's future, a component that we have taken for granted.
And let me just say we need to make an effort--perhaps this
hearing is the first one--to try to undo some of the damage
that has been done for the last 20 years of what I consider to
be senseless American hostility toward our former Soviet enemy,
which was now and should have been treated as our current
Russian friends.
This hostility and diplomatic incompetence has turned what
could have been a great friendship that would have well served
both of our countries into a situation today that it could go
in either direction. And I do not place that fault on the part
of the Russians.
Let me just note that we can describe in hostile words and
in sinister phrases the things that the Russians have been
doing. But, in reality if you look at them, does anyone expect
the United States should sell its natural gas and our reserves
and our products at a level lower than market value? Yet, when
the Russians try to do this, they are described as being
involved in some sort of heinous scheme.
If Russia was involved with putting up an anti-missile
system on our borders or participating in a military alliance
after the United States withdrew from an area, and ended up
putting a military alliance on our border, would we consider
that a hostile act? We certainly would.
I was as Cold Warrior as a Cold Warrior could be. I wrote
many of the speeches Ronald Reagan gave that were called the
hard-core anti-Soviet speeches of the day. I wrote them. I
worked with the President on those speeches. I engaged in
military action against Russian troops in Afghanistan and
probably killed a few.
I can tell you, this is a different world than it was then,
and we have to reach out to the Russians or we will suffer
because of it.
Today we have great opportunity to reset that relationship.
And one of the things, one of the few things I can say that I
totally support the Obama administration is in its efforts to
reset and reestablish a good relationship and a friendship with
the Russian people that will help us confront the two
challenges aligned with this.
There are two challenges that face our country. Just as
Soviet communism was the threat when I was a young man, the
threat today is radical Islam. They declared war on us. They
slaughtered 3,000 of our people, just as they slaughtered
hundreds of children in Russia, I might add. And Communist
China, which hasn't one inch of reform, and we have been
treating them like our business partners while Russia has had
dramatic reform and we have treated them as if they were still
some Communist despotism.
So with that said, we need to work with this. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I plan to work with this and the administration
to set things straight.
Mr. Wexler. I thank the gentleman for his kind and
thoughtful remarks.
And, Congressman Delahunt, you try to top that.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, if you would give me 1/2 hour, Mr.
Chairman, I might be able to even exceed it.
I was joined by the ranking member and Mr. Scott and Mr.
Sires, along with the chairman of the full committee, recently
on our trip to Moscow. It was very informative. I want to
congratulate both the Department of State and the Department of
Defense for I think a very valuable effort, and I think the
results are concrete.
I agree with others who have stated this is an extremely
important relationship because it has been noted, correctly so,
that in excess of 95 percent of the nuclear weapons on the
planet today are in the possession of the United States and
Russia. It is a relationship that has to work. I left Moscow,
observing the summit which I thought was a solid success, that
it is more than rhetoric. I think the reset button has been hit
and I think that progress is being made. I think we have to be
realistic in terms of our expectations. It did not reach the
low point the nadir, if you will, overnight. And it is going to
take time to restore it to what I think both nations wish to
see: A mutually respectful relationship.
And I think that both sides have to be careful as well in
terms of our rhetoric. You know, it is easy to--passion
sometimes overcomes good judgment when words are being used.
And we have learned, I think, that words do have consequences.
Words that have been uttered in the past 8 years have I think
impaired and hurt the United States national security
interests. But that is the past, and I think that we are
embarking on a new course. I note that there has been an
agreement that has been reached, a memorandum of understanding
between HHS and its counterpart in Russia.
I want to speak to you, Mr. Gordon, about an effort that I
think is worthy of serious consideration, and have spoken to
our counterparts in the Russian Duma and the Federal Council
relative to exchanges with a particular focus on sports,
bringing young people from Russia and sending our young people
over there for better understanding.
I think it was Mr. Scott that really emphasized there seems
to be a mystery. I think the key to unlocking that mystery is
more understanding, more communication, and real clarity. You
know, we hear even on this panel some reservations and even
among the American people about what is happening in Russia.
But we can't lose sight of the fact that polling data in Russia
indicates that more than two-thirds of the Russian people have
a negative view of the United States. We have got to address
that. If we don't address that, our, I think, shared and mutual
interest and our goal will not be achieved.
But again, let me congratulate you and also the President
for the good work, and let's just keep on keeping on. I yield
back.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here today. I was also one of the individuals, Members of
Congress, who traveled to Russia recently. And I found a very
interesting--how can I say? In the people that we met, there
seemed to be An Old Guard and a New Guard, and obviously the
New Guard seem to be more receptive to some of the ideas while
the Older Guard that we talked to seemed to be a throwback to
the Cold War.
Even when Congressman Delahunt asked about a question, two-
thirds of the Russians do not trust or like the Americans, the
person that jumped right away to answer the question, to me,
was the Old Guard. And he was resentful. He did not like or
trust Americans. I don't know how you deal with that in
negotiations, because who is going to set the direction for
Russia in the future?
We also talk about the problems with the journalists, the
lack of human rights, the shutting down of TV stations. Is that
the new Russia, or is that the pressure from the old Russia
advancing ahead?
So I think we have our work cut out for us. I think, like
everybody else, that we have to be very careful. I certainly
share that we have to negotiate, not backing away but just
confronting and dealing with the problems. So congratulations
on some of the negotiations that you have done thus far. And,
Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief because I want to hear the witnesses.
I concur with much of the statements that have been made
from my colleagues on both sides of the aisle here. This is a
very important relationship. It has not gone as well as I think
either country would have liked to see in the last 15, 20
years. The opportunity of this new administration to hit the
reset button I think provides a chance for both countries to
reset and to put their priorities on the table. Those
priorities have, I think, complementary issues that we share in
common. There are some obvious conflicts and differences of
point of view that were noted by Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr.
Delahunt.
I am especially interested to hear our witnesses talk
about, as we look at resetting, on how we focus on not only the
Middle East, but South Asia as it relates to the challenges
both countries face with a potential Iran that is seeking
nuclear weapons.
I am also looking at our relations with Europe and the
former Soviet republics that are now independent, and that
sphere of influence as Russia looks at it, as we look at it.
And then your suggestions on, as we look at trying to develop a
friendship that really should exist in more meaningful ways, in
my view, what the milestones ought to be. In other words, what
we should expect in the next 6 months, the next year, the next
2 years as we move in a more positive direction. So I will be
looking forward to that testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I also think it is maybe appropriate to note
when we talk about Russia and its former sphere of influence, I
have an exchange student here from Belarus, Veronica
Blechovich, and she and her fellow students are in the Capitol
watching democracy in action. So we welcome her and her fellow
students. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. And welcome on behalf of the
committee.
Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
convening this very important hearing. I too will be brief
because we have great witnesses and we want to hear from them.
I think when I contemplate Russia, I am reminded of what
Will Rogers said when he said that Russia is a country that, no
matter what you say about it, it is true. And as you know, he
said that over 70 years ago and yet it is still relevant today.
Russia's political, social, and economic dynamics are highly
complex, contradictory, and nonlinear. I think most U.S.
lawmakers, as was noted by my colleague from the great State of
New Jersey, Mr. Sires, most U.S. lawmakers will note that there
seems to be a values gap between the United States and Russia
which has been demonstrated time and time again through their
domestic political developments.
The same can be also seen in Russia's foreign policy. The
Ukrainian gas disputes and the Russia-Georgia conflict of just
this last year raises questions about Russia's capacity to be a
responsible stakeholder in the international community. And
just this year, we witnessed Russia withdrawing its candidacy
from the World Trade Organization and resorting to a customs
union with Belarus and Kazakhstan after waiting for membership.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia is accustomed to
isolation, and this is clearly not the appropriate strategy we
would hope and not the one most beneficial for the rest of the
world.
A Russia integrated into the international system is a
Russia that would be more likely to behave according to
internationally accepted norms of behavior and lead to a safer
world. That is why I support the administration's decision to
engage with Russia on matters of nonproliferation and energy
security, and I am encouraged by proposals to promote further
exchanges between Russia and the United States to close what I
refer to as the values gap between our two countries.
However, Russia's refusal to agree to tougher sanctions
against Iran in exchange for a new nuclear arms deal and in
pursuit of its military bases in Syria and Libya, makes me
wonder how much we should give through these talks. I hope that
Secretaries Gordon and Wallander will address these issues, and
we thank them for their testimony here today. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much
for being here. I chair the Transatlantic Dialogue, which is an
ongoing discussion between Members of Congress and our European
Union Parliament counterparts. We meet twice a year, once in
Europe and once here in the United States. In our last meeting,
we met in the Czech Republic. And prior to the meeting, the
American delegation went to Estonia and Lithuania in order to
show our support to the Baltic republics.
In our conversations with their government officials, there
was--they communicated to us their extraordinary concern about
a Russian--about the fact that they were concerned that they
would be sucked back into the Russian sphere of influence. We
also had an opportunity to meet with Belarusian dissidents, and
they also expressed the same concern.
I am hoping in your discussion today you will share with me
what our relationship will be with the Russians vis-a-vis the
Baltic republics. They are very concerned that we are going to,
in an effort to have a thawing of relations with Russia, that
we will in fact back away from our support for them. And they
expressed that concern time and again. So if I could ask you in
your very wide-ranging discussion today to hit upon those
issues, I would be very grateful. And I thank you again for
being with us.
