[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-42]
AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT OPERATIONS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 22, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROB BISHOP, Utah
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GLENN NYE, Virginia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Cathy Garman, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Megan Putnam, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 22, 2009, Air Sovereignty Alert Operations...... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 22, 2009........................................ 29
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009
AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT OPERATIONS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Readiness Subcommittee................................. 3
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 1
WITNESSES
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Homeland Defense and Emerging
Threats and Warfare, Defense Capabilities and Management Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 4
Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air,
Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S.
Air Force...................................................... 8
Verga, Peter F., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Integration and Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense..... 6
Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, USAF, Director, U.S. Air National
Guard.......................................................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
D'Agostino, Davi M........................................... 39
Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J................................... 58
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 37
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P........................................ 33
Verga, Peter F............................................... 54
Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III................................ 63
Documents Submitted for the Record:
GAO Report, Homeland Defense--Actions Needed to Improve
Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect
U.S. Airspace.............................................. 71
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Taylor................................................... 129
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bright................................................... 134
Mr. Franks................................................... 133
Ms. Giffords................................................. 133
AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT OPERATIONS
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 22, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. Good morning. And welcome to the hearing on air
sovereignty alert (ASA) operations.
During the Cold War we had planes standing alert to protect
us from potential air threats from the former Soviet Union. The
Cold War ended, we felt safe, and we no longer really needed
the ASA mission.
Our comfortable security suddenly changed on September 11,
2001. Following the tragic day, that tragic day, the Department
of Defense (DOD) initiated Operation Noble Eagle. Now
protection of our airspace from internal threats is our number
one defense priority.
The Department issued several policy memos and gave the
responsibility for carrying out the new ASA mission to the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD. Although
neither DOD nor NORAD ever specified which service should
support the ASA mission, the Air Force currently provides 100
percent of the fighter aircraft. The mission is conducted at 18
ASA sites across the United States with the Air National Guard
operating out of 16 of those sites.
The basic crews involved in the ASA mission have been
tested several times, most recently when a plane was stolen in
Canada and flown across the border into the United States. The
plane was intercepted and finally landed on a Missouri--
Missourah, I have to follow Chairman Skelton's pronunciation--
highway. The pilot was caught after he tried to flee the scene.
All this should make us feel somewhat secure knowing that
our space is well protected. So why are we here this morning?
We are here because appearances are not always reality. This is
a high-priority mission for which the Air Guard has
volunteered, but the funding, which comes from active duty Air
Force accounts, historically has not been allocated on a timely
basis. This raises serious challenges for the Guard related to
hiring personnel and providing the necessary training to ensure
the readiness of the crew supporting this mission.
Last year, because of our concern that this mission was
being ignored by the active duty Air Force, the committee
proposed language to address the funding and personnel
situation. Section 354 of the fiscal year 2009--the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act requires the
Secretary of Defense to provide in the Air Force budget
justification documenting information on funding requirements
for the mission and associated command and control elements,
including military personnel costs and flying hours.
I would be interested to hear from our Air Force witness
General Darnell this morning how the Air Force is complying
with that mandate. I recognize that because the full budget has
not been sent up here yet, we will not be able to discuss
specifics on funding and aircraft availability. We will have
those details for a later posture hearing. But I do expect to
hear that the Air Force is on track to comply with that
statutory language. And I am sure that General Wyatt, Director
of the Air Guard, will have a few things to say about this,
too.
With that congressional action, we believed we had fixed
all the problems associated with the ASA mission. We soon found
out we only scratched the surface. Congress has asked the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to do a review of the
ASA mission. Their report which was issued in January was very
troubling. I will let the GAO speak for itself and tell us in
detail what they found, but I would like to highlight a few
findings that bothered me the most.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 71.]
Mr. Ortiz. Mission document statements do not include the
ASA responsibility for the Air Guard. Since this is ignored in
the mission statements, the readiness of the units for the ASA
mission is not adequately considered. NORAD does not conduct
routine operation risk assessments, so we do not have a good
idea in terms of what is really needed in terms of personnel,
aircraft and types of units to perform the mission. The Air
Force has not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state
mission because they felt it would not be a lasting mission.
I am also concerned that the Department's responses to the
GAO's findings and recommendations were noncommittal. It is my
understanding that NORAD and the Air Force provided comments to
the Department on actions that they intended to take, but that
those comments were not included in the DOD response. That
might explain why the DOD response was unsatisfactory.
According to DOD policy, the ASA mission is our number one
priority. Mr. Verga can provide us a better explanation than
what the Department gave to GAO on how the DOD intends to
maintain ASA as DOD's number one priority mission.
Now I would like to turn to my good friend from the
Commonwealth of Virginia, Randy Forbes, for an opening
statement. Mr. Forbes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to say
that I share your concerns regarding this issue. And I would
like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today and for
sharing your expertise with us and for your service to our
country.
As the Chairman mentioned, we learned a lot of lessons on
September 11, 2001. We learned that a small group of nonstate
actors could take thousands of American lives by attacking us
from the skies above our homeland when they took a routine
commercial flight operation and turned it into an extremely
effective weapon.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
there were nearly 680 million passengers on domestic flights
last year and another 154 million flying between the U.S. and
the rest of the world. To put it in perspective, that is more
than the total populations of the United States, Japan, Russia,
Mexico, Canada and the United Kingdom combined. And this number
does not include nearly 28 million air hours flown by the fleet
of more than 234,000 general aviation aircraft owned by private
pilots and flight schools around the country.
Mr. Chairman, I raise this point because I think it is
important that we all understand the scope of the problem and
the enormous security challenges that we face. Although the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and their international
counterparts have taken great strides to increase aviation
security, it is imprudent to believe that their actions will
completely mitigate the risk should someone attempt to do us
harm. With over 830 million commercial passengers flying
annually in and around the United States, the scope of the
problem is too large, and the consequences are too great.
You mentioned the incident last week involving the general
aviation aircraft that was stolen from Canada and flown into
U.S. airspace. I certainly want to applaud all those involved
in the response and the resolution of that situation.
I also want to highlight that just this Monday, a Canadian
passenger jet with 159 passengers and 8 crew members on board
was hijacked by a lone gunman who, according to initial press
reports, somehow made it past security. Fortunately the police
were able to gain control of that situation while the plane was
still on the ground.
Although neither of these events appear to be linked to any
terrorist organization, they do highlight that current security
measures are not impenetrable. Our skies and our citizens are
still vulnerable to those wishing to do us harm.
With that said, I find the issues at the heart of today's
hearing concerning. The findings in the GAO report and the
lackluster response from the Department of Defense require our
attention. And I am thankful to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing. I am hopeful that we have got the right set of
witnesses here to address the issues, and I would like to
welcome once again each of them to the committee today.
Today's hearing focuses on the policy and resourcing
shortcomings between the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Air Force and the Air National Guard. But I know,
Mr. Chairman, that we both agree that NORAD and Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) also play a critical role in the execution
of the air sovereignty alert mission. As we go through the
course of the hearing today, we may find that we will also need
to have a direct discussion about the air sovereignty mission
with them as well.
Several of our subcommittee members have worked hard in
this area, and we recognize their contributions. I thank Mr.
LoBiondo for his work in this area. And we look forward to
their continuing efforts. And, Mr. Chairman, I now look forward
to hearing from our witnesses, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. I would like to welcome our
witnesses, and thank you for taking the time to appear this
morning. Today we have with us Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino, Director
of Homeland Defense and Emerging Threats and Warfare, Defense
Capabilities and Management Team, United States Government
Accountability Office. Thank you very much for joining us.
Mr. Peter F. Verga, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
Thank you, Mr. Verga.
Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, United States Air
Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information
Operations, Plans and Requirements. Thank you, sir, for joining
us.
And Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt, United States Air
Force, Director of the United States Air National Guard.
Welcome, Ms. D'Agostino. Whenever you are ready, you can
begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND
EMERGING THREATS AND WARFARE, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Forbes and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here before you this morning
to discuss GAO's January 2009 report on opportunities to
improve management of North American Aerospace Defense
Command's, or NORAD, and Department of Defense's, or DOD, air
sovereignty alert operations. We will be calling them ASA going
forward.
NORAD and DOD have fueled and armed fighter aircraft and
trained personnel on constant alert at 18 sites across the
United States. Given the continued air threat, it is crucial
for this capability to function at a high level of readiness.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, currently the Air Force
provides NORAD with personnel and equipment for these
operations, including F-16 and F-15 aircraft. Air sovereignty
alert units are tasked to conduct and train for both their
overseas and homeland operations. ASA operations are ground
operations that take place before the aircraft go airborne.
These operations support multiple missions, including the Joint
Staff's Operation Noble Eagle, in addition to NORAD's homeland
defense contingency plans.
Today I will address the following three questions. First,
does NORAD routinely conduct risk assessments to determine its
ASA operational requirements? Second, has the Air Force
implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in
accordance with NORAD, DOD and Air Force guidance? Third, has
the Air Force developed a plan to address the potential
aircraft shortfalls to sustain ASA operations for the future?
First, NORAD had performed three risk assessments in
response to individual DOD leadership requests about ASA
operations, but the last one was done in 2006. Such risk
assessments, if done on a routine basis, could help NORAD
determine the appropriate levels and types of resources for the
mission, and particularly, this is important, in a resource-
constrained environment.
