[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
U.S. STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN: ACHIEVING
PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs TED POE, Texas
of 3/12/09 deg. BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota DANA ROHRABACHER, California
RON KLEIN, Florida EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
David Adams, Subcommittee Staff Director
Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Dalis Blumenfeld, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Karin von Hippel, Ph.D., Co-director, Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Project, Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 12
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., Political Scientist, The RAND Corporation.. 20
Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy,
Center for Strategic & International Studies................... 37
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Karin von Hippel, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 15
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 23
Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 39
The Honorable Keith Ellison, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Minnesota: Article prepared by the United States
Institute of Peace entitled, ``Killing Friends, Making Enemies:
The Impact and Avoidance of Civilian Casualties in
Afghanistan''.................................................. 73
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 88
Hearing minutes.................................................. 89
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 90
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 92
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas: Prepared statement.................... 95
U.S. STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN: ACHIEVING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE
GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Gary L.
Ackerman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Ackerman. The subcommittee will come to order.
Last week, President Obama announced his new strategy for
fighting extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I
wholeheartedly support the President's new approach. The
previous administration--by its own admission--never recognized
that the true central front in the struggle to secure our
nation was Afghanistan, where the 9/11 attacks were
orchestrated, not Iraq. It has been clear for years that the
last administration took its eye off the ball and allowed al-
Qaeda and the Taliban to regroup and rearm in Afghanistan and
the tribal areas of Pakistan. For years, the fight against
extremists has been under-manned, under-funded and lacked a
coherent strategy. President Obama's new strategy recognizes
those facts and moves aggressively to address them. I am
gratified that it contained many elements that I and others in
Congress have been urging for several years.
First, the President laid out a clear objective which is,
``to dispute, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan and to prevent the return to either country in the
future.'' I know that there has been concern expressed that
focusing our attention on al-Qaeda--the reason United States
forces are in Afghanistan in the first place--somehow means
that we are abandoning our efforts to establish functioning
democratic government in that country.
I think a close examination of the strategy reveals that
the President intends to both stabilize the security situation
in Afghanistan and continue our work to improve governance
there. Successfully focusing on al-Qaeda will give us and our
allies the ``exit strategy'' the Presidents wants in order to
reduce our military footprint there and to sustain allied
involvement. But that does not mean that work on Afghanistan's
democratic institution will not continue.
No discussion of an exit from Afghanistan can even be
contemplated until the security situation is stable and al-
Qaeda and the Taliban can no longer use Afghanistan as a base
for terrorist operations. In the near team that means more
troops. I have been calling for additional United States forces
for Afghanistan since 2002, so the President's announcement of
17,000 additional combat troops and 4,000 additional trainers
is a welcome development. It is clear that neither we nor the
Afghans have sufficient forces to take and hold territory once
it has been cleared of extremists. More U.S. forces will allow
us to do that. In the long term, more and better trained Afghan
forces will be able to do it for themselves, allowing U.S. and
other NATO forces to recede into the background and ultimately
withdraw.
While we are on the subject of NATO, I know that the
President will use the summit tomorrow to remind our allies
that Afghanistan is their fight too. While some NATO allies may
not be willing to provide more combat soldiers, there are other
capabilities that they could provide--such as strategic airlift
and military trainers and mentors--that would support the
overall security mission there. There are also civilian aspects
of reconstruction and capacity-building at both the national
and local government levels with which our allies could assist.
But more resources from more countries also has to mean
more and better coordination by us. A signature result of the
Bush administration strategy of subcontracting Afghanistan to
our allies is that there has been little central coordination
of either the political or military effort, and many nations
sent forces with vastly different rules of engagement.
Each nation charged with security for a portion of the
country, or rebuilding some devastated Afghan institution went
off in their own direction, with their own objectives, and
reported to their own national capital. It should surprise no
one that as a result, little was accomplished. Afghanistan is a
case study of what happens when the United States abandons its
leadership role in an international security crisis. What is
most remarkable is that it has not turned out even worse.
More resources also means more money, from us and the
international community. But as the President's plan makes
clear, more of the money needs to reach the Afghan people and
much, much less of it should be spent inside the beltway on
consultants or on overhead. Our assistance should be used to
purchase goods and services from Afghan providers and to put
Afghans to work.
We cannot talk about strategy in Afghanistan without
talking about narcotics and the corrosive effect drug
trafficking has on security and governance. Afghanistan is the
source of 93 percent of the world's opium and, even though the
most recent report by the U.N. Office on Crime and Drugs show
an increase in the number of poppy-free provinces and an
overall decrease in the amount of opium produced, there is
still far too much drug money sloshing around in Afghanistan
tempting everyone from local policemen to provincial governors.
Afghans will never believe they have a real alternative to the
Taliban as long as they see local and even national officers on
the take.
Opium eradication, crop substitution, effective
transportation for those crops and improved local security all
have to be combined in order to make legal crops safe and
profitable for Afghan farmers. In a nation where 70 percent of
the population lives in the countryside, safe and profitable
alternatives to poppy production are not optional.
The President's strategy recognizes the need for an
effective counternarcotics strategy by combining the elements I
have just described with new authorities for the United States
and NATO forces to directly support Afghan counternarcotics
units during the interdiction of narcotics traffickers.
There is one more element necessary for a successful
strategy and that is a coherent regional approach. In
particular, one that deals effectively with Iran and Pakistan.
As usual, Iran has tried to have it both ways in Afghanistan.
On the one hand they have legitimate concerns regarding the
impact of narcotics trafficking and the attendant instability
that results, yet there is also significant evidence that Iran
has shipped weapons to the Taliban in an effort to gain
leverage over us.
The United States has talked to Iran before in the context
of Afghanistan and it is a positive sign that Iran attended the
international meeting on Afghanistan earlier this week. But
while we seek their cooperation in Afghanistan, we should also
insist that they stop arms shipments to the Taliban in
accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390.
The question of Pakistan's role is even more complex and
frankly merits its own separate hearing. Suffice to say that
the entire endeavor in Afghanistan is unlikely to succeed if
terrorist safe havens in Pakistan are not eliminated. The
Government of Pakistan, and more importantly, the people of
Pakistan must come to realize that the terrorists they have
nurtured for decades have now turned on them as this week's
attack in Lahore clearly demonstrates. The fight against
extremists is not solely an American fight, nor is it solely an
Afghan fight. The fight belongs to Pakistan too. It is a fight
for their very existence as a nation and they ignore the
problem at their own peril. I cannot say it more clearly: There
is a real and present danger to Pakistan's survival, but it
comes from inside, not outside the country.
President Obama's strategy for Afghanistan is a welcome,
indeed, desperately needed change from 8 years of reliance on
ad hoc, under-funded, under-manned, uncoordinated, and faith-
based strategies. It is finally time to devote our attention,
our energy and resources to defeating the terrorists who
attacked us on 9/11. My strong view is that the President has
given us a realistic strategy to accomplish that goal.
And now I would like to turn to our good friend, acting in
place of the ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
appreciate you calling this hearing, and I appreciate the many
years that we have spent discussing this issue as things got
better and got worse, and got better and got worse over the
years.
I certainly support the President's new focus on
Afghanistan. I am not sure if it is a policy. I have been
listening very closely as people have been talking, and I will
listen very closely today, to see if it is a strategy. It does
not seem to be that way to me, Mr. Chairman. It seems to be
statements, and seems to be concepts that are being thrown out.
I would hope that this, number one, is not just for PR, and
that instead what we have got from the administration is a
policy in the making. Perhaps what the President is doing and
perhaps what we have seen and how we have been briefed for the
last month is an example of the administration reaching out and
trying to find new idea and trying to come up with a strategy.
So far all I have heard are slogans that most of which I hate
to say will not work.
When we look back on Afghanistan, a lot of people blame
Ronald Reagan for involving us there with supporting the
Mujahideen against the Soviet army. I do not believe that was a
mistake. I think that support helped end the Cold War. I think
the bravery and courage of the Afghan people, coupled with
President Reagan's willingness to help them, brought an end to
the Cold War. The Afghans played a significant part and thus we
owe them a great debt.
However, when President Bush, the first President Bush was
in power after the Russians were forced out, we walked away. So
if we have to find where the chain of responsibility is, I do
not put it on people who would say that helping the Mujahideen
and ending the Cold War was where this started. That was
successful. What was not successful was after President Reagan
left, the senior President Bush cut a deal with Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia and walked away, and left the future of
Afghanistan, these brave people who fought and died in alliance
with us, let them jus sleep in the rubble.
Furthermore, when President Clinton became President, in
order to stabilize the situation a further deal was made for
the United States to covertly support the Taliban. Yes, that is
right. The United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan created the
Taliban and during the Clinton administration they dutifully
supported the Taliban against the forces within Afghanistan
that did not want that type of radical Islamic government. So
many examples of that that it was mindboggling at the time.
But let me note even here we have had witnesses that on the
record have contradicted the State Department when Ben Gilman
sat in this seat, along with me and requested all of the
documents from the State Department in our dealing with Afghan
policy, the State Department did not--not only did not comply,
but arrogantly cut us off the chairman of this committee from
information, and just a few weeks ago when former Secretary of
State--Assistant Secretary of State Inderfurth was here, there
was testimony indicating that a memo had been sent with very
important information, which is exactly what we were requesting
that was withheld from us by the State Department.
This is a democratic society. We cannot put up with that,
Mr. Chairman. We need to have an honest discussion of issues
between the Executive and Legislative Branch. This not closed
government making decisions, and we elected officials being
told about it.
So now we have President Obama. During the Bush years, of
course, we paid for what happened with our support of the
Taliban, and by first President Bush's walking away, we paid
for it in 9/11, and I would note I will submit for the record
places where about ten times I suggested that, and you were
present during my warnings that if we did not change our policy
in Afghanistan it would come back and hurt us in a big way.
So President Bush after 9/11 was forced to deal with that,
President George W. Bush. Unfortunately, he walked away as
well. We walked away, and we walked away and turned the corner
and went over to Iraq. Instead of keeping our promises to the
Afghan people who drove out the Taliban, the people who had
committed the crime against us, we walked away and spent our
money in another endeavor in Iraq. We walked away again. We did
not keep our promise again, and all of this talk about how we
defeated the Taliban after 9/11 is jus nonsense. It was the
Afghan people and it was the remnants of the Mujahideen. It was
the Northern Alliance that drove the Taliban out of
Afghanistan, again with our help, based on a promise that we
would now stick with them, and we did not.