Mr. Wexler. I want to thank all of the members for their
thoughtful remarks.
Our first witness is Dr. Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States
Department of State. Prior to this appointment, from 2000 to
2009, Dr. Gordon was a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution in Washington, DC, where he focused on a wide range
of European and United States foreign policy issues. Prior to
joining Brookings, Dr. Gordon served as director for European
Affairs at the National Security Council under President
Clinton. Dr. Gordon has held numerous teaching and research
positions, and he is a prolific writer on international
relations and foreign policy issues and has been a frequent
contributor to major publications such as the New York Times,
the Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, and the
Financial Times. Dr. Gordon holds a Ph.D. in European Studies
from Johns Hopkins University.
Our second witness is Dr. Celeste Wallander, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
in the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the
United States Department of Defense. Previously, Dr. Wallander
has served as a professor in the School of International
Service at American University, a visiting professor at
Georgetown University, director and senior fellow of the Russia
and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a senior fellow at the Council of
Foreign Relations, and professor of government at Harvard
University.
Dr. Wallander is also the founder of the Program on New
Approaches to Russian Security and the Eurasian Strategy
Project. She is an expert on Russian foreign and security
policy and Eurasian security relations, institutions, and
military and defense issues, including conflict escalation and
intervention. She has authored numerous books, articles, and
other publications on these topics, including the role of NATO
and the geopolitics of energy. Dr. Wallander holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from Yale University.
With that, Dr. Gordon, please. Thank you for your patience.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP H. GORDON, PH.D., ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
hearing. And thanks to all the members of the committee for
being here and for your thoughtful opening comments. I
appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about the
administration's achievements in Moscow at the summit between
President Obama and President Medvedev. I have submitted my
full testimony for the record, but here, if you permit, would
like to just make some introductory remarks briefly. And let me
begin by putting the results of the summit into a somewhat
wider context.
The Obama administration entered office seeking to put an
end to a period of difficult and deteriorating relations with
Russia. Last December, then President-Elect Obama called for a
reset in our relations with Russia, and he argued that the
United States and Russia have common interests in a number of
areas including, for example, nuclear nonproliferation,
terrorism in Afghanistan. There are many others. And he argued
that it should be possible to cooperate practically in these
areas, even as we disagreed with Russia in other areas. And I
think, and we will try to explain today, that the results of
the Moscow summit demonstrate that the President's instincts on
this were correct.
Just 6 months since the President took office and just 3
months since he met with President Medvedev in London and
announced the upcoming summit, the United States and Russia
have gone far toward achieving this fresh start. Not only have
our leaders made progress in improving the tone of our
relations and in building good will between our two countries,
but as the Moscow summit demonstrates, we have succeeded in
translating the rhetoric about potential collaboration into
concrete actions that are fundamental to the security and
prosperity of both of our countries.
The significant progress in our relations with Russia, let
me stress, did not in any way come at the expense of our
principals or partnerships with friends and allies. There are
still many areas where the United States and Russia disagree
and we will continue to disagree. This issue was raised by some
of you and I look forward to addressing it. The President made
this quite clear in Moscow.
At the same time, we demonstrated in Moscow in real terms
our shared desire to build a relationship based on mutual
respect and common interests, and I think we succeeded in a
number of concrete areas.
First and foremost, the United States and Russia took
important steps to increase nuclear security and prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our
own nuclear arsenal. The two Presidents signed a joint
understanding for a follow-on agreement to start that commits
both parties to a legally binding treaty that will reduce our
nuclear warheads and delivery systems by at least one-third
compared to our current treaty limitations.
They also agreed to participate in a joint threat
assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st
century, including those presented by Iran and North Korea. An
interagency team of experts is already heading out to Moscow
this week to begin discussions.
Second, we made concrete commitments to deepen security
cooperation, including by working together to defeat violent
extremists and to counter transnational threats, including
those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. At the summit,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, and his
Russian counterpart agreed to a work plan for resuming
military-to-military cooperation in areas such as
counterterrorism, search and rescue, and counter-piracy.
Another I think very tangible result of the summit was
Russia's agreement to allow the United States to transport its
military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of
the NATO-led international security and assistance force as
well as our coalition partners in Afghanistan. This agreement
will add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply
routes resulting in a potential savings of up to $133 million
in fuel maintenance and other transportation costs.
The significance of this contribution to our effort to
bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, which is also of
strategic benefit to Russia, should not be understated. I think
it is an excellent example of how the two countries can
cooperate in the pursuit of common interests without any quid
pro quos. We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in
nonstrategic areas, including public health and the restoration
of a Joint Commissioner on Prisoners of War and Missing in
Action.
Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized
the need for a more structured foundation for advancing our
cooperation in key areas across respective interagencies. The
bilateral Presidential Commission, to be chaired by the two
Presidents and coordinated by Secretary of State Clinton and
Foreign Minister Lavrov, will provide a mechanism for
sustaining and expanding the progress we achieved in Moscow
while also providing for ways in which we can work together to
narrow our differences.
Notwithstanding all of these positive developments, let me
be clear we have no illusions that the reset of relations with
Russia will be easy or that we will not continue to have
differences with Russia. Nonetheless, we are confident that the
United States and Russia can work together where our interests
coincide, while at the same time seeking to narrow our
differences in an open and mutually respectful way, be it on
questions of human rights, again raised by members of the
committee, or Russia's unlawful recognition of Georgia's
separatist regions.
In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his
message that our reset in the bilateral relationship will not
come at the expense of our friends and our allies. More than in
words but in actions, we demonstrated our commitment to the
territorial integrity and independence of Russia's neighbors,
including Ukraine and Georgia.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, at the Moscow summit the United
States and Russia took significant steps forward in translating
the reset in relations into concrete achievements, to the
benefit of both of our nations and our global partners. Without
abandoning our principles or our friends, we demonstrated that
the United States and Russia can work effectively together on a
broad range of issues.
I thank you all for inviting us to testify, and look
forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon
follows:]Philip Gordon deg.
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Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much
Dr. Wallander.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE A. WALLANDER, PH.D., DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND EURASIA,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wexler,
Ranking Member Gallegly, and members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the recent U.S.-Russia summit in Moscow and its implications
for the bilateral relationship, global and regional security
challenges, and American national interests.
I have long been a teacher, scholar, and analyst of Russian
foreign and security relations, but preparing for and
participating in the Moscow summit was my first opportunity to
contribute to the practical policy work of developing and
implementing America's strategy for working with Russia, where
possible, in order to protect and advance American national
interests. I am privileged to be asked to report on the results
of the summit and answer your questions. With your indulgence,
I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for the
record and will keep my opening remarks brief.
When Vice President Biden declared in February at the
Munich Wehrkunde conference that it is time to press the reset
button, he set in motion a process of working to create a
better foundation for pragmatic cooperation in areas where the
United States and Russia agreed, as well as structures to
address our differences where we do not. Simply declaring the
reset itself did not create a more pragmatic relationship; it
created an atmosphere in which laying the foundation would be
possible in order to better secure American interests. His
statement was followed by an intensive and productive series of
meetings at the highest levels, including between President
Obama and President Medvedev in London in April, as well as
numerous working-level bilateral meetings.
The Moscow summit was therefore the first opportunity to
test whether the reset of United States-Russia relations could
produce pragmatic results. And it did. It was a test of whether
the United States and Russia can work together to address core
defense and security challenges, including strategic arms
reductions, Afghanistan, proliferation of dangerous
technologies, military relations, and missile defense. And the
results were strikingly positive.
The summit was successful beyond expectations, and most
notably in the areas of defense and security. Of the eight
agreements and statements signed at the Moscow summit, seven
addressed defense and security challenges. Beyond the specific
agreements, the success is measured in the pattern of pragmatic
negotiations, constructive discussion before and during the
summit. The ongoing test of the reset will be whether Russia
will continue to engage in the pragmatic cooperation and
serious negotiations we have seen in the past months.
I would like to highlight two important summit achievements
of these seven in the defense area. The first is the Lethal
Transit Agreement. After weeks of intensive and constructive
negotiations, William Burns, the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov signed a
bilateral agreement which will allow transit of lethal material
and military personnel through Russian airspace. The agreement
permits up to 4,500 military and unlimited commercial flights
per year. It will result in significant savings over the use of
other routes, and allows us to diversify our supply lines, thus
reducing transit times and fuel usage.
The second agreement I would like to highlight is the
Military-to-Military Cooperation Framework. Admiral Michael
Mullen and General Nikolai Makarov signed a new framework on
military-to-military cooperation. This framework changes the
nature of the United States-Russia military-to-military
relationship, which will now be based on principles of
pragmatism, parity, reciprocity, balance, and synchronization
with NATO. The framework establishes conditions that will raise
military cooperation to new qualitative levels and deepen
mutual understanding between our respective Armed Forces. We
have agreement on a work plan with Russia which will include
nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before the end of
this year. And, in addition, the U.S.-European Command and the
Russian Ministry of Defense have agreed to meet to plan a
robust and even more ambitious work plan for 2010.
At the same time, the summit offered the opportunity for
the United States to clearly affirm our commitment to the
security and stability of countries throughout Europe and
Eurasia. We continue to support the sovereignty of all states
regardless of geographic location. President Obama clearly and
repeatedly made this point while in Moscow, in both public
statements and private meetings. We do not accept zero sum
thinking regarding security in Europe and Eurasia, and we
continue to believe that stable democracies on Russia's borders
contribute to not only Europe's security but to Russia's as
well. President Obama made clear during his meetings with
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin that U.S. support
for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity is steadfast and unequivocal.
