[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-31]
READINESS AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE NAVY'S SURFACE FLEET
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2009
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READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROB BISHOP, Utah
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
GLENN NYE, Virginia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Megan Putnam, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009, Readiness and Sustainment of the
Navy's Surface Fleet........................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009........................................ 19
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2009
READINESS AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE NAVY'S SURFACE FLEET
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Readiness Subcommittee................................. 2
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 1
WITNESSES
Campbell, Rear Adm. (Upper Half) (Select) Joseph F., USN,
Director of Staff, Fleet Maintenance Office (USFF N43)......... 6
Cullom, Rear Adm. (Upper Half) (Select) Philip H., USN, Director,
Fleet Readiness Division (OPNAV N43)........................... 4
Eccles, Rear Adm. (Lower Half) Thomas J., USN, Deputy Commander
Naval Systems Engineering, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 05).. 10
McManamon, Rear Adm. (Lower Half) James P., USN, Deputy Commander
for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 21)........ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cullom, Rear Adm. Philip H., joint with Rear Adm. Joseph F.
Campbell, Rear Adm. James P. McManamon and Rear Adm. Thomas
J. Eccles.................................................. 26
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 25
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P........................................ 23
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Report to Congress, Ship Maintenance and Material Conditions. 49
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Nye...................................................... 69
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 69
Mr. Taylor................................................... 69
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 84
Mr. Nye...................................................... 86
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 73
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 89
READINESS AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE NAVY'S SURFACE FLEET
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:17 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today, the Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear testimony
on the readiness of the ships comprising the Navy's surface
fleet and the Navy's plan to sustain those ships to achieve and
expand their anticipated service life. The hearing is intended
to inform Readiness Subcommittee members on Navy operations and
maintenance issues prior to release of the fiscal year 2010
budget submission.
I thank our distinguished Navy witnesses for appearing
before this subcommittee today to discuss ship readiness and
sustainment. Our witnesses represent the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and Naval Sea
Systems Command.
The Navy intends to extend the operational life of its
ships 5 years or more beyond the designated lifespan in order
to achieve a 313-ship fleet. However, the Navy is presently
experiencing a series of incidents that raise concerns
regarding possible systemic problems with the Navy's manning,
training, and maintenance.
In addition to recent collisions, groundings, and even a
fatal accident, in the past 3 years 10 ship commanders have
been relieved of duty for failure to maintain training or
materiel readiness standards. These concerns bring into
question the Navy's ability to achieve even the expected
service life of its fleet and sustained fleet readiness, let
alone extend the service life of entire ship classes.
These incidents follow changes in the way the Navy conducts
maintenance, changes in manpower and crew size, and changes in
how the Navy trains its maintenance personnel. In view of these
changes, the Readiness Subcommittee on March 16 asked the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the training,
size, composition, and capabilities of Navy ship crews.
Specifically, we requested the GAO to: evaluate current
requirements, authorization, and on-hand personnel levels for
selected ship types compared to historical data for the same or
similar ship types, including underlying reasons for any
differences; compare shipboard rank and rate distributions over
time and analyze underlying reasons for any changes and their
impact on ship capabilities; evaluate qualification training
for personnel in selected shipboard designators and ratings to
determine any changes to formal off-ship training programs,
including whether such changes have affected personnel
availability and the amounts and types of on-the-job training
for personnel to achieve required qualifications; and, also,
evaluate to what extent requirements to provide personnel for
Individual Augmentee and ``In Lieu Of'' positions in support of
ongoing operations are impacting the levels or composition of
shipboard manning.
Our witnesses today are four distinguished Naval officers:
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom, Director of Fleet Readiness
Division, Deputy Chief of Navy Operations for Fleet Readiness
Logistics; Rear Admiral Joseph Campbell, Director of Staff,
Fleet Maintenance Officer, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Rear
Admiral James McManamon, Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare,
Naval Sea Systems Command; and Rear Admiral Thomas Eccles,
Deputy Commander, Naval Systems Engineering, Naval Sea Systems
Command.
Now I would like to yield to my good friend, the Ranking
Member of the committee, Mr. Forbes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the
Appendix on page 23.]
STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to first
begin by thanking you for holding this hearing and for the
hearings that you hold consistently, getting the kind of
information we need to do our oversight; and also Mr. Taylor,
who, while not chairing this committee, does such a good job on
the Seapower Subcommittee.
And I thank all of you for taking the time to be with us
today. And we understand you have a lot on your plate, and we
just appreciate your insight with us.
As the committee is well aware, the Navy has been operating
at extremely high operation tempos for several years. And
during this period, not only have they worked to improve
operational availability by implementing the Fleet Response
Plan, but they have also made many changes in their training
programs and are restructuring their approach to surface fleet
maintenance and sustainment.
I am very concerned that the confluence of all these
changes in a relatively short time period have placed stressors
on the fleet that have a degenerating effect on readiness,
potentially jeopardizing safety and driving up long-term
sustainment costs.
This committee has been briefed on the numerous accidents,
incidents, and unfit or seriously degraded inspection
assessments that have plagued the Navy recently, and I think we
must be careful not to view these events in isolation. While
they may appear to be unrelated at first glance, I am concerned
that they may be indicators of a broader set of problems. From
unfit Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections to
the recent collision of the USS Hartford and the USS New
Orleans, we must work to understand if these events are simply
the cost of doing business in these challenging times or if
they are indicators that the Navy needs to make course
corrections.
Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing, and I want
to thank you again for holding it. And I also understand that
the witnesses we have with us today are here to discuss the
condition of the surface fleet and the Navy's sustainment
challenges. I would like to welcome all of them.
And, gentlemen, thank you for taking time to talk with us,
as we mentioned earlier.
But I hope that our discussion today will help us
understand the challenges the surface fleet is facing and
provide us some context on which to gauge the events I
mentioned earlier. I am also interested to hear about the steps
the Navy is taking to correct these deficiencies and to
implement a sustainment strategy necessary to obtain the
required service life out of our fleet.
There is no doubt we are facing a tremendous challenge, and
I don't believe we are going to find a silver-bullet solution.
I believe everything must be on the table for consideration,
from manpower and resourcing to training to leadership. And we
need to take time to evaluate our risk assessments and make
sure we are comfortable with the risk levels.
I think we must also look at the increased reliance on
contractors to provide maintenance that was traditionally
performed by our sailors. While this approach to sustainment
may initially provide a cost benefit, there is a downside in
that our young sailors aren't required to perform many of the
standard repair activities that hone their skills and sharpen
their ability to assess the ship's condition. This could have a
long-term impact on the skill and ability of our sailors, and
it is one specific area we must examine.
And then just two other points. I recognize that everybody
in here has good intentions in where we are going, but earlier
today, in the Judiciary Committee, we passed out a bill, which
was the Free Flow of Information Act, because we realized how
important it was to get facts and concepts and ideas out as
soon as possible to discuss them.
I have to tell you that I am extremely bothered by the
nondisclosure agreement that I know several members of our
military were forced to sign. And this administration
apparently has allowed that to take place, because, if you look
at this form--and I know that none of you four had to sign
that--but if you look at this, there is a huge question as to
whether or not anybody involved in that budgetary process can
ever disclose this information or talk about it. And I think
that gives us grave concern when we are talking about
maintenance of ships, when we are talking about weapons
systems, whatever we are. And I hope at some point in time this
committee will look at that.
And the final thing I want to address is something that,
while all of us sitting here talk about the maintenance dollars
that we are going to need and what we are going to need to have
a strong and viable Navy, with the bailouts that we have had
and the stimulus packages that we have had--and I have raised
this before--but the reality is the interest alone on those
bailouts and stimulus packages would fund the entire budget for
all of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
all of the National Science Foundation, all of the Department
of Transportation, all of Homeland Security, all of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), all of the Department of
Justice, every operation of the White House, every operation of
Congress, and every Army Corps of Engineers project in the
country.
And, at some point in time, I worry, Mr. Chairman, that we
are going to come back here saying we need dollars, and we are
going to have to struggle to see where we are going to get
those dollars and how we are going to get them. And I think
that is going to be a huge challenge.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and look forward
to our witnesses and their testimony today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. The gentleman has brought up some
very good points.
And now, at this point, I would like Admiral Cullom to
please proceed with your testimony, followed by Admirals
Campbell, McManamon, and Eccles.
Thank you. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (UPPER HALF) (SELECT) PHILIP H. CULLOM,
USN, DIRECTOR, FLEET READINESS DIVISION (OPNAV N43)
Admiral Cullom. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, and distinguished
members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to testify on surface
ship readiness and sustainment.
My name is Rear Admiral Phil Cullom, and I am the director
of fleet readiness on the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) staff. The Navy appreciates your support for
the readiness of the surface fleet and the critical part
materiel readiness and sustainment play in reaching expected
service life. We have assembled witnesses from the OPNAV staff,
Fleet Forces Command maintenance staff, and Naval Sea Systems
Command to testify on these topics today.
I am responsible to the chief of naval operations for
validating the fleet-generated maintenance and operational
requirements and then programming the resources necessary to
operate and sustain our ships. I am here today to provide you
with the OPNAV assessment of surface ship readiness and provide
an overview of the major actions we are taking to better define
surface ship maintenance requirements, properly resource that
requirement, and then attain full service life for our ships.
The Navy requires a minimum fleet of 313 ships by 2020; 215
of those 313 ships are already in service today. A key
underpinning of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding planned and
sustainment of a forward-deployed, surge-ready Naval force is
our ability to reach the expected service life for each of our
ship classes. Reaching expected service life demands an
integrated engineering approach to ensure the right maintenance
is planned and executed over a ship's lifetime, as well as the
resources necessary to execute those plans.
A well-established process exists to identify and program
the resources required for ship maintenance. A cornerstone of
this process is the Navy's ship maintenance model, which
receives a formal and independent validation by the Johns
Hopkins Applied Physics Labs.
The initial input to the model are class-specific, notional
man-days that are validated by the fleet. The ship maintenance
model uses these inputs to price the actual cost of that
maintenance. Since the maintenance generation process begins
almost two years prior to the actual budget year and whole
unique maintenance developments routinely occur in the year
prior to execution when most of the ships are deployed,
execution-year realities have put pressure on the need for
significant supplemental funding, work deferral, or
occasionally even cancellation of availabilities.
In order to increase the fidelity of the maintenance budget
and reduce the churn associated with work deferral or
availability cancellation, in August of 2007 the Navy
instituted a process improvement to provide better visibility
to hull-specific maintenance requirements. This Flag-level
process, known as the ``nine-step process,'' conducts a hull-
by-hull review of individual ship maintenance requirements that
refines notional ship maintenance requirements and then tailors
them to the physical condition of a specific ship as it gets
closer to its scheduled availability period.
This produces a more refined fleet maintenance requirement
that updates our input into our ship maintenance model for
pricing purposes. Beginning in 2011, we will use these
adjustments to update our notional requirements, strengthening
our ability to forecast future-year maintenance requirements
and reducing our dependence on supplemental funding.
The Navy has three distinct classes of ships: surface
ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Simply put,
submarines and aircraft carriers have very robust and
technically validated class maintenance plans that precisely
define the 100 percent maintenance requirement that is needed
to reach expected service life.
In conjunction with the class maintenance plan, submarines
and aircraft carriers also have dedicated lifecycle
organizations whose sole functions are to maintain and
continuously update class maintenance plans and build
availability work packages that ensure we execute the 100
percent maintenance requirement. This process has a proven
track record of ensuring submarines and aircraft carriers reach
that expected service life.
Surface ships have not been maintained with the same rigor
or discipline. To provide a highly surge-capable and present
surface force, current maintenance plans limit the time ships
spend in depot availability periods and instead spread
maintenance into several pier-side continuous maintenance
availabilities each year.
This focus on short-term, get-the-ship-underway type of
work, instead of the lifecycle-focused work associated with
tanks, structures, and distributed systems executed on
submarines and aircraft carriers, is adding risk to our ability
to reach expected service life for our surface ships.
Additionally, surface ship class maintenance plans have not
been as detailed or maintained with the same technical rigor as
those for aircraft carriers and submarines. This has been one
of the greatest obstacles to the surface fleet's ability to
articulate that 100 percent maintenance requirement necessary
to reach their expected service life.
Fleet priorities, the unambiguous maintenance requirements
of aircraft carriers and submarines, and the lack of an updated
technically validated surface ship class maintenance plan has
resulted in surface ship maintenance being the area where we
have historically taken funding risk in a resource-constrained
environment.
Despite these challenges, current ship readiness for the
Navy's surface force remains strong, and the committee can be
assured that we do not have a hollow force. We are meeting all
our commitments around the globe today. If allowed to persist,
however, these materiel discrepancies will ultimately impact
our future readiness and shorten the service life of our
surface ships.
The good news is that the Navy and Surface Warfare
Enterprise have taken specific steps to address these issues.
Partners from the Navy's technical community and fleet
maintenance community are with me here today to provide the
committee with a more detailed account of the actions they are
taking in their respective areas of responsibility to ensure we
continue to maintain and sustain our Naval forces.
We appreciate your ongoing support and this opportunity to
testify before the committee. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Cullom, Admiral
Campbell, Admiral McManamon, and Admiral Eccles, can be found
in the Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Admiral Campbell.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (UPPER HALF) (SELECT) JOSEPH F.