Second, at the time of our review, the Air Force had not
implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission. Because
it is not treated as such, the Air Force programmed money for
ASA operations in two-year increments. This has been the case
even though DOD in December 2003 directed the Air Force to
program money across the six-year future years defense program
submissions.
This incremental funding, the two years versus a six-year
approach, apparently has created several challenges for the ASA
units. Unit commanders we interviewed identified funding,
personnel and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three
factors affecting their ability to perform these operations.
Seventeen of the twenty units that we talked to said that
personnel issues were a moderate or great concern, and that
recruiting, retention and promotion limitations were the
primary issues due to the two-year funding approach. Some
commanders even told us that they had lost some of their most
experienced personnel due to job instability caused by the two-
year funding approach.
Finally, a key consequence of not being a steady-state
mission was that the readiness of the units to conduct these
operations is not being fully assessed. NORAD partially
assessed readiness through individual inspections that they do
about every 20 months, but the Air Force, which is a force
provider, is not monitoring readiness for these operations on
an ongoing basis. And what is fundamentally important, as you
noted, Mr. Chairman, this mission is not on the mission
Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statements for the units,
and therefore it is not being measured in the readiness system,
or Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS).
Finally, at the time of our review, the Air Force did not
have a plan to manage potential aircraft shortfalls to sustain
ASA operations for the future. We identified a potential
shortfall in the number of available aircraft that could affect
units performing ASA operations. Our analysis does have some
assumptions based on information that DOD provided us and
assumes the Air Force would provide F-35s to all the Air
National Guard units doing ASA operations. I would point out,
though, we recently reported that the F-35 acquisition program
may face schedule slippage risks because of this production
schedule. Until we see Air Force plans for managing this
difficult situation with the competing demands for the new
aircraft, it is unclear to us whether replacement aircraft will
be available to mitigate the potential fighter shortfall for
conducting ASA in the homeland.
I would like to just mention that we made several
recommendations, which you went through briefly, sir, and even
though DOD agreed or partially agreed with our report's
recommendations, we couldn't tell what actions they were going
to take.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, this concludes
my prepared statement.
[The prepared statement of Ms. D'Agostino can be found in
the Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. Mr. Verga.
STATEMENT OF PETER F. VERGA, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY INTEGRATION AND CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Verga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you
today on the Department of Defense protection of the air
sovereignty of the United States. As reflected in the National
Defense Strategy, the core responsibility of the Department of
Defense is to defend the United States from attack upon its
territory at home and to secure its interests abroad. The U.S.
Armed Forces protect the physical integrity of the country
through an active layer of defense. They also deter attacks
upon it directly and indirectly through deployments at sea, in
the air, on land and in space.
Within the Department of Defense, our responsibility to
defend the United States is assigned to the binational U.S.-
Canada North American Aerospace Defense Command. NORAD provides
aerospace warning, aerospace control, including air
sovereignty, and maritime warning for all of North America.
Consistent with the law, the Secretary of Defense assigns
forces to the United States Element of NORAD to perform its
assigned mission, and ensures that such assignments are
consistent with the force structure prescribed by the
President.
During the Cold War NORAD focused its defense of the United
States on air threats, originating from nation states. Although
the probability of a nation state air attack has greatly
lessened, the Secretary of Defense has said, quote, the United
States still has to contend with the security challenges posed
by the military forces of other countries, from those actively
hostile to those at strategic crossroads, and the United States
military must be able to dissuade, deter and, if necessary,
respond to challenges across the spectrum, including the armed
forces of other nations.
Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, when terrorists
hijacked civilian airliners and used them as weapons against
innocent civilians, NORAD's focus has expanded to include
terrorist air threats originating from within as well as
outside the United States. Terrorists remain the preeminent air
threat to the United States. As observed by President Obama
during his Inaugural Address, our Nation is at war against a
far-reaching network of violence and hatred. NORAD's vigilance
against potential attacks from within and from outside the
United States is a critical distinction between our air defense
posture pre-9/11 and post-9/11.
Collectively the interagency of the Government of the
United States provides 20 layers of security to enhance the
security in the aviation domain. And while no system is fail-
safe, collectively these security measures have created
multiple barriers, thereby reducing the likelihood of a
successful attack using the air domain.
Through Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD defends the United
States by surveilling U.S. airspace and the Nation's air
approaches, and by positioning air defense alert fighters
throughout the country. These alert fighters, whose numbers may
be adjusted to meet changing threat levels, are capable of
reaching targets threatening our Nation's major population
centers and national critical infrastructure within minutes to
dissuade, deter and, if necessary, defeat air threats.
Supporting and complementing these alert fighters are defense
and Federal Aviation Administration surveillance radars,
airborne early warning aircraft and supporting tanker aircraft.
In addition, in defense of the National Capital Region, the
seat of our government, Operation Noble Eagle conducts air
patrols; maintains a dedicated 24-hour, 7-days-a-week alert
fighter response at Andrews Air Force Base; and operates a
dedicated around-the-clock ground-based air defense missile
system. In addition, the United States Coast Guard supports
NORAD with alert helicopters to intercept low- and slow-flying
aircraft should they penetrate the National Capital Region air
defense zone.
In 2005, DOD employed a unique visual warning system in the
National Capital Region to supplement traditional radio
communications to warn wayward pilots to contact FAA air
traffic controllers immediately and to exit National Capital
Region restricted airspace they may have violated.
Currently, to facilitate interagency cooperation, DOD
maintains liaison officers in the TSA-hosted National Capital
Region Coordination Center on a full-time basis and provides
key interagency operation centers and the National Capital
Region Coordination Center access to DOD's classified
conferencing capability, which is used for DOD coordination and
decisionmaking during their response to domestic air threats.
Operation Noble Eagle is a joint operation managed under
the Global Force Management Plan to provide timely, risk-
balanced resourcing to NORAD requirements for capabilities and
forces. DOD ensures that the air sovereignty force furnishes
capabilities consistent with U.S. national security objectives
and a long established risk management system in conjunction
with the Global Force Management Plan. Although the Global
Force Management Plan currently directs the U.S. Air Force to
support the Operation Noble Eagle mission, the majority of
which is currently provided by the Air National Guard, the
Department may draw upon capabilities of active duty Air Force
or any other DOD component to fill the Operation Noble Eagle
air sovereignty mission with U.S. Navy E-2 Hawkeye Airborne
Early Warning aircraft or U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18s.
DOD will also continue to refine its risk management
approach to ensure that military capabilities and resources are
available to carry out its core responsibility to defend the
United States. As stated in the National Defense Strategy, the
challenges before us will require resourcefulness and an
integrated approach that wisely balances risks and assets, and
that recognizes where we must improve.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. We appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman and members
of the subcommittee, and your continued support for the
Department of Defense, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Verga can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, sir. General Darnell.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR AIR, SPACE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Darnell. Good morning, Chairman Ortiz, Ranking
Member Forbes and distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for calling this hearing and for the opportunity to discuss
Air Force air sovereignty operations.
The January 2009 Government Accountability Office report
focuses on a vital mission area that has been a part of the Air
Force and Air National Guard for over 50 years. The GAO report
provides useful recommendations the Air Force can take to
better support ASA operations. We have analyzed the GAO
findings and are working to comply with the recommended
actions. The Air Force stands ready to win today's joint fight
and plan for tomorrow's challenges.
I thank the subcommittee for allowing me to appear before
you today and for your continued support of the Air Force. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Darnell can be found in
the Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Ortiz. General Wyatt.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, DIRECTOR, U.S.
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
General Wyatt. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member
Forbes and members of the committee.
Secretary Gates wrote in the 2008 National Defense
Strategy, and I quote, a core responsibility of the U.S.
Government is to protect the American people, in the words of
the framers of our Constitution, to provide for the common
defense, closed quote. As we sit here today, nearly 3,000 men
and women of the Air National Guard are protecting the skies
over our heads. This includes Air Guard members manning first
Air Force and its air defense sectors and operation centers;
and the air crews, maintenance personnel and other support
personnel at 16 of the 18 U.S. air sovereignty alert sites
throughout the United States.
The January GAO report focused on the air sovereignty
alert, those sites that were conducting steady-state ASA
operations up through September of 2008. I would like to put a
face to some of the Air National Guard challenges associated
with ASA.
As, Mr. Chairman, you indicated, at 2:55 p.m. On April 6th,
a Cessna 172 was stolen from an airport in Thunder Bay,
Ontario, Canada. It entered U.S. airspace over Michigan's Upper
Peninsula at 4:23, and at 4:43 it was intercepted by two F-16s
from the 148th Fighter Wing, Duluth, Minnesota, Air National
Guard. I would point out to the committee that the first
responding aircraft are the oldest aircraft and the first
aircraft to age out, which we anticipate will happen in fiscal
year 2015.
As the pilot flew over Minnesota south through Wisconsin,
Illinois and Missouri, escort duty was then handed off to the
115th Fighter Wing, Wisconsin Air National Guard. And we have a
member of that unit with me today. Seated behind me is Staff
Sergeant West Chadwick. He was a member of the air sovereignty
alert team that performed that mission. And I will tell you
more about Staff Sergeant Chadwick here in just a second.
Subsequent to the Wisconsin Air National Guard, the
Louisiana Air National Guard F-15 picked up the mission, and
throughout the mission tanker support, in-flight refueling was
provided by the 117th Air Refueling Wing, Alabama Air National
Guard. By the way, they were flying a 50-year-old aircraft.
