[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
UPDATE ON LEBANON
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs TED POE, Texas
of 3/12/09 deg. BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota DANA ROHRABACHER, California
RON KLEIN, Florida EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
David Adams, Subcommittee Staff Director
Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
Dalis Blumenfeld, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Acting Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
(former United States Ambassador to Lebanon)................... 10
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 4
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement............. 13
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 32
Hearing minutes.................................................. 33
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 34
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement............................. 38
UPDATE ON LEBANON
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Gary L.
Ackerman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Ackerman. The committee will come to order.
Among the great speeches in American history is President
Kennedy's inaugural address in 1960. With the Cold War
accelerating toward a catastrophe that almost came in October
1962, Kennedy proposed a new beginning. Addressing ``those
nations who would make themselves our adversary'' the President
offered ``not a pledge but a request: That both sides begin
anew the quest for peace.''
Cognizant that cynics might misunderstand his intent,
President Kennedy reminded all those listening, ``that civility
is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to
proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never
fear to negotiate.''
These simple words convey the character of American foreign
policy properly understood, and were echoed recently by
President Obama who promised even ``those who cling to power
through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent''
that ``we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench
your fist.''
I am pleased today that we are joined by Acting Assistant
Secretary of State Jeffrey D. Feltman, who returned recently
from an effort to put into action this approach to our national
security. If anyone can deliver the message that engagement
with Syria will not be paid for in Lebanese coin--and this is a
message that needs to be repeated again and again--it is
Ambassador Feltman.
America's interests in Lebanon can easily be summed up:
Sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. We want
Lebanon to be ruled by the Lebanese, for the Lebanese. A
pluralistic democracy in landscape mostly occupied by strongmen
and tyrants, Lebanon is, sadly, a canary in the Middle East
coal mine. If Lebanon can be free; if Lebanon can find space
for all the different voices and religions and convictions
within it; if Lebanon can continue to exist with one foot in
the West and the other in the Arab world; if Lebanon can simply
be a normal country and not a battleground for outside powers;
then our interests, and I think those of most Lebanese, will be
fully satisfied.
We seek a partner, not an outpost. We want an ally, not a
proxy. And we must continue to aid those Lebanese committed to
their country's freedom from foreign rule or domination.
Lebanon is approaching a crossroads. The elections which
will take place in June will have a powerful effect on the
country's future, and I believe that we and Lebanon's friends
in the international community must be vigilant and active in
the days leading to the contest.
The real work of winning the election must be done in
Lebanon by the Lebanese. It is their campaign to run, it is
their future on the line, and it is their message that must
resonate with their electorate. One side can offer a future of
peace and prosperity. The other can promise only dogma and
destruction. But unless the forces of progress achieve real
coordination and meaningful compromise with each other, their
prospects, both before and after the election, will be greatly
diminished.
The United States cannot and should not interfere in the
election. The campaign and the election are for the Lebanese to
succeed or fail in on their own. But neither should we be
impassive. There is much that we can do and should do on the
outside to demonstrate that Lebanon's future is not dependent
on either militias or mullahs.
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has begun, and the United
States must continue to be a strong advocate for this body.
More significantly, in addition to providing funds for its
operation, American diplomats, in every country and context,
must continue to insist on the Tribunal's continued importance
and on the validity of its work. Especially in the Middle East,
there is a tendency to believe that there is a reality behind
reality. So, in word and deed we must continue to make clear
that there is no deal on the Tribunal, and there will be no
deal on the Tribunal. Period. Full stop.
We need to continue and enhance our support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces, the LAF, and the Internal Security
Forces, the ISF. These institutions enjoy strong support
throughout Lebanon, and have a pressing mission in battling
terrorists activated and armed by foreign powers. I am a strong
proponent of maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military
Advantage, but there is nothing that we are providing to the
LAF and the ISF that has, or will, endanger Israel's defense
capabilities.
There is a very large space between the capabilities needed
to effectively challenge the IDF and those needed to tackle a
terrorist group like the Fatah al-Isam, that in 2007 held off
the LAF for 3 months in the Nahr al-Bared camp. Even erring on
the side of caution, something on which I would insist, the LAF
has real needs that I believe we can help fill without
endangering Israel.
But we also need to look closely at the points of friction
between Israel and Lebanon which pose a significant risk to
regional security. One thing we should have learned about the
Arab-Israeli conflict is that it rarely gets better on its own,
and that problems left unresolved do not ameliorate, but
fester. The United States needs to initiate and lead a process
to help resolve the immediate conflicts over borders and
territory, Lebanese air space, and locating unexploded
munitions from 2006. Doing so will not only demonstrate that
diplomacy works, but that American assistance can improve
security for all sides.
What we, and our friends in Lebanon need to offer is hope;
not as a method for solving problems, but as a source of energy
and a reason for continuing to struggle for something much
better. Lebanon's future is not yet written; it does not have
to be one of civil war and foreign conflict. Lebanon's best and
brightest should not have to leave the country in order to live
normal lives. Lebanon's landscape does not need to be scarred
with wreckage and its leaders need not live in fear of their
very lives. None of that is necessary. But the Lebanese people
will have to choose to make it so. And if they do, they should
have no better partner in their efforts than the United States.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
today sitting in for Mr. Burton who is engaging in debate on
the floor of the House. However, I would have been at the
hearing anyway as I am a member of the committee. So let me
just a few thoughts in the opening statement for myself and not
for Mr. Burton, although I am here in his place.
Mr. Chairman, you just mentioned the concept that President
Obama expressed during the election, it is one of the issues he
brought up, which is not being afraid to talk to anyone, and
let me note that Ronald Reagan had that strategy as well.
Ronald Reagan said very clearly that we should be very nice to
people and be willing to talk, but very tough when it comes to
policy. And I have always agreed with that concept, but not
being afraid to talk is something totally different than making
sure that when you speak to a dictatorship or a group of
gangster that you are doing so responsibly and in a way that
will not bolster the position of those evil doers, so to speak.
Simply expressing our openness and trying to reach out to a
totalitarian regime will not make it better. The Iranian
mullahs, for example, know exactly what their position is. You
know, we are not trying to fool them and they are not trying to
fool us, and I am afraid that by thinking that we are going to
sway them by some sort of benevolent expressions or by
including their own description of their regime may have
horrible consequences.
For example, by suggesting for the first time that the
people of Iran are ruled by a legitimate government by calling
it, by referring to them as the people of the Islamic Republic
of Iran rather than just the Iranian people, perhaps what we
have done is demoralized the very people in Iran who we want to
have as our closest allies, and I would hope that any contact
that we have with Syria does not make this same mistake of
having a communication that seems to verify the legitimacy of
the tough guys who we are talking to.
