[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
GAZA AFTER THE WAR: WHAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE WRECKAGE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-1
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, MIKE PENCE, Indiana
California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ADAM SMITH, JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
Washington deg.Until J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
2/9/09 deg. CONNIE MACK, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia TED POE, Texas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANTAs of 2/10/09 deg.
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York MIKE PENCE, Indiana
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JIM COSTA, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
RON KLEIN, Florida DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ADAM SMITH,
Washington deg.Until
2/9/09 deg.
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
VACANTAs of 2/10/09 deg.
David Adams, Subcommittee Staff Director
Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
Dalis Blumenfeld, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. David Makovsky, Director, Project on the Middle East Peace
Process, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy......... 15
Ziad J. Asali, M.D., President & Founder, The American Task Force
on Palestine................................................... 23
Michele Dunne, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace............................................ 76
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy
Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research....................................................... 82
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 4
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 9
Mr. David Makovsky: Prepared statement........................... 18
Ziad J. Asali, M.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 25
Michele Dunne, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 79
Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement.......................... 85
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 110
Minutes of hearing............................................... 111
Statement from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee... 112
GAZA AFTER THE WAR: WHAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE WRECKAGE?
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Ackerman. The subcommittee will come to order.
I want to begin by welcoming our new ranking member, the
gentleman from Indiana, Dan Burton------
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. Whom I have had the pleasure of
working with before. I especially welcome his dedication and
enthusiasm and the verve that he brings to all of his work.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ackerman. Pleasure working with you again.
On our side I would like to acknowledge one of our new
members who is with us today, Gerald E. Connolly from Virginia,
and welcome him to the subcommittee.
I would like to start with a quote, as follows:
``Today the subcommittee had hoped to examine those
realistic and productive measures that the parties
directly and indirectly involved with the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict might have taken to restore a sense of
hope, and maybe even make some material progress toward
peace. But in the light of,'' I will insert here the
words what has occurred, ``I am not sure what is left
to discuss.''
The quote continues:
``Over the past 6 years there have been many plans
and many envoys. And contrary to popular opinion, there
has not been a deficit of attention, merely a deficit
in performance. Commitments made to the United States
or between the parties have often been honored only in
the breach. The timing was never right. What was
promised was never delivered. It was always a
provocation, an incident, an upcoming election, a
crisis, an attack. And so it is again today.''
That was a quote.
If we strike the words that I inserted, what occurred, and
insert the words Gaza conflict, these sentences which I read at
this subcommittee's first hearing in 2007 are, to my dismay,
equally applicable today.
It only looks like we are going in circles. In fact, we are
spiraling downward. I don't know where the bottom is, but I
know it is there, and I know we are getting closer every day.
It will hit with shattering force when, through malice and
terror, through shallow calculation and venal self-interest,
through short-sightedness and through political cowardice, the
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
finally rendered impossible.
The downward pressure comes from terrorism in the march of
settlements. It comes from the firing of rockets and the
perpetration of settler pogroms. It comes in daily images of
destruction and the constant reiteration that they only
understand the language of force.
It comes in the form of a political party that is always
just a few months away from reform, and in the form of
government coalitions whose chief purpose it is to avoid new
elections. It comes in the form of promises that bloodshed is
what God desires, and declarations that dirt and stones mean
more than human life. It comes from tunnels in Gaza, and yes,
from diggings in Jerusalem, as well.
Let me not be misunderstood. There is no moral equivalence
between these acts, but they are all part of the same
destructive dynamic.
Since the end of the Clinton administration, the basic
outlines of the peace agreement have been clear. And in fact,
in its waning days, the government of Ehud Olmert, like other
departing Israeli governments, further closed the gaps, and
added even more detail. Except now there are three sides, and
one of those sides is looking for a very different outcome than
the other two.
Hamas is the odd man out. I don't know what to do about
that. I don't know how you make peace with half of a wannabe
country. I don't know how you sign an agreement with an entity
who's legal, political, and administrative bona fides are all
in question.
Which brings us to Gaza, where so many of the
contradictions of this conflict come into focus. Start with
Hamas, a terrorist organization, an entity beyond the pale.
They are the enemy, and no one can talk to them until they
accept the quartet's conditions of recognizing Israel,
repudiating violence, and accepting the PLO's agreements with
Israel.
Except for years Israel has been talking to Hamas through
Egypt, and directly to Hamas through prisoners in Israeli
jails. And when the IDF was in Gaza in force, with reserves
building up outside, the Israelis announced that the
destruction of Hamas was absolutely not their goal. Hamas is a
deadly, vicious, implacable enemy, but somehow one that they
left in place.
For their part, the Fatah-led PA blasted Israel for
violence, while quietly hoping that the IDF would cripple Hamas
and pave the way for the Palestinian Authority's return to
Gaza. Likewise, the PA has continuously denounced Hamas for the
2007 coup in Gaza, and then intermittently engaged in direct
talks to form a unity government with it.
And Hamas itself, the great paragon of ideological purity,
insists in Arabic that its goal is the complete liberation of
Palestine, which is to say the elimination of the State of
Israel; while in English it declares that Israeli withdrawal to
the 1967 borders would be sufficient for long-term, but not
permanent, peace.
One real bright spot in all the chaos is the work of the
U.S. Security Coordinator, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, who, without
fanfare and very little money, has helped stand up a force of
several hundred competent and disciplined Palestinian security
forces, trained in Jordan and deployed successfully to major
cities in the West Bank. These mostly young Palestinians have
restored law and order in Jenin, in Nablus, and are finally
starting to put some authority back into the Palestinian
Authority, which for years has been leaking the stuff like a
bucket with no bottom.
I think we have learned from our own awful experience in
Iraq that between politics and security, security has to come
first. So what can be made of the new and growing security
dynamic in the West Bank remains to be seen. A lot will depend
on whether Israel, in a break from years of habit, can
recognize its own self-interest in the success of this
Palestinian enterprise.
And even if that happens, and I think we really must try
hard to help that process along, how developments in the West
Bank can be used to reestablish a connection with Gaza is far
from clear. And it is in Gaza that the United States, Israel,
the PA, and Arab states have to start coming up with answers.
There are pressing humanitarian needs and a reconstruction
vacuum that will surely be filled by someone, either for good
or ill. Hamas is still in charge there. And depending on what
polls you read and which people you talk to, is either badly
damaged or fully in command. The war has either alienated them
from the public, or powerfully reinforced their leadership.
Hamas has either suffered a severe blow, or has benefitted
immensely from merely surviving the Israeli onslaught.
The fact that so basic a question can still be in doubt
should make all of us a little more circumspect in our
assertions, and a little less confident in our understanding of
this conflict.
Fortunately, we have with us today a panel with real
expertise in the politics of Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
and Egypt, to help us understand where the interests of the
parties lie, and what equities they most need to protect in
coming to grips with the future of Gaza.
It is our job to start answering these same questions for
ourselves. What is it that we want? How can we achieve it? What
has worked, and what has to be done differently? What
assumptions have we made that haven't been borne out in fact?
We can start today by learning from our distinguished
witnesses.
I turn now to my friend, partner, Dan Burton.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman
follows:]Ackerman deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to be your
partner. We have had our differences over the years on the
floor and in the committee. But one thing on which we have
always agreed has been the Middle Eastern problems; and in
particular, the survivability of our good friend, Israel.
I have a statement I would like to submit for the record,
but I would like to make a few comments, if I may.
When Ariel Sharon decided to give Gaza away and they
started destroying the settlements that were in Gaza, I, for
one, was very concerned about that, because I thought there
were no guarantees of Israel's right to exist from the parties
involved. And I was concerned that Hezbollah would take
advantage, or Hamas would take advantage of the situation in
Gaza as soon as things took place.
And as I watched those people being removed from their
homes and their homes being bulldozed, it was a very
disheartening situation. But I had great confidence in Ariel
Sharon, and I felt like his decisions were very well thought
out, and that this was probably a step toward a lasting peace.
Unfortunately, that was not the case. The minute Gaza
became independent, Hamas started moving very rapidly by
getting weapons in from Iran through Syria, all kinds of
rockets and other equipment, and started their attacks on
Israel.
My concern today, and what I would like to get from the
panelists, Mr. Chairman, is what they believe the long-term
view is from their perspective on the situation in Gaza, what
the long-term view is from their perspective on Iran. Will Iran
start reducing or working with the rest of the world in trying
to stop the weapons from getting into Gaza and into Lebanon and
Hezbollah up there? And can we expect any real movement toward
a lasting peace?
We have been talking about this for as long as I have been
in Congress. I think you and I have been in Congress 26 years,
and we come back to the same position year after year after
year, where there is a determination by Iran, by Syria, by
Hamas and Hezbollah to destroy Israel and deny their right to
exist.
So I would like to ask the panelists today if they see any
light at the end of the tunnel, if they think the ending of the
hostilities that have taken place will lead to a lasting peace
in Gaza, and what their prognostication is about as far as Iran
is concerned.
The administration has indicated they want to try to open
up a dialogue with Iran to try to find out if there is a
pathway to peace. But unless there is a guarantee of Israel's
right to exist, I don't think there is going to be any
solutions to the problems over there.
And so if there are administration people here today, Mr.
Chairman, I would say I hope they will be very careful when
they discuss these issues with the Iranians, to make sure that
the number one question at every meeting is will you finally
agree to Israel's right to exist, and try to work out a
peaceful solution to these problems over there.
So there is an awful lot of things that are going on that
we would like to talk about today. I know I have covered quite
a bit of the waterfront with my opening remarks. But these are
all inter-related, so I would like to hear what your
perspective is on all of these issues.
And in particular, in closing, I would like to thank Danni
Pletka for being here. We worked together when she worked for
Jesse Helms on a number of issues. She is a very bright lady,
and we are really happy to have you here today. You are now
with the American Enterprise Institute, a very fine group. And
I look forward to working with you in the future.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and your
colleagues on your side of the aisle, and finding, hopefully, a
solution to some of these problems in the Middle East.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. And without objection,
your full statement will be put in the record, as it will for
all other members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton
follows:]Burton deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ackerman. I sent out a notice to each of the members
yesterday--I hope everybody saw it--that we would allow opening
statements, but we want to keep them to an opening comment,
maybe for 1 minute apiece. And we will do that as we usually do
on the subcommittee, in order of the member's appearance at the
committee.
Mr. Wexler, if you would like.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want
to commend you for assembling an extraordinary group today. Mr.
Makovsky is someone I have relied upon and continue to rely
upon, and I don't think there is any more knowledgeable voice
in this country in terms of the Middle East and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
Dr. Asali, as well, I think is a uniquely powerful and
constructive both advocate and resource for the United States
Congress. And we all--many of us--rely upon him greatly. And
despite Mr. Burton's wonderful comments, Ms. Pletka, we too
welcome you and Dr. Dunne, as well.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As one of our witnesses
points out here today, many believe that there is a magical
solution to the Israel-Palestine problem.
