[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-5]
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS
FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 4, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROSCOE BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
ADAM SMITH, Washington MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
JIM COOPER, Tennessee HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia California
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JEFF MILLER, Florida
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOE WILSON, South Carolina
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina ROB BISHOP, Utah
FRANK KRATOVIL, Maryland MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
ERIC MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Ben Glerum, Staff Assistant
------
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Elizabeth Drummond, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 4, 2009, Army and Marine Corps Force
Protection Programs............................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 4, 2009...................................... 41
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2009
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee............................... 1
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee......... 9
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking
Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee....................... 7
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 6
WITNESSES
Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M., USMC, Commander, Marine Corps
Systems Command, Program Executive Officer, MRAP Joint Program
Office, U.S. Marine Corps...................................... 12
Lennox, Maj. Gen. Robert, Assistant Deputy Chief Of Staff, G-3/5/
7, U.S. Army, Accompanied By Brig. Gen. Peter N. Fuller, USA,
Program Executive Officer, Soldier, Commanding General, Soldier
Systems Center, U.S. Army, and Kevin M. Fahey, Program
Executive Officer, Combat Support & Combat Service Support..... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M................................. 62
Lennox, Maj. Gen. Robert, joint with Brig. Gen. Peter N.
Fuller and Kevin M. Fahey.................................. 50
Taylor, Hon. Gene............................................ 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 77
Mr. Massa.................................................... 78
Mr. Taylor................................................... 77
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 78
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor............................... 81
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 88
Ms. Giffords................................................. 90
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 90
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 94
Mr. Wilson................................................... 88
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee,
Meeting Jointly with Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Wednesday,
February 4, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Abercrombie. Hello, everybody. Thank you so much for
your patience. We were a little bit too optimistic in terms of
the classified briefing that we were going through up until
now, and it necessitated us being a bit longer to come here
than we intended.
And again, I want to emphasize our appreciation, Mr. Taylor
and myself and the members.
We are coming to order for our first subcommittee meeting
of this session of the Congress. We are holding a joint hearing
on the Army and Marine Force Force Protection Programs.
We are joined, of course, with the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee under Mr. Taylor, to receive
testimony today on force protection programs from witnesses
representing the Army and the Marine Corps.
If members will look at the witness list, there is an
extensive number of witnesses, but we are going to have
singular speakers. And some of the witnesses are there to
provide perspective, observations, backup, et cetera, and to
answer questions or comment on observations of the members.
In addition, should there be questions or observations
which need commentary arising, we have the Deputy Director of
the Live Fire Test and Evaluation and Deputy Inspector General
for Auditing, as it proves appropriate and useful.
For the Army, may I ask just who is going to be speaking
for the Army? Will it be Major General Lennox?
General Lennox. It is, sir.
The Chairman. And for the Marine Corps, it will be Major
General Brogan, right?
General Brogan. Sir, I am still a Brigadier General, but
yes.
The Chairman. I beg your pardon, it is Brigadier General.
Well, we can change that. I am engaged in sympathetic magic,
General.
The testimony then, obviously, will include the status and
effectiveness of force protection equipment, both in Iraq and
looking--you can look forward or project forward to Afghanistan
or elsewhere, if you wish, as well--with particular focus on
tactical vehicle and personnel body armor initiatives.
I want to say, for those who are new members, that this
committee--this subcommittee and its counterpart, and Mr.
Taylor and Mr. Bartlett--in terms of my personal experience,
has been in the forefront of providing necessary nonpartisan--
we don't use the word ``bipartisan'' in our committee, we use
``nonpartisan.'' We don't believe that questions of life and
death and the national strategic interests where the armed
service is concerned is a question of partisanship in any
respect--the full spectrum of force protection matters.
For a number of years, members have been aggressively
urging the Pentagon to be more proactive in fielding Counter
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) systems, better personal body
armor, better helmets, add-on armor to tactical vehicles; and
adding intelligence in this respect as well--intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance systems (ISR)--to Iraq and
Afghanistan. And we have had the added advantage of having the
Chair of the Intelligence Committee serving on Armed Services,
as well, in Mr. Reyes.
I go through some of this preliminarily for the witnesses,
not because you don't know any of these things, but because the
public at large, of course, is viewing and listening and
hopefully understanding what is going on; and we are trying to
provide a perspective, and also one for new members, as I said.
Too often the Pentagon's and the military services'
discussions and promises of transformation in joint programs
have not necessarily been met because of what I would call
``grinding bureaucracy'' and failure to overcome individual
service cultures. I do believe that that is a difficulty that--
in other words, there has been some partisanship on the part of
the Pentagon, I think, maybe even more so than there has been
in the political arena, in the electoral political arena, and
that needs to be overcome.
So today's hearing will continue our efforts to assure that
our personnel--and I say our personnel, not the military's
personnel, those people serving in the interests of the United
States of America--have the very best equipment possible.
We are told that equipment deemed operationally suitable in
Iraq may not be operationally suitable in Afghanistan. The
operational environment in Afghanistan differs from that of
Iraq in very significant ways, including a less-developed
transportation infrastructure, higher and more rugged terrain.
This places greater demands on personnel and equipment; it
requires modification with regard to tactics, techniques,
procedures to address specific threats; and it requires
continuing oversight by the Armed Services Committee.
We ask that the witnesses provide testimony on what they
see as the unique equipment requirements of Afghanistan and how
they are addressing those equipment requirements in a timely
way and how we can be helpful in that regard.
We hope to not replicate previous delays in getting proper
equipment fielded for our personnel, and we don't want to go
through what we did go through previously in terms of having to
have hearings in order to expedite or to bring focus to these
questions.
Regarding the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
Vehicles, commonly known as MRAPs--again, Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles--$24 billion has been authorized and
appropriated for these vehicles. Over 15,000 vehicles have been
produced in just under 2 years, with approximately 10,000 MRAP
vehicles being fielded in Iraq and 2,000 currently in
Afghanistan.
These vehicles have saved lives and may save more, and are
considered to be the most survivable vehicle class in theater.
However, these MRAP vehicles are heavy and they are wide, and
they have been altered in various and sundry ways and come in
various versions. Operational feedback from theater has
indicated a need for a lighter weight, smaller and narrower
version, if possible, of the MRAP, especially for Afghanistan.
My mother used to say, if wishes were horses, we would all
be riding. So we know what we are looking for. Whether that is
possible, whether we need to bend laws of physics--which my
good friend, Mr. Bartlett, would say is impossible and will no
doubt comment on it if he thinks that is the case--we want to
make sure that we are not trying to say we can do something we
can't do. We don't want to mislead anyone.
At the same time, the MRAP vehicle requirement in
Afghanistan continues to increase, we are told. The word we
have now is that the requirement is for at least 2,900
vehicles. This is before any changes which may occur in the
strategic environment, let alone the political environment,
that will unfold in the weeks and months to come.
We are also very concerned and have the advantage again of
having the Readiness Chairman with us as well, where we are
dealing with spare parts, distribution, rollover accidents,
repair, maintenance depot questions with regard to the vehicles
and personnel.
We understand that there is a program now to field a
lighter MRAP variant. We don't want to fall into something
where we are going to be told, as we have with other programs,
everything is on schedule and on budget. If it is not on
schedule and it is not on budget, or it is not on schedule
because we are not able to do what we hoped we could do, we
need to be told what we need to know.
We expect to receive updates on this program today and on a
continuing basis so that we can better understand the
acquisition strategy, the fielding plan, and what we can do to
be helpful.
With regard to soldier equipment, recent media reports have
indicated that in Afghanistan soldiers routinely carry loads
from 130 to 150 pounds for a 3-day mission. We have previously
received testimony that personnel can wear only so much armor
beyond which their operational effectiveness is inhibited,
which, in turn, increases their risk of being injured.
We expect to receive updates and efforts to lighten the
load of soldier and marine without sacrificing their safety.
For our purposes today, we are not talking about whether it
makes tactical sense to even have military personnel operating
in that kind of environment under those kinds of circumstances;
we won't explore that today, but that is a policy issue when we
may be expecting something to occur because we want a political
outcome, and we are asking military personnel to effect that
outcome perhaps in ways that are not appropriate. But that will
be the subject taken up in other venues.
Finally, despite the fact that the committee has received
continued assurances of body armor systems effectiveness from
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services over
the past several years in hearings, briefings and personal
conversations, body armor effectiveness continues to be an
issue, which I am sure is no news to anybody who is going to be
testifying today.
Most recently, the Department of Defense Inspector General
(DOD IG)--and when I say ``recently,'' I am talking January of
this year--report stated that if standardized procedures for
body armor were consistently followed by the Army, three-plate
designs procured under one contract would have failed first
article testing, affecting 16,000 sets of body armor plates. I
bring that up again because that is out there, people know
that, members may be aware of it.
I understand, as well, it depends on how you start defining
things and what criteria you use and what protocols were in
place, and I am sure that will be gone into.
But I bring it up because this is the kind of thing that
becomes part of the conversation that takes place, and we have
to answer for that on the committee. The DOD IG, the inspector
general, recommended that the Army remove the body armor plates
in question from the inventory. We need to address that.
The Office of the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, the DOT&E, the Department of Defense's testing
expert, reviewed the three tests and disagreed with the DOD IG.
So the DOT&E concluded that the plates met the contract
performance specifications, although agreed that there were
significant issues in the Army's testing documentation process
and scoring analysis.
Again, I bring this to the attention of the public at large
and to the members because this is the kind of thing that we
have to then resolve when it comes to putting a defense bill
together; and we want to make the right decision, because
decisions that this subcommittee makes and the committee as a
whole makes are life-and-death issues. And I know that you are
as vitally concerned about that as we are and take it as
soberly and as seriously as we do.
And so I am going to take it that the testing and
evaluation branch and the inspector general branch are both
operating on the basis of professional competence and
commitment and determination to persevere in that regard. So it
puts us in a dilemma, and we need your professional
observations and commentary.
We understand the Secretary of the Army has requested the
Deputy Secretary of Defense to adjudicate the issue. I am not
sure that is the right way to go. I am not interested in
adjudication, we are interested in what do we need to do in
terms of policy that we put into the defense bill that is going
to advance the interests of the personnel involved.
In the interim, the Secretary has issued a precautionary
order to identify, collect and return the plates in question
while the matter is being adjudicated. I am not sure that that
advances what this committee's work is going to be.
I regret having to go into such detail about this, but we
have a lot of new members, and the public is not necessarily
aware of all these things; and I want you to know what is on
our plate right now.
Why the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) authorized
the release of the Inspector General's report with its own
testing director disagreeing with its own inspector general is
not known to me, but many things are not known to me in the
Pentagon. I realize there are no politics involved in the Army
or the Marine Corps, so this may be an obscure corner for you.
Perhaps politics of some kind was involved in that, but we
can't allow that to affect our decisions.
Given the critical importance of the issue, we would like
to see prompt action taken to resolve this body armor testing
issue. That is the reason I am bringing it to your attention
today; we want to have answers.
What direction should we go? None of the members on this
subcommittee, let alone the committee as a whole, is going to
do any of this testing. We are totally and completely reliant
upon your professional understanding of what is required for
military personnel as translated or transposed into the defense
bill. And then we have to make that recommendation to Mr.
Skelton and the committee as a whole and then on to the
appropriators. So we are counting on you to have this issue
resolved.
The number of body armor plates in question comprises a
very small percentage of the total number of the plates
procured, about two percent, but the implication is the Army is
not fully testing plates and allowing them to go into the hands
of our soldiers. So the whole program gets brought into
question, even though it may not be entirely the case.
Because of continued concern with the Army development
testing process for body armor, the committee has taken action
to have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and
evaluate the body armor first article test. The GAO has this
under way.
The IG has also made recommendations regarding
standardizing body armor, which I hope that you will address,
and we expect to receive an update on these provisions.
We are told, finally, that there is not a single fatality
in Iraq or Afghanistan due to the failure of the currently
fielded body armor plate to defeat the small arm threats it was
designed to stop.
I want to repeat that. We are told there is not a single
fatality at this point in either of those two immediate fields
of military endeavor. Our goal must be to maintain that record
and to provide our military personnel with the best body armor
and force protection equipment available. That is the duty and
obligation of this subcommittee, first and foremost, to the
committee as a whole, and to the Congress and the people of
this country.
So troops and their families must have continued confidence
in the body armor being provided to our personnel. And the
hearing today is to be the first practical step in seeing that
task completed.
Again, I apologize for taking so long to do that. I
ordinarily don't have such a long opening statement, but the
issues involved are so volatile, they have such public
attention being focused on them at the moment--not necessarily
fully informed--that I felt it was required of me to do that.
And with that, I am going to turn to Mr. Taylor for any
remarks that he would like to make at this juncture.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would
like to submit a very well written statement for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our acquisition
folks for being here today. I think that the purpose of this is
not just to educate a couple of Congressmen, but to let the
moms and dads and loved ones of the people in uniform know what
the military is doing and what this Congress is doing to
minimize American casualties as we pursue the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
I think everyone on this committee was very frustrated with
the attitude taken under the previous Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF). That attitude, summed up in my line, was that
casualties were acceptable, and that we were so busy worrying
about the next war that we were not responding quickly enough
to the war we were fighting; and hence, the foot-dragging that
took place, first on body armor, on getting a jammer on every
vehicle, on up-armoring High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs). It should not have been up to the individual
trooper to go to a junk yard in Iraq in order to up-armor his
HMMWV. We, as a Nation, should have been taking the steps.
Although I don't see him in the audience, I want to thank
again publicly Colonel Jim Littig, United States Army (USA),
Retired, for being the first person to actually come up to me
and say there is a better way to protect a vehicle from an
underbody explosion, it is called a mine-resistant, ambush-
protected, V-bottom vehicle. The South Africans figured it out,
the Israelis figured it out, the Japanese figured it out. It is
regrettable that it took the United States Army as long as it
did to figure it out.
I also want to remind people that these hearings have a
purpose. Two years ago right now, the United States of America
had less than 500 mine-resistant vehicles. Right now, we have
over 13,000 in theater. I want to commend General Brogan of the
United States Marine Corps for the outstanding job he has done
in, first, developing that vehicle, fielding that vehicle when
needed, flying those vehicles to theater, and finally,
producing enough vehicles to where we can send them shiploads
out of town to theater.
General, I wanted to let you know that in December I met a
Lieutenant General Helmick, who tells me that the vehicle he
was in was attacked by an 800-pound vehicle-borne IED, and he
lived to tell me about this, walked away from that explosion.
I want to let you know that the Mississippi Guard unit I
visited in December, every route clearance mission they run is
in ambush-protected vehicles, mine-resistant vehicles. I met
another colonel who will not let his troops leave the wire
unless they are in mine-resistant vehicles. Your work is saving
lives every day.
It took longer than any of us would want to; none of us
like the idea of going to five suppliers, using three different
engines and all the other different parts that you had to do in
order to get them fielded in a hurry. But I want to commend you
and all of your team for the work that you did. You are saving
lives every day.
The purpose for hearings like this is to identify other
needs, and on the part of Congress to fund and on the part of
your acquisition boards to build the things that we need to
save the lives of troops. We also need to know, in the case of
MRAPs, what sort of logistical problems we have created, as we
have--I mentioned three different engines, approximately 30
different varieties of vehicles. What do we as a Congress need
to do to help you simplify that process and make sure that the
troops are getting what they need?
Lastly, General, I would hope we could touch on it, for the
many years I have been fortunate enough to serve on this
committee we have heard the Army, in particular, say, ``We
train as we fight.'' We know in the case of MRAPs you did the
right thing in fielding those MRAPs as they came off the
production line, getting them to theater as soon as they came
off the line--in many instances, flying them there, later on,
sending them there by ship. I would hope that as that need is
filled in theater, that there is a plan in place to get those
vehicles to our training installations so that the first time
our troops see an MRAP is not in theater, but at that training
installation, and that they have adequate time to train on them
before they get to theater.
For whatever reason, I do read the casualty reports. And
every time I see a noncombat-related injury listed in those
casualty reports, I have got to wonder, was it an MRAP rollover
by someone who wasn't properly trained to operate that vehicle
in a tough environment, and is someone dying needlessly because
we haven't gotten the vehicles to the training installations?
So I would very much like to hear from you what is being done
to get them to the training installations in a timely manner.
And again, I want to commend all of you for the job you
have done. And I hope I told General Helmick your name in
particular, General. If I didn't, I hope he will get a copy of
this transcript and know that your work resulted in the saving
of his life and the lives of lots of sailors, soldiers, airmen
and marines on a daily basis in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I
want to thank you publicly for the work you have done.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you. As I indicated, we are
nonpartisan in this subcommittee and in the committee as a
whole. Gene and I have the pleasure, the honor and the delight
of having two close friends and colleagues serving now as
ranking members as we served as ranking members previously, in
Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Akin. And I will go to them now for their
remarks, Mr. Bartlett first, followed by Mr. Akin.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our panel for being with us.
We are very fortunate to have each of you serving our country.
And we are very pleased to have you with us here today.
Force protection has always been a top priority to both of
these subcommittees--and I serve on both--and I have no doubt
it will continue to be. We in Congress recognize that it is our
constitutional duty to properly outfit our brave men and women
who choose to serve their country in the military. Many of
these brave troops are currently overseas serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan and all over the world.
As the threat to our military personnel continues to
evolve, force protection requirements must continue to change
accordingly. We as a committee need to be reassured that all
force protection programs are being accomplished expeditiously,
the services are communicating with one another, and that every
effort is being considered to meet new force protection
requirements. Every day we must be able to confidently say that
we are doing everything possible to provide our warfighters the
protection they need and deserve.
It is along these lines--and I know the Chairman already
hit upon this in his opening statement--but I am troubled with
recent press reports in regards to the Army pulling body armor
from the field based on faulty testing. These press reports are
based on a recent Department of Defense Inspector General
report.
Many of you may be aware that although I did not serve in
the military, I worked for more than 20 years as a scientist
and engineer on military projects to improve or invent
equipment to protect the lives of military personnel. I mention
this because I understand the importance of testing to
guarantee that equipment performs to specifications and
expectations. I believe a fundamental foundation for those who
do serve is confidence in their government, confidence in their
civilian and military leadership, and confidence in their
equipment.
We are very fortunate to have some new members who have
recently served in the military and, Mr. Chairman, I think it
would be very beneficial for us to hear from them in regards to
how soldiers and marines react when they read these types of
articles that question the capabilities of their equipment.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am puzzled as to why the
Department of Defense leadership has not yet weighed in on this
issue. We certainly know where the Department stands on MRAPs
and ISR, and rightly so. It seems to me that if the enemy gets
through the ISR and gets through MRAPs, body armor is the
ultimate last line of defense for the individual soldier and
marine. We have the Department of the Army, the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, and the DOD IG, all DOD
agencies and all with differing conclusions. I hope that this
hearing will shed some light on this issue. And depending on
what we learn today, Mr. Chairman, I may suggest that we work
together to send some kind of official correspondence to DOD
leadership expressing our concerns.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. And I
want to thank you again for your service to our country and for
appearing before us this afternoon.
Mr. Abercrombie. And last, but certainly not least, our
good friend, Todd Akin.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And also, thank you very
much to our distinguished panel.
Like some of my colleagues, I have some great comments that
were prepared, and I would ask that they be made part of the
record.