So now we have President Obama, and I hear what is being
said but I hate to suggest that, as I say, I do not see the
policy. I am hoping this is a policy in the making. If it is,
let us have a discussion about it today. But from what I have
heard, what I have heard, the ideas being presented will not
work, and the situation will not get better.
Mr. Chairman, the structure that I have been told I have
been told about, the structure that I have seen in ``classified
briefings,'' the structure that we are supporting is a non-
democratic structure for Afghanistan. Let me repeat that. We
keep hearing about democracy and how important it is, freedom,
there is a non--what we have been presented by the
administration is a plan that will not permit democracy at the
local level. I would challenge the administration, I would
challenge anyone who cares about the Afghan people or wants to
finally find a solution to understand that Afghanistan has
never been ruled from the center, and we should admit that, we
should embrace it, and we should make sure that people all the
way down to the village have a right to elect their local
officials. Our plan is based on provincial governors being
appointed. District people being appointed all he way down to
the bottom, and let me suggest that that is exactly the wrong
approach. We have not included the local militias.
Again, we talk about building the Afghan army and cutting
deals with other governments, with the leaders of other
governments. That will not work.
Mr. Chairman, and again your thoughts on the drug war were,
I think, on target, but yet what I have heard is a down playing
of our commitment for drug eradication in Afghanistan.
So I think that this is vitally important for us to discuss
these issues. There are serious questions for those of us who
are supporting an effort that will succeed in Afghanistan, but
what we have now is a plan, from what I can see is a non-plan
that will not work, so let us discuss it, let us work with the
administration, try to come up with something that will work so
that we do not walk away again with a tragedy in the making in
Afghanistan.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief
because I want to hear from our witnesses. I am glad to see
President Obama and his renewed emphasis on the region that
launched the 9/11 attacks on our country, but we cannot have a
United States strategy on Afghanistan unless we have a United
States strategy on Afghan poppy and how to deal with that. As
the chairman said in his remarks, over 90 percent of the
world's poppy. We have to look at broader, smarter strategies
in terms of alternative crops, genetically-altered crops, legal
markets in terms of use by pharmaceutical companies. These cash
crops fuel extremists and terrorist activity. It lines the
pockets of corrupt officials and skews government reforms. Drug
routes make their way through Europe and also to the United
States, and even to my home city of St. Louis. So this has to
be fundamental in our U.S. strategy, and I look forward to
hearing about that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The ranking member, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was a
little late. There is a heck of a traffic jam out there on the
road. I sat there for over an hour which might be of interest
to everybody.
Mr. Ackerman. A break for us.
Mr. Burton. I am anxious to hear from the witnesses today.
The one thing that I recall about Vietnam was that the enemy
had the ability to go into sanctuaries across borders, and as a
result, in Cambodia and Laos, which were supposedly prohibited
from being attacked, led to one of the big problems that we
faced in that conflict.
We now have a similar situation with Pakistan. The Taliban
and their contemporaries seem to go back and forth across that
border with some ease, and I do admire the administration for
going after them with drones and air-to-surface missiles that
knock out some of their leaders. But I would just like to know
today how far we are willing to go.
Pakistan was very instrumental in us winning the war,
helping them win the war, the Afghanistan tribal leaders win
the war against the Russians, and it was a conduit for us
getting some military equipment in there that shot down Russian
helicopters. I think Dana knows about that because you were
over there. But I would like to know how far the cooperation
with the Pakistanis is going to go, what kind of problems they
are going to face with the people inside their country that are
upset about the United States hitting targets in Pakistan, and
whether or not we are willing to go all-out to eliminate those
sanctuaries so that the Taliban cannot run back and forth
across that border with impunity. I think that is one of the
key elements.
I believe our troops in every single battle, whether it has
been a fight, have done very, very well. They won. But the
problem is if we cannot pursue them back across that border and
knock them out in their areas of sanctuary, I think we are
going to have a long and drawn out problem. So I would like to
have some answers about that from our witnesses, and I really
appreciate you being here today.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
witnesses coming to talk to us today about the important
strategies to move forward on Afghanistan.
I had a chance to travel with the chairman and others,
Democrats and Republicans, to Afghanistan a couple of months
ago, and to see firsthand some of the things on the ground, met
with some of the military leaders, and some of the civilian
leaders, met with some of our folks to get some ideas on the
PRTs, the teams that are doing the reconstruction.
I also had a chance recently to meet in Washington with
Minister Zia to talk about the National Solidarity Program, and
I think that what I heard in the laying out of the policy from
the administration, which I appreciate the fact that it is
being thought through from top to bottom with excellent advice
from our military leaders, with excellent advice from our non-
military people who understand what it is going to take to get
the Afghan people to support this, which is the redevelopment
of their country, switching from poppies to wheat or
pomegranates or anything else, but recognizing that it is not
just military power that will be the solution here, and your
comments today, if you can talk to us about the National
Solidarity Program, your thinking on whether it is working, how
it is working, the notions of the transparency, the money going
in, outcome, coming out, and obviously that as well as the
coordinated effort.
Mr. Chairman, we heard about the reconstruction teams that
the United States is putting forward, we heard a lot about
European--different countries doing it, and not a lot of
coordination, and we all know that the effectiveness of this
thing will be the effective coordination, and the ability to
share information and strategies, so if you could comment as
well on those, I would appreciate it, and I thank the chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this excellent
hearing, very timely. I would also like to thank our witnesses,
Dr. von Hippel, Dr. Cordesman and Dr. Jones, appreciate all of
you being here to share with us.
I am very pleased about the new strategy of Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and I am also encouraged to see that the United
States is intending to pursue a smarter, more comprehensive
strategy, particularly on more constructive diplomacy through
enhanced cooperation with local leaders and international
partners to promote a reconciliation process. I would like to
hear about that in the course of the witness testimony.
I also welcome the policy to support basic human rights for
Afghan people and the focus on regional and civilian-led
approach, and the emphasis on reconstruction and development
that has been accompanied by a regular monitoring and
evaluation.
I am concerned and I would like to hear some testimony
about yesterday's suicide bombings in Kandahar that killed 13
people, including two provisional council officials, and by a
missile strike in northwest Pakistan yesterday that killed
about 10 people. I would like to get some information on that
and be brought up to date, if possible. I would also like to be
interested to hear your views, I mean, all the panelists, on
the analyses of these incidents and what they mean in the
larger framework.
I would also like to know--we have talked about Pakistan
and the important regional role it plays, but I am also aware
that Ambassador Holbrooke met briefly with Iran's deputy
foreign minister at the Hague conference in The Netherlands,
and I would like to know what role Iran might play in a
constructive way regarding the stabilization and development of
Afghanistan. I think it is important to take all these factors
into consideration, and in this regard I would like to hear
your opinions about the different and complementary roles that
Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Ross, and Senator Mitchell
could play in enhancing a regional approach.
And most importantly, I am interested to hear about the
implementation aspect of the new strategy and how we can avoid
repeating past mistakes. I am glad to hear the level of passion
on both sides of the aisle about the importance of a new way
forward in Afghanistan and hope that we can work in a
bipartisan way to see a stable, productive, and prosperous
Afghanistan. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
you for organizing this hearing, and thanks to our witnesses
for appearing today. Running a little bit late because I have a
hearing in oversight and government reform at the same time, so
forgive me for running back and forth.
After reviewing President Obama's plan for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, I am optimistic about the progress we can achieve in
the region. We must commit ourselves to the goal of attaining
long-term stability in South and Central Asia by dismantling
al-Qaeda. However, we must not let our enthusiasm for peace in
Afghanistan and Pakistan temper our firm insistence on
accountability for all parties involved.
After my own recent visit to Afghanistan, I agree with the
President that all who have a stake in the security of the
region should cooperate to stabilize that country. Not only
must we work with the people of Afghanistan, however, we must
also look to Pakistan, a key regional player in the Asian
subcontinent. We have an opportunity to work with Pakistan and
we must ensure that Pakistani, American and Afghan interests
are aligned toward one goal--peace and stability in the region.
The State of Pakistan can be a formidable ally in our
desire for regional stability, but the remain and unanswered
lingering doubts about Pakistan's full commitment to these
objectives in Afghanistan. Congresswoman Harman and I, along
with Congresswoman Tauscher and Congressman Royce, a fellow
member of this subcommittee, have introduced H.R. 1463, to
condition future military aid to Pakistan on two thing: That
the Pakistani Government make A.Q. Khan available for
questioning by United States authorities, and that it monitor
Mr. Khan's activities.
With the cooperation of the United States, Afghanistan and
Pakistan, we can work to eliminate Taliban's strongholds which
threaten the peace-loving citizens of three nations as well as
peace-loving citizens in the rest of the world. As the
President has stated, our NATO allies and our other partners,
the Central Asian states, gulf nations, Iran, Russia, India and
China, have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and
security and development in the region.
Mr. Chairman, if I might ask, I would be interested in the
panelists' reaction to the legislation I made reference to,
introduced by Congresswoman Harman and myself and others, about
the need for Pakistan to produce the scientist who has been
credited perhaps as being the number one nuclear proliferator
in the history of human kind, to make sure that he is available
to United States authorities as a precondition for continued
military cooperation and assistance to Pakistan, Dr. von
Hippel. Any reaction to that legislation or that notion?
Mr. Ackerman. We are just making opening statements.
Mr. Connolly. Oh, excuse me. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. I am so sorry.
Mr. Ackerman. No problem. Thank you very much. You will
have a chance to go around again with questions.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing
today and I welcome our panel. President Obama recently
announced the results of his administration's strategic review
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan policy, viewing the two as
intertwined, and I could not agree more with the President.
I visited the border with my colleague, Mike McCall, and
Congressman Quaire between Pakistan and Afghanistan last summer
and saw how porous it is. Pakistani and Afghan militants are
increasingly merging and pooling their efforts against
governments in both countries, and these militants also
threaten supply line. Yet Pakistan has not cooperated as best
as they can with us in putting pressure on the Taliban leaders.
