[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-32]
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING:
HAS THE CALL FOR URGENT
REFORM BEEN ANSWERED?
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2009
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM COOPER, Tennessee CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia DUNCAN HUNTER, California
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
Steve DeTeresa, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Trey Howard, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009, Contingency Contracting: Has the Call
for Urgent Reform Been Answered?............................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009........................................ 29
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2009
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: HAS THE CALL FOR URGENT REFORM BEEN ANSWERED?
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee...................... 1
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 3
WITNESSES
Assad, Shay D., Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
and Technology), U.S. Department of Defense.................... 4
Harrington, Brig. Gen. Edward M., USA (Ret.), Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Procurement), U.S. Department of the
Army........................................................... 6
Parsons, Jeffrey P., Executive Director, U.S. Army Contracting
Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command............................ 8
Scott, Maj. Gen. Darryl A., USAF, Deputy Commander, Task Force to
Support Business Operations in Iraq, Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation), U.S. Department
of Defense..................................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Assad, Shay D................................................ 40
Harrington, Brig. Gen. Edward M., joint with Jeffrey P.
Parsons.................................................... 68
Snyder, Hon. Vic............................................. 33
Wittman, Hon. Rob............................................ 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Snyder................................................... 83
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: HAS THE CALL FOR URGENT REFORM BEEN ANSWERED?
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:04 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order. Welcome to the
first in a series of three hearings to follow up on specific
legislation related to contingency contracting and the
Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition workforce. Today's
hearing will focus on the Department's and the Army's progress
in implementing the recommendations made by the Gansler
Commission on Army acquisition and program management for
expeditionary operations.
Our next hearing will focus on the congressionally mandated
Memorandum of Understanding that outlines DOD's, State
Department's, and United States Agency for International
Development's (USAID) role and responsibilities for managing
contracts and contractors on the battlefield.
Our third and final hearing in this series this spring will
look at progress made in implementing legislative provisions on
improving the Department's acquisition workforce from the last
two defense authorizations.
These three hearings examine specific topics that are part
of the larger defense acquisition system, and as I am sure most
people here know, Chairman Skelton has decided to bring about a
HASC Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform, which is to be led by
Congressman Rob Andrews, who is going to take a look at more
general questions of how to provide the warfighters what they
need, when they need it, and how to provide the best value to
the taxpayer in buying goods and services for the Department.
And we are working with Congressman Andrews. And the staffs
have been working together.
We are very excited about the work that is going to be done
this year. To support our nation's missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, thousands of contracts worth billions of dollars
have been awarded, and the Department of Defense has hired an
army of contractors. There is currently one contractor for
every service member in Iraq, and roughly two contractors for
each service member in Afghanistan. The Army in its role as
DOD's Executive Agent for contingency contracting was
unprepared to manage all of them when these contracts began.
The result has been a disappointing amount of fraud, waste and
abuse. Who ultimately pays? We all do, the American taxpayer.
And ultimately our men and women in uniform suffer if they
don't get what they think the American taxpayers paid for.
In response to these problems, Secretary of the Army Pete
Geren appointed the Gansler Commission to review lessons
learned from recent operations and to provide recommendations
to improve the Army's capabilities for contingency contracting.
The Commission's recommendations call for a major change in the
Army's cultural attitude toward contracting and for
institutional changes to the Army's contracting capability.
Since the Gansler Commission reported its findings and
recommendations, both the Army and DOD have issued progress
reports that were required by the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense
Authorization. Today we look forward to hearing about the
progress that has been made in implementing the Commission's
recommendations. We want to know if Army contracting career
paths and leadership positions have been established and what
progress has been made in rebuilding the Army's contracting
workforce. We would like our witnesses to discuss how the
Commission's recommendations apply to the other services and to
highlight any other Department initiatives taken to improve
contracting capability. We are especially interested in the
training of those outside the contracting workforce, those in
the operational forces who have to deal with contracts and
contractors in the battle space.
We are very pleased that all four of you are with us today.
And we know that all four of you have worked very, very hard on
these issues, and it is clear that progress has been made, and
we appreciate you being with us.
From the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy and
Strategic Sourcing, Mr. Shay Assad. Mr. Assad is also the
Executive Director of the Panel on Contracting Integrity, which
was established by statute in the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense
Bill.
We also have two acquisition officials from the Army, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement, Retired
Brigadier General Edward Harrington, and the Executive Director
for the new Army Contracting Command, Mr. Jeff Parsons.
We are fortunate to have with us Major General Darryl
Scott, U.S. Air Force, who is just six days away from his
retirement. General Scott was on the front line of contingency
contracting as the Commander of the Joint Contingency
Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan (JCCIA) from
January 2006 until January 2008. And let me say, General Scott,
thank you for your service and for the service you are
rendering today.
Thank you all for being here. I am going to yield to Mr.
Wittman for any comments that he may want to make at this time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
welcome our witnesses today. Thank you so much for joining us
and thank you so much for your service to our nation. We deeply
appreciate that.
Defense acquisition and contracting are matters that have
gotten a great deal of attention in recent months from the
public and the President and from the Congress. Most of the
current dissatisfaction is directed at weapons system
acquisition, and there is plenty of room for improvement in
that area. The Department of Defense has also received some
significant criticism regarding the cost and less than exacting
oversight of general support contracts in the contingency
operations, which is the subject of today's hearing. But to be
fair this is an evolving, expanding area of military
operations.
While even George Washington relied on contractors for
battlefield support, contractors today are an essential part of
our deployed force structure. Our way of waging war is such
that our deployed forces now rely more and more on contractors
to provide basic and increasingly more operational services in
contingency operations.
As important as contractor-provided services are to the
battlefield commander, little conceptual thought has been
applied regarding how best to structure the support system so
the commander knows precisely what services to expect and how
to manage contractors. Additionally, the military services have
largely reduced their pool of acquisition specialists in recent
years. The combination of greater demand for contractor
services, fewer professional contract administrators, and no
overarching infrastructures led to some undesirable outcomes.
Our purpose today is not to go over those mistakes, but to
see how the Department and military services have embraced the
recommendations of the Gansler Commission to improve our
expeditionary contracting. I think the Department is headed in
the right direction in the increased pace of operations, and
base expansions in Afghanistan will provide ample opportunity
to demonstrate greater competency.
Proper oversight of contingency contracts is important, and
we spend as much or more on these contractors as we do on
weapons acquisition, which makes it even more important in the
years to come. These contracts often do not get the same
attention because the work is performed overseas by more than
50,000 U.S. citizen contractors and over 200,000 foreign
nationals in the central command area of operations alone.
Mr. Chairman, the magnitude of contingency contracting
operations clearly deserves this committee's continuing
attention, and I thank you for your leadership in scheduling
this hearing today, and our witnesses who are experts in DOD's
efforts in this area, and I look forward to their testimony.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you Mr. Wittman. You all may recall that
in April of 2008, just about a year ago, Mr. Skelton in the
full committee held a similar kind of hearing on how we were
doing with the Gansler Commission. This issue of how monies
have been spent, which you all have been dedicating your life
to for some time now, we appreciate it, is one that the
Congress and the American people are very interested in. In
fact, this morning Mr. Skelton had a hearing, which I thought
was an interesting hearing, on the title ``Effective
Counterinsurgency: How the Use and Misuse of Reconstruction
Funding Affects the War Effort in Iraq and Afghanistan.''
I think that is ultimately what this is about; how we spend
money affects the results and affects our men and women in
uniform and their families. And so that is why we want to do
this hearing. And we will continue probably to, maybe not this
subcommittee, but the Congress is going to continue to look at
this for some time.
Your written statements will be made a part of the record.
And then we will hear from Mr. Assad. And then I understand
General Harrington and Mr. Parsons, you have a joint written
statement. And then we will go to General Scott, who didn't
give us a written statement, but is going to make some
introductory comments.
We will use the clock. When you see the light go to red
that just tells you that five minutes have gone by. You should
feel free to go beyond that if there are some things you need
to say, but just to give you an idea of time. So Mr. Assad, you
are recognized.
STATEMENT OF SHAY D. ASSAD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND
ACQUISITION POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Assad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. My name is Shay Assad. I am Director of the
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. I am also presently
serving as Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology. In that capacity, among other
things, I am responsible for all contracting policy with regard
to contracting in the combat environment. And I am also the
functional leader for all of those who do contracting within
the Department of Defense.
I want to thank you today for the opportunity to appear
before you and to participate in today's hearing. At your
request I will address the Department-wide applicability of the
Gansler Commission recommendations, actions taken since our
report was written, and other ongoing initiatives. The Army
will be reporting to Congress directly on its own activities.
The Gansler Commission developed a broad-based strategy for
addressing shortcomings identified during its assessment. On
October 31, 2007, the Commission published its recommendations
in an independent report. The committee provided four
overarching areas of recommendation: increase the stature,
quantity, and career development of military and civilian
contracting professionals; restructure the organization and
restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract
management in an expeditionary environment; provide training
and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary
operations; and to obtain legislative regulatory and policy
assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary
operations.
The committee provided 40 specific recommendations in
support of their four overarching areas. Twenty-two of those
recommendations were specific to the Army, and we believe that
the Army is making significant progress towards meeting those
recommendations. But there is much work left to be done. The
remaining 18 recommendations were found to affect the entire
Department and are applicable to all services. All require
legislative, regulatory or policy enablers and are the focus of
my testimony.