While this incident ended well, it demonstrates several
important points that the Chairman has already recognized:
First, that the threat to U.S. sovereignty from the air has
moved beyond Soviet bombers to include aircraft on domestic
flights, as we learned on September 11, and slow-flying, low-
altitude planes, such as the Cessna 172. What is next? Perhaps
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), cruise missiles launched from
offshore, and surely the maritime threat.
We must not again underestimate the ingenuity and
technological capability of our adversary. As the September
11th Commission aptly noted, beware the failure of imagination.
These threats require different defensive capabilities,
including modernizing and recapitalizing both our fighter and
aerial refueling aircraft fleets, and rethinking about how this
mission is sustained in the terms of funding and personnel.
I would submit to you that ASA is a system of systems,
including surveillance radar, early warning systems, command
and control and communication systems, certainly the fighters,
which get a lot of the attention, but the tanker fleet also and
the Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) System. But I submit to
you that the most important part of this system are the
dedicated professionals, the people, that accomplish this
mission.
You are well aware of the challenges that the U.S. Air
Force has in modernizing and recapitalizing both its fighter
and refueling fleets. We have been working closely with the Air
Force and their planning, but to date there are no firm plans
to replace the Air National Guard F-15 and F-16 fleet currently
protecting our skies. The ASA fleet in the Air National Guard
is among the oldest and therefore the most at-risk force that
we have.
Over the last several years Congress has been very helpful
in funding Air National Guard's ASA radar modernization
program. This program requires continued attention if we are to
meet today's threats and bridge capabilities to the next
generation of fighter aircraft. ASA is essential to improve
both capability and sustainment. For example, if the Cessna had
entered U.S. airspace in a high-traffic area such as New York,
it would have been very difficult for the older F-16s to find,
identify and track it with the older radar systems that they
had.
The aging KC-135 fleet, as you are well aware, is
especially critical for the Air National Guard not just for the
ASA mission, but for the fight overseas. The ASA mission is
dependent upon air refueling, and the Air National Guard has
some of the oldest KC-135s in the total force fleet. Example:
The 117th that performed in this mission with a 50-year-old
aircraft.
The most important part of ASA, as I indicated, is our
people. On an average day there are more than 1,600 Air
National Guard men and women performing the ASA mission in
Title 32 status. That includes not only fighter pilots, but
aircraft weapons maintenance, life support specialists, intel
specialists, security forces, and avionic specialists such as
Staff Sergeant Chadwick.
The GAO report states the Air Force has not implemented ASA
operations as a steady-state, ongoing and definite mission. For
the Air National Guard this translates into two primary issues,
the first, funding a lack of consistent predictable funding;
and second, the equipment part that we mentioned earlier.
Funding affects our people in various ways. Many of those
manning the alert sites are on temporary Active Guard and
Reserve tours. Two-year funding means that these people are on
two-year contracts that end at the end of September. The next
one will be this September. They do not know if they will have
a job after their contract ends. They don't know what to tell
their civilian employers; are they returning to work, or are
they not? In fiscal year 2008, only 772 of our required 922 Air
Guard Reserve (AGR) positions were funded. The difference is
filled with traditional guardsmen on mandates, and they are
caught in that same predicament: Do they have a job, or do they
not?
Staff Sergeant West Chadwick has joined me here today. He
is an avionic specialist with the 115th Fighter Wing, Wisconsin
Air National Guard. I would ask that he stand as I relate to
you his personnel situation, but it is a situation that is
echoed throughout the gallant people that are performing this
mission. He helped prep and launch the alert birds that
intercepted the aircraft intruder on 6 April. He is an example
of the outstanding guardsmen who are personally impacted by the
lack of consistent funding and planning for this mission.
From October 2005 to September 2007, Sergeant Chadwick
worked ASA at Truex Field as a temporary AGR on Title 32
orders, but he didn't know if his job was going to continue
past September 31st of that year because of a lack of funding.
He therefore volunteered for his wing's Aerospace Expeditionary
Force (AEF) rotation in the theater. And that is a key point,
because these ASA alert sites flying F-16s and F-15s are also
involved in the United States Air Force AEF rotation. It is not
only an ASA fleet strictly, it is one that we use in the AEF
rotations also.
But he volunteered to go to Balad in January through March
of 2008. In the meantime, from October of 2007 to January of
2008, he entered college; no income, no health coverage, and he
married in December of 2008. He returned from Iraq in April and
was offered another temporary AGR tour from May through
September of 2008, when the funding ended again. His orders
were late arriving, so he didn't go on duty until June 5th, so
he went for two months without pay. He eventually received some
back pay, but he lost TRICARE coverage during that period of
time. He has deployed one other time on an AEF rotation, and,
as he sits here today, has volunteered yet for a third time.
Because his unit must sustain ASA even as the rest of the unit
deploys for their AEF rotation, the unit must first find a
volunteer to replace Staff Sergeant Chadwick in his ASA job.
I would like to personally thank Sergeant Chadwick for his
dedicated service and perseverance. Thank you very much.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would submit that the
homeland defense mission is the primary mission of the
Department of Defense. ASA is a primary component of that
homeland defense mission, but we in the Department of Defense
need to work together to better ensure the long-term viability
of the capability.
The United States Air Force today has the power and the
ability to fix both of these problems, first by funding within
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and, second, assisting in
the recapitalization of the Air National Guard early, but not
late. Recapitalization of ASA is recapitalization of the United
States Air Force. It should not be viewed as competitive, but
rather complementary to the recapitalization of the Air Force,
because when you recapitalize the ASA fleet, you are
recapitalizing those same jets that perform the AEF mission.
The Air Force can have its cake and eat it, too, with early
recapitalization of the Air National Guard.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for
your time and support. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, General. Thank you so much for your
dedication and your commitment. We are proud of you and other
members of the Air Force, the National Guard and the Air Force,
for doing a tremendous job in keeping our country free from an
attack.
This reminds me. I come from Corpus Christi, and we are
prone to hurricanes, and they can strike with a devastating
force. But then after it strikes, there is a calm until the
backside of the eye of the storm hits you again. And thank God
that we have been--I guess because of the work that you have
done--that we have not been attacked again.
But as I was listening to this mower cut the grass, I
thought somebody was intruding into our airspace. But thank you
so much for your testimony.
Now, I would like, beginning with Secretary Verga, to ask
questions about how is the Air Force intending to comply with
section 354 of the fiscal year 2009 and the double A?
Mr. Verga. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know that it was our
understanding that the Air Force was, in fact, preparing the
necessary budget display materials to allow the committee the
information that it required. I am actually not personally
prepared to say what the Air Force is doing. I would ask that
the General address that specifically. But that is what we need
to do is to give you the information that is necessary.
Mr. Ortiz. General Darnell.
General Darnell. Mr. Chairman, we have read the language.
Our intent is to comply. You should see the information broken
out in the documents that come over for the budget, and we feel
like it is exactly what the committee is looking for.
So as I said before, the intent is to comply. It is our
first attempt to ensure you have got the information you need.
We will certainly work with your staff if there is any other
visibility that is required.
Mr. Ortiz. And this very important to us. This committee
has a huge responsibility, number one, to provide what you all
need to defend our country, our skies, and be ready to dispose
of anybody who might be trying to attack.
Let me ask GAO a question. Unless, General, do you have any
comments? The GAO, I want to ask them a question to see do you
believe DOD's comments to your report were responsive to your
findings and recommendations?
Ms. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, we noted that DOD did concur
or partially concur with each recommendation, which we always
appreciate. But normally when they really do concur, they tell
us what they plan to do to implement the recommendation and
when they plan to do it by. In this case we did not have a lot
of that kind of response in the discussion or the narrative of
the comments.
Mr. Ortiz. And I wonder why there was not adequate response
to the question from GAO.
Mr. Verga. As Ms. D'Agostino said, we did--the primary
office with responsibility for this bureaucratically in the
Department of Defense is the Office of the Inspector General
handles the staffing of GAO reports, and then it goes down to
an office that has a substantive expertise on it. In this case
it is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs. That is the
office that did, in fact, concur or partially concur in the
recommendations, agreeing with the needs as stated by the GAO,
but not necessarily the specific courses of action that were
recommended.
We have, in fact, responded to a bunch of follow-up
questions that we had with the GAO, trying to work together
with them. My understanding is to date we have not had the sort
of back-and-forth on those responses to the additional
questions. But I assure you that when we concur with a
recommendation or partially concur, partially concur meaning we
agree with what you said but not necessarily the remedy that
you suggested, that we will, in fact, follow up on them.
Mr. Ortiz. I would like to ask GAO do you agree? It is not
that I am trying to put anybody or picking on you guys. This is
not our intent. But what we are trying to do is to get to the
bottom of this so that we can give you what you need and so
that we--and you all to comply with the direction of what the
Congress gave you. So, ma'am, if you could.
Ms. D'Agostino. If I could just draw on a specific example
to explain.
Mr. Ortiz. Could you get closer to the mike?
Ms. D'Agostino. Sure.
If I could just draw on a specific example of the DOD
comments to one of our recommendations that was a little
confounding for us. We recommended that the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) direct the Secretary of the Air Force to
formally assign the air sovereignty alert mission to the units
that are performing those operations at steady-state sites and
then ensure that their readiness is measured. The DOD response
was, we partially concur; we are furnishing clear direction
through the Operation Noble Eagle execution order. And they
indicated they might review the execution order at some later
date. But our situation was you don't have to review the
execution order to have the Air Force assign the mission to the
unit.