CAMPBELL, USN, DIRECTOR OF STAFF, FLEET MAINTENANCE OFFICE
(USFF N43)
Admiral Campbell. Yes, sir. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman
Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today and address
strategies for readiness and sustainment of the Navy's fleet.
My name is Rear Admiral Joseph Campbell, and I am the fleet
maintenance officer for U.S. Fleet Forces Command. I am here to
provide you with a fleet assessment of the Navy's most recent
ship maintenance findings and recommendations for corrective
actions. Additionally, I will address the fiscal year 2009 ship
maintenance budget.
The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey, referred to as
INSURV, conducts material inspections on U.S. Navy ships every
five years. The five primary areas that comprise material
inspections include: deck; propulsion; combat systems; command,
control, communications, and computers, known as C4I; and
supply.
Upon completion of INSURV's inspections, the results are
submitted to the chief of naval operations. In addition to
individual ship reports, the chief of naval operations and
fleet commanders receive an annual report summarizing fleet
trends and the overall health of the force. Currently, overall
trends are positive, though some specific functional areas
require further attention.
I would now like to address in some detail recent INSURV
results between the years 2003 and 2008. The surface naval
force executed 191 material inspections with a pass rate of
over 91 percent. Some high-visibility failures in 2008 led the
Commander, Naval Surface Force to execute a range of
assessments, reviews, and corrective actions to ensure that any
degrading trend in material condition of ships was quickly
identified and immediate corrective actions were devised and
successfully implemented.
The ships with these degraded results are indicative of the
ship's leadership team not following procedures and policies
and not practicing the basics of equipment maintenance and
operation. Commander, Naval Surface Force is correcting these
trends via improvement in deck-plate knowledge of sailors and
the Preventative Maintenance System accomplishment rates,
development of applicable training courses and schools,
improved troubleshooting procedures and techniques, and focused
shipboard assessment teams for these deficient areas.
Conversely, the positive trends on other ships are the
result of increased training, assessments, and the directed
actions by the Commander Naval Surface Forces, by Commander
Naval Sea Systems Command, and Fleet Maintenance and Training
resource providers.
After the findings of the 2008 material inspections were
released for the USS CHOSIN and the USS STOUT, Commander Naval
Surface Forces embarked on a back-to-basics focus for ships.
Shipboard leadership reemphasized preventative maintenance
system program execution, zone inspection techniques, material
condition documentation, and maintenance of high operation
standards. Class squadrons, referred to as CLASSRONs, were also
directed to apply focus to Inspection & Survey (INSURV)
preparation and execution practices and to assist ships with
the same.
To determine if systemic support problems existed,
Commander Naval Surface Forces conducted a comprehensive review
of overall readiness of surface ships. This was known as the
``take a fix'' round of readiness briefs, where Commander Naval
Surface Forces assessed and reported on all readiness factors,
those being maintenance, supply, training, and personnel across
the force. The review concluded that stressors were present in
all readiness factors and course corrections were needed.
From those efforts, the Navy's Surface Ship Maintenance
Strategic Offsite convened to identify gaps in the surface ship
maintenance program and to clarify roles and responsibilities
for Navy organizations in the maintenance program. The
overarching focus of this offsite group was the commitment to
charter, resource, activate, and support the surface ship
lifecycle management activity, whose sole focus will be to
establish rigorous engineered lifecycle maintenance plans and
requirements for all surface ships.
I will now briefly discuss the status of the fiscal year
2009 ship maintenance budget. Ship maintenance began fiscal
year 2009 with a shortfall of $417 million. Of the $417 million
shortfall, $186 million is with U.S. Fleet Forces Command and
$231 million is at U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Since 2003, we have relied on supplemental appropriations
to fund additional ship maintenance that has arisen from higher
wartime operation tempos. There has been strong congressional
support over the last seven years that has enabled us to plan
and execute our ship maintenance workload.
In fiscal year 2009, due to the uncertainty of answers to
two questions--one, will we receive additional funds in fiscal
year 2009; and, two, if we receive additional funds what will
be the amount--the fleet is taking a measured approach and
prudent steps to determine mitigations that will be required if
no additional fiscal year 2009 funding is received.
In light of current fiscal realities, we are reviewing
financial expenditures to ensure we are able to meet
requirements for the remainder of the year. While challenging,
it is necessary for us to execute these actions at this point
in the year in order to remain within fiscal controls. We will
continue to monitor our execution through the fiscal year and
relax these measures if funding becomes available.
It is important to consider that we are now just halfway
through the fiscal year and are currently performing our mid-
year review. Due to the often emergent nature of repairs to
ships, there is always a possibility that additional
maintenance will need to be accomplished later in the year.
In summary, the Navy is committed to continually improving
ships' maintenance and lifecycle protocol and best practices.
The Navy continues to address deficiencies and issues
identified during INSURV inspections. We appreciate your
ongoing support and the opportunity to testify before the
committee today.
Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Campbell, Admiral
Cullom, Admiral McManamon, and Admiral Eccles, can be found in
the Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Ortiz. Go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (LOWER HALF) JAMES P. MCMANAMON, USN,
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SURFACE WARFARE, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
(SEA 21)
Admiral McManamon. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much
for this opportunity to testify on surface ship material
readiness, particularly as it pertains to sustainment of
surface ships, the lifecycle management of surface ships, and
the Navy's use of the multi-ship, multi-option--MSMO--
acquisition strategy to execute both the fleet response plan
and the material readiness of our ships.
My name is Rear Admiral Jim McManamon, and I am here as the
deputy commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Surface Warfare,
SEA 21. I am responsible for the maintenance and modernization
of nonnuclear surface ships currently operating in the fleet. I
am also the Surface Warfare Enterprise's designated focal point
into the Naval Sea Systems Command and acquisition community,
synchronizing lifetime support efforts for all in-service and
decommissioned surface combatants, nonnuclear aircraft
carriers, amphibious warships, Command Mine Warfare and special
mission craft. SEA 21 is the strategic bridge to the fleet that
connects Navy headquarters, NAVSEA, and program executive
officers to the waterfront and operating forces.
A key component of ship readiness is a robust and
proficiently executed process for ship maintenance and
sustainment. Ship maintenance is more than the conduct of
industrial efforts at a shipyard or another repair activity.
All ship maintenance requires a solid foundation of engineering
and analytics such that the right maintenance actions occur at
the right time and for the right reasons.
In spring of 2008, in response to a growing concern that
material condition of surface ships would not provide
sufficient margins to ensure each ship would meet its
designated service life, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
recommended establishment of a dedicated activity to provide
centralized lifecycle management and support for U.S. Navy
surface ships. The Surface Warfare Enterprise approved that
recommendation, and the Navy will formally stand up the Surface
Ship Lifecycle Management Activity in May 2009. Partnering with
fleet forces, this activity will assess and manage the
maintenance requirements through the lifecycle of ships in the
surface fleet in order to better plan and budget for long-term
maintenance needs.
The Lifecycle Management Activity is modeled after and
would function very similarly to the Submarine Maintenance,
Engineering, Planning and Procurement Activity, SUBMEPP; and
the Carrier Planning Activity, CPA. This activity will
maintain, monitor, and refine class maintenance plans for all
surface ships to maintain material readiness for the projected
service life, develop lifecycle strategies to address system
upgrades, and fully integrate the integrated class maintenance
plan into each surface ship's maintenance schedule and
availability planning process.
While improving maintenance planning on existing platforms,
the Navy is also challenged with fleet introduction of new
platforms. The Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) is a class of ship
that does not conform to the legacy process used on earlier-
generation ships since the manning is reduced and coupled at
the high level of automation, with much of that support,
including maintenance functions, pushed ashore.
An interim support period, ISP, has been contracted for a
trial period of three years during which the government will
conduct a business case analysis in order to determine an
optimal long-term sustainment approach. The three-year period
will give the Navy adequate time to evaluate contractor
performance, responsiveness, and appropriate use and repair
data in order to determine the optimal balance of ship's force,
contractor, and organic Navy workforce needed to support LCS
for the long term.
In a deliberate view to the future, ship life assessment
pilots will be conducted to determine the ability of a ship to
meet its expected service life. The surface ship life
assessment pilots are particularly important as they will
provide a solid analytical basis for making critical repair
decisions in selected areas and provide the potential to build
confidence that our surface ships can fulfill force level
requirements well into the future by assuring they will remain
effective warships for the full duration of their expected
service life.
This effort takes a best practice from industry and
utilizes advanced finite element modeling techniques to provide
a fully engineered view of the criticality of needed
maintenance actions.
With your assistance, we will continue to provide maximum
material readiness for our surface ships and improve our
ability to ensure they reach their expected service life.
Thank you again for letting me testify today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral McManamon, Admiral
Cullom, Admiral Campbell, and Admiral Eccles, can be found in
the Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Ortiz. Admiral Eccles, go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (LOWER HALF) THOMAS J. ECCLES, USN,
DEPUTY COMMANDER NAVAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS
COMMAND (SEA 05)
Admiral Eccles. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for this opportunity to
testify on surface ship material readiness.
My name is Rear Admiral Tom Eccles. I am here as the deputy
commander for naval systems engineering, Naval Sea Systems
Command. I am responsible for cradle-to-grave engineering
support for naval ships and shipboard weapons systems. This
includes research and development, establishment of design
standards for new-construction ships, certification of new
ships and ship systems, and lifecycle engineering for ships in
service in the fleet.
As Naval Sea Systems Command chief engineer, I am also the
technical warranting authority responsible for applying
statutory authorities delegated from the Secretary of the Navy
to ensure the safe and effective operation of ships and ship
systems. In that regard, I am responsible for the engineering
aspects associated with the development of ship maintenance
requirements. As chief technical authority, my staff monitors
the effectiveness of ship maintenance processes and adjudicates
critical variances and standards compliance issues.
As naval technical authority, my organization is deeply
dedicated to the success of the Surface Ship Lifecycle
Management Activity mentioned by several of the other
panelists. Other organizations also have roles in ship
maintenance, including the regional maintenance centers, in-
service engineering agents, and planning yards. My staff has
the necessary visibility and influence to ensure the proper
exercise of technical authority within those organizations. We
are keenly focused on outcomes that will ensure our current
fleet ships will meet their expected service lives.
We have teamed with the fleet to execute ship life
assessment pilots that have the potential to give us an
accurate picture of the health of each ship in the fleet. Those
pilot programs will survey representative combatant surface
ships of four types and develop pictures of the structural and
distributed electrical and fluid systems conditions compared
with our expectations for ships that will meet their intended
service lives.
We will assess the utility of this method for possible
future application on all surface ships. The result I am
looking for is an affordable and objective assessment tool that
may be useful in providing the analytical basis for required
maintenance investment to achieve expected service life. We
believe that solid engineering and objective measurement are
key elements of the plan to resolve our current challenges.
Thank you, and we all look forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of Admiral Eccles, Admiral Cullom,
Admiral Campbell, and Admiral McManamon can be found in the
Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much for your testimony. And I know
the committee has several questions for you.
You know, for all the changes in maintenance and manning
and training over the past decade or more, it may appear to
some to be a series of discrete actions detached from recent
incidents. To the Readiness Subcommittee, to our committee, the
cumulative impact that they have had on ship material readiness
appears anything but discrete.
My question is, what impact has the reduction on
intermediate maintenance shore infrastructure and the
consolidation of technical competitiveness on the regional
maintenance centers had on lifecycle sustainment of the surface
fleet? And what impact has the reduction in ships' crew,
including the removal of active-duty military from intermediate
maintenance shore billets, had on ship sustainment in
conjunction with reduction in shore infrastructure?
And, to us, this is very, very important. And I know that
we want to sing from the same page and we want to be of help to
you. And, hopefully, maybe you can try to respond to at least
those two questions that I have.
Anybody who would like to lead off?
Admiral Campbell. Yes, sir, I will take that question.
In fact, the Navy has combined our intermediate maintenance
activities into, as you mentioned, regional maintenance
centers. Those regional maintenance centers are sized to
accomplish the maintenance that we develop during our
programming and budgeting process. And I believe that for the
current amount of maintenance that exists in our class
maintenance plans, those activities are adequately sized.
We have taken sailor billets out of the shore maintenance
infrastructure to some extent, not entirely. But we have also
taken some of those sailors and moved them over to be part of
the naval shipyard team, where they get the benefit from
working closely with civilian journeymen and still will have
that opportunity to learn while they are on shore duty in
maintenance billets.
Mr. Ortiz. Anybody else who would like to add anything?
If not, I have another question. How does the Navy recover
these lost assets, especially the wealth of experience gained
by having sailors at the shore intermediate maintenance
facilities who previously returned to their ships with the
technical expertise they will share with junior sailors?
Admiral Campbell. Well, again, I would say that, while not
all sailors will have the opportunity to serve in an
intermediate maintenance activity, a number still do.
And then there is also the training aspects that I am not
really able to address in much detail. But we still are sending
sailors to ashore maintenance billets, where they have that
opportunity to learn alongside the civilian journeymen.
Mr. Ortiz. And I know, you know, at least those of us who
have depots, maintenance depots, I would like to know about the
impact of having some contractors do some of these jobs. Maybe
you can elaborate a little bit on that. Is it working out?
Admiral Campbell. Yes, sir, I would like to elaborate on
that.
