[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES IN EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-20
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
50-505 WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the
GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, MIKE PENCE, Indiana
California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ADAM SMITH, JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
Washington deg.Until J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
2/9/09 deg. CONNIE MACK, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia TED POE, Texas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs
of 3/12/09 deg.
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida, Chairman
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York TED POE, Texas
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California
Jonathan Katz, Subcommittee Staff Director
Eric Johnson, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Richard Mereu, Republican Professional Staff Member
Mariana Maguire, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Philip Gordon, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Eurasian Affairs, United States Department of
State.......................................................... 5
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe:
Prepared statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Philip Gordon, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........... 9
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 44
Hearing minutes.................................................. 45
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 46
The Honorable Michael E. McMahon, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New York: Prepared statement................. 47
The Honorable Shelley Berkley, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Nevada: Questions submitted for the record........ 48
The Honorable Philip Gordon, Ph.D.: Responses to questions
submitted for the record....................................... 50
STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES IN EUROPE
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Wexler
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Wexler. The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.
I want to first apologize to Assistant Secretary Gordon for
keeping you, and also to all the members of the public and
interested parties. Democracy at times can be less than
convenient. I do apologize.
With the Assistant Secretary's agreement or consent, I am
going to begin, and then we are going to take another 10-minute
break, roughly, to finish this round of votes. And then we
should have all the time that we need. I thank you very much.
I first want to welcome and thank Assistant Secretary of
State for Europe and Eurasia, Phil Gordon, for testifying. We
have looked forward to this for several months now, and we are
thrilled that you are here. I am especially pleased that
President Obama and Secretary Clinton have chosen an Assistant
Secretary with your extraordinary background and experience. I
am highly confident that you will represent the United States
in the highest capacity and will further America's national
interests and strategic partnerships in Europe and in Eurasia.
Today's hearing comes at a historic juncture for the United
States and our European allies as we face a myriad of difficult
issues, including a global economic crisis, accelerated global
climate change, a resurgent Russia, instability in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Within Europe and on its borders, there are many challenges for
American and European policymakers, including resolving frozen
conflicts, rising nationalism and right-wing extremism, energy
security, and significant backsliding by a number of nations in
the area of political, judicial, and economic reforms.
The good news is, according to recent polling data, the
European public opinion has embraced President Obama's message
of renewed American engagement and partnership. The President's
outreach to Europe at the G20 in London, NATO's 60th
anniversary summit, and the U.S.-EU meetings in Prague, has
laid the groundwork for deeper collaboration between the United
States and our transatlantic allies.
Unfortunately, however, greater European public support has
not necessarily translated fully into policy successes that
benefit the welfare and security of both sides of the Atlantic.
If President Obama and the new administration are going to be
successful in addressing issues such as global
nonproliferation, Middle East peace, stability and security in
Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and Iran's nuclear program, we
will need a stronger commitment from our European and
international partners.
Given the far-reaching foreign policy agenda of the Obama
administration, we are eager to learn more about your efforts,
Mr. Secretary, and those of the administration to strengthen
historic transatlantic relations and to build stronger
economic, political, and security links with our NATO and EU
allies.
It is essential that the administration continue to work
with willing partners in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and
Balkans regions as these nations struggle with democratic
reforms and push for greater engagement and inclusion into
transatlantic institutions such as the EU and NATO.
I want to applaud the Vice President for his statement
during the recent trip to the Balkans that the ``Obama-Biden
administration will sustain and reenergize the longstanding
American commitment to a Europe that is whole, free, and at
peace.''
I also want to highlight the extraordinary effort of the
President and Secretary of State for reaching out to our ally
Turkey and for their efforts to resolve the ongoing Cyprus and
Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Turkey is a key partner in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, and President
Obama's vision of a model partnership must be further fleshed
out.
The President's April trip to Turkey was historic, it was
successful, quite so, and I implore the administration to
continue to support Turkey's EU aspirations, as the President
so strongly did; Armenian-Turkish reconciliation; and work with
Ankara to combat PKK terrorism.
There is no greater challenge facing the United States and
Europe than our relations with Russia. I strongly support the
administration's efforts to reach out to Russia, to hit the
reset button and work with President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin on critical issues such as the START Treaty,
Iran, and North Korea. And it is also essential that we are
realistic and clear-eyed about the true intentions of the
Kremlin.
As Secretary Clinton stated during a town hall meeting
recently, ``Europe is our essential partner.'' I couldn't agree
with her more. And I look forward to working very closely with
you, Secretary Gordon, over the next couple of months and years
to strengthen the transatlantic alliance.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler
follows:]Wexler statement deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wexler. If Mr. Gallegly was here, I would invite him at
this time to make his opening remarks. He may be coming after
the other two votes, so I will wait to do that. And probably
the best thing to do at this point--I know we have a French
delegation of members of the Parliament that I would like to
welcome. There are four members of the French Parliament that I
believe are sitting in the front row. I want to welcome you,
gentlemen, and I apologize to you for the delay. I am sure the
French Parliament has no such delays. But we very much welcome
your presence here.
Mr. Assistant Secretary, there is about 2\1/2\ minutes left
with this. We could start, but then I would have to leave in
the middle of your presentation. So I would rather not do that.
So if I could just beg everyone's patience just for another
little bit of time, I think at this point we will just adjourn
for a short period, and then there will be two more votes, and
then I will be back here, and hopefully others as well.
Thank you for your accommodation.
[Recess.]
Mr. Wexler. I want to call the Europe Subcommittee back
into session. I want to again thank everyone for their
patience.
At this time I would like to introduce our witness for
today's hearing. Dr. Philip Gordon is currently serving as the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
Prior to this appointment, from 2000 to 2009, Dr. Gordon was a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, where
he focused on a wide range of European and United States
foreign policy issues. Prior to joining Brookings, he served as
Director for European Affairs at the NSC under President
Clinton, where he played a key role in developing and
coordinating NATO policy in the run-up to the alliance's 50th
anniversary summit.
Dr. Gordon has held numerous teaching and research
positions, and he is a prolific writer on international
relations and foreign policy issues and has been a frequent
contributor to major publications such as The New York Times,
Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, and the
Financial Times.
Dr. Gordon, there are many, many issues. So, ordinarily we
ask people to limit their comments to 5 minutes. But given the
wide length of topics, please take the time that you need. I am
hoping that others Members will come in as the votes actually
stop. I thank you so much for your time, your presence, and
your patience.
Please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP GORDON, PH.D., ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Gordon. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
thanking you first for your kind words in your introductory
statement, and to you and all the members of the committee for
giving me this opportunity to talk to you about the Obama
administration's policies and priorities in Europe and our
strategies to further the transatlantic relationship.
Let me begin by saying that President Obama, Secretary
Clinton, and I are all deeply committed to reinvigorating and
deepening the traditional relationships of confidence and trust
that we share with Europe. I am convinced that Europe is eager
to reciprocate and increase the breadth of our close
relationship, which is based on shared values, enduring
commitment to democracy, transparency, accountability, respect
for human rights and the rule of law.
Mr. Chairman, I submitted a much more detailed statement
for the record. You will see by its length and detail indeed
what a comprehensive agenda we have. What I would like to do
here, if I might, is just underscore three of our broad
priorities and the categories of issues we will deal with, and
then we can come back, if that is all right with you, to any of
the details in the written statement.
There are three main categories for our priorities. First
is how we engage with Europe on global challenges. Second is
how we work toward a Europe that is more whole, free,
democratic, and at peace. Then, finally, how we work to have a
renewed relationship with Russia. I will just offer a couple of
words about each of those, if I might.