President Obama also expressed U.S. support for Ukraine, an
important strategic partner. He reiterated support for
Ukraine's right to choose its own alliances based on its
sovereign rights as an independent nation.
The Department of Defense will continue to support both
countries' efforts to transform and restructure their
militaries into modern joint professional and NATO
interoperable forces.
Despite disagreement on Georgia and Ukraine, Russia clearly
seeks to engage with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council and in
NATO-Russia Military-to-Military Cooperation. Russia's strong
security concerns regarding Afghanistan and the instability,
crime, and extremism that an unstable Afghanistan breeds have
moved President Medvedev to a pragmatic, cooperative stance,
which we should build upon, given NATO's mission in
Afghanistan.
After the summit, our task is to follow up on the
agreements reached, and continue to work with Russia and our
allies in areas where we did not agree. The most promising
mechanism for this work will be the bilateral Presidential
commission that the Presidents agreed to create. With a
pragmatic and constructive atmosphere established in our
bilateral relationship, the United States can, as a result of
the summit, work now for success in addressing issues where we
have disagreed with Russia. In an atmosphere in which Russia no
longer sees U.S. engagement and policies in zero sum terms,
countries in the region will be able to engage more
productively with Russia and pursue their own global
integration and security interests.
So we had an ambitious agenda for the Moscow summit. And
while we did not achieve everything on the list with this first
step, we made significant progress on a number of very
important issues and achieved very real agreements in the
defense and military spheres. The United States and Russia have
a broad responsibility to work together in addressing global
and regional security challenges.
Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to
your questions and hearing your own assessments of the summit
and the way ahead.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wallander
follows:]Celeste Wallander deg.
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Mr. Wexler. Thank you to both witnesses.
I will start, if I may, by asking and concentrating on
Iran.
Certainly conventional wisdom would suggest that a nuclear
weapon-armed Iran would not be in Russia's interest. However,
Russia certainly has been, at best, reluctant in terms of
supporting meaningful sanctions with respect to Iran regarding
its nuclear weapons program. Certainly if President Obama's
policy of engagement is to be successful, it would appear that
Russian cooperation on all sides of that policy would be
essential.
So my question would be: What is it that we can do? What
are we in fact doing to encourage a more positive response from
Russia in the context of Iran? And in that regard, what can we
do to encourage Russia to cease its arms sales, specifically
the sophisticated antiaircraft systems, to the Iranians?
And, ancillary to that, with respect to Syria, there have
been certain reports indicating that the Russians were going to
sell quite sophisticated military equipment to the Syrians;
specifically, the advanced MiG-31E fighter jets. If both of you
could comment on that, I would greatly appreciate it.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is entirely appropriate to begin with Iran,
because there is not a probably greater global issue between
the United States and Russia or an issue of greater importance
than that one. I would say that was reflected in the
discussions in Moscow. There probably wasn't a topic in the
many hours of conversations between the two Presidents, and
between President Obama and Prime Minister Putin, an issue that
got more attention than Iran. Because, like you, we believe
this is a very serious matter.
I think also that Iran is in the category of those issues
that many of you have talked about where we see conflicting
signs from the Russians, areas of cooperation and areas where
they are less cooperative.
On the positive side, I also agree with you, Mr. Chairman,
any objective analysis would suggest that Russia has a very
strong interest in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. And I believe they understand that. They have supported
the E3+3 process, which is our main diplomatic tool for dealing
with the Iranian nuclear issue, and they have been working with
us extensively with that. And they have also supported a number
of chapter 7 U.N. Security Council resolutions putting pressure
on Iran.
So there are some common elements where we are working
relatively well with the Russians, but at the same time it is
true, as you say, that they are reluctant to take further steps
which we feel may be necessary if Iran continues to refuse to
meet its obligations to the international community on the
nuclear issue.
We were pleased at the summit that Russia agreed to a joint
threat assessment on the Iranian nuclear program, a joint
threat assessment on ballistic and nuclear issues which will
include Iran. And, as I mentioned in my testimony already, an
interagency team is headed to Moscow to talk to them about this
issue, and we hope that this exercise will help convince them
what we believe, which is that there are very serious concerns
about Iran's nuclear program. And by sharing with them our
analysis, we hope to persuade them that, as we have said many
times, the President has said, if we don't see a response from
Iran soon, we will indeed need to turn up the pressure on Iran.
Finally, on the issue of arms sales to Iran and Syria,
again, we agree with you very much that these are very serious
issues. We have certainly conveyed that to the Russians at the
highest levels, that the sales of sophisticated air defense or
other technology to Iran and Syria would be a real problem for
our relationship with Russia and we will continue to make that
clear.
Ms. Wallander. I would just agree with Dr. Gordon on his
answer on the arms sales, and just add that we would have to
discuss any specific issues relating to potential arms sales,
weapons sales, in a closed hearing. But we want to reassure
you, we would like to reassure you that the Defense Department
is monitoring the issue closely and also have concerns about
the potentially destabilizing nature of some of the weapons
systems that have been discussed.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are several pieces of legislation that would initiate
economic sanctions against people who are dealing with Iran.
How would those sanctions affect Russia?
Mr. Gordon. How would those sanctions affect Russia?
Mr. Rohrabacher. There is legislation here that is making
its way through the body that will actually be punitive against
people who deal--especially in the oil industry, et cetera. How
would that affect Russia?
Mr. Gordon. I think already we have had on the books for
years, legislation such as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, that
penalizes companies that make significant investments in now,
no longer Libyan but the Iranian energy sector, and I think
that legislation already has had a dampening effect on the
willingness of those firms to run the risk of sanctions before
making such investments. So I think that that sort of
legislation has had a deterrent effect. We have also made
significant progress----
Mr. Rohrabacher. How does this affect Russia?
Mr. Gordon. Well, in the same way it affects any other
countries in the international community that has firms that
would otherwise be thinking about major investments. I think
there are Russian firms who take that into account when they
consider whether they want to do business with Iran or they
want to do business with the United States.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you don't see this as having a
deleterious effect with trying to establish new relations with
Russia?
Mr. Gordon. There are two sides to that policy, and always
have been, including with our European allies as well. On one
hand, it does contribute to deterrence against those firms from
making the investments that we would find highly problematic
and undermine our efforts in dealing with Iranian nuclear
issue. At the same time, any secondary sanctions cause tensions
with our partners, which is why I would stress that we have
also made good progress, indeed perhaps even more significant
progress, in working with Europeans, Japanese, and Russians in
the financial sector in deterring banks and others from
providing credits that Iranian firms need. And almost all of
that has been done on a voluntary basis.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's hope we can work together on that.
And certainly by this hostility that was actually aimed in
Russia's direction the last 20 years, we couldn't expect them
just to automatically be concerned about what is--how something
will affect the United States and others.
Let me ask you this. The Vice President made some
statements recently that seemed to indicate that he didn't have
that same level of respect and concern about Russia that the
President expressed. Is the White House disavowing those
remarks?
Mr. Gordon. I think the entire administration is exactly on
the same page on this issue. The Vice President talked about
some challenges, very frankly, that Russia faces. It clearly
does, as do we and the other countries. But he also, I would
remind you, was the first to talk about the need for a reset
with Russia. It was, as Dr. Mullen just said, the Munich
Security Conference in February, less than 1 month into the
administration, that the Vice President stepped forward and
made famous this phrase about resetting relations with Russia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the administration is not renouncing or
disassociating itself from that statement, the rather strong
statement the Vice President made. Maybe when he goes overseas
next time, you can have someone whose only job is to have a gag
at the right moment for the Vice President.
On to NATO and expansion of NATO. Don't you believe that
expansion of NATO and the talks that we have had with countries
in Russia's backyard has contributed to the unwillingness of
those countries to reach compromises with Russia on various
issues?
Mr. Gordon. No. In fact, I think the entire process of NATO
enlargement has been enormously positive toward security and
stability in Europe, and that the reassurance that NATO
membership provides to those countries can and will and does
contribute to their willingness to work with Russia rather
than----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you think that giving them some sort of
military guarantee from the United States actually makes them
more likely to reach the compromises that are necessary to
solve problems rather than saying, well, now we have got the
United States behind us?
Mr. Gordon. Indeed, I think American reassurance to those
countries provides a level of security that allows them to rely
on collective defense, rather than their own national
rearmament or other efforts that would create further tension
with Russia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, that doesn't make sense to me. Let me
just note that we maybe we should invite Russia to join NATO if
we want to have a positive impact such as that. But if we are
not, how can we expect Russia to look at that as anything but a
military alliance that it is being kept out of and that perhaps
as belligerent motives? As I say, if that was done to us by
Russia, I think we would feel the same way. I would hope the
administration looks at the issue of NATO expansion very
closely and understands the how logically Russians would look
at that as a hostile act toward them.
One last question, Mr. Chairman. The missile defense, I
would hope when you are going to push a reset button that you
do reset indeed and start looking for new policies that were
not developed during the last administration, including NATO
expansion and including missile defense. Perhaps it is time to
scrap the European missile defense as designed by the last
administration and go into a partnership with Russia which they
offered to do in developing a missile defense that would be
beneficial to all of our countries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gordon. If I might respond to missile defense. First of
all, I appreciate the opportunity to do so, because it is an
important question including in the context of Russia. As you
know, President Obama, the Obama administration has indeed
decided to review the approach to missile defense in Europe and
worldwide. His consistent view from the start has been that
there is a growing ballistic and nuclear threat, and that if
ballistic missile defenses can contribute to the American and
Euro allied security then we should pursue them. And what this
review it doing is assessing that very question, how can we
best contribute to the security and defense of ourselves and
our European allies.