Mr. Abercrombie. Without objection.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The one thing that I might add, and I don't know that this
is specifically any of your specific responsibilities, but as
we were dealing in Anbar Province with the problem of MRAPs and
having those fully armored vehicles there, what happened that
was kind of interesting was that our number of fully protected
MRAPs, we had met that in Iraq. But the problem was that the
distribution was improper, and so we had a lot of people riding
around where there was no action going on in fully protected
vehicles, and yet our marines in Anbar Province did not have
enough of those vehicles. Fortunately, we did a quick
adjustment and made sure that the distribution followed where
the attacks were most significant.
So as we start looking at Afghanistan, trying to wrap up
the number of the smaller, I guess the 2,000 additional MRAPs
that are narrower and a little bit lighter for that road
system, that we could also be careful that those are
distributed at the most strategic places as they are delivered.
I don't mean MRAPs, I meant the up-armored Humvees. We had
trouble with the up-armored Humvees going to the wrong places.
The same thing could happen with the MRAPS. I am just
encouraging that we don't make that same mistake again.
And that is all I had.
Mr. Abercrombie. We will go right away to General Lennox.
Should there be a call for us to vote, we will return as
quickly as possible from that.
And in relation to the policy of my subcommittee, because I
happen to be in the Chair now, we are going to start with the
most junior members. The newest members will start the
questioning and we will work our way up to the senior members.
And then the next hearing we have we will reverse that and
start with the senior members back down.
So when the testimony is over--and by the way, you can
summarize if you would, because I do expect we are going to
have to vote fairly quickly--we will start with the newest
members and work our way up.
General Lennox, please.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT LENNOX, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, G-3/5/7, ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. PETER N. FULLER,
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER SOLDIER, AND KEVIN M. FAHEY, PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, COMBAT SUPPORT & COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
General Lennox. Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman Taylor,
Congressman Bartlett, Congressman Akin, and distinguished
members of the committees, on behalf of the Army, thank you for
this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Army
force protection programs.
I would like to start by introducing the fellow panel
members and the soldiers that have come with me today.
First, Brigadier General Pete Fuller, next to me, is the
Program Executive Officer (PEO) Soldier and the Commanding
General for Natick, Soldier Support Systems. So, body armor,
the fire-resistant gear, all those kinds of things, General
Fuller is in charge of.
Mr. Kevin Fahey next to him is a Program Executive Officer,
Combat Support and Combat Service Support, and he is in charge
of armoring the vehicles, mine-resistant, ambush-protected
vehicles and things like that.
Behind me is Brigadier General Tom Cole, and he is the
Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare
and Sensors. So the sensor platforms that are protecting our
combat outposts, forward operating bases and things like that
are delivered by Brigadier General Cole.
To my right is First Sergeant Patrick Schrader. First
Sergeant Patrick Schrader is a combat veteran of OIF (Operation
Iraqi Freedom). He has been awarded the Bronze Star medal with
a ``V'' device for valor for his conduct during OIF.
Next to him is Staff Sergeant Fred Rowe. He is a veteran of
multiple tours in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, he is a
survivor of several improvised explosive device attacks. And
Staff Sergeant Rowe has an amazing personal story that helps
validate the effectiveness of the body armor that we provide
our soldiers. And I hope he gets an opportunity to share that
with you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we are honored to be accompanied by Brigadier
General Mike Brogan of the United States Marine Corps, with
whom we work closely on the Army-Marine Corps Board, and we
help synchronize together the requirements and our efforts to
the greatest degree possible.
Mr. Chairman, we are going to discuss a lot of facts and
figures today, but our overriding concern is the welfare of our
soldiers. Today's Army general officers have 107 daughters and
sons that serve in the Army. The Army is really a family
business. And I don't mean to tell you that to be self-serving,
but I need to convey the idea that when we think about soldier
protection, we think about it like our sons and daughters. And
we are inculcated with that idea from the first moment that we
serve as leaders when you stand at the end of the chow line and
make sure that your soldiers are taken care of first. Soldier
protection, force protection are those kind of concerns for the
leadership of the United States Army.
As I was preparing to come speak with you today, I
contacted leaders in both Iraq and Afghanistan and I asked for
updates on what is going on in the areas of force protection in
their theaters so I could share with you all today. And what I
was struck with, really, was the effort in both theaters, but a
story that was told to me by leaders in Iraq about how they are
laser-like focused on defeating the improvised explosive device
threat there and their passion for solving this tough issue;
and how that number one threat to our soldiers in Iraq starts
with the individual protection gear, the body armor that a
soldier wears. It then goes to the vehicle that they ride in,
the armor that we have added to the side of the vehicle, the
MRAPs, the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles with a V-
shaped hull. And then it goes to the technology that we
provided to them, with both active and passive countermeasures
to help either detonate the IED before they get there or to
defeat the explosion in general.
And then it goes to the use of manned and unmanned aerial
platforms that provide sensors to help find the devices as they
are placed, to track the networks down to find out who is doing
those kind of things. It goes to the route clearance teams that
Chairman Taylor talked about that are out there on the roads
2,500 miles a day, running the routes, making sure they are
clear. And it goes to putting all those bits and pieces of
intelligence that they grab together to form a picture to help
roll up the threats of these bomb makers before they are
allowed to hurt and damage our soldiers.
Even this total commitment, this passion that comes through
in their discussions with me, is not sufficient, and they know
this. We are making progress. We are finding 40 to 50 percent
of these devices and either detonating them in advance or
exploiting them for information.
I wanted to share that with you today because I know that
this committee shares the same passion for protecting our
soldiers. We care, and we know that you do, too.
For this same reason, there may be some information I am
reluctant or hesitant to share in an open hearing with you
today. If that is the case, I want to make sure that we follow
up quickly in a closed setting or a classified setting to
address the concerns that you raise without endangering our
soldiers that are deployed.
Mr. Abercrombie. It may be that the briefing we had will
have covered that. If it doesn't, we will take it up. So when
that comes up, just say so and we will move on.
General Lennox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
The progress I have talked about wouldn't be possible
without the help and cooperation of the committee members here,
your support for our investment in training and equipment,
facilities and services.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement that I
ask be made part of the official record.
Mr. Abercrombie. Without objection.
General Lennox. It has a lot of those facts and figures.
The main point that I want to make today, and the one that
often gets lost in the middle of those facts, is that we do
care. The leadership of the Army is committed to protecting our
soldiers.
With that, sir, we stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Lennox can be found in
the Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Abercrombie. So General Fuller and Mr. Fahey, you are
prepared to answer questions and comment on observations?
General Fuller. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Fahey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Brogan, would you like to make a
statement at this point?
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL M. BROGAN, COMMANDER, MARINE
CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MRAP JOINT
PROGRAM OFFICE
General Brogan. If I may, sir.
Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman Taylor, Mr. Bartlett, Mr.
Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today, and thank you for
your continued support of our men and women who wear the cloth
of our Nation.
The theme that I would like to provide for you today is one
of iteration and evolution. Our personal protection equipment
has evolved significantly throughout this current conflict.
From the flak vest that we were all used to wearing prior to 9/
11 to the outer tactical vest, the modular tactical vest, and
looking forward to future improvements in that vest.
But beyond just the ability to stop shrapnel and limited
small arms fire, we included the small arms protective inserts
(ESAPI), the first time that we had ever fielded bullet-proof
equipment to our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. And
then, as the conflict progressed, we moved on to the enhanced
small arm protective inserts. We have now fully fielded that
ESAPI ensemble to the marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen
engaged in the current conflict.
Likewise, we began this effort with helmets that used a
webbed suspension system. We have now fully fielded the pad
suspension system to all of our troops.
We entered the conflict with canvas High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, the HMMWVs, through two
generations of Marine Armor Kits, and then to the M-1114, and
finally today, the expanded capacity, up-armored HMMWV
vehicles; and as you both discussed in your opening statements,
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected program. We have now taken
delivery of more than 15,000 of these vehicles by the U.S.
Government. We have over 13,000 in theater, and today, over
11,600 are in the hands of our warfighters.
Likewise, we armored our line-haul logistics vehicles, the
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement truck and the Logistics
Vehicle System.
We also made significant improvements in the fire-resistant
clothing we issue to our marines. Through the fire-resistant
organizational gear ensemble, we went from what was
historically given to our aviators in flight suits, our combat
vehicle crewmen, with a combat vehicle crewman suit, to now
issuing to every single individual who leaves a forward
operating base a combat suit that has fire-resistant
properties. And as we look forward to migrating to Afghanistan,
we are including in our cold weather ensemble those same fire-
resistant properties.
But this has been, as General Lennox indicated, more than
just that last line of defense, with vehicle armor, body armor,
and flame resistance; it is that holistic way that we look at
defeating IEDs through intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance assets, some of which he described. Through mine
rollers, through jamming equipment, through a number of
different means we look to protect our troops. We believe that
today we have the best equipped, best protected force this
Nation has ever fielded, and we continue to make improvements
to that equipment.
We look forward your questions.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, General.
[The prepared statement of General Brogan can be found in
the Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Sayre, could you identify yourself
just for purposes of the committee members being able to see
who you are, should questions or--and Ms. Ugone. There you are.
Very nice to see you.
They won't be testifying as such, but will be available;
and you can chime in when you think it is pertinent or
appropriate. And I don't take it as anything other than the
luck of the draw that you are sitting on opposite sides of the
room.
Let's see, the first question, then, or commentary is from
Massachusetts, the winner of the new member lottery is
Representative Tsongas--I should say, new member to the
committee.
Ms. Tsongas. Maybe one of the newest members, but I hate to
admit I am one of the oldest as well.
General Lennox, a question for you. And I appreciate very
much your testimony and the professionalism with which you take
the concerns we all have for how we care for our soldiers, but
I do have a question.
The Army reported 250,000 acute orthopedic injuries in 2007
that were linked to the stress of bearing heavy loads during
repeated deployments. According to General Peter Chiarelli,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, there are about 20,000
nondeployable soldiers equal to about four brigade combat
teams, which puts an additional stress on the force, that were
hurt from the sheer weight of the equipment. Now it appears
that the Army will issue a contract award for a stronger but
heavier ceramic plate.
I understand the need to be prepared for contingencies that
may require the increased protection of this equipment, but
what are we doing to produce lighter-weight plates at current
levels that are not only requested by commanders in theater,
but will also preserve the health of our force and allow us to
remain at appropriate force levels?
General Lennox. Yes, ma'am. You hit upon a very, very good
point.
It is a real tradeoff between protection of our soldiers,
providing the requisite amount of body armor, and the impact
that it is having not only on their wear and tear over time of
our soldiers and the readiness of our units, but really on
their effectiveness as they fight day to day.
Sergeant Rowe can tell you, if permitted at an appropriate
time, that wearing the body armor today, day in and day out
over an extended period of time, does take its toll.
Mr. Abercrombie. General, would you like to bring him up
now?
General Lennox. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Not a bit. Can you do it so we can get the
microphone so everybody can hear.
General Lennox. Sergeant Rowe, would you mind just
explaining about the impact of the body armor.
Mr. Abercrombie. Before you start, that is indicating that
we are going to have a vote. I expect it will be more than one.
If we hear five bells, it means that we will have about 10
minutes; I will stay here that long, but the members will have
to leave.
I expect there will be three votes. So there will be a 15-
minute vote, two 5-minute votes. And it doesn't mean that,
obviously; it will be longer than that.
We will have about 10 minutes, Sergeant. I don't think we
will get to a second question before we have to go.
Sergeant Rowe. Mr. Chairman, I can tell you from firsthand
experience----
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you for being here, Sergeant. And
thank you for your service.
Sergeant Rowe. No problem.
Over time, the wear and tear on our bodies is----
Mr. Abercrombie. Did you hear the question from Ms.
Tsongas?
Sergeant Rowe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
Sergeant Rowe. Over time, sir, the body armor, it does wear
on your body. I can tell you from personal experience in Iraq
that, you know, with the heat and all the weight, it does wear
on your body.
I was there for a year and a half on this deployment, and
it is rough. But I couldn't imagine doing what I did and
carrying what I carried in Afghanistan. It would have been
absolutely impossible to have carried the weight and the
weapons and the ammunition that I had to carry in Iraq. It
would have been absolutely impossible to have carried all that
equipment in Afghanistan.
General Lennox. Would you mind sharing your experience
about how you know the body armor does work.
Sergeant Rowe. Mr. Chairman, we were conducting a patrol,
and my truck was struck by an IED and was blown up and landed
on its right side.
Myself and the rest of the soldiers in the vehicle went
ahead and exited the vehicle through the turret because
obviously we couldn't get out of any of the doors and the truck
was on fire.
When we came out of the truck, there was an ambush set up
for Iraqi insurgents, and they began shooting us as we came out
of the truck one at a time. I took three rounds to the chest at
a less distance between me and you with the body armor, and all
three rounds were stopped by the plate. It hurt, but I was
still mission capable, and I was still able to do my job
throughout the rest of the day.
General Lennox. To answer your question, it is just a
tradeoff between effectiveness and weight.
General Fuller can probably talk a little bit about what we
are doing in terms of research and development to develop
lighter armor that is equally capable. And that is the
tradeoff, I think, over time: How are we going to be able to
have lighter capabilities, lighter armor that still allows our
soldiers to perform and do their mission?
And we struggle with that, frankly. And we struggle with
that in some of the decisions.
If you will allow me, I would prefer to respond to the
question about the new production in a closed session for some
of our rationale.
Ms. Tsongas. One quick question before we hear from General
Fuller--and I can't see the time to know--but does the
temptation exist to take the armor off because it is heavy or
hot or whatever?
Sergeant Rowe. Yes, ma'am. There is a risk that all
soldiers are willing to take. And I think that in certain
situations, mission dependent, that as soldiers we would be
happy to take off some of the body armor to be more mission
capable, more mobile on the ground, more flexible, faster. It
comes to a point where you are more mission incapable of doing
your job or more at risk or vulnerable with all of the
equipment on.
I think it should be left up to the commanders or to the
independent leaders on the ground to decide what kind of armor
we need to take out or what we could downgrade. Because there
are times that I have been on mission where I could have got
out of the firefight a lot quicker and I could have handled
business a lot easier if I would have been able to be more
mobile or do my job more effectively with less weight.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
General Brogan. Ma'am, this is an area where we need some
additional science and technology research conducted. In public
appearances over the last 18 months, on six separate occasions
where I have met with leaders of industry and their marketing
representatives, I have implored them to develop the materials
that will allow us to go from the hard ceramic plates with the
Aramid fibers that we currently use to something that may
involve carbon tube nanotechnology that can significantly
reduce the weight.
Currently, that technology does not exist. There is limited
work being done in government laboratories that the Office of
Naval Research, some sponsored by Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), but today we do not have that
technological breakthrough. We need to significantly lighten
the load.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Fuller, did you want to comment?
General Fuller. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Ma'am, an interesting point is, you also have to recognize
that Sergeant Rowe didn't tell us what he was doing at the
time. He was a sniper. And we now are looking at a solder as a
system. We just can't focus on giving him body armor
independently, giving him a weapon independently, giving him
all the other gear that they would carry. Now we are looking at
it as how do we provide soldier as a system and recognize you
might save five pounds in one area, but add it back in another
area that you didn't intend to because you are not managing it
as a system.
Mr. Abercrombie. So in other words, when you are dealing
with, as the sergeant indicated in Afghanistan, or dealing with
a different kind of terrain, a different kind of situation may
call for a different set of body armor, which may not be the
same kind of protection you would have under other
circumstances. But as he mentioned, the mobility question is
more important than the stopping power, necessarily, of the
armor.
I am not trying to simplify it, but I am just trying to
give a for-instance.
General Fuller. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that is an
accurate assessment. I think what we are trying to do is
provide the commander in the field that flexibility. We want to
make sure that they stop the rounds that come at them, but how
they carry that plate might provide a different weight factor
and different weight consideration.
Mr. Abercrombie. I think we will leave it at that, because
if we go further, we are dealing where we need to get into a
classified situation.
Let's try one more and we can get started.
Congressman Wittman, followed by Congressman Massa.
Congressman Wittman, maybe we can get started and we will take
it from there.
Mr. Wittman. I will get started by directing a question to
General Lennox.
I had the opportunity to go to Iraq and Afghanistan here
recently, and I heard a number of complaints when I was there
about stoppages and malfunctions with the M9 pistol and the M4
rifle. And with respect to the M9, I have been told that the
9mm doesn't have the stopping power that some of the larger
calibers do like the .40 and .45 caliber pistols. And what I
have learned in the meantime is that there is a 2006 study out
by the Center for Naval Analysis which polled soldiers who use
these weapons in combat and found that 48 percent of the
respondents were dissatisfied with the M9 Barretta, and 26
percent requested a larger caliber rifle.
Given these issues and the fact that there have been
numerous advances and improvements made in pistols since the M9
was fielded in the mid-1980's, can you tell us a little bit
about what the Army is doing to address those concerns? And is
the Army working to generate a new pistol requirement?
Are we doing things to increase the competition for those
small arms? And if so, when do you anticipate that this
requirement would be released?
General Lennox. I am not aware of the stoppages and the
trouble that you've identified, and we will definitely look at
that. And if you don't mind if I take that for the record, I
will go and investigate and get you feedback on that, in
particular.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 78.]
General Lennox. We do have an open competition for a new
carbine. The Secretary of the Army has made sure that we were
doing an open and competitive competition, looking at all
comers to see if we can provide something with the right
capability for our soldiers, using the latest technology and
weighing things like maintenance and effectiveness and looking
at it, as General Fuller said, in terms of soldier as a
system--the weapons part of it, the optics are part of it, the
soldier's training is part of it, and it all comes together to
deliver an effective soldier in the field.
I believe there may be some work being done on a pistol,
but I can't tell you that for certain, sir.
General Fuller. Sir, I am also responsible for the weapons,
and I am not aware of a new pistol competition, though we are
constantly looking at improvements and looking at other
calibers, but we have not initiated an action to get a new
pistol.
We are looking at constant improvements. As you articulated
on the M4, we aren't just waiting for the new carbine
competition to come forward. We have been doing industry days,
we have been asking industry, what can we do to our current
systems to give it better capability, make constant
improvements, not just waiting for our future technology or
future capability, but constant improvements. And I believe you
will see, as General Lennox articulated, it is more than just
the actual weapon; it is the training, it is the ammunition, it
is the optics, and it is the soldier.
Body armor actually has an impact on the soldier when you
are talking about the rifle, ensuring that they can get their
butt stock into their shoulder to get a good firing position.
We actually gave a little pad for left- and right-hand shooters
to ensure they can get that rifle into the correct position and
hold it there to get a steady bead.
We are constantly looking at everything we can. And as
General Lennox said, a soldier as a system, let's just not look
at the pistol, the rifle; let's look at what does that soldier
need to be able to do in their mission? How does it interface
with their body armor? Where would they carry their pistol?
Where do they carry the ammunition, et cetera?
Mr. Wittman. Let's go back real quickly to the Center for
Naval Analysis. They did conduct a survey on small arms fire in
2006, and let me speak specifically about the M9.
The study found that 38 percent of soldiers who experienced
a stoppage with the M9 reported an inability to engage the
enemy with the weapon even after performing immediate action to
clear the stoppage during a significant portion or throughout
the entire firefight. So I think there is some concern there
with the M9.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), I know, as you say, is
looking to replace the M4 rifles with a new weapon. Given the
level of dissatisfaction with the small arms and the issues
that our solders are having to deal with found by the Center
for Naval Analysis, can you tell us why the Army hasn't been
able to generate a new requirement for a pistol or a rifle, and
some of the directions we need to take to address that?