In order to implement the requirements of Section 849, the
Under Secretary established the Task Force for Contracting and
Contract Management for Expeditionary Operations. The purpose
of that task force was to evaluate the applicability of the
recommendations to the entire Department. It was staffed by
eight cross-cutting teams, members from all three services, the
Joint Staff, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense
Acquisition University, and the Joint Contracting Command in
Iraq and Afghanistan participated. I acted as the Executive
Director.
While the Department agrees with the intended outcomes of
all of the Gansler recommended actions, we did not agree with
specific recommendations as they were written in one specific
area, and that is as it related to DCMA, and I will be happy to
discuss that with you. At this point, I would like to provide
you a brief overview of several actions since the report to
Congress, as well as other ongoing DOD efforts that continue to
go beyond the recommendations in the four areas.
With regard to contract management and oversight, the
military departments and defense agencies must plan and program
to have the force structure capable of supporting the current
effort of contingency operations consistent with their core
capabilities. To do this we created a Joint Contracting Command
services executive steering group.
On February 19th, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required
each military department and agency to conduct a total force
assessment of their required contingency contracting officers
and the contracting officer representatives to meet their
mission. With regard to civilian personnel policy, the
Department must be able to fully access the range of talent
within the DOD civilian community in order to quickly and
efficiently support complex mission operations. To accomplish
this mission the Department is staffing a program office to
oversee its civilian expeditionary workforce initiative.
Regarding Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization
Act of Fiscal Year 2008, the Department has taken important
steps to have the Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund targeted for increased training associated
with contingency contracting officers.
I want to thank Congress for their support of the
acquisition workforce and the flexibilities provided for using
this fund.
In the area of tools and training for overall contracting
activities and contract operations, we have made significant
progress. The Department has made improvements in training
available in support of expeditionary contracting for both the
workforce as well as the noncontracting workforce.
The instructor pilot session for advanced contingency
contracting will get under way this spring. It will provide
just-in-time training to journeymen contracting professionals
deploying into management positions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Commission recommended that we train as we fight.
Operators outside the acquisition community must be trained on
the role, importance and rules of operating with contractors
and expeditionary operations. All senior leaders need to have a
fundamental understanding of what operational contracting
support is, the ability to plan and integrate the contract
support with other military and interagency capabilities, and
the ability to account for and manage contractors as an
integrated part of the total force. We are working with the
Joint Forces Command to make this training a reality.
In summary, the Department has implemented or adjudicated
all of the Commission's recommendations, but there is more work
to be done. Our warfighters deserve our very best effort, and
the taxpayers rightfully should expect our best effort in
providing our warfighters the goods and services they need to
meet their mission.
Finally, the Department is grateful for the support that
Congress has provided in enabling us to achieve the necessary
improvements, and I am prepared to answer your questions. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Assad can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Assad. General Harrington, you
and Mr. Parsons will do your statements.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. EDWARD M. HARRINGTON, USA (RET.),
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (PROCUREMENT), U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Harrington. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman,
distinguished Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Army's progress
and completed actions to enable an agile expeditionary and
responsive contracting mission for our warfighters while
ensuring proper fiscal stewardship of our taxpayer dollars. It
is my honor to represent the Army as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Procurement, having assumed this position last
December.
As an introduction, while on active duty I served as
Director for Contracting for the Army, and in my last
assignment as a general officer led the Defense Contract
Management Agency as its Director.
As you noted, sir, with me today is Mr. Jeff Parsons,
Executive Director of the Army Contracting Command. We have a
joint written statement that I respectfully request be made a
part of the record for today's hearing.
Mr. Chairman, in August 2007, the Secretary of the Army
chartered the Special Commission on Contracting led by Dr.
Jacques Gansler to look at the long-term strategic view of the
Army's acquisition and contracting system in support of
expeditionary operations. At the same time, the Secretary
established the Army Contracting Task Force internally to
review current contracting operations and take immediate
actions where necessary.
With that work complete, the Army established the Army
Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force in February of 2008 to
review the Commission recommendations and other contracting
recommendations, and determine the requirements and resources
needed to address them. The mandate of this task force has been
met, and the workload has been transferred to my organization,
Mr. Parson's organization, and other enduring organizations
responsible for sustaining long-term Army contracting success.
Mr. Chairman, the Army's progress has been steady and
significant, and the senior leadership remains fully committed
to executing and sustaining this positive trend. We have been
guided by the Gansler Commission's overarching recommendations:
Implement the Commission's recommendations rapidly and measure
success.
In addition, the Commission outlined four supporting
recommendations for the success of future expeditionary
operation. These four supporting recommendations included 40
actions to correct discrepancies identified. Twenty-two of
these are Army specific, while the remaining 18 are within the
purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or are
legislative actions being addressed jointly among the services
with OSD as the lead agent.
The Army has taken action on or is implementing 21 of the
22 Army-specific recommendations. The remaining one, to
increase the contracting workforce by 400 military and 1,000
civilians, will require more time to ensure we both have the
quality and the quantity necessary to execute our contracting
mission. Our plan for fiscal year 2009 is to increase our
military contracting workforce by 131 members and our civilian
workforce by more than 500 members. The increase in workforce
size will continue over the next three years. We thank the
Congress for the five additional general officer billets
designated for acquisition. As of September 2008 the Army
selected one additional general officer, a brigadier general,
as Commander of the recently established Expeditionary
Contracting Command, and we will select more general officers
this year.
As an experienced member of the Senior Executive Service,
Mr. Parsons heads the Army Contracting Command, a two-star
position, that is part of the Army Materiel Command. Another
billet presently filled by a member of the Senior Executive
Service is in the one-star Mission and Installation Contracting
Command. The remaining two billets are the Military Deputy for
Contracting in the Army Corps of Engineers and an Acquisition
Contracting General within my office.
A critically important issue for us is the size, structure
and training of the military and civilian acquisition
workforce. From 1998 to 2006 the contracting workforce declined
by 20 percent, while the workload and the number of dollars
associated with that workload experienced a five-fold increase.
The Army, with the help of Congress and the Secretary of
Defense, is making steady forward progress in addressing these
workforce workload issues. Over the years we have added more
than 850 contract professionals. This holistic focus on Army
contracting will ensure that we attract and maintain additional
military and civilian contracting professionals who are trained
to meet the increasingly complex demands placed on them.
Sir, this concludes my opening remarks. Mr. Parsons also
has remarks, after which I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Harrington and Mr.
Parsons can be found in the Appendix on page 68.]
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Parsons.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY P. PARSONS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY
CONTRACTING COMMAND, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
Mr. Parsons. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman,
distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, I appreciate the opportunity to be here before
you to discuss our progress in implementing the recommendations
contained in the Gansler Commission report. While the U.S.
Army's Smart Contracting Report to Congress dated December 14,
2008, provides a broad overview of how the Army has responded
to the 22 Army actions specifically identified in the Gansler
report, I am here today to report on the progress we have made
in standing up the U.S. Army Contracting Command and its two
subordinate commands, the Expeditionary Contracting Command and
the Mission and Installation Contracting Command.
The standup of these organizations was one of the first
actions directed by the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable
Pete Geren, in response to the Gansler Commission report, and
continues to be a focus of our Army senior leadership. In fact,
this past Saturday I briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army and
General Ann Dunwoody, our Commander of the Army Materiel
Command, on our progress in standing up this new command.
One year ago we provisionally established the U.S. Army
Contracting Command at a ceremony held at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia. By combining the contracting resources of the former
Army Contracting Agency and the U.S. Army Materiel Command, we
designed a new two-star subordinate command to the Army
Materiel Command that is responsible for global contracting
support to our Army and its soldiers. Our concept for the new
command was approved by the Army in mid-July and provided
increases to both our civilian and military resources. These
additional resources will add over 900 civilians and nearly 400
military to the new command. The majority of these resources
will be contracting specialists, contracting officers, and
contingency contracting personnel.
We are now in the process of hiring civilians and
increasing accessions for our military personnel. Between the
Active, Guard and Reserve components we will eventually have
905 soldiers in our expeditionary contracting structure.
To date, our Army Contracting Command and Expeditionary
Contracting Command headquarters are nearing a 50 percent fill
rate. We have appointed a one-star general, Brigadier General
Camille Nichols, as leader of the Expeditionary Contracting
Command, and we have activated four contracting support
brigades led by seasoned colonels. These brigades provide
contracting support and contract planning support to our Army
service component commanders. These brigades currently support
U.S. Army Central Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Korea,
U.S. Army North, and U.S. Army South. Later this year we will
activate two more contracting support brigades and the
remaining 7th Brigade will be activated in 2011.
Underneath these brigades we have eight contingency
contracting battalions. To date we have activated five of these
battalions. The battalions provide contracting support and
contract support planning at the Army Corps level and provide
oversight of our senior contingency contracting teams and
contingency contracting teams. These four-person teams provide
contracting support at the division and brigade level. By the
end of fiscal year 2009, we will have activated 42 teams.
The teams, battalions, and brigades, are modular in nature
and can be deployed worldwide in support of military
operations. The teams and battalions get their day-to-day
contracting training and work experience at our installation
and contracting centers located across the Army Contracting
Command.
While we have a ways to go in staffing and training our
contingency contracting soldiers, we are providing forces to
the Joint Contracting Command--Iraq/Afghanistan in support of
Army joint manning requirements. Our soldiers also support
numerous exercises in smaller military operations on a day-to-
day basis across the globe.