Let me note that we have with us today a young man who led
the demonstrations at the universities in Iran 10 years ago. He
is a young man who has been very active in resisting and
organizing resistance to the mullah since then, and I would
like to just have Mr. Ruzabah please stand up. Right there, a
young man, a courageous young man who is standing against the
mullah dictatorship in Iran. Thank you for joining us here
today.
We have to make sure that people like this young man who
live in Syria are not demoralized--who want democracy for their
country, the people throughout the Middle East who want to have
peace and prosperity and democracy, and want to live not only
peace with their neighbors, but want to be part of a global
system of harmony and justice, that we do not demoralize those
people, and what I am afraid of is that if we try to bend over
backwards too far with Syria, and we become just too sincere in
our openness and expressions to the Syrian leadership, thinking
that that is what will sway them, it will have the opposite
impact because it will demoralize those people in Syria who too
would like to be friends with the United States and friends of
democracy, and live at peace with the world.
I would suggest, first of all, to note, and this will shock
some of my friends, that we do have to recognize that Lebanon
was in chaos and confusion and bloodshed before the Syrian
intervention. And if we expect the Syrians to listen to us, we
should understand and recognize that.
But what happens when a non-democratic government
interferes with military force, and it did some good right off
the bat by ending that chaos and bloodshed that was going on
unabated in Lebanon? What happens if someone overstays their
welcome and stays too long is eventually the situation
deteriorates, and clearly now Syria is playing and has been
playing for a number of years a negative, a highly negative
role in Lebanon, and we need to tell the Syrians, and make it
clear to them, if we are just going to talk with anybody, let
us be tough on policy. We no longer can tolerate the type of
assassinations and interference that Syria has been doing in
Lebanon.
And if there is going to be a peace, a bigger peace and a
greater peace in the Middle East, and democracy, and there is
going to be some kind of an order established, yes, Syria has
to be included, but we know that it must be based on respecting
the rights of the people of Lebanon to run their own country,
and that has to be respected and demanded by the United States
in our negotiations with Syria.
With that, I am looking forward to hearing a firsthand
report, giving us an update as to where these discussions might
go, what are the chances for success, and the upcoming
elections, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, are something that
should--we should be making sure that we focus on those
elections and make sure that they are a success, and that
outside forces, like those in Syria, do not manipulate this
turning point in Lebanese history.
So, with that, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
looking forward to the testimony.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
I will just note that whenever you quote Ronald Reagan,
knowing that you were one of his speechwriters, I do not marvel
at the fact that you do not look down to read the quote that he
said. [Laughter.]
Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am looking
forward to hearing the testimony from our witness, and I will
defer.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you for holding the hearing, Mr. Chair.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I want to
welcome the Ambassador here with us, and look forward to what
he would have to share with us. I am particularly interested in
the reopening of the Hariri investigation and also have an
interest in learning about the--I guess there were two
Palestinian leaders who were killed in Lebanon recently. I
would like to know what the Ambassador can share with us about
that subject, and then also what prospects for United States-
Syrian, Lebanon-Syrian relations can take place. I am anxious
to hear about his recent trip to Syria that the administration
sent him on.
So, again, thank you Mr. Ambassador. I anxiously wait to
hear your remarks.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, to say
welcome, Mr. Ambassador. The last time we met a number of years
ago in Lebanon you were confined to your job, so to speak. It
is nice to see you were able to come home. So welcome today.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ambassador, for joining us today. We had the chance, the
chairman and a number of us, to travel to Beirut a couple of
months ago to see firsthand, meet with the military leaders,
meet with the political leaders, and obviously look at Lebanon
as a very interesting laboratory, a place where hopefully a
democracy can thrive. There is a lot of good efforts going in;
a lot of concern, of course, about the election coming up; and
if you will, the free will of the people and if Hezbollah ends
up with more seats in the Parliament, what impact does this
have. The government there is quick to distinguish between the
Hezbollah, that is, the political participant, and the
Hezbollah which, you know, creates what many of us believe is
the terrorist threats in he region; and would be curious as to
a couple of questions.
Number one, as I said, what would be the response the
United States Government should have in the event of an
election which Hezbollah wins a majority or controlling
interests of the Parliament?
Number two, what is your thinking on the mandate of UNIFEL
and whether it is effectively preventing the rearmament of
Hezbollah in the southern area, and what can be or should be
done on the part of the United Nations and the United States'
efforts in that regard?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again thank you
for holding this very important hearing. We all know that after
30 years of civil war Lebanon is actively undertaking the
effort to build a safe and more stable state for its citizens
with the help from the United States. It is not an easy feat
for Lebanon whose weak military and even weaker central
government has a lot of foreign-backed groups to set up shop
within its borders and drag it into wars with Israel.
Mr. Chairman, I support the notion of bolstering state
institutions in Lebanon and encouraging reform through the use
of foreign assistance. A stronger Lebanon should replace the
current security vacuum which exists and allows for Hezbollah
to thrive. But until Lebanon is in a position to productively
manage this assistance and its institutions, I would like to be
certain that U.S. assistance will not add to the vacuum by
somehow reaching the hands of Hezbollah.
In addition to supporting Lebanon, we also have to work
with our allies to diminish the role of Syria in Lebanese
politics and civil society. Syria, and ultimately Iran's
financial and political influence over Hezbollah is a major
impediment to a normal and successful Lebanese civil society.
Lebanon is already making strides toward an active
democracy with its parliamentary election in June, but as
former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, ``Democracy
has to deliver. People want to vote and eat.'' So the question
is, what can be done to make the non-Hezbollah parts of the
Lebanese Government be in a position to deliver? The United
States must take special care to not only monitor assistance,
but help Lebanon to eliminate corruption.
I look forward to our distinguished guest's testimony, and
look forward to him addressing these concerns. Again, thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on these issues, and I
yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The chair would make a unanimous
request that the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, be
permitted to sit with the committee and participate as if he
were a member of the committee. Seeing no objection, so
ordered. Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for that
unanimous consent, and thank you for the opportunity to be back
on a committee that I regretfully am on leave of absence from.