So it was confounding to us, very confusing, in terms of
why they brought up the execution order for Operation Noble
Eagle, which isn't the only foundation for the ASA operations,
as you know. And so it was very confusing to us, and it remains
so today. So we just wanted somebody to direct the Air Force to
assign the mission, it was pretty straightforward, and measure
the readiness, and then we got this execute order (ex-ord)
discussion, which doesn't really apply to the recommendation,
because you can fix the problem without changing the execute
order, okay? Does that help?
Mr. Ortiz. That helped. But let me just ask one more
question, and then I would like to allow some of our Members
who have other important questions.
What concrete actions would the Air Force take after
today's hearing to ensure that the ASA operations are
implemented as a steady-state mission?
General Darnell.
General Darnell. Mr. Chairman, I will answer that question.
Ms. D'Agostino's point--and when you talk about ex-ord and the
fact that she didn't feel like it really gave her the detail
that she needed--what we really need to do is to assign the
mission via DOC statements in the squadrons, which we are in
the process of doing. Just talking with my staff this morning,
Air Combat Command (ACC) has been working with the Air National
Guard. All but two of the ASA units have submitted their
recommendations for DOC statement tasking. We should have that
wrapped up, we hope, by late summer, early fall.
But when you have a DOC statement that assigns a mission,
then lots of other things fall in place. You are inspected on a
regular basis. You are trained and organized and funded and
resourced according to your DOC statements. This speaks to
General Wyatt's point, frankly, about the funding not being
long term. And I agree with his statement; I agree with the
GAO's finding as well. So I already talked to the resource
managers in the Air Force. We are already working to make this
a long-term funding mission for the Air Force versus the two-
year construct that we have right now.
Mr. Ortiz. And we want to help. Anything that we can do to
help, whether it is a personnel matter, is it equipment, let us
know, because we want to work with you. We want to do
everything we can to protect our country.
And with that, now I would like to yield to my good friend
Mr. Forbes for any further questions that he might have.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, first of all, let me start with Sergeant Chadwick. The
Chairman and I both want to thank you for your service, and we
appreciate your attendance here today, and we owe you better
than we have been giving you. And as the Chairman mentioned, we
are not here to point fingers at anybody. We are here just to
make sure that Sergeant Chadwick and the other people serving
our country don't fall between these gaps sometime when we are
trying to provide for resourcing them.
The other thing that sometimes frustrates us as we watch is
we are in negotiations with China from time to time, and they
always come in every time, and it is the same thing. They spend
a long period of time just denying something happened, and then
all of a sudden they start agreeing it happened, but we never
see them change. And so what we are trying to do here in as
friendly a way as we can is to say how do we just move this
ball to make sure it happens?
And, General Darnell, your statement is probably the best
statement that we will have here all day. If we can get that
mission statement assigned, I think this hearing would have had
a huge importance, because as I look at it, the bottom line is
prior to September 11th, I think we had about 4 sites operable,
and then after 9/11 we got, as you testified, about 18 sites
going.
There is no question that this is a mission that is going
to be ongoing, and eight years is probably long enough for us
to get that picture and to assign it, because the three things
we are concerned about you mentioned, General: the training,
the inspection, but also the capitalization. I think if we can
just assign those missions, the others will probably flow
through. And so I am just optimistic of hearing that. And that
was going to be my whole line of questioning, but you have
answered that.
The one question I would have for Mr. Verga, just to clear
up for me, you indicated, if I didn't understand you, that
Operation Noble Eagle is managed under the Global Force
Management Plan. I think that is a Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM)-administered program; is it, or is it not?
Mr. Verga. The Global Force Management Plan is the dynamic
process by which the Secretary of Defense, advised by the
Chairman of the Joint Staff, allocates forces to all the
worldwide combatant commanders for the missions that are
assigned to them. That is a process that is ongoing; when we
decide to do more in Afghanistan, drawdown in Iraq, when we
decide we have greater air threats against the United States,
all of the forces worldwide are managed dynamically in terms of
those which are assigned to the combatant commanders who bear
responsibility for those various missions.
Mr. Forbes. Help me with the connectivity here, because,
and I could be wrong, but as I understand it, when the airmen
are on alert, they are in Title 32 status, which basically are
under the States. How do we know that they are there? I mean,
is this something we just kind of hope for, is it something
that we kind of guess that they are going to be? How do we
connect those dots to make sure that that is part of your plan
if they are sitting in a Title 32 status?
Mr. Verga. I will defer the specific answers to that,
though. The Secretary holds the combatant commander who has
responsibility for the mission responsible for the readiness
and the ability of the forces to do that mission. He then turns
to the force providers, either the United States Air Force or
the Air National Guard component of the Air Force, to organize,
train and equip those forces for the missions that they may be
assigned to do.
The dynamic nature of the Air National Guard providing
ready day-to-day forces and this Title 32 while you are on
alert and Title 10 as soon as you take off in the air is a
process that has worked, to my understanding, very effectively
over the years. It has never been brought to my attention that
we have ever had a problem with being assured on the readiness.
We see reports every day on the numbers of fighters and all
those things like that, but I will turn to the general to give
me the specifics.
General Wyatt. Mr. Forbes, this may help a little bit. I
think the root of the problem goes back as far as the Global
Force Management (GFM). Global Force Management goes back to
the issue with the DOC statements. The management of personnel
through GFM relies heavily upon DOC statements for resourcing
of the people. If you have a DOC statement, that is the
beginning document that results in the assignment of manpower,
assignment of equipment, determination of minimum essential
task listings that the unit has to do, unit tasking codes; that
sets up a reporting system that allows the commander then to
report sometimes in a classified manner the status of forces as
it relates to the DOC statement.
The problem in the past has been that these units have not
had DOC statements. They have for their general purpose, but
not for ASA. ASA has been an additional duty, if you will, kind
of a pick-up game. And so without the DOC statement and the
resulting support systems that flow from the Department of
Defense and the United States Air Force, the manning of ASA
when a unit goes AEF is basically left up to the Air National
Guard and the Air Force and Air Combat Command to work their
deals, if you will. And it is kind of an ad hoc system that,
thanks to the great volunteerism that we have in the Air
National Guard, we have not missed a lick, but we rely upon
great support from the United States Air Force to continue that
mission.
It would seem to me that the appropriate thing to do--and,
as General Darnell indicated, we have already started writing
those DOC statements. It is not anything that I can push up
through the system. He can pull, I can push, and we can get
these DOC statements done and then have the Air Force corporate
system take a look at the importance of the mission. These
units do not go unevaluated. NORAD does do AFE, alert flight
evaluations, to make sure that they are trained, ready and
capable to do the mission.
But I think the key is--I am from Oklahoma, and actions
speak a whole lot louder than words. And when I hear comments
about the mission not competing well against other missions
that DOD or the Air Force may have, I kind of scratch my head.
And I think that is reflected in the status that we currently
have. But I kind of scratch my head, and I ask myself, what is
more important than defense of the United States of America?
And when we can match up the priorities that the Department of
Defense and the United States Air Force give defense of the
homeland with the resourcing, with the tasking, then I think
we, no kidding, can step back and say we are resourcing the
number one mission for this country adequately.
Mr. Forbes. Should the assigned alert personnel be in Title
10 status, or do you think Title 32 status is adequate?
General Wyatt. Title 32 works very well. It allows us to
field a capability. As soon as that aircraft is launched, they
go into a Title 10 status. This situation has worked very well
for us in the past. It allows the type of flexibility that the
local commanders need to man the mission, but yet it allows the
pilots to be in the appropriate Title upon execution of the
mission. It has worked very well for us in the past, and I
would urge that it be continued.
Mr. Forbes. I want to just echo what the Chairman said, and
that is if there is anything this subcommittee can do to help
move that process along, we want to be here to do it.
Secondly, to also echo what he said in terms of thanking
you for keeping us safe. Regardless of what blemishes, warts,
remedies that we need to do, you have done a fantastic job from
September 11th on. If you hadn't, people would have been in
here pointing fingers. So we want to make sure we just take
this opportunity to thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. And this is what is good about this
panel. We put you together, GAO, Air Force, so that we can get
to the bottom of what we need to do to correct anything that
needs to be corrected.
Now Ms. Giffords.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Forbes, as well for this hearing. And I truly believe, just
like General Wyatt talked about, this is the number one mission
of the United States Government, of representatives of the
United States Government, and it is the number one mission of
our military.
The job of protecting our homeland, General, falls squarely
on your shoulders; it falls squarely on the Guard, and
certainly on Staff Sergeant Chadwick and your colleagues,
because the responsibility really lies within your parameters.
And since 9/11, you have stood 24-hours-a-day alert for the
last 397 weeks.
I believe that your mission is unquestionable. But the
future of this mission, Mr. Chairman, I think is in question.
And this hearing is so important because I am certainly not
hearing the answers that I think are necessary for the people
that we represent. I believe that the Air Force and the
Department of Defense has failed to plan for the future of the
ASA. And by failing to adequately study legitimate options for
resourcing the mission, I believe that we are talking about a
virtual reality and not about a real-case situation. I think
our Air Force has generated report after report assuring us
that serious consideration has been given to the issue, yet we
have not seen specific planning, and certainly we have not seen
the action necessary.
The Air Guard's largest fighter wing, the 162nd, is in
Tucson, and Tucson is my hometown. It is responsible for the
overflights of Phoenix, the fifth largest city in the country.