If only we can arrange the diplomatic talks a certain way,
there is this feeling that it will be solved. And we have a new
special envoy, Sen. Mitchell, who is going to spend
considerable energy working this region. He will be working and
reaching for peace.
But the idea that some type of grand bargain might be
celebrated in the Rose Garden is very far off. Sen. Mitchell
must contend with the fact that there are those in the region,
Hamas and others, who do not even recognize Israel's existence.
Israel must be replaced with an Islamic state, according to
Hamas.
So this is a region of the world plagued with a growing
extremism that will frustrate peace initiatives, and won't be
easily or quickly reversed.
This hearing asks what can be built on the wreckage. I have
yet to see the firm foundation upon which structures must be
built, but that does not mean we don't try.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
Mr. Ackerman. The chair would like to recognize the
presence of the chair of the full committee, Howard Berman, and
ask the chairman if he would like to use his prerogative to--
the chairman has waived.
We go next to Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening this hearing today.
I think that it is imperative we understand the lessons
learned from the recent Gaza conflict. Only with a more durable
cease-fire and a commitment from Hamas to forswear violence can
we address the long-term humanitarian needs of the people of
the Gaza Strip.
I, for one, look to this week's Israeli election as
actually an encouraging sign in the effort for renewing the
peace process. While the closeness of the vote may present some
challenges, the edge appears to lie with those who vigorously
want to pursue the peace process.
When taken together, the election results, the current
cease-fire, no matter how tenuous, and the commitment of
President Obama to invest U.S. capital by engaging personally
in the peace process, as well as his appointment of Special
Envoy George Mitchell, are encouraging signs that we can broker
a long-term solution in the interest of all parties.
I welcome today's witnesses and look forward to hearing
from them about their recommendations for moving forward in a
positive direction.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence
here. I have got an abundance of paper in front of me.
Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you for
hosting the subcommittee hearing today. It is a privilege and
an honor to be here, and to be a member of this very important
subcommittee.
As we all know, this is a very critical time to be hearing
about the critical topic of Gaza. I am glad that we are here to
help move forward on the necessary rehabilitation and
reconstruction efforts in Gaza.
I take this opportunity to welcome all speakers and
witnesses to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. And I look
forward to hearing your testimony, as well as the discussion
and exchange of views on conflicts in Gaza, the reconstruction
and Middle East peace.
And also, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent. I
was approached by an organization called the American Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee who would like to submit a
statement, and was not able to do so. And so I ask unanimous
consent that their statement be allowed to be put into the
record.
Mr. Ackerman. Without objection.
[The information referred to was inserted into the
appendix]No material followed in original deg.
Mr. Ackerman. deg.Thank you very much. And Mr.
Ellison, we welcome you to the committee, as well.
Ms. Berkley, welcome to the subcommittee.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be back. And I also want to thank you for holding this hearing.
I was part of a Congressional delegation that was among the
last civilians to leave the Gaza when the Israelis left. As a
Jew, it was very difficult for me to watch other Jews being
forcibly removed from their homes, many of whom had lived in
the Gaza for three generations. But it was done by the Israelis
in the interest of peace, and with the hope that the
Palestinians would be able to demonstrate to the world that
they were capable of self-governance.
We were hopeful, I was certainly hopeful, that schools
would be built, infrastructure would be created, and that the
Palestinians would take control of their own lives.
Unfortunately, the result has been quite different. Hamas
has taken over, a terrorist organization that continues not
only to terrorize Israel by raining rockets on innocent Israeli
civilians from the Gaza, but raining terror on their own
people.
It would be my hope, especially in the aftermath of the
last action by the Israelis, precipitated by the continuous
launching of rockets into Israel, that the Palestinian people
would see that Hamas is not their future; and making a just and
lasting peace with Israel, and recognizing Israel's right to
exist, and securing the borders would be in the best interest
of both people. And that would be my hope.
But I have become, I must say, Mr. Chairman, very cynical
over the last few years, and hopeful that we will see a new
day. But I am very doubtful that that will happen. And I am
anxious to hear our witnesses talk about this issue.
Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Burton, for calling this meeting today. And thank you to the
guests who will present to us.
The Gaza Strip has obviously been a problem for many, many
years, both when Egypt was much more involved, when Israel has
been involved, and obviously in its own sense right now. And of
course, the movement of weapons and missiles and rockets into
the Gaza Strip from a number of, a number of means of getting
through there has been a problem which has continued to present
more difficulties.
Now that the general fighting has stopped at the level it
was a couple weeks ago, obviously there are still rockets being
fired, and this is a very fragile situation.
I think we acknowledge that Egypt, who has been helpful, is
in a position where they can continue to help limit the amount
of weapons that come in through that area. Egypt does not want
an unstable or destabilized Hamas or region to flow into its
areas, as well. The presenters today can comment on the role
that Egypt continues to play, and of course, we encourage their
continued cooperation as we go forward.
Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Burton. It is great to be back in this new session on this
committee. I look forward to working with you on the timely and
substantive work of this committee, and really getting it right
in Gaza is central to really making progress in the Middle
East. And so I thank the panel for being here, and look forward
to hearing from you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. We also want to welcome Mr.
McMahon, a new Member to the Congress, new member to the
committee and subcommittee. Would you like a minute, if you
want to take that now? You are recognized.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Chairman Ackerman. And I thank the
subcommittee for allowing me to speak today, my first hearing
here, first time in.
I would like to thank our witnesses for sharing their
knowledge with us here today, and I hope to share the
conclusions with my constituents back home.
Clearly, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is very grave,
yet Hamas still continues to exacerbate the humanitarian
situation by using innocent civilians to leverage power over
this broken region to advance their political agenda.
I think that most of my colleagues in this room would agree
that as the premiere nation allocating assistance to Gaza, the
U.S. is currently in quite a predicament. If Hamas increases
influence through circumventing the assistance and manipulating
civilians, what is to be expected for the future of our sister
nation, Israel, and for the region as a whole?
Mr. Chairman, my constituents, both Arab and Jewish alike,
are concerned for their families in the region, and cannot bear
for their relatives to be treated as worthless pawns.
Despite the severity of the situation, I remain hopeful
that a secure peace agreement that embraces the two-state
solution can be reached through the leadership of President
Barack Obama and Sen. Mitchell. And I hope through efforts here
today, we can bring humanitarian relief to all those who suffer
in the region.
I hope that we reaffirm our commitment that the only future
for Israel and Palestine is a path to peace.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. We will now turn to our
witnesses.
We are joined today by a truly first-rate group, each of
whom brings years of hands-on expertise and analytical
experience to this hearing.
David Makovsky is a senior fellow and director of the
Washington Institute's Project on the Middle East Peace
Process. He is also an adjunct lecturer in Middle Eastern
Studies at Johns Hopkins University in the Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies.
Before joining the Washington Institute, Mr. Makovsky
covered the peace process from 1989 to 2000 as executive editor
of the Jerusalem Post and as diplomatic correspondent for
Haaretz. Now a contributing editor to the deg.U.S.
News and World Report, he served 11 years as the magazine's
special Jerusalem correspondent.
Dr. Ziad Asali is president and founder of the American
Task Force on Palestine, a nonprofit, non-partisan organization
established in 2003, and based in Washington, DC. Dr. Asali was
born in Jerusalem, and received his M.D. from the American
University of Beirut Medical School in 1967. He completed his
residency in Salt Lake City, Utah, and then practiced medicine
in Jerusalem before returning to the U.S. in 1973.
Dr. Asali is also founder and chairman of the American
Charities for Palestine.
Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. She also edits the Arab
Reform Bulletin, a monthly online journal exploring political,
economic, and human rights developments in Arab countries. A
specialist in the Middle East at the U.S. Department of State
from 1986 to 2003, Dr. Dunne holds a Ph.D. in Arabic language
from Georgetown University.
Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense
policy at the American Enterprise Institute. Before joining
AEI, she served for 10 years as a senior professional staff
member for the Near East and South Asia on the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.
In addition to her work at AEI, she was also a member of
the congressionally-mandated U.S. Institute of Peace Task Force
on the United Nations.
We will begin with Dr. Makovsky.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID MAKOVSKY, DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
EAST POLICY
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to be
with you today.
Until post-conflict arrangements are settled, it is
premature to reach a definitive conclusion on the recent war in
Gaza. However, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment.
Israel set forward one major objective for itself at the
start of this war; specifically, to avert Hamas rocket fire
aimed at its southern cities. The objective of this war was not
the toppling of Hamas.
Israel has also sought to restore the deterrents that it
felt that it lost in the inconclusive 2006 war against
Hezbollah and Lebanon. As a result, in contrast to the 2006
war, Israel's objectives were defined more carefully.
One of Israel's main tactics for ensuring that its cities
are not the targets of Hamas rockets is to target the myriad of
smuggling tunnels along the Egypt-Gaza border that Hamas uses
to rearm itself. As such, Israel's success in shutting down or
destroying these tunnels will also be part of the post-war
evaluation.
First, some background to this Gaza conflict. As was noted
here, Israel removed all of its settlers and left Gaza in 2005.
Yet, Hamas rocket fire has been relentless, especially after
Hamas ascended to power in 2006.
By mid-2008, Israel and Hamas have been observing a cease-
fire for 6 months, which expired on December 19. Israel made
clear that it wanted to extend the cease-fire, yet Hamas fired
200 rockets at Israeli cities.
There are those who argue that Hamas wanted to use rocket
fire as a means of changing the terms of the cease-fire.
However, Israel felt it had no choice but military action.
Hamas believed that by taking up positions in densely
populated parts of the Gaza Strip in order to fire
indiscriminately at Israeli cities, it would be immune to
retaliation. This was not the case.
Israel embarked on what is called Operation Cast Lead, a
campaign that went on for less than a month, first by air and
then by ground, primarily in northern Gaza. While Hamas has
sought to claim victory in the aftermath of the fighting, these
claims are largely hollow. Its leadership was in hiding
throughout the fighting.
Hamas did not offer serious opposition on the ground, a
fact that will make it difficult for the organization to
credibly claim that it defended Gaza, let alone scored a
victory.
In contrast, Hezbollah, in 2006, offered substantial
resistance and determined opposition to Israeli ground forces,
employing the full range of its capabilities.
According to the Palestinian-run Jerusalem media
communications center polling unit, only 35% of Palestinians in
Gaza believe Hamas' assertion of victory.
Israel succeeded in degrading Hamas' ability to fire
rockets at Israeli cities. Military analysts widely believe
that the Israeli army was much better prepared for this
conflict on nearly every level--planning, training, equipment,
and force readiness--than it was in 2006.
Israel sustained far fewer casualties and injuries than it
did in 2006. Arab casualties were lower in Gaza than Lebanon;
but as I will point to later in my remarks, they were still
considerable.