What I want to make clear is that the review is being
driven by the threat from countries like Iran and by the
technology designed to deal with that threat, rather than what
other third parties might think of the threat. In that sense, I
want to be clear, there is not a link between our review
between missile defense in Europe and the issue of resetting
relations with Russia. The outcome of the review on missile
defense will be determined by the degree of threat that we face
from Iran and the best way to deal with that threat in terms of
technology and cost.
Ms. Wallander. I would add the Senate provided the
opportunity for moving forward in these discussions. In the
context of the joint statement on missile defense, the United
States and Russia affirmed that they will work to actually
bring to reality a planned joint data exchange center outside
Moscow on missile launches, therefore beginning that kind of
cooperation on a cooperative approach to the Department of
missile threats. So we are looking forward to being able to
continue those discussions with Russians and hopefully soon be
actually opening that center outside the Moscow.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. I think my colleague, Mr.
Rohrabacher, has sort of set the table for some of the lines of
questioning that I would like to pursue, because I really
believe that these are the two fundamental issues that are
really on the table for moving forward with Russia and the
United States, relationship as we reset. And that is missile
defense and NATO enlargement. I just think that those are the
two areas that we have to kind of start from. And I want to say
that I really hope we can develop improved relations with
Russia. It is a beautiful country with beautiful people, yet
there are, as I mentioned in my opening statement, some very
serious internal problems that we can help Russia with. Many
people don't know it, but Russia's average age for their men is
just 58 years, 58 years. Whereas this Nation we are pushing
about 80 now. Just 58 years is the average life span.
The alcoholism, some of corruption internally, the food,
our trade can be improved. I think that there are some
opportunities here for some us to really reach out and help the
Russian people. I have a compliment even for Mr. Putin, whom I
think put forward some solid economic reforms in place, that
really brought Russia back from the abyss were with a with the
fall of the Soviet Union. He deserves a lot of credit for that.
There are a lot of good positive things. But here we are where
the President and Putin are saying, we can't move forward on
nuclear non proliferation or offensive nuclear weapons with
Russia until we dispose of the missile defense system in
Europe.
And I think we need to pause and see how we can get a clear
definition of where we want to proceed with that. And tied to
them is a threat of NATO's enlargement that I think are very
key. So I guess my question has to be are they receiving clear
enough signals from us as to where we stand on missile defense?
At one point earlier this year, there was a letter that went
out that was in the media that President Obama said that that
was on the table, but if we could get Iran, Russia to help us
with Iran, we wouldn't need the nuclear defense missile system
and that that could be a point of discussion. I would like to
get a clarity on that.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you very much for the opportunity to
provide that clarity. You are right to say that the Russians
have insisted or tried to insist all along that we should not
proceed with offensive nuclear weapons reductions unless and
until the United States abandons the so-called third site in
Europe. And we have been consistent in responding to that that
we are not prepared do so. As I said a few minutes ago, our
review of missile defense plans in Europe will be driven by the
degree of threat and our ability to deal with that threat in
terms of different technologies and deployments, not by the
Russian willingness to move forward on a start agreement or
not. Let me also stress that that was our position going into
the summit, and we were prepared not to have a joint statement
on missile defense if Russia continued to insist that we
abandon these plans or this review as a price of a start
agreement.
We were consistent in that. And in the end, it was the
Russian side who agreed that once they realized we were now
prepared to sacrifice what we think best to do for the defense
of ourselves and our allies, then they were willing to go
through with the joint assessment on the missile threat and the
data exchange center that Dr. Wallender talked about. And we
will be consistent on that and will continue to be consistent
on that.
The letter from President Obama that you mentioned is also
consistent with everything we have said, which is that as the
President has made very clear, has said and this is eminently
logical, if the threat from Iran were to be eliminated, the
driving force behind any need for missile defense would also be
eliminated. And you asked for clarity and I am trying to be
very clear. It doesn't mean if Russia helps us try to deal with
that threat where the need to be eliminated, but it is the
simple fact of observation analytically that if there is not a
threat, then the driving force for protection against that
threat goes away.
Mr. Scott. If Russia comes back and says to the President,
yes, we will help you, we will help to get Iran to stop this
procurement of nuclear weapons, if you will remove the missile
defense shield, what will the United States answer be?
Mr. Gordon. Well, again, the deployment of a missile
defense system in Europe or anywhere else would be designed to
protect us from a threat that exists. Therefore, the simple
willingness help try to deal with that threat would probably
not be enough to lead to a conclusion that we don't need
missile defenses. As I have said, the President has said there
is a growing ballistic missile and nuclear threat. And if we
can find ways to deal with it, we should and we will. So the
driving factor is the existence of a threat and not Russia's
willingness to help us with that threat.
Mr. Scott. If we did that, to move forward with a joint
partnership and missile defense for the entire region, would
that help move us off center?
Mr. Gordon. We have indeed approached the Russians on a
number occasions and the run up to the summit and at the summit
itself. And we are prepared to continue to do so to discuss
ways in which we might work together on missile defenses.
Russia should understand that any missile defense plans we
might have for Europe are not directed at Russia, they are
directed at Iran or other threats from the greater Middle East.
Therefore--and Russia has an interest like we do in being able
to protect itself against such threats. And the President has
said if we can find ways to work together with the Russians on
missile defense, including on our research, development and
architecture, then we will pursue those discussions. We have
that on the table quite clearly, and quite specifically, and it
remains on the table. We are prepared to move forward in that
direction.
Mr. Scott. Thank for your generosity, Mr. Chairman. I know
I went over a little time. I will follow up with my NATO
enlargement question if we have another round.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Boozman.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I would like to
know, it seems like after the fall of the Iron Curtain and
things there was kind of a honeymoon period where the United
States and Russia got along. I guess what is the cause that we
are resetting from, Iran, Iraq--I'm sorry, Iraq, Afghanistan
NATO, what do we need to reset?
The other thing is I was a little confused about the NATO
enlargement. I have been on the NATO Parliament for the last 6
or 7 years. And the countries that have joined NATO, in the
former Soviet block really are very, very nervous and very,
very scared of them. Now, I agree it has given stability to
those countries, but when you talk about NATO enlargement of
Ukraine and Georgia, I think the Europeans are very worried
about that to the point of putting it off because they don't
want their oil cut off and their this-and-that cut off. And I
think the Russians are very nervous about that from their
perspective. So if you could just comment on those things,
where we come from and then again a little bit about the NATO
enlargement. Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity. I will
start, and I am sure Celeste will want to respond as well.
Those are both good questions. The first one you are right that
in the initial aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there
seemed to be both the prospect for and progress toward a much
better and healthier United States-Russian relationship.
I think what happened over the course of that decade is
Russians gradually started to resent the outcome of that, which
included, as you say, NATO enlargement, the United States
becoming frankly the sole superpower rather than a pair of
superpowers. And as Russia recovered from the demise of the
Soviet Union and its economy started to recover and the rise in
oil prices started to fuel a sense of prosperity and power,
that resentment came to the fore. And under President Putin,
initially Russia started to become more assertive and resistant
to what they considered to be undue American power and undue
American hegemony. And I think that is their story in part of
the past few years is Russia's effort to resist what they
consider to be excessive American power.
And of course, we in the United States have tried to
explain that our interests are in promoting global stability
and not dominating in any way, but they see it differently and
that has led to tensions.
Mr. Boozman. And they do appear to be bullies in many
instances. And it seems like they feed on instability in the
region. Would that be a fair statement? They like their
neighbors to be kind of----
Mr. Gordon. It is certainly true that for many Russians at
least, I want to come back to the remarks of several members of
the committee who talked about the old guard and the new guard,
I forget who put it in those terms, but there are different
views in Russia. But yes, I would agree that for all too many
Russians continue to see the world and Europe in zero sum
terms. If it is a gain for the United States, it is a loss for
Russia. That has prevented cooperation and frankly it is
frustrating because we don't see it in those terms. We think
there are things that can be done that should benefit both
countries. And that to answer your first question about what is
the reset for, that is one of the things we are trying to
reset, is this notion--and it is frankly a Cold War notion and
a 19th century notion they or we have to win on different
issues.
Preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapon I would
argue is not an American issue that we hope Russia will let us
pursue. It is a common interest, and again, that was exactly
the theme of the summit. There are some common interests like
promoting stability in Afghanistan or combating piracy or
fighting al Qaeda or reducing nuclear proliferation. We both
benefit and that is precisely what we are trying to achieve.
Very briefly on your NATO enlargement question, because it
fits into the same discussion. It is true that some of the
countries of the foreign more Soviet Union remain, as I think
you put it, nervous. We try to provide reassurance and make
clear to them that the reset with Russia doesn't, in any way,
come at their expense.
On the issue of potential membership for Ukraine and
Georgia, we are trying to feel a simple principle, which we
have made clear from the start, and that frankly the Russians
have accepted in different fora that European democracies
should be able to choose their own security alliances. And that
is what we said applies to Ukraine and Georgia. And there is a
lot of work for them to do. And we want to work with them so
that they feel more secure and that they are better able to
meet the criteria for NATO membership. But it is a rock solid
principle of ours that democracies should get to decide for
themselves what alliances they want to join.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. Miller--did I cut you off?