We have tested our deployable capability and doctrine in
two significant joint exercises in Panama and Europe. Lessons
learned from these exercises are used to refine our doctrine
and training. There is still much to be accomplished, but I am
confident that we are making good progress in building our
expeditionary contracting capability to support our Army and
future joint operations.
I appreciate the congressional support of the Army's
efforts in providing our nation's warfighters and allies with
quality products and services. We continue to pursue
improvements in our contracting processes and workforce as
demonstrated by our Secretary's commitment to implement the
recommendations in the Gansler Commission report. I look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Parsons and General
Harrington can be found in the Appendix on page 68.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Parsons.
General Scott.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DARRYL A. SCOTT, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
TASK FORCE TO SUPPORT BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (BUSINESS
TRANSFORMATION), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Scott. Thank you Congressman Snyder, Congressman
Wittman. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's
panel.
I am Major General Darryl Scott, and with my retirement
this month I conclude 34 years of service with the United
States Air Force. For more than 28 of those years I served as a
military contracting officer. During that time I was guided
through a variety of acquisition and logistics assignments and
development opportunities that taught me not only how to make a
sound business deal, but also how to establish and maintain the
standards of stewardship that the American people expect, as
well as how to develop, employ and support the elements of
military power.
I have held line and staff jobs. I graduated from the Air
Command and Staff College and Industrial College of the Armed
Forces. I have commanded three times, and I have served as the
Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency from
December 2003 to January 2006. The senior officers who nurtured
me as my mentors, leaders and commanders had similar
backgrounds to mine; a balance of operations, leadership and
contracting and acquisition education training and experience.
Their experiences taught them that the essence of good
stewardship is a careful balance between effective oversight
and operational mission accomplishment. Too little attention
paid to either results in waste and mission failure. And they
made sure that I understood that also.
For me, all that experience and preparation culminated in
the most challenging and rewarding assignment in my career as
Commanding General of the Joint Contracting Command--Iraq/
Afghanistan from February 5, 2006, to January 19, 2008. During
my tour nearly 900 of the finest airmen, soldiers, sailors,
Marines and DOD civilians I have ever met rotated through the
command. Almost without exception they were as honorable,
mission focused, hard working and selfless a group as you could
ever wish for, and I am extremely proud of them.
Sometimes hard work and self-sacrifice by themselves aren't
enough. Too frequently we found that the individuals the
services sent us weren't adequately prepared to work in an
environment as complex as Iraq. Some had been trained only for
small purchases of commercial supplies, yet in my first year
there 50 percent of our workload were large infrastructure
reconstruction projects. Some were well versed in the processes
for awarding new contracts, but lacked experience in managing
and overseeing a contractor's performance. Many were unfamiliar
with the exceptional authorities Congress has provided for
streamlining contingency contracting operations. Most had no
experience synchronizing contracting activity with the
strategic objectives of the Iraq and Afghan campaign plans and
no experience managing scarce human resources in ways that
properly balance operational and business risks. Some,
particularly among my Army personnel and Marine Corps
commissioned officers, were on their first assignment in
contracting. Almost literally a baptism by fire.
It is clear to me that these shortcomings were not their
fault, but rather the fault of a system that over a period of
more than 10 years had eliminated the path that produced the
superb senior officers who mentored me.
The Gansler report notes that at the time I took command
the Army had no general officers in contracting, and indeed I
was the only career contracting active duty flag officer in any
of the services. I was privileged to be allowed to testify at
length to the Gansler Commission about the challenges my
command faced in trying to provide effective stewardship over
contracting and the reasons behind those challenges. I was
pleased with the comprehensiveness of the Commission's findings
and the seriousness with which the Army leadership responded.
Still I remain somewhat apprehensive. The circumstances
that permitted the cadre of senior officers skilled in both
contracting and operational art to wither away will require
years of persistent effort to fix. I applaud the foresight of
the Congress, OSD, and the Army in establishing 10 new
contracting flag billets, five for the Army and five in the
joint community. But the true test of this policy will be
whether the bright young contracting lieutenant colonels of
today will receive the care and attention from knowing mentors
like I did, that care and attention that will enable them to
advance into these positions. And will the brightest young
captains and majors of tomorrow look at contracting experience
as career enhancing or as a career detriment?
Thank you for your time today. I look forward to your
questions.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you all. I appreciate your all's
statements today. What we will do is Mr. Wittman and I will put
ourselves on the five-minute clock and go back and forth here
until we run out of things to ask about.
I thought Mr. Assad, I thought it was your--no, I guess it
was Mr. Harrington, your statement, you referred to it I think
briefly on page eight in which you discussed what seemed to be
the underlying problem. You say that we found that more than
600,000 contracts may be complete, but have not been officially
closed out in the contract management system. We have taken
immediate steps to obtain greater fidelity in this figure,
explore the root causes, and implement a comprehensive plan to
clear the backlog of contracts requiring closeout. A primary
cause has been a 25 percent reduction in the contracting
workforce during a period of 500-plus percent in contract--500
percent increase in contract transaction workload.
I think that really describes the challenge that you all
are dealing with, and that is not at all necessarily an Army
created problem. That is as much a congressionally created
problem as anything. But that really brings home--and as you
just pointed out--brings home the problem. You just pointed
out, General Scott, it can take a long time to put those pieces
back together. It is a lot easier to reduce your cadre of
trained people than it is to build it back up again when you
have let them go.
I think the first question I wanted to ask is to you, Mr.
Assad. In your statement you refer to senior leadership. You
say, quote, on page 23, ``all senior leaders need to have a
fundamental understanding of what operational contract support
is, the ability to plan and integrate contract support with
other military interagency capabilities, and the ability to
account for and manage contractors as an integrated part of the
total force.''
And it seems like I suspect if we went out and talked to
most Americans, are you aware that half the force that we have
sent to Iraq are civilian contractors, only that they weren't
all sent there, significant numbers are brought from other
countries who are there? But are you aware that over half of
the support, or half of our force are civilian contractors? And
I think over half of the contractors are for base support. It
is not like they are doing something that is not significantly
important to the force. I suspect most Americans would not
think in those numbers. We always talk about how many troops
are in Iraq, pretty much a one-to-one ratio in Iraq since this
thing has started.
How do you think the military is doing and the Army is
doing with regard to the concept of how significant the
contracting force is, so significant that they need to
prioritize in their mind the ability to manage contracting and
manage contracts?
Mr. Assad. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is any doubt
that the leaders of today fully understand the fact that they
are managing an integrated force, and that 148,000 contractors
in Iraq and some 71,000 in Afghanistan, the commanders on the
ground clearly have a much better understanding today than they
did five years ago of the power of that force and the
importance of that force.
I can give you one personal example. I actually came on
board into civilian service in 2004 with the Marine Corps, and
I was a senior civilian contracting official with the Marines
at that time. General Mike Hagee was the Commandant of the
Marine Corps at that time. When I took over this position at
OSD I went to see the Commandant to thank him for everything
the Marine Corps had done for me. And he said to me, you know,
Shay, six or seven years ago I might not have said this, but
the reality is if, and he said I was a battlefield commander,
if I was going to the battlefield one of the first three people
I would bring with me is a contracting officer. And so there is
no doubt that the leadership now understands the importance of
being able to contract for certain nonorganic capability and
then to integrate that capability into the force.
This has been a learning experience for a number--for the
entire community in terms of the large number of contractors
that we have in our force. But there is no doubt that I think
as we go forward contractors will remain part of the support
force for the warfighting Army and Marine Corps especially. The
reality is that I think as we go forward we are working with
the Joint Forces Command now, so that we get training courses
into all of our staff colleges and into all of our junior
courses and our noncontracting military officers so they
understand what it is like to have contractors supporting them
and to have members of their operational force who will be
responsible for overseeing that contract performance. And I
think the Army is going through a transition right now in that
regard in the sense that it is the operating force that really
will provide most of the oversight for our post camp and
station type activities, where we will always have folks from
the Defense Contract Management Agency and professionals
overseeing certain unique technical oversight of certain
technical contracts in all of our engineering support contracts
for our major weapons systems. But for post camp and station we
will rely on our operating force to do that, and I think our
operational commanders are up to it now.
Dr. Snyder. General Harrington, before I go to Mr. Wittman,
do you want to comment on that issue of the senior leadership?
General Harrington. Certainly, sir. I will give you two
examples. About a month and a half ago I was called in to brief
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, much as we are discussing
this today. And I got to my second slide on an update of
Gansler and what we were doing with it, and he stopped me and
he had all of the major Army commanders on video teleconference
(VTC) hookups into the Pentagon and all of the Army staff, to
include some of the secretariat. And the reason he stopped me,
he expressed very clearly to the chain of command throughout
the Army that contracted support is a part of the Army, and he
essentially said it is a part of our force structure, we have
got to accept that we have got to get our arms around
contracting officer representative (COR) support, the
commanders in the field at each level have to emphasize the
proper training, the selection of those CORs, that they are a
vital component of ensuring the contractors deliver what they
are on contract to deliver, and that they are the eyes and the
ears for the contracting officer.
As recently as a week and a half ago I provided, and Mr.
Parsons did also, an update to the Secretary of the Army, and
we are due back in another week to continue to follow up with
him on the actions we are taking.
So I think the senior Army leadership is tuned in. They
know it is a matter of emphasis. They understand the value of
what contracted support provides the Army and understand the
necessity of overseeing it properly to make sure we get what we
pay for.