I think the Navy takes fundamentally a three-level approach
to maintenance. It is either a depot level, an intermediate
level, or an organizational level; organizational level being
the maintenance that is performed by the sailors on board the
ships. Intermediate, as you have already mentioned in your
earlier question, is done at the regional maintenance centers.
And then depot, of course, is done, as you know, in the
shipyards and other depots.
The Navy has been combining intermediate- and depot-level
maintenance. And that goes back to my earlier comment that that
combination has brought sailors who used to be in the shore
intermediate maintenance activities or on board tenders, many
of those sailors now are at the depots, where they are working
with those experienced civilian journeymen.
Mr. Ortiz. I want to allow as many members to ask questions
because we are going to be having a vote pretty soon.
Randy.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, thank you for what you are doing. You know, one
of the great things about this committee is it is probably one
of the most bipartisan committees in Congress, and I trust
every individual sitting in here to ask the same kinds of
questions and do what we need to do for the national defense of
this country.
It is so important that we get answers to the questions
that we need so we can move together as a team. While we are
sitting here right now, North Korea is loading a rocket on its
launch pad that many of us think could perhaps hit Alaska if
they actually go through with that launch.
I am concerned because, again, as I mentioned earlier, I
see so many of the discussions from the people who have the
information that we need to have to do the kind of oversight
that we need to do who are being barred from even talking to
us, as I read this nondisclosure agreement. And it says
``predecision or otherwise.'' But when we talk about the state
of our surface fleet, it is my understanding the Navy is now
moving to a position where all the INSURV assessments are going
to be classified. And if that is the case, I worry about how we
are going to get the information that we need just to make sure
we are making intelligent decisions to help you.
And I am not asking you guys to address that, but I am just
saying that is a concern that most of us have, if you will take
that back.
This committee, everybody that you see up here that was
here during the last year, supported adding $120 million. The
chairman got that into his mark for depot maintenance, and we
lost that in the Senate and in conference, as you know.
But as I understand, what we are talking about today--and
if I am asking the question unfairly or I am not phrasing it
the right way, correct me, because there is no intent to catch
anybody here. I just want to get the information.
As I understand it to get to the 313-ship Navy that many of
us think is a floor--it is not the ceiling of where we want to
go--we are dependent upon getting an extra five years out of
the lifecycle of most of our platforms. At least that is the
basis, I think, that we are working on.
Is that a fair assessment, or am I wrong on that? Maybe I
misunderstood the testimony.
Admiral McManamon. Sir, I think in our most recent report
to Congress OPNAV has asked the engineering community to look
at the extension of up to five years on expected service life
for a variety of the ship classes. So we are looking at that.
Mr. Forbes. But don't we need to get five years? I mean,
somebody had testimony that we are trying to get an extra five
years out of the lifecycle of those platforms.
Admiral McManamon. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And right now we are only at about 23 or 24
years on most of our vessels. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral McManamon. I think that is a fair statement.
Obviously, each ship class has different maturity levels. And,
obviously, the numbers of ships are----
Mr. Forbes. And one of the things that of course concerns
us--and I think we addressed it--is whether or not we even have
an assessment that gives us a lifecycle assessment as to what
we need for maintenance to get there. And I know we are doing
some prototypes to hopefully get there, but we don't have that
in play right now for the whole fleet, do we?
Admiral Eccles. No, sir, we do not have that in play yet
for the entire fleet. But we are moving out, and, in fact,
today in the Cruiser Mobile Bay, there is a survey team of a
number of surveyors who are under way with the ship. The
CLASSRON and the commanding officer of the ship felt it was
important that those surveyors in this pilot program have an
opportunity to not only measure the ship and have the kind of
full disclosure into structures and so forth that they are
looking for, but to see the ship in action under way. So they
have been doing that this week.
Mr. Forbes. And one of the things that I understand, a lot
of times before we actually do the INSURV, because we know when
the INSURV is going to take place, we actually spend quite a
sizable sum on that vessel before the INSURV takes place
sometimes, to get it up to go through the inspection. Is that a
fair statement?
Admiral Campbell. Yes, sir. We recognized after STOUT and
CHOSIN last year, with the results of those INSURVs, that the
ships had not done adequate preparation for the in-depth
inspection that the INSURV board performs. And so we did
recognize the need to consider when the INSURV is actually
scheduled in the ship's cycle and ensuring that the ship is
ready for such a detailed inspection.
The INSURV inspection occurs only every five years on these
ships, and so not all ships' force sailors have had the
opportunity on their current ship to have gone through an
INSURV. And, therefore, it is necessary for them to do that
kind of preparation before the board arrives.
Mr. Forbes. I am going to wrap up my question so we can get
to some other people before we go vote. But I am going to
submit some written questions to you, and let me just tell you
the scope of those.
I don't even know--one, we may not get the INSURVs because
they may be classified now. Second, if we get them, sometimes
they are a little bit deceptive because we had spent a lot of
money before the INSURV actually took place, you know, to get a
full picture. But, as I understand it, we have a $417 million
shortfall right now in our maintenance needs.
And some of the questions I am just going to submit to you
is, how much funding has the Navy requested in the 2009
supplemental request to meet the year-end shortfalls and ship
depot maintenance funding levels and whether or not that
requirement will be funded, the total fiscal year 2009
requirements for ship depot maintenance will be funded if
Congress fully funds those amounts.
But I have a series of other questions that I am going to
just submit to you, if you don't mind responding to them, just
so we can get a handle on how much money we actually need so
that perhaps we can get these budgets where we want them to be
to get the maintenance up to where we think it needs to be.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time now.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Now for questions I yield to my good friend from
Mississippi, the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, Mr.
Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, with what I guess is going to be a shift in the
Navy to building more 51s and fewer 1,000s, what plans, if any,
have you taken so that the first couple blocks of 51s--what are
you going to do to modify them to keep them in the fleet as
long as possible?
The second thing is, given the delays in the LCS program, I
spend too much time shaking my head at the early retirement of
the Coastal Mine Hunters. I am told that the primary reason
that you can retire in this fiberglass hull with less than 18
years on them is because of the engine. I mean, why isn't
someone just looking at putting a different engine in them and
keeping them around at least until we have sufficient LCSs with
their packages?
And the third question would be, I noticed the--what was
your budget for fuel in 2008? And what did you actually spend
for fuel in 2008 on these surface combatants?
Admiral McManamon. Yes, sir, I can easily talk a little bit
about our DDG modernization program, which is under PMS-400 and
surface combatants.
And we have been working for approximately four years to
plan the modernization plan for DDGs. And, in fact, we will be
looking to start our first hull and mechanical engineering
modernization for DDGs in 2010 and our combat systems in 2012.
So Admiral Clark, before he left, actually started us to look
down that. And, in fact, that was one of our big driving
forces, knowing how long that ship class is going to be around
for, to actually start looking now, right now today, at a
modernization program for those DDGs.
Our first ones are scheduled. We listened very carefully to
the Congress. Our oldest DDGs are going in first. The Arleigh
Burke and the John Paul Jones will be starting. And our entire
plan there is to do Maritime Hull, Mechanical and Electrical
(HM&E) and then combat system upgrades as we move forward,
starting in 2010 and 2012.
In terms of the engines----
Mr. Taylor. If I may, those vessels were brought into the
fleet in the late 1980's?
Admiral McManamon. 1991 for Arleigh Burke, so she is----
Mr. Taylor. So what----
Admiral McManamon [continuing]. Right about the 17-year
mark.
When we looked at--Arleigh Burke, herself, will be right
about 17, 18 as we move forward.
Mr. Taylor. So what is the anticipated service life of the
51?
Admiral McManamon. Right now, the 51 was designed for a 35-
year service life, and we were asked to look, could we extend
that 5 years to 40. And there is no--as long as we do the right
maintenance and we do the right modernization, there is no
technical reason why we cannot make 40 years for that ship
hull.
Mr. Taylor. Because, again, it really does gripe me that
when the Block 1 cruisers were retired at less than 20 years,
that was a terrible waste of the taxpayers' resource. And we
just can't keep making those kinds of mistakes.
Admiral McManamon. Yes, sir.
In terms of your question in regards to the Mine Hunters
and the engines, we are, also under our upgrade program,
looking to see how we can best support the MCMs. We do have a
look at the engine, and that was one of the big engine issues
on whether we were going to reengineer, were we going to try to
do a planned improvement program to that. And I will take that
for the record to give----
Mr. Taylor. Also, we have a hold on two MHEs that were
going to be transferred.
Admiral McManamon. Transferred, yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. And, again, we are only given so much of the
taxpayers' treasure to try to put together a fleet, and it just
doesn't make sense to retire something at 18 years,
particularly with the LCS being as late as it is, and not look
at putting a better engine in instead. So I wish you would get
back to us on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Mr. Taylor. And on the fuel because, again, as is
absolutely no secret, I am hard over that the next generation
of cruisers should be nuclear-powered for a lot of reasons. I
am just curious how much of that $417 million shortfall that
you spoke of is because of fuel prices.
Admiral Cullom. Sir, I will take that one.
On the fuel prices, overall writ large for Navy, our fuel
bill has varied between $1.7 billion, $1.8 billion up to $5
billion, depending on the price that we are paying for fuel.
For surface combatants exactly, I will go back and we will
get you an exact figure for that and----
Mr. Taylor. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I had a question about some of the problems that you are
seeing in training now. And it used to be that the training was
one-on-one, and now you are using more of self-directed
computer and also person. And they said that is more cost-
effective but actually the result might not be as good.
So could you address that, please? Do you have some
concerns about the way we are training people? Are we relying
too much on the automated and self-directed computer training
versus the traditional way of apprenticeship, working under
somebody actually showing how to do things?
Admiral Cullom. For the automated training, we are probably
not the right grouping of folks to ask on that question. We can
certainly get back to you with a better answer for you
specifically on----
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay, but you don't have a sense at all
that this might be factoring in some of the problems that you
are seeing, you know, some of the collisions that we have seen
recently and----
Admiral Cullom. I think Admiral McManamon might be able to
answer----
Admiral McManamon. Yes, ma'am. As part of--the Surface
Warfare Enterprise also is very interested in that. And, in
fact, at a couple of meetings over the last two years we
actually set up one of our enterprise cross-functional teams to
actually look very specifically at what was the impact of the
computer-based training, because there was some deck-plate
concern that perhaps we had moved too quickly in that.
We will get back to you for the record the results of that
study, but there was acknowledgment by the ships. And I think
what we generally found was that there are some years that are
very well-suited for the computer-based training and other
areas that perhaps we needed some more hands-on on some of our
junior sailors. And so we did look very carefully at that and
the Commander Navy Surface Forces, in his enterprise hat, has
asked us to look at it more carefully.
But we will get back to you, ma'am, on the results and what
we seem to be moving on there.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I would appreciate that.
Thank you, and I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 69.]
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Nye.
Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to thank all of our members here
for their service. And we are all working toward the same goal
here, in keeping our Navy and our fleet as ready as possible
and as effective as possible and doing the missions that our
country requires overseas.
I am going to keep my questions short given the fact that
we have a vote coming up, and I will submit additional
questions in writing.
But, first, a question for Admiral Cullom. Thank you for
being here today. I want to note that in January of this year,
the Navy announced its intention to home-port a nuclear carrier
in Mayport, Florida.
Given the fact that Mayport has, to date, never home ported
a nuclear carrier, the fact that we have seen numbers, a $4.6
billion shortfall in 2009 budget priorities, including $417
million in ship maintenance and also $800 million in unfunded
modernization and restoration for existing nuclear-capable
shipyards, my question for you is: Is the infrastructure that
would require what we estimate to be approaching a billion
dollars of military construction (MILCON) investment at Mayport
to put in place the same as that which is already available in
Norfolk?
Admiral Cullom. The Chief of Naval Operations and the
Secretary of Defense have been talking about this issue, and it
is under discussion and deliberation right now as to what is
the best decision. And no decision has really been made at this
point yet as to whether it should be done or not.
Mr. Nye. Okay. So if I understand your answer correctly,
this issue is still under review and no final decision has been
put forth?
Admiral Cullom. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Nye. Okay. Well, let me just comment, it seems to me
that if the facilities in Mayport would be equivalent to the
ones in Norfolk, we are talking about some duplicative spending
at a time when we are facing some serious budgetary shortfalls
currently in terms of keeping our ships ready so they can do
their missions overseas.
One other question, I just wanted to follow up on something
that my colleague Mr. Forbes said, a question for Admiral
Campbell. I would also be very interested in seeing the results
of your mid-year review. And I know you have said today you are
still in the process of doing that review, and so you don't
have the numbers available today.
I would appreciate it, if it is possible, to follow up in
writing to us and let us know what those numbers are if they
are available. Also, how much you plan to request in terms of
supplemental funding for the ship maintenance deficit.
To be quite frank with you, I, along with I know a number
of my colleagues, would be very happy to see a specific plan on
how we are going to get to meet that shortfall. And, again,
recognizing you are still under review right now, I would
appreciate it if you could give us as much, in a written
response, in terms of details of meeting that plan for
immediate shortfall as possible. I would appreciate that.
Thank you.
Admiral Campbell. We will provide that to you, yes, sir.
Mr. Nye. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 69.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
There are members that have other commitments, other
meetings, and we have about 3 minutes for the next vote. I know
a lot of members would like to submit questions for the record,
and they will submit them to you. We don't want to keep you
here any longer because we have votes and I know you have other
things to do. But thank you very much for your testimony.