Ms. Wallander. Let me just add two points on NATO. There is
a real disconnect between when you talk with NATO allies about
what NATO military missions are, what their training for, what
they are planning for, and what they are working on. And that
is focused on Afghanistan and our global missions where NATO
allies have agreed to contribute to common goals security
problems. And Moscow hasn't gotten there. Moscow really still
sees NATO as designed, deployed and ready for Cold War war.
That is a reason to continue the engagement though with Russia.
And we have agreed to restart the meetings of the NATO Russia
Council. At the meetings in Corfu, we agreed to restart the
meetings in the NATO Russia Council, and to restart the
military to military relations between the Russia and NATO
members precisely to continue this difficult process of
overcoming this Cold War thinking, which is understandable, but
incorrect about what NATO's missions, capabilities and
intentions are. So the work is still there, the process
continues and it is going to take some time. But again, the
summit provided the opportunity to get back to work in a
pragmatic way on that.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, and I apologize. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not think I have
ever attended a hearing at which political party was a less
accurate predictor of what member's opinions or points of view
would turn out to be.
I have a less benign view of Russia than some on this
subcommittee, including my friend Mr. Rohrabacher. I certainly
think we should look for those areas of mutual interest where
we can work together, where our interests are parallel and it
makes sense for us to join forces. But Russia and the United
States are unlikely BFFs. They do not really have either the
Russian people or certainly Russian leadership have a
democratic tradition or impulse. They are deeply nationalistic,
felt a great pride in being one of the world's two great
superpowers, it had nothing to do with ideology, but had
everything to do with nationalism and felt a great humiliation
at what happened in the 1990s.
One of the reason for Putin's popularity with Russians is
not just how better the economy is doing than it was under
Yeltsin, but that he is reasserting himself, that Russia is
rising from its knees.
And I agreed with what you said earlier, there are
certainly areas where we may need to hit a reset button, but
there are areas where we need to hit the save button with
respect to areas of our policy.
I was on the same delegation to Russia to Moscow that
several of the other members were. In one discussion, Russian
parliamentarians, they talked about South Ossetia and Crimea in
successive sentences. It worried me some. What happened in
Georgia last year has now become disputed, it is who started
it, who provoked who, what really happened, whose fault it was.
It has now all kind of fused over, and 1 year ago it
deg.is now already history. But if the Ukraine is found in the
heap at the bottom of the staircase the same way Georgia was,
what can we do to make it clear that we are not going to
believe that Ukraine tripped, we are going to believe that
Ukraine was pushed. What can we do, are we doing enough, what
are we doing?
Mr. Gordon. Thank you for those thoughtful comments. On the
first part, let me just say we agree with the analysis. When
you talk about Russia being nationalistic and resentful and
sometimes unhelpful. I don't think anybody here would challenge
that. And the President certainly didn't challenge that in his
thinking about why we wanted to reset. The question is do we
say therefore, let's not talk to them, let's not try to work
with them where we have common interests, let's cut them off
and try to contain them or do we try to find areas where we do
have common interest, and I think I have identified a few and
we identified some at the summit. That could show Russia that
the world actually is not only a zero sum place, that we are
not out to get them, that we can work together, and restore a
little trust. And maybe over time the new guard will prevail
over the old guard, and a new generation will come along, and
we can have the type of relationship that we would like to
have. So I think in terms of analysis of the situation, we
don't have a disagreement----
Mr. Miller. Ukraine. What do we do about Ukraine and
Crimea?
Mr. Gordon. We take very seriously Ukraine's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and I think Russia knows that. We
also take very seriously Georgia's territory and integrity. And
the point you made about South Ossetia and Abkhazia is
absolutely right. I want to make clear we are not fuzzing that
over. If anyone has the impression that we have moved on and
said, well, it was 1 year ago, so let's not worry about it. For
the reasons that you suggest, that would be a huge mistake
because it would imply that if it happens somewhere else we
would do the same thing. We are far from fuzzing it over; we
have been absolutely insistent that we will not and do not
recognize them.
We have successfully lead the international community in
opposing recognition, leaving Russia extraordinarily isolated
on this point. They went on a limb and recognized, and as far
as I understand other than the Nicaraguan legislature has found
nobody else to support them.
Mr. Miller. Hamas?
Mr. Gordon. No other countries to support them including
Belarus. That sends a pretty strong message that Russia can't
simply do what it wants and get away with it and we won't let
this lie. We will continue to bring it up at all of the
meetings of the international organizations and bilaterally
with the Russians with our friends so that this stays on the
international agenda and we can overcome it. And therefore in
the same way Russia needs to understand that any such actions
in another country, sovereign country with territory whose
territorial integrity should be defended would also not be
acceptable to us.
And of course, if I might just add in Ukraine's case, as in
the case of many other countries, the most important factor is
what happens within that country itself. The best thing Ukraine
can do is to pursue the political and economic reforms it needs
so that Ukrainians and even ethnic Russians within Ukraine want
to be part of a sovereign independent Ukraine, strong and
prosperous and stable.
Mr. Wexler. I don't want to cut you off again. Thank you.
Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know it is
important for us in the United States to focus on human rights
and we want to export those values around the world. I don't
know whether it is more troubling to think that the Russian
Government has the policy of supporting kidnapping and
assassinations of journalists and human rights activists, or
whether they just abdicate their role of maintaining order on
the streets. Which do you think it is? Are they participants or
they just stand back and watch? Which do you think is worse,
from an American perspective?
Mr. Gordon. Well, what is certainly true is that there has
been a troubling degree of violations of human rights and
frankly murders committed in wide open, and lack of follow up
by the authorities in dealing with them. I am not sure we are
in a position here right now to say exactly who was behind some
of the horrific developments that we have seen in Russia but we
can quite clearly say that we are not satisfied to the degree
to which those human rights have been protected and the Russian
State has done all it can to defend human rights and prosecute
those guilty for such violations, including the most recent
cases.
The kidnapping and murder of Natalia Estemirova which took
place just last week; it was obviously a terrible tragedy. The
Russian President Medvedev immediately wrapped it in this case
and said that he would follow up. And we will be sure to follow
up with the Russian Government to make sure that this atrocious
violation of human rights in Russia not go unpunished or
uninvestigated. It is very important to us and we will make
that clear to the Russian Government.
Mr. Inglis. What do you think, sir, in your view of the
Russian people, are they concerned that these things happen and
then nothing, no follow up, no prosecutions, or are they
accepting of it? Do you have a thought about what their
reaction is to the lack of prosecution of these murderers and
kidnappers?
Mr. Gordon. I would just say I do know plenty of Russians
who are troubled by the lack of prosecution. There are an awful
lot of Russians who do not want to live in a place where
people, journalists can be murdered on the street or kidnapped
without any consequences. So I don't want to make a judgment
about the overall Russian society or population, but I can tell
you I know a number of Russians who are deeply troubled by
that. I can tell you that we met with a number of them in
Moscow. The President raised this issue of the need for a rule
of law, and an independent judiciary, and the free press, and
respect for human rights. He raised it in his private meetings
with the Russian leadership and he spoke about it publicly when
he met with opposition leaders, when he met with civil society
groups, including human rights advocates, and when he spoke to
the next generation of Russians of the new economic school. So
it is absolutely something that we are very much focused on and
we raise at every possible level with the Russian Government.
And to answer your question yes, I do think a lot of
Russians are troubled by this and want to see an end to this
sort of injustice in Russia.
Mr. Inglis. Is there anything more we can do to aid the
folks that do want to end these sort of practices? Is there
something else as a Congress we can be doing or as an
administration?
Mr. Gordon. Well, it is an important point and we are
always open to. I think we should always have the attitude that
there is more we can do. Obviously we are not entirely
succeeding so we need to constantly be asking ourselves what
else we can do. I think we are trying to do a lot. As I say
both in terms of our assistance to those Russians who are
trying to remedy these issues, in terms of our engagement with
the Russian Government. But I don't want to be in any way
complacent. There is always more we can do when the results are
not showing what we need them to show.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to explore the area that I mentioned in my opening
comments about the former Soviet Union's spirit of influence
with regards to the various today independent republics. And I
know one size doesn't fit all obviously in this situation with
the Ukraine and Georgia, there are attempting to join NATO, and
of course with Belarus and with Kurdistan and some of the other
former Soviet republics, it is a different circumstance.
It is your views that Russia is trying to, in fact,
reestablish its former sphere with those countries today? What
do you think their true agenda and attitude is toward the
countries as they go about their own independent path?
Mr. Gordon. Again, I am hesitant to generalize about a
Russian view, but let me say that for many Russians yes, they
see what they call the Near Abroad as an area of special and
privileged interest. And I think I can say this with confidence
because they say that this is their view, and that they, for
historical, and cultural, and ethnic reasons, deserve special
influence in some of these neighbors. And that is obviously an
approach that we disagree with, not because we think we should
have some privilege spheres of influence in those countries. We
think it is up to those countries to decide how they want to
orient themselves, and that if they want to orient themselves
toward the European Union, NATO and us, that shouldn't be seen
as a threat to Russia.