Ensuring their viability is vital to more than four million
people in the metro area. During the recent NORAD review of the
162nd, the inspection team lead said of our alert detachment,
the 162nd, it is the best F-16 maintenance in NORAD. But
unfortunately, when you look at the current glide slope--and I
urge Members to really study this, and I will be passing it on
to other Members that don't serve on the subcommittee or even
the committee--unfortunately the 162nd will have no flyable
aircraft in just six years, and Tucson is just the tip of the
iceberg.
Our Arizona experience is indicative of Guard facilities
across the country who face an uncertain future. As the Air
Force continues to look over the horizon, they are ignoring the
rapidly approaching fighter shortfall at home. In eight years,
80 percent of our Air National Guard aircraft will be unfit to
fly. This is a hard fact that will result in a serious gap in
domestic air sovereignty. On any scale measured by any metric,
an 80 percent loss is simply unacceptable. When those aircraft
are removed from service, our guardsmen, our pilots, our
maintenance crews, our support crews in Tucson and across the
country will principally be out of a job.
So we have to take this opportunity to prevent a dangerous
and irreversible shortfall. This is going to require earnest
leadership from the Air Force and from the Department to choose
the right option based on the facts. To shore up our Air
Guard's ability to secure the homeland, I believe that we have
to choose to invest in more of the legacy aircraft that our
guardsmen already know how to fly and to fix. We should reject
service life extension programs that are penny-wise and pound-
foolish. And while fifth-generation aircraft are undoubtedly
the future for many units, relying solely on that aircraft that
to this day only flies in the world of PowerPoint is equally
shortsighted. These aircraft are not expected to be delivered
to the Guard for more than a decade, and we simply can't wait
that long.
My guard unit, my constituents, this committee, the people
that they represent, the American people, deserve to have the
answers that we have repeatedly requested from the Department
and the Air Force. We are not simply concerned about force
size. We have to sustain a balance in total force structure.
So with that I have some questions for General Wyatt.
Specifically, when you look at the chart showing that the
fighter waterfall will hit the Air Guard over the next 8 years,
can you please address the consequences of an 80 percent
reduction in capability and its negative impact on our national
military strategy?
General Wyatt. Yes ma'am, I would be happy to, and thank
you for the question.
You are exactly correct. We have about--of the 16 fighter
units in the Air National Guard that are pulling alert, 11 of
those are F-16 units, and of those 11, 8 are scheduled to reach
the service life of their aircraft in the fiscal year 2015
through 2017 year period, Tucson being one of those.
We have made some progress recently in working with Air
Combat Command in addressing the recapitalization of those
aging aircraft. We have not seen a flight plan yet for
recapitalization that takes care of that problem. There have
been statements made that the Air National Guard is written
into the beddown of the F-22 and the F-35, and those statements
are correct. But the timing of the beddown is what concerns me
more than the numbers of the aircraft right now, because the
only plan that I have seen that has been published to date has
the Air National Guard getting into these weapon systems, as
you say, about 10 years late to need. So we have been working
with Air Combat Command to push forward or accelerate the
fielding of the F-35 and F-22 into Air National Guard units
early, and we are making some progress there.
But the thing to consider is that the Air Force has other
competing missions that they must weigh. And this goes back to
my previous statement, that as we weigh and balance the
importance of all of these very important missions, I have a
hard time understanding why defense of the homeland is not the
number one and should be focused on for early capitalization.
If the Air National Guard could get into the earlier fielding
of these weapon systems, this problem would be solved. If it is
not solved, then some other force will have to pick up that
mission, and it detracts from the Navy's mission, the Marine
Corps' mission and the overseas fight that the United States
Air Force has.
So I share your concern, and that is one of the three main
issues that I think the GAO report and this committee should
rightly be interested in.
Ms. Giffords. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but I
would just like to emphasize that if we lose these guardsmen
and guardswomen, we will not get them back. Right now we have a
force that functions very well, highly trained, highly
competent; obviously, as we heard from Staff Sergeant
Chadwick's biography, very committed to the cause. But I think
that we are headed in the wrong direction by changing course
and not supplying our units with what they need.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. And if necessary, we will
have a second round of questions.
My good friend Mr. LoBiondo from New Jersey.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for
holding the hearing. I also would like to thank my colleague,
Congresswoman Giffords from Arizona, for joining in with me in
trying to raise the level of attention, should we say. And the
level of frustration, at least from my part, and I think from
some of my colleagues, is really growing. We for years now have
been hearing that a plan will be unveiled, a plan will be
developed, solutions will be laid on the table. And, Mr.
Chairman, I don't know how long we wait on this, but the clock
ticks.
We have heard what is going to happen in 8 years with 80
percent of our force. I represent the 177th Fighter Wing out of
Atlantic City, arguably one of the most strategically located
homeland security bases in the Nation by virtue of their
proximity to New York City and Washington, D.C., and we have
all of the same concerns without getting any of the answers.
Mr. Verga, would you say that protecting the homeland from
direct attack is the number one priority as outlined by the
National Defense Strategy as we know it?
Mr. Verga. Yes, sir. I would agree with that. It also
enjoys a very high priority in what is called the guidance for
the employment of the force, which is what we do. We tell the
services and combatant commanders how to actually employ the
force.
I would say that I am a little bit disturbed--is probably
the word I would use--about a direction I think I see some of
the comments going in, and that is the sort of fencing and
dedicating of this mission to the Air National Guard. While we
have traditionally employed the Air National Guard part of the
total force to do this mission, I do think we must keep in mind
that it is a mission broadly for the Department, not
necessarily a mission limited to any single component of the
Department. I personally do not think we are going to suffer a
gap in the air defense of the United States any time in the
foreseeable future due to the priorities that this is afforded.
I would separate that in my mind from the equipping and
recapitalization of the aircraft currently assigned to the Air
National Guard for their support of the total force mission. So
that is just a comment I think I would like to make. The
mission is not going to suffer.
Now can I say authoritatively that the fighter wings that
you are concerned about are going to be first up for getting
replacement aircraft? No, I can't say that. That is a master
plan that the Air Force will have. But the assignment of
sufficient forces to accomplish the mission of defending the
air space of the United States and maintaining air sovereignty
is unquestioned.
Mr. LoBiondo. I am thrilled to hear that but maybe it is
just my mind or maybe some of my colleagues can help me out or
the chairman, if the mission is protected and guaranteed, then
there has to be some ability to articulate how that is going to
happen. Because unless the Air Force is going to dramatically
increase its numbers, and we don't know what the tempo is going
to be in Afghanistan or even maybe what it will be in Iraq or
some other location around the world, and clearly the assets
that the Air Guard is using are running to the end of their
useful life, so we can say, well, okay, maybe we don't need Air
Guard units, but in my mind, if an Air Guard unit goes away, it
goes away. You can't flip a switch and bring it back. These
folks are the best bang for the buck I think we have in the
military. And part of my frustration is that we don't have an
understanding of how the protection of the mission will be
accomplished.
General Darnell, do you believe that we are going to have a
problem in 6, 8, 10 years with the fleet reaching the end of
its useful service?
General Darnell. Congressman, we will ensure that there is
no problem, and our dilemma at this point right today is we
have a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) discussion coming up.
We have to wait until we get on the back side of that to be
able to definitively give you something as of today to say
exactly where we will be at. But as General Wyatt said, we have
been working very closely with the Guard, ACC has, and this is
not something we are ignoring. We are trying obviously to
ensure that the Nation has the safety and defense that it
requires.
As Mr. Verga said, we will ensure, whether it be through
the Air Force or a combination of forces, that this Nation is
defended.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, General. But Congresswoman
Giffords has a chart that is easily understood. And what we
would like to see is that what you are telling us about
basically don't worry, we are going to have a plan and it is
all going to be okay, we would sort of like to see that. I
think the chairman has articulated he would like to see it. I
think GAO talked about that a little bit. And I would feel a
whole lot better if you could come to the full committee or to
this committee and be able to articulate why it is that we
shouldn't be concerned. Because if you look at the chart and
you look at the aircraft that are coming offline, and you look
at the challenges that the Air Force has, at least to me, as
just an average Member of Congress, I can't connect the dots in
my mind.
I know I am running tight on time, but General Wyatt, one
question for you. Do you have an opinion as to what the
solution would be for this fighter gap problem? If you had your
ability to make your choice, not worrying about what somebody
else was going to say, what would you say the choice would be
to fix this problem?
General Wyatt. Thank you for the question, sir, and let me
try my best to answer that. And Mr. Verga makes a good point
that this mission should not necessarily be fenced to the Air
National Guard, although I would maybe counter that with the
fact that the Department of Defense has sought willing
participants for this mission from across the services, and the
best resolution, primarily for expense purposes that you
pointed out, the most efficient force is the Air National
Guard. That is the solution in my mind that works the best.
I tried to make the point that recapitalizing the Air
National Guard fleet should not be considered as competitive to
recapitalizing the United States Air Force because these same
units are rotated in and out of theater in the AEF rotation. So
it is not strictly a fencing or dedication argument, as has
been proposed, but rather a recapitalization of the United
States Air Force, a portion of that recognizing the importance
of mission number one and recognizing the unique ability and
cost efficiencies of the Air National Guard in performing that
mission. My preferences would be that when we recapitalize,
``we'' being the United States Air Force, that we recapitalize
as a total United States Air Force, and we field these
capabilities concurrently and proportionately between the
active duty, the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.