And this hearing stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 25, 2009
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March 25, 2009
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 25, 2009
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Admiral McManamon. A previous one-year test aboard two MCM 1 class
ships demonstrated that the operational availability of the existing
engines could be satisfactorily improved through a series of engine
improvements. Test results showed engine operations in excess of 13,000
hours with a 56% reduction in corrective maintenance when compared to
the class average. There were minimal critical component failures and
no catastrophic casualties. Most failures experienced were repairable
on board with stocked parts.
The Navy developed and executed a planned product improvement
program as part of its maintenance and modernization program for the
MCM 1 class Isotta-Fraschini engines. This program has demonstrated a
15% increase in the operational availability of the existing engines.
The following improvements were installed on all MCM 1 Class ships'
Isotta-Fraschini main propulsion and ship's service diesel engines:
improved cylinder heads, redesigned main bearings, improved cylinder
liners, gallery cooled pistons, improved rings, as well as improved
filter systems for combustion air, fuel oil and lube oil.
Additionally, the Navy is conducting an AVENGER class MCM service
life sustainability study. The study will determine the equipment/
systems requiring modernization to continue all 14 AVENGER-class MCMs
in commission through 2030.
The AVENGER-class MCM was designed for a 30 year life span. They
are planned to decommission between 2017 and 2024. [See page 15.]
Admiral Cullom. None of the $417 million ship depot maintenance
shortfall is a result of fuel price changes. Maintenance and fuel are
funded in separate budget line items. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
Admiral McManamon. The Navy's training methodologies,
organizational manning, and maintenance philosophy have all evolved
over time. Within the training area, selection of specific training
methodologies to optimize the learning transfer of the knowledge,
skill, and/or ability (KSA) of the individual is a foundational part of
the curriculum development process to create a Navy course. The
resultant Blended Training Solution (combination of instructor lead
training, lab training, computer-based training, simulation training,
etc.) requires assessment if a Sailor's KSA's are not adequate to
support the work assigned. Currently CBT accounts for 33% of training
in Navy accession training schoolhouses; regular Training Requirement
Reviews facilitate maintaining Navy courses to current Fleet
requirements.
There is great value in the effectiveness and efficiency of CBT.
However, there is some concern that the pendulum has swung too far away
from traditional schoolhouse based training and there needs to be a
better balance between the two forms.
The Navy is assessing if CBT is delivering the right prerequisite
skills training and qualifications to our Sailors. The Center for Naval
Analyses is reviewing the impact of CBT with a report due later this
year. The Navy will take appropriate actions based on this report. [See
page 16.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE
Admiral Campbell. The mid-year review of the FY09 unfunded
requirement is still in progress and currently at the Commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces/Commander, Pacific Fleet level. In mid-March 2009, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
COMPTROLLER), provided guidance regarding the annual mid-year review of
unfunded requirements for the Navy's Operation and Maintenance (O&M,N)
accounts. All O&M,N appropriation holders were directed to follow the
guidance to generate, evaluate, prioritize, mitigate and forward all
additional requirements identified since the beginning of the current
fiscal year. The chain of command will evaluate, prioritize and
mitigate issues and forward all unresolved mid-year issues to the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) in the few weeks. OPNAV
will decide how to address each unresolved unfunded issue and whether
additional funds will be requested. Any modifications to the FY09
initial ship maintenance shortfall will be made at that time. The
several unplanned and unfunded requirements that DoN is currently
addressing have rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates and more
thorough evaluations of the total cost of repair, required funding and
plans of action are being conducted. As with the mid-year issues, these
repair costs will be evaluated, prioritized and mitigated within the
entire Navy program prior to any additional funds being requested
outside of DoN. Fleet readiness remains one of the Navy's highest
priorities and as such is receiving the highest level of attention from
the Navy leadership. [See page 17.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 25, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Mr. Ortiz. Extending ships' operational life beyond their expected
service life addresses a shortfall in acquisition, while uncertainty
about the ability to achieve the expected service life raises issues
regarding shortfalls in maintenance and sustainment. The Navy has not
technically articulated the maintenance requirement if it wants to keep
its ships operating 30-45 years. How is the Navy assessing whether its
ships will achieve their expected service life, and what is it doing to
extend ship service life? What efforts are being undertaken to improve
the capability of the ship's crew to do self-assessment of the ship's
material condition? What benefits would derive from extending the ship
life assessment pilot program beyond fiscal year 2009?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Reaching ESL for our surface platforms is a key underpinning
of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan and our ability to reach a
minimum 313-ship Navy. The Navy initiated four Surface Ship Life
Assessment Pilots in FY09 to help determine the ability of a ship to
meet its Expected Service Life (ESL).
The Surface Ship Life Assessment pilots provide a solid analytical
basis for making critical repair decisions in selected areas, and
provide potential to build confidence that our surface ships can
fulfill force-level requirements well into the future by assuring that
they will remain effective warships for the full duration of their
expected service life. This effort takes a best practice from industry
and utilizes advanced finite element modeling techniques to provide a
fully engineered view of the criticality of needed maintenance actions.
NAVSEASYSCOM has currently undertaken four pilots: one on a DDG 51
Class ship (USS COLE, DDG 67); one on a CG 47 Class ship (USS MOBILE
BAY, CG 53); one on a LSD 41 class ship (USS GERMANTOWN, LSD 42); and,
one on a FFG 7 Class ship (USS UNDERWOOD, FFG 36). To accomplish the
pilots, NAVSEASYSCOM has teamed with the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) which is the Classification Society that provides similar
services for the commercial shipping industry. At the conclusion of the
four pilots, the information gathered will be used for further study,
analysis and possible incorporation into future life cycle management
initiatives including ICMP tasks, new maintenance procedures and
possible changes in our maintenance processes. The Navy will also use
this information to decide how best to incorporate periodic engineering
assessments into the maintenance planning sequence for each ship class.
The benefit of extending the ship life assessment pilot program beyond
FY09 is that more ships would be included in the process and receive an
in-depth assessment of remaining ship life.
Additional activities currently used to assess a ship's material
condition are:
Inspections and organizational level maintenance
conducted by the ship's crew
Integrated Class Maintenance Plan (ICMP) condition
assessment tasks performed by Regional Maintenance Center personnel
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) chartered to
survey ships to assess current material condition and warfighting
readiness, including ability to support continued service (individual
ships surveyed about every five years)
Pre-Overhaul Tests & Inspections (POT&Is) performed on
selected ship classes to better inform the work package development
process
Mr. Ortiz. Ship commanding officers often face the quandary of
deciding whether to stay in a maintenance availability longer or opt
not to do maintenance work and risk more work later, potentially at a
premium price. Please explain the criticality of the class maintenance
plan to service life sustainment and service life extension of non-
nuclear surface combatants such as cruisers and destroyers. How does
engineered operating cycle versus a progressive maintenance plan affect
service life?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Prior to the 1980s, the Navy operated on a time-driven
maintenance philosophy where equipment was overhauled to like-new
status on fixed time intervals regardless of actual equipment material
condition. Time-directed equipment overhauls were bundled into large,
preplanned, and fully integrated complex ship overhauls. The approach
was less than optimal in that equipment often did not need complete
overhauls and equipment overhauls often induced subsequent equipment
failures. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the Navy followed industry best
practices and transitioned to condition based maintenance. Condition
based maintenance was introduced through the phased maintenance program
implemented on fast combat stores ships in order to improve operational
availability and was later expanded to include amphibious and some
surface combatant ship classes. Success of these and other programs led
to Navy wide adoption of condition based maintenance for all ships and
aircraft in 1998.
Under a condition based maintenance philosophy, maintenance is
performed based on objective evidence of need. Today, class maintenance
plans consist predominantly of material condition assessment tasks and
qualified repair tasks. Material condition assessment tasks objectively
measure material condition and establish objective evidence of the need
to accomplish specific corrective maintenance. Qualified repair tasks
are screened, brokered to a maintenance availability, and executed
based on the results of material condition assessments. Failure to
properly execute class maintenance plans will lead to late detection of
material condition discrepancies. Because most material condition
discrepancies get worse over time, late detection of discrepancies
leads to more costly subsequent repair and ultimately, higher cost to
achieve intended service life.
Accurate class maintenance plans and effective execution of class
maintenance plan requirements are therefore absolutely essential to
economical achievement of intended ship service life.
Engineered operating cycle is a maintenance availability scheduling
strategy where maintenance requirements are scheduled and grouped into
large depot maintenance availabilities. The Engineered operating cycle
strategy also allowed time for and tight integration with the extensive
modernization efforts being implemented prior to the 1990s.
Progressive maintenance planning refers to a number of maintenance
scheduling and contracting strategies (e.g., Multi-Ship Multi-Option
contracting and continuous maintenance). These strategies move most
depot maintenance required over a ship's service life out of large
availabilities. The maintenance is instead executed in shorter, more
frequent depot maintenance availabilities (e.g., phased maintenance
availabilities or selected restricted availabilities) or during
operationally available times when the ship can be in a continuous
maintenance availability without interfering with operational
commitments through an equipment or component change-out program.
For surface ships, progressive maintenance has a number of
advantages over the engineered operating cycle strategy. Because
progressive maintenance can be scheduled and executed during the
shorter, more frequent maintenance availability periods, the length of
time that material condition discrepancies are left uncorrected is
minimized, allowing for less growth of material condition degradation
and subsequent costs to repair. Because less maintenance is conducted
during any one particular depot maintenance period, availabilities are
less complicated, take up a smaller percentage of the operating cycle,
incur less depot overhead costs and are less likely to go over budget
or off schedule.
However, there are two disadvantages to the progressive maintenance
strategy. Maintenance planning can be more difficult under progressive
maintenance because availabilities are shorter, and short maintenance
period overruns can impact operational commitments. Additionally,
because equipment is not routinely brought back to the more expensive
``like new'' post-overhauled condition, progressive maintenance may
entail slightly greater per ship operational risk associated with
successfully achieving intended service life.
Mr. Ortiz. How confident are you, in a constrained funding
environment and in light of anticipated decreases in defense funding in
FY10 and beyond, that sufficient funding, manpower, and technical
support can be provided for SEA 21 to provide full-spectrum lifecycle
management and to the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM)
Activity to assess and manage maintenance requirements?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy will formally stand up the Surface Ship Life Cycle
Management (SSLCM) Activity in May 2009 under the Deputy Commander for
Surface Warfare (SEA 21).
Partnering with U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the SSLCM Activity will
assess and manage the maintenance requirements throughout the life
cycle of ships in the surface fleet, in order to better plan and budget
for long-term maintenance needs. The SSLCM Activity is planned as a
long-term improvement to surface ship maintenance and is being
addressed in the President's Budget submission so it can be
appropriately resourced, balancing the competing requirements of ship
operations, maintenance and modernization.
Mr. Ortiz. In Commander Naval Surface Forces' comprehensive review
of surface ships' overall readiness, what readiness factors were
reviewed, what stressors did the review find, and what course
corrections were found to be needed?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. In an effort to determine if systemic support problems
existed, CNSF conducted a comprehensive review of overall surface ships
readiness. Known as the ``Take a Fix'' round of readiness briefs
(Autumn 2008), CNSF assessed and reported on all readiness factors
(maintenance, supply, training and personnel) across the Force.
In the area of maintenance, three gaps or stressors were
identified: (1) Strategy and organization. The long-range, lifecycle
maintenance planning function for surface ships was missing. Submarines
and aircraft carrier lifecycle maintenance is guided by two dedicated
organizations (Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and
Procurement Activity (SUBMEPP), and Carrier Planning Activity (CPA))
who build long-range lifecycle maintenance plans based on engineered,
task-level maintenance requirements. An equivalent organization does
not exist for surface ships. This lack of centralized surface ship
lifecycle management, coupled with a condition-based repair philosophy,
limits the ability to accurately forecast maintenance requirements and
translate them into credible budget requests. The Surface Ship
Lifecycle Management (SSLCM) Activity of NAVSEA 21 will be established
(8 May 2009) as the activity responsible for this long-range, lifecycle
maintenance management. NAVSEA 05 (Systems Engineering) is responsible
to validate and approve the underlying engineering requirements and
associated maintenance tasks that deliver the planned service life of
shipboard systems.
(2) Measurements. An accurate measurement of the current ship
maintenance backlog (both planned and deferred work), and its
associated cost, is needed as an input to the maintenance requirements
development process. A measurement technique does exist to measure and
capture this information (``unfunded technical requirement'', UTR), but
requires strengthening of the underlying current ships maintenance
package (CSMP) input. OPNAV N43 and NAVSEA 04 have developed the UTR
technique; CNSF, through their ``Back to Basics'' campaign, is seeking
to improve the inputs to the CSMP, which will then improve the UTR
measurement.
(3) Tools and processes. Each surface ship class maintenance
strategy should be guided by a technical foundation paper (high-level
maintenance strategy), which provides assumptions and boundaries for
the Integrated Class Maintenance Plan (ICMP). The ICMP is a task-by-
task listing of engineered maintenance requirements needed over the
planned service life to maintain prescribed engineering standards and
system technical attributes. ICMPs are then ``filtered'' into class-
standard Baseline Availability Work Packages (BAWP), which guide
notional availability planning. Each ship then combines ICMP tasks in
the BAWP with ship-specific corrective maintenance actions to form the
ship- and availability-specific Availability Work Packages (AWPs). The
SSLCM Activity of NAVSEA 21 is responsible for the development of these
tools and processes. They will work with the Ship Class Squadrons
(CLASSRONS), who will be the ship-specific executive agents for BAWPs
and AWPs.