Mr. Parsons had just mentioned the Chief of Staff of the
Army is General Dunwoody, last Saturday, and that is a
component. We just left the VTC with our two bosses, General
Dunwoody and Mr. Popps to come here. They discussed
specifically the contracting support in Iraq and what we are
going to do in Afghanistan.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And that is a great
segue to my question. If you look in the long run it looks like
in Iraq we are certainly going to see a reduction in demand for
contracting and contractor support. But it seems like in the
near term as we move personnel and equipment out of Iraq there
is going to be an increase in demand. We are also going to see
that in Afghanistan as we move more personnel and equipment
into Afghanistan.
With that being the case, can you talk a little bit about
what steps need to be taken to prepare for this surge in
contractor support and for the demands that it is going to
place on the contingency contracting system?
Mr. Assad. Sir, we are working with the Army with regard to
what are the increases to the Joint Contracting Command that
are going to be necessary to meet this requirement, and whether
or not there is a civilian workforce component of certain types
of contracting that we can do in the rear to support what will
be done on the ground. So we are actively looking right now at
increasing the number of contracting officers on the ground in
the Joint Contracting Command, both in Iraq and Afghanistan,
for the very reasons you mentioned.
General Harrington. At the conclusion of our VTC today we
confirmed Brigadier General Bill Phillips is a contracting--has
a contracting background. He commands the JCCIA that Darryl
Scott commanded. He has done a deliberate workload assessment
both in Iraq and Afghanistan and looks at weighting the effort
in Iraq, for instance, with more civilians because of the
relatively more secure environment there and weighting the
Afghanistan requirements with more military.
I would ask Mr. Parsons, if it is okay, to talk further on
that.
Mr. Wittman. Absolutely.
Mr. Parsons. Sir, one of the other things that we have done
that we learned out of Kuwait is that we could establish some
reach-back capabilities, is what we call it, where we do some
of the contracting back here in the States for the theater. You
can't do this in all cases, and certainly you still need
presence in that country. But we have established a 10 to 12-
person cell dedicated to the Joint Contracting Command in Iraq
and Afghanistan now at Rock Island. We are going to increase
that. And as General Phillips identifies requirements that he
believes we can execute back here in the United States in
support of him, we will do that. That allows some reduction on
the demand for having people right there on the ground. It also
gives us the ability to reach into a lot more expertise when it
comes to the more complex contracts. So that is the other
aspect we are doing.
We are also putting a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) presence with LOGCAP IV into Afghanistan to help with
the surge requirements. In fact, task orders have already been
issued under LOGCAP IV in support of the buildup there.
Mr. Wittman. General Scott, your thoughts.
General Scott. Congressman, I will remind everybody I have
returned from Iraq 14 months ago, so I don't feel that I would
ever second guess Brigadier General Phillips and his assessment
of what is necessary. But I will say that one of the things
that came out of the Gansler report was a realization on all of
our parts that, first of all, we needed more people in theater.
And you heard from Mr. Assad that that plan is under way. But
as Mr. Parsons said, if we plan the work properly you don't
have to do all of the work in theater.
I would say that one of the maturation steps of the theater
of the contingency environment has been recognizing that we
need to do a better job of planning and organizing. Frankly, my
predecessors were faced with a pick-up game--they show up in
the driveway and the next game you play is in the Sweet 16--
where now we are doing a far better job on that and we are
learning an awful lot and taking advantage of that.
Mr. Wittman. We only talked a little bit about integrating
this whole thought process on contractor support. Have
combatant commanders recognized the importance of contractor
support, and how many have included operational contractor
support requirements in either their op plans or their con
plan?
Mr. Assad. Sir, we are working with--we now have an
organization called the Joint Contracting Acquisition Support
Office. The purpose of that office is to accomplish that very
mission. That is to work with each of the combatant commanders
and ensure that they in fact have contracting planning support
done in their op borders. Three or four years ago frankly those
op borders would have been pretty bare in terms of the
direction and the scope of contracting.
In today's environment we just conducted, for example, our
first Joint Contracting Command training over in European
Command (EUCOM). We have got two more training sessions going
on this year, one in Pacific Command (PACOM) and one in
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), I think. But the idea here is to
get the plans in place so that our operational commanders not
only understand what is the scope of the contracting support
that needs to be brought to bear, but what are the contracting
tools that are going to be used to get that contracting there
on time and, more importantly or just as importantly, who is
going to oversee this so that the taxpayers get what they are
supposed to get and our warfighters get the goods and services
they wanted.
Mr. Parsons. If I could add to that. We just recently this
past August participated in a joint exercise called PANAMEX,
which focused on Panama down in the Southern Hemisphere. And it
was the first time that, not really the first time, but the
second time that we tested this joint task force and joint
contracting by deploying one of our contracting support
brigades. And they started very early on with the joint task
force commander and the other services in the planning for that
operation.
So we are proving that the up-front planning pays off. One
of the things that they did was they included the Air Force
contracting folks, they included the Navy folks, and by that
early planning were able to actually identify contract vehicles
that were already in place that could be used for things like
opening a port. And so we are seeing this paying off in spades
now.
And what my observation is, I think there is a lot more
jointness that is now taking place between the services as we
work with these combatant commanders in doing their operational
plans.
General Scott. Sir, if I may add, one of the things that I
think the Army has done extremely well is the Army is out in
front in developing organizational concepts that facilitate the
planning part. The problem prior to the establishment of the
contract support brigade was you had military organizations
that were designed to award contracts, but they weren't
designed to plan the ingress phase, the transition phases, to
do the kinds of market research that you need to do to see what
is available in theaters. When I first saw the structure of the
contracting support brigades I said, gee whiz, I wish I had
this when I was walking into Iraq. It would have made life a
whole lot simpler, because you have folks already who
understand what the tasks are and how to sequence things in
order to make them work a whole lot smoother, and we sort of
learned all that on the fly.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. I guess using the jargon that you all use more
than we do, General Scott, you talk about these skills being a
core competency and not something that you kind of pick up as
you need to when you go to a new theater or something. And it
sounds like you are going back to the discussion about what are
the senior leaders doing that we are moving in that direction.
Is that what you are saying?
General Scott. Yes, sir. I would say that the real
challenge is getting them to understand that it is not just
knowledge of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), it is
understanding how do you--what the concept of operation is for
supporting a force, given the particular mission that that
force had. This is one of the reasons why you really need
military senior folks in there, because core competencies for
military force employment are in the uniform side of the
Department of Defense. And it is that knowledge and skill,
combined with FAR-based knowledge, combined with sound business
judgment that results in a good contracting support plan. If
any of those pieces are missing, the job becomes orders of
magnitude more difficult. And frankly, those are the kinds of
things that we have seen where fraud, waste and abuse can
occur. It starts with if you don't have a really good plan, if
you don't know how you are going to do oversight, if you don't
have the people identified and trained to task, the
opportunities for mischief grow.
Dr. Snyder. This is your all's book here I think. This
appeared in my office today. I didn't request it. But your book
brings home another issue to everything you just said there,
General Scott. But this does not look like a nice pristine real
estate office. Those are pieces of paper on what is a hood of a
jeep, I think, or a hood of some vehicle. You have got that
whole environment too that you are in strange settings and
dealing with different languages and trying to do things very,
very rapidly. That seems to be the theme to this book of how to
do these things when you are in difficult environments. Is that
a fair statement?
General Scott. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder. I wanted to ask, maybe I will ask you, Mr.
Assad. With regard to the CERP funds, I guess that is the
Commander's Emergency Response Program, isn't that the acronym?
Where do you see the management and contracting and oversight
of the CERP funds, which we have had this discussion on the
congressional side, are these development funds? I don't think
they are development funds, I think they are counterinsurgency
funds. And in an area that has just been cleared out and I see
300 men standing around and I can pay them five dollars a day
to clean trash and that gets them occupied, I would rather, who
cares about the paperwork, is a bit of an attitude at that
time. But I would like to hear your review of how you see the
CERP funds in this whole picture.
Mr. Assad. Dr. Snyder, that is an interesting point. When I
got to OSD, one of the concerns that was expressed by some of
the operational leadership was that we were invoking too many
FAR-based principles, Federal Acquisition Regulation
principles, on the CERP fund, and we were preventing it from
being used in the manner that it should be used. So we did a
pretty exhaustive examination of that. And as you all know,
there are no regulations that necessarily have to apply to
that. And in fact there were no FAR regulations that had
applied. But it was the operational commanders themselves and
their concern that the money be properly accounted for that led
to very stringent rulemaking amongst noncontracting folks, if
you will, in an effort to try to account for those funds
properly.
And I would like, maybe General Scott can talk a little bit
about that in terms of the ordering officers who were actually
using those funds.
General Scott. I would like to talk about that in terms of
two brief war stories. The first one was when the now current
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, who was the core commander at
the time, invited me for lunch at his headquarters and forgot
to inform me I was the main course. But actually what General
Corelli had in mind was a campaign, and this was Operation
Together Forward, the second battle of Baghdad. His strategy
was clear: Hold and build. So we did a security operation to
clear the area, we established a cordon around it to hold it,
and then we want to build within that area, whether it is
restoring public services, whether it is hiring the 300 guys
that are around the corner to pick up the trash, but we want to
do something to show the folks that the quality of their lives
was going to improve.
The problem that he was faced with was the FAR-based
bureaucracy. Even in the best of circumstances if you are going
to spend a half million dollars under the FAR, it is going to
take you about 45 days to do that. And what they had in mind
was about a 48-hour response time that we were clearing the
area, 48 hours later we would have people in there picking up
the trash, restoring the water and sewer and electricity and
improving the lives of the folks.