Well, what are our recommendations for addressing this
issue as this panel has moved forward toward--with a Pakistani
bill this spring? Going back to the topic of Afghanistan,
General David McCurren, the overall NATO and United States
commander in Afghanistan maintains that our mission is winable,
and after my visit I know firsthand how hard our military is
working toward this mission, not only fighting the insurgents
but through civilian efforts aimed at rebuilding Afghanistan's
economy and infrastructure.
I have to admit I flew around to Khost and Gardez in Ghanzi
with a one-star general, Mr. Chairman, who told us, he said he
is a helicopter--he was trained as a helicopter pilot, and yet
his biggest issue now is not only building that road from Khost
to Gardez, but also making sure we build health clinics and
schools in the area, and he said we are fighting the outlaws,
but we also need to make sure we bring a different way of life
to the folks, and I think that is our stated mission and we
need to stick with that.
While I was there, I visited the 451st civil affairs units
army reserve that was from the district I represent, and they
were working on building that road and working out in the
community in those areas, and I think we are making progress
with our civilian efforts, but we need to redouble those
efforts and make sure that we not only deal with the military
side but also with bringing up the average wage and lifestyle
of the Afghanistanis deg..
I have questions on how well our efforts have been as far
as nation building. Some observers say that the Afghan people
have become disillusioned with the corruption in President
Karzai's government, and this sentiment is causing many to
accommodate Taliban insurgents. I am interested in our panel's
views on this, particularly with the Presidential election set
for August, and what is our understanding of the prospects for
President Karzai to be reelected, and if he is not, what could
this mean for our policy toward Afghanistan.
And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this hearing. It
is so important to our country.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me add my appreciation
for the continued effort of this subcommittee being keenly
current in its assessment of America's foreign policy and as
well its impact on America's foreign policy and the hearing
today on Afghanistan, I think, gives us an opportunity to probe
the positions and the proposals of the administration.
There is no doubt that many of us who had differing
opinions on the war in Iraq have consistently said that our
focus should have been on Afghanistan. I do think the issue of
the 17,000 troops and 4,000 trainers will continue to be
monitored by many of us who do not want to see a long extended
strategy that puts us somewhat in the predicament of an ongoing
50-year presence, but we recognize that focus, collaboration is
crucial.
However, I also believe that partnership is important and
certainly the partnership with Pakistan is a must. I also
believe that we have to re-frame our sunglasses on Pakistan and
recognize that Dr. Khan represented an era, not a totality. All
of us want to fight nuclear proliferation, but if we are to
overcome the Taliban and the host position that Pakistan seems
to have with respect to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and
Taliban interests that want to destroy both countries, then
they have to be a viable partner. We have to look at the issues
of economic development in Pakistan, education in Pakistan. We
have to face the illiteracy rate in Afghanistan. We also have
to face the reality that it is a decentralized country.
I do not know how any President, whether it is President
Karzai or someone else, is going to alter the structure that
Afghanis have lived under for centuries, but I do believe it is
important for this committee to have a strategy in
collaboration with the administration, and I would offer as I
close that strategy should be restoring governance of
Afghanistan to its people, letting them have the resources to
educate their children, cease and desist or eliminate the
Taliban's authority in Afghanistan, recognize the vitality of
the Afghanistan people who want to have a democratic nation,
bolster their democratic opportunities, and join with them to
insist on their participation in the opposition to terrorism.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the committee, our witnesses. I think today's hearing and the
title, ``Achieving Peace and Stability in the Graveyard of
Empires'' is an apt title for the discussion at hand.
My first visit to Afghanistan was 4 years ago, and like
many of my colleagues visiting not only in Kabul but going down
to Kandahar and visiting our PRTs or provisional reconstruction
team settings and attempting, whether it be clinics or schools
or roads, the amazing things that the NATO forces have been
able to do, but yet realizing that that is not necessarily the
primary effort or operations of a force, a combat force whose
principal role is to focus on the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, and to
clear the area for a peaceful government for Afghanistan.
And so how we transfer the soft power in a way that makes
sense on roles that I think are really more appropriate of the
Department of State and other areas, I would be interested in
terms of the witnesses' comments here today. Clearly, the
notion that, first 4 years ago when I went, that the President
of Afghanistan was not a lot more than the mayor of Kabul, 4
years later is one I think we need to consider vis-a-vis the
corruption that has taken place, and I would be interested on
your take on the progress of that.
I was there last year, 4 years later, went up to Konar,
Kumbar Province, up past Tora Bora, saw again the roads that we
are building and the progress that has been made in some areas,
but I want to know from the witnesses today about this multi-
strategy, how we do it in collaboration with our allies and
NATO, where the leads to vis-a-vis an exit strategy, how well
you think this has been enunciated just last week by the
President's new policy, and whether or not you think it is
practical or whether or not in fact it can be implemented in
the long haul because I really think this is akin to--I noted 4
years ago and last year when I was there again--Korean, Korea
in this sense.
We ended the conflict in 1952, but in the fifties and the
sixties it was a tough slog, and the success of South Korea
really has not been acknowledged until the last 20-30 years. So
I mean, that is the kind of long haul I think we are in for if
this is going to be successful, therefore stability in a
graveyard of empires, I think, trying to achieve this peace is
so aptly named, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for your
thought in this, and I look forward to the testimony that we
will received.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. I will pass the kudos to the staff
for coming up with the title of the hearing.
Speaking of long haul, the bells have indicated that there
are votes that are beginning in the House. Unfortunately, it is
a long series of votes. This is usually the point that the
hearing, having heard our conclusions, you would edify us with
the facts. [Laughter.]
What I think we will do is forego for now the introduction
of the expert witnesses, because some of us are old and by the
time we come back we will forget who you were. It looks like we
have at least an hour and a quarter worth of votes. So rather
than interrupt you we will break now, let you stand down and
think of how to respond to some of the questions that you are
bound to hear, and go off to the floor. I would encourage
members to return, but usually history shows us that there will
be few of us and your odds will improve. We stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Ackerman. The subcommittee will come back to order.
We will now turn to our witnesses. Dr. Karin von Hippel is
the co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a
senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program. Her
research has focused on analysis of issues related to countries
in conflict and transition, including Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq and Lebanon.
Prior to joining CSIS, Dr. von Hippel was a senior research
fellow at the Center for Defense Studies, King's College London
where she managed research projects on issues including, the
root causes of terrorism, European counterterrorism reforms,
and the future of the U.N. humanitarian system. Before that she
spent several years working for the United Nations, and the
European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.
Dr. Seth Jones is a senior political scientist at RAND and
an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School. His areas of expertise include United States and
European counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and best practices in nation building.
Dr. Jones most recent publications include counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan and how terrorist groups end, lessons for
encountering al-Qaeda, and he is the author of the forthcoming
book, ``In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in
Afghanistan,'' as well as, ``The Rise of European Security
Cooperation.''
Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in
Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and is also a national security analyst for ABC News. During
his time at CSIS, he has led studies on the issues including,
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, armed nation building, and
counterinsurgency.
Dr. Cordesman formerly served as national security
assistant to Senator John McCain and as director of
intelligence assessment in the Office of Secretary of Defense.
He is the author of over 50 books, including a four-volume
series on the lessons of modern war.
The committee welcomes all of you. Sorry for the long wait
as we have been voting. Your full, complete statements will be
placed in the record in their entirety, and Dr. von Hippel, we
will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF KARIN VON HIPPEL, PH.D., CO-DIRECTOR, POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. von Hippel. Thank you very much, Chairman Ackerman and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to
be here and to be invited to testify on United States strategy
in Afghanistan. Today, I wanted to focus my remarks on one area
that will be critical to our success, and that is in forging a
new partnership with the Afghan people and Government.
I think even though we all recognize that the key to a
successful counterinsurgency strategy is the build component of
the shape, clear, hold, build arrangement, and build here means
providing basic services and strengthening governance. Thus far
we have not succeeded in building despite the billions of
dollars that we have spent so far.
The good news, I think, as we have seen in recent polls, is
that the Taliban have not been winning hearts and minds in
Afghanistan. Eighty percent of Afghans still view the Taliban
as a serious threat. So the political space is still there for
the Afghan Government, with the support of the international
community, to turn things around.
If President Obama's new comprehensive strategy is to
succeed, all Afghans need to become equal partners with the
international community and share the responsibility for
implementing this new approach. Now, to do this they need a far
greater stake in their future than they currently have. Too
many decisions are currently being made on their behalf without
their involvement.
Even if the rhetoric that is espoused by the international
civilians and soldiers in the country is all about
Afghanization and building local capacity, and I am sure you
have all heard it when you have been out there, the reality is
that many donors bypass the government, they often duplicate
efforts, and they focus on areas that may be a lower priority
for Afghans. Often donors even say that they are informing the
government before they launch into policies, and I think that
word already tells you that they are not--the word ``informed''
tells you that they are not really treating them as partners.
Now, these donors will argue--this includes the United
States by the way--they will argue that they are forced to
manage programs in this manner because of corruption and often
to demonstrate a presence back home, where, for some countries,
their presence in Afghanistan is not very popular. This is why
more and more money goes to projects that are outside the
national budget, and which often do not cohere with the
national development strategy. According to the Ministry of
Finance in Afghanistan, over 70 percent of donor funding goes
outside of the national budget.
Today, in Afghanistan, there is very little clarity as to
what donors are doing and whether or not successes and failures
in one part of the country are informing experience elsewhere.
I certainly saw this when I was there a few months ago, and 2
weeks ago I was chairing a panel on Afghanistan at a NATO/OECD
summit in Geneva with senior members of the international
community, military and civilians, and we definitely heard this
again.
Similar to our flawed policy in Iraq, in Afghanistan we are
far too reliant on international contractors, as the chairman
said earlier, and each of these takes a slice of the pie along
the way. One study noted that three-quarters of U.S.
development assistance in Afghanistan has gone to international
contractors. One wonders what percentage of every dollar gets
to the Afghan people.
Even, I think, in our more recent attempts to buy locally--
we have heard a lot of people talk about buying locally and
using local contracts--the U.S. Government is still using
international contractors to do the buying on their behalf.
Now, when I was there in late September, early October, I
heard that there were 400 Americans in the U.S. Embassy. There
is bound to be an increase due to the planned surge, and it
seems to me that those Americans can go straight to the source
and hire the Afghan contractors rather than go through a number
of international contractors.