Residual supply storeroom shortfalls have been experienced as a
result of funding constraints experienced during FY08 and FY09. The
relaxation of 100% on hand/on order TYCOM policy for parts was
necessary to support the substantial decrease in funding levels.
Although the aggregate range/depth percentages still remain above TYCOM
goals, potential exists for a ``bow wave'' of parts should the
requisitioning of material requirements be restored to normal
parameters. CNSF continues to monitor range/depth percentages across
the Force on a daily basis to ensure no severe degradation in logistics
readiness occurs.
In the area of training, Afloat Training Group (ATG) has had a
difficult time keeping up with the training requirements for the fleet.
They are fully capable of providing effective training however, manning
reductions have limited their capacity to match every ship's schedule.
The fleet has relied on more computer based training (CBT) and the ATRC
waterfront detachment was disestablished. Numbered Fleet Commander
(NFC) tasking during Basic Phase, Component Commander's (COCOM) Request
For Forces (RFF) make it difficult for ATG and the ship to provide and
receive effective training.
Corrective actions included establishing a Surface Warfare Officer
(SWO) introduction course on the waterfront. Engineman career
progression was reviewed and the formal training curriculum is being
revised. A Anti Submarine Warfare Officer (ASWO) Course and an
Engineering Readiness Assist Team (ERAT) was established. Initiatives
are in progress with Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and
Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) to bring back the Senior Officer
Ship Material readiness Course (SOSMRC). ATG Limited Team Training
(LTT) procedures were changed to stress less on assessment and more on
training by ATG. Main battery Non-Combatant Expenditure Allocation
(NCEA) was increased to improve gun systems readiness (INSURV finding).
A two-phase Shipboard Training Team course to better prepare ships for
the Basic Phase of the Fleet Response Training Plan to include Combat
Systems and Engineering LTT visits was instituted. In addition, revised
USW continuous certification requirements were implemented with
emphasis on external assessment and resources. A16-week Basic Phase and
increased Maintenance Phase entitlement was codifed in the revised
Fleet Training Continuum (FTC) (USFF instruction approval pending) as
part of an increased emphasis on basic level surface platform training
and performance.
In the area of personnel, a myriad of manpower decisions were made
independently across a number of years resulting in a synergistic
negative impact on shipboard manpower and manning. Optimal Manning (OM)
concept, which applied to most ship classes, compounded by several
extremely difficult POM cycles (POM 08/10) reduced manpower even
further. The reduction in manpower on the FFG 7 class was the result of
POM 08 required fiscal balancing. In addition, OPNAV's directed ``Top 6
Alignment,'' though it did not reduce overall manpower on ships, it did
reduce the pay grade of the billets and the associated personnel with
the unintended consequence of reducing experience level, a significant
impact to units with already reduced or Optimal Manning. Finally, the
Navy Individual Augmentation program to support the Overseas
Contingency Operations continues to reduce the available manning for
ships.
Corrective actions taken include a PR09 issue to fund additional
enlisted billets on DDGs, and a PR11 issue submitted to refund billets
on FFG 7s to support a revised Required Operations Capabilities (ROC)/
Projected Operational Environment (POE) which will require the ships to
be capable of full multi-mission operations. Additionally, action has
been taken to support imminently deploying ships through the
reassignment of personnel from future deploying units to those
deploying within the next several months to ensure ships are fully
manned to meet deployment requirements. This action resulted in the
degradation of the manning level for some ships.
Mr. Ortiz. The Aegis Program Executive Office PEO was involved in
the full life of that ship, from design to development of training for
sailors and life-cycle maintenance. What has the Navy learned from the
Aegis experience about life-cycle sustainment and how can those lessons
be applied to improve the life expectancy of other ship classes?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Initial design of Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers included
life-cycle sustainment as an overall design factor. The entire Aegis
concept included a detailed systems engineered approach to meeting the
mission of the ship. Organizations charged with sustaining these
platforms over their lifecycle were integral participants in the design
of the Aegis Combat System (ACS) and the platforms on which it is
employed. This involvement during initial design and follow on
improvements has resulted in a team of engineers, technicians and
trainers who are better prepared to support these ships. The Aegis
program was a complete ``Cradle to Grave'' organization that integrated
HME, Combat Systems, Training, Logistics, In-Service support and
modernization and upgrades. This expertise was transitioned to the
homeports in support of in-service cruisers and destroyers with the
Combatant Homeport Engineering Teams (CHET) and the Aegis Modernization
Test Teams (AMTT) including a strong building yard planning yard
component. These organizations, and headquarters commands, were
constructed to allow continuous feedback which has proven instrumental
in applying lessons learned from Fleet operations through both the
iterative improvement to cruisers and destroyers during the
construction process and in developing their mid-life upgrades. The
mid-life upgrades of the modernization programs allow for further
sustainment of these ships and enable the achievement of a 35 year
expected service life in support of the Navy's 313 ship requirement.
It is the intent of the Navy to apply many of the lessons learned
in sustaining the Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers to other surface ships.
In order to facilitate application of these lessons, and those obtained
from other platforms, the Naval Sea Systems Command established the
Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA-21). SEA-21 provides the
Fleet with an organization focused toward sustainment of the surface
force. This organization is further partnered with PEO SHIPS, forming
Team Ships, to continue the tradition of including lifecycle
sustainment as a primary factor in the ship design and construction
process as the Navy introduces new platforms and capabilities to the
Fleet. The Navy's Surface Ship Lifecycle Management (SSLCM) Activity
will take full advantage of the existing stakeholders (Program
Manager's Representatives, Engineering Field Representatives, Planning
Yard representatives, etc. to apply best practices to ensure that every
surface ship meets its expected design life.
Mr. Ortiz. Your testimony states that ``a key tenet of our ability
to maintain forward-deployed and surge-ready naval forces is the proper
resourcing, planning and execution of maintenance needed to prepare and
sustain our ships. The same testimony states that Fleet Response Plan,
``when fully funded,'' enables the Navy to continuously deploy three
Carrier Strike Groups to points around the globe, surge three more in
30 days and deploy a seventh in 90s days.'' What happens when
sufficient resources are not found and accounts are not fully funded?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. If sufficient resources are not found, the Navy will be
required to balance the risk between the operating, maintenance, and
procurement accounts in a manner that takes into account the short term
risks of not meeting current operational demands with the longer term
risks of either not meeting expected service life or recapitalizing our
ships and aircraft.
Mr. Ortiz. Your testimony states ``A well established process
exists to identify and program the resources required for ship
maintenance,'' yet it also states that ``one of the greatest obstacles
to the surface fleet's ability to articulate the 100% maintenance
requirement necessary to reach expected service life'' is the lack of a
detailed surface ship class maintenance plan. What steps is the Navy
taking to bring greater rigor to the surface fleet maintenance
requirements process and to ensure that these requirements are fully
resourced?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy is taking several steps to bring greater rigor to
the surface fleet maintenance requirements. These include:
Establishment of SEA 21 as the full spectrum life cycle
manager for surface ship readiness
The creation of the Surface Ship Life Cycle Maintenance
Activity (SSCLMA) to manage and improve class maintenance plans and
create more accurate baseline availability work packages
Establishment of technical redlines for surface ships
for NAVSEA 05 similar to those that exist on submarines and aircraft
carriers
Conducting a bottom up review of surface ship class
maintenance plan to ensure the 100% technical requirement required to
meet expected service life is embedded in the our ship class
maintenance plans
In conjuction with the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS), conducting a pilot program to survey a ship from each of four
major ship classes to establish baseline material conditions for use in
building future class maintenance plans
The Navy will continue to take a balanced approach that manages the
risk to our operational, maintenance and procurement accounts to meet
both current and future readiness demands in light of current fiscal
constraints.
Mr. Ortiz. If only five weeks of a nine-week depot availability
involves ``real wrench turning,'' what will need to be done to get more
time in depot for surface combatant ships? Does the Navy have
sufficient infrastructure, manpower and funding to increase that time
to 15-16 weeks? How can the Navy meet its FRP requirements with
extended depot time?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The current notional Fleet Response Plan (FRP) cycle for
surface ships is 27 months in duration: 9 week (2 months) maintenance
availability, 4 months Basic Phase training, and 3 months Integrated
Phase training, which generates 18 months (67%) where a unit is
employable (available for tasking).
Extending maintenance period to a 15-16 week maintenance
availability (approximately 4 months), while maintaining the notional
training cycle and timelines, leaves 16 months (59%) where a unit is
employable. Aggregating this change across the surface force structure
and making minor schedule changes, the Navy would still be able to meet
the most stressful operational plan (OPLAN) requirements, and the
SECDEF approved Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)
presence requirements.
With respect to maintenance infrastructure, most surface ship
maintenance is sourced from the private sector which has demonstrated
significant expansion capabilities. As for manpower and funding
impacts, current maintenance execution practice involves assignment of
a funded 2-4 week continuous maintenance availability (CMAVs) prior to
and/or following the scheduled CNO availability. These CMAVs enable the
start of funded depot repair work (tank cleaning and gas freeing,
interference lay-out and removal, open-and-inspection), as well as
preliminary alteration production work. Thus, a nine-week CNO
availability was, from a funding allocation perspective, essentially a
12-16 week availability.
Mr. Ortiz. Your testimony states operational tempo for Navy surface
combatants has increased 19% since 2000. While maintenance and ship
operating budgets also have increased, the focus of those additional
maintenance dollars were aimed at near-term ship readiness, making the
surface fleet much more susceptible to changes in optempo. Is the Navy
funding the maintenance it needs or doing the maintenance it has
funding for? When you look at the sharp rise in operational
availability and the slight rise in maintenance funding, are we funding
short-term readiness gains in operational availability at the expense
of maintenance required to fund long-term readiness?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy is funding the maintenance it needs. In the case of
Aircraft Carriers and Submarines, we have a proven process that has
allowed us to fully articulate and fund the 100% technical requirement
needed to fund both short-term and long-term readiness to ensure these
ships reach their expected service life. While surface ship maintenance
has also been funded near 100% of the stated surface ship maintenance
requirement, our process for accurately identifying that specific 100%
technical requirement was lacking. Our planning requires specific
improvements. To that end, the Navy is taking several steps to bring
greater rigor to the surface fleet maintenance requirements. These
include:
Establishment of SEA 21 as the full spectrum life cycle
manager for surface ship readiness
Stand up, under SEA 21, of the Surface Ship Life Cycle
Maintenance Activity (SSCLMA) to manage and improve class maintenance
plans and build baseline availability work packages
Establishment of technical redlines for surface ships
for NAVSEA 05 similar to those that exist on submarines and aircraft
carriers
Conducting a bottom up review of surface ship class
maintenance plan to ensure the 100% technical requirement required to
meet expected service life is embedded in the our ship class
maintenance plans
With the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), conducting
a pilot program to survey a ship from each of four major ship classes
to establish baseline material conditions for use in building future
class maintenance plans
Once properly established, the 100% technical requirement will
allow surface ship maintenance to compete on a level playing field with
other Navy requirements for funding. The Navy will take a balanced
approach that manages the risk to our operational, maintenance and
procurement accounts to meet both current and future readiness demands.
Mr. Ortiz. In Commander Naval Surface Forces' Surface Ship
Maintenance Strategic Offsite, what gaps were identified in the surface
ship maintenance program?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Gaps identified were primarily process gaps in work package
development and strengthening the technical foundation for work to be
accomplished or deferred during surface ship maintenance
availabilities.
Comparable organizations such as the Submarine Maintenance
Engineering, Planning and Procurement Activity (SUBMEPP) or Carrier
Planning Activity (CPA) equivalent do not exist for surface ships. This
lack of centralized surface ship life cycle management coupled with the
current condition based repair model stresses the ability to accurately
forecast maintenance requirements and translate them to budget
requests. An accurate assessment of the current ship maintenance
backlog, and its cost, has to be developed. Each surface ship class
needed to have a specific Baseline Availability Work Package (BAWP) and
a coordinated Integrated Class Maintenance Plan (ICMP). Ship Class
Squadrons (CLASSRONS) did not have the tool necessary to help manage
the Availability Work Package (AWP) to establish an accurate cost and
schedule baseline for each availability. Notional availabilities were
inaccurate and did not reflect actual cost and schedule return data.
As part of a holistic effort, three key organizations were tasked
to improve overall surface ship maintenance execution.
1. CLASSRON's are responsible for development of baseline and
final Availability Work Packages (AWPs) and inclusion of Integrated
Class Maintenance Program (ICMP) work items in appropriate
availabilities.
2. NAVSEA 21 is responsible for development and management of the
ICMP. Additionally, NAVSEA 21 will establish the Surface Ship life
Cycle Maintenance (SSLCM) Activity in May 2009.
3. NAVSEA 05 (Systems Engineering) is responsible for validating
technical content of the ICMP, for adjudicating all deferral requests
and for providing engineering support to SEA 21.
Mr. Ortiz. What are the timelines for completing the integrated
class maintenance plans for each class of surface ships? When will the
Navy complete the review of its process for recroding and report the
surface ship maintenance unfunded technical requirement (UTR). Please
provide for the record the UTR for surface ship maintenance each year
since fiscal year 2000.