Although many thoughts Israel's deterrence was eroded in
the 2006 war, Israeli officials state that it was restored
after the current fighting with Hamas. Hamas is responsible for
the Gaza population and manner that is not true for Hezbollah
and Lebanon; therefore, there is hope that this deterrence will
be sustained over time.
It is noteworthy that Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran were
either unwilling or unable to assist Hamas during the conflict,
excluding rhetorical support. This should give Hamas pause
about the value of its alliances. Hezbollah did not open up a
second front, contrary to speculation that it might, and this
might be a sign that Israel did increase its deterrence during
the 2006 war, which would be significant.
While Iran interpreted the inconclusive outcome of 2006 as
a victory for its proxy, Hezbollah, and for Tehran's own
regional influence, Iran will have to view the Gaza conflict as
a setback. It could not believe that it gained any momentum
with this episode.
Moreover, divisions surfaced within the Arab world. Egypt
and Saudi Arabia boycotted an aborted Arab summit that they
viewed as supportive of Hamas, and, implicitly, Iran. Egyptian
leadership was willing to withstand demonstrations and
criticism, and still refused to support Hamas' demand that it
gain control of a key access point to Gaza. All these
developments were negative from Hamas' perspective.
The Gaza war brought fresh international focus to the
tunnel network between Egyptian Sinai and Gaza. The issue of
border security has become increasingly important for Israel,
particularly since the network is crucial to Hamas' ability to
rearm.
During the recent conflict, Hamas fired 122-millimeter
ground artillery rockets, a type of rocket that is designed by
Iran to fit through the tunnels by hitting Gadera, 20 miles
south of Tel Aviv. It fired many rockets, as well. One million
Israelis are now within this rocket's range, including the
largest city in southern Israel, Beersheba. If more
sophisticated, longer-range rockets are smuggled into Gaza,
Israel's international airport could come within range within
the very near future.
For Israel, this international focus on the tunnel network
is necessary, albeit not sufficient. International focus is not
synonymous with action.
For example, in 2006 the U.N. Security Council Resolution
1701 addressed the issue of arms smuggling for Hezbollah by
calling on an embargo on weapons to Hezbollah militias,
Lebanese militias. This provision, however, has never been
enforced. There are estimates that Hezbollah has in fact
tripled the number of its rockets since 2006.
Therefore, a more practical approach was being tried now.
Toward the end of this war, the United States and Israel signed
a memorandum of understanding, an MOU, that authorizes United
States assistance to Egypt to halt the flow of arms. This
international assistance could potentially involve the U.S.
Navy and NATO, elements to help police international waters,
since the grads are believed to come from transit points in
Iran, Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen.
Mr. Ackerman. I am going to have to ask you to start to sum
up.
Mr. Makovsky. Okay. The question will be: Will Egypt indeed
recognize that its national security is at stake? Because this
is not a favor to Israel, it clearly has an interest in the
Palestinian Authority being stronger, and also weakening its
own opposition at home, the Muslim brotherhood. And it clearly
does not want to see Iran gain, as President Mubarak made clear
in a speech the other day.
If Egypt acts, this will be the optimal situation. I fear
if Egypt does not act, Israel will go back into southern Gaza,
occupy the Philadelphi Corridor, as it is known, and on its
own, try to explode these tunnels.
To avoid this scenario, Egypt is critical, but so is the
MFO, the multi-national forces of the Sinai. It was put in
place to, as an early-warning system against possible Egyptian
attack against Israel, given the wars in the sixties and
seventies. But given the new threats, maybe we should think of
an enhanced role for the MFO, given the problem of tunnels.
Like monitoring some of the main roads that traverse the Sinai;
there are very few of them.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been helpful.
Mr. Ackerman. You are going to need to conclude.
Mr. Makovsky. Okay. I would just conclude here by saying
the question here of Gaza reconstruction is something that we
will discuss. I am happy in the Q and A to discuss this, as
well.
It is clear to me that the pivot point is the Palestinian
Authority being in Gaza, and making that difference. The Arab
world could provide assistance, but they could also provide
assistance by delegitimizing Hamas.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Mr. Makovsky. I promise to stay in these Israeli elections
and what next steps will be taken by Mitchell, but I will do
that in the Q and A.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky
follows:]Makovsky deg.
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Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Dr. Asali. Push your button on.
STATEMENT OF ZIAD J. ASALI, M.D., PRESIDENT & FOUNDER, THE
AMERICAN TASK FORCE ON PALESTINE
Dr. Asali. As requested by your staff, allow me to state
for the record that the recently signed memorandum of
understanding mentioned in my bio between American Charities
for Palestine and USAID is only for the purposes of vetting
recipients of donations made by ACP. Neither I nor ACP has
received any further gain.
Now I will start my testimony.
Mr. Ackerman. We will restart your time.
Dr. Asali. Thank you very much, and I will not go beyond.
Mr. Ackerman. We will allow you the same latitude.
Dr. Asali. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and
the subcommittee's esteemed members for the privilege to
testify before you and summarize my 51-page written testimony.
Although Hamas launched reckless and provocative rocket
attacks against Israel, Gazans are not Hamas. They are not
combatants, and should not be punished. As a human being and as
a physician, I was horrified by the tragedy that has befallen
the people of Gaza by Israel's disproportionate use of force.
After an estimated 1,400 deaths and 5,400 injuries, 80% of
surviving Gazans now depend on food aid, and 51,000 need
shelter. Their suffering must come to an immediate stop.
Gaza lies in ruins, but Hamas still controls Gaza.
Mr. Ackerman. I am afraid we cannot have any approbation,
approval or disapproval from the audience. Everybody is welcome
to be here, so we want to just constrain our approval or
disapproval of any of the witnesses, or even any of the
members. You can criticize us someplace else, but not in this
room. Thank you.
Dr. Asali. Thank you. Restart the clock for me? [Laughter.]
Mr. Ackerman. We will not subtract our comments.
Dr. Asali. Gaza lies in ruins, but Hamas still controls
Gaza. And the responsible policies of the PA and other U.S.-
Arab allies have been undermined.
Mr. Chairman, the challenge now is providing essential aid
and reconstruction to the people of Gaza without bolstering
Hamas. Opening the crossings and implementing the Access and
Movement Agreement of 2005 is essential.
Immediate humanitarian assistance should proceed unimpeded
and without politicization, to deliver food, shelter, medical,
fuel, and educational supplies, as well as power and
sanitation. It should be provided and expanded through existing
agencies, including UNRWA and international NGOs. If Hamas
again attempts to interfere, it risks suspension of aid.
Reconstruction, however, takes time, and requires a new
international mechanism that can ensure entry of construction
materials into Gaza, secure from political interference. And
any party blocking the reconstruction process must publicly
bear the blame.
This mechanism should be structured to quickly grant
contracts, vet recipients, and have security and logistical
components. This must be coordinated by the new U.S. Special
Envoy to the Middle East and composed of the Quartet, the PA,
and the indispensable Egypt.
Private reconstruction should be managed through direct
bank transfers from the PA to beneficiaries, as proposed by
Prime Minister Fayyad, which will benefit 21,000 property
owners at a cost of $600 million to $800 million.
The Palestinian partner for reconstruction can only be the
PA under President Abbas. A non-partisan Palestinian national
accord government could help, but it must meet the Quartet
conditions, exert security control, and have the specific
mandate of overseeing reconstruction and preparing for
elections.
Mr. Chairman, there is no military solution to this
conflict. And until it is resolved through two states, a secure
Israel alongside a viable Palestine freed from occupation,
further violence is inevitable.
Unless progress is made on advancing Palestinian statehood
and quality of life through negotiations, and unless the PA and
Fatah implement serious and genuine reform, the PA will
continue to weaken. Without progress, anything rebuilt will be
destroyed. Our own actions can either foster hope or feed hate.
Permanent status negotiations must continue, but cannot be
sustained without expanding the space of freedom in Palestinian
cities, and in delivering tangible improvements in access,
mobility, and economic opportunities.
Settlements entrench the occupation, and are the most
pressing political and logistical impediment to peace. All
hopes for progress depend on an immediate settlement freeze,
and this is where U.S. leadership must be asserted to preserve
the credibility of the two-state solution.
U.S. assistance must be intensified to help the PA further
develop the new professional security system, which has proven
its effectiveness under very difficult circumstances. It also
has to develop the fledgling economy unimpeded by unreasonable
restrictions, and pursue good governance reform, transparency,
and the rule of law.
A devastated Gaza, a stagnant West Bank, and a moribund
peace process would benefit extremism. The losers then will be
Palestinians, Israel, and the cause of peace, and most
importantly, our own national interest.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Asali
follows:]Asali deg.
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Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Dr. Asali.
Dr. Dunne.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE DUNNE, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee for the privilege of testifying before you. I am
going to be discussing the role of Egypt in this crisis. And I
am sure the subcommittee members are aware of Egypt's mediation
effort, and the elements of a cease-fire proposal that Egypt
has been putting forward.
The basic elements are a mutually agreed-to cease-fire
between Israel and Hamas, as opposed to the unilateral cease-
fire that exists now; and the duration of that would probably
be something on the order of 18 months, renewable. The
reopening of crossings to Gaza, with some limitations as to
what could enter Gaza. A prisoner exchange that would involve
perhaps the release of Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit. And talks
between Fatah and Hamas.
And I would like to note that there are indications in the
press that those talks are already beginning in Cairo, between
Fatah and Hamas representatives.
So what are the Egyptian interests that inform Egypt's
actions here? I would say in the current crisis, Egypt has
demonstrated that it has two principal interests related to
Gaza. One of them is that Egypt wants to avoid taking on
responsibility for the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza.
And second, Egypt is trying, through its mediation efforts, to
restore some role for the Palestinian Authority under the
leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, to the extent that is
possible.
Now, regarding Egypt's taking on responsibility for the
Palestinians, there are at least two ways this could happen,
and President Hosni Mubarak is going to try to avoid either one
of them.
One possibility is that if there were a humanitarian crisis
in Gaza, tens or hundreds of thousands of Palestinians could
flood across the border into the Sinai, and stay on a semi-
permanent basis. And as I am sure the members of the
subcommittee are aware, this is not an idle fear; it actually
happened a year ago, in January 2008, that hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians crossed the border illegally, and it
took Egypt about 2 weeks to get them to leave and to
reestablish control over its international border.
Then there is this question of whether Egypt would take on
some sort of a role in Gaza itself, perhaps administering Gaza
the way Egypt did between 1948 and 1967. Now, this is not the
official policy of Israel or anyone else; no one is asking
Egypt to do this. But the suggestion that this might be a
possibility has caused a lot of concern in Egypt.
Now, President Mubarak will resist this for a couple of
reasons. First of all, he realizes that governing hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians, either in Sinai or in Gaza itself,
would be a thankless task for Egypt.
But he also has reason to be concerned about stability in
his own country, should one or other of these situations be
forced on Egypt. Sinai is already a troubled area, populated
largely by Bedouin with little loyalty to the Egyptian state,
and terrorists have carried out several large-scale attacks
there in recent years.