And if we do that, we can take care of the issue that you have
pointed out with the waterfall charts. We can do this through
the concept of associations and recognizing that there is great
benefit, especially in the ASA mission, of the distribution of
locations offered by the Air National Guard. We are
strategically located, as you pointed out, in Atlantic City,
New Jersey, from your constituency, but if you take a look at
the locations of all the ASA sites in the Air National Guard,
they are located where they can quickly react to a threat that
may come from any of the 360 degrees of air space that we
protect. But through the construct, not only recapitalization,
but construct of associations where we mesh active duty and Air
National Guard and in some cases Air Force Reserve, I think
that is an answer, too, in addition to the recapitalization
issues that we have talked about.
Mr. LoBiondo. I thank you, General. And I am in complete
concurrence with your answer.
Mr. Chairman, I hope you will found ways to continue to
keep the heat turned up on getting some of these additional
answers. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. I think that the gentleman has raised some very
important points. We would like to see the replacement of these
fighters that are getting old. We would like to see a budget.
We would like to see the training. We would like to see what
the National Guard is going to do. I think that you are raising
some very important issues here.
Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. Mr. Verga, you said that the
mission is not going to suffer. And I grew up in a very large
family. And we had work lists every single day twice a day
because my mother knew the mission of that Shea household would
suffer if we didn't all know who was doing what. And so I just
wanted to take a little bit of the comments that were in the
GAO report and perhaps Ms. D'Agostino will talk about it, but I
am concerned NORAD had not conducted routine risk assessments
to determine ASA operational requirements, including the
appropriate level and types of unit personnel and aircraft for
the mission, and that the Air National Guard units that are
performing the ASA mission do not have the mission included in
the designated operational capability statement. Is that so,
Ms. D'Agostino?
Ms. D'Agostino. Yes, ma'am. Yes, it is.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And does that worry you, like it worries
us?
Ms. D'Agostino. It concerned us. Let me clarify that. NORAD
did do three assessments in response to individual requests
from the leadership at the Department largely looking to save
money. And each time they did these risk-based assessments, the
current number of units and assignment of aircraft, et cetera,
and personnel were apparently validated. So that there was no
reduction and no change from the 18-unit, the current
configuration.
I guess our only concern is that you know things change and
the threats are asymmetric, that it makes a lot of sense to do
risk assessments on a routine basis and also in light of the
current fiscal constraints that we are facing as a nation, it
makes sense to take a good hard look at your requirements. And
we think the best way to do this is through a risk-based
assessment process, and that would consider threats,
vulnerability, criticality, and then you have to consider
resources as well and you would prioritize your needs or your
requirements and then resource those highest priority
requirements.
So that is why we suggested that they do a routine risk
assessment process to determine their requirements and so they
have valid justification for what they request.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Are you also concerned about a diffusion
of responsibility when so many different groups have a piece of
it?
Ms. D'Agostino. We were very concerned that the air
sovereignty alert mission was not on the DOC statements of
these units and because of that, it really created, I don't
want to use the ``waterfall'' thing, but it has a number of
rolling consequences for the units in terms of, you know, their
readiness, that is not put into the readiness system, they are
not measured, their training isn't checked up on. So as an Air
Force responsibility, we thought that they needed to formally
assign the mission to those units, and that is why we
recommended that.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Obviously I concur. And I would like to
associate myself with the Congresswoman's comments. I have the
same concern. I think the American public would be horrified to
know, let me make sure I have the count right, but that in 2001
we had 14 aircraft designated for this mission, is that
correct? And now we have 54.
So let me ask the next question, please. And I don't know
if it makes any sense or not, but knowing that we are facing a
problem with a shortage of aircraft and knowing the other
circumstances, does it make any sense to have more active duty
wings at Air National Guard bases? Would that in any way help
alleviate some of the pressure at least for the planes
themselves and maybe for some of the personnel?
I have absolutely no idea if that is a reasonable question
or not but it occurred to me.
General Wyatt. I think one way to answer your question
would be to go back to a previous comment I made about
associations. As the number of fighter aircraft available for
the defense of the country and execution of all of our
missions, including those overseas, I think it makes sense to
look at ways to become more efficient in the recapitalization,
in the placement location of those capabilities and in the
different components, strengths and weaknesses as we try to
figure out a better way to proceed forward.
The days of unconstrained capability are long gone. And I
am very appreciative of the financial concerns that the country
is experiencing right now. And I think one of the ways to make
sure that we most efficiently meet the taskings of this
mission, but all of our missions overseas, is to place a great
importance upon the association construct that considers
location and some of the ideal locations that the Air National
Guard provides for these particular missions, but we also need
to recognize that there are some ideal locations where the
active duty Air Force can provide for these types of missions.
And so I think location should not be determined based upon
whether it is Air National Guard or United States Air Force but
where the location best serves the interest of the country. And
then as we put those units together because we have fewer air
frames to fly but we need to maintain the pilot proficiency,
the maintenance proficiencies, and we need to, especially in
the Guard, we need to provide this country with a surge
capability--I mean that is what makes the Air National Guard
the most efficient force--is that not only do we handle the
day-to-day ASA and our share of the AEF rotations, but we are
also available for that surge capability. If we have limited
numbers of airplanes, you nevertheless need a surge capability
because pilots and maintainers cannot work 24 hours a day. If
you have to deploy or you have a situation in the United States
of America that requires 24-hour-a-day operations at a much
greater level than the current steady state, you need to have
access to that surge capability.
And I think the association construct, whether it is what
we call active associations where the active duty comes to a
Guard location or whether it is the classic association where
Guard members go to the active duty, we need to do the smart
thing. We need to do both of those in locations that make sense
for air sovereignty alert, but also makes sense for some of the
other missions that the Air Force does.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. I know my time has run out but
I would also like to thank the men and the women of the
National Guard. We are still working on trying to make things
right for their service. Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Wyatt, one
issue I want to raise, a Colorado specific issue, is Buckley
Air Force Base, which was a former National Guard facility, but
it has our--we have the wing component or the F-16 component of
the Air National Guard there. They are hopefully going to go to
F-35 at some point. There is some concern, my district has the
eastern edge of that coming up to the base and I think there is
concern about encroachment onto, in and around the base where
we might lose that flying mission. I wonder if you might
comment on any efforts made there to preserve the flying
mission there relative to development around the facility.
General Wyatt. Congressman, as you are aware, the Colorado
unit is one of those units that performs ASA. My good friend
Mike Edwards, the Adjutant General of Colorado, himself a
fighter pilot, is very attuned to the issues and challenges and
in fact he contributes greatly to the expertise within the Air
National Guard that addresses these issues.
You speak of encroachment. I have been to Buckley several
times. I hate to admit the first time I was ever in an F-100,
flown A-7s in there, been there on a number of different
aircraft, and I remember the days when Buckley was kind of out
there on its own. And you are right, there are encroachment
activities. And that is true of some Air National Guard bases.
It is also true of active duty bases. And I think we need to be
cognizant of that as we look forward to forward basing.
But in talking to General Edwards, I am aware of some
significant efforts by your leadership and the leadership, the
local leadership in Colorado, to be cognizant of the
encroachment issue and do what can be done to make sure that
that does not adversely affect the possibilities of the
Colorado Air National Guard in this recapitalization effort.
I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Coffman. General Wyatt, just another comment. I have
introduced House Resolution 1879, the National Guard Employment
Act of 2009. And it takes into account the folks that are
called up within the United States as well as dealing with the
five-year limit. I wonder if you might be able to comment on
that.
General Wyatt. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. And thank you
very much for your interest in that particular area because it
demonstrates sometimes what unintended consequences of some
really good intentions to begin with. We talked about the
status that guardsmen are in when they perform the ASA mission,
and up until about 2005 it was Title 10 status for not only the
pilots when they launch but also as they sat alert and for some
of our maintenance crews and supporting personnel. In 2005,
because Title 32 status gives the wing commanders a little more
flexibility in providing manpower for that mission and handling
their other taskings, the law allowed Title 32 people to do
that mission, converting to Title 10 when the mission was
launched, which I think is the proper way to do that.
The provision in the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) that you talked about has a
five-year limitation. The USERRA protection is only available
for five years unless--there are some exceptions to that--
unless you were called to Title 10 service or to serve in OCO,
Overseas Contingency Operations, or any other similarly
situated wars. When we went to the Title 32 status, that same
protection was inadvertently, I think in my mind inadvertently
not provided for our Title 32 folks, so that as they do the
same mission they were doing in Title 10 but now simply because
of their conversion to a Title 32 status, they lose that
exception, and now after 5 years of doing ASA, they have no
reemployment rights. I don't think that was the intention of
the original legislation, but your legislation fixes that
problem and provides that same sort of relief that we thought
was the right thing to do under Title 10 for doing that same
mission to Title 32 folks that are doing the ASA mission.
So I thank you very much for your attention to that problem
and helping fixing it. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Wyatt.
Any other comments by the panel? Mr. Chairman, I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. General, very quickly, before I yield my time
to Ms. Giffords, we had the unfortunate death of a National
Guardsman the night of Katrina. Because he died while under
Title 32 status, his widow and children received a smaller
death benefit than had he died under Title 10. Now with the
help of General Blum and General Casey, we were able to fix
that. I am just curious. Is that still the norm, if one of your
pilots dies on a training mission, is married, is his widow
still, would his widow receive a smaller death benefit than if
he died under Title 10 status?