On the question of engaging with Europe on global
challenges, it is a reality that many of our European partners
are among the most prosperous, democratic, and military-capable
countries in the world. Therefore, working with our allies both
multilaterally and bilaterally will remain critical to our
success in tackling the many serious global challenges that we
face together.
The United States cooperates with Europe on literally all
of the most important challenges. Just naming a few: Restoring
growth and confidence in the world financial system, fighting
poverty and pandemic disease, supporting
ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, countering
terrorism and nuclear proliferation, promoting energy security,
combating climate change, advancing peace in the Middle East,
promoting human rights, combating trafficking in persons. The
list is long, and I could name others.
The point, however, is that there is not a single one of
those issues on which we are not better off when we are working
closely with our European friends. And I would be happy during
the hearing to talk about the ways in which we are working to
enhance that cooperation to strengthen our own interests.
The second category I would mention is how we promote a
Europe that is more democratic, more whole, more free, and more
peaceful and stable, which is another important administration
priority: Extending stability security and prosperity and
democracy to all of Europe and Eurasia. This has been an
objective of all United States Presidents since World War II,
both Democratic and Republican, which is to say, working with
Europe to realize this joint vision.
We have made great process in the past 20 years since the
end of the Cold War, but clearly more remains to be done. One
of the ways we are seeking to do this is through our critical
alliances and partnerships in Europe, including NATO, the EU,
and the OSCE. We believe that the openness of Western
institutions like the EU and NATO to the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe has been, simply put, the most successful
democratization strategy in history, and it has brought peace,
stability and prosperity to millions. And the administration
strongly believes that this process must continue.
In promoting such a Europe, and while working with the
EU, NATO, and the OSCE, we will strongly support the
sovereignty and independence of all European States, including
those that emerge out of the former Soviet Union, such as
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. With Congress's continued support
we will continue foreign assistance programs in Europe and
Eurasia to nurture democratic and economic progress in the
still fragile reformers and to promote their integration in
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Looking to the Southeast, I would like to say, as you did
in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, that we support
Turkey's aspirations for membership in the European Union, as
Turkey advances reforms that will make it an even stronger
partner and a better neighbor. We are engaged energetically to
support efforts by Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations
and efforts by Armenia and Azerbaijan to settle the conflict in
the Nagorno-Karabakh.
As you may know, I just myself returned from a trip to the
region just a few weeks after being confirmed. I felt it was
important to go to the region to signal our support for those
countries and to do what we can to promote the historic
processes that are going on.
We also support the negotiations toward a settlement in
Cyprus, and vigorously promote diversification of European
energy supplies. We will continue to develop our relationship
with the Central Europeans, who are now core members of NATO
and the EU, and increasingly important global partners.
We will show renewed leadership in the Balkans where, more
than a decade after Western interventions, the forces of
democracy, openness, and modernity still struggle against
backward-looking ethnic nationalism and intolerance.
Let me add finally in this category that we will engage the
countries of Europe to help those still living survivors of the
Holocaust to achieve some belated justice. The upcoming
Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets in Prague I know is a
subject that this subcommittee will be looking at on Thursday
this week, and that will offer us the opportunity to do so.
Let me finally mention the third broad category where we
are trying to work more successfully with Europe, which is our
renewed relationship with Russia. The President has made clear
the Obama administration is committed to reinvigorating our
relations with Russia, and looks forward to building a
relationship based on respect and mutual cooperation.
When President Obama and President Medvedev met in London
in April, they agreed to work together on a variety of issues,
including reducing strategic nuclear weapons and enhancing
nuclear security, and cooperating on issues such as
counterterrorism, Afghanistan, counternarcotics, Iran, North
Korea, the environment, and many others.
We look forward to upcoming talks with Russians in a number
of different fora. There is the OSCE ministerial in Corfu; the
NATO Russia Council, which we have revived and will also meet
in Corfu; and, of course, the summits where the Presidents will
meet in July.
We look forward to those discussions and to the opportunity
of strengthening relations with Russia. But I also want to make
clear that at the same time that we reinvigorate our relations
with Russia, we will not abandon our principles or ignore
concerns about democracy and human rights.
While we look forward to a more cooperative partnership
with Russia, we have no illusions that this will be easy or
that we will not continue to have differences. Russia's
decision yesterday at the U.N. to block extension of the U.N.
observer mission in Georgia is a clear example of such
differences. The United States will not recognize the Russian
sphere of influence. The United States will also continue to
support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's
neighbors.
In conclusion then, Mr. Chairman, the United States and
Europe share the important responsibility of leading the
international effort to address our most pressing global
challenges. We also share core values, which is a strong
foundation as we work together on our global agenda of
advancing these core values as well as security, prosperity and
stability to the entire European Continent and the world.
Mr. Chairman and all of the members of the committee, I am
very grateful for the opportunity to be with you today, and I
look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon
follows:]Philip Gordon deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Assistant Secretary, you must be the
equivalent of a rock star up here, because I don't remember six
or seven Members of the House coming to the Europe Subcommittee
in a very long time. So you are a big draw.
Before we go to questions, I would call upon my colleagues
if they have any comments to make.
Mr. Sires from New Jersey.
Mr. Sires. No, I don't have any comments.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. No.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a
brief opening statement. I think the presence of all of us here
certainly shows the importance of Europe to our future. And our
European partners have proven to be some of our more lasting
and committed allies, stretching back to the birth of our
Nation. From our own battle for independence, to the Barbary
Coast, to the world wars, to the Cold War, we have cooperated
with European nations to meet the challenges we face
domestically and around the world.
And now, as we are in the midst of global crisis and
reaching to face new challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
never before have we needed European cooperation combating
global warming, the dwindling of energy supplies, and also in
improving and enhancing all of our partnerships in Europe and
neighboring countries, particularly with Russia, as Mr. Gordon
mentioned, and certainly with China and the emerging economies
of India.
Mr. Chairman, given the scope of this hearing, the width
and the breadth of our interactions with the whole of Europe, I
doubt that we will have the time to delve into many of the
challenges lying before us, but I look forward to dealing in a
few specific ones. I am specifically interested in your
thoughts concerning how we can develop a more workable,
meaningful relationship with Russia.
I think Russia holds the key not just to Europe, but for so
many things that we need to enhance peace and security around
the globe, global warming, cooperation in terms of nuclear
nonproliferation. So many critical issues. And I think that
Russia certainly plays a very important role in that, as well
as enhancing our cooperation with our NATO allies as we grapple
with the many issues.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. I will wait. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Inglis, you have any comments you would
care to make?
Mr. Inglis. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a great opportunity for me to mention something
better than cap-and-trade, because it seems to me that Europe
is finding out that there are some real challenges with cap-
and-trade. And we in America, I think, are about to find out
that it sure is hard to pass something like that, especially a
massive tax increase, in the midst of a recession, a Wall
Street trading scheme that would make Wall Street traders
blush, I think, after what we have been through, and that
punishes American manufacturing.
But there is something better. There is an opportunity here
to, when that falls apart, to pursue something different, which
is basically a revenue-neutral tax swap that involves reducing
taxes on payroll and in an equal amount imposing a tax on
carbon dioxide.
So it is not a tax increase of any sort, it is simply a tax
swap. Revenue-neutral. So you move from taxing wages and income
and industry in the payroll tax, you take that tax away and you
put a tax on carbon dioxide. And what it does is changes the
economics of alternative technologies.