The introduction of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian
refugees there, perhaps including militants from Hamas,
Palestinian-Islamic Jihad, would undoubtedly increase tension
and the danger of terrorism there.
Inside Egypt itself, although many Egyptians have called on
their government to extend greater diplomatic and humanitarian
support to Gaza, actual Egyptian rule in Gaza, or rule of many
Palestinian refugees in Sinai, would very much enflame anti-
government sentiment in Egypt. And as I am sure the members of
the subcommittee are aware, there is significant anti-
government sentiment in Egypt today. Protests of one kind or
another, mostly about domestic, economic, and human rights
issues, have become a daily phenomenon in Egypt.
And the Muslim Brotherhood that is the primary opposition
movement in Egypt supports Hamas fervently, and has been
organizing protests against the government. There has developed
in Egypt a sort of tradition, since the outbreak of the second
Palestinian uprising in 2000, of protests that begin in support
of Palestinians and criticizing Israel, and often the United
States, and then those protests turn against Mubarak and call
for an end to his rule.
Now, the second goal that I mentioned for Egypt in this
Gaza crisis is the desire to restore the Palestinian Authority
to a role in Gaza to the extent that that is feasible. Egypt
takes a realist approach to Hamas. It would prefer that Hamas
not rule Gaza, but acknowledges that at this point, it is
impossible to ignore the group.
So one constant in Egyptian mediation efforts has been to
insist, for example, on enforcing the terms of the 2005 Rafah
Agreement, which treats the Palestinian Authority as the
responsible authority on the Gaza side of the border. And Egypt
would like to see the Palestinian Authority returned there, at
a minimum to the border with Egypt.
Egypt has also pressed Hamas to agree to resume
reconciliation talks with Fatah, which were going on under
Egyptian auspices for some time, were broken off in November
2008, and seem to be perhaps resuming now.
Regarding the arms smuggling issue through Rafah, Egyptian
officials are undoubtedly aware that there is a spotlight on
the issue now. David Makovsky mentioned that there has been
technical assistance from the United States through the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, a $23-million program that was funded
out of United States annual military assistance to Egypt.
This has now been implemented in only the last week, and
there is actual technical monitoring now by the Egyptians, with
this assistance from the United States, of tunneling and
underground movements through the Rafah area. And Egypt should
be able, with this tool, to significantly improve its
performance in preventing arms trafficking into Gaza.
There is a report, by the way, in the Jerusalem Post today
that talks about that, and says that there is significantly
stepped-up Egyptian enforcement.
Mr. Ackerman. You are going to have to start to summarize.
Ms. Dunne. Okay. The aftermath of the Gaza crisis does
afford some opportunities for the United States and Egypt to
strengthen their ties, which have been strained in recent
years. United States and Egyptian goals regarding Gaza are
largely consonant.
Over the longer term, however, I would like to note that it
will be necessary for Egypt and the United States to reach an
understanding on progress on human and civil rights inside
Egypt as well, in order for the partnership to really flourish.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dunne
follows:]Dunne deg.
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Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Dr. Dunne.
Ms. Pletka.
STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND
DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
Ms. Pletka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Burton, for
inviting me today. I am going to summarize my remarks, and you
will put my full statement in the record.
Mr. Royce was kind enough to quote my statement--I am glad
somebody read it--in advance. I suggested that part of the
problem historically has been that each time a new
administration comes to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, they
assume that there is some magical peace that has not been
fulfilled, some individual who will make it all work right;
some process that we have not embraced.
And the truth is, of course, there simply is no magic to
any of this, and we should stop thinking about the problem in
those ways.
I would also add that the measure that we have historically
used to discuss progress between the Israelis and the
Palestinians has almost entirely been self-referential. We
always talk about what we have done, and how we have made
progress, and how everybody is at the table. And we really
haven't measured the Palestinians' progress.
I would argue that perhaps we have paid more attention to
the Israelis, but no attention to Palestinian progress on the
ground. And when I say Palestinian progress on the ground, I do
not mean the shape of their government or the stability of
their government; I mean the progress of individual
Palestinians, the general welfare of the Palestinian people.
And in fact, the Palestinian people as a whole have made very
little appreciable progress. To the contrary, there has been a
great decline in standards of living, and a great flight by
Palestinians from the West Bank in Gaza, not just Gaza I would
underscore, but also from the West Bank.
Nor has the cause of peace made any great strides forward
in recent years, including when President Bush turned his
attention to it, when President Clinton put a great deal of
personal effort and attention toward it.
There are some who are going to suggest now, in the
aftermath of this Gaza war, that the fact that Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and others have turned on Hamas is a real sign of
progress and hope for the future. And I think that we need to
be very careful in making that judgment.
I think that the main motivation there is that they see
Hamas very clearly for what Hamas is, the face of jihadism,
which represents a threat not just to Israel, not just to the
Palestinians, but, more specifically, to them. And I think that
is where a lot of that antipathy comes from. Whether we can
manipulate that or gain from it is another thing, but let us
understand it for what it is.
What should American goals really be in the West Bank and
Gaza specifically, between the Israelis and the Palestinians?
At the end of the day, what our ambition is is what our
ambition always has been: It is to build peace on a stable
edifice. That edifice may or may not include a Palestinian
state; personally, I think that it would be inevitable. But the
fact that we have always been willing to suggest that somehow
the fact that we want a Palestinian as progress toward peace is
really an illusion. It is not progress toward peace. It is the
stability of the edifice itself that is in question.
We cannot, I think, as we consider new ways of going
forward, embrace relationships, a relationship with Hamas. That
is a real danger. There are some who have suggested that the
United States should open up talks with Hamas, much as we are
thinking about opening up talks with the Iranian regime. That
is not a good way forward. It is a dangerous way forward. It
risks undermining not just the Israelis, of course, but the
Palestinian Authority and all moderate Palestinians that have
sought to diminish Hamas' role as it has come forward in Gaza.
Also in that regard, we need to be very, very careful of
temptations to tinker in Palestinian politics. We have seen in
recent reports talks about how we can reach out to particular
members of Hamas, and not talk to other members of Hamas;
thereby strengthening the moderates, and putting down the bad
guys.
We have historically been extraordinarily bad at tinkering
in politics. We are not that good at tinkering in our own
politics; we are really quite bad at tinkering in Arab
politics. And that is a dangerous path forward for us.
On the other side, Mr. Burton, you suggested that somehow
these rocket attacks from Gaza and the war should be a reason
to rethink the wisdom of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. And
I would only say that this is the Israelis' business.
You talked about Ariel Sharon and his decision, and I think
that is true. There were too many in the United States who
wanted to use U.S. influence to either push the Israelis to
withdraw, or to foresee Israelis not to withdraw. This is an
assessment that they must make, and in fact, they are now
living with the consequences of that decision. It was not our
decision to make.
Today, talking about Gaza, we have not talked enough about
one of the huge sources of the problem, which is Iran. Hamas
would not have rockets to lob anywhere if Iran did not
continually resupply them. Yes, it is true they use the tunnels
and sea routes and other routes, as well. But at the end of the
day, the source of the problem is one that needs to be
addressed by sitting down with the Iranians, as the Obama
administration has indicated it wishes to in the coming months.
I see very little likelihood that this is going to be on
the top of the agenda. On the contrary, what are we going to
talk about? They have said very clearly we are going to talk
about the nuclear weapons program.
So that is a troubling fact, deg. and something
that I think Congress can play a strong role in pushing back to
the top of the agenda.
Just a quick note on the question of aid to the
Palestinians, because you asked me to talk a little bit about
this. And I think that we have to recognize that the heart of
the problem with aid to the Palestinians, but particularly to
Gaza, lies in UNRWA, the United Nations Relief Works Agency,
which has basically become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hamas,
in my estimation.
It is propagandist for Hamas. They have 24,000-plus
employees. Compare that, by the way, to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, which is responsible for refugees
all around the world, which has less than a quarter of that
number of employees.
They are based in Gaza. They do not vet the NGOs with whom
they work. They do not vet their employees. They have allowed
Hamas in the past to manipulate aid. It does not go to the
purposes that we desire. And I think that it is important that
we revisit their role and United States assistance through
them.
One additional note on the role of international
organizations that might be of interest to the Congress and
this committee, which has spoken to this issue many times in
the past.
Mr. Ackerman. I have to ask you to wrap up.
Ms. Pletka. I will wrap up. At the end of January, the
Palestinian Authority granted jurisdiction to the International
Criminal Court for the West Bank and Gaza, and the ICC has now
opened up an investigation into Israeli war crimes in Gaza. I
do not see that as a very productive way for the international
community to go forward.
Last, in wrapping up, I think that we need to recognize
that while Hamas has been a major problem, no one can under-
estimate the problem that it represents. It should not force us
to look at Fatah through rose-colored glasses. This has been
our habit in the past. Oh, well, if Hamas is lousy, then--I am
sorry. If Hamas is lousy, Fatah is better.
It is a cop-out on the part of the United States that we
have failed to focus on governance for the Palestinians, that
we have failed to focus on accountability, that we have failed
to use our aid to try and deliver to the Palestinian people the
kind of things that we would wish to deliver to ourselves: A
responsible, accountable government that actually promises
something that is more important to the day-to-day lives of the
Palestinians than a Palestinian state. And that is just a
little bit of hope for their future, and the future of their
children.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka
follows:]Pletka deg.
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Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. And thank all of our witnesses.
The chair will reannounce that we are going to operate
under the 5-minute rule, and the chair will be less flexible
with the members of the committee than we were with the, with
the panel, in order to keep things moving. And try to keep me
to the 5-minute rule, too, whoever is running these clocks.
A peaceful solution, a two-state solution if you will,
seems difficult, if not impossible, with Hamas as an active
player and Fatah controlling the West Bank. And it seems that a
lot of energies have been spent with all the theories of how
you get them basically unelected. Whether you hobble them, as
the Israelis have attempted to do, or whether you show them
that there is a better alternative in the West Bank, it would
seem that a lot of hope is being placed on an election that
might take place in which they become delegitimized as far as a
part of the government, or the government.
I think that is putting too many of our eggs in one basket.
If Hamas is unelected, do they really go away? If they are a
terrorist organization, do terrorist organizations not exist or
function if they don't hold elective office? Because very few
do, and we seem to be going in that direction in different
places in the world. Or is there a different way to deal with
this? Or how do we deal with this specifically in this case?
And is the problem really, as was pointed out by our last
witness, Iranian-generated? And does that have to be solved
before the Israeli-Palestinian-Hamas problem is resolved?
Historically, everybody says well, all the problems in the
Middle East or the world or the universe, you know, would be
solved if the Israeli-Palestinian problem went away. Do we have
it backwards? Who would like to start? Dr. Asali. Press your
button.