General Wyatt. Congressman, there still are differences in
the benefits that are available under the varying different
statutes, you know, active duty in support of operations, State
active duty, Title 32 and Title 10. We are making some progress
in equalizing those or making those more equitable. I think you
will find guardsmen understand the difference that they are not
full-time active duty members serving in Title 10 status, and
certainly there will be some differences between the benefits
that are available under the different statutes. But I think
what they are looking for is an equitable treatment.
The particular issue that you point at is one of those
areas where they--there needs to be equity because when a
person gives their life regardless of the status, we as a
country, in my opinion, need to take care of the survivors of
that airman, soldier, sailor or Marine.
Mr. Taylor. If you feel free to do so, I am requesting you
to put that statement in writing. I would like to have it. I
think it is one of the things we ought to try to address this
year in the defense authorization bill.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I am going to yield the
remainder of my time to Ms. Giffords.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 129.]
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Giffords is recognized.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Congressman Taylor.
General Wyatt, given the Department's strategy in terms of
closing the F-22 production line and reports of the Test and
Evaluation Directorate, specifically for the delays in the
Joint Strike Fighter program, can you please discuss in the
limited time we have left the bridging strategy to continue to
use the fourth generation aircraft until fifth generation
solutions are available to the Guard?
General Wyatt. I will be happy to give it a shot,
Congresswoman. The question sometimes asked, you know, what
platform is, would be good for this mission? And I have
recognized that we are in a fiscally constrained situation. I
am interested in capabilities. I am interested in being able to
do the mission. The Air National Guard is going to do this
mission with whatever platform Congress decides is the
appropriate platform, because after all the Constitution
provides that Congress raises and equips armies and air forces.
And I appreciate that fact. I also appreciate the fact that
sometimes what we would ideally like to have may not be
affordable. I caution against having a separate platform for
ASA from United States Air Force for the reasons that I
previously discussed in that these units also perform AEF
rotations and they need to--whatever platform is finally
decided or whatever options are finally decided upon by
Congress I would hope takes into consideration that these units
also perform AEF rotations and need to be able to fuse with and
use the same capabilities as any other unit in the United
States Air Force or the Department of Defense.
As far as options, you mentioned some of those. We are
looking at fifth generation fighters. I think the decision
needs to be made, where does air defense and defense of the
country range on the scale of priorities of the missions that
the Air Force will be required to perform? And I think our
decision on that should be driven by the importance of the
mission.
In the fiscally constrained situation that we are in, if
that is not possible, certainly there are fourth generation,
4.5 generation options out there. There is also service life
extension options out there. Each one has their advantages over
the other. Each one has disadvantages. And I prefer not, you
know, there are a lot of different scenarios that we can get
into, what if this happens or what if this happens. But my
concern is that the capability is available for the country for
the long term and that it not end in fiscal year 2015, 2016, or
2017.
So I think whatever options that Congress decides is the
right thing to do, and I have every confidence that Congress,
in its wisdom, will decide what is the right thing to do, that
capability should be applied towards this mission set, whether
it is the Air National Guard, United States Air Force, Navy or
Marine Corps doing the mission. It needs to be a capability
that the country expects for the number one mission for our
military services.
Ms. Giffords. General Wyatt, do you think upgraded models
of fourth generation aircraft like the Block 50 F-16s have the
sufficient capability to conduct the ASA now and also for the
years ahead?
General Wyatt. I think what you have to look at is the
rising threats that we see out there with the maritime threat,
with cruise missiles, with UAVs, whether they are sea base
launched or launched within our borders or without our borders,
with some of the capabilities of weapons of mass destruction
that can approach the United States from any sector. This
mission, this defense, is a lot different than an offensive
mission overseas. Because if we have the option overseas, we
decide the time, the place, and the method and the weapons
systems of choice. We don't have that luxury in defense of the
United States. We have to be ready 24 hours a day, 365. We have
to defend from all axes of attack. We have to use our
imagination, if you will, to think of platforms that, or
capabilities that may be used to attack the United States. So
as we try to answer that question, does fourth generation, 4.5
generation, have the capabilities to provide the defense we
need, we must first of all look and try to analyze what sort of
threat we are talking about. The use of radar, I mentioned that
in my opening statement, is extremely important because it is a
leap in technology that allows us to meet some of those
challenges that I just talked about.
Again, if you consider, and I know cost is going to be a
consideration, but if we are in the situation where Congress
decides that we simply can't afford fifth generation airplanes,
then we need to take a look at the capabilities necessary to
meet those threats that I just talked about, and whether that
be fourth generation, third generation fighters, whatever is
the best answer, looking at the whole problem, not just ASA,
but our other continuing missions, whatever answer Congress
gives us will be what we use to defend the country in this its
number one mission.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. My friend, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I was
excited when I heard General Darnell's comment about the
mission statement and including that for the Guard, and then,
Mr. Verga, I heard your comments and I just want to clarify the
two. I understand about not being fenced in. But I hope your
statements were not to be interpreted to mean that you
disagreed with General Darnell's position that the mission
statement would be written to include that for the Guard
because I don't know how else we would get the training,
inspection and capitalization. I just wanted to clarify that if
I could.
Mr. Verga. Absolutely not. We fully support the Air Force's
efforts in doing that. Their mission of organized training and
equipping forces to provide to the combatant commander to carry
out the missions that are assigned from the President through
the Secretary to that commander is extremely important. My only
point was that we need to not lose sight of the fact that it is
a mission for the total forces of the Department of Defense of
the United States, not any particular subcomponent of it. And I
just wanted to make sure that we don't lose sight of that.
Mr. Forbes. And the last thing I will say is really more of
a comment than a question. From the outset of this year we have
been asking this question to try to get into the mindset of
Department of Defense as to how you are setting your priorities
so that we can know. General Wyatt said something incredibly
important when he said that they would use whatever platforms
Congress deemed to be appropriate in their wisdom in making
those decisions. I have an enormous fear right now that we have
had a sea change, and the big concern that I have, General
Darnell had mentioned that you wanted to get on the back side
basically of QDR when you are doing this planning. I fear that
we have shifted now. Instead of having a strategy that is
driving our budget, I think we are looking at our budget
driving our strategy. And one of the things that I am very
frightened when I see these gag orders coming out to the
Department of Defense for this cone of silence where the people
that are making this information and have the information,
General Wyatt, that we need to make those decisions, and they
can't even talk to us, that they are barred from doing that, I
think that is an unconscionable action to take place. I think
it is a dangerous action. It is one that I hope we will all
stand up and say we can't afford to not get this information.
And just one other thing, and the chairman of Seapower
Subcommittee knows far more about this than I do, but when we
begin to do things like moving the Inspection and Survey
(INSURV) inspections and classifying those, the danger with
that is that that information--we can get that communicated to
us but we can't communicate it to the general public or to the
press or anybody else. And I think that is a dangerous avenue
for us to go down because, General, I think it keeps us from
making the wisest decisions and getting those appropriate
platforms.
And Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just real quick, General Wyatt, prior to 2003, when we were
flying combat air patrol, when the Guard, many Guard units were
flying combat air patrol in Iraq in the no-fly zones, it
obviously took a lot of resources relative to flying the ASA, I
am assuming relative to flying the ASA mission, I assume we had
more units deployed in Iraq than doing the ASA. I wonder if you
can comment on that and then comment on our capability. It
seems that in Iraq and Afghanistan right now that our fixed
wing missions are not as robust as they normally would be in a
conventional versus a counterinsurgency conflict. I am just
wondering if we got engaged in a conventional conflict, does
the Guard have the capability of performing both missions, ASA
and a conventional mission, with the Air Force?
General Wyatt. Thank you for the question, Congressman. The
answer to your question is that our units do the ASA mission
not as part of their DOC statement but as part of the mission
assignment and we have addressed actions that we, as an Air
Force and the Department of Defense, will take to correct that.
But these units that pull ASA do do the AEF rotations. We are
always striving to modernize the Air National Guard equipment
that we have because, as you know, sometimes the Air National
Guard doesn't have what I call the front line capability that
the active duty Air Force has. We try through our modernization
programs and working with the Air Force to provide the
capability that allows our systems to fuse with and become a
relevant partner with the active duty force in these overseas
rotations.
The best example I can give you would be out of my personal
experience as a wing commander and as a young pilot that my
leaders decided that it was important for the Air National
Guard--we were in A-7s at the time converting to F-16s, and the
Air National Guard had no precision guided targeting capability
at that point in time. The Air Force recognized that as a
requirement, but because of their budget limitations could not
fund targeting pod acquisition for the Air National Guard. So
thanks to Congress' insight in the need, relevant need for that
capability, through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Account (NGREA) we were able to acquire targeting pods and have
continued to do so through today's date that allows our systems
and our capabilities to more fully mesh with and be a part of
the total force as we engage in combat.
We continue to do that today, and I would hope that one of
these days we will get to that point where a capability may be
funded across all three of the components proportionately and
concurrently. That is what I am pressing for. But in the
interim period of time we will continue our efforts--and it is
not just the fighter fleet, it is the large aircraft fleet with
the LAIRCM, the large aircraft infrared countermeasure systems.
We are using NGREA funds to help these self-protective systems
in these airplanes so they are more relevant in the warfight
overseas. And we will continue those efforts with the help and
support of Congress.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. I think that we had a very,
very good hearing today. And you know, sometimes Congress makes
up committees and they play a very important role. And
sometimes in this case we do have a check and balance system
and because we are all seeing it from the same page as you.