Indeed, I think Europe and the world will be a better place
when Russia sees it the same way. That when they come to the
conclusion that having stable prosperous democracies on their
border is their greatest way to achieve security. They don't
currently see it that way, at least many Russians don't
currently see it that way. And when I said in Moscow we, after
a positive summit, had disagreements with the Russians and were
frank about them, this was one of them. And President Obama was
clear with President Medvedev that we believe it is up to those
countries to decide what sort of foreign policies they want to
pursue and that there shouldn't be privileged spheres of
influence. I do think Russia continues to take a different view
of that issue.
Mr. Costa. Would you care to comment quickly?
Ms. Wallander. Sure. In the NATO frame, it is an
opportunity to clarify that the approach to NATO cooperation
and defense, and bilateral defense cooperation with countries
like Ukraine and Georgia is to support their defense
transformation, their modernization, their reform, their
capacity to contribute to global missions. Ukraine has
contributed in the Balkans. Georgia preparing to contribute
forces to Afghanistan. And that these are capabilities that
allow countries in Russia's neighborhood to contribute to
common security problem. These are the not intended, nor
shaped, nor aimed at contributing to defense capabilities
against Russia.
Mr. Costa. But Russia doesn't see it that way.
Ms. Wallander. But Russia doesn't see it that way.
Mr. Costa. Quickly, before my time expires, you noted in
your comments about after 15 years of effort, there was
withdrawal from attempting to become a member of the WTO. Mr.
Rohrabacher mentioned in his opening comments about inviting
them to join NATO.
In both cases what would be an incentive, a momentum for
Russia to either be reengaged on WTO or to look seriously at
NATO?
Mr. Gordon. We would like to see Russia join the WTO. That
is a goal of the administration because Russia to join the WTO
would have taken market reforms and establish guarantees and
things like intellectual property that would be good for us.
Obviously it has to meet the criteria before it can join the
WTO. And the reason it hasn't in these 15 or 16 years, is it
hasn't yet met those criteria. But we want to work with them
toward that end. And that is why we were somewhat puzzled
frankly and disappointed even that out of the blue, they came
up with this idea of joining as a customs union with some of
their neighbors which has no precedent and as far as I
understand it which is imperfectly doesn't fit within the rules
of the WTO.
Mr. Costa. How about NATO, quickly?
Mr. Gordon. It shouldn't be excluded. We have said that
NATO's doors should be open to democracies in Europe. And if
Russia meets the criteria, and can contribute to common
security, and there is a consensus in the alliance, it
shouldn't be excluded.
Mr. Costa. A defense specialist opine.
Ms. Wallander. We will do whatever the State Department
tells us to do.
Mr. Gordon. That is the first time that has been said.
Mr. Costa. My time has expired. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. That bears repeating. Dr. Gordon said, that was
the first time.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes, thank you.
This is to both of you really, in terms of missile defense,
this is a follow up to the questions that were posed by Mr.
Scott. And I appreciate what you said in terms of collaborative
and working with the Russians on missile defense.
Would that also include discussions relative to a missile
defense system that was located, positioned within Russian
geographical borders or has that been taken off the table?
Ms. Wallander. Nothing has been taken off the table. And
some of the proposals that the Russians have floated which
could be the subject of intensive discussions now that we have
agreed to explore those did involve facilities on Russian
territory. Although not exactly in that same vajadak would be
the first step along those lines, but maybe the only step. This
is meant to be a true opportunity to share ideas as options.
And I think that that is definitely on the table.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. I appreciate that.
In terms of the architecture itself of the system, there is
a possibility that does exist that the system itself, the
hardware could be placed within Russian geographical borders, a
possibility.
Ms. Wallander. Well, the discussions have not gotten that
far down the road to actually specifically talk about hardware.
And it has to be, as Dr. Gordon pointed out, driven by the
assessment of threat and the ballistic missile defense review
is underway. So we would have to await that assessment.
Mr. Delahunt. It hasn't been eliminated.
You have heard a lot of concern on this side of the dais
expressed about Russian sales, the potential sales of weapons
to Syria, to Iran. We have heard them regarding the sale of
military hardware, to Venezuela in this particular hemisphere.
So there has been some concern. It has been expressed what I
find interesting is a recent story in The Washington Post, last
week that Georgia's--I am reading the headline--Georgia's
Saakishvili is seeking U.S. weapons to deter Russia.
I took note of a quote that is attributed to Mr.
Saakishvili that the only thing to stop him, meaning Mr. Putin,
is a clear unequivocal message from the West that there are
going to be very grave consequences. He believes that Mr. Putin
is in a pretty desperate situation, his domestic political
standing is in question, although when we were in Russia his
poll numbers were pretty good. I think some us on the panel
would be happy with them if we took a poll on our own
districts. I am really concerned about Mr. Saakishvili. I
understand he wants to be a better democrat, he has made his
speech recently that he's going to give it his best shot to be
less authoritarian and a better democrat, small ``d'' democrat.
But his language seems to create a real us versus them in
implicating the United States into a problem that I would
submit to a large extent he is responsible for vis-a-vis
Russia.
And now we see a new suggestion that--and again this is his
statement of Georgia for reintegration issues, this is his
quote, not mine. ``It will be the same mission''--in other
words make United States part of the EU mission--``it will be
the same mission, but representatives of other countries will
also take part, they will increase the authority of the mission
and granted additional safety because attacking American
monitors or attempting to attack them is politically
disadvantageous.''
I am really concerned about being used, and I would be
adamantly opposed to the sale of weapons to Georgia. You know,
we can be critical of the Russians and sometimes that is
justified, but I did note that there was a statement from Mr.
Medvedev, the President. Now, I don't know if this is taken out
of context, but it is reported in the New York Times, which is
generally responsible. And it is reported that the Russian
President stated at NTV the Russians need--and again, these are
language attributable to the Russian President--normal working,
friendly relations with the United States, mutually beneficial
relations. He went on to say, the deterioration of our ties
with other countries, our U.S. relations with some other
countries, including Ukraine and Georgia, should not affect
that relationship, the United States and Georgia. I kind of
welcome the tone. But I certainly do not welcome the idea of
selling arms to Georgia, nor making the United States part and
parcel of the EU mission. We have got plenty on our plate. And
if we are going to reset this relationship, why add fuel to a
volatile situation? Care to make a comment?
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman, President
Saakishvili gave that interview just before the Vice President,
as the Vice President was on his way for his visit to Tbilisi,
so it gave the Vice President an opportunity to address those
two issues that the President of Georgia had raised. And he was
very clear in the answer on U.S. policy, which is that the
United States supports a responsible and robust defense
cooperation program with Georgia that is focused on improving
Georgia's education, training, command capabilities, building
an NCO core and along those loans. That is what Georgia needs
right now. But Georgia is not ready for the kinds of weapons
acquisitions that the President floated. And that in the
future, is not off the table, but certainly the United States
is not in a position for believing Georgia is ready for that
kind of defense acquisition.
And similarly on the EU monitoring mission, the Vice
President was able to point out that the EU, that is an EU
mission, and the EU would need to decide whether it wanted to
invite American participation. And at that point, the United
States would have to have a discussion about whether the United
States would believe it was the appropriate choice to send
American participation or agree to American participation in
that mission. So this is all very premature.
Mr. Delahunt. If I may, Mr. Chairman. I presume that the
invitation from the EU has not arrived in the mail yet.
Ms. Wallander. As far as I know, it has not arrived.
Mr. Delahunt. Okay.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
On the issue of energy immediately following the signing of
the Nabucco pipeline deal with the EU, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel met with President Medvedev of Russia to discuss energy
security. And it seems our European partners dependence on
Russian gas leaves them both, them and NATO in a tough bind.
How can we use our arms reduction talks with Russia to help our
transatlantic partners ease their concerns over Russian gas and
the sectors increasing instability? Can we somehow triangulate
or use the two issues to the benefit of the other?
Mr. Gordon. I am not sure that we can. They are both
important issues, we want to pursue the weapons reduction and
the energy security in Europe. We have not linked the two
together by somehow suggesting to the Russians that we would be
unwilling to pursue what we think is a common interest in
reducing nuclear weapons unless we see changes in the energy
area. Rather, we have focused to make progress on the energy
area, promoting diversity of energy supplies within Europe,
including the example you gave of the Nabucco pipeline and
there are some others. We made some progress, I think the
cutoff of gas to Ukraine last winter was a wake-up call to a
lot of Europeans about what can happen to them. And it sent a
message that to the degree that you are energy dependent and
therefore economically dependent, you risk being politically
independent as well and nobody wants that. So it is our policy
and the President and the Secretary, Ambassador Morningstar to
focus on this issue of Eurasian energy issues to promote
supply. And interconnectors, and proper pricing, and market
mechanisms, and liquid natural gas so that Europeans are less
dependent. I think we made some progress on that over the past
year. But what we haven't done, and I am not sure it would be
advisable is try to link it to what we think is a common
interest in reducing nuclear weapons.
Mr. McMahon. On the issue of Nabucco, it is just a
pipeline. Is there a variable source to provide the energy to
provide the gas into the pipeline?
Mr. Gordon. That is precisely the question. The pipeline
will be built if and when there is a reliable source to supply
it. On these energy issues there is always a sort of chicken
and eggs prospect because you could also argue that there will
be reliable sources when there is a pipeline because companies
don't want to invest in the pipeline until they are sure they
have supplies. But companies don't want to invest in developing
the supplies until there is a reliable pipeline. So that is the
point of coordination and that is where governments including
ours can help, not by investing our own money in these things,
but by coordinating so that these things come on stream at the
same time and reinforce each other and that is what we are
trying to do.