Dr. Asali. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are many, many
comments that can be said about this. Fundamentally, I think,
the two-state solution is more or less like democracy; it is
the worst system except for all the others. If anybody gives us
an alternative, we would be very happy to listen to a workable
solution. Just to say that it is not working is not enough. You
have to have an end to the conflict; no conflict goes unended.
So the two-state solution has not been given enough
support, even at the present circumstances, to improve the
situation well enough in the West Bank, under the Palestinian
Authority, with knowing full well that Hamas has not supported
the two-state solution and is not inclined to go along with it.
The problem is------
Mr. Ackerman. Are you saying deal Hamas out of the two-
state solution?
Dr. Asali. Yes. Hamas has been dealt out. And Hamas
continues to be dealt out, and is not expected not to be dealt
out. What is a problem------
Mr. Ackerman. That is what you are advocating, as well?
Dr. Asali. I am advocating that, until they accept the
Quartet conditions. I think it makes sense, and I think the
Quartet conditions are simply an affirmation of the commitments
that the PLO, as the governing entity for the Palestinians, has
made, and that should be continued.
What was lacking, unfortunately, was real progress,
palpable progress by the Palestinian people on the ground, and
this has many, many causes. But it could not have happened,
other occupation, without the cooperation of the occupying
powers. And it could not have happened without an improvement
in the governing system in the PA.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Makovsky, 30 seconds.
Mr. Makovsky. I agree with Ziad completely with the issue
of Hamas. They need to accept the conditions.
I think if your premise is that the only thing that Hamas
cares about is power, then I am sure accommodations can be
found. I just believe there are a lot of Islamist movements in
the Middle East, and they have a very heartfelt religious
ideology. And I don't think we do ourselves or them any favors
if we short-change--I don't think we do ourselves or them any
favors if we short-change their world view.
And they have been willing, I think we should listen to
what they are saying.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Ms. Pletka, 30 seconds.
Ms. Pletka. I agree with David. I think it is very
important for us to listen to exactly what they say. This is
not just a political fight, this is an ideological fight. But
we also have a practical battle ahead of us.
You ask a very hard question. One, should we put Iran
first? And the answer to that is no, of course not. We can't
just walk on one path. We have to chew gum and walk.
We need to work toward an Israeli-Palestinian solution. But
we must prioritize the support for terrorism along with Iran's
nuclear weapons program, or we will end up------
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Ms. Pletka [continuing]. Facing this in the rest of the
region.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Dunne, 30 seconds, because my time is
running.
Ms. Dunne. Regarding Hamas, I think that our problem as the
United States is we want Hamas to walk the road that the PLO
walked 20 years ago. And Hamas sees very well that the PLO
walked that road, and it failed. And so that is the difficulty
that we face now, is to give the Palestinians some hope in
order to------
Mr. Ackerman. You are saying it failed because they have no
state?
Ms. Dunne. They failed for two reasons. Because they have
no state, and because also what Ms. Pletka pointed out,
disastrously bad governance and corruption. So they failed on
both of those scores, and that is why we see the popularity of
Hamas now.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Thank you, my time has run.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me
just say that my view on whether or not Mr. Sharon should have
gone into, or should have given Gaza back to the Palestinians,
that was only my opinion. I certainly would not want to ever
try to interfere or dictate to a foreign government on the
policies that they have. But I did think it was probably an
error, and it did bother me a great deal.
You indicated that there was a disproportionate amount of
pressure put on by the Israeli military when they went in, and
I thought they showed a great deal of restraint. Because the
Hamas militants were using women and children, and hospitals
and mosques as shields against Israeli attacks, and the
Israelis did stop so that they could minimize the civilian
casualties.
There were those who said that they should have pressed on
further, to completely destroy Hamas. But I think they showed a
great deal of restraint, even though there were some
differences of opinion there.
Mr. Makovsky, the Washington Times reports this morning
that Bebe Netanyahu is a likely winner. What is your opinion of
that? And can you give me an answer on why that is the position
they have taken?
And Saul, are you a friend of Saul Singer's?
Mr. Makovsky. I know Saul very well.
Mr. Burton. He used to be my first foreign policy guy, so
would you tell him I said hi?
Mr. Makovsky. Will do.
Mr. Burton. Thanks.
Mr. Makovsky. I would just say on the, if I could say on
the humanitarian part of your question, I think by firing from
civilian areas, Hamas has shown its disregard for human life.
And that put Israel in a very difficult position.
I think one of the lessons Israel, though, has to take from
this is to set up an urban core, where you have designated safe
zones that would be manned by soldiers, so it could not be
exploited by terrorists.
But that is the nature of warfare in the Middle East now,
with these non-state actors, is using urban areas. And that
requires I think some reorganization in Israel.
Mr. Burton. Okay.
Mr. Makovsky. According to Mr. Netanyahu's policy, my
belief is that from what he said, and from the people around
him who I have talked to in the last 24 hours, he is going to
try to have a broad-based government with Ms. Livni of the
Kadima Party, who won the most------
Mr. Burton. Do you anticipate that he will prevail?
Mr. Makovsky. If I was a Las Vegas odds maker, Congressman,
I would have to say that he will, he will be the next Prime
Minister.
Mr. Burton. Okay. Ms. Pletka, there are several high-
profile delegations going to Syria, Congressional delegations
going to Syria in the next couple of weeks. What do you think
about that? Do you think this is a wise thing to do?
Ms. Pletka. An open-ended question. I never think that it
is wrong for, I never think it is wrong deg.for
Members of Congress to go on delegations to find out what
foreign leaders are thinking.
The only caution that I would give is not to, not to be
fooled by talk. We are really interested in what the Syrians
are willing to do. Are they continuing to funnel arms to
Hezbollah? Yes, they are. Are they continuing to interfere in
Lebanese politics? Yes, they are. Are they continuing to allow
killers into Iraq? Yes, they are. Have they got a burgeoning
relationship with al Qaeda? Yes, they do.
Mr. Burton. Well, of course. What about Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton has indicated that there is an opportunity for
the Iranian Government to demonstrate a willingness to unclench
their fists, and to begin serious and responsible discussion
about a range of matters. And she goes on to indicate that
there ought to be discussions.
What do you think about discussions with Iran from the
State Department? And do you think that Congressional
delegations ought to be involved in any way in discussing the
situation in the Middle East with any Iranian officials?
Ms. Pletka. I think that Members of Congress should be as
constrained as the State Department is in their discussions
with Iranians. The United States Government and Foreign Service
Officers and political appointees have been talking with the
Iranians for years. Ambassador Khalilzad, Ambassador to
Afghanistan and then to the U.N., had regular meetings with
Iranian counterparts. Ambassador Crocker in Baghdad has been
meeting with them.
I think we should not underestimate the imprimatur that the
United States gives in having meetings with countries, and the
seal of approval that it conveys. If it is, in fact, a change
in position on our part, it should be accompanied by an
expected change in position on the part of the Iranians. We
know what we are looking for; let us see their bona fide.
Mr. Burton. My time is running out. Would any of the others
of you like to make a comment on that? Mr. Asali.
Dr. Asali. If I might just say something in response to the
remarks about the Israeli, what I call disproportionate--two
things.
First off, a kill ratio of 100 to one or an injury ratio of
50 to one is a statistical evidence of something
disproportionate. But there is a humanitarian aspect that is
way too disproportionate.
And also, the first reaction to the attack on Gaza was
blamed by several Arab countries, including the head of the
Palestinian Authority, President Abbas. It is afterwards that
this relentless attack resulted in so much destruction, with TV
pictures all over the place showing it, that they lost support.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
this fascinating hearing.
If you could speak to the most immediate needs of the
population of Gaza. And is there a humanitarian crisis, or is
the situation stable or just awful? Does the United States have
a bigger role to play in helping the humanitarian side of what
is going on on the ground there? And do we have to then look at
reconstruction and stabilizing the situation, as well?
But what is going on in the daily lives of the people
there, and how are the conditions?
Dr. Asali. First off, if I may, we need to take lessons
from what happened in Lebanon in 2006, where a promise of aid
was never delivered after the invasion. And Hezbollah took
charge of that process, and it changed that help that was
extended to incredible political benefit.
I think this should not be lost, neither on this Congress
nor anywhere else.
Secondly, the present humanitarian condition in Gaza is
just beyond terrible. You know, there are problems with water,
electricity, roads, housing. There are over 50,000 people
without shelter. There is no food; there is not enough food.
There is not enough of anything. And the convoys that are
supposed to carry aid are still restricted by access in every
direction in Gaza. And there is no manufacturing.
The life, the quality of life for the people at every
level--the health, the education--probably is worse than
anywhere in the world now.
This needs to be addressed, in and of itself, as a separate
issue from all the other reconstruction and other developments
that need to work be worked on apolitically. This cannot be
politicized.
UNRWA, I heard some criticism about UNRWA in this panel's
representation. UNRWA is what we have now as a main provider of
help to Gaza. Over 800,000 people depend on the food that, and
other help that is provided by UNRWA.
There are other sources, of course. But this cannot be now
a subject of serious political conversation. Let us get the
humanitarian situation out of hand and controlled. And here
again, we propose that we have the Special U.S. Envoy deal with
this issue promptly with the Quartet.
And we recommend the establishment of an international
community that adds to the Quartet Egypt, which is the
indispensable partner, and the one that can help in a
meaningful way, and whose role has been quite positive. Plus
the Palestinian Authority, which has to take the political
credit for this thing in order to carry this forward.
Mr. McMahon. Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. Yes. I just want to pick over that very last
point.
I think the key thing is that the Palestinian Authority
needs to get the credit. You are all politicians; you
understand the importance of the nature of credit and public
support. And I think that this is crucial.
There is going to be a donors conference in Cairo coming
up, which I think will be key. I just want to say on the issue
of UNRWA, I would be happy to--and I hope you don't see this as
institutional self-promotion--James Lindsay, who was the legal
counsel of UNRWA, wrote a study for us at the Washington
Institute, a very serious, heavily, heavily footnoted study on
UNRWA.
We are not calling for the abolition of UNRWA at all. We
just think that it should focus much more on its humanitarian
mission. And with your permission, I would like to circulate it
to the members of the subcommittee.
Thank you.
Mr. McMahon. Mr. Makovsky, can you speak to the human
conditions in Gaza today?
Mr. Makovsky. Oh, I think that they are, you know, they are
terrible conditions, you know. And Hamas, they brought all this
on them because they cared more about their ideology than
helping their own people. But I don't think that means that we
should stand by.
What I would hope is that the Palestinian Authority could
be at the access point going into Gaza. After they had been
thrown out in 2007, there should be an international effort on
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. And I think we
should all care about that.
Mr. McMahon. Ms. Pletka, do you wish------
Ms. Pletka. I wanted to say something quickly. I couldn't
agree more with David.
The humanitarian situation, just to your specific question,
there should be no disagreement about the humanitarian
situation on the ground, nor about the urgency of getting
assistance to the Palestinians.