And also of importance to our friends in other countries,
it would be border-adjustable, so that this bill we have got
pending could be removed--the tax could be removed on exports
and imposed on imports.
It may be something that, from what we hear from European
friends, may actually be very similar to a VAT export rebate in
that way, something that they have a great deal of experience
with. And we think that it is WTO-compliant, unlike the current
cap-and-trade bill, which, as I understand it, is a per se
violation of WTO to give away free allocations. Eighty-five
percent of them have been given away for free. You have got to
wonder whether our trading partners are going to sit still and
say, Yo, you think that is a WTO violation?
And so if they do, we have got the alternative. And it is
something that I think we can work together with our European
friends especially to bring about real change in our economies
and address the challenge ahead of us.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak
about that.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. I will begin, then, maybe focusing on two
principal areas, Russia and Azerbaijan. You have ably outlined
the parameters of the new administration's approach to Russia.
I was wondering with maybe a bit of specificity if you could
talk about the areas that are of potential contention between
the United States and Russia, as well as the areas that are of
potential strategic cooperation, and what role will the
administration seek with our European allies as we engage
Russia in that regard.
And with respect to Azerbaijan, in the context of the
engagement between Turkey and Armenia, there are obviously
certain sensitivities with respect to Azerbaijan. I think the
Secretary very ably, when the Azerbaijan Foreign Minister
visited Washington, talked about the strategic importance of
Azerbaijan. I would like to ask you what steps the
administration is taking to bolster the American relationship
with Azerbaijan; what steps are we taking to navigate the
course of the engagement between Turkey and Armenia so that
Azerbaijan comes out a winner as well? And very specifically
you may be aware I introduced legislation with Congressman
Shuster that would lift Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions for
Azerbaijan, and would ask if you are prepared to comment at all
in that regard.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Both of those are very
important topics, and I appreciate the opportunity to address
them. Let me begin with Russia because it is indeed central to
our European policy.
The President came into office and very early on made clear
that we wanted to put the difficulties and recriminations we
have recently had with Russia behind us, to the extent
possible. The previous years it had seen a serious
deterioration in our relationship with Russia, and the
President's view was that this was unfortunate because we
really do share a number of common interests, and we are better
off if we can work constructively with Russia.
And you asked about some of the areas. We are better off
when we get Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran, nuclear
nonproliferation, the world economy, climate change, and
European security.
So, he proposed that we try--and the word is maybe overused
now--but try to reset the relationship with Russia and see if
we can change the tone and the substance of the relationship.
That is what we are trying to do. He had very constructive
discussions with President Medvedev in London in April and
looks forward to resuming those in July.
But there is a second part of the way the administration
thinks about the issue that I want to make equally clear, that
even as we seek to have a more constructive relationship with
Russia, for all the reasons I just said, we will not do that at
the price of our principles and interests and friends. That is
to say, as the Vice President made very clear early on at the
Munich Security Conference, that there are certain principles
that go along with this. We don't recognize any privileged
sphere of influence for Russia in Europe. Democratic European
countries have the right to join the alliances that they want
to join without any third country having a veto, and,
specifically, we will not recognize the breakaway regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
I think, just to make clear, that just this week we
demonstrated that we will not pay any price in order to have a
more constructive relationship with Russia over the issue of
Georgia. We stood firmly behind our principles at the U.N.
during the discussions of a follow-on U.N. mission in Abkhazia,
a part of Georgia, and we are not simply prepared to concede
that principle to the Russians in the name of a better
relationship. And I can give you other examples of how, whether
it is NATO enlargement or others, we will stand by our friends
and by our principles.
That said, I think there still is an opportunity for a more
constructive relationship with Russia.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, when you asked which areas are in
the issue of possible cooperation and which possible
confrontation, the reality is both. In each of the areas I
gave, we can go one way or another, and what we are trying to
do is make sure that we cooperate on all of those, rather than
the opposite.
If I might address the question of Azerbaijan, which is
also very important, and, as I said, only a couple of weeks
into my own tenure in office, I decided to go to Armenia and
Azerbaijan and Georgia because it seemed to me that of all the
many challenges we face in this vast region, there are some
serious opportunities there. And you talked about what they
are.
You have two parallel but separate tracks going on, a
Turkey-Armenia normalization reconciliation process that we do
think is quite potentially historic, where two countries have
agreed on a framework for normalizing their relations that
would include opening the border, which has been closed for far
too long, which would establish diplomatic relations, and would
provide commissions in key areas, including history. And we
encourage that process, and we support it.
We have said that it is an independent process and believe
that it should move forward regardless of whatever else is
happening in Europe or anywhere else, because both countries
would benefit.
That said, it is nonetheless the case that at the same time
negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh are going on between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. That is the part of the context in which the
region moves forward, and we are encouraging that process as
well.
Again, our view is that these are separate tracks. They are
moving forward at different speeds. But we are engaged
vigorously on both, because if both were to succeed, it really
would be an historic opportunity for the region from which all
three of those countries would benefit.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gordon, the United States policy has been to support a
Cyprus settlement based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation,
with a single sovereignty and international personalities.
Given that current direct talks are taking place under the U.N.
framework, what is the United States doing to encourage the
Turkish Government to embrace this framework for final
solution?
Mr. Gordon. You have indeed well described the
administration's approach and the administration's aspired
outcome. At present the two sides on the island have been
talking directly to each other since last September, which is a
good thing. And they have been doing so under U.N. auspices.
We have said from the start that we are prepared to be
helpful as we can. At present it looks like the direct talks
are going on regularly, and the U.N. is being helpful. And we
will support that process. If a more direct role would
ultimately be useful, we would be prepared to consider that.
We have directly engaged with both sides, including the
Turkish Government, to make clear that that is our view as you
described it. The outcome should be a bizonal, bicommunal
federation with a single sovereignty. And we make that clear to
our Turkish counterparts consistently when we talk about the
issue.
A Cyprus settlement, just as I described, regarding
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, a Cyprus settlement would also
be win-win. Both sides would benefit from a political
settlement, and we will be actively engaged to achieve it.
Mr. Sires. Getting back to Russia and the visit by the
President in July, are you concerned at all the expectations
may be too high, meaning with Russia, in terms of what we can
accomplish?
Mr. Gordon. Expectations should indeed be realistic. We are
not going to go from a very contentious relationship with
Russia, where the United States and Russia have had significant
disagreements about European security, about missile defense,
about NATO enlargement, about other regional issues, to one in
which we agree on all of those things. So I appreciate the
spirit of your question.
Expectations should be kept in check, particularly because,
as I said, we are not prepared to pay any price for a
successful summit or a better relationship with Russia. We will
stand by our principles and our interests, but I do think there
are opportunities for not just a successful summit, but for
concrete results from that successful summit. We are looking at
areas in which we can do that.
We welcome the Russian Government's offer of providing
transit for assistance, including lethal transit assistance to
Afghanistan. That is an example of something that is in our
common interest, a stable Afghanistan. As it is Russia's
interest, it is in our interest. If they are prepared to help
us with that, that is a good thing, and we welcome it.
We welcome Russia's cooperation on the issue of containing
nuclear proliferation to Iran. We are talking seriously about
strategic nuclear arms reductions and a follow-on to the START
agreement, and believe that that is also in our mutual
interest, and that we can move that ball forward at the summit
in July. We are talking about economic relations between the
two countries and possibly Russia's eventual WTO membership.