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Integrated class maintenance plans currently exist for every
surface ship class. However the Navy is conducting a bottom up review
to ensure they are complete and technically accurate. The Navy expects
to complete this review in late fiscal year 2010. Conducting a bottom
up review of surface ship class maintenance plans will ensure the
technical requirement required to meet expected service life is
embedded in ship class maintenance plans. Once established, the
technical requirement will allow surface ship maintenance to compete
with other Navy requirements for funding. The Navy will take a balanced
approach that manages the risk to our operational, maintenance and
procurement accounts to meet both current and future readiness demands.
The Navy calculates the surface ship maintenance unfunded technical
requirement (UTR) for the previous fiscal year at the beginning of the
next fiscal year. The UTR identifies future budget requirements for
maintenance work that was not performed. UTRs are planning tools used
to identify needed maintenance work and associated costs in order to
avoid future operational impacts or mission effectiveness of performing
maintenance at a later date. For example, FY08 UTR was calculated on
October 1, 2008, the beginning of FY09. This year's UTR will be
calculated on October 1, 2009, at the beginning of FY10. The UTR
process is reviewed annually at the time of calculation to ensure it is
aligned with current Navy practices and desires. Slight adjustments are
typically made to the process; however, a complete change has not
occurred since 2001.
Table 1 contains the surface ship unfunded technical requirement
(UTR) for fiscal years 2001-2008 (POM04-PR11). UTR is expressed as the
average for a single ship in the class in man-days to remove effects of
inflation and location. UTR values are affected by ships' operational
availability and individual funding levels. Table 1 reflects
supplemental funding received in FY03-FY05 to reduce maintenance
backlog.
UTR as a concept was introduced to the surface community in FY00.
The UTR calculation method was significantly revised in 2001. These
changes made UTR comparisons prior to 2001 invalid. The following steps
were added in 2001:
- Work must be identified prior to the start of an availability
to ensure the opportunity exists to provide funding.
- Service jobs inherent to availabilities are not considered.
- All jobs are reviewed for validity using reliability-centered
maintenance practices. Therefore, jobs not integral to the mission,
safety, or structural integrity of the ship are removed. This typically
accounts for 1% of the jobs considered for UTR.
Beginning in FY06, a UTR business rule was added for classes that
had no depot availability period during a single fiscal year. For
classes with no availabilities during a fiscal year, the last valid UTR
is carried forward. This business rule has been applied twice: LHD-1
Class in FY07 and LHA-1 Class in FY08.
The following classes do not have UTR calculated for all years
FY01-FY08: DD-963 Class and PC-1 Class. Responsibility for calculating
UTR and representative availabilities for the PC-1 Class was assumed by
the Maintenance Resource System in FY05. Prior to that year, UTR data
was not collected for PC-1. UTR was no longer calculated for the DD-963
Class following the final depot availability in FY04. DD-963 Class
decommissioned (decom) in FY05.
Table 1
Average Surface Ship UTR in Man-Days
FY01--FY08
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CG-47 1,808 890 204 82 760 380 410 849
DD-963 1,458 879 855 Decom N/A N/A N/A N/A
DDG-51 1,733 691 350 173 480 147 364 599
FFG-7 731 589 36 45 223 302 490 687
LHA-1 11,233 400 0 114 26 1,164 1,734 1,734
LHD-1 4,993 2459 666 0 980 755 755 3,379
LPD-4 3,038 347 0 1657 81 715 650 423
LPD-17 2,430 1007 323 101 1006 612 972 913
MCM-1 70 3 17 5 43 94 30 112
PC-1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 338 2 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Ortiz. Your testimony states that ``Port engineers'' who work
for the [Regional Maintenance Centers] are the professional advisors of
each ship's maintenance team. What issues is the Navy experiencing in
regard to recruitment and retention of qualified port engineers?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy is not experiencing any problems with recruitments
or retention of Port Engineers. The current contract structure allows
for greater flexibility in attracting qualified contracted Port
Engineers. The strategy for attracting qualified candidates utilizes
maritime trade magazines, direct interface with Maritime Academy Job
Boards and Industry word of mouth to find qualified Port Engineers.
Currently the 5 Maritime Academies being utilized are Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, Kings Point and California. Based on contract
requirements we are able to promptly find the right blend of experience
and education in recruiting potential candidates. Surface Forces
currently employs 114 port engineers in a mix of government civil
service and contracted personnel. The current average retention for
this aggregate community of Port Engineers is 10.64 years.
Mr. Ortiz. How do multi-ship, multi-option (MSMO) maintenance
contracts contribute to achieving or extending ship expected service
life? What steps is the Navy taking to resolve the difficulties it has
experienced in successfully awarding MSMO contracts on the East Coast?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Multi-Ship Multi-Option (MSMO) contract vehicles for ship
maintenance, modernization, and repair within homeport areas maximize
the ship's operational availability and surge readiness, minimize the
disruption in the quality of life of the ship's crew, and provide
potential for learning curve cost reductions. They form the cornerstone
of Navy Fleet Maintenance and Modernization strategy for surface ships.
Proper maintenance and modernization programs, such as the Cruiser and
Destroyer Modernization programs, ensure our ships achieve their
expected service life.
There has been an extensive assessment of the Navy's MSMO
contracting process and Navy continues to work with Industry to improve
the MSMO contracting process. The Navy has made the following
commitments and improvements:
(1) MSMO processes have been revised to capitalize on previous
availabilities and repair work to improve Notional Work Package (NWP)
relevance and Independent Government Estimate (IGE) accuracy.
Specifically, historical data from previous CNO Availabilities,
Continuing Maintenance (CM), and Emergency Maintenance (EM) periods for
each ship class will be used to identify common work items for each
ship class. Those common items will be used to develop the NWP included
in the solicitation. In addition, historical cost data for those common
work items will be utilized to formulate the IGE. These changes will
provide credible, accurate data that will be the building blocks of
future MSMO solicitations.
(2) The MSMO post-award debriefing process has also been revised
to provide to each bidder greater detail of the Government's analysis
of its proposal. This expanded debriefing format will provide each
bidder with an in-depth review of the Government's evaluation of its
cost and technical proposals, with the goal of an improved bidder
understanding of shortcomings in its proposal that can, in turn, help
the bidder improve its competitiveness for future MSMO contract awards.
This expanded format has been successfully piloted; a debriefing
``template'' is under development to standardize this approach.
(3) The Navy will publish the upcoming MSMO solicitation and
contract award schedule in an earlier and more predictable manner. This
will provide our Industry Partners with timely information to plan
their resource allocation and to establish teaming arrangements, all of
which will enhance the competitive marketplace for the benefit of all
parties.
(4) In accordance with FAR 15.201, the Navy conducted a ``MSMO
Industry Day'' in Norfolk, VA. In an effort to increase transparency,
NAVSEA discussed the MSMO process and engaged with industry on feedback
for process refinements. To further communicate the Navy's improvements
to the MSMO strategy, a follow-on Industry Day is scheduled for April
22, 2009, at the Washington Navy Yard.
Mr. Ortiz. One of the three things your testimony cites as early
signs that surface ship material readiness is being impacted is the
current process for executing maintenance. What examination have you
made regarding how reductions in ship manning and ashore maintenance
billets, and changes in crew training in apprentice and journeyman
technician schools, onboard ship, and through reduced shore
intermediate maintenance facilities is having on ship material
readiness?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. We are continuing to examine the impact of manpower and
training changes to ship material readiness. Surface ship manpower
reductions have occurred since 2003 for various reasons, including cost
savings, policy changes (e.g. elimination of visual signaling
requirement and consolidation of Boatswain's Mate of the Watch with
Quartermaster of the Watch) and technological advances (SmartShip
installs and moving most Pay and Personnel functions ashore). Ship
class manpower cuts since 2003 until 2008 are as follows:
CG 13%
DDG 13-15% (dependent on flight)
FFG 11%
LHA 06%
LHD 10%
LSD 04%
LPD-4 05%
Optimal Manning determines the minimum quantity and quality of
personnel required to operate ships in both Condition I (general
quarters) and Condition III (wartime steaming, maintained for 60 days).
Ship classes with manpower requirements determined using optimal
manning initiatives are funded at 100 percent of the number of required
billets. One-hundred percent manning has not been consistently met due,
in part, to the number of personnel assigned as individual augmentees,
including those in post IA deployment dwell time. While on board
manning is less than optimal, the overwhelming majority of ships are
succeeding at these manning levels. Ships with good leadership who
adhere to Navy's material maintenance program have fared well during
INSURV inspections. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) is conducting a
study to better quantify the effect optimal maiming has on the combat
readiness of ships, with an expected completion in June 2009. We
continue to assess our manning levels and will adjust as necessary.
Computer Based Training (CBT) is a significant component of
apprenticeship training. Consequently new recruits receive less
classroom and hands-on training. As with the legacy training construct,
the Revolution in Training relies heavily on utilizing experience
levels on board ship to provide oversight to the new recruit. However,
total training has not been significantly reduced between 2003 and
2009. The average recruit reaching the fleet in 2003 received 282 days
of training, versus 275 in 2009 (a 2.5 percent decrease). Some schools
were significantly shortened. For example, the training pipeline for a
Gas Systems Turbine Technician was reduced from 355 days to 290 days;
however, we increased the number of Sailors reporting to their commands
having completed Class ``A'' School. The percentage of unrated firemen
reaching the fleet declined from 4.8 percent in 2004 to 0.3 percent in
2009. Likewise, the percentage of unrated Seamen declined from 16
percent to 8 percent during the same period.
The journeyman level technician is critical to equipment readiness.
The technical training associated with Navy's Journeyman, or Class
``C'', schools, regardless of method of delivery, has not resulted in
less prepared Sailors. The curriculum comprising Class ``C'' school
training delivered via CBT has remained largely unchanged, unless
modification is required by acquisition of new capabilities or
equipment. Regular training requirement reviews facilitate maintaining
course content designed to meet Fleet requirements.
Historically, Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) and
Fleet Technical Support Centers (FTSCs) permitted active duty
technicians to continue honing their technical skills in repairing
ships while assigned to shore duty. This better prepared them to
perform ship repairs upon returning to sea duty. As an efficiency
measure, Fleet Forces Command requested that 2200 SIMA billets, in
excess of sea-shore rotation requirements, as well as FTSC billets, be
converted to civilian performance. Completed in fiscal year 2008, this
initiative established a more proficient and lower cost workforce to
provide intermediate level ship maintenance, but reduced opportunities
for Sailors to learn journeyman level skills. Approximately $250
million in realized savings was transferred from the Military
Personnel, Navy (MP,N) account to Type Commander continuous maintenance
to support the reduced capacity. Material degradations and rising costs
due to increases in contracted maintenance have quickly outpaced the
realized savings. Reductions in manning, along with reduced experience
levels of technicians, have resulted in a situation in which the ships
are challenged to train newly arriving personnel to an acceptable
proficiency level. The Navy Inspector General (IG) is currently
conducting an investigation into determining if CBT delivers
appropriate levels of prerequisite skills training and qualifications
for our Sailors. When the Navy IG completes the investigation and
releases the findings, CNSF, with all surface ship providers, will take
appropriate actions to rectify any indentified short-comings.
In addition to the factors above, increased Operational Tempo
presents the greatest challenge with respect to readiness. Since 9/11,
the Navy OPTEMPO has increased by approximately 8%, and OPTEMPO for our
surface combatants is up by 18%. We are examining the initiatives and
policy changes discussed above and see that each change had a valid
reason, at the time, in terms of improved efficiency and cost savings.
As we continue our pursuit of identifying the root causes of the
material readiness decline, we will make any necessary resource
adjustments.
Mr. Ortiz. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead has
stated that a crew of 40 people will not be enough to maintain the
Littoral Combat Ship through its lifecycle. Manning and maintenance
requirements are not defined adequately in the LCS interim support
plan. What is the life-cycle support strategy for LCS? What work will
be done in the private and public sectors?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a class of ship that does
not conform to the legacy process used on earlier generation ships
since the manning is reduced, coupled with a high level of automation,
with much of the support, including maintenance functions, accomplished
ashore.
Although the USS FREEDOM (LCS 1), built by a team led by Lockheed
Martin, and INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2), built by a team led by General
Dynamics, have two different seaframe designs, the maintenance concept
is the same. Specifically, maintenance actions beyond the capability or
capacity of ships force, including more extensive facilities
maintenance, will be assigned to shore support via the Maintenance
Support Detachment (MSD) and appropriate contracting vehicles. Legacy
systems, such as fire pumps and air conditioners, will be supported by
existing infrastructure. An Interim Support Period (ISP) has been
contracted for a trial period of three years during which the
Government will conduct a Business Case Analysis (BCA) to determine an
optimal long-term sustainment approach. The three-year period will give
the Navy time to evaluate contractor performance/responsiveness and
appropriate usage and repair data in order to determine the optimal
balance of ship's force, contractor, and organic Navy workforce needed
to support LCS for the long term.
Preventative and corrective maintenance will be accomplished during
regularly planned Continuous Maintenance Availabilities (CMAVs).
Initial estimates for LCS 1 and 2 include the cost to execute
preventative, facility and corrective maintenance that would
traditionally be accomplished by the crew. Every 117 days there will be
a CMAV coinciding with crew turnover where a contractor team will
conduct necessary preventive and corrective maintenance. Every two
years the ship will complete a Selected Restricted Availability (SRA).