On the other hand, I do think there is an important role
for the Congress. And this committee and your Senate
counterpart can play a very strong role in ensuring that
American assistance is not manipulated or abused; that it does
not go to terrorist organizations, directly or indirectly.
There are rules right now that are under consideration for
AID that would significantly weaken the vetting process that
goes on to NGOs and their subcontractors. Money has gone to
terrorist groups in the past, and you can stand in the way of
that and ensure that assistance is used effectively, not just
for our interests, but also for the Palestinians.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I suppose this
question really involves something of a crystal ball for you to
maybe assess what you think the approach would be of the new
coalition that will be formed in Israel, and what their
approach to the peace process would be. Or how would they
approach Gaza.
Anybody want to take a stab at that? Shine up your crystal
ball?
Mr. Makovsky. Well, I think the most likely outcome,
whether Mr. Netanyahu or Ms. Livni is the next Prime Minister,
is a broader-based government led by Likud and Kadima, those
two parties. And you could say well, you need unity if you are
going to move forward.
The issue is, how much can be done? It seems to me that at
the outset earlier and what the chairman said in his remarks
about building a better alternative in the West Bank is part of
the answer. It is not the whole answer. Improving economic
institutions that Tony Blair and Dayton have been working on,
working on the security institutions that Three-Star General
Keith Dayton has been working on in training and equipping
Palestinian security forces, so Israel could pull back to the
September 28 lines, in the year 2000 at the start of the
Intafada.
You know, there will be I am sure some discussion with the
United States and Israel over a letter that was signed in 2004
between Secretary of State Rice and Mr. Weisglass, who was an
aid of Mr. Sharon, about the binding settlement, you know, to
make sure there is no expansive settlement. It has been a
contentious issue.
I have a view--I don't claim it to be the view of my
institute or of anyone else--but I believe the actual
differences between the parties over land, despite what someone
like, respectfully, I say, former President Carter might think,
the differences are actually very narrow. And I think there is
actually more of a consensus in Israel on this.
The Israelis are just afraid of being blown up, given the
Qassam rockets coming out of Gaza. Because they didn't like the
book in Gaza, they don't want to see the movie in the West
Bank.
So the question is, can you construct the situation where
that you could demarcate the line, and basically end, once and
for all, the problem of settlements, that has been a friction
point since 1967. And say here, here, we now know where the
border is. This will be Palestine, this will be Israel. And it
may move those settlers, but maybe the IDF, the Israeli army,
will have to stand there until the Dayton mission over years
will be able to demonstrate that it could pick up the slack,
and a vacuum will not be filled by terrorists.
I think something to end this ambiguity that has been with
us for so long--sometimes ambiguity can be constructive,
sometimes it is destructive. And I think a focus on the
territorial dimension of this conflict--which everyone thinks
is at the core, and I don't--I think it has been the problem of
not rejecting that Israel's right to exist, for the most part.
But I think the territorial dimension, if you separated it
from the security dimension, in my view actually holds forth
some promise. And it is possible--I am not here making a grand
prediction with a crystal ball--but I think that might be an
area that the United States and Israel could actually engage
upon, because the differences have narrowed between Israelis
and Palestinians on the territory.
The key is security, security, security.
Dr. Asali. If I may, I think there are two election
contests that have just happened. One of them was one in this
country, where there is a clear commitment of the new President
and new administration to energetically get involved with the
Middle East and pursue a two-state solution.
What happened in Israel is still uncertain, of course, in
many ways. But the leader of Israel would have to accommodate
his policies to the policies of the United States in order to
continue the grand strategic relation. And it is hard for me to
imagine that the leader of Israel would oppose the policy of
the United States and stay in charge for very long.
Having said that, I think there are many things that can be
done regardless of what happens. One is improving the political
conversation that is taking place with the Palestinian
Authority, and improving the security and economic situation of
the West Bank. And part of this is to actually empower the
Palestinian Authority by moving forward and forcefully on the
Gaza reconstruction.
There is a proposal by the Prime Minister of Palestine,
Prime Minister Fayyad, to move $600 million to $800 million
through the banking system, a private enterprise solution to
the present crisis in Gaza. That bypasses the difficult and
thorny issues.
There is no question that the Israelis can be cooperative
with that by allowing the money to go in. This has been another
problem with Israel, not allowing actual money to go into Gaza.
So there are many things that can be done on the margins,
as long as the policy approach remains solid toward a two-state
solution.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Next, Ms. Berkley. Just so the members know
where they stand for the questioning under the 5 minutes, we
have switched to seniority order on the subcommittee, which is
not necessarily the order people are sitting in right now, to
add to the confusion.
Ms. Berkley, you are next.
Ms. Berkley. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a lot of
questions that I would like to ask, but perhaps by way of
speaking, and then I will ask the questions.
When it comes to rushing aid into Gaza and thinking that we
are going to give credit to the Palestinian Authority, and that
the Palestinians in the Gaza are going to rise up and be, throw
Hamas away because they finally recognize who is helping them,
I think is nonsense.
If Hamas have a whit about the Palestinian people, there
would be peace, and there would have been a two-state solution
long ago.
The reality is that there are many, many trucks getting
through that provide aid, and have equipment and food and
medicine for the Palestinian people living in the Gaza. And we
already know that Hamas has been commandeering these trucks,
and stealing the content, instead of the content going where it
needs to be.
But this is nothing new, and nothing surprising. So more
trucks going in and more aid rushing in doesn't change the
situation on the ground.
Now, I agree with Ms. Pletka. Secretary Rice was sitting
right where you were when she was, when Hamas won the election,
and she stated that American policy was not to give any aid to
Hamas, so the Palestinian people would realize that Hamas was
not where their destiny lie.
But she said we were giving money to the NGOs. And I
remember Mr. Ackerman asking this question, well, how do we
track, how do we know that the money we are giving the NGOs is
actually going to the Palestinian people. Her response took my
breath away, because she said well, she says, we don't actually
know, because we don't have any people on the ground ourselves.
But we know people who know people that tell us that the money
we are giving the NGOs is actually going to the Palestinian
people.
I thought, for a Secretary of State of the only superpower
in the world to say that was absolutely astonishing to me.
And I also agree with you that there is a reason that Hamas
won this election. And it is because Fatah is corrupt and
riddled, riddled with fraud and abuse of the Palestinian
people.
And I would submit to you that the Palestinian people's
problem has nothing to do with money. Because the Quartet,
particularly Europe and the United States, has given billions,
billions of dollars over the last several decades to the
Palestinian people through their leaders.
And I also would submit if the Palestinian Authority wants
additional money, and they definitely need it because the
Palestinian people are suffering, they might track down
Arafat's widow. Because I believe she is living very, very well
on the hundreds of millions of dollars that we have donated to
the Palestinian people. While she is living high on the hog,
they are starving. And that is outrageous to me.
Now, I cannot understand why the Palestinian people are
held to such a low standard. If the Palestinians are ever going
to have a state of their own that is governable, that they can
take their children into a new direction and a new future for
the Palestinian people, they have to get control of their own
destiny. And it can't be constantly with their hat in hand,
asking for the rest of the world to keep bailing them out.
I submit to you that the Palestinian people have to stand
up for themselves, take control of their own destiny, and make
a determination of who their leaders are that are going to move
them into a new future. It is not Fatah. Abu Mazen is a very
weak leader that does not even command the respect of his own
people. That is not America's destiny, and we shouldn't be
hooking up with him. And Hamas is a terrorist organization.
Either way you go, the Palestinian people are the losers.
And until the Palestinian people empower themselves, I don't
see how we have a two-state solution, and I don't see how the
United States partners with either Fatah, and obviously not
Hamas, to help the Palestinian people.
And I am not sure if that is a question, but that certainly
is a statement precipitated by all of your comments.
There is one other question that I wanted, to Ms. Dunne. I
understand some of the measures that you suggested, and I think
they have been tried time and time again. But one in
particular------
Mr. Ackerman. Your 5 minutes are run.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We all agree that the
United States policy vis-a-vis Hamas should be that we don't
acknowledge, or deal with in any way, until Hamas meets the
Quartet's principles. We agree with it; President Obama agrees
with it; Secretary Clinton agrees with it.
It seems to me, then, the question becomes: How does the
United States participate in a dynamic that either defeats
Hamas or marginalizes it? And that, to me, is the question.
Now, what I have heard from Arab leaders who have dealt
with Hamas over the last several years, and principally in the
last several months--what I hear from them--is that, very
consistent to what has been said here: Listen to what Hamas
says; they are genuine in their expression of their goals. And
the idea that there is a mechanism in which to co-opt Hamas
from a terrorist organization into some type of constructive
political entity is not realistic.
So if they are correct, and our policy remains the same, I
go back to the original question. How, then, do we defeat or
marginalize Hamas.
Before I get there, though, just a few points, if I could.
Respectfully, Ms. Pletka, you are obviously an incredibly
bright, informed, thoughtful person. And I agree with about 80%
of your written testimony. But there are parts of it that I
think undermine, in essence, the position that you take, or at
least I think the position you take.
You say American policy goals should be straightforward: An
end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict built on a stable
edifice that may, but should not necessarily, include a state
of Palestine.
Well, if the United States is ambivalent in its support of
a two-state solution, we condemn the moderates to fail in that
arena, it would seem to me.
Also, statesmen such as Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad
represent a new Palestine, supposedly; but rather, they are the
old Palestine that looks better only when compared to Hamas.
Prime Minister Fayyad: I mean, no one is perfect, but the
man has set up a transparent system of accountability that both
the United States, Israel, and others believe in deeply. He is
obviously handicapped in many different respects, but again, to
dismiss the efforts, the ideology, and the perspective of Prime
Minister Fayyad is quite unhelpful and undermines the goal of
what it is we are seeking to achieve.
Dr. Asali, I agree with 90% of what you say. I respect you
enormously. I would respectfully disagree as to the conclusion
with respect to disproportionate force in the context of
Israel's actions. To me, it is a false misnomer.
No nation should act with proportionate force when it is
attacked in the manner in which Israel was attacked by Hamas
repeatedly. And Israel was totally justified in doing what it
did, as catastrophic as the consequences undoubtedly were.
But I do think you make one extremely important point. And
I think those of us, and I would like to think I am one of
them, who are deeply committed to the security, both
professionally, emotionally, and personally, to the state--the
security of the state of Israel--must say, and must say it in
an unequivocal fashion: It is incumbent upon Israel to freeze
settlement activity. While in and of itself that is not the
only part of this equation, the Palestinians have enormous
responsibilities; but the notion that Israel can continue to
expand settlements, whether it be through natural growth or
otherwise, without diminishing the capacity of a two-state
solution, is both unrealistic and, I would respectfully
suggest, hypocritical.
And it is incumbent, in my view, upon the new
administration, along with many other factors, to assist upon
that part of previous agreements.
So to the original question: How do we defeat Hamas?
Please.