So, while keeping expectations in check, I would also want
to underscore there are some real prospects for progress, and
we will do all we can to achieve them.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I applaud you for your statement about standing on
principles. I am not quite sure about standing with friends if
they do something rashly. And I would suggest that in terms of
the conflict between Georgia and Russia, Mr. Saakashvili did
not respond to concerns expressed by your predecessor. Dan
Freed actually testified in front of this committee that he was
in communication with the Georgian officials the night before
the invasion and asked them to move cautiously and do not
launch a military offensive. They ignored him. I don't know if
I really want to stand by that friend.
I dare say if they had acceded to NATO, there would have
been certain treaty obligations that could have been not just
embarrassing, but might very well have implicated the United
States in terms of some sort of military engagement.
So, while I appreciate standing on principles, and I think
we should do that worldwide, by the way, whether it is the
Mideast, whether it is Asia, whether it implicates China,
whether it implicates the principles that we are known for in
human rights, due process, we ought to consider those very,
very seriously whether it implicates those who are our friends
as well as those with whom we have a contentious relationship.
Care to comment?
Mr. Gordon. Sure. I appreciate your thoughts on that. We
have said that whatever the origins of the war in Georgia last
summer, and whatever the actions of the Georgian Government,
they didn't justify the Russian invasion of Georgia,
dismembership of Georgia, the disproportionate use of force and
occupation of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, nor would those actions have justified or do those
actions justify the subsequent violations of the cease-fire
agreement that Russia reached with the European Union under the
French Presidency.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, do you
think that the Georgians have any culpability or responsibility
in terms of what occurred in August of last year?
Mr. Gordon. As I said, the origins of the war can and have
been and should be debated----
Mr. Delahunt. What is your opinion about the origins of the
war?
Mr. Gordon. My opinion about the origins of the war is that
President Saakashvili may well have fallen into a group that he
shouldn't have. The international community--the United States
and the international community was unsuccessful in persuading
him not to fall into that trap.
Mr. Delahunt. So you are suggesting a trap that was
intentionally laid?
Mr. Gordon. I certainly think there were provocations that
Georgia's use of force and going into Skinvali didn't occur in
a vacuum. There were provocations on both sides. There were
certainly provocations coming from the South Ossetian side.
Let me be clear, I would have strongly--or I would have
done everything I could to avoid seeing the Georgian
Government, as I have put it, fall into this trap and the war
that followed it. Nonetheless, I would repeat that----
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Secretary, again, with all due respect, I
am going to suggest to you that if they fall into a trap, and
it implicates American national security interests, that we
should be very wary of who we chum around with in that
particular region. And it would appear, listening to your
testimony, that, at least in your opening statements, that
there appears to be no responsibility and no culpability on the
part of the Saakashvili regime, a regime that has a rather
speckled human rights record. And I am sure that you have
reviewed that.
It causes me great concern that there appears to be within
Georgia a growing tendency toward authoritarianism. You know
what happens in terms of closing of the media outlets. Peaceful
protesters were assaulted by security forces. What I suggest is
a more balanced view, without just simply ignoring the
responsibility of the Saakashvili government.
Mr. Gordon. I appreciate that. I will, if I might, just
address both of those points.
On the first, again, I would say that whatever the origins
of the conflict last summer, they didn't justify Russia's
disproportionate use of force, nor the recognition of the two
breakaway regions, a recognition that has simply not been
supported in the international community.
I think only Nicaragua has joined Russia in recognizing
those two breakaway regions, and the rest of the world has
stood firmly behind the principle of territorial integrity,
which is the principle that the United States also stands
firmly behind.
There is not a military solution to those breakaway
regions. That is clear. But it is also inappropriate for Russia
unilaterally to have recognized them and also to fail to
implement the cease-fire agreements, which require Russia to
bring its forces back to the positions that they were prior to
the outbreak of conflict, something that Russia signed up to do
and has not yet done, nor has it allowed the full humanitarian
assistance to go in.
On your second point about democracy in Georgia, I also
went to Georgia to pay close attention to that issue. There
have been massive protests throughout the country in recent
months. I think, on the whole, the Georgian Government has
shown significant and appropriate restraint in dealing with
those protests.
We have encouraged them to do that. We welcome the fact
that they have. But we have also encouraged them to move
forward with the democratic reforms that are necessary to see
Georgia remain on the path to Europe.
Mr. Wexler. The time has expired.
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gordon, thank you for your public service and your
testimony here today.
I have two questions. First, since the 1974 Turkish
invasion, over 36 percent of the territory of the Republic of
Cyprus has been occupied by approximately 43,000 Turkish
troops. Can you comment on how the United States can use its
close relationship with Turkey to convince it to remove the
disproportionate and unnecessary number of troops from Cyprus,
thereby removing a major hurdle on its path of accession to the
EU?
Secondly, I am convinced that the Government of Turkey
continues to prosecute journalists and academics under Article
301 for writing about the Armenian genocide. Most recently, the
persecution of Turkey's first literature Nobel laureate, Orhan
Pamuk, was upheld by Istanbul's highest appeals court. His
trial is expected to resume this year for his remarks about the
Armenian genocide.
In light of Turkey's continued prosecution of intellectuals
who express themselves, what steps will you outline with the
Turkish Government to ensure greater freedom of press and
expression in Turkey? Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you for both of those questions.
On the first, as described earlier, we have a very clear
type of Cyprus settlement in mind that would be a bizonal,
bicommunal federation, single sovereignty. It is for the
parties to decide exactly how that comes out in terms of
territory and refugee return and troops and demilitarization,
but in any imaginable Cyprus plan that I have seen and that the
parties are discussing, it would also involve a significant
reduction in outside forces on the island, including Turkish
forces.
Again, the path to the outcome that you describe, which is
a reduction of the Turkish military presence in Cyprus, is a
Cyprus settlement. That is why we are so engaged and so keen to
have one. It would bring about the outcome that you referred
to, and it would benefit both sides in so many ways.
As for freedom of expression in Turkey and Article 301, I
can say the United States everywhere is a strong--and the Obama
administration is a strong proponent of freedom of expression,
freedom of the media, freedom of the press, free societies.
Turkey took some steps last year to revise Article 301 of its
penal code that made it more difficult to have political
prosecutions. That was an important step forward. It would do
well to continue down that path and allow for more freedom of
expression. And we have a constant dialog with the Turkish
Government about these issues, and will continue to make that
view clear.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening this very important and interesting subcommittee
meeting.
And thank you, Dr. Gordon, for being with us today. I just
want to add my voice to those who are very concerned about the
situation in Cyprus and see it as very important to the people
of Cyprus that it gets resolved, but also for those of us who
want to see Turkey become a full partner in Europe and part of
the EU, certainly I see it as a major stumbling block, because
as long as there are all those troops in Cyprus, as long as
there is not a recognition there that there should be one
federation and no reference to a Republic of Northern Cyprus,
which we have heard too often, even sometimes from the American
Government, I think, will we be able to get that done.
So when I hear you say that you kind of have an attitude
that we want to see this--get this done, but I don't quite hear
that America sees that as the imperative that it needs to be so
that we then can say with one voice: Yes, Turkey should go into
the EU, but it can't until the situation gets resolved.
So I guess my question is: What is the administration doing
to--and you are right, Cyprus has to solve itself, but I am
sure Ankara should hear from our Government that this is a step
for us to then say: Get Turkey into the EU.
Mr. Gordon. Absolutely. Let me say it quite clearly. This
administration is strongly engaged toward just that goal. The
Secretary has had this discussion with her counterpart, the
Cypriot Foreign Minister, with her Turkish counterparts. She
and the President, of course, have both traveled to Turkey, and
they have made clear that we see real opportunities in Cyprus
this year with the parties talking directly to each other, and
that it is a strong United States interest to get a deal on
Cyprus done as soon as possible.