Well, what else could be done? Our goal here should be to
ensure that Afghans are fully in the lead. That means in
building security, building the economy, reestablishing
governance and rooting out corruption, as well as generating
outrage and revulsion when the Taliban Afghans kill civilians.
The International community really should be focusing on
playing a catalatic facilitating and supporting role, and in
many cases trying to mentor their government counterparts in
different parts of the government at the national and local
levels in a very similar way to what the international soldiers
and police trainers are doing. They should be embedded in the
government and spending most of their time working with their
counterparts.
But also I think our assistance needs to be much more
direct and accountable. It needs to go straight to the people,
and to successful government programs. As Mr. Ellison mentioned
earlier, the National Solidarity Program is one great example.
I think we should be far more supportive of the programs that
are working.
Now, of course, corruption is a problem. I think we all
know that, and that is not just within the Afghan Government
but it is also among international donors, and here perceived
corruption can be just as bad as real corruption among
international donors. Afghans hear about billions of dollars
that is going into the country, but they often see little
result that it is reaching the people.
Now, I think corruption can be reduced through greater
transparency over all the money that is pledged and spent by
them and by us. We can call it two-way accountability, so that
the Afghan people, as well as taxpayers in all of our
countries, in all of the coalition countries, can see where
their money is going. There are a number of ways to do this,
through the media, through Web sites, and through other
programs. We need to publish what we spend and monitor what we
are spending.
There are some great examples. The Aga Khan development
network is already doing this up in the north of Afghanistan.
They are working with the shuras and training them how to
scrutinize books. They call them social audits. There are other
programs like that that we could be supporting.
Now, this new approach, I think, to aid effectiveness
should be directed by the United Nations. The United Nations
has been mandated to coordinate the international donor
community in Afghanistan. It has not been able to realize its
goals so far. Yet the United States needs to be far more
supportive of U.N. efforts, and to help the U.N. become more
robust. A more robust United Nations could be seen as part of
our exit strategy, along with a stronger Afghan national
security force.
The President could also consider appointing a high level
deputy to Ambassador Holbrooke to really be the development and
accountability czar to make sure that the monies that are
pledged and spent are accountable and are going more directly
to the people, and this could also apply, of course, across the
border in Pakistan if the $7.5 billion aid package over 5 years
is approved.
Finally, Afghans need to hear that the United States is
totally committed to their welfare and security, and that we
are not just concerned about the threat posed by al-Qaeda. Only
when Afghans view the struggle as a common one, that they are
not fighting America's war, will they become full partners. We
have seen the negative effects of this already in Pakistan,
where too many Pakistanis today see their own struggle against
insurgents really is fighting America's war and not their own
fight even though we have seen greater attacks within the
country.
So just to summarize, more direct aid, two-way public
accountability, and a shared struggle with the Afghan people.
Thank you for your time today and the privilege of
appearing before this committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. von Hippel
follows:]
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Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Jones.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., POLITICAL SCIENTIST, THE
RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members
of the subcommittee. I will keep my remarks brief. They are
based on a range of trips to Afghanistan, in particular over
the last several years; most recently at the end of 2008, and
also in a few weeks I will be back.
What I am going to argue in general, and I have got a range
of different points I will make, but one argument that I would
like to make is I think over the last several years there has
been a focus of U.S. efforts and U.S. spending at a national
level, and I think when one visits rural areas of Afghanistan
the power is very localized. I will come back to that in a
second, but I do think there is a much--there is a much more
significant need to understand and then find ways to work with
local officials. This came up in some members' comments as we
began.
My first comment builds a little bit on Dr. von Hippel's
comments about the threat. In my view, there is a very
significant and serious threat to the United States homeland
from the Afghan-Pakistan front. U.S. intelligence is very clear
about this. We have seen it even recently with individuals such
ass Baitullah Meshud threatening and supporting terrorist
attacks in Washington, DC. We heard that this week. We also are
aware of Uzbek militant groups that have planned attacks in
Europe. There have been arrests in Germany, in Denmark, in
Spain and France. The threats to the United States homeland
from this area and to its allies and to the Governments of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in my view, are extremely serious,
and are supported by significant amounts of U.S. intelligence
information along these lines. Therefore, the stakes, in my
view, are very important.
Second, I think in general that there is little
understanding among many, certainly in reading press accounts,
of what is actually going on on the ground. There is continuing
over-simplification of this as a Taliban fight, talks with
Taliban. In fact, when one gets into rural areas of the
country, the situation is much more complicated. There are a
range of militant groups operating in these areas, not just the
Taliban. There are a range of sub-tribes, tribes, clans, mostly
Pashtun involved, criminal organizations, not even just drug
trafficking organizations, but timber traders, gem traders.
There are state support as we know, not just from Pakistan and
Iran, but also even from, we know from Afghan national police
in some cases, as well as Afghan district officials.
So, in general, we are talking about a very complicated
insurgency that is not just a Taliban insurgency by any means,
and where motivations range from at senior levels of the
Taliban Intersura, a Deobandi ideology, to financial
motivations, tribal motivations, grievances against the Afghan
Government, a range of motivations as one looks across this.
The point though is that, in my view, important chunks, the
motivation for fighting the Afghan Government, the Americans
and others is very locally based, and that is important to
realize because it means, in my view, that the solutions are
not just about a central government; they are also about
working with and understanding local dimensions. So my
comments, very briefly, are going to talk about thinking more
concretely about bottom-up rather than entirely about top-down,
which is where we have focused.
In particular, I would argue this is either won or lost in
areas of the south in particular, but also to some degree the
east of Afghanistan. The south, of course, is where our U.S.
second marine expedientary force, the U.S. Marines are moving
into, especially Helmand, in particular, and this is quite
important.
Now, on force structure, as we talk about a bottom-up, I
want to point out if one takes General Petraeus's rough numbers
of how many forces are needed to win a counterinsurgency, and
this is a--take these numbers with an important grain of salt--
one of the suggestions that comes out of the field manual is 20
counterinsurgents per 1,000 inhabitants.
Well, if one looks at the areas where most of the
insurgency is focused on in Afghanistan, the provinces from
Heart south to Kandahar and Helmand, and up through most of the
eastern provinces, that leads to a population of just under 14
million, if we take those force requirements what that gives us
is an--and I take these as rough numbers--a force requirement
of 271,000 forces.
But this still leaves us with a range of questions: What
percentage of these forces should be international? Which
should be Afghan? Among Afghan forces, which should be
national, that is, army or police in these areas? Which ones
should be local forces? And we have even on the local front a
range of options from the Afghan Public Protection Program in
Wardak to more traditional ``lashkars'' and ``arbakai.''
So the argument here is there is no magic number for
numbers, and there is a lot of desire to see numbers, but I
would say over 7 years into this counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan the United States clock is clearly ticking. In my
view, ultimately this is not just going to be about building
Afghan national capacity. In my view, this is also going to be
about building local capacity at the sub-national level
including finding ways to work with key sub-tribes, some of
which we know are sitting on the fence. The Alikozai and the
Achakzai are probably the premier examples in the south;
finding ways.
And what I am really talking about, without going into
details yet, is I think an important component of this is a
much more sophisticated understanding from the United States of
local power, and frankly, rather than large numbers of American
forces, a much more significant focus on covert action and
clandestine operations in rural areas to work with local entity
because, again, I think we have seen public opinion polls in
rural areas of U.S. forces have deteriorated over the past
year. I think this means a greater emphasis, as the U.S. did in
2001, in spending more time thinking about covert/clandestine
operations rather than entirely on overt/large numbers of
military forces.
So there are a whole range of other issues that came up
during the questions on reconciliation, Pakistan human rights
that I would be happy to address as I know the rest of us
would. But I would just leave one with this thought: The war in
Afghanistan is now longer than--has how occurred longer than
World War II. We are on seven, now going on 8 years in
Afghanistan. In my view, we have already seen public perception
and support begin to decrease. I think that is probably likely
to continue. So I would suggest thinking a little bit more
creatively about how to take advantage of a range of issues at
the very local level in Afghanistan.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
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Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Dr. Jones. Dr. Cordesman.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, PH.D., ARLEIGH A. BURKE
CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Cordesman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you for your patience.
Mr. Cordesman. Well, thank you, and thank members of the
committee for the opportunity to testify. I am not going to try
to recap my testimony, but there are a couple of key points I
would like to make in introduction.
We are not in a state of stalemate; we are losing this war.
We are not losing it simply because of the kinetic events, the
military outcome, although frankly we have seen a 30-50 percent
rise in casualty incidents in the course of this last year. We
are losing it for reasons we do not map very well. We are
seeing a steady increase in the expansion of Taliban, Haqqani
and Hekmatyar influence. These measured in public opinion polls
in the areas where they operate indicate they are not having
the kind of unpopularity they had in the past, and a lot of
this is occurring because we do not have the presence there.
One problem we have we do not have good intelligence on
this increase in influence. We do not have the ability to map
Afghan on Afghan violence. We describe these areas often as
support areas because there are not combat going on in them,
and as a result many of our assessments badly understate what
is happening in Afghanistan, and add to this the fact we de-
couple the analysis of Afghanistan from what is happening in
Pakistan.
I say this because we have essentially probably 2 years in
which to reverse this, and in which we have to focus
essentially on war fighting. Development, human rights, all of
these things have to be done, but to do them with limited
resources simultaneously with the combat load we face is not
something that is practical.
I believe that President Obama has outlined a concept that
may well work, and has begun to allocate resources that may
succeed. The fact is, however, that the people who worked on
this would be the first to admit we do not yet have a strategy,
a plan, a budget, for using these resources in detail, and we
will not for several months. That is not an indictment to come
into office in a losing war, it is not something where you can
instantly develop the kinds of plans and detail you need to
win.
We now at this point have a plan which will build us up
from what used to be 32,000 troops in NATO/ISAF to more than
70,000. We do not know exactly where they will go. We do not
know how they will be allocated to try to achieve a strategy
which is now clear hold/build. We do not know how many will
have to be used in aid functions, but many will. We do not know
how many of the so-called trainers will have to stay embedded,
but there will have to be a team with every single Afghan
battalion for at least several years. We do not yet have a
clear credible plan for building up Afghan forces. Our police
efforts have been largely unsuccessful over the last 7 years.
We have some hope in what is called the Focus District
Development Plan, but it is far from clear that is working.
Only about 15 percent of the Afghan army units are yet able
to achieve the highest level of readiness. They will move
forward, but it will be several years before this happens.