Mr. Makovsky. Congressman Wexler, you raise a very
important point. And I would argue that we need a new paradigm
in our relations with our Arab allies, with our friends in the
Arab world; that we cannot let them off the hook. This is the
core.
Whatever we as Americans, or what they, the Israelis, say
about Hamas is one thing. In my view, the only people who could
delegitimize Hamas are Arabs, are Muslims. And we need to make
that point.
I would like to just quote one thing Hosni Mubarak said, a
rare statement--it was right after George Mitchell visited
Cairo, so maybe there is a relationship there. He was speaking
to the Police Academy, I believe, in Egypt.
He says:
``The resistance must take into account victories and
losses. It is responsible for the people, who in turn
should settle the score with resistance over the gains
it has achieved, but also the sacrifices, the pain, and
the destruction it has caused.''
Ideally, the Arab States should say it is immoral to say,
to engage in terrorism. At minimum, they should say it is
counter-productive.
In my view, until the leadership in these countries
delegitimize what Hamas is doing, we are going to have a very
marginal return on everything else. They are the missing piece
of this puzzle, and I would hope that Congress, with all its
relationships with our Arab friends in Arab capitals around the
world, that the leadership makes this point clear in Arabic, on
Arabic satellite television, together.
I feel that there is really no other alternative. This has
been an area which has not been pushed in the past.
Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask the panel
this question first.
In the aftermath of the Israeli military operation in the
Gaza, is Hamas politically stronger today, or weaker?
Dr. Asali. Politically stronger in the West Bank, and
weaker in Gaza, if we are to believe the statistics and what we
hear. And it is significant in that sense.
There has been a war, a propaganda war, global propaganda
war about this issue, and a fight about ideas and about images,
et cetera, et cetera, that has been very effective. And it did
portray the destruction in Gaza as beyond, you know, endurance
in every way. And people were seeing that not just in the West
Bank, everywhere. And that has definitely accrued to the
benefit of Hamas, not just on the West Bank, also in the Arab
world.
On the other hand, you can say that what we hear from
Gaza--and this is supported by the recent surveys, there are
two surveys in fact--the people of Gaza live there. They have
lived what happened, and they have an understanding of how it
started, how it was triggered at least, and they still are
suffering the consequences. So Hamas cannot very readily
convince them by vote.
And I will go back to how we can defeat Hamas. Eventually
this has to be a democratic process. We have to believe in what
we preach. And it is doable. Eventually the Palestinians will
have to vote. The Palestinians must vote at some point in time
to give legitimacy to any kind of a government that comes.
And this is how you, if you want to defeat Hamas, you have
to convince them not that Hamas is offering a dead end, but
that there is another end that actually works. That is why I
cannot say enough about what Congressman Wexler said. You have
to empower the people who are trying to offer the alternative,
as you demand of them the accountability and transparency that
you need. You cannot just say all the Palestinians.
If you say Hamas is terrible and Fatah is terrible, you are
condemning the Palestinians and the Israelis, so there is my
future.
Mr. Connolly. Anyone else on the panel? Yes, Dr. Dunne.
Ms. Dunne. I would like to note that regarding the status
of Hamas in the Arab world, unfortunately it is in the opposite
direction from what Mr. Makovsky suggested it should be. In
other words, the status of Hamas has risen in the Arab world,
and the recognition of Hamas as somehow the legitimate
governing body at least in Gaza, and perhaps the legitimate
representative of the Palestinians.
This is a very unfortunate development. But we saw, for
example, Qatar invited the representative of Hamas to an Arab
summit, instead of the PLO. And this is the result of the
hopelessness about the two-state solution, the sense that it
isn't going anywhere, and it isn't going to go anywhere.
And also, the weakness of the secular nationalist
Palestinian leadership, the PLO and Fatah, which frankly has
not been able to pull itself together in the last few years and
represent, you know, a strong alternative to Hamas.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. I will just say very briefly, I mentioned in
my remarks that only 35% of Gazans believe Hamas actually won
the war.
So I know people like to say that Hamas is 10 feet tall. I
don't believe it, given those results.
And Michele is right about that in the Arab satellite
television--which is a key form of communication--they did well
with the publics. But I think it should be pointed out that
President Mubarak, when he understood that national security
interests were at stake, he held the line and didn't call for
Hamas to take over the crossing points.
And that, to me, is the key. The key is leadership at the
top. The public is going to say what it is going to say. And we
should care about that, of course; but we should care no less
that the leadership, in my view, understand and act in concert
when vital issues are at stake.
Because Hamas there, and as, you know, as Danni pointed
out, with Iranian support, this is not in the interest of any
Arab country. They understand very well who Hamas is aligned
to, and I think we need to encourage them to be more clear in
public. They whisper wonderful things in private, to all of us.
But what is important is what is said in Arabic in public to
their own people. They could shape public opinion.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Makovsky, I only have 30 seconds left.
Could you expand a little bit? You predicted that if you were
in Nevada, you would bet on Netanyahu putting together some
kind of coalition government.
What is that going to look like? And what does that mean
for the peace process moving forward, do you think?
Mr. Makovsky. I think a broader-based government, with
Livni, the Kadima Party, and making her Foreign Minister, maybe
giving one of her colleagues to be the defense minister; you
know, they will cobble together a government. I think there
will be elements more on the more left side of Israel that will
sit it out. But I think that clearly on economic issues--and
this shows that there has been progress. I realize that
everyone can be very disdainful that no progress has been made.
Everyone now thinks it is important to build economic
institutions in the West Bank. Well, let us see that
practically. What does that mean? We, in the United States,
should put forward ideas.
But economics is not enough. There has to be a movement on
the political process, too. The economics won't sustain it.
But I think under the able leadership of Mr. Fayyad, the
Prime Minister who has done fantastic work there, and with
Blair and Dayton and all the other who are on the ground, we
have some foundation to build on. And any new Israeli
Government is going to be receptive to it.
But again, it is not sufficient. I accept the point on the
settlements, and the broader process. But there is something to
build on.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The chair believes Mr. Ellison
will be back in. In the meantime, we will entertain a second
round of questions for 2 minutes from each of the members, if
that is okay with the panel.
I will turn first to my ranking member.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
question.
And Syria is the ``headquarters'' for Hamas. Is there any
hope or any indication that discussions between Members of
Congress or the administration with the leadership in Syria,
that we could bring about a change in their attitude toward
Israel and toward stability in the Middle East? And would that
be a worthwhile endeavor, as far as stopping them from being
conduit for weapons getting into Hezbollah and Hamas coming in
from Iran?
In other words, is there any chance that we could have some
reasonable status area if we had discussions with them on a
multi-level basis?
Mr. Makovsky. Sure, if I may very briefly--and Danni Pletka
and I might disagree on this one--but I think it is at least
worth a conversation of a new administration with the
authorities in Syria about peace.
They have to understand what this involves. It is a
realignment of their regional foreign policy. Are they going to
sever their military alliance with Iran? Are they going to stop
missile flow to Hezbollah? That would be a huge windfall, if
they are willing to do basically what Egypt did in the 1970s,
and expel the Hamas and Islamic Jihad offices.
I don't think we know the answer to that. And I am not here
to say that I know the answer, but my view is it doesn't hurt
to have a conversation with the Syrian authorities about that.
Ms. Pletka. David is right, we do disagree. I think that
the problem is not in talking. All of us have enjoyed the
election and talking about talking to our enemies, and we are
done with that now. But let us not fool ourselves.
The prospect that Bashar al-Assad is going to sever his
relationship with Iran and his support for Palestinian so-
called rejectionist groups, like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, cut off the weaponry and everything else to Hezbollah,
and disentangle his own government from interference in
Lebanon--and let us not forget, that is a priority for the
United States--means essentially that he would recast the
entire nature of the Baathist Alawite regime in Damascus. And
certainly I believe it is his estimation that it would be his
downfall.
So what we are really saying is come and lie to us a little
bit so we can move forward with you, and we can put in place
the elements of this great, great game, which all the dominoes
fall into place. And we talk to Iran, we isolate them. We
isolate the Palestinians, we cut off Syria. I am sorry, forgive
me, I have been doing this a little bit too long. It is not
credible.
We can go in with an open mind, but for goodness sakes, let
us not engage in fantasy.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Makovsky, in discussing reconstruction
you noted the enormous potential of the wealthy Gulf States,
and you urge the U.S. to seek their involvement in the process.
What price do you think we would have to pay them in order
to get their whole-hearted and open-handed support? And what do
they need to make contributions worthwhile politically?
Mr. Makovsky. I am not sure I know the answer. But I mean,
they who are the biggest advocates, in theory at least, of
Palestinian nationalism, should at least be supportive of their
brethren. That has not often been the case.
The things they could do are not just in Gaza. But if they
could just do large-scale housing construction projects in the
West Bank, I think they would help the Palestinian Authority
enormously.
And my view is we just shouldn't let them off the hook.
They are very happy to hold our coats and see us pressure the
parties. But I think we should just be more insistent than we
have been in the past on their participation. That means
economic participation; that means their political
persuasion, deg. and their use of the public bully
pulpit to make its views clear on which parties are bringing us
closer to a two-state solution, and which ones are bringing us
farther away.
And I think because of maybe other priorities we have had,
and maybe the price of oil and all sorts of issues, we have not
been energetic in dealing with the Gulf States. And I would
hope that would change with the Obama administration.
Mr. Ackerman. The interesting statistics that have been
cited as to who believes Hamas won the war, with that
indication saying that was a more popular notion in the West
Bank than in Gaza, I guess is because the people in Gaza have
to live with the reality, and the people in the West Bank can
live with the romance.
In a year from now, what does that poll show?
Dr. Asali. Well, we hope, and we hope this committee and
this administration in general, would contribute to answering
that question in the right direction.
I think a commitment to improving the situation in the West
Bank, and here I cannot but emphasize how positive the role of
General Dayton and his security forces buildup has been
important in order to bolster the safety and security of the
Palestinian people, which would in turn make it possible to
make economic improvements. And all this within the context of
a political horizon would be the way to point for the future
elections if it is held, let us say 1 year from now.
The Palestinian people cannot but see some kind of an
improvement on the ground if they are going to be voting the
way you want them to vote. We hope that they would vote.
Settlement freeze, unquestionably, because it undercuts the
credibility of the two-state solution. And this is a political,
as well as a practical, step that can be taken.
Secondly, withdrawal from cities, and you know, David has
already alluded to that one the 8th of September, and access
and mobility, improvement of these things. This is not just
talk; this is the way people live.
I understand pork in this country. I think we all
understand pork in this country. Well, pork is everywhere. If
you do not give pork to the people of Palestine, then how can
they possibly respond to the kind of politicians and add to
that the accusation------
Mr. Ackerman. This is the Muslim explaining to a Jew why
pork is necessary? [Laughter.]
It works, doesn't it? I think it is the grease.
Mr. Makovsky. I would just add very briefly to Ziad's
answer of two specific programs that I think, and if Congress
would undertake to help out on the West Bank.
