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Testimony of Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
June 22, 2007
"The Future of NATO: How Valuable an Asset?"

Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you our thoughts on NATO's value to international security and defense.

I want to make two key points. First, I will describe how NATO is critically important in meeting the security challenges North America and Europe face today. Second, I will highlight the significant transformation that NATO has undergone and which it will continue to undergo. NATO is perhaps halfway through this transformation, in terms both of policies and capabilities. Some Allies could be doing more to support NATO operations. But the trend over the past several years is good: we see an Alliance effectively transforming itself and taking on the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Meeting Security Challenges

Consider at the outset where we started. During the Cold War, NATO focused almost exclusively on Europe - recovering from WWII, building democracy in its aftermath, and defending freedom against Soviet aggression. While NATO has not abandoned its core missions and is aware of concerns from some of its new members, NATO increasingly looks outward - because the challenges to our common security are global, with their roots far beyond Europe. These dangers include violent extremism that preys on fragile societies, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, failed states, cyber attacks, and insecurity of energy resources, to name a few. Effectively protecting the security of NATO members in the face of these global challenges requires NATO to take on operations far afield, build partnerships with others who share NATO's values and can contribute to common goals, and develop new capabilities to meet these new kinds of challenges.

We should consider the magnitude of this historic shift. Europe's western half has now been at peace since 1945, the longest general peace since the Pax Romana, and this peace is now extended throughout Europe. Eleven states once behind the Iron Curtain are now democratic nations contributing to common security within NATO. There is still critical work to be done in Europe - for example, helping the nations of the Balkans maintain security while building democratic, prosperous societies and joining the European mainstream. We are aware of security challenges in Europe's East. But the most critical security challenges NATO faces today have their roots outside of Europe. And so NATO today is focused on how the United States and Europe can work together to deal with challenges in the rest of the world.

NATO's missions have spanned a wide geography - from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Darfur and Louisiana. And they can span a wide array of activities: from high-intensity peacekeeping, with combat as necessary, to airlift in support of other humanitarian or peacekeeping goals, to counter-terrorist naval operations. We expect that this trend is only going to continue. Because when faced with daunting security problems, our leaders always ask, "Who can help deliver a solution?" The answer often is NATO.

Clearly, there were differences within Europe, and between much of Europe and the United States, over the war in Iraq. Yet these differences never paralyzed NATO. In 2003, NATO established air defenses for Turkey against a possible Iraqi response to coalition operations. In August 2003, as differences over Iraq flared, NATO took over the ISAF operation in Kabul, and began the long process of expanding that operation to cover the entire country of Afghanistan. Though their role is different, there are now more forces under NATO command in Afghanistan than under Operation Enduring Freedom. And in 2004, Allies agreed to establish a NATO Training Mission inside Iraq, charged with the critical role of training and mentoring Iraqi security forces officers. All 26 Allies contribute to NATO's mission in Iraq, either through personnel or funding.

Critics may argue that the United States does not believe in NATO, and instead prefers coalitions of the willing. Others charge that Europeans are not assuming their share of the hard military burden. Neither accusation is true today, and it is the job of Allied leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to make sure they never become true.

In fact, the United States and Europe are working together, through NATO, dealing effectively with the real security challenges we face as a democratic community. This cooperation is demonstrated by NATO's two largest operations today: Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Kosovo

It has been eight years since NATO intervened to stop Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Starting from a bombing campaign to drive out Milosevic's killers and then an initial Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment of approximately 40,000, the Alliance currently has over 15,500 personnel deployed. Twenty-four of 26 NATO nations contribute forces to KFOR, along with 11 non-NATO contributing countries.

Just over 1,500 of these are American: U.S. National Guard soldiers, currently led by the Virginia-based 29th Infantry Division. Our Guardsmen and women have played an important role in community building in both Serb and Albanian areas and are viewed by both groups as vital to the success of NATO's operations.