So what we did is we went and examined it and said, well,
why is this, that we have this lag time between flash to bang,
as the Army calls it, between the desire for it and the actual
effect showing up. And it turned out that when we did that
examination most of the rules that had been imposed were not
required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations, not required
by the Department of Defense. Congress had been very, very
clear that their intent for CERP money was you need a process
that is fair, transparent and accountable, but we give
commanders broad discretion in how they establish that. It
turned out that most of the rules we had put on ourselves. So
the fairly quick solution was loosen up. We established some
local procedures for accountability, we told the folks they are
ordering officers, that this is the standard for competition,
free independent sources, bidding on a project. And we said,
everything you do, write it down, because eventually we are
going have to come back and account for it. And we did that.
First of all, we achieved the 48-hour turnaround where we could
achieve the effects that the commanders wanted within that time
frame. And second of all, through that whole period of time
there was not one case where CERP money went unaccounted for.
So folks took it very, very seriously. The commanders
understood that they were personally liable and accountable.
This was not something that some contracting officer was going
to go to jail for, it was something that they were going to be
held accountable, and they responded.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you had
mentioned a little bit earlier the hearing we had earlier today
that talked about the use and misuse of resources there in the
reconstruction of Iraq. It brings me back to the Gansler
Commission report that talked about there being more auditors
in the field than government contractors there.
The question is this. Do we have the right balance now
between auditors and contractors, and are the folks in charge
of auditing doing the proper job in staffing and training those
folks that are charged with that audit function?
Mr. Assad. I think we have done a lot better. But right now
what we are doing, Mr. Congressman, is examining, especially in
Afghanistan, the answer to that question, do we have enough
oversight? Not just auditors, but Defense Contract Management
Agency professionals, as well as properly trained contracting
officer representatives.
I think that in terms of auditing invoices for our U.S.-
based contractors, we have got that down pretty well. When we
start to talk about local procurements, then it becomes a
little bit more difficult because there are situations where
the contractor is there one day and not there the next.
And so what we want to make sure of, however, is that as we
award these contracts that sufficient oversight is in place. We
are looking to put more contract oversight in theater. There is
no doubt about that. We need to train our contracting officer
representatives more capably, and we also need look at our
Defense Contract Management Agency staffing.
Right now there are about 240 folks in the Defense Contract
Management Command who are overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan.
That probably needs to be plused up a little bit.
General Scott. Sir, if I can comment on that. I would also
say that in a contingency, the relationship between the
auditors and the contracting officers has to be somewhat
different than it is in typical state-side contracting. What we
found worked very well was to maintain the independence that an
auditor must have in order to do their job effectively, but
there had to be some degree of cooperation. It was almost--I am
an Air Force guy, so it was almost like an air defense solution
where someone queues the weapon to the target and then somebody
else goes out and prosecutes the fight.
General Scott. And the someone that queued the weapon to
the target most frequently was the contracting officer.
Something smells bad about this. I have a bad feeling about
something going on. Can you guys please take a look at this?
Where state-side, we are more used to the auditors setting
their audit agenda much more independently as well as
conducting the audits themselves.
But I will tell you I met with Special Inspector General
(IG) for Iraq Reconstruction monthly. My staff met with them
weekly. I met with the Army audit agency monthly. When Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) established their presence over
there, we had monthly meetings. And it was really kind of an
audit coordination meeting where we would look at it and say,
hey, look, I am really worried about blanket purchase
agreements. I think that they may be being misused. Can you
guys go take a look at that and give me either a thumbs up or
thumbs down?
The advantage for me as a commander was, those initial
reports came directly back to me and to my contracting officer,
so we could go do something about it right then, not wait until
two or three months later when things go through the normal
coordination cycle and the nice pretty bound report comes out.
Well, by that time, the guy that was doing all the mischief is
gone.
Mr. Wittman. Gone.
Mr. Assad. If I might say something, Dr. Snyder, you had
mentioned that we have a panel on contracting integrity that
was set up by this committee, as a matter of fact. It was
initiated through the House. One of the subcommittees that we
have is on procurement fraud. And in particular, it was to
educate and create tools to educate our contracting officers on
the battlefield to become more aware of areas or events or
situations that they could be in that might prevent or that
might cause fraud and/or waste and abuse. Creating check lists,
simple things like checklists for when they were going to
relieve another officer in a forward-operating base what they
should be looking for. And also helping that officer who is at
that forward-operating base to say, you better be prepared with
the following documentation, because it is going to be expected
of you by your relief.
We have worked with the DOD IG as well as the Navy, Air
Force and Army IGs in setting up some terrific tools on Web
sites for our contracting officers who are in the battlefield
to gain access to tools that will help them with regard to
ferreting out fraud.
Mr. Parsons. I would just like to add one more point. Our
design over these contracting support brigades led by these
colonels, the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and
the Army Audit Agency had both agreed to make a pool of
deployable CID agents and Army auditors that we can tap into as
part of our deployment for the brigade. So when a brigade
deploys, we will most likely bring a CID agent and an Army
auditor with us as well. And those CID agents are already
helping us in doing some instruction with the contracting
officer representative. So when we give a class to the
Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) today, the CID has
a block that talks about procurement fraud and bribery and
those types of things. So a lot of the education is improving.
And I think the more we get our forces educated, the less
auditors you really need on site. I think what we are suffering
now is, like General Scott said, so much inexperience and not
enough people kind of lead to that environment where you almost
had to overreact with the number of auditors. I think in the
future it will be better balanced.
General Harrington. Sir, I would add, with the help of OSD
within the Army, we have restored what we called the
Procurement Management Review Process. We have now just about
completed staffing up two teams and very much appreciate
Congress's support for the resources to be able to do that.
These two teams are specifically dedicated to going out into
the Army. As recently as last week, we reviewed the Kuwait
contracting command under Mr. Parsons. And today we are putting
the planing together to go into JC CIA in Iraq as well as in
Afghanistan in about another month.
The procurement management review goes into contract files,
looks at policies, processes, tools. It is not just the
inspection activity; it is to say, to determine, are you
adhering to the guidance that you have got? It is as well my
tool to collect data on what we need to, at our level, to
better enable our contracting workforce. Mr. Parsons has the
same capability in the Army contracting command, and it is our
ability to gain firsthand experience about what is really
happening out in these activities wherever they may be. So we
have that in process.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. See, we get to rest up for five minutes and you
all don't. We have a tag team going on here.
I want to ask, have you, any of you, heard of the steamboat
the Sultana? I see a nodding head in the second row back there.
The Sultana is the worst maritime accident in the history of
the United States. It was a couple weeks after the end of the
Civil War. I don't remember where it shoved off from, but it
picked up a load of mostly Union soldiers who had been released
from prisoner-of-war camps in the South. They were all
emaciated, sick, not doing very well.
The company had a contract to haul these soldiers up North.
Now this is where there became a problem, because the steamship
was, I think, three times the load it was supposed to take. It
actually pushed off from Memphis, picked up a load of wood at
Marion, Arkansas, went out in the middle of the river; it was
at flood stage, and the boiler blew. So I forget the number. I
am not sure I know exactly, 1,700 or so lives lost because most
of them were very weakened Union soldier war veterans.
The country didn't pay a whole lot of attention to it,
except for the families, because Lincoln had been assassinated
shortly before then. The war was over. But it brings home, it
is not just writing the contracts; it is what happens, the
quality, the performance. Obviously, we haven't had anything
like that I don't think ever since then. But we do have things
that have occurred. The one I think has gotten the most press
attention was the allegations of improper electrical work that
has resulted in the loss of life.
I have got your book now, and I don't see anything along
here in this little index thing about monitoring a contract or
quality controls during performance of the contract. Where does
that fit in? And that may not be your all's responsibility.
Where does that fit in for the guy who just signed this on the
hood of a vehicle, what is his responsibility to go back and
check on the contract?
Mr. Assad. Well, his responsibility is to ensure that the
contracting officers' representatives that are participating
and working with him are in fact properly trained to execute
their responsibilities, and that DCMA, working through the
Joint Contracting Command in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan,
is in fact overseeing contract performance. It depends on the
instrument.
If it is LOGCAP, for example, much of that oversight is
conducted by the Army contracting officer representatives. If
it is a technical contract, that would in fact be overseen by
DCMA. And so I believe there is a section in there, Doctor, and
I would be happy to get it for you, that does talk to
contract----
Dr. Snyder. Contract administration?
Mr. Assad. Yes, sir, that is it.
Dr. Snyder. Ah, look at that.
Mr. Assad. There is a section in there. But having said
that, there is also a DVD in the back of that book that we have
provided to our contracting officers that leads them to, it
would be in the last page of that, that would lead them to a
Web site that gives them additional information with regard to
contract oversight and contract management services. It should
be in the very last page of the book.
Dr. Snyder. Actually, I will read the first sentence. It
says, this chapter discusses actions a contracting officer
should take to administer a contract that covers actions to be
taken and documentation included from contract award to
contract close out. And this includes seizures, monitoring,
transferring, terminating and closing out contracts. So I
missed a tab. You have it all covered.
Mr. Assad. You had me worried there, Mr. Congressman.
Dr. Snyder. I know it. It is an issue, though. You
mentioned, I think, the 600,000 contracts that haven't been
formally closed out. I suspect that is not because somebody did
a bad job. I suspect it is because they are overwhelmed with
volume.