In the years that I have served on the committee and the
years that I have known the Ambassador, I found him to be fair,
honest, and knowledgeable of the issues, first, of Israel and
the Palestinians, then Lebanon in all its complexity and its
mosaic of different issues, whether it is how to get Walid
Jumblatt to be solidly with you, or in fact how to get the
press to believe that you are pulling the strings of all the
decisions made by all the elected and unelected officials in
Lebanon. And if you knew how much the press loved to hate you
as you wormed our way through a solution to the 2006 war as you
dealt with the post-war challenges and a prime minister who
would gladly have left for retirement if not for the continued
support of the United States.
So I look forward to an update on where you see opportunity
in the Lavant. Yes, Lebanese centric would be very important,
but as we all know Lebanon touches all of the tentacles, if you
will, of the Middle East problems. Certainly no peace is
possible without Syria, but certainly as long as Syria has an
influence in Lebanon that is less than productive, no peace
will happen in that country either, either for the people of
Lebanon or in fact for the hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians who have had to call refugee camps their home for
their entire lives.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this very knowledgeable
ambassador who can obviously link together the challenges that
Lebanon faces but also the challenges and opportunities within
the region. I would ask unanimous consent to have the rest of
my statement put in the record.
Mr. Ackerman. Without objection.
Mr. Issa. I yield back.
Mr. Ackerman. Now, we could not hope to have a more expert
witness than Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Ambassador Feltman,
since December 18, 2008, has been the Acting Assistant
Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and
has been Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary since February
11, 2008.
Before that, Ambassador Feltman served for 3 years and 9
months as the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. A career member of
the U.S. Foreign Service since January 1986, before his posting
in Lebanon, Ambassador Feltman headed the Coalition Provisional
Authority office in Irbil, and simultaneously served as deputy
regional coordinator for CPA's northern area. From August 2001
until December 2003, Ambassador Feltman served as the U.S.
Consulate General in Jerusalem, first as deputy principal
officer and then from July 1, 2001 until September 2002, as
acting principal officer.
In addition to a number of staff positions in Washington,
Ambassador Feltman has also served in Tel Aviv, Tunisia,
Hungary and Haiti.
So we are all delighted to welcome him back to this
subcommittee today. Ambassador, you may proceed. Your entire
statement will be made a part of the official record and you
can proceed as you would.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON)
Ambassador Feltman. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like
to thank you in particular for your leadership on the issue of
Lebanon. I also would like to thank the entire committee for
its role in supporting the concept of a free and democratic
Lebanon. I would also like to thank the former members of the
committee for their role in Lebanon.
President Obama and Secretary Clinton have demonstrated our
continuing and unwavering support for a sovereign democratic
and prosperous Lebanon, the type of Lebanon that the members of
this committee have just described as being our objective. And
we continue to seek full implementation of all of the U.N.
Security Council resolutions on Lebanon and we will continue
our efforts to strengthen the institutions of the Lebanese
state. We are also seeking to advance a comprehensive regional
peace. Lebanon will play a key role in the long-term effort to
build lasting stability and peace in the Middle East.
Many of you have mentioned the upcoming elections.
Lebanon's June 7th parliamentary elections offer an opportunity
for moderate voices in Lebanon to continue their support for a
sovereign, stable, independent and democratic Lebanon. It is
worth noting that Lebanon alone among the Arab countries has
two former Presidents who continue to live in Lebanon, two
former chiefs of state who continue to live in Lebanon as a
sign of the vibrancy of Lebanon's democracy.
In terms of the elections, we continue to urge all parties
to support the conduct of free, fair, and transparent elections
unmarred by violence. With the strong support of the U.S.
Congress, the United States has provided $10.5 million for a
number of programs to help Lebanon improve its ability to carry
out these fair transparent elections.
In terms of the result of these elections, the elections
will hinge on a handful of seats located primarily in
Christian-dominated areas of Lebanon. How the Christian voters
divide between the two main political blocs--the March 14th
block and the March 8th bloc--will determine who has the
majority in the next Parliament and the next cabinet.
Decisions on the shape and the composition of the next
government that will come out of these parliamentary elections
should and can be made by the Lebanese themselves, for Lebanon,
free from outside interference.
In terms of our own role, we anticipate that the shape of
the United States' assistance, the United States' policies
toward Lebanon will be evaluated in the context of Lebanon's
parliamentary election results, and especially by the policies
adopted by the new cabinet.
Some of you have mentioned the threat of Hezbollah. We
remain extremely concerned about the role that Hezbollah is
playing in Lebanon. The group continues to receive weapons from
Syria and Iran, in violation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1701, the resolution that led to the cessation of
hostilities in 2006. Hezbollah violent actions against fellow
Lebanese citizens in May 2008 provide a fresh reminder of the
threat the group poses to peace and stability.
Our position on Hezbollah remains unchanged. It was
designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. We see
no distinction between the leadership and funding of the
group's terrorist, military, political, and social wings.
We share this committee's strong support for the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon which opened on March 1. We are confident
that the tribunal will bring the murders of Rafiq Hariri and
other Lebanese to justice. The tribunal is an independent body.
It should not be politicized, and we agree, Mr. Chairman, there
will be no deals at the expense of justice.
In terms of the Lebanese Armed Forces, we are encouraged
the Lebanese state continues to strengthen its authority
throughout the country, continues to expand its authority
across all of the Lebanese territory with considerable help
from Lebanon's international partners, including the Lebanon,
in this regard particularly for the security services, and I
want to thank again Congress for providing the resources to
allow us to be a partner with the Lebanese Security Services.
Our assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces as helped it
respond more quickly and effectively to isolated outbreaks of
violence throughout the country, prevent additional rocket
launches, and discover more arms caches in south Lebanon. Our
partners in the Lebanese Armed Forces have proven highly
professional and our assistance continues to be used
responsibly and with exemplary end-use monitoring as noted in
our regular reporting on this issue.
As noted by the chairman and by some of you, I recently
traveled to Syria with Dan Shapiro, who is the Senior Director
for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security
Council. As Secretary Clinton stated, as many of you have
urged, we are not engaging with Syria simply for engagement
sake. Our policies toward Lebanon are unshakable. We hope to
use continued dialogue with Syria, in fact, to press for the
need for non-interference in Lebanon, to urge progress in
unimplemented parts of Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680,
and 1701, and to address other pressing regional concerns such
as Iraq.
We do support Israeli and Syrian efforts to reach a peace
agreement, and we also hope that Lebanon and Israel can find a
mutually acceptable mechanism to address their outstanding
issues, including full implementation of Security Council
Resolution 1701. We are prepared to support any dialogue, any
mechanism that the parties agree is acceptable. We are pleased
to see, in fact, that Israel and Lebanon are already engaged
indirectly through the U.N. over the situation in South
Lebanon, including Ghujar, the village of Ghujar.