NATO is in Kosovo with the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and others - providing basic security, while the work of building a society goes on in many other ways. NATO's role is critical, but it is only part of the picture.

When Kosovo's status is resolved, which we believe will be through supervised independence, KFOR will continue to maintain a safe and secure environment during this critical time, by providing a robust security presence throughout its area of operations. Every poll taken in Kosovo shows NATO to be the single most respected institution there.

After status resolution, KFOR will supervise the establishment of a small, lightly armed, multiethnic Kosovo Security Force and oversee the creation of a civilian institution to provide civilian control over it. Development of these structures will hasten the day when Kosovo can provide its own security and NATO can successfully conclude its deployment in the region. Kosovo's provisional government has already signaled that it will wish to join NATO's Partnership for Peace when possible, and begin contributing to NATO operations itself.

I also want to note, that as we implement Kosovo's final status, we must not leave Serbia behind. Serbia deserves a European future. As Serbia takes the steps it must take - reforms at home and cooperation with the ICTY war crimes tribunal at The Hague, the transatlantic community must take clear, strong steps to bring Serbia into our family and institutions. For that reason, I was pleased that Serbia and the European Union have re-opened talks aimed at Serbia's closer integration into Europe.

Kosovo has been a success story for the Alliance. By proceeding with the resolution of its status, we can move toward ending our post-conflict military involvement and put the Balkan region on the road to becoming an exporter, rather than a consumer, of security.

Afghanistan

NATO's largest and most challenging mission today is in Afghanistan, a mission that says a lot about NATO today, and where it is going. The fact that NATO is in Afghanistan at all is a reflection of the changing security environment facing our Alliance. Events thousands of miles from NATO territory have a direct impact on the security of NATO members. The strengthening of a stable, democratic society in Afghanistan is likewise a critical national interest for all Allies. The tools that NATO needs to succeed in Afghanistan - from combat forces, to peacekeeping, to global partners, to coordination with civilian donors and institutions largely define the directions in which NATO must grow in the future.

Afghanistan provided the training ground for the September 11, 2001 armed attack on a NATO member - the United States. The Alliance reacted with speed and unity in invoking Article 5 for the first time. Europe recognizes that global jihadist ideology and organizations threaten not only the United States, but also either inspired or directly coordinated attacks on NATO Allies in Madrid, London, and Istanbul. While NATO did not immediately engage militarily, it began consultations about Afghanistan, individual Allies gradually joined coalition operations, and in 2003 NATO took the first step by taking over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul.

Many were concerned that this spring would bring a Taliban offensive of greater strength and severity than 2006. Reports on this enemy campaign were all the rage for months. That offensive never materialized thanks largely to the efforts and sacrifices of Afghan, U.S. and Allied forces.

Instead, NATO has taken the initiative this spring with our own civil and military efforts: NATO and Afghan forces have increasingly denied the Taliban safe haven in Afghanistan, and the Government of Pakistan has done same across the border. We have taken many mid- and senior-level Taliban leaders out of the fight; and we have more closely linked military operations with follow-on reconstruction efforts to help the civilian population.

Our "comprehensive approach" in Afghanistan, where soldiers and reconstruction experts work hand-in-hand, where NATO security efforts support the priorities of Afghanistan's democratic leadership, shows how NATO is likely to operate in coming decades.

Today, 37 countries - 26 Allies and 11 non-NATO partners - participate in NATO's UN-mandated International Security Assistance Forces, providing over 40,000 troops. About 24,000 of these troops - nearly 60 percent - are from our Allies and partners, and (since October 2006) serve throughout all of Afghanistan. Many of our allies also continue to contribute to the separate Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan, spearheaded by the United States.

At a time when our own military is stretched, it is important to recognize the tremendous impact that Allied contributions have on our own security. Together with growing Afghan forces, Allied forces are fighting off the Taliban, securing Afghan territory, protecting Afghan counternarcotics teams, helping extend the authority of the democratically elected Afghan government, and enabling reconstruction and development that is improving the lives of the Afghan people.