Mr. Abercrombie. Can you answer that in about 30 seconds? I
doubt it. Do you think we should come back to that?
General Lennox. I think I can be very quick, Mr. Chairman.
This is the first I have really heard of the level of
dissatisfaction, sir, that you are aware of. And I think not
having heard that, we have not seen that kind of a problem with
an M9 before or heard about it. It is something we will
definitely look into and see if there is that kind of
dissatisfaction.
Mr. Abercrombie. Are you familiar with the report or the
article that the Representative is referring to?
General Lennox. No, sir, I am not.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Maybe we can take a look at it. Why
don't you take a look at it and get back to us and to him with
some--perhaps you can do a book review of it. How does that
sound?
General Lennox. That is great, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. With that, we will recess and return as
soon as we can, but I expect it is going to be closer to a half
an hour than 20 minutes.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 78.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you for your patience. We almost
made it. Let us see. We finished with Representative Wittman. I
don't know if Representative Massa--let us give him another 10
seconds.
Who will be next, then, after Eric? It will be Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. I am Navy also.
Mr. Abercrombie. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Sestak. Massa is Navy also, so I will take his place.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask a question. It came up already with the
Representative from Massachusetts, and the chairman mentioned
it to some degree. This morning we had a briefing, classified,
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And I have been quite taken by the
difference between the two ventures, as I think the sergeant
pointed out. And to my mind is why Congress has done immense
goodness, under the two gentlemen behind me particularly, but
to some degree I am almost concerned that we can become risk-
averse, particularly as we head into Afghanistan. Because force
protection, you would know better than I would, is not really
just solely or even maybe primarily a materiel solution. So my
question is to you, and I would be curious is, how does
training, tactics, techniques, intelligence, mobility, and I
don't mean mobility with a lighter vehicle only, tie into this?
Have you seen, you know, I mean, because I think Afghanistan is
so different, that the lessons there that maybe were pending a
little bit too much down the road here thinking about armor
rather than the holistic approach that maybe it is kind of hard
to transition out of that after you have had such a focus from
Congress on it?
Do you have comments upon that?
General Lennox. Sir, if you don't mind, I will start. I
think your point is spot on, that there is enormous
environmental differences--Chairman Abercrombie talked about it
earlier--between the two different theaters. One size does not
fit all. I was assigned in Colorado Springs a couple years ago,
and that was about a mile high. And for the soldiers there, you
take that mile high and now you add another 4,000 feet on top
of it. And now you add combat loads on top of that it. And it
is got a tremendously debilitating effect in terms of your
ability to maneuver.
We are taking some initiatives at their request, at the
theater's request. We are trying things like the Special Forces
tactical vest and armoring system in small numbers because it
is about 7 pounds lighter just to see if that works and try to
get some feedback and learn from that. We are trying a lighter
machine gun, four or five pounds lighter in small numbers
trying it to see if that helps us.
You heard the earlier discussion perhaps about the mine-
resistant ambush-protected all-terrain vehicles. One of the
constant themes that has come from Afghanistan is the desire
for vehicles that are lighter, capable of going off road, a
smaller turn radius, capable of keeping up with some of the
pick-up trucks they may be chasing and things like that, giving
you a little bit more capability. And not in all cases have we
given people MRAPs, for example. The Third Brigade 10th
Mountain Division was outfitted with armored security vehicles,
specifically because MRAPs didn't fit their needs. So I think
you are exactly right that the conditions are different in both
theaters. You have to be cognizant of that. And we are working
initiatives----
Mr. Sestak. General, could you take me one step further.
How do you begin to measure performance versus protection? For
instance, there are really no roads along where the insurgents
tend to cross into Afghanistan. There just aren't. And my
goodness, I imagine down in Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC), I understand they are looking at an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to carry logistics around in Afghanistan,
because the key here is to stay off any roads that might be
anywhere. I mean, are we kind of pushing a little bit too much
on this? Every solution you came back to me here with is
something on the man. Shouldn't we be looking beyond that now
for performance rather than protection only?
General Lennox. I don't mean to give the impression that
everything is on the soldier. Frankly, a lot of this is about
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
that empower the soldiers. In terms of the increase manned and
unmanned vehicles that are going into theater, that provides
situational awareness, can direct you and save labor. Some of
the things that we are putting around the bases to provide
situational awareness, the camera systems that work both day
and night and allow you to see the enemy at farther distances.
So some technological advances are not just in armoring but are
in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, I think that
help get at some of those problems.
General Fuller, do you have any thoughts about that, or
General Brogan?
Mr. Sestak. I throw this out because this will be my last
one comment and close. As you answer, I guess my issue is, Iraq
you know you place people in a place and you basically secured
it and held it and enhanced it, and we had to get logistics
back and forth. I think the concept is so different in
Afghanistan, and that is why I am just curious.
Thank you.
Go ahead, General.
General Brogan. Sir, in addition to the things like General
Lennox mentioned, when you met recently with Lieutenant General
Flynn, he may have described for you the Combat Hunter
initiative that we have going on, instilling that offensive
mind-set into each and every marine, not just the riflemen,
giving them the skills to help find enemy combatants in the
shadows, behind windows where they would normally be out of
view, those type of things, so that we can take the first shot
and not be forced to rely just on our body armor when we detect
an ambush because they have initiated it with a firing action.
You mentioned the cargo UAV. Anything that we can do to get
our troops off of the roads certainly limits the opportunity of
the threat to target us with the improvised explosive devices.
And then, in the training base, you know we have a pretty
well established Mojave Viper, Desert Talon events that go on
at 29 Palms and Marine Corps Air Station Yuma that have proved
their worth in Iraq. We have a similar effort to focus on the
unique aspects of the theater in Afghanistan, specifically so
that we are not relying just on personal protection equipment
to be the end of the story.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you.
Mr. Abercrombie. Is that sufficient, Representative Sestak?
Mr. Sestak. Yes.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman is next.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, thank you so much for appearing before this
committee. I think my question is, if we look across the
spectrum of the force protection initiatives that you have been
discussing, whether it is a protective vest or Hesco barriers
or it is MRAPs, are there any--obviously the Congress of the
United States is looking at spending some money to get this
economy moving, and we are trying to parallel our spending with
the Nation's needs and with things that have a multiplier
effect on this economy. Are there any deficits in the area of
force protection that if the requisite funding were available
could accelerate procurement so that our troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan have the most up-to-date equipment possible?
General Lennox. Thank you, sir.
We do have some differences between capabilities in Iraq
and Afghanistan today. We do have funded things like route
clearance vehicles that are en route to Afghanistan that are
not yet the same as Iraq. Some of the unmanned aerial vehicles
and things like that we do have funded, but they are not yet
there. So there is a difference still in the theater
capabilities that we are working to address. And should the
President decide to switch emphasis or--and the Secretary of
Defense--decide to switch emphasis into Afghanistan, there are
some things that we have been doing to lean forward in terms of
armoring vehicles and preparation for that. But there will
likely be requirements for additional supplemental funding
addressing some of those kinds of concerns in the event that
policy decision is made.
General Brogan. Sir, I would submit that the work of the
legislature has fully funded all of our personal protection
needs as well as the armoring needs for vehicles. So,
unfortunately, there is not any of those quick wins that we can
get that would fall in the realm of economic stimulus with
respect to personal protective equipment.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
One follow-up question, Mr. Chairman.
And that is, with the MRAP, are there some issues given the
nature of the terrain in Afghanistan that create a safety
hazard given the weight of those vehicles?
General Lennox. Sir, I think the right answer is, they are
challenged. There have been accidents. There was an accident
today with an MRAP in Afghanistan. The vehicle's rear wheels
got caught, and the vehicle turned over. Thankfully nobody was
injured.
I think the terrain is extraordinarily demanding there, and
it is a challenge each and every day to operate in those
vehicles. We have received requests for the lighter version,
and hence the request for the mine-resistant ambush-protected
all-terrain vehicle. Nevertheless, it is state-of-the-art and
it is saving lives in both theaters today. I don't know if I
answered your question adequately or if there is additional
comments.
Mr. Coffman. Is training a function of some of these--a
lack of training, since some of these soldiers and marines, as
I understand it, don't see these vehicles until they are in
theater?
General Lennox. I think that is a good question, sir.
There is training that goes on in theater before a soldier,
marine, is allowed to operate the vehicle. It is not optimal.
We would clearly like to do training, as Chairman Taylor
mentioned earlier, before the soldiers deploy back here. We
would like to take our time. We want to make sure that it is
right. But before they operate the vehicle, there is training
in theater.
And some of it is certainly an impact of the theater
itself. Roads give way, precipitous turns. And those things
have an impact as well.
General Brogan. If I may, sir, we have analyzed all of the
vehicle incidents that resulted in rollover. Roughly--and that
is about 94 vehicle accidents that resulted in rollover. Two-
thirds of those are directly related to the weight of the
platform. The road bed crushed underneath it, and the vehicle
fell over onto its side or slid down into a canal. The next
largest category has to do with maneuvering; a sharp turn,
avoiding an accident, avoiding a pot hole, avoiding what they
perceive to be an improvised explosive device. So those, I
believe, can be impacted by training. Today we have simulators.
In fact, one is now at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. We also
have in the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Air Force, and Special
Operations Command, a significant number of vehicles in the
training base. And there is an Army plan to cascade vehicles as
we put the newest, most capable vehicles into theater to bring
the ones that they are replacing out and put those at home
station to be used for training by the forces here in the
continental United States.
Mr. Abercrombie. General Brogan, could you comment further
in relation to that question in the context of the question
about the idea then of the so-called lighter, I don't know,
smaller, faster, you know, the welter-weight version of the
light or heavy weight or heavy-weight versions with regard to
whether or not that takes you into what General Fuller was
talking about and what some of the questions previously related
to with regard to function and purpose altering. In other
words, you have heavy armor, that is one thing, but you lose
mobility. Now, if we are talking about a lighter, faster, et
cetera, MRAP, are we also talking about a difference then in
what you can expect in terms of vulnerability?
General Brogan. I won't go too far into the vulnerability
area, sir, in open session. But what I will offer is that the
MRAP all-terrain vehicle was specifically requested by the
Commander of Joint Task Force 101, those folks operating in
Afghanistan. The attributes that they described in their desire
for that platform indicate that they want MRAP-like
survivability with Humvee like mobility, the tighter turning
radius, et cetera.
Mr. Abercrombie. I understand that. So here is where the
testing question, here is where the research and development
question has to be concentrated on. And we need to move in that
direction.
In other words, I am not saying it can be done or not be
done. But if it is going to be done, that means we have to
concentrate funding and emphasis on research and development,
right.
General Brogan. We believe we have the technology today for
MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV), sir. I mean, it may be
lighter, but it is still 24,000 pounds, which is 10,000 pounds
more than an up-armored Humvee. So that is still a fairly
significant, substantial platform. As we discussed previously,
the three mechanisms that injure people in an improvised
explosive device event are the blast and over-pressure,
fragments, and then acceleration. It is that third piece, the
acceleration, that is more of a concern with a lighter platform
because the same size explosion will move that lighter vehicle
much faster.
Mr. Abercrombie. And that is also a question of training,
too, isn't it.
General Brogan. It is, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. You are going to need preparation. You
can't just drop somebody in theater and say, you will pick this
up real quick I am sure.
General Brogan. These are large vehicles with air brakes,
high centers of gravity, so training certainly plays a role.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter would be next.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first for Staff Sargent Rowe, I would like to
get back to what you were talking about, about body armor. You
are a sniper, right, which means you aren't necessarily walking
point, and this goes back to your answer that you would not
wear the same equipment in Afghanistan that you wore in Iraq,
correct? That was your statement. And then you said you were a
sniper. I have been to both theaters. I have been to Iraq twice
and Afghanistan once. I have had shrapnel bounce off my flak
jacket and never have an actual bullet hit it and break it. But
you are a sniper, so you have a much different role than the
guys walking point or the guys just driving roads every day or
the guys just walking through passing out Meals Ready to Eat
(MREs) or anything else. So what you are saying is not that the
usual equipment is bad, but that you would like to have
different equipment for different scenarios like climbing
cliffs in Regional Command East (RC-East) in Afghanistan as
opposed to walking roads in Regional Command South (RC-South)
correct?
Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. I am 11 Bravo; I am just a regular
infantryman, too. I have done both jobs, and that is why I say
I think the decision should be left up to be tailored by the
commanders on the ground to whether, if I was a sniper one day
and I was out doing a mission, then I might not need all the
body armor because I will be dragging my equipment behind me.
Mr. Hunter. Is it not now, though? Is it not up to that
ground commander?
Mr. Rowe. No, sir. You know, the body armor and the
equipment that we wear is tailored for the Army as a policy
that you will wear all your equipment at all times and that all
equipment is needed at all times. Whereas, you know, as an
infantry squad leader, and you are on the ground and you are
trying to chase down the enemy or you are reacting to contact,
you need to be lighter; you need to be able to react to that
contact properly or enter and clear buildings. Whereas, if you
are just walking down the street as a patrol, you might want
all that body armor because you are just going to get shot at.
So, yes, sir, I think it should be tailored to the soldier, his
job and the situation at hand.
Mr. Hunter. So, General Lennox, that is more of an Army
staff level tactical decision. That is not a congressional
decision or necessarily even a DOD decision. That is your
decision.
General Lennox. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Right, so that is not up to us whether or not
have you to wear your body armor. We had Marine snipers that
would wear outfits like the enemy. They wouldn't wear anything.
And that was up to that ground commander at that time. So that
is up to the Army generals.
General Lennox. And what we are after is actually trying to
equip them with things that give them equal protection but at a
lighter weight. And I think that is the common theme that comes
from theater, sir.
Mr. Hunter. And my last question here, this is a force
protection meeting. But the golden hour in Afghanistan, there
is no golden hour, the much talked about golden hour that we
developed in Iraq. And that means that if you got somebody back
within one hour, they had a much higher chance of living as
opposed to, after that hour, they would bleed out or whatever
else happened to them. That does not exist in Afghanistan right
now at all. There is no golden hour. It is like an hour and a
half, hour and 45 minutes because how spread out everything is.
And I was wondering if you have been working that, are we going
to start deploying more forward surgical units? Are we going to
use the Osprey there? What are we going to do to make that
golden hour come to Afghanistan?
General Lennox. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of
the Army have been very personally involved and committed to
getting the same capabilities in both theaters responsiveness
to a forward surgical team. They are in the process of
deploying an increased number of assets. I don't want to go
into details of a request for forces here in the open hearing.
But they are in the process of deploying additional
capabilities to meet that objective.
Mr. Hunter. Is there an actual time line for that.
General Lennox. Yes, sir.
Actually, by April, it will be done. We are trying to
mitigate that by pushing as much earlier as possible. So there
are steps that are happening now, but by April, it should be
accomplished.
Mr. Hunter. In Afghanistan by April?
General Lennox. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much.
I yield the rest of my time.
Mr. Abercrombie. Could you as a matter of interest to not
just this committee but to Mr. Skelton, if not resting with you
personally or within your command area, give us an update, give
the committee a perspective on that question about the surgical
units and so on and how that is going to be done and how the
funding is going to take place, et cetera, how that is being
accounted for?
General Lennox. It is really a question of the resources
that are being reallocated and pushed forward in order to make
sure, resources that are available now to make sure that the
capability is the same for a soldier in both theaters.
Mr. Abercrombie. No, I understand that. But the logistics
of it are going to be entirely different.
General Lennox. Absolutely.
Mr. Abercrombie. I think that is what Mr. Hunter is
referring to. Am I correct?
Mr. Hunter. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
General Lennox. Mr. Chairman, you are right. Some of the
challenges are things like, in Afghanistan, you may have to use
a lower--
Mr. Abercrombie. That is okay. You needn't go into it now.
But why don't we get a little more direct report about that,
what is involved in it.
General Lennox. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Or what is likely to be involved in it,
because that needs to be made a part of the budget process. I
don't want to see this stuff start showing up in supplemental
budgets because that means it is not real in terms of the
budgeting process of the Pentagon--do you get what I mean--or
the services. And once you get started down that road in
Afghanistan like we did in Iraq, we are going to have serious
problems, budget problems, okay. So it is not entirely on your
shoulders, but the question is a real one, and it needs to be
pursued. So if it is not entirely within your purview, if you
can shift that to somebody who can alert Mr. Skelton about it
and then send us a copy of it, we would be gratified.
General Lennox. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Taylor is next and is going to take
the Chair of the committee for the moment.
Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] I want to thank you gentlemen
again, and we all apologize for keeping you here later than you
would like to be because of the votes.
General Brogan, a couple of things that I would like you to
address. For one, for the newer members, I want to commend
General Brogan on the huge task you had in developing the MRAP.
It is a lot more than just a V-shaped bottom. For what it is
worth, the fuel tanks have to be designed to blow away,
otherwise you incinerate the occupants; that as a matter of the
seats, whether you suspend them from the bottom or from the
ceiling, again, because of the initial shock of the blast
coming up, limiting the number of port holes where a Rocket
Propelled Grenade (RPG) or explosive penetrator can enter. So
it was a, in fairness to the General, it was a huge task. And
as new threats evolved the need to respond to those threats,
and, General, again, you and your crew deserve our Nation's
gratitude and the gratitude of every mom and dad who has got a
loved one over there.
One of the things we discussed as you were looking at the
nine or so different varieties at the testing ground was you
had come up with a grading system and you had, I don't know,
maybe 10 different criteria that you were looking at; one of it
being the hull, another being the fuel tanks, fire suppression,
et cetera. And I remember you saying that one or two of the
vendors might do really well on one thing but poorly on nine,
or it might do well on nine and poorly on one. And I think at
the time you expressed a frustration that the ideas belonged to
the vendor, that you couldn't pick and choose different
characteristics and incorporate them in your ideal vehicle. And
one of the things I hope I had asked you to do was see to it
that future contracts were written so that, as our Nation paid
to have these different varieties of vehicles proposed, if you
saw something you liked, a feature you liked, that you could
incorporate it in the final version of the vehicle that you
ordered, water under the bridge with the first MRAP. And again,
you did a great job, but as you are looking at the second
variety, the one that is being designed for Afghanistan, I am
curious if you have the contractual freedom, if you see a
characteristic you like in one vehicle, that you could
incorporate that idea in the final vehicle that you decide to
make.
General Brogan. Sir, as you recall in a previous hearing
where you brought the representatives from industry in here,
each of them agreed to share the test results on their
platforms with the other vendors. And that spirit of
cooperation continues to exist today. I am going to have to
check and see if we put a specific clause in the contract. As
you know, we intend with MRAP ATV to down select eventually to
a single manufacturer. And we will do everything we can to
ensure that that vehicle is the most survivable, most capable
platform that we are able to field.
Mr. Taylor. I am curious, given the unfortunate economic
downturn, one of the problems that we were facing as you built
the first batch was a fairly red hot economy and a limited
number of people who could make the vehicles and wanted to make
the vehicles, which is why you ended up going to five vendors.
I am curious, given the economy now, I am glad to hear that you
can go to one vendor. Once you down select, what do you
anticipate the time line from the day you place that order, let
us say the first order is for 2,000 vehicles, which is the
number being kicked around, from the day you place the order,
what do you expect the delivery day to be of that 2,000th
vehicle off the assembly line and headed over to South Carolina
for integration?