But to repeat what the chairman said, as we invigorate our
efforts to achieve a comprehensive regional peace, no deal will
be made at Lebanon's expense.
In conclusion, I would like to note that the pro-
independence forces in Lebanon tell us consistently of their
appreciation for the clear support they receive from Members of
Congress as demonstrated by many of your visits and your
statements, and from the administration. That support, which is
bipartisan, must continue. Along with its other partners, the
United States will continue to support the Lebanese people in
their goal of a fully sovereign democratic state where the
Government of Lebanon is the one exercising control over the
territory of Lebanon. This is a vital goal for the Lebanese and
it will help achieve peace and stability throughout the region.
Thank you for your time. It is a real honor for me to
appear before you today, and I would be pleased to address your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Ambassador, one of the issues that
has provoked Syrian threats against Lebanon in the past has
been the posting of international forces along the border of
the two countries. At the same time we know by independent
means that Syria continues to arm Hezbollah across its frontier
with Lebanon, contrary to the mandate of the Security Council.
The question is, what can the United States and what can
the international community do to stop the flow of arms and to
get Damascus to accept the delineation of the Lebanese/Syrian
border?
Ambassador Feltman. Mr. Chairman, you have touched on one
of the biggest challenges we face in trying to support the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 that
basically called for an end to all arms shipments to any group
except for the Government of Lebanon.
Those arms coming from Iran are also, of course, a
violation of other Security Council Resolutions such as 1748
that prohibits Iran from shipping weapons. These weapons not
only have a destabilizing effect in the region but they
endanger Lebanon itself. It is our firm belief, and we have had
an ongoing dialogue with the Government of Lebanon about how to
address this problem.
It is not just the United States that is concerned. It is
all of Lebanon's international partners. In fact, many of
Lebanon's international partners came together in two ways: One
was to support a Lebanon border assessment team, Lebanon
international border assessment team from the United Nations
that went out twice to study the problem you describe, and to
identify possible fixes to this. The second thing that we did
internationally was we came together to set up a model program
for integrating Lebanon's security services, providing them
support, technical assistance in order to build a border patrol
regime starting on the north. That effort is still underway.
But the big concern is to the east.
We would urge that the problem begin to be addressed, first
of all, by Iran and Syria complying with their obligations
under the Security Council Resolutions, not to permit arms
transfers to unauthorized groups in Lebanon, but second, to do
the border demarcations you mentioned. To control the border
you need to know where that border is. The Lebanese have stated
their willingness to start that border demarcation immediately.
They have reactivated their side of a joint border control. We
would hope that Syria would respond in reactivating its side of
the border control. I assure you this is one of the issues that
we discussed when we visited Damascus a few weeks ago because
this is a very, very serious concern and a real deficiency in
the implementation of 1701.
Mr. Ackerman. In mid-March, President Bashar Assad gave an
interview in which he issued veiled threats against Lebanon
should the Hariri tribunal reach the supposedly wrong
conclusions, or should the March 14th coalition win the
elections and actually attempt to govern as a democratic
majority.
Questions: Do you believe that violence remains a part of
Syria's strategy for dealing with Lebanon? What can we do to
put the Syrian regime on notice that interference with
Lebanon's elections will have consequences? Is it a good idea
to tell them now what those consequences would be, and do we
even know what those consequences are?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, our concerns with Syria, we
have very, very serious concerns with Syrian behavior, and
Lebanon is one area of those concerns. When Dan Shapiro and I
went to Damascus, Lebanon, of course, is one of the issues we
discussed.
Although one doesn't normally talk about what happens in
diplomatic channels, I will take the liberty to say that
Foreign Minister Walid Moallem, Presidential Advisor Bethena
Shaban, Deputy Foreign Minister Facil McDudd, assured us that
Syria shares our goal for elections in Lebanon that are free
and fair, where the Lebanese people are able to choose their
own representatives in Parliament away from intimidation and
violence. Those were words, those were a statement, but they
were said in a very important official bilateral dialogue.
All of us are very aware of problems in Lebanon as the date
for elections approach.
Mr. Ackerman. Let me just say that my time is up. The
witness will be allowed to finish the answer, and I am trying
to set a pattern. Please continue then.
Ambassador Feltman. All of us are very aware of problems
that have occurred in Lebanon in the past as elections
approach. In fact, if you remember, the assassination of Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri happened just a few months before the
scheduled 2005 legislative elections. All of us are watching
this very, very closely.
I will not speculate now on what the consequences would be
of violence in Lebanon, but I am sure there would be an
international reaction should these elections be marred in the
same way that there was an international reaction in 2005.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I am going to start off with this observation
because it is something we forget, but it does not negate the
fact of how tough we need to be, and that is, Syria did play a
positive role years ago in helping end the conflagration that
was causing so much bloodshed and seemed so out of control at
that time. I remember that very well. And when dealing with the
Syrians, I think that we need to, if we are going to make a
deal with these guys that will protect Lebanon, we have got to
make sure that they understand that we are not forgetting that,
because that is something that is quite often they have a right
to be proud of, that they helped stop that bloodshed and
turmoil.
Of course, since then their role degenerated into a very
negative role in Lebanon, and I just would like to ask you
this.
We were talking about what we expect, we expect the border
to be controlled and such, what can we offer the Syrians that
will be--is there a quid pro quo that we can offer them? The
fact that they say they want to have free elections in Lebanon,
quite frankly, coming from the government that does not permit
free elections in their country, that does not hold much weight
with me. What quid pro quo can we offer the Syrians in order to
bring peace to Lebanon?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, if I can comment first on
a more general part, noting how you opened your question,
framing it and reminding us of the Syria role and helping to
end Lebanon's tragic civil war.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Feltman. I think all of us would welcome very
positive ties between Syria and Lebanon. It is natural that
these two neighbors should have very strong bilateral ties.
There are economic reasons for doing so, there are family
reasons, you know, people going back and forth. There are lots
of historic reasons, cultural reasons. All of us would like to
see very, very positive Syrian/Lebanese relations, relations
that are based on the idea of mutual respect; relations that
are based on diplomatic recognition which now has in fact
occurred, and I think all of us were pleased to learn that the
Syrians have now sent the request for Agri Mahon for the very
first Syrian Ambassador to ever be posted in Lebanon. This is
all good news.