I have to say I would join with what Dr. von Hippel said,
but I would make a stronger point about aid and echo what the
Secretary of State has said. We have seen a nightmare in the
U.S. administration of aid. There has been no real coordination
between USAID, the State Department, and the Corps of
Engineers. We cannot tie what they have said to meaningful
measures of effectiveness. It has not been related to the war.
We do not have meaningful accounting systems, and no one ties
this together. That aid is critical, initially for war
fighting, and then for effective action.
I have to say that I do not believe that the United Nations
is efficient or any less corrupt or disorganized than we are.
It has no audits. It cannot demonstrate what it has done, and
the same is true of far too much of our aid activity. To win we
have to change that.
But I think the most critical dimension we may really face
is Pakistan, and I think that as we proceed during this hearing
we need to look much harder at what is happening there because
of all of the things that people were working on in the
strategy exercises the highest single risk was trying to get
Pakistan to cooperate, and here I have to say one of the
problems that we grossly understate is the extent to which this
is not a problem in the Fatah area or the Baluki area, but a
national problem inside Pakistan.
We are not just talking about the movements that I have
identified, we are talking about Deobandi movements which
exists throughout Pakistan. The best unclassified study I have
seen of this is by the Crisis Group. There are other studies by
Pakistani groups. But if we cannot motivate the Pakistani army,
if we cannot develop an effective presence in terms of
Pakistani governance, if we cannot change the map of what is
happening there, I think most people would say we cannot win in
Afghanistan. So we either have one strategy with very clear,
detailed plans, which the Congress insists on monitoring, in
seeing in terms of facts on the ground, not concepts, or we are
gong to spend the next 2 years probably wasting resources when
we could win.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cordesman
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ackerman. Well, thank you. Thank the whole panel. I
think it is some of the most interesting testimony we have had
in quite awhile.
Let me start on a comment first by Dr. Jones when he
mentioned that the war in Afghanistan is going on longer than
the war we had in World War II. It is interesting, but I would
also observe that in World War II in each of the countries with
whom we were at war we only needed one guy to surrender. I
think here we have a very complicated circumstance of who
surrenders. We are not talking about the national leadership,
to whatever extent that exists seriously in either Afghanistan
or Pakistan, but somebody else has to surrender, and I do not
know that we could identify one person or 10 people that if
those 10 people surrendered that this deal would not still be
going on into the unforeseeable future.
I guess the first question I would ask is based the idea
that we are really not in national wars. We are in wars with
entities, groups of people, and varying interests. I guess the
first question I would ask is what is commonly called the
insurgency, what is the insurgency?
America's overriding interest here is to protect our
national security, and some of that insurgency is not
necessarily in and of itself a threat to American security, but
if they are all combined up somehow, and allied up, then that
becomes a force multiplier in the threat that we face, and we
are talking not about just the borders of Afghanistan. But I
congratulated by the way--I hope I am making a connection
here--I congratulated the outgoing Ambassador of India on
finally becoming de-hyphenated. He had one half of a hyphenated
problem, and now I think we have come to all realize that the
major problem here is Afghan-Pakistan, and that is the new
hyphenated problem, and I think you are right, Dr. Cordesman.
It is like love and marriage, you cannot have one without the
other. Well, you cannot--well, maybe you can, I do not want to
get into that fight with any of my colleagues. But certainly
you cannot solve one problem with one of these countries
without solving both problems, because it is not a problem of
the traditional nature when it comes to war.
How much of the insurgency is what we would call terrorist
as opposed to what we would call the guys who are fighting for
this, that, and the other thing, and the real threat is when
they all hook up and feed each other's needs and interests, and
feed off of each other that all the insurgency becomes
terrorist? Is that the real threat that we are facing? And how
many of the people involved percentage-wise are ideologically
based other than in it for whatever they are in it for, these
miscreants of various tribes?
Start with anybody who raises their hand first. Dr.
Cordesman.
Mr. Cordesman. I think we need to be very honest. We really
have not done a competent job of measuring motivation. We have
not really mapped out the networks and the informal structures
because these are not formal that tie together many of these
movements. And when you talk to people, as I am sure members of
the committee have in the intelligence community, you get very
different views, and I think there is a clear recognition that
much more needs to be done to fully understand this.
But having said that, I think the word ``terror'' is very
dangerous. Insurgents always use terror. The Maoists did it,
the Vietnamese, the Vietcong did it. The Vietnamese main force
divisions had organized elements during the Vietnam War dealing
with this.
Mr. Ackerman. If I may just rephrase that, and I think you
are absolutely right. There are two different brands of
terrorism that we have looked at historically. One is the
traditional terrorism where people terrorize their own people
for whatever power motives that they have, and the kind of
terrorism that we are looking at currently, which are
ideological movements that look to internationalize their
problems that go beyond national, traditional national borders.
Mr. Cordesman. Well, let me just very briefly, because I
know that Seth has a lot to say in this area too, I think what
you have seen is a very steady increase in al-Qaeda influence
in the East with much closer ties to the two main groupings of
the Taliban there, to the Hekmatyar and the Haqqani network;
that you have seen a similar expansion of ties to the various
Deomandi groups. Those Deomandi groups play a major role in
international terrorism already in Europe, in India, and other
places.
So what we are really saying is if we have a power vacuum
of any kind in Afghanistan or Pakistan you will see, I think, a
steady expansion of international terrorist activity even
though these movements in the past have largely been
nationalist and more focused on their internal goals.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Sure. It is a very, very important question. In
my personal view, just starting from al-Qaeda, what al-Qaeda
has done, I think fairly effectively, is embedded itself in an
area, as Tony mentioned earlier in the testimony, not just in
the tribal areas or in Baluchistan, but also in a range of
other places. Al-Qaeda has embedded itself in a range of
militant groups; mostly Sunni, mostly Deobandi. So we know, for
example, among Afghan insurgents we know al-Qaeda connections,
regular connections, meetings, assistance to Haqqani network,
to Mullah, Mohammed Omar's Taliban organization. So we know
that there is--so what that broader series of militant groups
does, it provides an operating environment for al-Qaeda in a
range of areas which poses a threat to us. Again, it is not
just al-Qaeda as we have seen with the range of countries too.
There are some Uzbek militant groups, the IMU, for example;
Tohir Yuldeshev, that have posed a direct threat to a range of
United States allied countries, in Germany and Denmark and
other places.
Now, just to be clear about this, when we talk about these
range of groups, including al-Qaeda, which really does not play
a major role in the actual fighting in Afghanistan, its role is
primarily to help. If you remember the German pharmaceutical
company ran a series of ads, BASF, a few years ago. We do not
make a lot of the products you buy; we make a lot of the
products you buy better. That is al-Qaeda's modus operandi.
They have improved suicide attacks information operations for
the Afghan groups.
But what we see as we look across these groups, I would say
just in concluding, is that we see a lot of different interests
across them, and some of them have clearly fought against each
other historically. We have seen Hekmatyar and the Taliban
fight, a lot of the 1990s they fought each other until
Hekmatyar had to flee from Afghanistan. So we have seen a range
of fissures historically against some of these groups, and even
some of the sub-tribes that are supporting elements of the
Taliban we have seen actually fight each other historically. So
by no means is this a unified movement: Variations in scope,
how much they are interested in a global jihad; some are
interested primarily in parochial things. But again I do think
it is important, as Tony mentioned earlier, just to understand
who we are dealing with, what their interests are, what they
are motivated by, and how they are cooperating or not with each
other.
Ms. von Hippel. Could I just add one final point to
reinforce my colleagues'?
Dennis Blair recently said that the United States still
lacks intelligence about the power structures inside
Afghanistan and the same certainly applies on the Pakistan side
of the border. The Pakistani officials do not know fully who is
operating in their country. You can get a range of figures from
800 foreigners to 8,000 foreigners, and so really we are
lacking knowledge on both sides of the border. We are not
nearly where we should be.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. My time is up. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
am sorry I was a little late. I have another hearing after
this, and I actually had to have a little bite to eat some time
today, so I grabbed a quick bite before I came back.
Let me just note again, as I stated as we opened this
hearing, that I am deeply concerned that the strategy that we
are talking about is not a strategy, and that instead we have a
series of ideas and many of the ideas that I have heard will
not work. And when we talk about a regional solution, which has
become, you know the watch word, we are going to have a
regional solution, it appears to me what we are really talking
about here is a willingness of our leadership in the United
States to try to cut deals with political leaders who are not
in Afghanistan, foreigners, foreign political leaders, and
expecting the people of Afghanistan to go along with it.
The people of Afghanistan, and we can make any deals we
want with the people of Pakistan, with the leadership in
Pakistan, or the leadership in various countries, Iran, et
cetera, but when you get right down to the village and the
provincial level in Afghanistan, they will not follow the
orders and obey the deals and agree with the deals that we cut
unless, of course, they are part of the decision-making process
and they are included.
Mr. Chairman, I need to answer these--let me just ask the
panel this question, and again everybody keeps talking about
bottom-up, nobody is willing to really give me a strategy with
bottoms-up. Is this administration willing to permit from what
has been said for local people to elect their own people who
govern them at the local level, a the district level, at the
provincial level, or is this administration, as what I have
heard in the last few days, insisting that these be appointed
from Kabul?
And how do we expect to enlist the people at the local or
the tribal leaders and the other community leaders that exist
and have militias at their disposal unless we are willing to
have faith that through elections local people will make the
right decisions?
So are we going to permit local people to elect their
people or are we going to insist that they just have to accept
appointed people from Kabul?
Mr. Cordesman. May I suggest, and I am sure each member of
the panel will have a comment, I do not believe that you can
hold local or provincial elections in the most threatened
provinces at this point in time. The fact is that our PRTs, the
troop strength we have, can only hold an extraordinarily
limited area.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, you have----
Mr. Cordesman. The number of killing----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Before you go on, the caveat was in those
areas, in specific areas. Let me note there are huge areas of
Afghanistan where you can basically create the type of
stability and strength that may give us leverage on the areas
that you are talking about, but instead if we insist on corrupt
officials being accepted at the provincial level there just
because down in Kandahar there is too much chaos to have an
election, then we have cut ourselves off from that option, have
we not?