General Brogan. Sir, as you know, we are now in source
selection on that. And I have not personally looked at the
proposals. And even if I did, were I to divulge the most
aggressive of those time lines, I could be adversely affecting
the outcome of that solicitation. So I am going to have to take
that for the record, and after source selection is complete and
we have awarded the initial five contracts for the more
exhaustive testing of the platforms, be able to provide you an
update at that time.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Taylor. I guess my last question, General, would be, it
is common knowledge in this town that we have paid too much for
the first of any platform, but the real bargains come at the
tail end of a production run. That is when the manufacturers
come and say, hey, I am getting ready to lay people off. It is
a fact that the price of particularly metals have dropped
dramatically since you started the MRAP program because of the
worldwide economic slowdown. I think the price of aluminum is
the cheapest it has been in about five years. I am sure steel
is about the same. So, given the fact that the tail end of the
run you get your best bargain and that we need vehicles at the
training installations, do you have, number one, the financial
empowerment and the legal empowerment to buy whatever vehicles
you deem necessary or the training commander deems necessary to
get them to Fort Polk, Camp Shelby and the other training
installations, again in a timely manner? And this is very
personal. I have got about another 5,000 Mississippi Guardsmen
have been notified that they will be training up this summer to
be deployed. I would sure like to be able to tell their
families that they will train on an MRAP stateside before they
deploy some time next fall.
General Brogan. The short answer is, yes, we have all of
the funding we need to buy all of the vehicles that are
destined for the training base. All of those vehicles are on
contract and being produced. But as I indicated, the plan is to
take the most capable vehicles, which are the ones coming off
the assembly line now, place them forward into theater and then
retrograde the vehicles, the early delivery vehicles, back into
the CONUS training base. So we don't need any additional money
to buy training vehicles, sir. They are all on contract.
Mr. Taylor. Again, so what would your time line be to get
20 or 30 vehicles of each to the stateside training bases?
General Brogan. Sir, I would defer that to Major General
Lennox with respect to the Army training.
General Lennox. Sir, I think we have about 300 scheduled to
be back in the March time frame. And I don't want to commit to
an exact date, but it is because we have to take a look at the
states of those vehicles, make sure they are refit and ready to
go out for training and we don't put any of those soldiers in
danger. But I expect the big numbers to start flowing some time
in this next quarter. And our ultimate goal is about 1,000
total, so to have enough of every variety at all the different
post camps in the station.
We also are very aggressive with the trainers. General
Brogan mentioned the very first one, by coincidence, did go to
Camp Shelby. But there are many more that are coming. And not
just the drivers trainers but also the rollover trainers to try
to get us to where we are comfortable exiting the vehicles and
not just doing make-believe drills to get at that training that
you so aptly put.
Mr. Taylor. General, if I could, Secretary Gates had what I
thought was a pretty good quote last week when he said that
there is nothing magical about putting a date on a calendar,
but in our world, if you don't do that, you really don't ever
get there.
So what I would ask for the record is when you intend to
have those vehicles at the different training installations,
understanding the world changes, requirements change, but I
would like to know at least what your target day is.
General Lennox. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much, sir.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Massa.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, on behalf of the 645,000 men and women I
represent, thank you and thank you for all that you do.
Just a quick series of tactical kinds of questions. I had a
wonderful opportunity to talk with the staff sergeant, who I
know is representative of so many. And I notice that he is a
path finder, at least one of--my eyes are failing--but at least
one of the senior officers at the table is an airborne
qualified officer. To what extent is the United States Army and
perhaps the brigadier can also mention, to what extent are the
armed services looking at personal protective equipment and
body armor from a weight-saving point of view with respect to
airborne tactical services? We saw the largest air drop when we
went into Iraq. We have added an awful lot, as you have said
here today. And I am wondering if anyone has a weather eye on
what this personal protective equipment does with respect to
tactical air drops.
General, if you would like to lead off, and I would enjoy
hearing a variety of responses.
General Fuller. Sir, I am not aware of jumping with--I
manage the parachutes. We have a new parachute to ensure that
we get the soldier safely to the ground. But I would have to
sort out whether we jump with our body armor on. I am not aware
of that at this time.
Mr. Massa. So, as far as you know, there has been no
tactical testing or training with respect to the increases in
potential weight because of body armor vis-a-vis the kind of
use of air drop forces?
General Fuller. No, sir, I am not aware, but I can find
out.
Mr. Massa. Obviously, you don't want to drop heavy. You can
break a leg. But I am just wondering if anyone is looking at
this as a synergistic issue.
General Fuller. I am not aware, sir, but we can sort that
out for you.
Mr. Massa. Anyone else?
General.
General Lennox. I have to take that for the record. We
recently opened a free-fall school, and I will find out whether
or not we are jumping with the body armor or not.
Mr. Massa. I appreciate the looks from the table. I hope it
is because we brought up something that people aren't thinking
about and not something that I am completely off the wall in
asking.
General Brogan. I think it is more a lack of knowledge of
the details than it is inappropriate----
Mr. Massa. Perhaps in a detachable kit, in a stringer, so
the weight doesn't impact on the individual air drop element.
Again, if I had the honor of doing what you do, I can't imagine
dropping with another 25 pounds, but I think it is something
worth asking about.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 78.]
Mr. Massa. Two other real quick questions if I may, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Sure.
Mr. Massa. One is, first off, I honor all of the things you
have said. It is incredible how far so many have come so
quickly considering the starting point on these important
issues. At any time during the years that this has been an
issue of conversation have you ever felt that budgetary
processes, money, inhibited your movement forward.
General Fuller. Not from my perspective. We appreciate all
the support we have received from Congress. I think we inside
the Department of Defense understand the priorities of
protecting soldiers, providing them the best. When they come
out of that MRAP vehicle, when they climb into that MRAP
vehicle, they are a soldier, we want to give them the best kit
that they have as a baseline. As we have articulated before,
the soldier is the basic and is the centerpiece of our
formation. The vehicles are the mechanism in which they get
there, whether it is an aviation platform, a MRAP or whatever
it may be. And I don't believe we have been slighted or not
requested or been supported by this committee or any of the
other organizations in that endeavor.
Mr. Massa. And this is the concurrence of the panel.
General Brogan. I would suggest that there are some
processes that occasionally made it challenging but certainly
never prevented us from fielding the life-saving equipment we
needed to our troops. For example, the above threshold
reprogramming ceilings, there is a limited amount of money we
can move around ourselves without the support from the full
committees. But even at times when the full committees were out
of session, we were still able to get the chairman and get
signatures on those Above Threshold Reprogrammings (ATR)
actions, reprogramming actions. So it never inhibited us from
doing our job. As you know, money is appropriated for specific
line items. Having the flexibility to move between those line
items requires that sort of reprogramming.
Special Operations Command has a pot of money that is kind
of unlabeled, and it allows them, when a need arises, to
rapidly react to it and then report after the fact how that
money is spent. A similar pot of money for the other services
would be very valuable. In the MRAP program, we have enjoyed
the benefits of a transfer account. So all of the money from
the MRAP program was put into one account, and then it was
given to a service. And they either executed it on their own if
they were buying the government-furnished equipment for the
platform, or they transferred it to the MRAP program office for
us to place on contract to buy vehicles and the things that we
did jointly. If, instead of a transfer account that had been a
true joint account, a huge amount of recordkeeping and
accounting would have been able to be avoided because then the
lead financial manager of the MRAP program could have done one
set of books, one set of transactions. Now, she made it work
through Herculean effort. I mean, I very much appreciate
Chairman Taylor thanking me for what has been done on MRAP, but
in all honesty, it was a huge team effort. Mr. Fahey sitting
next to me, my counterpart in the army, has shouldered every
bit of the load that I have. The program manager, the extended
program team, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA),
Defense Supply Center Columbus, the Aberdeen Test Center. A
huge number of folks have made this effort possible. I am very
pleased to be here to accept the thanks and congratulations,
but in no manner did I do that on my own.
Mr. Massa. Thank you.
And with the indulgence of the Chair, one final follow-up,
sir.
If I could ask the staff sergeant, please. Sorry to make
you shift chairs there, staff sergeant. Now, I know that no one
is looking at you and you are under no pressure or scrutiny.
But if you could ask of the United States Congress anything
before or if you had to go back to where you came from in Iraq,
what would you ask of us?
Mr. Rowe. The restrictions that are mandated on us as
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, sir, I would like for some of
those decisions or the majority of those decisions be left up
to the commanders or the ground troop commanders on the ground.
Depending on the mission or depending on the location of the
mission, I would think that body armor, ammunition, being able
to engage the enemy differently than you would in the city
environment, those are decisions I would like to have left up
to the commander rather than the Army in general or as a whole.
Mr. Massa. Thank you for your candor. I appreciate that.
And as an example of all who have served, again, I thank you
personally.
Thank you gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Abercrombie. [Presiding.] Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
General Brogan, it is nice to have a confirmation once in a
while that what we are doing is really important and makes a
difference. In this regard, just yesterday I was made aware of
a communication received just this week by the manufacturer of
a new device from a Marine field officer in Iraq. I would like
to read it to you and the committee for the record, Mr.
Chairman, if I may. It is short.
He says, he e-mailed: I am the logistics Officer in Command
(OIC) for my battalion currently serving in Baghdad, Iraq. We
are having a serious issue compounded by the fragile political
situation with bystander kids throwing rocks at our convoys as
they pass by. We have had a few soldiers seriously injured from
such occurrences. I researched the Long Range Acoustical Device
(LRAD), and I believe that this device will fulfill our
requirement to strongly deter personnel at distances of 50 to
75 meters from throwing rocks at our passing convoys. I just
wanted to confirm with my company that my assessment of your
product is correct and that it is the product we require. Thank
you for your assistance.
The LRAD, which is the long range acoustical hailing device
can be used to transmit clear voice instructions or deterrent
tones to break up crowds, encourage vehicle drivers and animals
to move out of the way and to simply communicate to the outside
from the safety of the inside of the convoy or an MRAP vehicle.
The new LRAD 500X was developed in cooperation with the Joint
Nonlethal Weapons Directorate and Research, Development, and
Engineering Center (RDEC). It completed safety testing by RDEC,
and Aberdeen is in the initial stages of fielding to the Army
while also being deployed and supported by the U.S. Navy.
Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) commissioned
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to complete an
evaluation of the use of LRAD for convoy protection, and the
recommendation was to field the system throughout the Army.
My question is, are we moving fast enough to get this added
layer of force protection to our troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan? And specifically, what is the MRAP joint program
office doing to rapidly equip our forces with this technology?
General Brogan. Sir, there were some early requests from
theater for acoustic hailing devices. LRAD was one of the
companies that provided those devices. There were some others
as well. And there is obviously debate between the
manufacturers about whose is the better product.
Specifically, with respect to MRAP, there has been no
request from the field for us to integrate an acoustic hailing
device on that platform. We certainly have that capability down
at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Charleston
to conduct that sort of integration and, if the need arises, to
field those types of devices into theater.
Mr. Bartlett. General, you can't ask what you don't know
exists. I suspect that most of your people in MRAPs don't even
know this capability exists. Wouldn't it be nice to let them
know that?
General Brogan. Sir, we are familiar with LRADs in the
program office. I have been shown a number of that type of
system by several manufacturers. And as I said, we have fielded
some of this capability into theater. We are using some
acoustic hailing devices at entry control facilities and things
of that nature. So I believe there is some knowledge of those
systems in theater. And if they wanted more, they have
certainly not been shy about asking us for things when they
need them.
Mr. Bartlett. I appreciate that very much.
General Fuller, I am very distressed that there are
newspaper articles out there implying that some of our young
men and women in the theaters over there are wearing defective
body armor. I have been briefed on this issue, and I don't
think there is any evidence that this body armor is in fact
defective.
The DOD IG report raises a number of questions regarding
the integrity of the testing process for body armor.
Specifically, the report states that parts of the testing were
not consistently conducted or scored in accordance with
contract terms and specifications. I don't think this means
that our soldiers in theater are wearing unsafe body armor.
This is just a disagreement as to how to conduct these tests,
is it not?
General Fuller. Sir, I appreciate your concern. It is a
disagreement on how we conduct the tests. We do agree with the
Department of Defense Inspector General that we had
deficiencies in our testing processes, not in our product. Our
product is safe. What we have done is gone and changed the
processes. We have pulled the testing out, which was a point of
discussion; we pulled the testing out of a National Institute
of Justice certified lab and brought it back within the
government. We are talking about a critical force protection
survivable item. We should be monitoring that within the
government, and we have done that. We have pulled back the
testing inside the government. We have changed our processes
and our procedures. And to this date, we recognize we needed to
fix this, and we have changed it. We have gotten support from
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. We applaud the
insights that were provided to us by the Department of Defense
Inspector General, and we want to fix this.
But we never issued defective body armor. We might have had
process issues. We have cleaned up these process issues. We are
moving forward to continue to straighten this out. But soldiers
have the best body armor by far. And besides the discussion of
Sergeant Rowe talking about receiving shots in the chest, they
have the best body armor, and they continue to have the best.
Mr. Abercrombie. Would you yield a moment?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Ms. Ugone and Mr. Sayre, you heard
Representative Bartlett's question. He was making a
differentiation, if you will permit me, Roscoe, between
experiment protocols per se and whether or not the body armor
could be construed as being insufficient or not up to standard
as a result of those. You don't have to argue with each other
here about what your reports say or don't say. But could you
comment with direct reference to Mr. Bartlett's observation and
question?
Mr. Sayre, why don't you go first.
Mr. Sayre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to
respond. The Inspector General has issued an important and
significant report with significant recommendations that we
find we are in agreement with all but one. In fact, this report
is very supportive of our view that department-wide standards
and processes for the testing of personal protection equipment
is essential, and we support that view. Since the House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) hearings in June of 2007 relative to
the dragonskin issue, the Army Test and Evaluation Command has
conducted significant testing of ballistic inserts under our
oversight. We can report that many of the issues in the
Inspector General's report had been resolved through that
testing process; not all of them, but some of them independent
testing by the Army Test and Evaluation Command is a
significant improvement. New instrumentation that resolves many
of the measurement issues, new processes that standardize the
scoring and have resulted in, and I will comment on some of the
statistics, resulted in improved scoring and consistency.
Furthermore we also appreciate that the Congress,
recognizing this, has in the last Defense Authorization Act
given us authority to exercise oversight over these systems.
And we are moving out to do that so that, by the end of this
calendar year, we believe we will have processes in place that
will address all of the issues mentioned in the Inspector
General's report. We do take issue with the finding that two
tests failed and one was inconclusive which resulted in their
recommendation to return the plates. We defer to the Secretary
on the return, but we do believe that using sound engineering
judgment and the contract specifications in place and our
professional judgment, that the three first article tests in
question did in fact meet the contract specification, and that
is our view. We do appreciate the issues that the Inspector
General has raised about the consistency of scoring. But we
were asked to conduct a limited review of these three specific
tests which I believe to be appropriate as these first article
tests are the basis to qualify the design and proceed to
procurement. So we looked at the record of these tests and made
this judgment. I am prepared to expound on each one of these if
the members would like me to.
Mr. Abercrombie. I don't think that is necessary. The
question here is, in your judgment, are the plates that are
being utilized in the field meeting the test of field service?
Mr. Sayre. My answer is that we stand behind the judgment
that these three specific first article tests of these three
designs met the contract specification.
Mr. Abercrombie. You understand the differentiation here.
We are not--there can be arguments about whether or not the
elements of scientific experimentation are being met;
replication, et cetera, those kinds of things. It may be--an
argument about that doesn't mean that the product coming out of
that process is any less capable than that which was contracted
for in the first place.
Mr. Sayre. I don't believe it is any less capable.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay.
Ms. Ugone, you get the context of the question?
Ms. Ugone. Yes, I do.
Mr. Abercrombie. Because I really don't think this is the
forum to conclude, let alone get an explication of what the
differences may have been as to whether or not scientific
procedure was adequately followed in all instances, let alone
documentation of it.
Ms. Ugone. I agree with you, Chairman Abercrombie, but I
would like to in general answer the question.
And thank you, General Brogan, for sharing the mike. If I
could just give you a little bit of context in which we did
this audit. This report is a third in a series of body armor
reports conducted in response to requests from two Members of
Congress.
This report had two findings. The first finding related to
the inconsistencies in the testing and scoring processes during
first article testing for contract 0040, and we used the
criteria of the contract specifications. The second finding had
to do with a lack of DOD standards for ballistic testing. In
fact, with regard to the recommendations, we do not believe we
have any disputed recommendations. The Secretary of the Army
had agreed to identify and collect the ballistic inserts that
are in question. However, we are still in disagreement about
the finding. And as you have already mentioned, we are not here
to argue the actual finding, but we are satisfied with the
response that both the Army and DOT&E have made to our
recommendations.
What we did also in our final report is ask for an
additional information on the plan of action the Secretary of
the Army has implemented as a result of his order to identify
and collect these ballistic inserts. We have also added a
recommendation with respect to not allow government contracting
officer technical representatives to make any changes to
contracts without authorization from the contracting officer.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, again, though, I appreciate all of
that, and I understand it.
Ms. Ugone. Well, we can state because of the
inconsistencies, the Army does not have assurance that all
inserts purchased under contract 0040 provide the level of
protection required by the contract.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Well, then, that goes to your point,
Roscoe. Back to you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Let me give an example
of what I understand was one of the inconsistencies. The plates
are exposed to a shot. And the speed of the bullet is
determined by camera, and sometimes there is an over-velocity
of that first shot. Sometimes the testing officer would simply
replace that plate with another plate and another shot to have
the correct velocity. Sometimes he would take that plate and
subject it to the second shot. If there was no penetration with
the second shot--see, the notion is that the first shot,
although it may not have penetrated the plate, may have
weakened the plate so that it was now more susceptible to a
second shot. So sometimes the officer would simply take the
plate that had an over-velocity shot, expose it to a second
shot, and if the second shot did not penetrate, then he made
what I think is a logical conclusion that the plate is okay.
Now, clearly, that is an inconsistency because sometimes he
would simply take a second plate and do a correct velocity shot
and then proceed with the test.
Now, if the first shot was over-velocity and you used the
plate for the second shot and the second shot went through the
plate, why did it go through? Because the plate was defective
or because its capability was reduced by the first shot? So now
he would take a new plate and do it again. This is not
consistent. But I don't think that there is any evidence that
this results in any lesser of a test for it. And I don't know
what the other inconsistencies were.
But my major concern is that, why couldn't this have been
resolved in-house? I like oversight, and I would love to have
seen an article after the fact saying that the Inspector
General found these problems, the Army immediately responded to
this and fixed it, and none of the plates were found to be
defective. Now there is the press out there which is implying
that we have a lot of body armor out there that is putting our
young people at risk. I am not sure that is at all true, and I
think that does a disservice to all of you who work so darn
hard to provide our people with the best equipment to have this
out there. Why couldn't this have been resolved this way before
it got out into the press? That added nothing to this, by the
way, getting it out into the press. Why couldn't it have been
resolved before it got out into the press? And what can we do
in the future to make sure this kind of thing is resolved? I
want oversight. I want visibility. I would love to have had an
article out in the press saying that the IG did this
inspection, the tests weren't consistent, the Army corrected
the thing, they went back and the tests are consistent now, and
what do you know, all of the armor was good, thank God. What do
we have to do in this committee to make sure that this kind of
thing doesn't get out prematurely in the future and harm what
you all are doing and the image of this whole institution?
Ms. Ugone. Mr. Bartlett, if I could answer that question.