Docking SRAs (DSRA) will take place approximately every six years.
All shipboard maintenance requirements will be managed by the LCS
Class Squadron (LCSRON) and the Maintenance Support Detachment (MSD) in
San Diego. The MSD consists of two teams, the Maintenance Support and
the Logistics Support Teams that will handle any and all maintenance
and logistics issues for the LCS hulls. Those teams consist of
personnel from the Regional Maintenance Center, Fleet Industrial
Support Center (FISC), Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), LCSRON,
and the prime contractors.
Mr. Ortiz. What is the plan to return sailors to waterfront schools
a year after their first cruise? When will this plan be implemented and
when will funding be requested?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The normal process is for schools to be scheduled to occur
before and after a Sailor's first shipboard tour which could be up to
five years in duration. Formal schools are conducted by Naval Education
and Training Command (NETC) with quotas controlled by the detailers at
Naval Personnel Command (NAVPERS). NAVPERS also funds the Sailors to
attend these schools. On an as-needed basis, officers and enlisted
personnel are sent by their commands to schools to obtain critical
skills. These schools could occur at any time during a Sailor's tour,
but typically not within one year of transferring or leaving the Navy,
and are paid for out of the ship's training funds account. These
schools may be formal schools, with a Navy Enlisted Code earned upon
successful completion, or waterfront schools depending on the skill
taught and whether the school is for individuals or teams. Officers
additionally attend Surface Warfare Officer training during their
initial tour as part of their indoctrination and qualification process.
Amplifying information:
Combat Systems and Deck training is based on an Apprentice-
Journeyman-Master construct and begins with ``A'' schools based on a
Sailor's rate prior to their arrival at their first ship. Sailors gain
experience and qualifications during their initial tour and then attend
``C'' schools prior to their second tour.
Engineering training follows an Apprentice-Journeyman-Master
construct similar to topside training. All engineers attend Basic
Engineering Common Core (BECC) before reporting to a ``strand''
training course based on their rate. BECC combined with the strand
course constitutes the Apprentice level training. After an engineer's
first tour, they attend ``C'' school based on their rate and earn NECs
prior to their second ship tour.
In the Surface Officer world when an officer executes their first
set of orders, they are sent to one of five pipeline schools en route
to their first ship. These schools provide fundamental skills that the
ship will require based on first tour division officer billets and
include: Ammunition Administration, Anti-submarine Warfare Officer,
Legal Officer, TTWCS/ATWCS, and EKMS Administration. Once the officer
has been permanently assigned to a ship, he or she is required to
attend the first available four-week SWO Introduction Course, which is
provided at each Fleet Concentration Area. The first three weeks of the
course covers subjects ranging from Division Officer Fundamentals,
Engineering, Maritime Warfare, Navy Familiarization, Ship Simulators,
Watchstanding, and School Ship visits. The 4th week focuses on
Leadership and it is managed by the Center for Personal and
Professional Development. When the officer completes the course, he/she
returns to their ship to complete all applicable fundamental, system,
and watchstation Professional Qualification Standards (PQS). Dependent
on ship's schedule and the officer's drive, the PQS is normally
completed in 8 to 12 months. Once the PQS is complete the officer will
attend a three-week Surface Warfare Officers School Advanced
Shiphandling and Tactics (SWOS ASAT) course in Newport, RI. The course
focuses on advanced Surface Warfare fundamentals, Seamanship and
Navigation, and Maritime Warfare. Funding is provided by PERS-41 to
attend SWOS ASAT. It is calculated based on travel to and from
homeport. For ships deployed away from homeport, a quota request will
be submitted to and approved by PERS-41. Additional training is
provided after an officer's first tour based on their second tour
assignment. For instance, if a junior officer is going to be the Damage
Control Assistant then they will attend DCA School en route to their
next command.
Mr. Ortiz. The Navy surface fleet is heavily reliant upon private-
sector contractors for ship maintenance. The reliance has translated
into, and is reflected in, the changes in maintenance training at the
Navy's ``A'' (apprentice-level) and ``C'' (journeyman level) schools
and onboard ship. For example, the engineman course at ``C'' school
that previously took two months is now 13 days. Onboard ship, sailors
no break down engines; they call in a contractor technical
representative (CTR) instead. It would seem logical that the smaller
the crew size, the more critical the individual sailor is to ship
operation. If you no longer have intermediate maintenance shore
infrastructure and if do not have engineered maintenance plan to
support service-life extension, then it would seem apparent that you
need to have very qualified sailors who can provide onboard care of the
ship's systems. Is the product that the ``A'' and ``C'' schools are
producing adequate to meet the needs of the fleet at a time of high
operational tempo, reduced manning of crews, and pressure to fill
individual augmentee billets? How do you incorporate maintenance back
into the C school side after you have contracted out so much
intermediate maintenance and reduced maintenance infrastructure ashore?
How do we put a renewed value on onboard training?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The surface engineering `A' (Apprentice level) schools and
`C' (journeyman level) schools production rates are closely aligned to
FY09 production goals. Of the eight ratings that comprise surface
engineers, six (EN, EM, GSE, GSM, HT and MR) are on or ahead of
production goals. The other two (MM and IC) are slightly behind goal
with sufficient capacity to meet goal by the completion of the fiscal
year. Of the 17 total Surface ratings, the only Surface rating that
will not meet the planned production goal for FY09 is the Combat System
rating of ET. The content of the engineering schools was thoroughly
reviewed and validated by a working group chartered by the Commander,
Naval Surface Forces, US Atlantic Fleet in 2002, and then revalidated
by SURFOR and AIRFOR in 2008. The goal of the working group was to
conduct an Engineering Functional Analysis and define requirements for
surface engineers in the 21st Century. The working groups had
representatives from the US Navy, US Coast Guard, Merchant Marine,
British Navy, academia and industry. Significant efficiencies were
gained by providing the right training at the right time in a sailor's
career. As a result, many courses attained a degree of efficiency that
enabled the content to be delivered in significantly shorter training
periods. While it may appear that an individual course was
significantly reduced in length implying that the course is not meeting
the training goal, training content was re-engineered to ensure that
Sailors are being properly trained.
The training requirements review process managed by Naval Education
and Training Command ensures that course reviews are conducted on a
periodic basis. The reviews enable the stake holders to update content
training in response to shipboard system changes and to determine if
Fleet objectives are being met. If the Fleet identifies training
deficiencies, the courses are modified appropriately.
The Navy is currently developing man-machine interface operating
constructs and more robust automation for new construction ships as
well as backfit capabilities for ships in service which reduce manpower
requirements to operate and maintain ships. These also reduce the
unique skill sets required of Sailors on legacy platforms. This is in
response to OSD and DoN objectives to reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC)
for weapon systems and capabilities. Achieving this manpower TOC
reduction requires systematic approaches to how ships are designed,
maintained, operated, supplied and equipped. This includes embedded
technologies to reduce corrective maintenance actions, automated
performance monitoring and data collection capabilities to reduce
operator loading, distance-support concepts to move non-operational
tasks off ships to centrally managed support fimctions, and contract
strategies to deliver business efficient logistic support to ships at
the right location, time and cost. On board training is still being
pursued in terms of skill retention for operators and maintainers who
can practice scenario-based individual and teamwork skills and decision
making/troubleshooting.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. ``What are the results of the mid-year review of
surface ship maintenance requirements?'' ``Have there been additional
requirements identified in the mid-year review that have affected the
surface ship maintenance shortfall?'' ``What is the resulting total
surface ship maintenance shortfall for the remainder of FY09?''
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Office of the Assistant Secretary (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AND COMPTROLLER) letter dated 13 March 2009 provided guidance regarding
the annual mid-year review of unfunded requirements for the Navy's
Operation and Maintenance (O&M,N) accounts. All O&M,N appropriation
holders were directed to follow the process to generate, evaluate,
prioritize, mitigate and forward all additional requirements identified
since the beginning of the current fiscal year. During every phase of
the process, each echelon command conducts a thorough review of the
requirement prior to advancing that mid-year issue to higher authority;
ultimately, to be reviewed and addressed by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO). As of now, the beginning of the year ship maintenance
shortfall of $417M has been mitigated by USFF, CPF and CNO by $262M
leaving $155M as the current recognized ship maintenance supplemental
request. The several unplanned and unfunded requirements that DoN is
currently addressing have rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates of
$161M and more thorough evaluations of the total cost of repair,
required funding and plans of action are being conducted. Fleet
readiness remains one of the Navy's highest priorities and as such is
receiving significant attention from the Navy leadership.
Mr. Forbes. The Recent Non-disclosure agreement prohibits the
exchange of information pre-decisional or otherwise. What does this
mean? Does this mean that senior DOD officials will be unable to share
unscripted data with Congress? Congress is mandated to raise and
support armies and navies--without the support of DOD, this task is
very hard to achieve. The NDA also prohibits sharing information other
than with required government agencies and then list OMB. Does this
mean that DOD is prohibited from exchanges with Congress in relation to
developing budget priorities?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Department of Defense was directed by OMB (Memorandum M-
09-11 dated 19 February 2009) to refrain from making commitments about
programs not specifically mentioned in the Department Budget Overview
or address account level details until the release of the full Budget
in April. We now expect that the full FY 2010 President's Budget will
be released in early May. The Secretary of the Defense recently
reiterated this direction in a memorandum dated 8 April 2009 to the
Military Departments, Agencies and Staffs that the normal budget
process rules apply and that DOD is ``obliged to protect from
disclosure the details of the proposed budget until released by the
President.'' The Department of the Navy is obligated to comply with the
direction provided. The specific non-disclosure agreement which is
referenced within this question was not provided to any of the
witnesses at this hearing. As such, it is impossible to address these
concerns. Specific questions regarding the application of the DOD non-
disclosure agreement would need to be addressed by OSD.
Mr. Forbes. In January 2009, the Navy announced its decision to
homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station in
Florida. Mayport has never homeported a nuclear-powered carrier. We are
told that the military construction price tag will be $456 million
dollars, plus a one-time maintenance cost of $85 million and $24
million in personnel change of station costs. That's $565 million.
Additionally, the Navy estimates that it will cost an additional $25.5
million in annual recurring costs compared to keeping a carrier in
Norfolk. This is due to the recurring cost of base operating support
and sustainment restoration and modernization costs, and travel and per
diem for transitory maintenance labor. Can you help me understand how
ship maintenance and readiness will be conducted on a nuclear aircraft
should we move one to Florida? Were you consulted on the maintenance
impacts of this arrangement during the Navy's decision-making process?
Will the Navy be able to do perform all of the required maintenance
work in Mayport, or will a Mayport-homeported carrier still need to
travel to Norfolk for certain maintenance work? Specifically, how
often, and at what cost, will the Navy be required to fly specialized
workers down to Florida? Do you feel this is an effective utilization
of manpower? What other impacts--such as on quality of life and worker
efficiency--do you believe will result from such an arrangement?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Ship maintenance and readiness for an aircraft carrier
stationed in Florida will be performed in a manner similar to the way
it is currently conducted in San Diego. As in San Diego, with the
exception of drydocking, the Navy can conduct the full spectrum of
repair work required to support a ready carrier. The Navy has been
successfully executing CVN maintenance availabilities in San Diego
since 1998. The relationship between Mayport and Norfolk Naval Shipyard
will be the same as the proven relationship between San Diego and Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard.
The Navy's policy is that, when possible, we conduct maintenance in
the homeports of our ships for crew Quality of Life reasons. During
scheduled 6-month maintenance availabilities, conducted about once
every 32 months, the Navy will be required to fly Naval Shipyard
personnel to Mayport. The travel and per diem costs associated with
that travel are estimated to be $23M. A CVN homeported in Mayport will
be required to travel to Norfolk about five times in a 50-year life;
four times for scheduled 10.5-month docking periods at Norfolk Naval
Shipyard and once for a 39-month mid-life refueling overhaul conducted
at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding--Newport News (NGSB-NN). This is
similar to CVNs homeported in San Diego that are required to travel to
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard four times for docking and to NGSB-NN for a
mid-life refueling overhaul.
This arrangement works well on the west coast. The best indication
of the effect on shipyard worker quality of life is there has been no
difficulty in assembling qualified crews of voluntary workers to
conduct the remote site maintenance. There is no indication of a loss
of worker productivity compared to availabilities conducted in the home
shipyard.
Mr. Forbes. How much funding has the Navy requested in the 09
supplemental request to meet year-end shortfalls in Ship Depot
Maintenance funding levels? How much of the Navy's total FY09
requirement for ship depot maintenance will be funded if Congress fully
funds your requests for FY09?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy has requested a total of $440 million in FY09
supplemental funding for ship maintenance, of which $155M has not yet
been appropriated. The Navy plans to fund all remaining FY09 ship
maintenance availabilities. We are taking targeted risk in our other
operational accounts, while continuing to meet COCOM demands, to fund
these availabilities. This plan is contingent upon receipt of the
balance of supplement funding not yet appropriated.