You mention it as an obstacle to Turkey's access to the EU,
and we agree with that. A Cyprus settlement would be a major
step forward in opening up the door, the EU door, to Turkey.
That is a further reason that we support it. That is why the
Greek Government supports it. It would be good for Turkey, and
even the EU.
So we will be very closely engaged, and the Secretary is
very personally interested in this. It has been too long. It
shouldn't wait any longer. This year would be a good time to
have a Cyprus settlement.
Mr. McMahon. I think you said it, but it is clear, I think,
that the administration and the Secretary see this as a very
important issue and one that they will press in the immediate
future.
Mr. Gordon. Absolutely.
Mr. McMahon. Assume that were to happen, and there were to
be a withdrawal of troops and an agreement on Cyprus, what
other impediments do you see in terms of Turkey allowing
admittance into the EU? It seemed that when the President, to
his credit, visited Turkey that--I wouldn't want to say
displeasure, but it seemed that our great allies in France and
Germany, Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy, were not
thrilled by it.
How do you see--assuming, and only assuming, in my opinion,
and obviously from my colleagues, that the Cyprus issue is
resolved favorably, what other impediments do you see, and how
can America help to remove those impediments?
Mr. Gordon. It is an important question. Thank you. I will
be frank. It is a real challenge. I think as a general
proposition it is fair to say there is enlargement fatigue in
the European Union, not just toward Turkey, but especially in
the context of an economic crisis, countries and populations
are not terribly enthusiastic about bringing in new members.
That is unfortunate, but I think it is a reality.
It is a particular challenge toward Turkey, which is a
country of some 70 million geographically further away, a
majority Muslim country that faces some skepticism among
European populations.
But we continue to make the case that European Union
membership for Turkey has been an enormous incentive toward the
type of Turkey that Europe would like to have as a neighbor and
ultimately as a member, a more democratic Turkey, a freer
Turkey, a more stable Turkey, and one that can contribute
strategically, economically, culturally, and in so many ways to
the European Union. That is a discussion we have had for years.
We will continue to have it. As the President has said, we know
we are not members of the EU. This is not up to us. But as
friends of the Europeans, we are able to talk about these
strategic issues and common events, and we will continue to
make the case as to why that would benefit Europe.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you for your forthrightness and being
with us today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder
of my time.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
At this time I want to recognize the former chairman and
now the ranking member of this subcommittee Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Well, I thank the former ranking member and
now the chairman of this committee for yielding to me. I
apologize to all of you for being a little tardy.
Unfortunately, one of the things we can't make more around here
is more time. I appreciate you giving me the opportunity, Mr.
Chairman. And thank you for holding this oversight hearing
today on the transatlantic relationship.
I would also like to welcome Dr. Gordon, the recently
appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian
Affairs at the State Department. Thank you for being here.
There are many areas I would like to focus on regarding
United States-European relations. However, in the limited
amount of time today, I would like to focus on just a couple of
areas.
First, I am very concerned about the situation in Bosnia.
We are now 14 years after the Dayton Accords. Instead of
improvements in the political situation, we are seeing little
progress in creating a more unified, multiethnic society.
Second, in Kosovo I see very little evidence that the
Serbian enclave in the north is willing to cede authority to
the central government. In fact, every briefing I have received
indicates that the Serbs who are living in Kosovo conduct their
day-to-day lives as if they were being governed from Belgrade
instead of Pristina.
I would also like to hear Dr. Gordon's analysis on the
situation in both Bosnia and Kosovo and the strategy of our
Government in conjunction with the Europeans to build a more
stable future in these two countries. If we do not make
progress in Bosnia or Kosovo, I believe there is a real danger
of renewed violence in the entire region.
In addition, I would like to touch upon the situation in
Cyprus. I know that there was some reference to Cyprus as I was
walking in, but having been a Member who traveled to Cyprus, it
is one of those areas that is less traveled than some of the
other places in the world. I visited that country less than 2
years ago and strongly support negotiations between the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders as they work to reach a
settlement regarding the future of the island.
I was pleased to see that in his written statement
Dr. Gordon reiterated the administration's support for the
negotiations. However, there have been questions raised as to
whether Turkey is helping to facilitate an agreement or is
actually constraining Mr. Talat's ability to reach common
ground on specific issues with the Greek Cypriot counterpart. I
hope we can explore this in the future during the question-and-
answer period, which obviously has already started.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Former Ranking Member, and I
look forward to the testimony of our witness. Thank you very
much. I yield back.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask
you, Dr. Gordon, about Russia. It would be very helpful to me.
I will be going to Russia in the next week, and I want to try
to prepare myself to engage in those areas where I believe we
can have a partnership with Russia. I think it is critical that
we find areas of common interest that we can work together on,
and I want to get your comments on each one of them.
I believe nuclear nonproliferation is an area that we can
work on, and most paramount with that is the situation in Iran
and the situation in North Korea.
Now, in many respects, Russia has as much to win or lose
from this situation as we do. So how can we engage in that?
What is the administration's position on that? What must we be
prepared, what kinds of questions do we need to get answers for
in terms of Russia and Iran; Russia and North Korea; and how
can we get Russia to play a more definitive and positive role
in helping us? Those are the two most critical areas of nuclear
nonproliferation, to stop North Korea and stop Iran.
That is the first part of my question, Iran and North Korea
and Russia, and what degree can the two of us work together to
disarm these two nations from their nuclear weapons capacity?
Mr. Gordon. If I may, I will answer that right now, and
maybe we will have a chance to come back to Mr. Gallegly's
questions about the Balkans.
Nuclear nonproliferation cooperation with Russia is a
priority for this administration. One of the reasons that we
are trying to create a broader and more trusting general
relationship with Russia is so that we can work together on
issues like the one you mention. The fact is, and it is
regrettable in many ways in recent years, Russia has appeared
to view relations with us as a zero-sum game. If it is good for
us, they must be against it; and if it is good for them, it
won't be good for us.
And we see things differently, and you have given an
example of how this should be good for both of us. A nuclear
armed North Korea means potential for proliferation and weapons
of mass destruction getting in the hands of people who could
harm us and people who could harm Russia. That is even more
true of Iran. Iran is lot closer to Russia than it is to us,
and Russia would be equally threatened by a nuclear armed Iran,
and I think Russia's leaders know that.
So the question is, how do we maximize cooperation? As I
said, one is to just have a better overall relationship with
Russia so they don't see a gain for us as a loss for them. But
more specifically, we have been prepared to talk seriously with
the Russians about how they can be involved in containing a
nuclear proliferation in Iran.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask this because my time is coming, and I
want to get my last part of this question in. In an effort to
get Russia to deal more positively and more meaningfully with
us on these two very critical issues in North Korea and Iran,
what role could the missile defense system possibilities that
we have on the table in our plan of placing them in the Czech
Republic play into this? What is administration's thought on
this? Is that an area of no touchability? Are we being held
strongly and succinct in our positions there? And how do we
play the missile defense shield situation? We have got one
going in Alaska and California to take care of North Korean
missiles. This was there for Iran's. Is that in play?
Mr. Gordon. Thank you for raising that important issue,
which comes up a lot.