You had mentioned a fair shot determination. And I am going to
respect Chairman Abercrombie. I am not going to get into the
details. But the issue with that was scoring. And how it was
scored and the manner in which it was scored resulted in a
first article test that had passed that really should have
failed if you looked at the scoring. And when they entered into
that determination, they already had four points; there is a
six point system. And what we are saying is, had they scored it
appropriately, it would have failed. So we can provide you more
details upon that for the record. But in the second instance,
with regard to our effort to dialogue with the Army,
absolutely, we have been dialoguing with the Army since the
middle of October when we first alerted the Army to the issue
that we had related to standards of ballistic testing. We have
had two discussion drafts, one formal draft. We have had
numerous meetings. And, frankly, the Army has taken corrective
action on all our recommendations. We don't have a disputed
recommendation.
Mr. Bartlett. Then why would we have this negative article
out in the press? What could we do in the future to avoid that?
This is not helpful to you or any of us.
Ms. Ugone. I am not sure that I can do anything about the
press, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Maybe we can, Mr. Chairman.
If I might I have one more issue I would like to address
very briefly, if I could.
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes, you may.
Let me just say, this hearing, I think, provides the
necessary incentive not to have this occur again, right? Okay.
I have already quoted my mother once. I will quote her again.
She used to say, a word to the wise should be sufficient.
Mr. Abercrombie. She said that to me numerous times.
Hopefully, we won't have to say that again here.
Mr. Bartlett. General Brogan, we have read and heard
testimonials in regard to how the ESAPI body armor has and is
saving lives, and that it is obviously very important. We have
also heard that we have added so much weight to what the
individual soldier and marine has to carry that it is causing
serious long-term medical problems and decreased deficiencies.
What are we doing to motivate or incentivize industry to
reduce the weight of body armor, say by 50 percent? There is
currently, as you know, no dedicated Research and Development
(R&D) funding line. Maybe that is our fault.
Mr. Chairman, we need to fix that.
There is no dedicated R&D funding line for body armor, and
the procurement is done through the Operations and Maintenance
Command. What do we have to do so that body armor gets the same
level of interest as a major weapons system, such as the Future
Combat System or the F-22.
I have just got to think that meaningful R&D here, basic
research and R&D could yield meaningfully better armor. What do
we have to do, Mr. Chairman and panel, so that we have a
dedicated line for R&D?
Mr. Abercrombie. Maybe Mr. Fahey would be most appropriate
to speak at this juncture. You are getting an offer here, you
understand.
Mr. Fahey. I mean, I can talk about the armor of vehicles,
and General Fuller can talk about the armor of personal vests.
But we do have a----
Mr. Abercrombie. Do you have a line as well, or not?
Mr. Fahey. We do.
Mr. Bartlett. Staff tells me we don't have a dedicated R&D
line for body armor.
General Fuller. Sir, for body armor, that is correct.
Mr. Abercrombie. So, just for the record, Mr. Fahey, that
is why I wanted to ask you, you do have a dedicated line,
right?
Mr. Fahey. For vehicles.
Mr. Abercrombie. For the vehicle, right.
Mr. Bartlett. I am asking body armor.
General Fuller. Sir, that is correct. At this time, the
Army does not have a dedicated line for both research and
development funding nor procurement funding for body armor.
However, it is predecisional, but the Army is looking at
funding that in the near future.
We also have efforts underway, in our science and
technology field, to try to reduce the weight of the armor and
give it the same protection at a reduced weight or give it
increased protection at the same weight. We are funded in that
area. The research and development line associated with
constant improvements is in our science and technology field
right now, not directly in a body armor research and
development line.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Abercrombie. So you compete, then, within that
category, correct?
General Fuller. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. What is the extent of the category? What
are some of the other elements that are part of that science
and technology line, if you know?
General Fuller. Yes, sir. Part of that is associated with,
for example, as Mr. Fahey said, the armor associated with
vehicles. Some of the technologies that we will see are common
between a ground platform armor and a body armor. So we are
looking at the basic core elements that allow us to----
Mr. Abercrombie. Who do you compete with aside from that in
that category?
General Fuller. Sir, we will compete with all the efforts
that the Army has going on in research and development, whether
it is in the aviation----
Mr. Abercrombie. So you are in a big pool.
General Fuller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. You are not in a little pond.
General Fuller. Correct, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. I think it is important, in response to
Mr. Bartlett's inquiry with regard to the question of whether a
line is appropriate, you are competing against some pretty
powerful internal research and development interests.
General Fuller. Roger, sir. On the science and technology
side, a lot of the basic science.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay, very good.
General Lennox. Mr. Chairman, do you mind if I add
something to this?
Mr. Abercrombie. No, not at all.
General Lennox. There has been a lot of scientific talk and
testing talk across the table here. And I want to go back to
Representative Bartlett's point and underscore the fact that we
believe every soldier has absolutely safe body protective
armor. The Secretary of the Army has made a decision to
identify and collect those that are disputed in this disputed
lot--it is just the prudent thing to do----
Mr. Abercrombie. That is 30,000-plus plates, right?
General Lennox. Exactly, sir. So we don't have any question
in the soldier's mind that they don't have the finest body
armor in the world. And I just wanted to state that.
Mr. Abercrombie. What stage is that in, that collection?
General Lennox. The order went out last week, sir. We are
monitoring that.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Very good.
Mr. Hunter, do you want one more shot?
Mr. Hunter. I just want to say, my father was in the 173rd
Airborne in the Army Rangers in Vietnam. I was a marine in
these latest conflicts. And my little brother is now a
specialist, just graduated from advanced infantry training
(AIT). He is going to jump school in about a week and a half.
So if you see Specialist Hunter, you can go ahead and haze him
and tell him that his older brother said it was okay.
But, General Lennox, this really is a family business for
quite a few of us up here. And what you all do affects our
family and our friends as well as our constituents and young
people across America. So I just want to say thank you. And
especially to the staff sergeant, who was very candid here and
answered the questions in front of all these folks, thank you
for your service.
First Sergeant, thank you for yours, I really appreciate
it.
And semper fi.
General Lennox. Congressman Hunter, if you don't mind, I
didn't want to leave you with the impression that commanders in
the field don't have a lot of leeway, enormous leeway to do
what is right for their soldiers. And that is taking place
today. It is the commanders in the field, their role and
responsibility to make these important decisions about
tradeoffs and mobility and body protection. And it is not
something that is being dictated by headquarters, Department of
the Army. We provide the equipment. We provide the resources
for commanders in the field to fight the fight and make those
decisions.
Mr. Hunter. Good. That is how it ought to be.
Mr. Abercrombie. And for the record, this is something that
the committee, let alone the Congress, won't be involved in,
that is for sure. That is a policy and tactical and strategic
decision that you have to make--or the services have to make,
right?
General Brogan, I assume you wouldn't disagree with that.
That is not something--to me, I will tell you, it is like this
question about the UAVs and whether it is 3,000 feet or 3,001
feet and whether the Army is doing it or the Navy and all the
rest, we shouldn't be involved in all that stuff. And that got
kicked to us. What happens is, if there is a question like that
and it doesn't get settled internally, what happens is, it ends
up here. That is the problem. But I can assure you we won't get
into that.
But what we do want to get into--and I am going to ask my
questions right now, if that is okay, and then we will finish
up.
Especially with relation to the last line of questions
about a written line in order to do research and so on, is all
of this or any of this part officially a program of record?
Because I am concerned, going back to the MRAP situation, you
have already heard me speak today and you have heard
Representative Taylor mention this over and over again in this
hearing and others, I am very concerned that this not drift
into the supplemental budget situation. If I have my way, we
will never have another supplemental budget unless it is real,
an actual emergency, and it is supplemental to the actual real
budget.
So is the research and the activity associated with the
vehicle or with the personal armor force protection, is this a
program of record?
General Brogan. Sir, it is a program of record. But we have
done some of the procurement----
Mr. Abercrombie. Is the MRAP acquisition a program of
record?
General Brogan. Body armor. The family of personal
protective equipment is a program of record.
Mr. Abercrombie. What about the vehicle force protection?
General Brogan. Each individual vehicle program--leave MRAP
off the table for a minute, if I may, sir--but Humvees,
Advanced Artillery Vehicle (AAV), Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle (EFV), tank, those are all programs of record. And the
equipment--survivability, packages, things that go with them--
are part of the program of record. So research, development,
testing and evaluation lines are rolled into the budget for
those particular things. And they are normally at the program
element level.
Part of the challenge is, with personal protective
equipment, there is a whole family of things that are included
in a single program element because program element is a fairly
high level, so helmets, body armor, flame-resistant equipment,
all of that is included in that one Program Element (PE), the
procurement, because they are very small dollar value items. It
is really not procurement. It is purchasing with operation and
maintenance funding.
Mr. Abercrombie. How are you funding the former? What you
just cited before this last--how are you funding all the things
that you just mentioned?
General Brogan. A major vehicle program you would procure
after you have done the research effort, the development
effort, with procurement Marine Corps dollars, the Procurement,
Marine Corps (PMC) appropriation.
Mr. Abercrombie. Where does that fit in in the program of
record? Is it a base budget item or not?
General Brogan. It absolutely is a base budget item. And we
have in our base budget money for this personal protective
equipment. We did, however, take advantage of supplemental
funding to accelerate the fielding of this equipment once we
went to conflict. But we always had money to buy vests, to buy
plates in our base budget.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Well, let's see, I understand that.
That is a true emergency supplemental item that gets no
argument from me or from other members because you are already
doing something. The situation arises that wasn't anticipated
during the regular budget process. You have to supplement it
because it is in fact an emergency to make sure everybody has
what they need. Is that a fair summary of what an emergency
supplemental budget should be?
General Brogan. I concur with your assessment, yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, okay. Where does the MRAP fit into
this?
General Brogan. MRAP was not a program of record. It was
funded purely under supplemental appropriation. However, all of
the oversight that was provided in that program by the
Department of Defense, Secretary Young, Secretary Etter, now
Secretary Stackley, Mr. Popps and Secretary Bolton within the
Army, it was managed as if it was a program of record.
Mr. Abercrombie. I agree with you on that. But the status
today, it is still not a program of record.
General Brogan. In fiscal year 2010, the direction has been
provided by the Department of Defense that each service will
fund the sustainment of those vehicles not specifically
associated with combat operations within their base budgets. So
it, in effect, migrates to program of record status----
Mr. Abercrombie. This is very good. You are going to be
major general sooner than you think.
Leaving aside for a moment the migrating, in the effect, it
is not a program of record as of now, although you are trying
to treat it as much as you possibly can.
General Brogan. Because it will be in the base budget,
because it will have a program element associated with it----
Mr. Abercrombie. It will be a program of record?
General Brogan [continuing]. It will be a program of
record.
Mr. Abercrombie. So we haven't done the 2010 budget yet.
General Brogan. Correct, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is upcoming. We are living with a
continuing resolution--time out. I am asking for a real
purpose. I am not trying to harass you or trick you or
anything. There is a method to this.
We are dealing with a continuing resolution, and we will
have a budget shortly that will be presented to fix that. There
will be a supplemental budget, much to my great regret, that we
will have to deal with in one form or another. Then there will
be the budget for 2010, for the fiscal year starting in October
of this year, of this calendar year, right?
General Brogan. That is correct.
Mr. Abercrombie. So, will the MRAP program be a program of
record in the upcoming fiscal year 2010 budget which we will be
drafting in terms of the DOD bill and subsequent appropriations
over the next few months?
General Brogan. I would say, yes, given that each service
was directed to fund its own share of the operations and
maintenance costs of that program----
Mr. Abercrombie. You can see where I am going, General. I
hope the message goes back to the Pentagon and the
administration----
General Brogan. It will remain a hybrid program, because as
new things emerge, for example, if we have to insert a
technology into that program that we did not anticipate, it is
going to come to you in supplemental.
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes, but that is separate. A supplemental
budget should be on programs of record. And if some emergency
comes up that wasn't anticipated by anybody about anything and
it doesn't fit in anything, yes, then we can take it up. But
that is an emergency, an urgent program. I mean, that is what
the whole MRAP was. And that came out of the Congress. It
didn't come out of the Pentagon. But now that it is there, I
hope we are not going to get into, well, this got originated by
the Congress, so we are not going to pay attention to it.
General Brogan. No, you are not, sir. The services will
budget to continue the vehicle and----
Mr. Abercrombie. The message should go back upstairs or
down the street, or however it goes, or across the river, this
has got to be a program of record.
General Brogan. I understand, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. And then one other thing on the
question of the multiple engines and the different variations--
none of which I disagree with, by the way, the variations, they
all have their reasons. But what are you doing, because we have
scarce resources, to prevent duplication of effort? Maybe that
is a program issue.
General Brogan. Well, sir, one of the things that we did
was we trained all of the commercial field service
representatives----
Mr. Abercrombie. In other words, I am not conflating
multiple efforts with duplication, as I realize there are
variations, the different manufacturers are not doing the same
thing. There are different vehicles that are being put--there
are variations in the vehicle. So I am not saying that the
variations mean that that is duplication.
General Brogan. I understand. So, for example, we trained
field service representatives to operate on all of the
platforms so we didn't have to hire them just from an
individual company to work only on that company's vehicles. So
we didn't duplicate field service representatives, we use a
single one who is universal.
Because the engines on these vehicles are widely used in
both commercial and Department of Defense, we are able to take
advantage of some of those economies of scale.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. One last thing, but you need not
answer it now, but I would appreciate in writing, I would like
both the Army and the Marine Corps, when contemplating the
shift of forces to one degree or another from Iraq to
Afghanistan, to give us, if you can, your primary force
protection challenges--and I am putting it in the plural. I am
not asking you to rate one, two, three, or something like that.
In fact, you may have one; I don't know, maybe you will have
five. But if you can give us your primary force protection
challenges with an eye toward helping us draft the DOD bill for
this upcoming fiscal year.
General Lennox. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. The budget that will be forthcoming within
the next few weeks, I expect, isn't going to really address
that. It is going to get rid of the continuing resolution and
will essentially help us to operate up until October of this
calendar year. So I am thinking about, for the next DOD
authorization bill and its appropriation implications, if you
could simply provide us with your primary force protection
challenges as you see them for the Marine Corps and for the
Army.
General Lennox. We will do that, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Very good. You have been very patient. And
again, I apologize for the fact that we had to have this break
in between, but this has been very, very helpful and useful to
us. I hope you found it informative as well. I appreciate it.
Aloha to everybody here.
[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 4, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 4, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 4, 2009
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
General Lennox. Mr. Chairman, improving MEDEVAC response times
requires a systematic approach and the synchronization of aircraft,
medical capabilities, communications, infrastructure, training, and
security to support these operations. The Secretary of Defense directed
a comprehensive bottom-to-top review last fall on how to best
synchronize efforts in theater and improve MEDEVAC response times
there. Based on detailed analysis and coordination, the Department of
Defense is now executing a course of action that achieves parity of
MEDEVAC operations in both theaters to the mission completion standard
currently used in Iraq. This is to be accomplished through constructive
MEDEVAC procedural improvements and by adding 16 more dedicated
aircraft and 3 additional forward surgical teams. The medical
infrastructure to support operations in Afghanistan is included in the
Army's regular budgeting process. The incremental costs of our
operations in Afghanistan are budgeted as part of the Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) request. [See page 24.]
General Brogan. The Army and the Marine Corps continue to
coordinate effectively on the development and fielding of force-
protection solutions. The DoD has established a standard system for
truck armoring and both the Army and Marine Corps are armoring their
vehicles to the same level as we converge on armor solutions. As for
individual personal protective equipment, the Marine Corps coordinates
closely with PEO Ground Soldier. Both organizations continue to share
test data with one another in an effort to continually upgrade and
provide the best protective equipment available to our troops. We share
all test data and communicate openly with each other. Even when
specific products are different as in the case of Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacement and Improved Modular Tactical Vest, the protection
levels are the same.
The Army and the Marine Corps do not believe that duplication of
effort is counterproductive. There is value in competition and we
effectively leverage our scarce resources by challenging industry to
come up with the best and most innovative solutions available today.
Through these efforts, we ensure that our Services are provided with
the most sophisticated and reliable equipment on the market today.
There are no unique force protection challenges in Afghanistan.
However, as we shift forces from Iraq to Afghanistan the different
terrain, topography and cultural landscape will present challenges.
Restrictive roads, and mountainous terrain will restrict the use of
MRAPs. Minimizing the weight of personal protective equipment will be
more important in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan than in the
flat urbanized landscape in Iraq. We are developing policies and
acquisition practices for our future equipment that will make it more
modular and scalable to allow us to increase and decrease armor
protection and its associated weight according to the commander's
assessment of mission requirements and threat. [See page 40.]
General Lennox. As the Army repositions forces from Iraq to
Afghanistan we recognize we may need to address resulting increases in
force protection requirements. As movement on existing and future
Ground Line of Communications (GLOC) heightens, we may need additional
security forces as well as route clearance assets to secure our
logistics. Aviation requirements may increase along with ground based
radars to ensure integrated networked force protection coverage.
Additional Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) assets will
also facilitate heightened threat warning in support of force
protection. As we flow additional soldiers into existing bases as well
as establish future bases we will plan to increase base force
protection operations should OIF conditions warrant the increase in
those operations. [See page 40.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
General Brogan. We cannot respond at this time due to SS
sensitivities. In the transcript, Gen Brogan states that he would take
the question for the record and respond after the contracts have been
awarded. The estimated award date will be in the month of May. [See
page 26.]
General Lennox. The Army has identified that a total of 702 MRAP
vehicles are currently needed to support pre-deployment training. The
Army expects to have that many vehicles at approximately twenty
different training locations by the end of December 2009. There are
already 26 vehicles supporting training in the United States, and
another 25 have been identified in Kuwait for shipment back to support
training by April 2009. As the Army receives the newest and most
capable MRAP vehicles in theater, older and less capable vehicles are
being replaced and returned for use in training Soldiers before they
deploy. The Army will adjust the schedule for the return of these older
vehicles based on a number of factors, including how much maintenance
is required on the vehicles before they are shipped, and when shipping
is available. Changes in the operational situation could also cause the
Army to adjust the schedule or numbers. [See page 27.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MASSA
General Lennox. The Army's current inventory of personal body armor
with Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) plates is generally
not worn during airborne operations with the T-10 parachute, as the T-
10 harness is not large enough to accommodate the increased size of the
jumper wearing the body armor with plates inserted. Additionally, the
Modified Improved Reserve Parachute Systems (MIRPS) is limited in the
weight it will safely support--the weight of the body armor severely
limits the amount of other equipment a parachutist can carry. The new
T-11 parachute, which replaces the T-10, is specifically designed to
support greater weights to include the additional weight of all body
armor. The additional size of the T-11 harness allows parachutists to
jump with the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) including mounting
the front and rear ESAPI plates. The IOTV in this configuration is
certified for T-11 airborne operations. Parachutists no longer have to
jump without protective plates in their body armor. [See page 28.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN AND MR. ABERCROMBIE
General Lennox. Mr. Wittman, I'll address the carbine first. In the
same Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) study you cited, approximately 90%
of the Soldiers surveyed were satisfied with the performance of the M4
Carbine. Additionally, in another recent survey of 917 Soldiers with
recent combat experience with the M4 in Iraq or Afghanistan, 89% of
Soldiers reported overall satisfaction with the M4 and only 1% of these
Soldiers recommended that the M4 be replaced. Although the weapons are
performing well, the Army continually seeks ways to improve their
performance as well as provide Soldiers with enhanced capabilities. The
Individual Carbine Capabilities Development Document (CDD) is currently
in the staffing and approval process. The goal for the CDD to complete
all staffing is September 2009. As directed by Secretary Geren, we plan
to conduct a full and open competition utilizing the new requirement
beginning in late 2009. The new requirement is not caliber specific and
will allow different calibers to compete.