There are some weaknesses on one side maybe the other side can
correct it. But I want to thank all of you for being with us
today. And we do have a good check and balance system. And
thank you for being candid with us. Remember, we are all
singing from the same page and if it is a budget problem, if it
is an equipment problem, whatever you need, let us know. We are
here to work with you. But you know we have huge
responsibilities. We see the big, big picture being ready to
defend this country. At times we see that air fighter has been
grounded. Whether they are Navy, Air Force, or whatever, they
are grounded. We want to be sure that we have the right
equipment, the right personnel to defend this country.
One of our key members of this committee, Chairman Reyes,
who is chairman of the Intelligence Committee, couldn't be here
with us today. He had a death in the family. And his mother-in-
law passed away, and this committee offers our condolences to
Chairman Reyes.
Being no further business, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 22, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 22, 2009
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 22, 2009
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 22, 2009
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
General Wyatt. Federal entitlements for Air National Guard members
who die on Active Duty (Title 10) or Active Duty for training (Title
32) are equal. In addition, many States offer additional death benefits
for their guard members who die in the performance of their duty. These
benefits vary greatly from State to State.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Every Air National Guard base has a Casualty Assistance
Representative assigned. This individual works with the Air Force
Casualty or the Air Reserve Personnel Center Casualty office (depending
on the status of the member at the time of death) and provides benefit
counseling to survivors.
Thank you for your inquiry regarding Title 10 vs. Title 32 death
benefits for members of the Air National Guard. We appreciate that the
Congress continues to recognize the sacrifice of our members and that
regardless of status, when a service member gives their life, we as a
country, take care of the survivors of that Airman, Soldier, Sailor,
Coast Guardsman, or Marine. [See page 24.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 22, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. The GAO report states that ``the Air Force faces two
challenges to sustaining its ASA capabilities over the long-term--(1)
replacing or extending the service life of aging fighter aircraft and
(2) replacing ASA units with equipment and training personnel when they
deploy.''
In your review, how would you say the Air Force has performed and
is performing on those two key challenges?
Ms. D'Agostino. We found that the Air Force did not have plans to
manage or deal with either of these challenges even though they could
adversely affect the long-term sustainability of ASA operations.
Ms. Giffords. At this rate, what impacts will affect the Air Guard
and the ASA mission?
Ms. D'Agostino. Until the Air Force develops plans to address the
availability of fighter aircraft to conduct ASA operations, our
analysis of Air Force and Air National Guard data (as of April 2009)
reflects that there will be a number of ASA sites, including those
supported by Air National Guard units, that will not have enough viable
aircraft to train and conduct both ASA operations and expeditionary
missions (e.g. military operations in Iraq). \1\ Additionally, unless
the Air Force develops a process to replace ASA units with equipment
and trained personnel when they deploy and as they transition to
different aircraft, the voluntary process that ASA commanders currently
use to find replacements may continue to be inefficient and burdensome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The number of ASA sites that could be without viable aircraft
varies depending on the assumptions that are made. Our January 2009
report entitled, Homeland Defense: Management Actions Needed to Improve
Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace
(GAO-09-184), identifies the assumptions we made while analyzing the
Air Force and Air National Guard data.&
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Giffords. Do the current projections for Air National Guard
capabilities meet our nation's ASA mission requirements?
General Wyatt. The current projections for the Air National Guard
capabilities meet the nation's near-term ASA requirements. The Air
National Guard and the Air Force are working together to ensure there
is no gap in mid-term capability and solutions are in place for the
long-term capability. The solution to ensure the availability of
aircraft for the United States' requirements in the long term will
require a combination of effective legacy fleet management, force
shaping, and recapitalization with a Total Force approach. We are
working with the Air Force to produce this solution and ensure the
strategic requirements of the United States are met.&
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. General Darnell, in reading the GAO report and
testimony one would think ASA operations and locations are not
routinely assessed to include personnel capability to perform the
mission, training, equipment, and mission responsiveness. I was under
the impression these units do receive regular oversight in the form of
readiness inspections. Can you please discuss briefly what these
readiness inspections include, how they assess the unit's mission and
your level of confidence in their results as they pertain to unit's
ability to conduct the ASA mission?
General Darnell. The Inspector General (IG) for the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) performs inspections and evaluations
that provide a comprehensive assessment of the units' readiness to
perform the Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) mission. Specifically for ONE,
the NORAD IG is the only entity that evaluates unit readiness. However,
all Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM) gained units which participate in
ONE (Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and Pacific Air Forces)
have their primary missions evaluated by their respective MAJCOM IGs
during Phase I and Phase II Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs).
Mr. Franks. General Darnell, the GAO report talks at length about
the service life of our existing F-16 and F-15 aircraft and the impact
that will have on the ASA mission and homeland defense. General Renuart
mentioned in his testimony to the SASC last month the Air Force was
working on a plan to bridge capacities of our existing F-15 and F-16
fleet as the F-22 and F-35 become operational. Can you please discuss
for a moment some of the options that are on the table? What concerns
do you currently have with the transition or any potential gaps that
may exist over the next 5, 10, 15 years? In addition, can you please
discuss the role of tanker (air-refueling) aircraft in the ASA mission?
Considering fighter operations are pretty dependent on tanker aircraft
availability, do we currently have, or do you foresee, a problem with
tanker aircraft support over the next 5-10 years?
General Darnell. Homeland defense is DoD's first priority and the
Air Force is committed to the ASA mission now through the long term. As
you know, long term recapitalization of the fighter and tanker fleet
requires many years. Within the funding available, the Air Force must
maximize the life of the existing aircraft until they can be replaced.
All of the options to ensure the ASA mission remains viable are
dependent on the life expectancy of these airframes.
The Air Force, in conjuction with DoD, is currently developing
plans to ensure we can meet the combatant commander's requirements for
the defense of the Nation--whether it is with Air National Guard
aircraft or in combination with active duty assigned aircraft. There
are many moving pieces as we look at all the different Air National
Guard units around the country to determine the best alignment of our
limited resources. We anticipate an update from the Quadrennial Defense
Review regarding national requirement, and subsequently, the Air
Force's requirement for this critical mission.
Tanker aircraft are a critical force multiplier for the Air
Sovereignty Alert mission through ground alerts, scheduled air
refueling, and airborne orbits. Assuming that the number of tankers
required by Combatant Commanders does not increase and unforeseen
reliability or availability problems do not arise, the Air Force does
not foresee any shortfalls in tanker support for the ASA mission today
or in the next 5-10 years. However in larger context of meeting
National Military Strategy, Mobility Capability Study 05 identified a
required tanker force of between 520-640 tanker aircraft. Currently,
there are 474 legacy tankers (415 KC-135RT, 59 KC-10A) in the Air Force
fleet. The Air Force is taking action to minimize risk by modernization
of the current tanker fleet and recapitalization through the KC-X
program to fill tanker fleet requirements.
Mr. Franks. General Wyatt, there has been a great deal of
discussion on aircraft availability and long term sustainment of the
ASA mission, however GAO sited ``Personnel Issues'' and ``Funding'' as
the two highest factors identified by ASA Commanders as ``Moderately or
Greatly Impacting Units' Ability to Conduct ASA Operations.'' Can you
please discuss for a moment some of the Personnel Issues that are
driving these Commanders to list this as one of the highest factors of
concern?
General Wyatt. The ``Funding'' and ``Personnel Issues'' identified
in the GAO report highlight the historical need to utilize various
funding sources for the part time guard members that were put on full
time status to perform the ASA mission for the United States. The full
time manpower used to execute the ASA mission at ANG units is now
funded every two years in the POM cycle. Previously, the Air Force
corporate structure did not fund the requirement at 100%, which meant
that various other sources of funding were required to cover the
difference in execution year funding. This funding often occurred last
minute and would occasionally require members to change types of
orders, sometimes even in mid-fiscal year. This instability in funding
causes members to experience interruptions in medical benefits, monthly
pay, leave tracking, and concern about their future employment. The
current ASA requirement for the full time manpower is funded at 100% in
the FY10 PB.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIGHT
Mr. Bright. According to the National Guard posture statement, 80%
of Air National Guard F-16s will begin to reach the end of their
service life in 8 years. Unfortunately, the F16s we fly at Dannelly
Field are part of that situation with service lives ending generally
between 2017 and 2020. It is my understanding that new F22s and F35s
will be provided to the Air Guard at some point later than that so it
appears that there will be a ``fighter gap.'' If Air Guard fighter
units have no planes to fly, I can't imagine the units will survive.
This is of deep concern to me because we fly F16s in the Air Guard in
my state. Does the Air Force have a plan to address this ``fighter
gap'' in Air National Guard F16 units like mine in Alabama?
General Wyatt. The Air Force is concerned about F-16s nearing the
end of their service life. The AF will sustain the F-16 Block 30
aircraft to ensure they meet the programmed 8,000 hour service life.
The AF also has plans to transition some ANG units currently flying F-
16s to other fighters such as the newer block F-16s, A-10s and F-15s.
These transitions will enable us to bridge the gap between the F-16 and
its fifth generation fighter replacement.
With the current fiscal constraints on our fifth generation fighter
procurement schedule, some units currently flying fighter aircraft will
transition to other relevant AF missions. Several ANG units have
already transitioned to emerging mission sets that are vital to our
national defense such as the unmanned aerospace system, and direct
command and control support for our combatant commanders. These
missions are critical to today's war efforts, homeland defense, and
wartime readiness. These new mission sets have kept these units
relevant to today's mission requirements and the future needs of our
nation's defense.
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