On the missile defense plans, let me say this. The
administration is reviewing the plans that existed to put
interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic. The
President has said there is a ballistic missile threat; there
is a nuclear threat, and if missile defenses will make us and
our allies safer, we will deploy them. But he wants to take a
serious look at whether the system works, whether it is cost-
effective, and whether it is the best way to protect ourselves
and our allies.
That review is ongoing, and we will see where it comes out.
In terms of the link with Iran, there is one, but in the
opposite direction, I would say. That is to say, the President
has said, if we can prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles, the less there is a need for a
missile defense system in Europe. It is just sort of a logical
conclusion.
The point of the missile defense system is to protect
against an Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile threat. If
that threat goes away, then the need for the system also goes
away. And he has said that to the Russians to underscore that
if they can help us deal with the threat, then there will be
less of a cause to have the missile system that they oppose.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Dr. Gordon.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Gallegly has graciously suggested, Mr.
Tanner, that we go to you.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you Mr. Secretary. I have just a very brief question
and comment about NATO. It has some challenges, no question
about it. Any consensus organization does. It has the financial
challenge and so forth, but it also has an institutional
challenge with respect to prosecuting the effort in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
And that is the--not only the member nations of NATO and
what they bring to the table, but the cooperation, hopefully,
with the European Union to help on the civilian side on some of
the things that are maybe a little bit outside of NATO's
mission.
I would be anxious to hear what you all are doing in that
regard to convince or to urge the European Union to do more
with respect to the building of the civilian part of the
equation that must take place in that part of the world.
Secondly, we just got back from a NATO trip where we went
to Sweden. Sweden is becoming president, as you know, in July.
And we were in Finland and Norway, Oslo, at the NATO PA
conference. But we went to the other countries to discuss the
High North issue. And I wondered what the administration was
doing with respect to the issues that are going to be
developing in the areas called the High North. Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you very much.
On the first part, we are indeed actively encouraging the
Europeans to do more on the civilian side in Afghanistan and
Pakistan just as we are. At the NATO summit, our allies stepped
forward with modest military contributions, including some
3,000 troops to help get through the elections, but there were
not significant added military contributions, which you know as
well as I do are very difficult to get from Europeans. And
therefore, we are encouraging them all the more to do what they
can on the civilian side because we know that there is not
ultimately a military solution in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The EU is a special priority of Special Representative
Holbrooke who is working on the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue.
There is a Pakistan pledging conference this week, and we have
been strongly encouraging our European allies to get more
engaged there and do what they can because we have also reached
a conclusion that you can't solve Afghanistan unless you solve
Pakistan, and that requires a lot of assistance.
And we have said to them, we understand that there are
constraints in what you can do on the military side, but it is
in our common interest that you do more on the civil side, and
we hope that they will.
The High North, you are right to draw attention to it. It
has been overlooked, but it is something I think we are going
to have to start paying more attention to. NATO, as you know,
has had a couple of recent conferences on this subject. The new
secretary general comes from a northern country with a long
history of involvement. And we agree with you that we are going
have to pay attention to that emerging issue. It is not just a
security issue, but it is an energy issue, and because it is an
energy issue, it is a security issue.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gordon, I am sensitive to the fact that you have been
sitting there for 2 hours, and I appreciate that. And I am
going to keep my questions very brief in view of that. But I
would like to get back to that issue of Kosovo and Bosnia and
the strategy that you see that we are going to try to implement
in order to try to preclude further problems.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Gallegly.
I think you hit the nail on the head when you talked about
Bosnia. We are not satisfied with the situation in Bosnia 14
years after Dayton. I think an honest assessment would conclude
that Bosnia is not just not moving forward in the way that we
would like but has actually taken some steps backward.
The Vice President recently took a trip to Bosnia because
we wanted to show that we are engaged, and we are paying
attention, but he was very clear with his Bosnian counterparts
on all sides that they need to get beyond this ethnic
nationalism that is dividing the country and bringing serious
risk to stability throughout the region. We stand by the Dayton
agreement. With the agreement of the parties, it can be tweaked
and you can make constitutional and political progress.
But there needs to remain a single Bosnia, and we just
won't recognize any attempts to break away from that single
Bosnia. But at the same time, there are entities that the
constitution recognized, and those need to remain.
It is a serious challenge, but we are trying to bolster the
High Representative that stems from the Dayton Peace Accords. I
think over time, I talked about EU enlargement fatigue; there
was a bit of an international Bosnia fatigue as well. People
felt, well, the war is over; we don't have to pay much
attention anymore. And I think the high representative didn't
get the political backing that he needed to keep Bosnia on the
right track. And we are going to try to bolster that and stand
firm behind the Dayton constitution and work with our European
allies. After all, they are at least or more engaged than we
are in Bosnia to put Bosnia back on track and make sure that
this sort of ethnic nationalism doesn't pay.
You also highlighted the challenges in Kosovo. They are
there, and I wouldn't deny them for a minute. But I would say,
if we pause a year, I think yesterday after the adoption of
Kosovo's constitution, for a first year, that country has done
pretty well. It has now been recognized by some 60 countries
around the world, including most of the Europeans. It was voted
in to IMF membership a couple of weeks ago. The World Bank
recently voted as well. It is gradually acquiring its place in
the international community, and we stand by it. The Vice
President went there as well to underscore that.
You are right that in the north of the country, ethnic
Serbs still seem reluctant to buy into Kosovo as an independent
state. But let me be clear that we cannot accept the idea of
partition. We think that is a route that, if you started to
travel down in the north of Kosovo, it would just never stop in
the Balkans. So we are doing everything that we can to support
Kosovo and hope that, over time, its citizens in the north will
realize that their home is in Kosovo, and Kosovo is going to be
a place where people of any ethnicity can have their rights
respected, their religious rights preserved and respected, and
they can find a stable home there.
Mr. Gallegly. Very briefly, can we jump back to the issue
of Cyprus and give us an assessment of how you see the role
that Turkey is playing in trying to facilitate or otherwise?
How would you assess Turkey's role in this process as it exists
today?
Mr. Gordon. I think that Turkey has an interest in a Cyprus
settlement, and the Turkish Government realizes the interest in
the Cyprus settlement. All of the parties in the Cyprus dispute
are tough negotiators. And Turkey, while not a direct party, is
included in that category. They, like everyone else will have
to make some compromises if there is going to be a settlement.
And as I have said before, we have this discussion with them on
a regular basis, and I will continue to have it and to make
clear that all sides are going to have to compromise for there
to be a settlement. But if there is a settlement, all sides
would benefit, including in the case of Turkey where a big
obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations would be removed.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Dr. Gordon.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A number of
questions. First, beginning with Russia, earlier this year with
some fanfare, the administration talked about the reset button;
although I think we got the translation wrong. You enumerated
what you thought the areas in which we could move forward on
with this new approach. What do you think we should be looking
for in terms of the next 6 months or 12 months to determine
Russia's sincerity in terms of making this reset effort
successful?
Mr. Gordon. That is a good question. Obviously, we will
welcome cooperation wherever we can find it.
. But priorities for this administration in foreign policy
include the Iranian nuclear issue. And that would have to be
near the top of the list to see Russia cooperating with us on
such a critical issue where they can play such a political role
is something that we will be very much looking for. Without
cooperation on that issue, that is clearly going to be a
significant blow to the cooperative relationship we would like
to see.
Afghanistan and Pakistan is another. It is a place where
Russia can make a positive contribution, and it is a priority
for the administration.
Strategic arms control is another because we have a real
prospect to do something in our mutual interests. Are they
going to be working with us constructively in that area? That
will be another test case.
But I think I could go on for some time with examples where
there will be indicators of whether they are also interested in
a better relationship with us.