At the NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006, as well as at four Foreign and Defense Ministerial meetings since January, NATO Allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We have continued to press Allies to fill force shortfalls in ISAF, and since last fall Allies and partners have pledged well over 7,000 new troops to the mission - half of them U.S., and half European - and most without caveats. Although some caveats restricting operations of longstanding deployed forces remain a concern, Allies have expressed a willingness to come to each others' aid, should the need arise, and new forces are providing commanders with increased flexibility.

NATO forces increasingly serve side-by-side with Afghan National Security Forces. The United States, along with its NATO Allies and partners, are doing everything possible to train and equip Afghan National Army and Police forces so they can take an ever increasing role in providing for Afghanistan's security. Allies and partners are adding new embedded training teams and sending much needed arms and equipment. The recent supplemental passed by Congress, which provided funding to better train and equip Afghan forces, has helped us leverage even more from other contributors.

We are also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion over the last year in new multi-year assistance. Afghanistan deserves our full effort and we believe the international community can and should do still more. Europe recognizes that Afghanistan matters for its own security and European partners have provided, individually or through the European Commission, over $2.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction since 2002.

It's important to underline the scope and scale of the changes over the past five years in Afghanistan, due in large part to the combined efforts of the United States and its Allies. Afghanistan has a democratically elected President and Parliament. Five million Afghans have returned to their country. The number of children attending school has increased five-fold since 2001 to six million, two million of those girls - who had no access to schools under the Taliban. Over 80 percent of Afghans have access to basic healthcare and approximately 6,000 kilometers of new roads are expanding commerce and opportunity. However, the challenges that remain are real and our commitment must not waiver.

NATO and Missile Defense

A final example of how Europe is working together with the United States to address security challenges is through missile defense.

Today, NATO faces the possibility that some of the world's most threatening and unstable regimes can develop nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe and even the United States. Iran already possesses hundreds of medium range Shahab-3 and short-range ballistic missiles. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States by 2015 if it continues on its present course.

NATO has also begun to explore options to protect the Alliance against ballistic missile threats. NATO's work on missile defense has focused on three activities: the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, technical work to support decisions on possible missile defense for the protection of NATO territory and population centers, and cooperation with Russia on Theater Missile Defense.

In 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved the ALTBMD program, a NATO-funded Command and Control structure to integrate member states' sensors and missile defense interceptors. This system is focused on protecting of NATO deployed forces against ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km (shorter-to-medium range missile defense). NATO plans to achieve by 2010 an initial capability to defend NATO forces; a fully operational system capable of protecting defined areas against missiles up to 3,000 km is tentatively planned for the 2015-2016 timeframe.

At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which found that missile defense for all NATO territory is technically feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study. At April's meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo there was near unanimity in support of missile defense from our NATO allies. Minister after minister acknowledged that a genuine threat exists. Now that the United States is proposing a long-range missile defense system in Europe, Allies have agreed to assess the implications for the Alliance of the U.S. system and the possibility of integrating NATO's short- to midrange system to ensure all allied territory is protected. Allies also expressed support for our offers to increase cooperation with the Russians in the field of missile defense.

During his press statement on April 26, Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer noted that U.S. missile defense plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe. He stated, "It is clear that there is a full understanding between the Allies that the plans in the framework of the third site cannot, and will not, and do not upset the strategic balance in Europe. There was a lot of support for the wide-ranging United States proposals vis-à-vis our Russia partners for closer cooperation on missile defense."

Transatlantic security is indivisible. As we learned the hard way in the twentieth century, if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral or isolationist approach to security. Our goal is to see NATO bolt its own missile defense efforts onto the burgeoning U.S.-led long range missile defense system, thus helping ensure full spectrum coverage for the entire Alliance. We need a common level of protection from threats for the United States and for our European allies, and with our NATO Allies we are working to develop that. We welcome the chance to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Putin's proposal at the G8 Summit for cooperation using the Russian radar in Azerbaijan may be an opening. Ideally, NATO, U.S. national efforts, and U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation could all work together to provide more general and comprehensive security from this challenge.