Mr. Cordesman. Well, let me say that I think that one of
the rules that was not followed by the Bush administration but
virtually everyone in the nation-building field would say, you
do being with local and provincial elections. Your problem now
is you have created levels of infiltration and violence which
go far beyond this limited number of districts.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Cordesman. And holding an election would be extremely
difficult, but if I may, I think in fairness I do not believe
the people developing this strategy put heavy emphasis on the
regional approach. They will attempt it but they did not
believe it would succeed. I think they saw, with the exception
of Pakistan, three key elements: One was building up Afghan
forces, a process which will take a least 2 years; another was
to reenforce the United States and allied presence to the point
where you can shift to a win/hold/build tactics and strategy in
the most threatened area, bringing in aid workers to provide
the build capability and focusing----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, I have only got a couple of
minutes, and so I am sorry that I----
Mr. Cordesman. All right, could I----
Mr. Rohrabacher. There are a couple of points that I want
to make sure I get on the record in this hearing. Number one,
from what I see we are not going--as has been confirmed--we are
not going to have provisional and local leaders elected, thus
we will then, of course, have them cooped by--because we have
put them outside the circle--we are going to have corrupt
officials being appointed by Kabul instead. The militias, here
we are building up a national force so that we can pacify an
area, that sounds really familiar does it not? It does not
work. Everyone of these areas have local militias.
When we drove the Taliban out of Afghanistan, it was not
us, it were the local militias of the Northern Alliance that
drove the Taliban out in the first place, and I might add
defeated the Soviet Union. The plan of building up a
centralized force will not work unless it includes the local
militias. Are the local militias included in some sort of
national guard thing? I do not see that.
One last element, and I have got to--again, I have only a
short period of time--put these thoughts on the record.
Mr. Chairman, this is being fueled, the money that we are
talking about that finances these radical groups in Pakistan
and in Afghanistan, it is oil money from our good buddies
elsewhere in the Arab world, and it is the poppies, and again
the briefings that I have had on this plan deemphasizes--let me
repeat that--deemphasizes poppy eradication, and we have an
option with a micro-herbicide to eliminate those poppies, and
to come forward with a bold, very expensive operation to build
their economy. That is the only thing that is going to work as
far as I can see. It is not included anywhere in the plan, and
a micro-herbicide needs to be addressed, and I will just throw
that out. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. The gentleman is a minute-and-half or so
over, but if there is no objection, I would like to restore an
additional 2 minutes to the gentleman, and ask if he would
yield to me to make a point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Certainly.
Mr. Ackerman. And I hope to leave enough time for you to
respond to it as well.
In addition to the President's speech, which we listened
to, which was indeed a speech, you do not get everything in a
speech, there was an accompanying white paper which probably
comes a lot closer to talking about what we would consider
strategy, and within that I would just point out, I would hope
a wider level of comfort and the rest of us as well, there is a
small section that says ``including provincial and local
governments in our capacity-building efforts'' and it very
briefly reads what you would have written for the President, I
would think.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does it include elections?
Mr. Ackerman. ``We need to work with the Afghan Government
to refocus civilian assistance and capacity-building programs
on building up competent provincial local governments where
they can more directly serve the people and connect them to
their governments.'' It does not specifically say ``elections''
but I think that is more what it is pointing at than not,
working with the local governments. So I just offer that----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, if I could note, it does not
say ``elections'' because there will not be. We are going to
make the same mistake we made in Vietnam where we send the
powers in from the capitol, and we expect them not to be
corrupt, and they will always be corrupt. For the center core
in these developing countries, when you send them out to take
charge of the countryside, they end up turning people off.
Without local elections, the local people feel desperate and
alienated from the system. So I hope that the President----
Mr. Ackerman. I do not want to divert from our----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. Panel, and engage in a debate
with my knowledgeable, learned and distinguished colleague who
has probably been to the region more than the rest of us
probably combined. The fact of the matter is elections are not
necessarily the cure-all, and does not mean that you have
democracy. Witness Hezbollah's victories in Lebanon and Hamas's
victories in Gaza, and the National Socialist Party in Germany.
You do not always get what you want. It does not always mean
you have an ideal democratic society.
But let us work together on that with the administration
and use the tools that we have here, and I would, with the
tolerance of the rest of the committee, and Mr. Ellison, who
would be next, just ask if the rest of our panel just wanted to
respond to that, and then we will turn to Mr. Ellison, if that
is okay with Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Certainly, I will be happy to defer to the
chair.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, and you will have your full time,
as much as you need.
Dr. von Hippel first.
Ms. von Hippel. Just two quick points. First of all, it is
a sovereign state obviously, Afghanistan is a sovereign state.
They have a highly centralized form of government that may not
be appropriate, as you are saying, to their very fragmented
society, but that is what they have agreed on during the Bonn
process. That is the constitution they agreed on. Now----
Mr. Rohrabacher. We ran the Bonn process.
Ms. von Hippel. But that does not mean----
Mr. Ackerman. Let her finish.
Ms. von Hippel. That does not mean that there is not a
degree of--a lot of local involvement at a number of different
levels through the National Solidarity Program, through this
program I mentioned earlier that the Aga Kahn network, they are
working with shuras, and the shura can vote out the people who
are in charge of certain projects. So there are a number of
ways at the local level where local Afghans are voting out
people who are implementing projects, shura, et cetera. So it
is not to say that there is not a democracy there.
On the regional point, just one quick point I wanted to
make is that India, Iran, Russia, and China all have motivation
to prevent the Taliban from returning to power. Drugs hit them
far more than they hit us, so we do have common cause with
them, and we can work together as you were saying earlier in
closer partnerships to make sure that this happens.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Yes, just two brief comments, and I support the
direction of Mr. Rohrabacher's comments on local, a focus on
local power because I think in visiting numerous times rural
areas of the south and east, in particular, we actually,
interestingly, there are several bottom-up models. One of them
is the one the United States used in 2001, again not just
Northern Alliance in the north, but also U.S. intelligence and
special forces operating in the south, working with Pupelsei
tribes, or the sub-tribe, for example, in Kandahar, the
Baraksai, and a range of others, recognizing the inherent local
dimension of power.
One also has to realize that the Taliban strategy, campaign
planning and tactics, techniques and procedures in areas they
operate, especially in the south, is a bottom-up strategy. We
have pursued a top-down strategy. They have pursued a bottom-up
strategy. I would argue that has been more effective in rural
areas of the country than ours has been. They approach a range
of tribe and sub-tribes and clans. I think what will be
interesting along these lines is monitoring U.S. efforts in
Wardak province whereas now the first effort to try to put
together a bottom-up strategy.
The other thing that I would note very briefly when we talk
about democracy, in Pashtun areas of the country--again the
primary areas where the insurgency is happening--we do have
government-appointed district shuras--sorry--district governors
and provincial governors, but we also what you might call the
Pashtun version of democracy which is the jerga or the shura at
the village level and at the district level, and these are
their sub-tribal/clan representatives.
So I would say in addition to thinking about elections,
although as Tony noted earlier, in an insecure environment
there may be problems, there is a form of Pashtun democracy.
That is what is called the shura or the jerga, and in my
personal view we have not successfully managed, (A) to
understand; and (B) to work with that portion of Pashtun
society that is somewhat democratic.
Mr. Ackerman. If I could just ask a question on that. Is it
we that have to learn how to work with them or the Afghan
Government?
Mr. Jones. Well, I mean, ``we'' collectively. I mean the
Afghan Government and the United States. If you look at 2001,
this was a combination of locals and U.S., so I think it is
both actually.
Mr. Cordesman. Could I make a brief comment, Mr. Chairman?
I think that there are over 360 districts in Afghanistan. At
this point in time you could not under U.N. rules hold a local
or provincial election in more than half of them, and that is
because of the map of insecurity of the area. I think the key,
as Seth has pointed out, is to take the local authorities,
provide security, provide build assets, and build from the
bottom up. I think that is one of the key goals of this
strategy, is it bring enough aid workers, enough people in
EPRTs, and work with local people after you have established
security to begin to build up local authorities, local
loyalties.
One of the ideas people are looking at is some kind of
variation on what we had in Vietnam by way of local security
forces, but the truth is that as yet we do not have this by way
of a detailed plan, and given the number of U.S. troops we
intend to deploy, this will only affect the most critical
districts at best during the course of 2009, and early 2010.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Picking up on the prior theme, I wonder if you all would
offer your views on how well the United States, and at this
point I am not really talking about the Afghan central
government so much, but I am talking about things under our
control, how well the United States can integrate a local/
national type strategy because it does seem, based on
everything I have heard today as well as Mr. Rohrabacher's
comments and the chairman's comments, that the action is at the
local level, but there is no way we can simply ignore the
national level. How well can these efforts be integrated for
maximum United States security and Afghan stabilization? Mr.
Jones, maybe you can start.
Mr. Jones. Sure. Just to briefly respond, I would like to
use an example. An area that I have been to a number of times
is the Asadabad area in Konar Province, and I think where the
U.S. has been effective along these lines is the PRT in Konar
has done under a range of different navy commanders actually
who have backgrounds in general in commanding ships, is to work
both with the provincial and the district governors in Konar.
This is, the provincial governor is Governor Wahidi. And then
in key areas, to sit down at the village level and the district
level with the shuras to understand what are the primary needs.
So I will give you one example.
There is a lot of agricultural activity in Konar. There
have been some problems in getting goods to market because it
is a mountainous area. So one of the issues that was identified
for locals is road construction for a very specific economic
purpose, to get goods to Asadabad. So what the PRT did under a
range of different people, including Commander Larry Legree,
sit down with a range of villages along the routes, see if this
was something they wanted, and employ their villagers in the
construction as it went though their area. That gave them, (A)
stake involved in planning it, stake involved in actually doing
it, and stake involved in actually protecting the road.
So I think where we have done it effectively, that kind of
model has actually been very useful, and again there was input
from the Afghan Government level.
Mr. Ellison. Dr. Jones, is there a document out there that
perhaps we could put into the record or share around to
colleagues describing this effort?
Mr. Jones. I do not believe it has been written up
anywhere, which is quite sad.
Mr. Ellison. Would you mind volunteering for that effort?
Mr. Jones. Sure.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you. I mean, I am serious. It really
would be helpful if you could sort of describe that. You know,
we are looking for ways forward, and I think one of the
problems is that no on really knows exactly what to do, and so
we are all trying to--we are looking for that collectively, and
it is not necessarily that elegant or pretty.