Mr. Costa. In your sense of the meetings that have taken
place, both with the President and the Secretary of State so
far in the visits to Europe, I know we are not calling it a war
on terrorism anymore; but to what degree do you think the
Europeans, you talk about Bosnia fatigue, you talk about
fatigue with regards to Afghanistan, that they continue to
sense that the threat, I mean the bombings in Spain and London
is continuing to be a source of concern among European
countries?
Mr. Gordon. That is something that we all have to be very
conscious of and cautious about not losing sight of the degree
of threat that is out there. When weeks and months go by
without a terrorist attack, it is easy for populations to lose
sight of it. I am sure that applies to Europe as well, but you
gave the best possible reasons why that shouldn't happen. We
have a good dialogue with Europeans on terrorism. I think we
are on the same page.
Mr. Costa. But do you gauge they sense the same sense of
threat, the European countries?
Mr. Gordon. I think, since 9/11, there has been a gap in
the degree of threat felt by populations. It depends on the
country. Europe is a diverse range of views.
Mr. Costa. No, I understand.
On NATO responsibility, and we talk about Afghanistan, and
we look at the problems that concern the problems with poppy
production and eradication; that is an area that directly goes
into Europe. Where do you think NATO can play a greater role in
that effort?
Mr. Gordon. NATO has gradually--in the beginning in
Afghanistan, NATO and all outside forces were highly reluctant
to get involved in the drug issue. It is dangerous. It is hard
to have success because you end up often displacing it rather
than eradicating it. But over time, I think, we and our NATO
allies in Afghanistan have realized that it is too central a
part of the challenge we face to ignore. And gradually, NATO
has gotten more aggressive in targeting the labs that make the
drugs.
Mr. Costa. So you think it has gone beyond reluctance at
this point?
Mr. Gordon. No. I need to be honest, there is still
reluctance.
Mr. Costa. Let me move over. We talked--I am kind of going
full circle here back to Russia and the sanctions we are trying
to deal with Iran. It is my understanding that France's oil
enterprise, Total, hesitated regarding its investment in Iran,
but the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation took
total spot of about a $4.7 billion contract.
In addition to that, we are told that Royal Dutch Shell of
Dutch and British origins and Reposal of Spain have offered new
proposals for an initiative of Iran's major gas production in
the Gulf and with the Iranian Government. How do we make
sanctions work if our allies are not on the same page?
Mr. Gordon. You have underscored exactly the reason why
this is a global challenge where we need all of our partners
and not just some. That is what we hear all the time from oil
companies in certain countries; that if we pull out, someone
else will go in. I would actually say that we and the Europeans
are pretty unified in terms of the financial investment
consequences that Iran should pay for failing to cooperate on
the nuclear weapons issue, but if we don't get China and Russia
to cooperate as well, that is only going to have a limited
impact.
Mr. Costa. A final question if I might, Mr. Chairman.
And since I want to cover all the continents here, we were
in Sudan over a year ago, and obviously the EU has been trying
to play a role in an effort there. USAID has been a big part of
that. But providing the monetary support for the military
forces to try to protect those folks has been limited. Do you
think we are going to get the kind of support we need in Sudan
from our European allies?
Mr. Gordon. I can't make a prediction on that. I can only
say, it is a priority. And I began this by talking about how we
need Europe to be a global partner, and that is a good area
where they could show global responsibility alongside us.
Mr. Costa. All right.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have exceeded my time.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow part of Mr. Costa's
questioning with respect to Iran in the context of the dynamic
of Europe. Obviously the Iranian election is too fresh, too new
to know fully all the ramifications, although I suspect they
may, in fact, be far greater than any of us realize as we sit
here now.
Mr. Costa rightfully points out what would seem to be some
of the divisions, notwithstanding all of the efforts that the
EU3 have provided in terms of negotiating with Iran and the
degree of commitment that is in fact shared between the United
States and Europe in terms of thwarting Iran's nuclear
ambitions. There is a division when it comes at times to
contractual relationships.
And in the context of the President very ably, at least at
this early stage, navigating between his commitment to a policy
of engagement, which many of us and I certainly do support very
strongly, and at the same time of course pointing out the need
for a legitimate election and a review and standing up for
people's voting rights and their human rights and the like,
there is almost complete unanimous support in Europe for the
President's engagement policy.
But what worries me is, once we get beyond engagement,
should it not result in the type of Iranian behavior that we
would wish, what kind of commitment do you foresee at this
point in terms of the next steps, should they be required? Are
our European allies, in your view, considering the next level
of options that may, hopefully not, but may be required? Is the
EU in a position to seriously contemplate autonomous sanctions
against Iran outside of the U.N. if the ability to develop that
framework within the U.N. does not exist? And what impact do
you think the election in Iran is having in Europe?
And just totally aside from that, if you could, maybe just
point out or make a comment with respect to the agreement I
understand that was made this Monday between the European Union
and the United States with respect to Guantanamo and the
detainees? If you wish to comment on that, which I think is a
very important development, I would like to give you the time
to do that.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Those are challenging and important questions. I will
comment on both.
On Iran, I think we have made enormous progress over the
years in coming together toward a more unified United States
and European view. I think that by taking the lead in some ways
on the talks with Iran about the nuclear program, the EU3
process that you mention, Europeans have developed a sense of
responsibility on the issue and I think increasingly got on the
same page as us in making clear to the Iranians that, on one
hand, we are open to a better relationship, in bringing Iran
into the international community, but on the other, if they
refuse to give up their nuclear weapons programs, then there
would be consequences.
And I think we have seen a significant cutting back, not
just in terms of the U.N. resolutions and U.N. sanctions, but a
significant cutting back in financing from European countries
for Iran and in terms of European investment in the Iranian
energy sector.
You asked the challenging question, will they be prepared
to take the next steps if we don't have success in this? And I
can only say, Mr. Chairman, that that is what we are working
constantly on. I think the answer is yes. I think Europeans
understand that if we allow, we collectively, the international
community, allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, then
whatever is left of the international nonproliferation regime
is dead; that other countries would follow suit.
And when they think it through, they understand that
proliferation throughout the Middle East and the Gulf is not in
their interest. And they understand and I think they are
following the leadership of the Obama administration on this
score to make clear to Iran we are ready for talks; we will
talk about anything; we will hold up the prospect of bringing
Iran back into the international community; but there has to be
a serious price to pay.
I do think we and the Europeans are significantly on the
same page on that issue. I said already that getting Russia and
China and India and others on board will be critical as well.
You are right to draw attention to the importance of the
EU-U.S. Agreement, the EU statement on Guantanamo. That was a
prerequisite in many ways for getting the Europeans to help
with the closure of the prison on Guantanamo. They have been
calling for it for a long time. The Obama administration said
it would do so. And clearly, a path to being able to close the
prison would be for Europe to take some of the detainees. EU
countries would only do that when there was a framework among
them, which is understandable, so that, given open borders in
Europe, it was understandable that some countries wouldn't want
to accept, wouldn't want their neighbors to accept detainees
with open borders.
So that agreement is an important step. But I think we also
have to recognize the reality that the Europeans have said that
their willingness to accept detainees will be influenced in
part by our own. And they have made clear that it is hard for
them to explain to their populations why they should take
detainees even if they want to help with closure of the base if
the Americans aren't prepared to do so as well.
Mr. Wexler. Well, it seems like a fair position.
Mr. Gordon. I will let you characterize it.
Mr. Wexler. You have been very generous with your time.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. If I can, Mr. Chairman.