Addressing the dissatisfaction for the handgun, the Army's Small
Arms Capability Based Assessment confirmed the shortfall in the area of
close engagements which includes both the pistol and the sub-compact
personal defense weapon. The Army has prioritized the development of a
sub-compact or ``miniature carbine'' capability ahead of the pistol at
this time. However, the Air Force (AF) has completed a new joint
requirement for a handgun that can be adopted by any service. The Army
is looking closely at adopting this requirement in the near future. The
AF wrote the Modular Handgun System Capabilities Production Document
with significant input from the Army and joint participation from all
services. This new requirement addresses an improvement in stopping
power along with improvements in ergonomics and other areas. The CNA
study reveals that only \1/2\ of 1% of Soldiers surveyed had a stoppage
with their M9 that made a significant impact on their ability to engage
the enemy. Even so, by adopting the AF pistol requirement, we can
address all of the issues with the M9. However, I need to state again,
the priority for the Army in this area is currently the carbine and the
sub-compact personal defense weapon. [See pages 16 and 18.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 4, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE AND MR. TAYLOR
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Many force-protection items, such
as body armor, vehicle armor, and counter-IED equipment have been
developed by both the Army and Marine Corps to address similar
requirements. In 2006, GAO reported that a lack of a synchronized
approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck
armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps
identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions
months after the Army, potentially delaying the availability of armored
vehicles to deployed Marines.- How do the Army and Marine Corps
coordinate on the development and fielding of force-protection
solutions that address similar urgent needs requirements of both
services?- How does each of the services ensure that they are
preventing duplication of efforts and effectively leveraging their
scarce resources when developing solutions that might address both Army
and Marine Corps needs?
General Lennox. In the area of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, the Army
and Marine Corps coordinate on force-protection solutions through the
Joint Program Office for MRAP vehicles, Protection issues for other
vehicles used by both services are coordinated at the Army and Marine
Corps Board (AMCB). For future programs, such as the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle, the vehicle is being developed jointly to ensure that
they have inter-service commonality and economical as possible.
The Army and Marine Corps constantly coordinate with each other
through the AMCB and the ``Army-Marine Corps Staff Talks''. These
forums help ensure that the services are aware of each others on-going
initiatives, and are able to take advantage of the other service's
efforts when possible.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What are your primary force
protection challenges that you will face should we shift forces from
Iraq to Afghanistan? What does the Army need? What does the Marine
Corps need?
General Lennox. As the Army repositions forces from Iraq to
Afghanistan we recognize we may need to address resulting increases in
force protection requirements. As movement on existing and future
Ground Line of Communications (GLOC) heightens, we may need additional
security forces as well as route clearance assets to secure our
logistics. Aviation requirements may increase along with ground based
radars to ensure integrated networked force protection coverage.
Additional Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) assets will
also facilitate heightened threat warning in support of force
protection. As we flow additional soldiers into existing bases as well
as establish future bases we will plan to increase base force
protection operations should OIF conditions warrant the increase in
those operations.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Do you consider the X-SAPI
requirement to be an urgent and compelling need? If not, why?
General Lennox. Chairman Abercrombie and Chairman Taylor, the Army
does not consider the XSAPI requirement to be urgent and compelling.
The approval of the XSAPI requirement is a prudent, precautionary
measure to ensure the combatant commander in theater has the ability to
counter potential emerging threats.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Are you aware of an operational
need statement, universal urgent need statement or joint urgent
operational need statement for a next generation body armor plate that
provides for a higher level of ballistic protection?
General Lennox. Chairman Abercrombie and Chairman Taylor, I am not
aware of an Operational Need Statement within the Army or a Joint
Urgent Operational Need Statement being submitted for a next generation
body armor plate. I will defer to BG Brogan regarding the status of any
United States Marine Corp urgent need statement.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Explosively formed projectiles
(EFPs) are a primary killer on the battlefield. What force protection
measures and TTPs are we using to defeat this threat? How are we
staying ahead of this adaptive enemy?
General Lennox. The Army acknowledges that Explosively Formed
Projectiles (EFPs) are a significant enemy threat and as a result has
taken extensive measures to protect Soldiers. The Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicle was initially developed to protect Soldiers
against the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat. As the threat has
changed to include EFPs, the MRAP design underwent several changes to
defend against them. The Army has also developed systems that target
EFP initiators. Additionally, the Army has continued to develop
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) designed to counter the
threat. We have included individual and team training of EFP awareness
into Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training across the
Army. Organizations designed specifically to defeat IEDs have been
established and serve a vital role in providing EFP awareness and
measures to counter the threat. Highly trained post attack analysis
teams and route clearance packages are examples of these types of
organizations.
Timely and relevant intelligence is the primary method we stay
ahead of new threats and an adaptive enemy. Continuous identification
of emerging EFP technology and enemy TTPs is key to the identification
of new requirements for equipment and training. The Army's Attack the
Network IED targeting methodology is intelligence driven and has been
highly effective in defeating EFP networks.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. How do you encourage the
development of next generation body armor by the industrial and R&D
communities and what is the Army and Marine Corps's process for
evaluating these potential advances? Is this process standardized? What
is the extent of the R&D effort to reduce the weight of body armor
systems?
General Fuller. The Army and Marine Corps both work extensively on
a continual basis with representatives from industry to address
material requirements. Both participate, along with the other Services
and SOCOM, in forums such as the Cross Service Warfighter Equipment
Board (CSWEB) and the annual Advanced Planning Brief to Industry
(APBI). The CSWEB is an opportunity for DoD to exchange ideas on future
improvements of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The APBI is an
opportunity for the Services to present briefings to industry on
current and future requirements with respect to body armor and other
PPE and for industry to provide immediate feedback and to ask questions
on those stated requirements. APBI provides an annual launch point for
continued collaboration between the Services and industry throughout
the year to ensure effective and efficient communications and results.
Another key venue to encourage innovation from the industrial base is
periodic ``Request for Information'' postings on Federal Business
Opportunities (FEDBIZOPPS) in support of the Soldier Protection
Demonstrations (SPD). The SPD provides a setting for the Army and USMC
requirements community to assess current technology to support the
development of operational requirements and for vendors to demonstrate
creative solutions to specific capabilities; such as low profile
lighter weight body armor plate carrier. The effort will include an
assessment using Soldiers with previous combat experience conducting
various activities while wearing the various candidate systems. The
baseline for comparison will be the current Army Improved Outer
Tactical Vest (IOTV). The United States Marine Corps (USMC) Scalable
Plate Carrier will also be assessed. The Army will defer to the USMC on
their specific programs to evaluate potential body armor solutions. The
Army has several on-going R&D programs to reduce the weight of body
armor systems. The focus is to reduce the weight of X-SAPI by 10% in
the near term (FY10-13) with a long-term goal of 30-40% reduction of
the entire system by FY 14-15.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What quality control measures are
used to ensure that all body armor fielded to troops meets
specifications?
General Fuller. The Army uses a comprehensive and holistic approach
to ensure the body armor fielded to Soldiers meets stringent standards.
The Army conducts multiple levels of continuous testing throughout the
life cycle of body armor. The first level of continuous testing is the
rigorous First Article Test (FAT). The second level of testing is Lot
Acceptance Tests (LAT). LATs are conducted with the same ballistic test
criteria of the FATs and provide statistical confidence the body armor
accepted is of the highest quality and will meet the Soldiers' needs
for protection. The third level of testing is the continuous
surveillance testing of plates and environmental surveillance of soft
armor. The Army has a Non-Destructive Test Equipment (NDTE) facility to
scan plates in Theater and return plates for additional testing. The
Army conducts ballistic testing on plates with cracks as determined by
the NDTE. To date 100% of the plates passed testing with the most
prevalent round. The fourth level of quality control is user inspection
of the body armor. Additionally, the Army upgraded all body armor
contracts to surveillance criticality level designator A, which
requires increased DCMA surveillance. The increased surveillance of
contractor manufacturing processes is identified in Quality Assurance
Letters of Instruction (QALIs) for each contract.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Why are the Army and Marine Corps
procuring different outer tactical vests that provide the same level of
protection? Please explain why one design would not be appropriate for
both services.
General Fuller. The Army and Marine Corps collaborated in the
development of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV), which provides the same
level of protection. However, different mission requirements required
the Services to field a different OTV. In an effort to reduce weight
and integrate components that had been fielded during the overseas
contingency operation to counter emerging threats, the Army developed
the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV). The IOTV reduces weight of
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) by 3 lbs, increases area of coverage, is
compatible with other Army Organizational Clothing and Individual
Equipment (OCIE) and weapons, has a quick release and medical access.
The Army is in the process of transitioning all OTVs to IOTVs.
Additionally, the Army is currently evaluating the Marine Corps plate
carrier to determine if it will meet specific Army mission
requirements.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Do you consider flame resistance to
be a key performance specification requirement for combat helmet pad
suspension systems? If not, why not? Are you seeing any burn injuries
as a direct result from pad suspension systems igniting?
General Fuller. Flame resistance (FR) is not a requirement for the
combat helmet suspension system in the ACH. The complete helmet system
is inherently flame resistant due to the para aramid fiber (Kevlar/
Twaron) material used in the rigidly constructed helmet shell. The ACH
protects against ballistic and blast effects; to include flash flame
incendiary events. The Brooks Army Medical Center, the Defense
Department's premier burn center with responsibility for treating all
DoD burn casualties and the Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of
Injury in Combat (JTAPIC) Program Office has no recorded burn injuries
associated with helmet pads igniting or melting. The Army will continue
to analyze injury data and seek improvements to helmet pads.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What metrics do you use to evaluate
and procure pad suspension systems? Do you consider comfort and
feedback from the warfighter?
General Fuller. Impact protection is the key metric in the
selection of a combat helmet pad suspension system. Comfort is also a
key consideration and warfighter feedback is actively sought. The Army
proactively pursues Soldier feedback via Web-based surveys, exhibits of
equipment, post-combat surveys, Army Materiel Command Forward Support
Brigades, and Logistics Assistance Representatives. Additionally,
trained and experienced Soldiers are used for Human Factors testing in
operationally relevant (and controlled) environments to assess the pad
systems. Soldier acceptance is considered an important criteria to
determine the best overall performing pad, however the pad system must
meet or exceed threshold impact resistance requirements.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Where will the Army and Marine
Corps conduct future body armor testing and how did you select your
approach?
General Fuller. The Army plans to conduct all body armor testing at
a government test facility. The Army Acquisition Executive directed on
February 9, 2009 that the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) will
conduct all Body Armor First Article and Lot Acceptance Testing. The
Army will defer to the Marine Corps on their testing requirements. If
the testing requirement exceeds the capacity of ATEC, ATEC will
contract the work to independent certified testing facilities to
include the National Institute of Justice.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What is the status of the Army's
current source selection for next generation and current armor plates?
When is it expected that new plates will be fielded under the latest
solicitation?
General Fuller. Source Selection for the next generation armor
plates (XSAPI) was completed in 1Q09. Notice of Fair Opportunity to
Compete for Delivery Orders under Contract W91CRB-09-D-001, -002 and -
003 was issued in March 2009 for Theater contingency stock.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. The Army has just issued a return
order for some 16,000 sets of armor plates as a result of an audit by
the DOD Inspector General. What were the problems found with this armor
and were there any adverse impacts on warfighters in the theater due to
the return? Have any of these or any other armor plate designs shown
performance problems in the theater? Will any additional testing
performed on these plates? And if so, what is the status of this
testing?
General Fuller. The Army maintains that the armor plates in
question continue to meet or exceed ballistic requirements. The
decision to return the 16,000 plates was not the result of any defects
in the plates. The Secretary of the Army non-concurred with the DoD IG
findings that the plates in question failed First Article Testing. The
DOT&E concurred with the Army and concluded in their evaluation, ``the
DoD Inspector General has identified significant issues with the
documentation of the test process and analysis (scoring). However, the
three designs meet the performance specification in place at the time
of each test.'' Out of an abundance of caution, the Secretary of the
Army directed; ``To ensure there can be no question concerning the
effectiveness of every Soldier's body armor, I have ordered that the
plates at issue be identified and collected until such time as the
findings by the DoD IG are adjudicated by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.'' The Army is collecting the plates in question from Theater
and is currently performing additional ballistic testing. All the
plates tested met the Army's ballistic standards. Testing is ongoing.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Do you plan to conduct all body
armor test and evaluation (to include first article tests and lot
acceptance tests) at a government laboratory? If yes, why?
General Fuller. The Army plans to conduct all body armor testing at
a government test facility. The Army Acquisition Executive directed on
February 9, 2009 that the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) will
conduct all Body Armor First Article and Lot Acceptance Testing.
A January 29, 2009 Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG)
report on testing requirements for body armor underscored the need for
internal controls to ensure adequate oversight of the First Article
Test (FAT) process and proper review and approval of FAT results. The
DoD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, who has oversight of
body armor testing, reiterated this finding, stating that FATs
conducted at a government facility with government oversight would
significantly reduce the risk of recurrence of the types of issues
DoDIG cited in its report.
The Army policy on Personal Protective Equipment testing adopts
this recommendation for FAT and extends it to Lot Acceptance Testing
(LAT). The Army policy is based on the belief that the same benefits of
conducting testing at a government facility equally apply for both FAT
and LAT.
If the testing requirement exceeds the capacity of ATEC, ATEC will
contract the work to independent certified testing facilities to
include the National Institute of Justice.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Many force-protection items, such
as body armor, vehicle armor, and counter-IED equipment have been
developed by both the Army and Marine Corps to address similar
requirements. In 2006, GAO reported that a lack of a synchronized
approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck
armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps
identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions
months after the Army, potentially delaying the availability of armored
vehicles to deployed Marines. How do the Army and Marine Corps
coordinate on the development and fielding of force-protection
solutions that address similar urgent needs requirements of both
services? How does each of the services ensure that they are preventing
duplication of efforts and effectively leveraging their scarce
resources when developing solutions that might address both Army and
Marine Corps needs?
General Brogan. The Army and the Marine Corps continue to
coordinate effectively on the development and fielding of force-
protection solutions. The DoD has established a standard system for
truck armoring and both the Army and Marine Corps are armoring their
vehicles to the same level as we converge on armor solutions. As for
individual personal protective equipment, the Marine Corps coordinates
closely with PEO Ground Soldier. Both organizations continue to share
test data with one another in an effort to continually upgrade and
provide the best protective equipment available to our troops. We share
all test data and communicate openly with each other. Even when
specific products are different as in the case of Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacement and Improved Modular Tactical Vest, the protection
levels are the same.
The Army and the Marine Corps do not believe that duplication of
effort is counterproductive. There is value in competition and we
effectively leverage our scarce resources by challenging industry to
come up with the best and most innovative solutions available today.
Through these efforts, we ensure that our Services are provided with
the most sophisticated and reliable equipment on the market today.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What are your primary force
protection challenges that you will face should we shift forces from
Iraq to Afghanistan? What does the Army need? What does the Marine
Corps need?
General Brogan. There are no unique force protection challenges in
Afghanistan. However, as we shift forces from Iraq to Afghanistan the
different terrain, topography and cultural landscape will present
challenges. Restrictive roads, and mountainous terrain will restrict
the use of MRAPs. Minimizing the weight of personal protective
equipment will be more important in the mountainous terrain of
Afghanistan than in the flat urbanized landscape in Iraq. We are
developing policies and acquisition practices for our future equipment
that will make it more modular and scalable to allow us to increase and
decrease armor protection and its associated weight according to the
commander's assessment of mission requirements and threat.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Do you consider the X-SAPI
requirement to be an urgent and compelling need? If not, why?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Are you aware of an operational
need statement, universal urgent need statement or joint urgent
operational need statement for a next generation body armor plate that
provides for a higher level of ballistic protection?
General Brogan. No, the Marine Corps is not aware of an operational
need statement, universal urgent need statement or joint urgent
operational need statement for a next generation body armor plate.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Explosively formed projectiles
(EFPs) are a primary killer on the battlefield. What force protection
measures and TTPs are we using to defeat this threat? How are we
staying ahead of this adaptive enemy?
General Brogan. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. How do you encourage the
development of next generation body armor by the industrial and R&D
communities and what is the Army and Marine Corps's process for
evaluating these potential advances? Is this process standardized? What
is the extent of the R&D effort to reduce the weight of body armor
systems?
General Brogan. The load carried by the individual Marine in combat
is based upon the mission, the enemy threat, and the environment and
terrain in which they will be operating. The Marine Corps has fielded
PPE items that enhance our commanders' ability to scale loads to best
suit the situation. The Marine Corps continues to actively challenge
industry to design equipment that can perform at least as effectively
as today's gear but with reduced weight and volume.
Dialogue with our vendors and potential vendors continues to
involve discussions about ways to decrease the burden on the individual
Marine. The Marine Corps uses continuous strategic market research,
Quarterly Industry Days, and the Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) program to enhance links with industry. We have engaged industry
at events such as Modern Day Marine Exposition, Executive Workshop,
Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Navy League Sea, Air & Space
Exposition, Advanced Planning Brief to Industry, and Acquisition
Excellence Day. As it relates to body armor, the Marine Corps is
currently pursuing SBIR efforts in the areas of developing a lighter
weight Enhanced-SAPI (E-SAPI) plate and the development of an
objective-weight (same weight as E-SAPI with performance
characteristics of X-SAPI) X-SAPI plate.
The Marine Corps is involved with the science and technology
communities and is funding research efforts designed to yield material
solutions that can reduce the weight, and volume of equipment being
used today while also increasing performance. Inclusive in these
studies are projects being sponsored under the Department of Defense's
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, as well as Marine
Corps funded projects through the Naval Research Labs (NRL), and the
Office of Naval Research (ONR).
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What quality control measures are
used to ensure that all body armor fielded to troops meets
specifications?
General Brogan. Our body armor test protocols are constantly
evaluated to ensure that they thoroughly and properly test the plates
in all potential operational environments. The Marine Corps uses
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 family
vendors that make use of best industry practices to maintain optimal
quality control. Ballistic performance of the armor is initially
verified by First Article Testing (FAT) and is complemented by Lot
Acceptance Testing (LAT) of a pre-determined quantity of random samples
gathered by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). The PPE that
is issued by the Marine Corps has met government test standards by
National Institutes of Justice certified labs.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Why are the Army and Marine Corps
procuring different outer tactical vests that provide the same level of
protection? Please explain why one design would not be appropriate for
both services.
General Brogan. The physical dimensions, missions, and operational
approach of the two services differ, therefore, the desired form, fit,
and function of the soft armor carriers are developed by each service
to satisfy these dissimilar needs. Body armor requirements are based on
protection from ballistic projectiles, blast, and fire, balanced
against the need to keep the equipment light enough to permit Marines
to carry out their missions. The Marine Corps incorporates the feedback
of its user community on the desired attributes and features that they
would like to see included in the design of body armor.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has approved the way ahead
for the next generation vest, including the parallel development of
improvements to the MTV and SPC as a bridge to development of the next
generation vest. The objective of the next generation vest will be to
incorporate all of the modular and scalable aspects of the ``improved''
MTV and ``improved'' SPC into one ``Joint'' vest. The Marine Corps is
committed to the development of the Next generation vest in close
coordination with the Army and the other Armed Services.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Do you consider flame resistance to
be a key performance specification requirement for combat helmet pad
suspension systems? If not, why not? Are you seeing any burn injuries
as a direct result from pad suspension systems igniting?