I also would like unanimous consent to put an article into
the record. This is a document prepared by the United States
Institute of Peace, and it is entitled ``Killing Friends,
Making Enemies: The Impact and Avoidance of Civilian Casualties
in Afghanistan.''
Mr. Ackerman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ellison. Are you all familiar with this document? You
know, could you all talk for a moment, perhaps Dr. Cordesman, a
little bit about what it means when we, in an effort to
eradicate a violent, hostile person, do that perhaps but also
kill a whole lot of other people like wedding parties and stuff
like that? What does it mean? What is the impact of it?
Mr. Cordesman. First, with all due respect, I think that
report needs to be taken with a great deal of reservation.
Mr. Ackerman. So ordered.
Mr. Cordesman. I think what we have seen--Dr. Jones pointed
out--where we have been able to put together PRTs and troops
that provide security, where we win kinetically and defeat the
enemy, and then provide security rather than go in and fight
again and again with civilian casualties and losses and
alienation, when we bring in jobs and we bring in some kind of
aid----
Mr. Ellison. I am sorry, Dr. Cordesman.
Mr. Cordesman [continuing]. That works, those kind of----
Mr. Ellison. Dr. Cordesman, I do control the time.
Mr. Cordesman. All right.
Mr. Ellison. And I want to thank you for your----
Mr. Cordesman. Sorry.
Mr. Ellison [continuing]. Explanation, and I appreciate it,
but I mean, I have heard you say what you seem to be saying,
and I am listening to you carefully, but I would like to just
get something on the record, if somebody would, about what the
casualties mean. What are they doing? And I am going to go to
Dr. von Hippel because I think she may be more interested in
answering that question. Thank you.
Ms. von Hippel. Sure. The civilian casualties are very
divisive. It is one of the most important issues that Karzai
raises time and again with the U.S. Government. Now, we have
made great efforts to reduce civilian casualties on the Afghan
side of the border. On the Pakistan side of the border we are
not doing as much, especially because the drone strikes are
killing civilians. But we are not fully admitting that we are
doing it on the Pakistan side of the border. We do need to
reduce civilian casualties. We need to protect the population.
That is the whole point of counterinsurgency.
Mr. Ellison. Yes, Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Just to put some cultural component in this, in
Pashtunwali society killing a civilian is met by revenge. It is
a core tenet of Pashtunwali society. So from a cultural
standpoint, civilian casualties by nature need to be met with
revenge. So that is the kind of cultural mindset that we fall
into, and frankly, the Taliban too during their suicide
attacks, they run into the same issue, but there is a cultural
dimension that is important to understand.
Mr. Ellison. And if I may, I am running out of time, but I
was reading as I was trying to form my own views on this, or
reform them, I ran into some material about what The
Netherlands was doing in Uruzgan, and again you all have
information way above my head, and so I am not trying to
compete with what you know and what I know because you would
win that one, but could you talk about--I read about the Dutch
effort in Uruzgan, that they have not had any troop increases,
and they have had quite a bit of success and stabilization.
Could you offer your views on how the Dutch are doing, if there
is anything they are doing that we might look at, Mr. Jones?
Dr. Jones, excuse me. I know you worked hard for that Ph.D.
Mr. Jones. I would just point out in a range of polling
data there are notable security concerns among Afghans in
Uruzgan province, so both the Dutch and the Australians who are
there, I would say there still has been a problem in
understanding and working with local entities in Uruzgan. So I
think the Dutch have faced the same problem that the British
have had and the Canadians have had in the south, which is
working with local entities.
I do not believe the Dutch have succeeded in stabilizing
Uruzgan by any means.
Mr. Ellison. I will get to everybody.
Mr. Ackerman. What I will do because I want to make sure
everybody gets in because I know everybody has other things. I
am going to come back for another round if it is okay with the
panel. It will be a brief round.
Okay, Mr. Ellison? Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As sort of a follow up to that, I guess I should point out
that having been to Afghanistan twice I sure am impressed by
the work that our armed forces are doing there; incredible
people doing what we ask them to do, and they really are
impressive folks.
I am also impressed by how difficult a place Afghanistan
is. A friend who served in Iraq was talking to me recently
about comparing Iraq to Afghanistan in terms of the long-term
prospects, and he pointed out Iraq has water and the ability to
really feed much of the Middle East if they had peace and
stability, and an economy that would work, surely starting with
agriculture and going into many other things.
The challenge in Afghanistan has a lot to do, it seems to
me, with just the geography of the place. Very little water,
very remote mountain passes. It is just sort of lends itself to
small fiefdoms and not a unified governing structure, and it
sort of makes it natural as to why people would be involved in
illegal drug trade, because what else are you going to do in a
mountain pass that if you can divert some water to it, pretty
soon the salt has built up and now you have got to move onto
another patch of ground. So you have got to have a pretty high-
value crop or high-dollar crop in order to make agriculture
work.
So, comparing those two give me some reason for hope, that
there is a way to unify that country and not have the
experience the Soviets have had there of eventually the
warlords winning. Anybody got any hope for me there about how
you deal with the very difficult geographic features of
Afghanistan?
Mr. Cordesman. If you look at eastern Afghanistan, and
understand how few troops NATO/ISAF has had, and how few aid
workers there have actually been in the field, because out of
our PRTs we have 1,000 military and less than 40 civilians, you
see often in the east where we were able to provide sort of a
critical mass of troops and aid workers, where we did provide
security and aid as well as troops, we won once rather than
constantly inflicting new civilian casualties. There we had
significant success.
We have never had that in the south because we have never
had the resources. We have never had it in parts of the east
because when you look at the numbers, and it is hard to
remember this, through 2005 all of NATO and the U.S. had less
than 10,000 troops actually present in the area. Even today we
are talking about 47,000 to 56,000, because a lot of those
forces are not really deployed, and many are held up in
national caveats.
So now we are talking about putting in enough aid workers,
putting in enough troops, building up Afghan forces while we
build up governance at the local level, and if we can take the
examples we have had in the east and move them to the south,
then, as the strategy I believe calls for, we have some chance
of success. But the people I know who helped formulate this
would say it will be a close run thing. Nobody can guarantee
that the current plan will win, but there is a reasonable
chance it will provide that level of security and stability.
Mr. Inglis. Anybody else going to----
Mr. Jones. Yes, if I can just comment. There is hope. I
mean, there are--I think part of what we need to do is look at
the periods in Afghanistan's history where it has been stable.
Now, a lot has changed, a lot had changed during the Soviet
period, during the civil war, then early 1990s during the
Taliban years, but one thing I would submit has historically
been true, when stability has occurred in Afghanistan, for
example, between 1933 and 1973, during the Sahir Shah period,
you had a central government that could establish order and
deliver services in urban areas of the country and along key
roads, and sub-tribes, clans that did it in rural areas and
some ability of cooperation between those two, but you never
had a strong central governmental that could establish order in
rural areas.
Ms. von Hippel. Yes, if I could just add to that. You are
absolutely right; we are dealing with extraordinary challenges.
We are doing development aid while we are getting shot at. We
are doing development aid in places where literacy rates for
police officers and judges is maybe 10 percent, and so these
are enormous challenges. But I would agree with Seth and Tony
that if we can provide basic services, if we can protect the
people, and help them build justice and the rule of law at the
local level, we do not need to worry as much about building a
strong center. They will be very happy going about their lives
at the local level with some--you know, with less corruption at
the center.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The chair would announce that we
have to abandon the premises at 1:30, so we will go around the
whole room again if we can each do 3 minutes, if that would be
all right, if we could try to stick to that. We will run the
clocks at 3 minutes, and if you get your stuff in in 3 minutes,
it would be great.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know in my opening statement and it is frustrating
because whatever happens in the Presidential race in
Afghanistan the United States is going to be blamed for. If we
support President Karzai with all the problems of his
administration, then we will be blamed for imposing him. But if
there is someone else that could actually do a better job,
obviously he has not united the country as we have heard from
previous questioning because it is a country that is difficult
to be united because of the diverse area, but we do have
examples of very diverse area around the world who do come
under a national government, be it maybe a more loose
federation than what we expect.
I guess my question is, you know, the corruption issues,
and the Afghans refusing to cooperate with United States-led
forces, is there someone else other than President Karzai that
could do a better job that the Afghan people can turn to
whether we like it or not? And that will be my first question,
I guess, if I have time in the 3 minutes.
Mr. Cordesman. Let me answer that very quickly because I
watched people try to bring down Diam with all the success that
had. If we knew that person, they would know his name and he
would be running with great popularity. If they do not know the
name, it does not really exist.
Mr. Green. Any other comments?
Ms. von Hippel. Yes. The official policy of the Obama
administration, which I do support, is that it is up to the
Afghans to elect their new government. If we interfere it is
going to, as you were saying, it potentially could harm the
candidates. So the best thing for democracy in Afghanistan is
to have several transitions of government. It is going to be a
rocky road to get there, but whether or not it is Karzai or
someone else, hopefully it will not be Karzai because hopefully
we will have different leaders that are democratically elected,
which is what they need.
Mr. Jones. I would just point out in answering the question
that again we go back to the local population is the center of
gravity in a counterinsurgency, and that means what we do not
know, we do not have good public opinion polls that are telling
us support bases among Gulag Asherzi and Ahadi, and Ashraf
Ghani, and the range of others that look like they will
probably run. But again, I think from a U.S. position this has
to be supporting the process, not supporting a candidate;
again, it has to be a local answer to who they want to
represent them in Kabul. I think that is the only way around
this one.
Mr. Green. Well, it sounds like what I do when I go to one
of my union halls, and I will stand up and say, you elect
whoever you want as your President because I am going to work
with you, and Mr. Chairman, sometimes that works out, keeps me
out of union politics, but maybe that is what we need to do
because we know the problems that President Karzai had. I mean,
his brother, his family, the lack of support around the
country, again some of it is geographical, some of it is
tribal, but again I do not want us to foster his continuation
if the Afghan people can actually develop some other things.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. The chair is announcing that I will pass on
my questions and give each person 4 minutes, if you have
another minute you want you can----
Mr. Green. What can be done to enhance and promote
additional regional security and stability between Afghanistan
and Pakistan? And like I said earlier, I was there. We stayed
at the hotel in Islamabad that is no longer there, and that was
at that time the safest in Islamabad, and it was very
protected. I do not know how many security screenings we had to
go through to get there. But to work to get Pakistan and
Afghanistan to realize they are all in this together.