This morning we had a hearing in front of the committee
that I chair, which is the Committee on Oversight of American
Foreign Policy.
And I understand that there are guests from France here,
and I wish to acknowledge their presence.
The hearing this morning was on the issue of detainees. We
are doing a series of hearings on them.
We extended our gratitude to the Government and the people
of Bermuda, as well as to the Government and the people of
Palau.
We welcome the expression of support from the European
Union. We understand the difficulty dealing with publics. We
all are elected members of this body, but we do respectfully
seek your help. You can be assured of our gratitude if you are
able to assist us in this very problematic issue.
Now that I have a few minutes, I believe that there is
overwhelming sentiment to support the recision of Jackson-Vanik
here in Congress on the leadership of yourself and others, Mr.
Chairman.
If we are successful in passing that resolution, what would
your recommendation to the President be, Mr. Secretary, if it
ends up on the President's desk.
Mr. Gordon. I believe the President has said that he sees
Jackson-Vanik as anachronistic, no longer really applying to
the issues of the day, and I think he would welcome that
development.
If I might, I would also like to thank you for your
comments about those countries who have been helping with the
detainees. I would also like to express my appreciation to
those who have done so, and simply to add that the Italian
Prime Minister, Berlusconi, announced that Italy would also
take three. France had previously taken one and said it would
consider others. We appreciate those efforts because this is a
common endeavor so that we can work together to close the
prison.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, and I am sure that expression of
gratitude coming from the White House is joined by all members
of your committee and the full committee.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Just to give the other members another opportunity if they
wish.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. I certainly will take advantage of Dr. Gordon's
wisdom here.
I want to go back to, if I may, to Russia a bit here. What
is your understanding of Russia and the closure of the base in
Manas? How do you view that? I mean, we are getting mixed
signals. What is the real deal on Russia's role in closing that
very critical military base that supplies our troops in
Afghanistan with their supplies? I mean, can you explain their
role and how the administration views it and if the United
States has some strategy for dealing with that situation?
Because if that base is closed, where do we go? How do we feed
our troops? How do we get the supplies to them?
Mr. Gordon. Again, good questions.
I don't have any independent confirmable information about
what went on with the back and forth over the Manas Air Base.
We would have liked to continue to use it for the reasons that
you say. The Kyrgyz Government explained that it wanted to
close it. That did coincide with a Russian foreign assistance
package, but nobody has ever stated linkage between the two
things. And we are left to deal with the reality of the
situation, which is that the Kyrgyz Government denied access to
the base.
It is useful but not absolutely indispensable. Our military
has other means of getting what it needs to Afghanistan. But,
obviously, we would have preferred to be able to continue to
use the base.
Mr. Scott. Why do you think they did that? What was their
point? What point were they trying to make by putting pressure
on them to close that base.
Mr. Gordon. Well, again, I don't want to speculate about
that because I just don't know. We don't even want to say
explicitly that this is a Russian decision. The Kyrgyz
Government told us we couldn't use the base anymore, and we
have to respect that.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Now, let me ask you about Europe and the
almost nearly virtual monopoly that Russia now is beginning to
have on energy, supplying energy, particularly gas, into
European countries. And apparently there seems to be a split
decision here, and I am wondering how the United States deals
with that, or do you agree that there are some countries in
Europe who have viewed a more tolerant role of dealing with
Russia vis-a-vis their energy situation, and then there are
others who say this bad stuff here, particularly like
Lithuania, Estonia, some of the more closer ones in?
And what really intrigues me about this is, here is Russia,
with probably the largest natural gas reserves of any place
else on the planet, with a staggering weak economy, that it
seems to me that if they use their energy surplus and their
energy significance in a more constructive way, it could boost
and help get their economy go in another way, but instead,
correct me if I am wrong, it seems to me that they tend to use
their energy powers as a political tool. Is that a fair
assessment? And how do we reason to that, and what is the
feeling in Europe going forward?
Mr. Gordon. I think it is a fair assessment, and I think
our response needs to be focused on enhancing diversification
of energy supplies across Europe. It is not a healthy situation
for countries to be dependent on other countries for energy
because that risks making them politically dependent as well,
and you alluded to that. And there is a correlation between a
country's political dependence and views toward Russia and
their energy dependence. This is, of course, particularly true
for gas, where you need pipelines, and you can't diversify
simply by having ships come in from somewhere else.
So we are very keen to promote energy diversification in
Europe. I think the Europeans have been sometimes slow in
coming to the conclusion that this is necessary. The Secretary
appointed Dick Morningstar to be special coordinator for
Eurasian energy, because this is such a priority for us. In the
Clinton administration, he was very successful in promoting
energy diversification then, and he is very much focused on
helping do so now so that we are not in the position that you
just described.
Mr. Scott. May I just follow up with one quick question,
Mr. Chairman, and my last question?
But I do want to get a clear understanding, I asked you
about Iran and North Korea vis-a-vis Russia and we kind of
dealt with Iran, but I didn't get your response to North Korea.
In your assessment, what is your assessment of Russia's feeling
that North Korea presents a threat to them, because a threat is
a threat, but it really doesn't really become a threat until it
threatens you? And so does Russia see North Korea's getting
nuclear weapons a threat to Russia?
Mr. Gordon. I think they do. They voted along with us and
other members of the Security Council on a significant U.N.
Resolution that imposed further sanctions on North Korea, a ban
on arm sales and provided for inspections to prevent
proliferation. Russia went along. I am pleased to say that they
did. They didn't hesitate to cooperate with us on an issue
where we have a common interest. And that is a good example of
the places that we can cooperate in a common interest.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Doctor. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
If I can conclude the hearing just on one issue, if I may.
The visa waiver program. I believe last year we welcomed seven
new European countries into the visa waiver program, which I
think gained us a good strength of proper good will with those
countries, and we benefit mutually on both sides of the
Atlantic. Understanding that it is not just the State
Department but also Homeland Security and others that play a
very significant role in this process, I just want to put in a
special plug for Greece, which has gone through an arduous
process, and we would serve Greek-American relations quite well
if we can figure out a way to allow Greece into this program
quickly.
And in a broader sense, my understanding is, at the end of
the month, the waiver provision that is provided in the bill
expires, which would make it more difficult for countries such
as Poland and Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia to ultimately take
advantage of the visa waiver program. And I am wondering if the
administration has any plans on asking for an extension of that
waiver so that the expansion of the program might go forth in a
more successful fashion in the future.
Mr. Gordon. I am not sure I have the answer to your second
question. I think that group of countries that you mentioned is
not yet on the verge of meeting the criteria necessary.
I would want to say on the first, though, the importance of
getting Greece in the program, we share your view. Greece has
gone through an arduous process, and we appreciate that, and it
has made progress. And I think we are getting close. We now
have the agreements necessary in place. They still have to be
ratified in Greece. An American review team has to go out
there. But I think that we are coming near the end of this
arduous process, and we would very much welcome that. It would
be good for Greece and Greek-American business ties and
cultural ties, and we will celebrate the day when Greece is
finished this process and can join.
Mr. Wexler. Well, hopefully, we can celebrate in Athens.
Mr. Gordon. That would be nice.
Mr. Wexler. Dr. Gordon, thank you very much for your time.
Your testimony I think is greatly appreciated by all the
members, and we very much look forward to months and years of
working with you. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Minutes deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Gallegly statement deg.
__________
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
McMahon statement deg.
__________
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Berkley QFRs deg._
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Gordon responses to QFRs deg._
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