The United States Customs Service in different countries
has a container initiative program to seal containers for
export. In my view, if this was done in the West Bank, and
working with the Israeli authorities as well, that the Israelis
didn't have to worry that there are bombs and there are et
cetera, it could fast-track Palestinian exports. And exports
have been a huge problem.
The second element is biometrics at crossing points that
could ensure that movement and access is upgraded.
So my whole premise is, how do you improve Palestinian
institutions and better life, and not at the expense of Israeli
security? I don't believe it has to be a zero-sum game.
And Mr. Chairman, in mentioning your remarks, I think it is
interesting there were virtually no demonstrations in the West
Bank during the Gaza initiative. So I think that is an
interesting sidelight.
Mr. Ackerman. Were there no demonstrations? Or were they
tamped down?
Dr. Asali. There were demonstrations, but they were ruly
and orderly.
Mr. Ackerman. Anybody else want to answer the underlying
question?
Ms. Dunne. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a point. I
think we need to be realistic about the need for a stronger and
more unified nationalist leadership on the Palestinian side.
All of these things that we are speaking of--improving
economic conditions, freezing settlement movement and so
forth--all of this can help, but none of it will be enough if
Fatah is not able to pull itself together in some way. Because
that was one of the reasons why they lost the 2006 elections,
in addition to the greater credibility that Hamas had in some
ways, also Fatah was extremely disorganized. And we have seen
that continue.
Despite good leadership of the Palestinian Authority on the
ground by Prime Minister Fayyad and President Abbas, we still
have seen a failure of political organization and unity. The
Fatah has been trying to organize a general conference to
renovate its leadership and so forth, and has failed to do so.
So this is a continuing problem that we have to be aware of
and be realistic about.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Makovsky, could you identify for us which
organizations, which international aid organizations have the
experience, the infrastructure, the wherewithal to deliver aid
in Gaza?
Mr. Makovsky. I don't feel that I am qualified. I mean, a
lot of them, I think there was just $20 million that the United
States gave through the International Red Cross and some of the
other NGOs. I don't think people are questioning the ability of
these organizations so identified by the United States.
Mr. Ellison. I only ask you because the issue of UNRWA has
come up. And I just want to know, do you believe they are one
of the groups that are effective at delivering aid in Gaza?
Mr. Makovsky. Well, as I said before, and I will say it
again, I feel that UNRWA has an important humanitarian mission.
And my hope would be it would focus on its humanitarian
mission.
I think there are some other parts that it has evolved
into, that were not in its original mission when UNRWA was
formed. And I think it has strayed into those areas. And I
think the goal is not to abolish it, but to make it more
effective. And I think that should be the hope.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you. I am curious to know your views on
the Israeli election. Obviously things are so well settled, it
is pretty tough to know what is exactly going to happen.
But in my reading and research, I have run across documents
which seem to suggest that Mr. Netanyahu does not necessarily
support the two-state solution. Could you give me a better
reading of whether some of those documents that I read are
accurate, whether they are not accurate? And if he doesn't
support the two-state solution, what does that mean in terms of
the U.S. policy?
Mr. Makovsky. I think here it is going to be what sort of
government is configured. If there is a broad-based government,
I think there is hope. Ms. Livni is a very passionate advocate
for a two-state solution.
And to be fair to Mr. Netanyahu, who said, well, he
wouldn't talk to Yasser Arafat, I remember when he was in the
opposition in 1996. Well, when he won, he met with Arafat
within 100 days of taking office. And he is the one also, when
there was an issue of Hebron--Hebron is one of the most
religiously charged cities--and he was the one who reached an
agreement there.
So I don't think we should disqualify people. But I do
think the constellation of power is important, and there is no
doubt, I would have more confidence, in terms of his own rule
as part of a broader-based government. I think if he leads a
narrow government, frankly I am very concerned. I do not think
this will be a walk in the park in terms of United States-
Israel relations in the future.
But I don't think he wants to go that way. And he said
publicly it would be wrong for him to go that way, and this is
one of his biggest regrets when he was in power in the 1990s.
Mr. Ellison. So Mr. Asali, do you have any views on the
same question I just put to Mr. Makovsky? So let me just
tighten it up.
If Mr. Netanyahu is the Prime Minister, and given some of
the things he is reported to have said--and I can't say he said
them to me, so I don't know if he said them or not, I just know
what I read--how does the position that he hasn't affirmed the
two-state solution square with the U.S. policy embracing the
two-state solution?
Dr. Asali. Well, I think I discussed this earlier about
having two elections that matter. One of them was the election
in the United States where President Obama is clearly committed
to a two-state solution, and his administration is. And there
is no doubt in my mind that the agenda of the United States is,
should I say carries more weight than a local agenda anywhere
when it comes to discussions about international interests.
I imagine that Mr. Netanyahu would have to adjust his
thinking or his campaign rhetoric or his previous position to
come to some terms with the President of the United States if
he is going to have any relations that are meaningful.
Mr. Ellison. And Ms. Dunne, could you offer some views on
some of the comments that Mr. Netanyahu has said, reported in
the press? Again, I haven't talked to him, so I don't know if
he said this, but he reportedly said he wasn't in favor of
negotiating land for peace with Syria on the Golan. Are you
familiar with those comments?
Ms. Dunne. Actually, I am probably less an expert on
Netanyahu's statements than Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Ellison. Well, let us go back to Mr. Makovsky, then.
Mr. Makovsky. Like, here is welcome to the Middle East, you
know.
Mr. Ellison. Right.
Mr. Makovsky. Because Mr. Netanyahu said that, and he went
up to the Golan Heights when he said it.
But the same Mr. Netanyahu, through a cosmetics executive
by the name of Ronald Water, in 1998 actually cut a back-door
deal. Well, it was awaiting a signature. And it was a fellow
named Ariel Sharon who was then his Foreign Minister who
squashed it.
I think there is speculation in Washington and a lot of
capitals that Mr. Netanyahu, if he is going to surprise us,
will surprise us on the Syria track because there the issues
are much more clear-cut. Given what was said before about Iran
and Hezbollah, the regional benefits, the biggest cheerleaders
in Israel for talks with Syria are the Israeli military.
And given his track record in 1998 and the fact that Mr.
Sharon tragically is not around to stop it, I don't think we
could rule out that what Mr. Netanyahu said on the campaign
trail and what he does in office may be two separate things.
Mr. Ellison. Am I all done, Mr. Chairman? Okay.
Now, we have now a three-state situation, not a two-state.
What position should the United States take regarding
Palestinian unity talks?
I mean, one of the interesting things that is going on here
is that if the United States or Israel's--I mean, if Mr.
Mahmoud Abbas said I will sign any document you put in front of
me, he still couldn't speak for all the Palestinian people.
What does that mean, going forward? Ms. Dunne, do you care to
offer a view on that?
Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Congressman. I think you have raised
an extremely important point, Congressman, that this lack of
Palestinian unity, lack of unified leadership is a serious
problem moving forward.
I am not an advocate of direct U.S. engagement with Hamas,
which we consider to be a terrorist organization. But I do
think the United States has become gradually more supportive of
efforts by Egypt, for example, to get Fatah and Hamas talking
to each other, and to try to work out some sort of unified
arrangement.
There is the possibility of some kind of a technocratic
type of Palestinian Government, or a government that would not
bring senior leaders of Hamas into major positions.
Probably some kind of arrangement like this needs to be
worked out so that there can be a restoration of some semblance
of connection or unity between the West Bank and Gaza once
again and so that the Palestinians eventually can move toward
elections, hopefully under a situation where there is a much
more hopeful prospect for realization of the two-state solution
and so forth.
But all of this is going to take some time. And the United
States, I also agree with what Ms. Pletka said in terms of the
United States not really being able or being very good at
getting in and trying to re-engineer Palestinian politics
directly.
Mr. Ellison. Mr. Asali, do you want to talk on this?
Dr. Asali. Yes, thank you. This and many other issues have
really been dealt with in our long document, and I recommend
for people who have time to read it.
I think the idea that a unity government that would repeat
the Mecca Agreement that would be rejected by the international
community is a non-starter. We do not want to have a
Palestinian Government again in a position where it is in its
entirety rejected by the international community.
What can be done, and what is being considered as far as I
know, is what is called a national accord government, whereby
you have individuals who are supported by Fatah or Hamas or
whatever, who would be on that, who would serve on that
government without direct participation, either Fatah or Hamas,
as partisans. Which would have two assignments. One is work on
the relief and reconstruction business; two is prepare for
elections.
I think this is not an entirely bad idea. I think it is
something that most people can live with. And I think this is
something that the Egyptians are working very hard to put
together. We will see how this jells in the next few days in
Cairo. And I think that the United States has to commit itself
to the idea that a two-state solution is appropriate; that
elections to validate whatever agreement that eventually are
subjected to the Palestinian people through negotiations, is
the way to go.
If that is acceptable, then we can make progress, I think.
Mr. Ellison. What progress can we make in terms of opening
up the crossings? As I understand from things I have read from
UNRWA, there is about 120 trucks going through the Karni
Crossing now, and they need about 700 a day.
Dr. Asali. Yes.
Mr. Ellison. What can be done to get that, the aid flowing
to the degree that it needs to be? Mr. Asali, do you want to
address it?
Dr. Asali. First off, I just want to, I want to say that
these are the statistics, the accurate statistics that all of
us have. And I think there is, you know, with all due respect,
there is a problem still with delivering these trucks. And it
is all tied into the security issues or the explanation that it
is a security issue.
We said there are two separate issues that have to be dealt
with immediately. One is the humanitarian relief. You cannot
have people not have enough to eat or drink, or have their
daily needs, day-to-day life, hospital, et cetera. You cannot
have that, and accept it, and accept any kind of political
explanation for that. Those kinds of things have to be dealt
with with these kinds of organizations that we talked about:
UNRWA, CHF, et cetera, et cetera. All of them have to have
enough.
And they have the statistics. They know how many trucks are
needed. And the materials that Israel would let go through. All
these things have to be done, and done quickly.
The other is reconstruction.
Mr. Ellison. Last one. Mr. Makovsky, if we, if Israel could
open up those Karni Crossings, and if they had the scanning
material that they needed to make sure there was no contraband
coming in, wouldn't that make the security issue on the border
easier? Because then you could assume that, you know, any non-
humanitarian goods-and-service-type stuff in those tunnels is
probably up to no good.
Mr. Makovsky. I think you raise a very good point. Once you
make the distinction between, that it be clear that anything
that goes through the tunnels is patently illegal, I think that
is a very good idea.
I just think the Palestinian Authority should be the one
manning those crossing points to get the credit. But I
certainly believe humanitarian assistance, which Israel says it
is doing, that whatever can be done is intensified.
Mr. Ackerman. Unless anybody has an immediate solution to
the problem in the Middle East and the funding, this committee
will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee hearing was
adjourned.]
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