Transformation

NATO is going through its own transformation to develop its capacities and intellectual horizons to deal with these new challenges. Much more needs to be done, but much has been done already.

Consider 1994: NATO was an alliance of 16 countries. It had never conducted a military operation. It had no partners. Now consider NATO just 11 years later, at the end of 2005: the Alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously; had 26 members, and partnership relationships with another 20 countries in Eurasia, seven in the Mediterranean, a growing number in the Persian Gulf, and a number of Contact Countries.

Many of us hoped that NATO's transformation would happen faster. We set transformational goals at the Prague Summit in 2002. We refined them at the Istanbul Summit in 2004. But transformation does not end - not because we fail, but because, in a changing world, the challenges facing NATO change. And this requires new approaches to meeting them.

Developing the capabilities so that NATO can launch and sustain these missions takes political will and money. So far, the will has been in the hand-off to NATO - but not necessarily in the will to give NATO more resources to do the job.

NATO Capabilities

The Riga Summit last November marked an important step forward in NATO's transformation to meet twenty-first century challenges.

At Riga, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was declared to have reached full operational capability. The NRF is a prime example of NATO's transformation to meet global challenges. Twenty-five thousand strong land, air, and sea elements when at full strength, the NRF can act as a quick reaction expeditionary force capable of beginning deployment of elements with as little as five days notice. NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s showed that NATO needed a scalable option for dealing with operations that required limited number of troops and special capabilities, different from the Cold War era force structure. The NRF concept, launched at the 2002 Prague Summit, emerged in response to this perceived need.

Even before it was declared fully operationally capable, NATO needed to mobilize the NRF. Elements of the NRF were used to provide additional security to the 2005 Afghanistan elections and to provide air transport and medical assistance to refugees from the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and to the U.S. Gulf region after Hurricane Katrina. Important lessons have been learned from these operational deployments, as well as from the joint training exercise in Cape Verde.

The NRF construct has served well as a catalyst for the transformation of Allied forces and capabilities but much work needs to be done to make it a viable option for the range of missions to which NATO may need to respond. More analysis on its composition, deployability, potential uses in extremis, and as a reserve force, as well as approval of common funding for short notice deployments, will improve the utility of this key capability.

The Strategic Airlift Initiative marks an important step forward in addressing one of NATO's chronic weaknesses - a lack of dedicated strategic airlift. Airlift has become increasingly important over the last five years as NATO operations have taken the Alliance thousands of miles from Europe. Fifteen Allies and two Partner nations formed a consortium to operate a small fleet of C-17 aircraft that could be used by consortium nations to provide airlift when needed. Participating Allies would proportionally share ownership of the fleet based on their projected annual airlift requirements. The aircraft will be nationally owned but operated by the contributing nations from a European airfield. All ten of the newest NATO members are participating. The initiative also offers to coordinate support structures for A-400M strategic airlift.

The Strategic Airlift Initiative will greatly increase NATO's capabilities to fight expeditionary warfare. Authorization and appropriation of the U.S. in-kind contribution of one aircraft is still underway. Allies who are not participating have expressed concerns on ownership issues, but seem closer to endorsing the NAMO Charter which will formalize the consortium. This initiative is important because it also sets an important precedent for voluntary, shared Allied investment in high priority strategic assets that are needed for NATO-led operations. UAVs and Air Refueling strategic assets are two examples that may follow this model.