Mr. Assad. Dr. Snyder, I think that the issue here, and it
is one that we are all looking at very carefully, and I did
mention to you that there was one recommendation, actually it
was three, that were tied into DCMA. And it was about contract
oversight. And the difference of opinion was that the
commission felt that contract oversight for post, camp and
station in the United States should be done by the DCMA. I have
two former DCMA commanders here. That has never been a
responsibility of DCMA and would have required a significant
change in organizational structure to make that happen.
But it is our belief that, in order to have the operational
force understand the capability that they are contracting for
is to lay some of that responsibility on them to do oversight
for post, camp and station. And so when we are in theater, when
we are looking at life support services, dining facilities,
laundry facilities, things of that nature, we are looking for
the operational force in concert with the contracting officer
and with DCMA oversight to do that oversight. You are
absolutely right, sir, it is a critical function that, at the
end of the day, we have got to assure the taxpayers as well as
the warfighters that we got what we paid for.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One final question, gentlemen, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and others have come out with a
report talking about some of the longstanding challenges
regarding contractor support for deployed forces. If you were
to look at what the Army and DOD are recommended to do under
the Gansler report, would you see, in comparing those, is there
anything left, if all the Gansler report recommendations are
fulfilled, would there be anything left that the GAO has
pointed out that needs to be done? And if so, who would be
responsible for doing those things?
Mr. Assad. I think that we are really in the early phase of
getting through integration of our operational commanders in
the planning of contract operation. And I think that is the
area we are focused on with the Joint Forces Command and the
Joint Staff, but that is the area that we really need to place
a significant amount of focus on. Every plan changes, that is
true, but the reality is we need to ensure that we have
inculcated that mind-set that says we really do need, not only
to plan what is organic and what is not, but exactly what
contracting mechanisms and who is going to do it as well as
which part of the operating force is going to oversee the work
that needs to be done.
So I would say, Mr. Congressman, from my perspective, it is
that aspect of contract planning and ensuring, as Darryl said,
that you understand, what is in fact the battle plan and how
will we integrate it into it to ensure that we provide the
support that is necessary?
General Harrington. Sir, we will provide a contracting
officer's representative pocket guide for you. We will get that
over to you. That reinforces, that is what gives soldiers and
actually anyone who is going to be a COR out there, boots on
the ground actually watching what the contractor does. The
challenge we have got, I think, is exactly as Mr. Assad
described. We are on a path now. We need to have the continued
emphasis at every level for it. We need it to evaluate contract
files and show the contract team and the contracting officers
that key input into that contract file upon which we judge the
performance of a contractor. Those are critical functions. I
think we have begun to reinforce; we just have to continue to
emphasize it.
Mr. Parsons. I would just add that I think the other area
where we are going to need continued help is the focus on this
issue. We have a long way to go in building up this capability,
as General Scott alluded to. And my fear is that, if the world
becomes a calmer place and there is a draw-down on the number
of deployments that we are making, there may be a sense that we
can, you know, eliminate some of what we are trying to build up
here.
So my appeal would be, we have gotten great support out of
Congress as we have gone forward on this Gansler Commission
report. I think we need to keep that laser focus on that to
make sure that the capability we are developing and building
up, we do not lose it 10 years from now, and that we do follow
through on the appointments of the general officers and
developing the career path for these military officers and Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs).
General Scott. Congressman Wittman, as I was thinking
through my answer and listening to my colleagues, I checked my
route home to make sure I don't have to get off at the Foggy
Bottom Metro stop, because I would say that the one thing that
remains to be done is not strictly the purview of this
committee; it is the coordination and synchronization of
everyone who is involved in stabilization and reconstruction
operations.
When I was there, half the money I spent came though the
State Department. But USAID, main State, Department of
Commerce, all had different rules; all organized to conduct
contracting and contractor support differently. And the only
place that all came together was in the ambassador's office.
And there needs to be a functional, operational and tactical
level coordination that says, if we are going to bring all the
elements of national power to a counterinsurgency fight, we
have got to have a way where everybody's capabilities are put
on the table. And the senior leaders in charge of the U.S.
mission, be they the ambassador's staff or be they the Joint
Task Force Commander staff, can look and say, who is best
qualified and best positioned to do this? Because when you
don't do that, you have an opportunity for duplication. You
have an opportunity for waste. You have an opportunity for
effort that is less effective than it could.
One of the classic cases that GAO pointed out is cases, for
example, where one department would build a water treatment
plant, but the other department is charged with putting in the
sewer pipes that carry the waste to the water treatment plant.
If the two schedules and the two contracts are not
synchronized, you either end up with waste running in the
street because the plant is not there or you end up with a
beautiful plant with no inflow coming in.
So, in my view, that is what needs to be done. It is
setting up the mechanisms for coordination between all the
branches of government that are operating in the
counterinsurgency.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you gentlemen, great answers, thank you.
Dr. Snyder. General Scott, you answered one of the
questions I was going to ask which is about State and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) because this has
been an ongoing interest of this committee is how to get
everybody working together. The example you just gave, I think,
you said came from GAO. What, did you have any, from your
personal experience, where you saw things that didn't go so
smoothly?
General Scott. Yes, sir. First of all, I would say that
most of my relationship with State went very well, but it was
highly personality-dependent. I worked very closely with the
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, later ITAO. And I don't
remember what the ITAO initials stood for, Iraq Transition
Assistance Office. I worked very closely with those staff
members, and we had an excellent relationship that allowed us
usually to work out problems. But nevertheless, there were
cases, for example, we had to take over the contract to
complete the children's oncological hospital in Basra after
USAID had initiated the effort, the contract was overrun, the
cost overrun. The contractor wasn't making adequate progress
and it eventually took my contracting officers and the Army
Corps of Engineers doing quality assurance to come through and
get the project completed.
It should have been apparent that this was a program that
exceeded USAID's capabilities, because at the time, USAID had
three contracting officers in country. And they had no ability
to extend their contract oversight down to Basra. I had a local
contracting office down in Basra. The Corps of Engineers had a
regional office down in Basra. We were well able to provide
contract oversight and quality assurance. It was almost like a
Chinese menu; pick the services that you want, and we can
provide them. But there was no mechanism, short of the First
Lady herself getting involved in this, to cause people to
coordinate and cooperate in order to bring success to the
project.
Dr. Snyder. I think our opinion is that there is a lot of
excellent State Department USAID people, but we have
dramatically cut back on their numbers in the last decade and a
half, to our great detriment as a country.
General Scott. Sir, that would be my observation. I had no
question about the quality of folks either in USAID or in
State, but I had 171 contracting officers in Iraq, and they had
three.
Dr. Snyder. I wanted to ask, Mr. Assad, I wanted you to go
into a little more detail about the DCMA, Defense Contract
Management Authority. And you go through it on page 6 of your
written statement, and I want to be sure I understand, which
was Gansler recommended that DCMA would manage all the
contracts for base, security, water, all those kinds of things.
Mr. Assad. Actually, what he recommended, Congressman, was
that the responsibility for base operations and base oversight
in CONUS at all of our post, camp and stations would be done by
DCMA.
Dr. Snyder. DCMA. And the Army said, no, because we
actually have some officer bases we refer to as the mayor.
Because you felt that that, not you but the Army felt that was
an integral part of being the base commander and that was a
military function. Is that correct? So that was why there was a
push back on that?
Mr. Assad. Actually, Mr. Congressman, it was all force
services, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine were uniform in the
thought that the responsibility for oversight at a particular
post, camp and station should be resident and the
responsibility of commanding officer.
What Dr. Gansler's concern was, was that, when we went into
theater, if we were going to expect DCMA to do that kind of
oversight for post, camp and station oversight in theater, if
they didn't have the same experience in the continental United
States (CONUS) or a way to train themselves repeatedly, that
that could be a problem. But our view, where we are headed is
to ensure that when our soldiers and our Marines and airmen are
in garrison, that they are getting the experience that they
need in garrison to do that kind of oversight and that they
will conduct the training so that when we have our plan in
place, each of our organizations knows how many of their folks
within their operational unit will actually have to do that
kind of oversight overseas, and that we have that training in
place so that they can in fact do it in CONUS.
We just didn't feel like that particular responsibility,
never having been a responsibility of DCMA at any time in its
existence, was an appropriate way to use the resource.
Dr. Snyder. That makes sense.
Mr. Wittman, do you have any other questions?
Mr. Wittman. No questions.
Dr. Snyder. I wanted to ask if you had any comments, and I
think, General Scott, you talked a little bit about it because
you are the Air Force, but if we had a group of people here
today from the Army, from the Marine Corps. and from the Navy,
would we have a similar type of reporting? What do you think
with regard to where the other services are at, Mr. Assad?
Mr. Assad. It is not consistent. If what we are talking
about is senior leaders across the force, we need more, in my
view, more flag officers, more general officers in the
acquisition and contracting profession. There is no doubt about
it. At one point in time, the Air Force really was the
preeminent service in terms of leadership within the
contracting profession.
When General Scott, who is now about to retire, leaves, we
will have one. At one point in time, there could be three or
four general officers serving in various positions within the
Air Force who would be significantly capable in the contracting
profession. The same is true for the Army. But the Army has in
fact recognized and, much to the credit of the chief and
secretary, they have moved out smartly in terms of increasing
their numbers.
The Navy has remained relatively stable. It turns out that
we have a resource within the Navy that we haven't always
tapped, and that is our flag officers who are in the Civil
Engineering Corps. Every one of those officers has to be a
level three certified contracting officer. So they are
perfectly capable of operating in a combat environment and
serving in the role that General Scott served in.