To the extent that you have normal relations between Syria
and Lebanon, that is great, and Syria will have influence in
Lebanon through the economy, through the family ties, through
history. You know, we are not saying no Syrian interference, no
Syrian influence in Lebanon. We are saying let it be a natural
positive influence the way that the United States-Canadian
relationship works.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, Mr. Ambassador, that is a very
good point, and I think it is important for us to make sure
that we assure, reassure the Syrians that if there is a
regional peace, they will prosper.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And they will be part of that, and our
goal, of course, is not to put Syria down; our goal is to bring
a regional peace and bring about an environment where you can
have democratic government. Perhaps they could have democratic
government in Syria as well, I might add. So are you optimistic
that that message can get through? Because I have heard that
there is movement going on, we have all heard these rumors, is
there movement going on toward that direction in----
Ambassador Feltman. Toward democracy?
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, no, toward Syria actually being
willing to make the agreements, for example, the Golan Heights
and the agreements about Lebanon that will bring about a
regional peace.
Ambassador Feltman. Well, you know, there were four rounds
of indirect talks between Syria and Israel that took place over
the course of the past year. They were brokered by Turkey. This
is a positive sign of both Syria and Israel wanting to explore
with each other how to get to a Syria-Israel track that is
viable.
The President and the Secretary, I think, Congress, would
like to see a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. That has
been a bipartisan policy for many, many administrations. So to
the extent that you can get a Syria-Israel track going, not at
Lebanon's expense, I think that is all positive. I think that
is what the Syrians are looking for us to help broker.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We need to be very tough on one side and
very open-handed on the other, and I would hope, and Mr.
Ambassador, I want to congratulate you and thank you for what
you personally have done and used your influence to try to see
that there are positive changes in that region. You have
dedicated your life to these things, and those of us--that has
not escaped us here in Congress.
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So thank you very much.
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Regarding Hezbollah, what concrete steps do you think the
Lebanese leaders can take internally to help promote
disarmament of Hezbollah?
Ambassador Feltman. I think the question of Hezbollah
actually requires larger thinking than simply inside Lebanon. I
think the Lebanese have a responsibility, but it also requires
the international community and regional partners to work
together.
The goal, I think, should be that all parties in Lebanon
compete democratically through elections, through normal means,
and that you do not have one party that is able to change the
equation by threatening its arms or intimidating others because
people know they have these kinds of arms.
The Lebanese Government has taken some important steps
since 2006, such as redeploying the Lebanese Armed Forces to
the south. For the first time since the late sixties the
Lebanese Armed Forces are present on Lebanon's south border,
and if you look at the number of incidents, security incidents
between Lebanon and Syria, they are at their lowest level from
2006 until now compared to the period from 2000, Israel's
withdrawn from south Lebanon until the war in 2006.
The Lebanese have also committed themselves to a national
dialogue process to discuss how to best defend Lebanon, how to
build up the Lebanese institutions that can provide for
Lebanese security. I do not think there is an easy answer from
today until tomorrow. It also requires work on the part of
Syria and responsible behavior on the part of the Iran.
I am optimistic that we are headed in the right direct. The
biggest enemy to Hezbollah's arms is a strong, viable,
responsible, accountable Lebanese state, and I think that is
what the international partners are trying to do in helping the
Lebanese establish.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you. In that same regard, strengthening
cities and rural areas outside of Beirut center is an important
task to reducing popular support of armed militias operating
outside the mandate of the central government, such as
Hezbollah and other extremist organizations. How can the
Lebanese Government continue to strengthen cities and rural
Lebanon so that they can have their own free-standing, strong
institutions?
Ambassador Feltman. It is an excellent question. You have
pointed out something that not only gives Hezbollah strength,
but also allows other sort of more traditional leaders or other
groups to get loyalty of constituencies at the expense of
government institutions.
I mean, I think what the international community is trying
to do in response to requests from Lebanese officials, Lebanese
members of Parliament, Lebanese civil society leaders, is help
strengthen government institutions at the national level all
the way down to the local level so that they are transparent,
they are accountable, they are responsible so that the Lebanese
feel that if they need protection their state can protect them.
If they need water supply, utilities, they can go to their
municipal officials and get them. They do not have to go to
tribal leaders, to communal leaders. They can rely on the
government.
All of us are trying to help the Lebanese build the state
institutions, the municipal institutions, that a democracy
requires to thrive, and I do think we have made some progress
there. With the support of Congress, we have some very good
programs working with municipal government to make them more
transparent, to do constituent outreach so that the local
citizens can see what they are doing. We are working on
improved water resources in the south in a way that the
constituents can see that their government is delivering. These
are the sorts of activities that I believe the international
community is right to support with the Government of Lebanon,
and I am very proud that we as the United States have been
participating in this effort.
Mr. Ellison. And with my remaining seconds, Mr. Ambassador,
you know, there is recently a report in the news about two
Palestinian leaders who were killed in Lebanon. What can you
tell us about that? What are the dynamics there, and what was
at play?
Ambassador Feltman. I can comment on one. I am not familiar
with the second, but one that was killed was the second ranking
PLO official in Lebanon, a guy named Kamel Medhat. He was known
for his moderation of trying to negotiate between Palestinian
factions in these Palestine refugee camps. He was PLO, he was
Fatah, so he was sort of mainstream Palestinian trying to bring
others on board to prevent violence from occurring in these
Palestinian refugee camps, or worse, violence from spreading
from the refugee camps outward, and I can only think that
whoever decided to murder him using an explosive-laden car,
like so many other assassinations in Lebanon, did not have the
best interests of Lebanon or the Palestinian refugee camps at
heart because he was--as I said, he was the one that was trying
to find nonviolent ways to address Palestinian concerns.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Burton in person.
Mr. Burton. In person. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice
being with you.
I have been very concerned about Syria for a long, long
time because they appear to be the conduit for weapons coming
in from Iran into Hezbollah and Hamas, and Hamas's headquarters
is in, I believe, Damascus.
What, if anything, can we do to convince Syria to become a
member of the nations of the world who believe in freedom and
democracy, and to stop this support for Hezbollah and Hamas?
And what can we do to get them to change their policies toward
Israel? If you can give me the answer to that, it is like
cutting the Gordian Knot, but I would just like to hear your
opinion. Tough question, huh?
Ambassador Feltman. It is a tough question, and if you look
at Syria in behavior in some ways they have tried to have it
both ways, because they have in fact engaged on these indirect
talks with Israel over the past year. Israel and Syria via
Turkey had four rounds of indirect talks where they went into
quite some detail about how they might move forward toward a
peace agreement between the two, and I am sure that security
issues like Hezbollah and Hamas were among the issues that were
discussed in these indirect talks.