General Brogan. No, flame resistance is not a key performance
specification requirement for combat helmet pad suspension systems. The
USMC Lightweight Helmet (LWH) is composed of a para-aramid fiber that
exhibits natural flame resistance properties, and protects against
ballistic threats and flash flame incendiary events. Any flame in
contact with a pad long enough to ignite would have already seriously
injured the individual wearing the helmet.
The Brooks Army Medical Center, the Department of Defense's burn
center responsible for treating all DOD burn casualties, has no record
of burn injuries associated with helmet pads igniting or melting. The
Naval Health Research Center reports that out of 192 burn patients,
there are no injuries associated with helmet pads melting or dripping.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What metrics do you use to evaluate
and procure pad suspension systems? Do you consider comfort and
feedback from the warfighter?
General Brogan. Blunt Impact: Blunt impact testing was performed in
2006 by the US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, with oversight
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E). This helmet pad testing evaluated the performance
of the helmet padding material (in ambient, cold and hot temperatures)
by impacting the helmet in different locations and tested impact
attenuation of the material in large and small contact areas. The
testing methodology was chosen to compare the test results across the
previously fielded suspension systems.
Flame Resistance: The USMC Lightweight Helmet (LWH) is composed of
a para-aramid fiber that exhibits natural flame resistance properties,
and protects against ballistic threats and flash flame incendiary
events. The flame resistance of the helmet is tested as part of a
modified FED-STD-191 test method 5903.1 and the Marine Corps tests the
helmet pads as part of a system within the USMC Lightweight Helmet and
other associated gear. The helmet pad flame resistance testing was
performed according to the Pyroman test method, a commercial standard
which simulates flash fires of up to 4 seconds in duration, and
correlates to a Burn Injury Prediction (BIP) scale, similar to what
occurs in an IED event.
Comfort: The Marine Corps completed three user surveys on the LWH
in 2007. A Limited User Evaluation (LUE) was performed assessing the
fit, form, and function of the helmet pads in 2008.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Where will the Army and Marine
Corps conduct future body armor testing and how did you select your
approach?
General Brogan. The Marine Corps looks forward to fully
participating in the DOT&E's Integrated Process Team for the
development of standard protocols and processes for the testing of body
armor. In the interim, the Marine Corps' approach to body armor testing
will continue to rely upon government-approved independent test labs,
with periodic inspections, to test its body armor. First Article
Testing will be conducted at government owned labs and Lot Acceptance
Testing will be permitted at National Institutes of Justice certified
labs with appropriate government on-site for oversight testing. When
the revised standard protocols and processes are implemented, the
Marine Corps envisions using a combination of government-owned and
government-approved independent lab facilities to conduct future body
armor testing.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. If modifying MRAP design proves to
be a significant mitigating factor in MRAP rollovers, is it possible to
modify the thousands of deployed MRAPs and those already manufactured
and in the MRAP pipeline? If these MRAPs can be modified, what are the
associated funding issues?
General Brogan. If there are modifications that can mitigate
rollovers, we are capable of making them in theater. We do not have to
transport vehicles back to the United States.
It is unlikely that a design modification is going to significantly
affect rollover - this is a high center of gravity vehicle. Of the 116
rollovers recorded during the (17 month) period, 72 were attributed to
the road failing, (e.g. poor infrastructure). Twenty-two were due to
driver maneuverability, which is best addressed in the training
pipeline. The better trained the driver, the less likely they are to
conduct a maneuver that will hazard the vehicle.
The JPO currently has some funding in hand and some included in
future budget requests to procure and install various modifications
into MRAP vehicles. If a modification is designed or becomes available
to prevent vehicle rollovers, we will either realign on-hand/requested
funds or seek additional funds.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. DOD is currently ``catching up'' in
terms of acquiring and stockpiling MRAP repair parts. Is this shortage
a function of funding, the ability of the respective MRAP manufacturers
to produce sufficient stocks of repair parts, of programmatic
priorities, or a combination of factors?
General Brogan. We are no longer catching up; repair parts
generally available. We have effectively balanced production and
sustainment. We have maintained higher than 90 percent operational
readiness availability while producing vehicles and building operating
stocks.
In a little over a year, the Program began provisioning vehicles
from five different manufacturers. We based our initial Stockage levels
on our limited experience with route-clearance vehicles, and used
analogies from heavy trucks and Stryker. We also learned the specifics
of our MRAP fleet and determined which parts were going to become high
demand and needed to be stocked. Overall, we have been effective in our
parts supply and resupply efforts and have maintained the vehicles so
they are operational and available to the user.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. DOTE has recommended ``the MRAP JPO
in conjunction with the Army Test and Evaluation Command conduct a
detailed operational assessment of all variants of MRAP vehicles based
upon data gathered from deployed MRAP-equipped units. This operational
assessment would provide information for further vehicle
improvements.'' Do you plan to implement this recommendation from DOTE?
If not, why not?
General Brogan. JPO MRAP is gathering data from forces in theater.
There are at least five formal operational unit feedback mechanisms in
place for capturing what the warfighter states as their requirement for
MRAP capability improvements: the deployment of JPO Forward personnel,
a Joint User Working Group-Monthly meeting of all Services and SOCOM
representatives, user surveys conducted by deployed personnel from the
testing community, weekly video teleconferences to review current
issues, and user conferences. Some engineering change proposals are the
result of field feedback, and the MRAP Operations Cell has developed a
process that requests all information required for appropriate
analysis. As a result, capability improvements to both safety and
survivability include a gunner's restraint system, fuel tank fire
suppression, and overhead wire mitigation kits.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. What is the difference between the
M-ATV and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)?
General Brogan. M-ATV is designed to meet an urgent near term need.
It is not a development effort. The JLTV is designed to meet a critical
long term need, and with the concomitant insight and influence on life
cycle cost and effectiveness within the future force available through
the CJCSI 3170/DOD 5000 paired processes. A major difference between
the two vehicles is weight. An M-ATV weighs approximately 25,000
pounds, whereas a JLTV is expected to weigh about 13,500 pounds. The
JLTV is needed to preserve the MAGTF's expeditionary nature. Therefore,
JLTV sets rotary wing transport as a boundary condition of the system,
whereas M-ATV does not. The JLTV is also intended to have modular
scalable survivability. As the threat increases, additional protection
in the form of kits may be added to the vehicle.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. Are there sufficient contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan to support the ever-growing MRAP fleets?
General Brogan. Yes, there are currently sufficient Field Support
Representatives (FSRs) in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the MRAP
fleet. We are adding additional FSRs as the fleet grows.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. When do you plan to transition the
life-cycle management of MRAP vehicles from the Marine Corps to the
Army?
General Brogan. The transition will be event driven. The agreement
between the two Service Acquisition Executives is that we will begin
the transition when production and fielding are complete. Since we are
yet to begin producing M-ATV vehicles, transition is far in the future.
Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor. How many M-ATVs do you expect to
procure? Will the M-ATV program have the same priority rating as the
MRAP vehicle program? If not? Why not?
General Brogan. The approved Joint Urgent Operation Needs Statement
(JUONS) is for 2,080 vehicles. We will also have to procure some
overhead vehicles for testing, but we currently plan to field 2,080
vehicles to Commander, Joint Task Force 101. They will be used to
compliment the other tactical vehicles that are already in the theater
of operations. Yes, the M-ATV will be produced and fielded using the DX
rating and an Urgent Material Release (UMR).
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. Describe the Army's program of record for a counter
sniper system to include the funding profile, schedule, and acquisition
strategy.
General Lennox. The Army currently does not have a program of
record for a counter sniper system. However, of the two potential
acquisition programs that are related to ongoing sniper defeat
initiatives, the following is the status:
The Gunshot Detection System (GSD) vehicle borne system:
The GSD requirement document was approved by HQDA on 13 Feb 09 and
HQDA G3 issued the requirement document CARDS number 02077. The program
will compete for funding in the FY12-17 Program Objective Memorandum
(POM). Should the GSD program be funded, the Army plans to conduct a
full and open competition to identify the best materiel solution to
procure. As far as the urgency based procurement of vehicle borne
gunshot detection systems is concerned, the Army has fielded 607
Boomerang III Gunshot Detection Systems in Iraq/Afghanistan to date and
plans to field over 2000 more systems throughout the year.
The Individual Gunshot Detector (IGD) soldier worn system:
The IGD requirement document is currently being staffed at the Army
Requirements Oversight Council for approval. The Rapid Equipping Force
(REF), Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), and Army Test and Evaluation
Command (ATEC) are conducting an evaluation in OEF and OIF on an IGD
representative system called the Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting
System (SWATS). The test report is expected by early April 2009 and
will be used to inform Army decision makers regarding the approval of
the IGD requirement. Should the requirement be approved, the program
will compete for funding in the FY12-17 POM. If the program is funded,
the Army plans to conduct a full and open competition to identify the
best materiel solution. To date, the REF has fielded over 1000 SWATS to
units in Iraq/Afghanistan that have requested individual gunshot
detection capability.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. General, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted a
survey on small arms for the Army in 2006. This survey questioned
Soldiers recently returned from combat who had used their weapon to
engage the enemy. The study found for example that 38% of the Soldiers
who experienced a stoppage with the M9 reported an inability to engage
the enemy with the weapon even after performing immediate action to
clear the stoppage during a significant portion of or all of the
firefight. I also note that Special Operations Command is replacing
their M4 rifles with a new weapon. Given the level of dissatisfaction
with small arms found by the Center for Naval Analysis is the Army
doing anything to generate a new requirement for a pistol or rifle?
General Lennox. Mr. Wilson, in the same Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA) study you cited, approximately 90% of the Soldiers surveyed were
satisfied with the performance of the M4 Carbine. Additionally, in
another recent survey of 917 Soldiers with recent combat experience
with the M4 in Iraq or Afghanistan, 89% of Soldiers reported overall
satisfaction with the M4 and only 1% of these Soldiers recommended that
the M4 be replaced. Although the weapons are performing well, the Army
continually seeks ways to improve their performance as well as provide
Soldiers with enhanced capabilities. To that purpose we conducted an
Industry Technology Day on November 13th that was designed to gather
information from our industry partners as to what is achievable in
terms of small arms technology. This is an important step in the effort
to ensure that our Soldiers always have the best industry has to offer.
The Individual Carbine Capabilities Development Document (CDD) is
currently in the staffing and approval process. The goal for the CDD to
complete all staffing is September 2009. As directed by Secretary
Geren, we plan to conduct a full and open competition utilizing the new
requirement beginning in late 2009. We will look at the industry's best
innovations and proposed solutions for a possible new individual
weapon.
For the handgun, the 38% you refer to is actually a percentage of
another percentage which translates to \1/2\% of the Soldiers surveyed.
That said, the Army's Small Arms Capability Based Assessment (CBA)
confirmed the shortfall in the area of the personal defense weapon, and
the Army has prioritized the development of a sub-compact or
``miniature carbine'' capability ahead of the pistol at this time.
However, currently the Army plans to wait until the completion of the
carbine competition to see what industry provides as solutions to
better inform the writing of a sub-compact requirement. The Air Force
(AF) has completed a new joint requirement for a handgun that can be
adopted by any service. The Army is looking closely at adopting this
requirement in the near future. The AF wrote the Modular Handgun System
(MHS) Capabilities Production Document (CPD) with significant input
from the Army and joint participation from all services.
Mr. Wilson. Is the Army and Marine Corps working to equip every
military vehicle, including light, medium and heavy tactical vehicles,
with fuel tank fire suppression kits?
General Lennox. No. The vehicles most vulnerable to fuel tank fire
hazards have been those with external side saddle fuel tanks: the Army
Line Haul tractors, Heavy Equipment Transport (HET) tractors, Heavy
Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) and the Marine Corps Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement Vehicle (MTVR). In Iraq insurgents have
specifically targeted these side saddle tanks during IED attacks. Only
vehicles destined for, or in, Theater are equipped with a Fire
Suppression Kit (FSK); either a Kevlar ``quilt'' made of 6-inch
stitched pouches of fire suppression powder or a molded, hollow plastic
shell filled with fire suppression powder, wrapped around the saddle
tanks. When activated by an IED event, the powder disperses in the shot
line and the surrounding area suppressing the fire. Pooling fuel that
comes in contact with the powder becomes inert, reducing the likelihood
of secondary fires caused by penetrated fuel lines or secondary
ignition.
The Army has a validated ONS, and is equipping all armored Line
Haul, HETS tractor, and HEMTT vehicles in Theater with FSKs. The Marine
Corps plans to equip every MTVR with fuel tank protection kits, with
initial priority on armored vehicles. All MTVRs in theater have been
retrofitted with fuel tank protection kits. The USMC is looking at
adapting the MTVR (Firetrace) fuel tank protection kit to Logistics
Vehicle System Replacement, but there is no current requirement to add
these kits to the vehicles.
Mr. Wilson. Is fuel tank fire suppression viewed differently
depending on the category of vehicle?
General Lennox. Yes, the Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facility (DOTMLPF)
analysis for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fires completed in April 2008
concluded that no one solution will fill the capability gap to prevent
and then quickly eliminate/extinguish vehicle fires. Solutions are
dependent on vehicle type, age, design and specific mission. First
priority is crew safety, survivability, escape and rescue. Second
priority is to minimize vehicle and cargo damage.
Many vehicles in theater (included all Tactical Vehicles) are
equipped with portable, vehicle-mounted and back-pack foam systems as
Basic Issue Items. Stryker systems have integrated a foam distribution
system into the design of the vehicle, focusing on extinguishing tire
fires. Foam agents are one effective solution for extinguishing
petroleum based fires in tactical vehicles. Automatic foam systems,
however, may not be possible in every tactical vehicle because of
design strictures, integration structures, crew areas. Some MRAP
vehicles also employ dry powder fuel zone fire suppression systems
which can be manually or are automatically activated.
Saddle tank, dry-powder Fire Suppression Panels or Kevlar quilts
are very effective for external fuel tanks on tactical trucks. These
solutions have been installed on HEMTT, HET, Line Haul and MTVR
vehicles in theater. M978, HEMTT, 2,500 gallon Fuel Tankers also have
additional protection that incorporate Fuel Tank Self-Sealing spray,
which closes small-arms and splinter punctures in the fuel tanks thus
mitigating fire hazards from fuel leaks, and armor grade steel over
hoses and pumping components to protect critical equipment from small
arms fire and IED fragments.
Mr. Wilson. When does the Army expect to have the MRAP home station
training requirement at 100%?
General Lennox. The Army has identified that a total of 702 MRAP
vehicles are currently needed to support pre-deployment training. The
Army expects to have that many vehicles at approximately twenty
different training locations by the end of December 2009. There are
already 26 vehicles supporting training in the United States, and
another 25 have been identified in Kuwait for shipment back to support
training by April 2009. As the Army receives the newest and most
capable MRAP vehicles in theater, older and less capable vehicles are
being replaced and returned for use in training Soldiers before they
deploy. The Army will adjust the schedule for the return of these older
vehicles based on a number of factors, including how much maintenance
is required on the vehicles before they are shipped, and when shipping
is available. Changes in the operational situation could also cause the
Army to adjust the schedule or numbers.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
Ms. Shea-Porter. General, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted a
survey on small arms for the Army in 2006. This survey questioned
Soldiers recently returned from combat who had used their weapon to
engage the enemy. The study found for example that 38% of the Soldiers
who experienced a stoppage with the M9 reported an inability to engage
the enemy with the weapon even after performing immediate action to
clear the stoppage during a significant portion of or all of the
firefight. I also note that Special Operations Command is replacing
their M4 rifles with a new weapon. Given the level of dissatisfaction
with small arms found by the Center for Naval Analysis can you tell us
why the Army has not been able to generate a new requirement for a
pistol or rifle?
General Lennox. Ms. Shea-Porter, in the same Center for Naval
Analysis (CNA) study you cited, approximately 90% of the Soldiers
surveyed were satisfied with the performance of the M4 Carbine.
Additionally, in another recent survey of 917 Soldiers with recent
combat experience with the M4 in Iraq or Afghanistan, 89% of Soldiers
reported overall satisfaction with the M4 and only 1% of these Soldiers
recommended that the M4 be replaced. Although the weapons are
performing well, the Army continually seeks ways to improve their
performance as well as provide Soldiers with enhanced capabilities. To
that purpose we conducted an Industry Technology Day on November 13th
that was designed to gather information from our industry partners as
to what is achievable in terms of small arms technology. This is an
important step in the effort to ensure that our Soldiers always have
the best industry has to offer. The Individual Carbine Capabilities
Development Document (CDD) is currently in the staffing and approval
process. The goal for the CDD to complete all staffing is September
2009. As directed by Secretary Geren, we plan to conduct a full and
open competition utilizing the new requirement beginning in late 2009.
We will look at the industry's best innovations and proposed solutions
for a possible new individual weapon.
For the handgun, the 38% you refer to is actually a percentage of
another percentage which translates to \1/2\% of the Soldiers surveyed.
That said, the Army's Small Arms Capability Based Assessment (CBA)
confirmed the shortfall in the area of the personal defense weapon, and
the Army has prioritized the development of a sub-compact or
``miniature carbine'' capability ahead of the pistol at this time.
However, currently the Army plans to wait until the completion of the
carbine competition to see what industry provides as solutions to
better inform the writing of a sub-compact requirement. The Air Force
(AF) has completed a new joint requirement for a handgun that can be
adopted by any service. The Army is looking closely at adopting this
requirement in the near future. The AF wrote the Modular Handgun System
(MHS) Capabilities Production Document (CPD) with significant input
from the Army and joint participation from all services.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. Given the weight of individual body armor systems and
associated equipment, what is being done to treat muscular or skeletal
injuries associated with carrying these loads for extended periods?
General Lennox. Soldiers complain of pain in the spine (neck, mid,
and lower back), shoulders, and lower extremities after wearing the
gear for an extended period of time. One study queried the Soldiers who
had these complaints and found that those who wore the gear for four
hours or longer had more complaints than those wearing the gear for
shorter periods. The immediate treatment is to allow for frequent
periods of ``unloading'' or taking the gear off if it is safe to do so.
The Army recognizes physical therapists (PTs) as the primary care
providers for prevention, identification, treatment, and rehabilitation
of musculoskeletal injuries. These PTs use a sports medicine approach
to identify, treat, and rehabilitate musculoskeletal injuries
expeditiously which is critical in a wartime environment as Soldiers
are able to stay healthy and ``in the fight''. Treatments for Soldiers
with musculoskeletal injuries include joint manipulation, specific
therapeutic exercises, soft tissue manipulation as well as a variety of
modalities to mitigate pain, promote healing, and prevent reoccurrence.
PTs also assist Commanders with unit exercise programs that strengthen
the shoulders, lower extremities, and muscles surrounding the spine in
order to prevent injuries from occurring when wearing the gear.
Programs focusing on injury prevention and performance enhancement
emphasize core strengthening, plyometrics (used to train explosiveness
and power in muscles i.e., jumping on/off boxes of varying heights
simulates jumping on/off vehicles in combat), and cardiorespiratory
endurance. The programs also emphasize muscular strength, muscular
endurance (anaerobic endurance), power, and movement proficiency
(incorporates balance, flexibility, coordination, speed, and agility)
to better prepare Soldiers to physically withstand the rigors of
combat. In conclusion, by making sure Soldiers receive early
identification and treatment of their musculoskeletal injuries and
improving Soldiers' physical strength and conditioning, we also improve
the overall medical readiness of our Force.