The Special Operations Force (SOF) Initiative will improve the coordination and interoperability of Allies' special operations forces. The complex and challenging environments in which today's military operations take place differ greatly from the Cold War realities NATO's military structure was originally designed to address. SOF will possess the ability to span the operational continuum and are uniquely suited for operations in unconventional environments. The SOF initiative will enable NATO to respond to the rapidly growing need for increased SOF capabilities in its operations. The initiative will facilitate SOF interoperability between nations, disseminate key lessons learned, expand and improve SOF training, and enhance SOF capability among Alliance nations.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI) constitutes part of NATO's outreach to new partners in the Broader Middle East. It will deepen cooperation and reciprocal training opportunities with NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners. NTCI seeks to promote the ability of NATO and the MD and ICI nations to work together; strengthen regional security relationships; promote durable, democratic civil-military defense structures; and enhance military-to-military cooperation. To start this effort, NATO is working to establish a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome and to possibly bring NATO-supported Mobile Training Teams visiting interested regional partners to make this training more accessible by bringing it to the region. And as interest and demand grow, NATO could also support developing a Strategic Cooperation Center in the region.

NATO Enlargement

In addition to building its capabilities, a second significant transformation has been the growth in NATO's membership.

It is easy to forget that, back in 1989 and 1991, people spoke of a "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe, and debated how it could be filled. Many argued that the newly free countries of Europe should have been relegated to a "gray zone" of Russian influence. But the Bush and Clinton Administrations rejected that course, and, today, the growth of democracy and prosperity in Central Europe, and the integration of Central European nations into NATO and the European Union, is a fact, so successful it is taken for granted.

This was a great success of three U.S. Presidents. NATO acted boldly and invited ten countries to become members - three at the Madrid Summit in 1997, and seven more at the Prague Summit in 2002. These actions, along with the expansion of the European Union, secured a future of freedom, democracy, market economy, human rights, and the rule of law for over 100 million people. We rejected a gray zone, and helped the people of Central Europe consolidate the freedom they had gained.

To be clear - it was not NATO and EU membership itself that made the difference, but the realistic prospect of membership that convinced nations to make hard decisions about political, economic and defense reform. In the pursuit of NATO (and EU) membership, countries pursued reforms that improved the lives and opportunities of their citizens in ways far beyond basic security and defense. These reforms strengthened individual rights and freedoms, institutionalized democratic systems, fostered market economies, resolved border disputes, and protected minorities. All were challenging; many were hard; none could have been accomplished without political will.

Today, this process continues as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine pursue reforms and seek eventual NATO and possibly EU membership. Others, such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia, may also choose this path.

NATO enlargement is still playing this transformative role. European countries still seek to join NATO, strengthening their democracies, their economies, and their militaries through reform and through working together with NATO. They believe that NATO membership is in their interest. But it is also in NATO's interest to add new members that meet NATO's performance-based standards. Democratic, market economies strengthen the Alliance with their commitment to share values and their determination to contribute to common security - whether by reducing tensions among neighbors or deploying troops as part of NATO operations.

Despite recent rhetoric on this topic, gone are the days when security in these regions was a cold calculus. Zero-sum thinking when it comes to security is an anachronism. NATO's history demonstrates the ability not only of nations, but of entire regions to transform fundamentally. Every state has the right to choose its own security orientation, its own future, for its own people. And by building strong, stable, democratic, prosperous societies, everyone's security is strengthened. A more secure Europe means a more a secure United States and, though they would disagree, it means ultimately a more secure Russia as well.

As was agreed at the November 2006 Riga Summit, NATO should issue new invitations for membership to qualified candidates at its next Summit in Bucharest in 2008. NATO is prepared to do its part, and they must do theirs by putting in place the reforms and policies necessary to meet NATO standards and contribute to the Alliance.

The Way Ahead

The April 2008 Bucharest Summit will address many, if not all, of these issues. For us, Bucharest is about using NATO effectively to deal with today's security challenges, and strengthening NATO, with new capabilities and new members, so it is prepared to face the challenges of tomorrow. At the fourth major NATO Summit in this Administration, our goal is to consolidate and strengthen what we launched in Prague, refined in Istanbul, and built upon at Riga.

Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward to your questions.



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