Mr. Cordesman. I think Secretary Clinton has said that
negotiation will be key. It may be. But quite frankly, I think
we will be dealing with a fractured Afghanistan and Pakistan
for at least several years in the future. Pakistan will be torn
apart by its own internal political issues. It will have the
same problems with the army. It will take it at least 2 to 3
years to really even move, if it can, into the Fatah and Baluki
area effectively.
So I think, should we negotiate? Yes. Should we count on
practice and success? No. We will have to try to work these
countries together and separately because we have no choice.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two
questions.
The first is in my trip to Afghanistan something that
alarmed me, candidly, was the use of CERD funds. Essentially
originally intended to augment the resources available to
military commanders on the ground, to help complement the work
they are doing by winning hearts and minds and helping provide
potable water, or do something with a health clinic. Those
funds have grown, as I understand it, from about $26 million a
year to a projected $900 million. That would make CERD, if it
were a bilateral aid program, one of the biggest in the world.
What is your take on whether this is maybe outgrown its
utility because I am not at all convinced the military make the
best folks in running development programs? They do many, many
things well, but we may be asking just a little bit too much
with them with respect to that.
Ms. von Hippel. Sure. I will start. As far as my
understanding, it was $200 million a year in 2006 and 2007;
2008, it is supposed to be $400 million. This is in addition to
the funds that USAID and other people have.
Now, for some Afghans, this is their only support that they
see, the only visible means of support. So, yes, you could
argue that the military are doing the bulk of development, and
being seen to deliver the bulk of development aid is a negative
thing. On the other hand it does help them establish the fact
that they are there to protect the community. They are there to
work with the community.
So I think that you see CERD funds as different from USAID
funds. We are spending a lot more money on other types of
funding in Afghanistan in addition to CERD funds.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. By the way, Dr. von Hippel, when I was
in Kabul the auditors on the ground cited $900 million.
Ms. von Hippel. Really?
Mr. Connolly. But I guess the pending request. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Just quickly, I think the problem we have in
looking at--with all due respect--to other organizations, the
problem we have had is other options have simply been sub-
optimal. USAID in many cases takes too long. It uses a range of
international contractors. There are positive, there are also
negatives to use of CERD funds.
I think where it has been done well in places, I will use
the Konar example as one, there were State Department reps on
the ground in helping figure out and negotiating with the
Afghans on where it should be placed. There were also USAID
people on the ground.
So the benefit of CERD is that it does--able to get into
Afghan hands quicker, local hands quicker. Locals tend to use
that money, but I think in the PRTs that have used CERD most
effectively have been ones that have actually integrated
civilians into the CERD decision.
But if USAID can figure out ways to get its funding
quicker, and to minimize the use of international contractors,
including American ones, I would be all for more USAID money.
Mr. Connolly. But you are not troubled by the fact that our
military is now looking at hundreds of millions of dollars of
what are in effect aid dollars, something that it is not
trained or equipped to manage.
Mr. Cordesman. Well, Congressman, actually it is far better
trained than most of the field people that will go in as part
of the surge and aid who will come in with no prior experience
because they are just being trained for the first time. Many of
those military are on their second or third rotation. The PRTs
that we talk about, again, the latest report from the
Department of Defense, over 1,000 military, less than 40
civilians. Those are the people in the forward areas and in the
high risk areas. The aid people, the others, which have limited
personnel, do not move there. We are talking about surging aid
workers in there, but they would have to then have equally
flexible aid and they will not be there under these plans until
2010, and we are fighting now. So these are grim realities.
I do not like these numbers, but they are the reality we
have, and if we are going to win, we have to live with it.
Mr. Connolly. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I would love to
take some issue with Mr. Cordesman because the issue is not how
many tours of duty you have been on, the issue is the resident
expertise you possess or do not possess in development
assistance, and I think when you get into hundreds and hundreds
of millions of dollars, you are talking very different orders
of magnitude now, and the original mission of CERD has changed
fundamentally, and that is the question; not whether our
military are doing their job and have the courage to be in the
front lines, but whether they have the resident expertise, and
whether we really want to add that burden to an already full
plate for our military.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee for 4 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
I am not sure if this is accurate, Dr. Jones, but did you
in your testimony indicate 271,000 in security forces in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Jones. I did, I did in the west, south and east based
on the General Petraeus field manual ratios.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And would those include Afghan forces as
well?
Mr. Jones. Well, that is the--I mean, this is the question.
I was suggesting if you use those ratios, that is what is
required if you use those ratios.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Combination of. So you are not pinpointing
what troops, you are saying a combination.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Could be Afghan, could be NATO, could be
United States.
Mr. Jones. Could be Afghan nationals, could be Afghan
local.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. And foreign?
Mr. Jones. Foreign.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Mr. Jones. That is our question about how we want to
answer, I mean.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But that is a huge number.
Mr. Jones. That is a big number.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a big number, and your basis for
that is what? Containment and then security ongoing? How long
would you think that would be required?
Mr. Jones. Well, the focus would be protecting the local
population. How long that would take is an open question. The
average length that it takes to win a counterinsurgency is 14
years.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you do not sense the comfort and
support of the present administration in Afghanistan, is that
something you think that would be acceptable?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think if most of those forces were
Afghan, military, army, army police and local forces, that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see any inclination in the present
administration in Afghanistan to agree with that?
Mr. Jones. Well, the first test case for this is Wardak
province where there is an effort to raise local forces, so I
think we have a first test case in Wardak.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And it is local forces funded by the
central government or by the local government there?
Mr. Jones. Funded directly through the Ministry of
Interior, so by the national.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it would be the central government.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What do you think will be the impact of
that kind of force on our neighbor, Afghanistan's neighbor,
Pakistan?
Mr. Jones. I think if it is able to stabilize the country,
I think it should be in everybody's interest.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think it would have some negative
impact in terms of that large a force on their border?
Mr. Jones. Should not. I mean, if they are locals, one
thing that I am quite sure of in Afghanistan is there is not a
lack of guns, ammunition and weapons, so----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you are talking about an organized
security force so that can be stabilized so the children can go
to school?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Others can be--the Parliament can
function? I had the unfortunate opportunity to hear from women
parliamentarians, very difficult to go back to their
constituencies. Thank you very much.
Dr. Cordesman, you have just indicated the neighbor
Pakistan is falling apart. What then is the nexus that we need
to have between a restoration of Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Mr. Cordesman. I do not think it is falling apart. I think
it faces deep internal political tensions. Hopefully, it will
resolve them democratically and with changes in the military.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So there is hope?
Mr. Cordesman. There is hope, definitely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And when you say that change in the army
chief of staff or changing the structure?
Mr. Cordesman. I think that ultimately the real question
for Pakistan more than anything else is whether they can make
the full conversion to a successful stable democratic
structure, and the military can become a military that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can we help them with that with
legislation that focuses on democratization and social needs?
Mr. Cordesman. You can try to help them. Will it really
have much impact? Historically, no. It costs a lot of money,
and you feel good afterwards.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me say that I think we do have a
way of strengthening those democratic ideals and I believe we
cannot survive if we do not have a regional policy between
India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I believe that this
committee has the tools, and I thank the chairman for yielding
to me. I look forward to working with him on that issue. Yield
back.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
If we could take another 3 minutes total, 1
minutes deg. each, to have you answer the question you
wish we would have asked you, but did not, or emphasize a point
that you think is important that we hear again or hear.
Mr. Cordesman. Well, let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying
that in the testimony I gave you I gave a list of areas where
we desperately need transparency, where we need to actually
measure whether the strategies are working, whether we need to
go from the past where we have had almost no meaningful
reporting and accountability on what we are now calling AFPC,
to find out whether the President's strategy is being fully
implemented and actually working. I think the elements are
there, but it is a grim fact that the administration for 7
years has not provided meaningful reporting on what has
actually happened in this war.
It is also a fact we have concepts without detailed plans,
without derailed matrix of their success, without even a clear
picture of their cost. If we are to be successful by the summer
of this year, we need to know what is happening, we need to see
real progress, and we will need to be able to monitor it and
see it more efficiently in the course of these years.
Let me make one other point. For this entire time there has
been no real effort within the State Department to tie together
the U.S. aid effort, the international aid effort, provide
accountability in any kind of real responsibility. How do you
solve this? Make the deputy secretary personally accountable
for the failures of the people dealing with aid, not only in
State but the Department of Defense.
Mr. Ackerman. Heard you loud and clear on that.
Mr. Jones, would you like a minute?
Mr. Jones. Sure.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Very briefly, the role of neighbors, we have
danced around it a little bit, I think what needs to be
understood and for us to find ways to deal with is issues that
are causing a great deal of insecurity among Afghanistan's
major neighbors in the region. We see serious tension between
the Indians and the Pakistanis which is impacting security in
Afghanistan. We see Indian schools being built on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. We see a range of consulates. This
causes deep insecurity among the Pakistanis. I think we have to
do a much better job of addressing a strategic level causes of
insecurity between states. We have now marines that are going
to be operating on the Afghan-Iranian border. That will also
cause tension.
My point here is there are a range of steps, in my view,
that can be taken to decrease tension among the major powers in
the region, and that is Ambassador Holbrooke's job, but I think
there are a range of things he can do.
The only last thing I would say on neighbors is we have
members of the Taliban's Intersura operating in some cases
openly in Quetta, in Karachi. How can we continue to let that
happen? How can senior members, whether it is Barader or Omir
or Zeker, continue to operate openly?
I yield my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Dr. von Hippel.
Ms. von Hippel. Yes, I would just like to reemphasize a
point I made earlier about changing the paradigm from this very
heavy contractor-driven development program, one that never
really worked in Iraq, and is not working in Afghanistan.
We do not need to spend nearly as much money as we are
spending now to make things work. We need to get more aid
directly to the people, and I think we need to put a lot more
pressure on our international partners to work very closely
with us and to build up the capability of the U.N. so that they
can make sure that everybody is singing to the same hymn sheet.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. On behalf of our entire committee
I want to thank the panel. You have been very impressive, very
articulate, very succinct, and made your points with great
clarity, and with the thanks of all the members of the
committee the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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