Mr. McMahon. I thank you.
On the issue of global security, the Russian Navy is
reported to be moving ahead with plans to upgrade its Soviet-
era naval bases at the Syrian port of Tartus in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Also seeking to establish naval bases in Libya
at the western end of the Mediterranean, and in Yemen on the
Red Sea.
As I mentioned in the opening statement I am a huge
proponent of engagement with Russia. But do you feel that
Russia's military expansionism will be curbed through increased
engagement or is there another--are we being active enough in
that regard? Why do you think Russia is ramping up its program
its Mediterranean, its military program in the Mediterranean?
Ms. Wallander. You are right. The Russian officials have
announced at least their intention to upgrade the 1980s-era
naval base at Tartus and Syria and talked also about Libya.
Were it to be affected, it would probably be in the context of
moving naval assets from the Black Sea fleet into the
Mediterranean, not in that increase in assets at least in the
time frame given the time it takes to build naval forces of
that capacity. And so then it would depend on for what purposes
those forces were in the Mediterranean. Some Russian analysts
have suggested, and this might be actually consistent with U.S.
interest, but that they would be aimed at supporting Operation
Active Endeavor, which is a counterterrorism operation in the
Mediterranean that United States and NATO partners participate
in.
Or it might be aimed at Russian counter piracy needs,
because Russian ships have also suffered problems of piracy the
gulf as have other nations. So it would be something you would
need to be watching in terms of what the missions would be and
what they would be focused on rather than the assets in and of
themselves.
Mr. McMahon. Do you believe this is an area of great
concern.
Ms. Wallander. It is an area to watch. There is a time
frame that is extended enough that we can assess what those
missions are. It is not--I wouldn't want to react--I think we
wouldn't want to react presuming a zero sum frame. That would
become apparent in how those forces were deployed and what they
trained for and whether they engaged in cooperative counter
piracy operations as has been discussed in the NATO-Russia
Council.
Mr. McMahon. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Ms. Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a very few questions, but I am wondering about
your opinion on the following issue: Do you think that the
United States missed an opportunity after the fall of the
Soviet Union to restart our relationship with Russia?
Mr. Gordon. I don't know if it is worth--as I pointed out
in the previous answer, we did in the early aftermath of the
Cold War make significant progress toward a new relationship
with Russia, and the question that you raised, the big
interesting historical question, is there anything we could
have done differently to avoid the later down turning relations
that I described? The historians will continue to ponder that.
I am not sure that there is.
We were open to new and different relationship with Russia.
It may be that structurally empires have a hard time dealing
with a loss of Empire, and no matter what we did we would have
found ourselves in a world where we had resentful Russians
still getting used to the idea that we weren't equals.
I think when the Cold War ended, many Russians wanted to
believe that both sides would stand down and NATO would
disappear just as the Warsaw Pact disappeared. Well, we had a
different view because all of the members in NATO still liked
it. They thought it was useful and they thought it had other
purposes, including global purposes and other countries wanted
to join it.
So in a way, what could we have done other than force
people to abandon what they thought it was the most successful
alliance in history. So we can think about whether there is
anything else we could have done. It may be that structurally
the loss of Empire was always going to be something that led to
a significant period of resentment on the side of the Russians.
Ms. Berkley. Yes, I find myself in the same position that
Mr. Miller is in, in that I seem to have a less benign view of
Russia than many of my colleagues here today. But I am also
hopeful that the reset button will not only be pushed, but
there will actually be a reset in the relationship, because I
fully appreciate the need to relate to the Russians in a
different way than we have been doing.
There are three areas that I have concerns, one of them, of
course, is about Iran and a number of my colleagues have
already mentioned it. But it seems to me that a non-nuclear
Iran is of mutual benefit to both the United States and the
Russians, but it seems more important to us or we have more of
a passion for it and I am wondering why that is.
The second thing is missile defense, is there anything that
we can offer the Russians that would back them off from their
position of no way, no how, or is that just a continuing
problem between the two countries that can never be solved.
The third, of course, is renewed flexing of muscles, I
didn't want to overstate our meetings, what was communicated
with us in our meetings with the Estonians and the Belarusians
and the Lithuanians and the other Baltic nations. There wasn't
a huge fear factor, but I walked away feeling that they know
the Russians very well and they very much appreciated the fact
that we were there. And I also realize that this was fairly
soon in the aftermath of the invasion of Georgia. So they were
very, very concerned, as you could understand.
Can you respond to those three issues?
Mr. Gordon. Absolutely. Thank you very much for that
thoughtful set of questions. First, a word on the overall reset
and then your three points that follow within it. Because I
fully appreciate your concerns and those of others about
Russia's willingness to go along with the reset. No one has any
illusions about this. The President has said we should try to
have a different relationship while backing up principals and
our friends. We do not know if it will work, we are trying to
find out.
One of things that is important I think about the reset or
the effort to reset is we need to give Russia stake in the
relationship. If we simply say, we have differences and
therefore we are not going to talk to you, we are not going to
work with you, we are not going to cooperate on the things that
we care about, but by the way will you help us on Afghanistan.
I think the answer is likely to be no. And so what we are
trying to find out is whether we can find some areas that will
give them a stake in the relationship as well so they might not
see it in such zero sum terms, which leads me to some of the
issues that you raised including Iran.
You asked why they have not been entirely helpful. I think
sometimes Russians are torn between their own interest in
preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and their own
desire to prevent us from a big diplomatic success in the
Middle East. And if we can reset the relationship, maybe they
wouldn't see it that way, and would be more inclined to focus
on their national interests, in preventing Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon which happens to be exactly the same as our
national interest without seeing it as somehow giving a win to
American power and hegemony around the world, we hope to
persuade them of that.
You asked missile defense whether there is anything we can
do to reassure them or persuade them it is not a threat to
them. We are trying, I think our efforts at transparency so
that they understand that this really isn't directed at Russia
and it really isn't the idea of a handful of interceptors in
Europe that is all we are talking about to deal with the
threats from Iran just cannot threaten the Russian nuclear
arsenal, even at the new limits that were talked about in the
start follow on. And cooperation as Dr. Wallender talked about,
cooperation that could include material cooperation with
Russia. We are trying to persuade them that this could actually
be in our common interest rather than in any way a threat to
them. And I wouldn't be too pessimistic on that score. I think
progress is slow and difficult, but it is not impossible to
imagine that we could get there.
And then finally on the issue of reassurances to our
friends, we have really I think done all we can, and will
continue to make clear to them that a reset of Russia doesn't
come at their expense. Our commitment to NATO in Article 5 is
as rock solid as it ever was, and we will continue to review
how best to manifest that commitment. We have been in close
touch with them. We were--I personally was with my colleagues
across the interagency engaging with them, within hours of the
end of summit, just as we had before the summit so that they
know absolutely what we are up to and what we accomplished and
what we didn't.
And it is very important to us to make sure that they are
entirely comfortable with how we are dealing with Russia and I
think I can say for the most part, they can speak for
themselves, but they are.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. The witnesses have been
very gracious with their time. If you would give us just a bit
more, not too much more. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Just a few thoughts, just a gleaning from
what has been said here today, it just seems that the United
States is still overly concerned about an alliance with
Lilliputians rather than a partnership with a giant. And I
would suggest that if we are to have a peaceful world that we
better get real. There are powers in this world that can make a
difference. There are other powers, there are other countries
in this world which will only be secure because they are
latching themselves on to us or bigger powers. Russia is one of
those big powers.
If we are to have a peaceful world, we need to have a
partnership, a relationship with Russia, and India and Japan.
And all of our European friends who have lost their courage to
stand for anything, can go in the direction that they want to
go to, because our security can't rely on people who send
troops to Afghanistan but who insist they never go near a
battle. They should be sending social workers instead of
troopers.
The Russians are some of the most courageous people on this
planet, I fought the Russians. Russians, we fought the Russians
for decades, they are courageous people. We need them on our
side. They will not fade away when it gets tough. We can have
that kind of ally or we can have the allies that we have had in
Europe who want to take time out for tea when there is an
emergency. That was not a shot at the British, by the way, just
to say that. They are people we could stand by.
I heard Russia as related as a bully. Do you believe that
it is a bullying to insist that your customers pay market rate
for your gas--this is what we--was Russia bullying their
neighbors by insisting they pay market rate for their gas,
natural gas?
The answer is no, all right. I will save you from having to
upset the Ukrainians. And let's just also note this, that
missile defense was initiated as a major American goal by my
President that I worked on the speech with him that initiated
that goal. I have been in the room a number of times when
Ronald Reagan expressed that missile defense would be something
that we should ask the Russians to participate in, if we could
ever get them to give up their belligerency toward the West.
And obviously, the missile defense that is now being put on
their borders, but they are not part of is not seen as a
partnership with them. I would, again, the one last thing and
that is the double standard of why would Russia--we have a lot
of work to do to make up for the last 20 years, my colleagues
would disagree with me on this, have to know this, we have, in
the last 20 years, permitted China, which is the world's worst
human rights abuser, to get away with murder, literally get
away with murder, arresting Falun Gong, religious dissenters,
putting them in prison, shooting them and selling their body
parts, as ghoulish as it gets, but we have our businessmen
swarming over to China to make a buck. While at the same time,
Russia has opened up all of its churches, respects these
rights, the religious rights of its people, that does have
opposition parties, there are opposition newspapers there on
sale, they aren't perfect obviously, but yet we have treated
Russia like an economic pariah while we have set capital and
technology to build up the world's worst human rights abuser in
China.