So on the one hand Syria has been willing to show that it
will engage at least indirectly with the Israelis, and, in
fact, President Assad has referred that he is even willing to
do this directly at some point. On the other hand they are, in
fact, the conduit for the armed shipments to Hezbollah, and
also host the Hamas political leaders who have been clear in
their rejection of the conditions that would lead the
Palestinian reconciliation, the condition that would lead to
real Israeli-Palestinian peace. So I agree with you, they are
playing a double role right now.
One of the reasons why the President and the Secretary
asked Dan Shapiro and me to go to Damascus was to start talking
about moving on the positive side, moving away from the less
constructive behavior that they have been engaging in. It was
one round of talks. I cannot say that we have found the secret
to untangling this Gordian Knot after one 4-hour meeting, but
nevertheless it was in the spirit of your question that the
President asked us to go.
Mr. Burton. The President has indicated he would like to
talk to the leaders of almost all of the Middle Eastern
countries, in particular, Iran and Syria. What do you think
should be the preconditions before the President does that?
He gave a speech, I think, last week almost directly to the
people in Iran, and he was rebuked by, I think, one of their
cleric leaders, the Ayatollah Khomeni, the Supreme Leader of
Iran. He said that Obama has insulted the Islamic Republic of
Iran from the first day. So this was after President Obama made
those overtures to the Iranian people.
What do you think that this country and this administration
should do to try to open a dialogue, if they should, and what
should the conditions be not only for Iran but also Syria?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, I do not believe that engagement
is soft. I do not believing that talking has to be a sign of
weakness. Talking is one tool.
In terms of Iran and Syria----
Mr. Burton. Let me just interrupt you a little bit.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. There is a number of people in the Congress,
myself included, that believe unless the conditions are very,
very stringent that talking to Iran is a sign of weakness to
them, and that they are going to gain from just the very fact
that the talks are taking place. So what I am trying to figure
out is what should be the parameters and why should we be
talking to them until there is something to talk about?
Ambassador Feltman. I think that the Supreme Leader's
reaction that you quoted indicates that they are not looking at
talking as a sign of weakness on our part. The fact that he has
to make some critical comments about what was a New Year's
greeting indicates that they are a little off balance by this.
I would advocate that we----
Mr. Burton. Let me just, because my time has run out, I do
not agree with that assessment at all. I think that they are
very recalcitrant, and I think they see a discussion with any
of our leaders without very strong preconditions that deal with
the problems in the Middle East would be a sign of weakness and
it will be an encouragement to them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
Ambassador. It is great to have you here. I wanted to just
start with a comment and really see the time is a great
opportunity to reengage. I think like many of my colleagues and
many Lebanese-Americans that I represent, you know, we hope to
see a rebirth in the post-civil war Lebanon. So it is great to
have you here.
In terms of what we can do to strengthen the consensus
government and Lebanese institutions, two in particular that I
wanted I wanted to ask about, and one is, first, the Lebanese
Armed Forces. You were here back in July of last year before
the committee. You noted that the expansions of U.S. assistance
to the LAF was to make long-term investment in the state of
Lebanon, the security of the state in the national institution
that enjoys almost universal respect among the Lebanese.
Can you tell us today if we have seen any improvement in
the LAF performance since you were before us last year, and in
terms of how we should support that going forward?
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman
Carnahan.
The reaction of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the events
in Gaza in January I think was illustrative. There was
incredible pressure throughout the Middle East on moderate
governments by what was happening in Gaza. You may remember
hearing more radicals trying to attack moderate leaders and
saying, now wait a minute, we should be part of this fight. We
should be siding with the Palestinians who are under seize in
Gaza. We should be getting involved.
Of course, moderate leaders in the Arab world realized
that, no, what in fact we needed to do was to try to get back
to a cease fire and get back onto a viable peace process, but
there were elements trying to rile the street in a different
direction.
This pressure, of course, was felt in Lebanon where there
are 400,000 Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon.
There were, in fact, it was two or three, I believe it was
three rockets fired from south Lebanon into Israel during the
Gaza crisis. This risked putting Lebanon and Israel at war
again.
The Lebanese Armed Forces, working with UNIFEL, immediately
stepped up their patrols. They immediately issued statements
along with the Lebanese President, the Lebanese cabinet,
unanimously on the part of the Lebanese cabinet, showing their
support for 1701, their commitment to the Resolution 1701 that
provided for security and stability in south Lebanon. There
were no further rocket attacks in south Lebanon.
This is one example of the Lebanese Armed Forces stepping
up to its responsibility to secure the south Lebanon border
where the Lebanese Army had been absent from the late sixties
all the way up until the fall of 2006.
There is a long way to go, but I repeat what I said back
almost a year ago, which is, the Lebanese Armed Forces is the
national institution in Lebanon that everyone takes pride in.
There is not a Shiia unit, a Maranite brigade. This is a cross
confessional organization that every family, every community is
part of.
Mr. Carnahan. If I could, I want to cut you off because I
have one more institution that I want to ask about.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes.
Mr. Carnahan. And that is the American University in
Beirut, in terms of opportunities there to use that institution
going forward in terms of better repairing them for success.
Ambassador Feltman. I have tremendous success for the
American University of Beirut. You know, it is one of the
outstanding institutions of education in the Middle East, and
it is something I think that we can all be proud of from the
legacy of American benevolence from the Nineteenth Century.
I had the opportunity last night, in fact, to meet the new
president, new for me, he has been in the office a few months,
but the new president of the American University of Beirut, and
the U.S. Congress has been extremely generous in supporting the
American University of Beirut over the years, and I expect that
support will continue.
But we work with the American University of Beirut in a
variety of ways, but we also have to keep a little bit of a
hands-off role from AUB because it is a private institution. It
is not part of the U.S. Government. So we support AUB while
also letting AUB thrive as an independent academic institution.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, a lot of subjects to go through, and I will try
to be quick and brief, but let me start in reverse order with
AUB. Historically, AUB has had a total support in the words of
the United States both at the administration level and at
Congress's level, but they have often had to be ear-marked, a
word that has become a little distasteful. Do you expect this
administration to provide funding without separate ear-marks
from the Congress for AUB?
Ambassador Feltman. I would expect that we would have
consistent support for AUB. It is in our interest to see that
institution thrive.
Mr. Issa. I appreciate that. I am glad to hear it.
The history of military equipment, and it is leading
question, but I hope you will appreciate in the vein that it is
given, is when I go to Lebanon and I see M-113s that were from
before I started in the army in the 1970s. Is it relatively
true or completely true that no major piece of equipment has
ever been lost by the Lebanese Armed Forces through all these
years that was entrusted to them through our aid programs?