In terms of the Marine Corps, it is a much smaller force.
There are only about 175 Marines who are presently contracting
officers or NCOs with contracting experience. So the path that
the Marines have chosen, and frankly I fully support, is one
where they are trying to get their logistics officer to have
significant contracting experience so that, when they get to
the 06 level, it becomes an enhancement to command and an
enhancement for general officer rank to have contracting
experience.
So right now, we have no--well, that is not true. The two-
star general officer who is in charge of logistics for the
Marines, in fact, it was a contracting officer at one time, but
that wasn't necessary done by plan. The Navy has two officers.
In fact Rear Admiral Dussault just returned from Iraq. She
relieved General Scott. And Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault is
now back home in CONUS, who is moving on her way to the Joint
Staff. They have two officers in contracting, and then they
have their contracting officers in the Civil Engineering Corps.
So I would say, of all of services, I think the Air Force,
frankly, in my view, needs to relook at increasing the number
of general officers that they have in contracting. I think the
other three services are pretty well addressing the matter.
Dr. Snyder. General Scott, you have only about six days
left, do you have agree with that assessment of the Air Force?
General Scott. Yes, sir, I do. At one time, there were six
general officers in Air Force contracting. When I retire in six
days, there will only be one, Brigadier General Wendy Masiello.
And she is currently not serving in contracting. So the value
of the kind of background that I had proved itself, I think,
over in Iraq and Afghanistan. And frankly, one of the questions
that was asked was, could we do the job with a member of the
senior executive service, and we looked very closely at that
when it was time for me to rotate out of the command billet.
And the conclusion that we universally came to, and by the way
the guy with the heaviest vote was a guy named Dave Petraeus,
was no, you need an experienced flag officer to do these kinds
of missions. And with the Air Force only having one, that is a
mighty thin bench.
Mr. Parsons. I think it is very critical that the junior
officers see that there is a career path for them to be general
officers. If you eliminate those general officer slots, then
what we found, especially in the Army, is that anybody that
came into acquisition would lean over towards program
management side, because they knew there was a possibility to
make general officer on the program management side.
I think it is really key that, if you want to keep a viable
career path, not that everybody attains this rank of general
officer while they are in active duty, but it is a career goal
for many in the service.
Dr. Snyder. I see General Scott sitting there about to
retire next week, and it seems to be a career path that
preserves your youthful appearance.
In response to Mr. Wittman, you all talked a little bit
about the way ahead. Do you all have any specific concrete
legislative things you think are obstructing your way or
suggestions of things we need to look at that we had in year's
defense bill?
Mr. Assad. Dr. Snyder, actually, I think Congress has done
very well by us. I mean, as far as we are concerned, almost
everything that we have asked for, Congress has in fact enacted
some form of legislation to support us. And so, at the present
time, I think what we need to do is utilize the flexibilities
and capabilities that Congress has given us to move forward.
There were a couple of minor legislative actions that we
asked for which were not significant that would make life a
little easier, but really, one of them, for example, was the
express option at the GAO. We asked for that, but in reality,
every time have we asked the GAO to use the express option,
they have given it to us. So, in practical terms, I don't think
it has much benefit. So, right now, I would like to say, I
would like to thank the Congress very much for being so
responsive to us in enabling us to get our jobs done.
General Harrington. Sir, we second that. Particularly with
respect to the workforce, Congress's help has been tremendous,
the flexibilities we had with the section A-52 funding will
help us get the workforce built back up, restored and trained
over the coming years, so that we can make them a permanent
part of the Army civilian workforce structure. So it is
incumbent upon us to execute the support and reinforcement
part.
General Scott. Sir, as a field commander, I was delighted
with the support I got out of the Congress. It was clear that
the Members were paying attention. When we asked for something,
it came through quickly, usually in exactly the form that we
asked for it.
So one of the things that we had to be very careful was to
make sure you know what you are asking for, because Congress is
going to give it to you. I have nothing but praise for the
support that I received from the Congress while I was a field
commander. It was clear that you all were on our side, even
when there were a lot of other people who were putting
obstacles in our way. Congress was not one.
Dr. Snyder. I think the last question I would ask, and it
is not answered today, but I hope that you all will feel free
to provide in writing anything you want to add, we will make it
a part of the record in response to, considered as formal
question, to augment anything you have said today if there is
something you think we need to hear of.
General Scott, I think I will give you the last opportunity
here, and you are one week out, if there is anything you would
like to tell us about before we close the hearing, this is your
last chance.
General Scott. Well, sir, since it will be on the record, I
just want to say, for 34 years, it has been my honor and my
delight to serve our great nation. When I went over to Iraq and
Afghanistan, I felt like the athlete who had trained long and
trained hard and had never got an opportunity to play in the
big game until then. I got in the game. I got to score some
points. I may not have gotten a complete victory, but I think
we put everybody on the right path. It is with somewhat of a
slightly heavy heart that I hang up the uniform after serving
the nation for as long as I have.
One thing I can assure you is I will always be there to
answer when the nation calls, even if it is not in uniform. I
thank you, sir, for the opportunity to testify, thank you for
the support that you and the committee have given us. God bless
you all, and God bless America.
Dr. Snyder. We appreciate your service, General Scott. I
hope you will convey to all the folks who work for you how
important we think they are. They are not the kind of folks
that are going to be on television, but they are so important.
Now, they will get these cool pictures, though, of them
signing contracts on hoods of vehicles, but we think they are
so important. And the American taxpayers think they are very,
very important. And the men and women in uniform and their
families, they may not know who it is who is important in their
lives, but it is the folks you are trying to train up and the
ones already doing the work, and we appreciate you. And you can
count on us revisiting these topics as time goes by. This is
very important to the Speaker and very important to Mr.
Skelton, and very important to all the Members.
So we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 25, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 25, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER
Dr. Snyder. Is the ability to define contract requirements and to
manage contractors and contract service support part of the performance
evaluation for military personnel who are outside the acquisition
workforce but have these responsibilities? Should it be?
Mr. Assad. The Department currently mandates that a Requiring
Activity affirm that performance of Contracting Officer Representative
(COR) functions will be addressed during COR performance assessments.
This requirement appears in a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum
dated August 22, 2008. The Gansler Commission report identified CORs as
an essential part of contract management. As highlighted in the March
25 testimony to the Subcommittee, the Department's section 813 DOD
Contract Surveillance Subcommittee has made much progress in the area
of CORs, including developing the requirement for COR functions to be
addressed during performance assessments.
Dr. Snyder. Is the use and management of contractors included in
unit readiness assessments?
Mr. Assad. Unit commanders assess the readiness of contractors to
support their mission when contractors are assigned to deployable
positions that are in direct support of that unit's mission. Further,
the use, management and performance of contractors are evaluated on a
consistent basis through contractual oversight. Contracting personnel,
requiring agency leadership and contracting officer representatives
manage service contractor performance through Performance Based Service
Acquisitions (PBSA) in accordance with contractual requirements.
Dr. Snyder. What is the status of the Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics strategic workforce plan to address sourcing contracting
personnel with the right skills for contingency operations?
Mr. Assad. The Secretary of Defense recently announced intentions
to grow the organic DOD acquisition workforce by 15 percent. This
growth will directly enhance DOD's readiness and capacity to deploy
contracting professionals worldwide who are effective immediately upon
arrival. In addition to growth, the plan to source contracting
personnel with the right skills includes the recent effort to identify
competencies critical to the contingency mission as part of the DOD-
wide contracting competency assessment initiative. Results are being
factored into development of a joint contingency contracting
certification program based on a three tier proficiency level approach.
Additionally, DOD continues to improve training and performance support
resources. DOD just released the second edition of ``Contingency
Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century.'' This pocket-sized
handbook and DVD provide essential information, tools, and training for
contingency contracting officers. DOD has also redesigned its
contingency training courses to include interactive simulations, hands-
on practical work, and robust capstone projects. Cultural awareness and
ethics are emphasized. Subject matter experts provide perspective in an
expeditionary environment. In addition, lessons learned, best
practices, and after action reports are posted on the Contingency
Contracting Community of Practice web-portal. DOD is also developing an
advanced Contingency Contracting Course, which provides ``just in
time'' training to senior level contracting personnel deploying to a
management position. The course addresses several important issues:
sustainment contracting in a contingency environment, major source
selection, cost and price analysis, and reconstruction in a contingency
environment.
Dr. Snyder. In the early 1990s, Congress passed the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) to try and ensure that
the acquisition workforce receives the necessary training to perform
its duties. DOD implements DAWIA through DOD Directive 5000.66.
a) Do these mechanisms provide adequate policy guidance for the
contracting workforce? b) Should Congress revisit DAWIA in light of the
current situation, particularly in relation to contingency contracting?