Does this administration plan to end that double standard
with Russia and China and perhaps--I mean, we have in the last
8 years during the last administration we couldn't get rid of
Jackson-Vanik much less make Russia part of the WTO or give
them permanent, normal, most favored nation status. So do we
plan to change those basic economic double standards that we
have had with Russia as part of the reset button? That is the
question. Is that one you shouldn't answer as well?
Mr. Gordon. I wasn't sure if it was a rhetorical question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, it is a real question. We have had a
total double standard with China while Russia remains totally
isolated and fenced off from the Western markets. What are we
going to do? Or are we planning to do that as part of the reset
button?
Mr. Gordon. I will leave it to other colleagues in the
administration to address China. I would say on Russia we have
been pretty consistent on the economic front. We do want to
expand bilateral economic relations with Russia which are far
too underdeveloped given the respective size of the economies.
And we want to see, as I said earlier, Russia join the WTO. And
as soon as it meets the standards, we will do that.
That said, we continue to have concerns about some of the
freedoms within Russia that you addressed, freedom of the press
and independent judiciary, and we are not going to ignore those
issues even as we try to promote the bilateral economic
relationships.
Mr. Rohrabacher. If you will indulge me just one moment,
just one comment. We just had China shoot down hundreds of
Uighurs, religious people who are religious minority in China,
shot them down in the streets, arrested thousands of them. One
journalist--now, we should never have turned a blind's eye,
whether it is a journalist or anybody whose rights are being
violated. I don't know the details of that case. But one
journalist gets all of the attention that thousands of victims
in China get. In fact, a week from now, you are never going to
hear anything more about the Uighurs, but you will still hear
people testifying about that journalist in Russia. If that is
not a double standard, I don't know what that is.
Mr. Gordon. Again, I will leave China to others. But in
terms of the details of the case, the case was one of an
investigator of human rights being pulled from her car,
kidnapped, and then shot dead and it is not something we are
prepared to overlook.
Ms. Wallander. If I could just address one point you made,
Congressman, about the Russian military. I would agree with
you, and the Defense Department does agree with you, that there
is great potential for working with the Russian military. That
is why the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff went to Moscow
for the summit for himself sign the military-to-military
framework to signal how important we believe this relationship
is, the potential that inheres in that relationship and how we
really would like to get serious about a military-to-military
bilateral program with Russia.
And as I argued in my opening statement, now we will see
whether that opportunity is something that the Russian side
actually steps up to. Because I can tell you that the
Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
particular is ready to cooperate with the Russian military for
many of the reasons that you, yourself, pointed out.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. If I may quickly just follow up with
respect to Jackson-Vanik, respecting very much the answer that
in part was given, and understanding that there are other
concerns; intellectual property, agriculture, a host of trade
and economic concerns.
With respect to Jackson-Vanik, what would the dynamic look
like that would enable or encourage or prompt the
administration to come to Congress to ask for Russia's
graduation from Jackson-Vanik?
Mr. Gordon. The administration is still considering the
best way forward on this in consultations with the Congress,
and we will look forward to your views on the subject. The
President has said, as previous administrations have also said,
that Jackson-Vanik was passed in a very different context for a
very different purpose. It is more than 30 years old. Its
purpose was to foster immigration from Russia, largely Jewish
immigration. And the context has changed so much that it is no
longer relevant for that purpose. And, therefore, it is
anachronistic and we should find a way to move beyond that.
None of that is to say that the other concerns that are
sometimes linked to Jackson-Vanik about Russian protectionism,
about other extraneous issues aren't important human rights.
But using a 30-some-year-old piece of legislation to try to
promote different goals that may be important might not be the
best way to move forward. So we do want to find a way to
graduate, and we look forward to working with Congress about
finding that best path ahead.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. I would concur with your answer. And
certainly respecting the large numbers of citizens in the
country of Israel that are from Russia, clearly Jackson-Vanik
has worked at least as to the availability of emigration. And I
would highly encourage the administration to consider the
proper path for moving forward.
If I could just take my final moments, just considering how
our policy with Russia relates to our policy in the broader
sense in Central and Eastern Europe, a number of the most
prominent Eastern and Central European leaders not too long ago
wrote an open letter to President Obama in essence asking him
to double down on our relations with Central and Eastern Europe
to reinvest in NATO, to reinvest in transatlantic relations.
There certainly was a degree of uncertainty or anxiety or
concern in that letter. The writers of the letter proposed I
think six relatively cogent steps to reinvigorate transatlantic
relations. And I was wondering if you could just take this
opportunity now to address that letter and address the concerns
that were raised by those prominent leaders.
Mr. Gordon. I appreciate the opportunity to do so, because
that is an important issue, and I want people to know where we
stand on it. These are well respected leaders. We know them
well. We have worked with them for years. We like them very
much, and we always are happy to hear from them.
What they called for is something we are happy to support.
They called for commitment and attention to Central Europe,
which we think we have been paying and want to continue to pay.
And if anyone there feels we haven't been paying enough, we
want to make sure that they understand that we are very much
focused on the issues that we are concerned about. They want to
make sure that NATO's Article 5 commitment is real and so to
we, and we will work in the context of the new look at NATO's
strategic concept to make sure NATO is doing everything it
needs to do to make sure its members are protected and
reassured.
And they asked us in the context of some of the issues we
have been discussing, relations with Russia, missile defense,
to make sure that we consult closely with them before we do
anything with Russia or as we move forward, which we are
absolutely committed to doing.
So their weighing in on this set of issues is welcomed. We
saw them as an administration when they were here. We will
remain in close touch with them, and we will make sure that as
we move forward with Russia, as I think I have said many times,
we are not going to do so at the expense of our friends in
Central and Eastern Europe.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. With that, I will turn to my three
other colleagues for their final remarks. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I indicated earlier that I am working on a
particular initiative that I would put under the aegis of
public diplomacy.
Now, I note in the commission, the bilateral commission
that has been established, there are various working groups. I
would like to work with the administration on this. Myself and
the chair of the full committee have a draft, are in the
process of drafting a sense of Congress, resolution, or maybe
just a concept paper. Could you identify who among the working
groups would this be an appropriate--under which working group
would this fall?
Mr. Gordon. What you said about exchanges?
Mr. Delahunt. Right. And let me be clear. This has a
particular focus on sports.
Mr. Gordon. Can I volunteer for participation in some
capacity?
Mr. Delahunt. Have you played in any sports?
Mr. Gordon. As often as I can. Less in this job than in
previous ones.
Mr. Delahunt. I have been having discussions with a former
minister of sports, who I know has communicated to high-level
Russian authorities and he is actually a star of Russian
hockey. But this would not just be limited to hockey, but would
include soccer, track and field, basketball, whatever. And it
would be focused on bringing in large numbers of young people
from Russia and young Americans to Russia to engage in
international competition. And, again, the feedback coming from
Moscow has been very positive and enthusiastic. And, let's say
goodwill games. At one point in time we had the Presidential
Council on Health and Fitness. This is, in rough form--not
defining it very well, but this is the core of the concept.
Mr. Gordon. It sounds like a terrific initiative. We will
have to look into the best way to move forward. There is an
education and cultural exchange subcommission in the
Presidential Commission that we have set up. Under Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale is running that. Maybe
this fits under that category. But if it doesn't, let's talk
about other categories, because it sounds like a great thing.
Mr. Delahunt. I will be calling you.
Mr. Gordon. Please do. Celeste is a marathon runner, so you
might want to involve her as well.
Mr. Delahunt. We will bring the Department of Defense into
this.
Mr. Gordon. Excellent. That sounds great.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. McMahon. Ms. Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. Yes. I also wanted to ask you, as long as you
are doing sports with Mr. Delahunt, let me ask. As I mentioned
to you earlier, I chair the transatlantic dialogue. Our next
meeting is here in the United States, first weekend in December
in New York. Many of our European Union Parliament members are
new because of their elections, so this is the first time they
are coming to the transatlantic dialogue. This has been going
on for over 35 years.
I am wondering, we usually bring a number of administration
officials. Part of the dialogue is very much concentrated on
Russia, Iran. I am wondering, Mr. Gordon, because we usually
deal with State Department more than Defense, would you be
willing to come? And to whom do I speak about this?
Mr. Gordon. In principle, of course I know about the
transatlantic dialogue. It is important and we would love to
support it. If your staff gets in touch with our office, I am
sure we will do all we can to make sure we are properly
represented.
Ms. Berkley. It would only take 1\1/2\ hours of your time,
because each segment of the discussion is only about 1\1/2\
hours long.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. If you think you are getting away with
``properly represented,'' with Shelley on the march, I doubt
it.
Mr. Gordon. I will be on a sports delegation to Moscow that
week. But if there is any way to work it in. No, seriously.
Thanks. Let's be in touch about it.
Mr. Wexler. I very much want to thank Dr. Wallander and Dr.
Gordon. I hope everyone agrees, I think this was a particularly
thorough and illuminating hearing. And your answers and
responsiveness I thought were quite uncommon, and I am deeply
grateful to both of you.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, if I can, I would like to
repeat what I said at the beginning, and that is, to offer
accolades for the excellent work done to date in terms of
moving this relationship along, especially with the President
in Moscow.
Mr. Wexler. I will let that be the last word. The
subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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