Ambassador Feltman. You are asking me easy questions,
Congressman, but it is true. The Lebanese Armed Forces has one
of the best track records in the world for this. Our end-use
monitoring has revealed no deficiencies.
Mr. Issa. Excellent, and I appreciate that because we do
have some portion of that $1 billion still backed up and not
yet delivered to them.
Probably one more softball, and that is, is there a win-win
in your opinion dealing with the Latani and the Hezbani River
to try to bring water to the south while at the same time
allowing more water to flow into Israel if we are able to
eventually engage in those projects in some construction way? I
know that has always been a ``can we go that far south''
question.
Ambassador Feltman. This is far from a softball question,
Congressman.
Mr. Issa. Water never is easy even in Southern California.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes, we had a program with the Latani
Water Authority several years back that we have now recently
reinvigorated. It is extremely important for all the regions of
the Middle East, but particularly in that part of Lebanon to
utilize the resources that are available to their fullest
extent. We are looking at waste water treatment, waste water
reuse. We are taking a comprehensive approach of how to better
utilize the resources available in south Lebanon, but it is
about Lebanon. This is part of our program for Lebanon.
What we are doing is to help provide resources, better use
of resources inside Lebanon is what our----
Mr. Issa. No, and I appreciate. I only brought up the
question of Israel because there was some threat of bombing a
pumping plant some years ago based on Israel's belief that
Speaker Berry had funded a project that might be denying them
some water, and that sensitivity, I think, hit the press.
During the 2006 war and also during the run-up to the
election or determination and election of the President, there
was an attempt by a number of groups to sort of tear at the
fabric of Lebanese society, and certainly to us on the outside
it appeared to fail. Can you confirm that in fact all these
attempts to tear apart the Lebanese and put them back into
civil war have consistently failed?
This is mostly a question of are they durable running up to
the parliamentary elections?
Ambassador Feltman. It is worth going back to that spring
of 2005, or February 2005. The most powerful political figure
in Lebanon was assassinated. The strongest Sunni leader in
Lebanon was assassinated. The most renounced figure on the
international stage in Lebanon was assassinated when Rafiq
Hariri was killed on February 14th.
I expect that whoever did that thought that it would scare
the Lebanese, perhaps send them into civil war, but it would
derail the elections that would come up. What happened instead,
the Lebanese people pulled together, the international
community pulled together and in fact the Syrians had to leave
Lebanon at the end of April, and there were free and fair
elections at the end of May and June of that year.
I think the Lebanese people have pulled together
repeatedly. There have been security breaches. There have been
other assassinations. There have been murders of followers of
certain political leaders, and every time this has happened,
with the exception of May last year, May last year was an
exception, but all these security incidents have not in fact
led to broader civil war. They have lead to the Lebanese
stepping back and saying, now wait a minute, let us solve our
differences through democratic means, not through violence.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, if I could have your indulgence
just for one quick follow-up question.
Mr. Ackerman. We will allow that in a moment----
Mr. Issa. Of course.
Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. If I get a positive response
from the Ambassador.
Mr. Issa. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman. We have each had our turn. Your appearance
was highly heralded and you did not disappoint. If you would
agree, I would go one more round, of one question each, with
the members of our panel, and if my colleagues will indulge Mr.
Issa, I will let him take his question with his follow up.
Ambassador Feltman. That is fine.
Mr. Issa. Thank you all. Mr. Ambassador, cluster bombs from
the 2006 war, an estimated 1 million of them that some portion
of them are still are in the south, mostly in the south of
Lebanon and serve as sort of bad examples of land mines because
they are not designed to go off or not go off at a particular
time. Can you give us a progress report, and two other portions
to it; not only how well are we doing but what effect is it
having, and what do you think more that Congress should do to
deal with the residue of that war?
Ambassador Feltman. As, of course, you know I was in
Lebanon during that war and for the first, I guess, 18 months
after that war, and it was tragic to witness the civilian
casualties during the war and that continued on after the war.
I am glad that we have been able to respond with the
support of the congressional appropriations. We have so far
provided over $15 million, $15.5 million or something for the
clean up of what they call ERW, the explosive residue of war,
and $13 million of that has gone directly to the mine advisory
group to actually do the clean up.
But I think a more important part of it is $2.5 million
that has gone to the Lebanese Mine Action Center because this
is about building capacity for the Lebanese because,
unfortunately, the mines and the cluster bombs were not only
from that 2006 war, which we are addressing systematically, but
there is also all sorts of unmarked mines remaining from the
civil war, and so by building up the capacity of the Lebanese
themselves to clean it we hope we can keep the effort beyond
just the south and the 2006 war.
The other thing, of course, is we have always encouraged
the Israelis to share all their strike data with the U.N. The
Israelis have told us that they have shared strike data on two
occasions, including the data that they provided to their own
troops when they were withdrawing in 2006.
I took note in the Secretary General's most recent report
on Lebanon, his most recent 1701 report, that there is a
reference to the possibility of Israel providing more strike
data. I do not have any way to confirm that now, but it would
be encouraging if it is true.
In terms of the actual clean up and progress report, much
of the south has been clean, but there is still additional
discoveries of cluster munitions, so it still does provide a
danger.
Mr. Issa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Ambassador, Hezbollah and Syria have said that regardless
of who wins the election in June, that Lebanon should have a
government of national unity; one wherein the minority
possesses a blocking third. In other words, the ability as they
have now to veto all major government initiatives.
The ruling March 14th Coalition was compelled in May 2008
to accept this condition, but does not presently seem to have a
cohesive position on that issue. The majority leader Saad
Hariri has announced that his Future Movement would not
participate in a Hezbollah-led government, but leaders of the
other parties have indicated that they are nonetheless open to
the idea.
My question: Does the Obama administration have an opinion
or a position on this question?
Ambassador Feltman. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me, I
will give what I think is--I will give you the position, but I
would also like to offer a personal observation on this.
Mr. Ackerman. We would appreciate that.
Ambassador Feltman. The position is that the Syrians should
not be talking about this; that none of us should be talking
about this; that this is what the Lebanese should be deciding.
Our whole policy has been bipartisan. Congress and the
administration for the past several years has been the Lebanese
need to decide what is best for Lebanon.
We have worked to create the atmosphere internationally in
which the Lebanese have the space to maneuver, the room to
maneuver to make these decisions for themselves.
So, first and foremost, it is a decision for the Lebanese
to make. Whatever they----
Mr. Ackerman. That is assuming they have the space.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes, and it is important for us to keep
the space by emphasizing and finding ways to keep that space
open.