Mr. Forbes. How does the Navy anticipate budgeting for these costs
in FY10? Given the recent incidents involving the USS Port Royal, the
USS New Orleans and the USS Hartford and the likely emergent costs
associated with getting these ships back into service at a time of war,
does the Navy feel that these and other unanticipated costs can be
properly accounted for in the regular FY10 budget and beyond, or do you
anticipate targeted supplemental funding requests to handle such
issues?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy has a process for adding unfunded prior year ship
depot maintenance requirements (deferred maintenance) to future years
and including that amount in future budget requests. The Navy baseline
budget does not include allowances for extraordinary events like those
that have affected USS Port Royal, USS New Orleans and USS Hartford.
When they occur resources must be realigned and previously scheduled
work must be deferred. Supplemental funding for Port Royal, Hartford
and New Orleans would reduce the amount of deferred maintenance added
to future budget years.
Mr. Forbes. I understand that the Navy's stated policy on
contracting for the DDG modernization program is to conduct these
modernization projects in the homeport region of each destroyer. Is
this still the plan?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. Yes, execution of DDG modernization is planned to be
conducted in the ships homeport region. DDG modernization utilizes a
Multi-Ship Multi-Option (MSMO) contract vehicle within homeport areas.
This strategy provides potential for learning curve cost reductions,
maximizing the ships operational availability and minimizing the
disruption to the quality of life to ships force. MSMO contracts
operate under an ASN(RD&A) approved acquisition strategy and form the
cornerstone of the Navy Fleet Maintenance and Modernization strategy
for surface ships.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE
Mr. Nye. In January 2009, the Navy announced its decision to
homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station in
Florida. Mayport has never homeported a nuclear-powered carrier and
requires a minimum of $456 million Mil-Con dollars, a one-time
maintenance cost of $85 million, $24 million in personnel costs, and
$25.5 million in annual recurring costs compared to keeping a carrier
in Norfolk. That's more than $565 million in infrastructure costs,
which is double the original estimated cost. It is my, and many of my
colleagues' estimate, that the total project cost for Homeporting a
Carrier at Mayport will approach $1 billion. All this with $4.6 billion
in unfunded 2009 budget priorities, $800 million in unfunded
modernization and restoration projects at its four existing nuclear-
capable shipyards, and a surface ship maintenance shortfall of at least
$417 million. Is the infrastructure that would be required to be built
at Mayport, FL to homeport a CVN identical to that at Norfolk, VA? If
the answer is the infrastructure not identical: a. Does this mean the
Navy will not be able to perform all of the required maintenance work
in Mayport, and a Mayport-homeported carrier will still need to travel
to Norfolk for certain maintenance work? b. Specifically, how often,
and at what cost, will the Navy be required to fly specialized workers
down to Florida? If the answer is the infrastructure is identical: c.
Which parts--exactly--of the nuclear maintenance capacity that will be
requested for Mayport are duplicative to the maintenance capacity in
Norfolk? Given these funding realities, it would appear to me that
spending more money to duplicate maintenance capacity in Mayport will
only exacerbate your unfunded priorities. d. Maintaining the necessary
fleet vessel numbers is the most important mission for Navy fleet
readiness. Will you pledge today to review the requests you make to
your superiors to find where possible duplicative or unnecessary
funding can be cut in order to obtain this preeminent goal?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. No, the infrastructure required to be built in Mayport is
not identical to that in Norfolk, VA. Specifically, the infrastructure
will not include a CVN capable dry dock. However, the Navy's policy is,
when possible, to conduct maintenance in the ship's homeport to enhance
crew Quality of Life. In this respect, the infrastructure required to
homeport a CVN in Mayport is similar to the infrastructure that exists
in San Diego today. The Navy has been successfully executing CVN
maintenance availabilities in San Diego since 1998. The relationship
between Mayport and Norfolk will be the same as the proven relationship
between San Diego and Puget Sound with the same flexibility and
dispersal objectives.
During scheduled 6-month maintenance availabilities, conducted
about once every 32 months, the Navy will be required to fly Naval
Shipyard personnel to Mayport. The travel and per diem costs associated
with that travel are estimated to be about $23M. A CVN homeported in
Mayport will shift homeports to Norfolk about five times over a 50-year
life; four times for scheduled 10.5-month docking periods at Norfolk
Naval Shipyard and once for one 39-month mid-life refueling overhaul
conducted at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News (NGSB-NN). This
is similar to CVNs homeported in San Diego that are required to shift
homeports to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard four times for docking and to
NGNN for one mid-life refueling overhaul.
Mr. Nye. If the answer is the infrastructure is identical:
c. Which parts--exactly--of the nuclear maintenance capacity that
will be requested for Mayport are duplicative to the maintenance
capacity in Norfolk? Given these funding realities, it would appear to
me that spending more money to duplicate maintenance capacity in
Mayport will only exacerbate your unfunded priorities.
d. Maintaining the necessary fleet vessel numbers is the most
important mission for Navy fleet readiness.
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The infrastructure is not identical so the above questions
do not apply.
Mr. Nye. Will you pledge today to review the requests you make to
your superiors to find where possible duplicative or unnecessary
funding can be cut in order to obtain this preeminent goal?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy agrees that an important mission for Navy fleet
readiness is our ability to reach our goal of a floor of 313 ships. A
key tenet of this plan is our ability to reach the expected service
life for our ships and provide the maximum response out of all the
fleet assets consistent with fiscal resources. To this end, the Navy
reviews all funding requests to ensure they represent the most
effective and efficient use of the resources required to meet all DON
strategic and operational guidance. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
determined that the final decision on whether to permanently homeport
an aircraft carrier in Mayport, Fla., will be made during the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR will assess the need for
carrier strategic dispersal in the broad context of future threats,
future Navy force structure, and likely cost effectiveness.
Mr. Nye. It is my understanding the Navy reported shortfall in Navy
surface ship maintenance was $417M as of October 1st, 2008. There have
been several unplanned and unfunded surface ship maintenance
requirements since that time, including the USS Port Royal grounding
and the most recent collision between a U.S. sub and the USS New
Orleans. What are the results of the mid-year review of surface ship
maintenance requirements and have there been additional requirements
identified in the mid-year review that have affected the surface ship
maintenance shortfall and if so, what is the resulting total surface
ship maintenance shortfall for the remainder of fiscal year 09? a. In
order to cover the current shortfall, you will certainly request
substantial funding in the upcoming supplemental, how much funding
exactly will you be requesting? b. If it isn't enough, that just kicks
the problem into the next year and doesn't allow us to properly
maintain the fleet. Maintaining the necessary fleet vessel numbers is
the most important mission for Navy fleet readiness. I would like you
to provide me a plan of how the Navy will rectify their surface ship
maintenance funding deficit.
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Office of the Assistant Secretary (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AND COMPTROLLER) letter dated 13 March 2009 provided guidance regarding
the annual mid-year review of unfunded requirements for the Navy's
Operation and Maintenance (O&M,N) accounts. All O&M,N appropriation
holders were directed to follow the process to generate, evaluate,
prioritize, mitigate and forward all additional requirements identified
since the beginning of the current fiscal year. During every phase of
the process, each echelon command conducts a thorough review of the
requirement prior to advancing that mid-year issue to higher authority;
ultimately, to be reviewed and addressed by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO). As of now, the beginning of the year ship maintenance
shortfall of $417M has been mitigated by USFF, CPF and CNO by $262M
leaving $155M as the current recognized ship maintenance supplemental
request. The several unplanned and unfunded requirements that DoN is
currently addressing have rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates of
$161M and more thorough evaluations of the total cost of repair,
required funding and plans of action are being conducted. Fleet
readiness remains one of the Navy's highest priorities and as such is
receiving significant attention from the Navy leadership.
Mr. Nye. The Navy recently suspended ship maintenance due to a
funding shortfall. Its unfunded budget requirements for 2009 was $4.6
billion; the sea service also has a backlog of nearly $800 million in
unfunded modernization and restoration projects at its four nuclear-
capable shipyards. Given these funding realities, it would appear to me
that spending more money to duplicate maintenance capacity in Mayport
will only exacerbate your woes. How will you ensure that these added
costs are accurately captured in future fleet readiness and maintenance
budget requests to Congress?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Navy has experience establishing the maintenance
facilities necessary to support homeporting CVNs in San Diego and has
been successfully executing CVN maintenance availabilities in San Diego
since 1998. The Navy will leverage that experience to ensure we
accurately capture the cost to establish and maintain the
infrastructure, as well as execute CVN maintenance in future fleet
readiness and maintenance budget requests to Congress.
Mr. Nye. The Navy's Environmental Impact Statement includes a
``purpose and need statement'' that is to guide the Navy's
decisionmaking regarding homeporting additional ships at Mayport. The
Navy's purpose and need statement indicates that the Navy's action
should utilize the available facilities at Naval Station Mayport in an
effective and efficient manner in order to minimum new construction.
The Navy chose the option that maximizes new construction for a type of
ship that the former Secretary of the Navy has indicated that SOUTHCOM
and Fourth Fleet does not need. Former Secretary of the Navy, Donald
Winter, said this at the Current Strategy Forum in June 2008. ``The 4th
Fleet demonstrates the Navy's commitment to the region by creating
presence in support of combined training operations, humanitarian
operations, and disaster response. And this can be done without using a
carrier battle group. We should also remember that it is sometimes more
effective to have a smaller combatant that can access many of the
littoral areas where we need to go. Smaller platforms are also more
suitable for training, as they are more compatible with the navies with
which we will be operating. We must balance our presence requirements
with the missions and threats we are likely to face in a given
region.'' a. Given the fact that we know many of the existing frigates
at Mayport will be retired soon and given the unique types of missions
we encounter in Fourth Fleet's operating areas, such as counter-drug
operations, theater support cooperation, military-to-military exercises
and training, do you agree with Secretary Winter's assessment that the
Fourth Fleet does not need a carrier group to accomplish its objectives
``without a carrier battle group,'' or do you believe that homeporting
a nuclear carrier at Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix of
assets to support the US Fourth Fleet and justifies spending $565
million to implement?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Fourth Fleet is routinely capable of accomplishing its
engagement missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR without an aggregated carrier
strike group (CSG). The Navy's objectives for homeporting a CVN in
Mayport are independent of Fourth Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
The Navy's objectives for homeporting a CVN in Mayport are to create a
strategic dispersal alternative for Atlantic Fleet based CVNs and
provide an alternative CVN nuclear maintenance capability on the East
Coast. The Navy's decision was based on the following:
Currently the Hampton Roads area is the sole East Coast
location capable of supporting the operational, maintenance, and
training needs of CVNs
A catastrophic event of any type in the Hampton Roads
Area, whether to the ships themselves, the shipping channel, the
supporting maintenance and training infrastructure, or the surrounding
community (Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipyard and/or the public/
private skilled nuclear labor force) has the potential to severely
limit East Coast Carrier operations
The flexibility of a 2nd CVN capable homeport reduces
risk, provides the Navy operational readiness and flexibility, and is
consistent with homeporting strategies in place on the West Coast
(i.e., Bremerton and San Diego)
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Whittman. Given the fact that we know many of the existing
frigates at Mayport will be retired soon and given the unique types of
missions we encounter in Fourth Fleet's operating areas, such as
counter-drug operations, theater support cooperation, military-to-
military exercises and training, do you agree with Secretary Winter's
assessment that the Fourth Fleet can accomplish its objectives
``without a carrier battle group,'' or do you believe that homeporting
a nuclear carrier at Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix of
assets to support the US Fourth Fleet and justifies spending $565
million to implement?
Admiral Cullom, Admiral Campbell, Admiral Eccles, and Admiral
McManamon. The Fourth Fleet is routinely capable of accomplishing its
engagement missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR without an aggregated carrier
strike group (CSG). The Navy's objectives for homeporting a CVN in
Mayport are independent of Fourth Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
The Navy's objectives for homeporting a CVN in Mayport are to create a
strategic dispersal alternative for Atlantic Fleet based CVNs and
provide an alternative CVN nuclear maintenance capability on the East
Coast. The Navy's decision was based on the following:
Currently the Hampton Roads area is the sole East Coast
location capable of supporting the operational, maintenance, and
training needs of CVNs
A catastrophic event of any type in the Hampton Roads
Area, whether to the ships themselves, the shipping channel, the
supporting maintenance and training infrastructure, or the surrounding
community (Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipyard and/or the public/
private skilled nuclear labor force) has the potential to severely
limit East Coast Carrier operations
The flexibility of a 2nd CVN capable homeport reduces
risk, provides the Navy operational readiness and flexibility, and is
consistent with homeporting strategies in place on the West Coast
(i.e., Bremerton and San Diego)
The Navy's Environmental Impact Statement includes a ``purpose and
need statement'' that is to guide the Navy's decision-making regarding
homeporting additional ships at Mayport. The Navy's purpose and need
statement indicates that the Navy's action should utilize the available
facilities at Naval Station Mayport in an effective and efficient
manner in order to minimum new construction. The Navy chose the option
that maximizes new construction for a type of ship that the former
Secretary of the Navy has indicated that SOUTHCOM and Fourth Fleet does
not need. Former Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, said this at the
Current Strategy Forum in June 2008.
``The 4th Fleet demonstrates the Navy's commitment to the region by
creating presence in support of combined training operations,
humanitarian operations, and disaster response. And this can be done
without using a carrier battle group. We should also remember that it
is sometimes more effective to have a smaller combatant that can access
many of the littoral areas where we need to go. Smaller platforms are
also more suitable for training, as they are more compatible with the
navies with which we will be operating. We must balance our presence
requirements with the missions and threats we are likely to face in a
given region.''
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