Mr. Assad. a) DAWIA is implemented through DOD Directive 5000.52,
DOD Instruction 5000.66, and the DOD Desk Guide. These documents
provide adequate guidance for managing the career development of the
acquisition workforce. Each year the Functional Advisor for each
acquisition career field reviews the currency of competencies and
certification requirements for the career field. Certification
requirements for the acquisition career fields are posted each year at
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Web site in the DAU Catalog.
b) The Department has efforts underway to standardize experience,
education, and training requirements for contingency contracting
professionals. Changes to DAWIA are not required to accomplish this
effort. The Commander, Joint Theater Support Contract Command, needs to
deploy the right contracting assets. In today's Joint operational
environment, which comprises individual Component contracting
personnel--military and civilian--experience and education/training
levels vary. To ensure the Commander can leverage the varying
backgrounds and skill sets within this cadre of contingency contracting
professionals, the Department is developing standard proficiency
levels. A key tenant of this program is to track experience, as well as
education/training, looking at both contracting generally and
contingency contracting specifically. The certification levels
associated with DAWIA remain an important way to track general
contracting experience and education/training. On top of this, the
contingency contracting cadre model looks at contingency contracting
experience and education/training. Contingency contracting operational
experience is of principal importance, ranging from exercises to
multiple deployments. The cadre's participation in contingency
contracting training, in a specific set of core courses, also feeds
into the proficiency assessment. Developing this contingency
contracting cadre is one of the many initiatives being worked by the
Department's Task Force on Contracting and Contract Management in
Expeditionary Operations. Originally established to address the
requirements of section 849 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, the Task Force continues to support
implementation of contingency contracting improvements. The Task Force
comprises representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and all the Military Departments, so it leverages the full range of
initiatives--from the policy level to the grass-roots level.
Dr. Snyder. Should the Gansler Commission examine the contingency
contracting capabilities of the Air Force and the Navy? a) Do these
departments provide adequate contingency contracting training for
military personnel outside the acquisition workforce? b) Do they
incorporate contingency contracting in pre-deployment training and
mission readiness exercises?
Mr. Assad. No, an examination of the contingency contracting
capabilities of the Air Force and Navy was conducted as a result of the
Gansler Commission findings and recommendations. Section 849 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the
Department to examine the applicability of the Gansler Commission's 40
recommendations to the Air Force and the Navy. The Department engaged
in a six-month analysis and reported its findings to Congress on June
2, 2008, which included an assessment of the Air Force and Navy.
a) Yes, the Department has created DOD-wide contingency contracting
training for military personnel outside the acquisition workforce. The
Department developed a broad program of instruction (POI) for non-
contracting operational military leaders on the management of
contractors with deployed forces. The Military Education Coordination
Council has added the POI as a special area of emphasis, so that it
will be taught at the war colleges. In addition, the POI is available
as an on-line module.
b) Yes, contingency contracting is covered in pre-deployment
training and mission readiness exercises. In conjunction with all the
Services and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the Department
has established a core set of required DAU courses for contingency
contracting officers (CCOs). The Joint Contingency Contracting
handbook--which serves as the basis for one of the required CCO DAU
courses--provides a consolidated source of information for our CCOs
conducting contingency contracting operations in a Joint environment.
It provides the essential information, tools, and training to meet the
challenges they will face, regardless of mission or environment. In
addition, mission readiness exercises like EUCOM's AUSTERE CHALLENGE,
SOCOM's PANAMAEX, and PACOM's COBRA GOLD are major joint military
exercises that incorporate contingency contracting. These exercises
serve as joint training, done for the way we fight.
Dr. Snyder. Is there anything you didn't have an opportunity to
share during the hearing that would be valuable to the subcommittee's
enquiry?
Mr. Assad. No additional information to provide at this time.
Dr. Snyder. Is there anything you didn't have an opportunity to
share during the hearing that would be valuable to the subcommittee's
enquiry?
General Scott. I thank the Chairman and the members for the
opportunity to share my experiences and insights. I urge the Oversight
and Investigations Subcommittee to continue to press the Services on
their plans to build viable career paths for uniformed contracting
officers that will attract their share of each service's `best and
brightest.' The Army has a good plan, but executing it successfully
will require close attention at least through this term of Congress and
the next.
I believe the Air Force, on the other hand, is in danger of
repeating the neglect that the Army's contracting career field suffered
from prior to the Gansler Report findings. They don't have a strategy
for developing officers that can compete with the service's best beyond
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
The Air Force hasn't made a clear distinction between the roles of
its officer, enlisted and civilian contracting officers. Consequently,
there is a misperception that the three are largely interchangeable,
which leads to the perception outside the career field that officers in
contracting are narrow technicians, rather than leaders. This lack of
deliberate, purposeful career development for officers in particular
has resulted in today's situation where not one Air Force contracting
primary executive leadership position is held by a military officer--
they are all held by civilians of the Senior Executive Service. As the
Gansler Report pointed out, the Army's deteriorating contingency
contracting capability began when they eliminated General Officers from
the career field--I believe the Air Force has started down that same
path.
The Air Force doesn't have clear doctrine or training for operating
in a joint and/or interagency environment--this in spite of the reality
that, because they have the largest contingency contracting force, they
will likely provide the bulk of contingency contracting assets at least
until the Army completes its build-up, and perhaps beyond that.
The Air Force's contingency contracting doctrine and training
focuses primarily on how to execute contracting transactions in short-
term contingencies, not how to plan and conduct contracting operations
in support of a large campaign. For example, I continually had to
convince my Air Force officers that buying commercial items from the
local Iraqi economy, and hiring local Iraqi labor was in the U.S.
interest, even though the Operation Iraqi Freedom Joint Campaign Plan's
objectives for its economic line of operation included revitalizing the
Iraqi economy and putting military age young men to work. They were
trained to look for the lowest price--which was often from the U.S. or
another Persian Gulf region country--and none of them had been exposed
to the Campaign Plan prior to deployment. My soldiers, on the other
hand, were far less proficient than their airman peers at executing
transactions, but were wizards at developing innovative methods of
synchronizing acquisition planning and execution with tactical and
strategic objectives.
The Army, on the other hand, has ably addressed campaign planning
in the design and concept of operations for its Contracting Support
Brigades, as evidenced by the recent exercises that Mr. Parsons
referenced in his testimony. Greater and more frequent cooperation
between the two services (and the Navy and Marines where appropriate)
in training and exercises could provide an efficient remedy. For
example, the Army already includes contracting activities in their pre-
deployment planning and exercises at Brigade and Division HQ levels.
Air Force contingency contracting officers who will support those units
should be included as well.
Finally, let me express again, for the record, my appreciation for
the interest and support of the Congress, and this Subcommittee in
particular, in this area. I was the anonymous Flag Officer quoted in
the Gansler report as saying that my troops solved unprecedented
problems every day, and they deserved a medal for it; but if we
approached the next contingency with the same lack of preparedness as
this one, we should all be fired! Thanks to your leadership, and the
energetic response by the OSD and Army staffs, I think our jobs are
safe for the next time!
Dr. Snyder. Is the ability to define contract requirements and to
manage contractors and contract service support part of the performance
evaluation for military personnel who are outside the acquisition
workforce but have these responsibilities? Should it be?
Mr. Harrington. The rating official will address appropriately,
based in the OER, the percentage of the person's duties and importance
in that subject area. Some Contracting Officers Representatives (CORs)
only spend a very small amount of their time on this duty whereas
others perform COR functions nearly full time, and the OER reflects
that accordingly.
Dr. Snyder. Is the use and management of contractors included in
unit readiness assessments?
Mr. Harrington. No, contractors do not factor into the personnel
readiness ratings of operating force units.
Dr. Snyder. Do you have any concerns for funding any of the efforts
or initiatives the Army is undertaking to implement the recommendations
of the Gansler Commission?
Mr. Harrington. To date Congress has been very supportive of Army
needs to facilitate the transformation recommended by the Gansler
commission. The Army wishes to express its appreciation for this
support. The Army is striving to capture sufficient data on which to
base a fully supportable decision regarding its need for additional
resources in the out years. When that information becomes available,
the Army will look forward to working with the Congress to ensure the
Army is well positioned to meet its obligations in support of all
contingency operations, both in conflict and in support of the American
people.
Dr. Snyder. Is there anything you didn't have an opportunity to
share during the hearing that would be valuable to the subcommittee's
enquiry?
Mr. Harrington. Yes. Since September 11, 2001, there has been a 300
percent growth in contracted dollars and contract actions have grown
significantly.
The report of the Gansler Commission on Wartime Contracting
(Gansler Report) is the clearly defined product illustrating a decade
of decline in Army contracting workforce due to attrition, retirement,
and downsizing, all to the point that the remaining workforce could
focus only on the most pressing needs. Training and professional
development have suffered and critical expertise have retired. The
Commission revealed a problem that we were well aware of within the
acquisition workforce, and has provided the momentum to overcome a
decade of inertia.
The Army is institutionalizing the systemic and long-lasting
improvements necessary to ensure ongoing, successful alignment of
contracting, doctrine, organization, training, leader development,
materiel, personnel, and facilities for supporting our Soldiers and to
provide the best value to the nation's taxpayers. The theme of the
Gansler Report was that the Army did not have the organizational
structure in place to support the explosion in expeditionary
contracting, nor sufficient numbers of professionally trained
contracting personnel to meet greatly increased requirements for
contracted support Army-wide, with the requisite oversight, controls,
and contract administration. Additionally, the Report emphasized the
need for the Army's commitment to recognize contracting as a core
competency and to enhance training, professional development, and
career opportunities among the workforce.
It took more than a decade to get Army Contracting in to this
damaged shape. There is no quick fix. It will take time, and more
important, the sustained commitment and support of the senior
leadership of the Army, DOD, and Congress to rebuild the Army
contracting workforce's skills, training, and experience. ASA (ALT)
leadership will continue to provide the support, structure, and
oversight needed to ensure a premier contracting workforce. Our
Soldiers and our nation deserve nothing less.
Dr. Snyder. Is there anything you didn't have an opportunity to
share during the hearing that would be valuable to the subcommittee's
enquiry?
Mr. Parsons. No.
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