My personal observation is that for those who advocate this
national unity-type government that you describe that exists
now, I would hope they would be telling their friends that are
in the Government of Lebanon now to make this government work.
If people believe that this is an ideal solution for Lebanon,
it does not seem to be operating ideally in practice because
the idea of having consensus for all government decisions has
led in what is my personal view to many, many blockages in the
work of the government.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher, for one question.
No semi-colons, complex clauses or Part B. [Laughter.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we have determined that it would be, in
the last round, that we would be well served by trying to
convince, if we could, Syria to serve their own interest by
becoming a very positive player than a negative player, in the
long run that would serve--there is your carrot, okay? Now I am
going to ask you about sticks, because I have noted that
sometimes when you are dealing with tough guys, rather than
democratic leaders, which is what we are dealing with in Syria,
the tough guys sometimes only understand the sticks, and the
fact that you are willing to use them.
My read from their testimony is that we have gone Iran in a
relationship with Syria, which has a relationship with
Hezbollah and Hamas, which is a negative influence in Lebanon
and in fact Syria has a direct negative influence in Lebanon.
So what are the sticks that we can use--first of all, Syria
is a poor country, it does not have water and power sufficient,
so it is a very relatively vulnerable country that way, what
sticks would you suggest that we use if they are not convinced
out of positive arguments please join the family of nations so
we can all prosper and live at peace and there will be harmony
in this area, that they are not swayed by that, what sticks can
we use to pry Iran and Syria apart because obviously being a
poor country Syria depends on Iran, and then how can we make
sure that we pry apart Hezbollah and Hamas from Syria, and what
sticks would we use to accomplish that?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, I do not believe that many
countries would envy being in the position Syria is in right
now. Syria's best friend is Iran. Who are Iran's friends?
Nobody seems to trust Iran in the region or globally. There are
people who deal with Iran, but there is a lot of distrust based
on Iranian misbehavior domestically, regionally,
internationally.
You know, there are a number of sanctions, designations
that Syria belabors under now that Iran also is under. Syria is
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. These are fairly
significant measures that are existing in the relationship with
Syria now.
I do not know if we will succeed in convincing Syria by
words that it is worth changing direction, looking at different
things. But I also do not think it is a sign of weakness to
try. The Syria-Israel track that the Turks were promoting is a
very intriguing, is a very intriguing one. We have long said we
want a comprehensive peace in the region. That means peace
between Israel and all of its neighbors. I d not believe you
can get to a peace between Israel and Syria as long as you have
Syria giving the sort of support to Hezbollah and Hamas that it
is giving now.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I take it you do not have any sticks from
what you are saying.
Ambassador Feltman. I am not using that language, but I
would say look at the--look at the context in which the
relationship with Syria is operating now.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me give you one thing and then I
will----
Mr. Ackerman. We are trying not to go into----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Just one last thing.
Mr. Ackerman. You are doing good.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
How about if the non-democratic Government of Syria
continues to be playing a negative role rather than coming over
and joining us and trying to play a positive role, how about if
we support people who want to overthrow the Government of
Syria?
You know, maybe they might be willing to compromise more if
we were willing to put that kind of pressure on them, the same
with the mullahs in Iran. I am not talking about invading their
country. I am talking about supporting the democratic elements
within those countries.
Mr. Ackerman. I had a no-hitter going, and you threw a
spitball.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will just leave it with that. Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. I want you, Mr. Chairman, to define what one
question is one of these days. [Laughter.]
That sounded like to me it was a small book. Anyhow, I do
not mind. I thought they were good questions. I do have one
question.
You know, if we are talking about our leadership on this
committee, or the White House, or the leaders like yourself or
people in the State Department, if we believe that the
leadership should talk to Syria about them becoming a non-
terrorist state and becoming a member of the family of nations
and helping solve the problems not only with Syria, but Lebanon
as well, should we not prior to any kind of discussions, talks
or meetings request, require that Hezbollah and Hamas be
removed from Syria as not only irritants but a problem for the
entire Middle East and particularly Israel, and also since
Syria wants us to facilitate Israel giving the Golan Heights
back, should not all those things be part of some kind of
agreement before we have talks of a high level?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman Burton, let me be clear.
Our policy is that Syria should stop supporting Hezbollah,
Syria should stop facilitating arms and financial transfers----
Mr. Burton. But that has not in any way slowed down the
movement toward talking with Syria. I mean, we have had a, and
I am not criticizing my colleagues, but a number of my
colleagues have gone over there from this committee and others
to meet with Assad, and there was pretty much with no
preconditions. So what I am saying is should there not be
something pretty well understood before they make these high-
level talks, in particular, with the President, before any of
that takes place?
Ambassador Feltman. The approach the administration is
taking right now is to see if we can use talks along with the
other tools we have to try to get to the same policy goals. We
share the same policy goals you describe. Syria should stop
supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. Syria should play a
constructive role in the region.
We have a number of tools at our disposal, diplomacy is one
of them. Talking is one of them. It is not a tool of softness
or of weakness. It is a way to see if we can use a different
tactical approach to achieve the same goals.
One of the reasons, in fact, my own trip to Damascus went
the way it did was to be able to demonstrate that our
underlying policies are not changing just because we are
talking to Syria. I went to Beirut first. I wanted to see a
number of Lebanese leaders to talk to them not only about
Lebanese elections, things we have talked about today, but also
to talk to them about our discussions with Syria; what we were
trying to achieve. We were not going to make a deal at
Lebanon's expense. We were not going to let Syria off the hook
for Hezbollah.
I then went to Damascus with Mr. Shapiro. Then returned to
Beirut to show again that even though tactically we are
employing a different tool than we may have employed a year or
2 ago, that the basic policy goals of supporting a Lebanese
state, of supporting a Palestine reconciliation, that under the
Cortex principles, that trying to stop the arms to Hezbollah,
these policy goals remain the same.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, let me just say this; that my
wife is from that part of the world, and I would like to go to
Lebanon and Syria, and I know she would, her family is over
there, and if we can ever reach some kind of an agreement on
the preconditions for these discussions so that the United
States will not look or appear to be weak and caving in, then I
will be one of the guys that will be wanting to go, but at the
present time I still feel, Mr. Chairman, that those
preconditions have not yet been met and we should not be doing
anything until they are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
Ambassador, thank you for agreeing to be our witness here
today and appearing without any preconditions. [Laugher.]
We thank you for your service, your major contribution to
our discussion, and for your continuing service to our country.
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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