Ms. Giffords. What changes have you made to your fitness and
nutrition programs to better train servicemembers for carrying their
current combat loads? Are your current fitness tests and weight
standards sufficient? What type of fitness trainers do you have at
company and battalion levels to train your servicemembers for the
rigors of combat?
General Lennox. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson,
South Carolina has researched our physical fitness doctrine and found
our current model that emphasizes aerobic and muscular endurance does
not correlate well with the physical fitness requirements of current
combat operations. To fill this gap, the Physical Fitness School
drafted a new doctrine called Army Physical Readiness Training (Field
Manual 3-22.20) that aligns with our current operations and training
doctrine. Army Physical Readiness Training focuses on improving
Soldiers' aerobic endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance
(anaerobic endurance), power, and movement proficiency which physically
prepares Soldiers and units to meet the physical demands of full
spectrum operations. As this new doctrine is inculcated throughout the
Army, we will adjust our physical fitness test to reflect this change.
In the meantime, units across the Army, with the assistance of subject
matter experts, have adopted a variety of injury prevention and
performance enhancement programs. For example, Special Forces and
several Brigade Combat Teams have implemented programs that, in
addition to traditional aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening,
short term bursts of power, and speed and agility drills. Army training
policy continues to highlight that commanders are the primary training
managers and trainers for their organization. Although the Army no
longer designates a unit fitness trainer, unit commanders delegate
authority to non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as the primary trainers
of enlisted Soldiers, crews, and small teams. This new doctrine
designates the NCOs as the primary trainers for Physical Readiness
Training in units.
With regard to nutrition, the US Army Research Institute of
Environmental Medicine has developed a new, light-weight, small volume
ration that can be eaten on-the-move without any preparation. Their
Military Nutrition Division worked with the ration developer to define
the optimal amounts of different nutrients needed to sustain physical
performance and prevent excess loss of lean mass during extended combat
missions. The result of this collaborative effort is the
``Nutritionally Optimized'' First Strike Ration that is currently
available for use in Theater.
Finally, the Army considers our weight standards as outlined in
Army Weight Program policy (Army Regulation 600-9, 27 November 2006) to
be sufficient. The weight table and measurement techniques outlined in
this regulation were carefully evaluated by the US Army Research
Institute for Environmental Medicine and a team of nutritionists,
healthcare professionals and fitness experts.
Ms. Giffords. The MRAPs that we have rushed to the field in Iraq
are too large and too heavy for Afghanistan and are not ideal for
domestic missions at the National Guard level. What will be done with
MRAPs once our forces leave Iraq?
General Lennox. The Army is committed to keeping MRAP in the Force
Structure. There are plans to integrate up to 1,400 MRAP into Explosive
Ordnance Disposal and Route Clearance organizations. Additionally, the
Army is exploring the operational feasibility of placing them in other
organizations, including Sustainment Brigades, Maneuver Enhancement
Brigades, Army Prepositioned Stocks and Training Sets.
Ms. Giffords. What plans are in place or being developed to
transition our Up-Armored Humvees back to the United States or directly
to Afghanistan as forces drawdown in Iraq?
General Lennox. The Army's current validated Theater operational
requirement for UAH is 19,645. This requirement is currently being re-
evaluated based on possible reductions of forces in Iraq and the
pending force structure decisions for Afghanistan. The Army will not be
able to finalize its requirements until these decisions are made.
As requirements in Iraq are reduced, Theater will fill all
requirements in Afghanistan first, and then begin moving UAH back to
the United States to fill MTOE requirements and training sets, thereby
supporting readiness for future operations.
Ms. Giffords. Given the substantially improved survivability of
MRAP-like vehicles and the potential for future enemies to utilize
similar asymmetric means, how are you incorporating successes of these
vehicle designs into FCS?
General Lennox. Operational feedback and lessons learned inform our
design process. While FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV) are designed to
provide protection against a broader range of direct-fire threats than
MRAP-like vehicles, the FCS program is exploring concepts for
protecting MGVs based on the same principles that enable MRAP-like
vehicles to protect our Soldiers against Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED). FCS is assessing the feasibility of incorporating principles
such as increased ground clearance to reduce the effects of evolving
threats. Other exploratory efforts include potentially developing a
Mine Kit similar to the MRAP-like ``V''-shaped hull.
FCS MGVs will use advanced armor technologies to achieve
significant ballistic protection for hemispherical and under-vehicle
threats. Lightweight, ceramic-based composites provide performance
protection up to medium caliber for hemispherical threats. Additional
under-vehicle protection is gained through an anti-tank (AT) mine kit
that provides significant capability against AT mines.
FCS MGVs are designed to accept future upgrades of ballistic armor
to take advantage of increased performance at lower weights. The common
modular approach to all MGV designs allows for easy removal and
replacement of the armor skin as future armor technologies evolve to
meet the changing threat. The Army, through the Army Research and
Development Command (RDECOM), continues to develop, mature and provide
improved armor solutions to the FCS program that not only provide
increased performance but will continue to target reducing weight.
Ms. Giffords. Are the Army and Marine Corps closely coordinating
efforts to design future combat vehicles? If not, why not?
General Lennox. Yes, the Program Executive Officer Land Systems
(PEO LS) USMC is working closely with the Army on two future combat
vehicle programs - Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Marine
Personnel Carrier (MPC). With respect to JLTV, the U.S. Army is the
lead service with a Joint Program Office at TACOM (Michigan) under the
leadership of the Program Executive Office for Combat Support/Combat
Service Support (PEO CSS) and has an additional Program Office under
the leadership of the PEO LS USMC at Quantico, Virginia. The MPC
Program Office is pursuing a joint effort with the Army to include
Stryker in the revised MPC Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).
Due to the cancellation of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV) program and the
decision(s) to continue use of USMC Tanks and Light Armored Vehicles
(LAVs) for the foreseeable future, the Marine Corps is no longer an
active participant in the Army's FCS MGV development program. However,
the Marine Corps continues to closely monitor the FCS program. Recent
areas of focus include MGV armor capabilities geared toward IED
mitigation/survivability for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
and the Active Protection System for use in the USMC LAV and EFV. USMC
coordinates future vehicle S&T with the Army RDECOM and Office of Naval
Research (ONR). PEO LS has also established a Marine Corps Integration
Capability Cell with the Army's FCS program at Fort Bliss, Texas.
Ms. Giffords. Given that we entered this war with little to no
armored vehicles for our servicemembers who perform vital support and
logistics functions, what are your plans for hardening future logistics
and combat support vehicles?
General Lennox. TRADOC and PEO CS&CSS developed the Long Term Armor
Strategy (LTAS) that was approved by the Army Requirements and
Resourcing Board (AR2B) to enhance current Tactical Vehicle Platforms
with an integrated armor capability through an A-cab, B-kit format.
This concept allows peacetime operation in a lighter A-cab solution,
with a capability to rapidly apply armor protection (B-kit) when
required. To date, PM Tactical Vehicles has integrated this capability
in the Up-armored HMMWV (UAH), Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
(FMTV) and Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). The PM is
currently developing solutions for the Palletized Loading System (PLS),
Line Haul Tractor and Heavy Equipment Transporter.
TRADOC is currently developing the Long Term Protection Strategy
(LTPS) for Tactical Vehicles which includes updating the Army's LTAS.
The objective of the LTPS is to enhance the survivability of TWV
occupants by synchronizing a variety of complementary Force protection
and Survivability initiatives in support of current operations, Army
Transformation and future modernization capabilities by optimizing
strategies for procurement, deployment, recapitalization and
sustainment. This strategy will provide recommended quantities of B-
kits that should be maintained to ensure the Army has sufficient armor
capabilities on-hand to support Tactical Vehicles deployment.
Ms. Giffords. What help does the Army need to expedite the update
of the Counter-IED Jamming systems in theater?
General Lennox. The Army is executing a strategy to keep their
current fleet of jammers relevant to meet a constantly evolving threat.
The current upgrade is the Duke V3. It is the most advanced Counter
Remote Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) system
available and provides increased protection against current threats and
is software programmable to defeat future threats. Continued
Congressional support for Counter-IED funding will allow the Army to
adequately meet the OIF requirement and lean forward in supporting OEF.
For the future, the Army will invest in long term Electronic Warfare
capability that incorporates the counter IED (CREW) mission as a subset
of a much more comprehensive and integrated Electronic Warfare system
addressing the totality of Army Electronic Warfare requirements.
Ms. Giffords. Given the weight of individual body armor systems and
associated equipment, what is being done to treat muscular or skeletal
injuries associated with carrying these loads for extended periods?
General Brogan. The Marine Corps has not experienced a significant
increase in musculoskeletal injuries. The average tour length for
Marines deployed to a combat zone is seven months, versus the Army's
average tour length of 12-15 months. Our units form prior to beginning
the Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP). With very few exceptions,
the entire unit completes PTP together. During PTP the Marines are
conditioned, hardened and prepared for the rigors of the combat
environment. Combined with our culture of high physical conditioning,
we are not experiencing a significant increase in musculoskeletal
injuries.
Hospital Corpsmen attached to Marine units provide the first
echelon of care for an injured Marine. Corpsmen are trained to rapidly
respond and treat front-line casualties, and the treatment and
management of musculoskeletal injuries makes up a large portion of
their curriculum.
Ms. Giffords. What changes have you made to your fitness and
nutrition programs to better train servicemembers for carrying their
current combat loads? Are your current fitness tests and weight
standards sufficient? What type of fitness trainers do you have at
company and battalion levels to train your servicemembers for the
rigors of combat?
General Brogan. A comprehensive review of USMC fitness programs
began in Nov 2006. Key outputs of this review resulted in the following
changes to Physical Training (PT) programs in Entry Level Training
(ELT) and in guidelines for commanders in designing unit PT programs:
Greater emphasis on anaerobic (short burst) capacity, de-emphasis of
long distance running, increase in body movement skills (agility) and
increase in progressive load bearing capacity. These changes are
reflected in PT application, testing, and also in education of Marine
leaders in the Training and Education continuum. Nutrition education
begins in boot camp conducted by Semper Fit and continues in the T&E
continuum as well.
Pre-deployment physical training is sufficient to meet the demands
of combat. Improvements to fitness programs have enhanced the already
high physical fitness readiness of Marines.
In May 2008, the Command of the Marine Corps (CMC) approved the
Combat Fitness Test (CFT) which was implemented in Oct 2008. Designed
to be a complement to the semi-annual Physical Fitness Test (PFT), CFT
events are: Movement to Contact (880 yd run), Ammo Lift (repetitive
overhead lift of a 30 lb ammo can for two minutes), and Maneuver Under
Fire. The last event is a 300 yard shuttle run which includes sprints,
numerous changes of direction, a fireman's carry, buddy drag, ammo can
carries and a simulated grenade throw. The CFT has helped shape USMC
fitness programs, which will serve to enhance combat-related
conditioning.
USMC Height/Weight standards are in accordance with DoD guidelines.
Maximum body fat allowances graduate slightly by age and are the lowest
within DoD guidelines.
There are no dedicated fitness trainers at the company and
battalion levels. However, the Marine Corps has recently implemented a
Combat Conditioning Specialist (CCS) program to assist commanders in
designing and implementing their unit PT programs. Included in the CCS
curriculum are classes on basic exercise physiology, injury prevention,
etc. and contemporary strength and conditioning methods. In addition,
commander's also have access to Semper Fit personal trainers at major
bases who also provide detailed expertise in designing effective PT
programs.
Ms. Giffords. The MRAPs that we have rushed to the field in Iraq
are too large and too heavy for Afghanistan. What will be done with
MRAPs once our forces leave Iraq?
General Brogan. There are more than 1,800 MRAP vehicles in
Afghanistan, at the request of operational commanders. Certain
variants, such as the RG-31 MaxxPro Dash and Cougar variant have
performed well. As the focus shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, the
Joint Program Office has procured more than 2,000 vehicles to meet
theater-specific requirements in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
Speaking only for the Marine Corps, a portion of the fleet will go
to operational forces: route clearing teams, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) teams, and combat engineering organizations; a portion
will go to geographic pre-positioning, and a portion will likely be
made available for our maritime pre-positioning force. Currently, the
Marine Corps does not intend to leave vehicles in Iraq.
Ms. Giffords. What plans are in place or being developed to
transition our Up-Armored Humvees back to the United States or directly
to Afghanistan as forces drawdown in Iraq?
General Brogan. Transition of up armored HMMWVs back to CONUS will
depend upon the state of the individual vehicle and will be made on a
case-by-case basis prior to re-embarkation. Equipment determined to be
cost-effective to repair will be returned to CONUS and reset at
government depot facilities. Equipment determined not cost effective to
repair will be made available for foreign military sales or the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS).
Ms. Giffords. Given the substantially improved survivability of
MRAP-like vehicles and the potential for future enemies to utilize
similar asymmetric means, how are you incorporating successes of these
vehicle designs into the Marine Expeditionary Family of Fighting
Vehicles?
General Brogan. There is no Marine Expeditionary Family of Fighting
Vehicles program. The Marine Corps' HMMWV and MTVR fleet has already
been up-armored. Armor kits are available for our heavy tactical
vehicle fleet, which consists of the LVS/LVSR. The Marine Corps has
ongoing programs to upgrade the LAV and Tank fleets to address current
and projected mission requirements.
Ms. Giffords. Are the Army and Marine Corps closely coordinating
efforts to design future combat vehicles? If not, why not?
General Brogan. Yes, the Marine Corps is working closely with the
Army on future combat vehicle programs--JLTV. The JLTV program is Army
lead with Marine Corps participation.
Ms. Giffords. Given that we entered this war with little to no
armored vehicles for our servicemembers who perform vital support and
logistics functions, what are your plans for hardening future logistics
and combat support vehicles?
General Brogan. The Marine Corps is currently engaged in a study to
determine future armoring requirements as well as a proposed strategy
to meet the required capabilities of the future tactical wheeled
vehicle fleet. The study will address issues including protection
scalability, vehicle weight, square and cube, and expeditionary
deployability.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. Please provide budgetary details since 2004 for all
funding for body armor S&T, R&D and where (program element) it resides.
General Fuller. The budgetary details for R&D are provided, by
Fiscal Year (FY): FY 2004, Program Element 0603747A (Soldier Support
and Survivability) with a Program Amount of $1,029,639; FY 2005,
Program Element 0603747A (Soldier Support and Survivability), with
Program Amount of $1,869,509; FY 2005, Program Element 0604713A (Combat
Feeding, Clothing and Equipment), with a Program Amount of $1,588,935;
FY 2006, Program Element 0603827A (Soldier Systems--Advanced
Development), with a Program Amount of $791,000.00; FY 2006, Program
Element 0604601A (Infantry Support Weapons), with a Program Amount of
$3,472,410; FY 2007, Program Element 0604601A (Infantry Support
Weapons), with a Program Amount of $4,381,345; FY 2007, Program Element
0603827A (Soldier Systems--Advanced Development), with Program Amount
of $530,000; FY 2008, Program Element 0603827A (Soldier Systems--
Advanced Development), with a Program Amount of $1,562,019; FY 2008,
Program Element 0604601A (Infantry Support Weapons), with a Program
Amount of $2,185,499; FY 2009, Program Element 0603827A (Soldier
Systems--Advanced Development), with a Program Amount of $1,505,000 and
FY 2009 to date, Program Element 0604601A (Infantry Support Weapons),
with a Program Amount of $2,659,163.
Ms. Tsongas. Please provide budgetary details since 2004 for all
funding for body armor S&T, R&D and where (program element) it resides.
General Brogan. The body armor R&D is funded by PE 0206623M Marine
Corps Ground Combat/Supporting Arms Systems in the Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy budget. The funding contained in
the President's Budget for R&D in support of body armor is as follows:
FY04: 1.0M
FY05: 1.0M
FY06: 2.7M
FY07: 4.4M
FY08: 5.6M
FY09: 7.0M
This funding was requested for the exploration of new commercial
technologies that can be inserted into current body armor to reduce
weight, increase survivability, lethality, and mobility. Both torso and
head/neck ballistic studies will be conducted to assess blunt trauma/
shock forces on the body and how ballistic materials/designs can afford
the most protection while reducing weight. Modeling and simulation
initiatives will baseline current equipment and enable configuration/
compatibility management of new equipment. Specific R&D efforts for
body armor include but are not limited to the following efforts:
Next generation equipment design
Combat casualty trend analysis and headborne integration
efforts
Headborne injury trend and analysis, helmet sensor data
collection and analysis
Prototyping skills, Computer Aided Design (CAD) pattern
development, and sizing/fit standardization for body armor components
Additionally, the following federal/government entities provide S&T
support via funding, program management, or program execution:
Office of Naval Research (ONR)
Naval Research Lab (NRL)
USMC Small Business Innovative Research Office (SBIR)
U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development &
Engineering (NSRDE)
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL)
Ms. Tsongas. Snipers pose a serious threat to our armed forces
because of their precision and elusiveness. NATO's International
Security Assistance Force, which leads coalition forces in Afghanistan,
said last month that coalition deaths have risen sharply over the last
several months, mainly due to the increase in the Taliban's marksmen.
There are proven technologies that can detect a threat's location, and
allow our soldiers and Marines to take preventive action that would
undoubtedly save American lives. Last year's Supplemental included $400
million for items such as Vanguards vehicles, Boomerangs, Decoy
Boomerangs, and Sniper Defeat Fixed Site systems. Could you discuss the
Army's plans for spending these funds and its overall intentions for
fully funding sniper detection and protection systems? Will the Army's
budget include additional funding for sniper defeat systems?
General Lennox and General Fuller. The Army has invested nearly
$447M in FY08 Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funding to purchase various
Sniper Defeat equipment in response to an urgent need from units
deployed to Iraq/Afghanistan ($400M was appropriated in the December
2007 Supplemental and nearly $47M in the July 2008 Supplemental). In
addition to Vanguards, Boomerangs, and Decoy Boomerangs, the Army is in
the process of fielding the Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting Systems
(SWATS), Handheld Thermal Imagers, Binoculars, Nets/Veils, and 3x
magnifiers for the Close Combat Optic. This year, the Army has
allocated over $52 million in Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA)
funding for the sustainment of the aforementioned equipment and will
continue sustaining these items for the foreseeable future.
The Army has responded to every validated urgent need for Sniper
Defeat equipment from deployed units and will continue to do so through
the Senior Budget Requirements and Program Board (BRP). Furthermore,
the Army has decided to transition two Sniper Defeat technologies into
formal acquisition programs. The Army recently approved a requirement
for a Gunshot Detection System (GSD) and approval for an Individual
Gunshot Detector (IGD) is pending. These Army plans to compete these
programs for funding during the development of the FY12-17 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM).
The Army's Sniper Defeat Integrated Capabilities Development Team
(ICDT) continues to monitor the enemy sniper threat and emerging
technologies to counter that threat. The Army's Asymmetric Warfare
Group (AWG) and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) are members of the
Sniper Defeat ICDT and assist in developing and bringing promising new
Sniper Defeat technology into the Army. Should new Sniper Defeat
technology prove viable, deployed units may document the capability
required with an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) and request the
equipment through the BRP process. Once fielded, the Army continues to
assess select Sniper Defeat technology via the Capabilities Development
for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process. Based on user feedback from
operational assessments, the CDRT council makes recommendations to
senior Army leadership on whether the technology should remain in
theater as a niche item, terminate, or transition into a formal
acquisition program of record.
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