Statement of Peter H. Smith
Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
June 19, 2007
"South America and the United States: How to Fix a Broken Relationship"
Introduction: The Problem
Our relationship with South America has fallen into disrepair. It can be fixed, but only through attention, understanding-and a clear-eyed definition of U.S. interests in the region.
South America is important to the United States. It occupies nearly half the land mass of the Western Hemisphere. It is home to more than 370 million people. It is a reliable trading partner and hosts large amounts of American investment. Within the past generation, it has spurned authoritarian dictatorship in favor of political democracy. As of this moment, all ten countries of the continent (excluding the Guianas) are governed through free and fair elections.
So what's the problem? It is a three-part challenge:
U.S. prestige has plummeted markedly. Among opinion makers, support for U.S. policies toward Latin America ranges from 5 percent in Chile and Argentina to 23 percent in Colombia, our closest ally; approval ratings for President Bush extend from merely 12 percent in Brazil to 24 percent in Chile. This is not just a popularity contest. The data reflect a significant erosion in America's "soft power" in the region and a resulting inability to get things done.
A "new left" has emerged throughout the region. Citizens in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela have elected leaders espousing admixtures of leftist, populist, and nationalist ideologies. (This has also occurred in Nicaragua.) Close calls took place in Peru and Mexico. In itself, this trend need not be a cause for alarm; after all, it reflects the will of the people. Yet the Bush administration has failed to forge a constructive response to this new reality.
From Venezuela, Hugo Chávez has proclaimed undying hostility to the United States. Seizing increasingly authoritarian control at home, Chávez has devoted rhetoric, grandstanding, and petrodollars to the goal of creating a continental anti-American alliance. He has established a close relationship with Cuba and sought allies in other parts of the globe, most notably in the Islamic world and most specifically in Iran. Ironically, shortsighted U.S. policies have not only failed to defeat the Chávez campaign-they have unintentionally assisted him.
Assessing the Pink Tide
What has led to the emergence of this new left (a.k.a. "the pink tide")? What does it signify for the United States?
The pink tide is a recent development, one that has come to the fore only within the past decade. At bottom, it represents popular frustration with the persistence of poverty and inequality-after 15-20 years of "neoliberal" reforms mandated by the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. government.
It is not an organized or coordinated movement. It represents a series of spontaneous developments. It does not have a clear-cut overarching ideology. In contrast to Cold War communism, its views are not imported from some alien source. It is a home-grown left, what is known in Spanish as an izquierda criolla.
It is a product of democratization. Citizens throughout the region are expressing their views, and their angers, by going to the ballot box. They might not be voting the way that some of our leaders would like, but they are voting-that is the essential point.
Why is the movement anti-U.S.? There are at least three reasons:
The United States is perceived as the leader and prime beneficiary of a global economic system that spawns social injustice around the world and takes unfair advantage of weaker and less developed countries. (For better or worse, the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s-90s were known as the "Washington Consensus.") For masses in Latin America, the United States represents a hostile force.
After 9/11 the Bush administration dismissively ignored the region. And when it has focused on the hemisphere, it has assumed a unilateralist and arrogant stance. The United States' understandable concern with the war on terror led to counterproductive neglect of Latin America's legitimate concerns with poverty, development, and democratic consolidation. (President Bush's recent trip to the region addressed some of these issues but in general it was much too little, too late.)
The war in Iraq has promoted has prompted widespread distaste not only for U.S. policy, but also for American society. South Americans regard Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and other incidents as systematic violations of human rights; they are especially incensed by the treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo. In Latin American eyes, the United States no longer stands as a beacon for human dignity and freedom. Our nation is seen as grasping, uncaring, and imperialistic.
It is important to differentiate the "new left" from Hugo Chávez. The pink tide is not his creation. He has promoted it and has tried to take advantage of it, but he is not its author. (In fact, his attempts to affect electoral outcomes in Peru and Mexico have been conspicuously counterproductive.)
And if Chávez were to fall from power in Venezuela, the social foundation of the pink tide would still persist throughout the region. In most countries, one- third to one-half of the citizenry is frustrated, angry, and disappointed-with or without Chávez. That is the most fundamental fact.
Implications for the United States
The emergence of the pink tide has important implications. By shaping new realities throughout the region, it challenges long-standing assumptions about U.S.-Latin American relations.
First, it underlines the political diversity of Latin America. There is no ideological consensus. Among the ten governments of South America, five might be classified as representing the "left," with three in the center and two on the right. The United States will have to recognize and respond to this complexity.
Second, we cannot assume-as during the Cold War-that freely elected leaders will automatically or necessarily support U.S. policies within the region or around the world. On the contrary, we must now anticipate and accept discrepancies.
Third, we cannot intervene or take otherwise hostile action against recalcitrant pink tide leaders in the name of "regime change." The United States simply must not overthrow or undermine any democratically elected government in Latin America. The political costs of any such action would be enduring and utterly unacceptable.
And fourth, we should not take South America for granted. We must not think of it as our "backyard." It is a significant region with serious leaders. They will not follow the U.S. lead just because we tell them to.
Policy Recommendations
What steps might the United States take to improve the state of relationship with South America?
The most obvious recommendation would be to pay more and better attention to the region-not in order to increase our popularity, but because it would be in our national interest. We should listen carefully to voices of the continent.
We should change the way we talk and think about Latin America-not as a patio trasero given to unpredictable passions and troublesome leaders, but as an important area with critical issues and serious problems.
We should focus not on political differences but on social grievances, as President Bush began to do during his March trip to the region. The president is no longer a credible messenger, however, so others will have to take up this cause.
We should strengthen multilateral institutions and approaches toward the region. In particular, we should coordinate our efforts with the European Union and we should work to strengthen the OAS. This will require thoughtful diplomacy.
As mentioned above, we should make a clear distinction between Hugo Chávez and the pink tide. With regard to Chávez, the United States should:
- Avoid tit-for-tat exchanges, which almost always redound to his advantage;
- Maintain open lines of communication with members of his movement and his government, even if the short-term results are not rewarding;
- Uphold freedoms of speech and the press and political organization in Venezuela, but only in explicitly transparent ways-without supporting or appearing to support extra-legal action against his government (as appeared to be the case in 2002).
Outside Venezuela, the United States should undertake to weaken his continental coalition. In other words, we should court his allies, rather than isolate them. We should remember that they are democratically elected leaders. They do not all appreciate Chávez's bombastic style or his transcontinental ambitions. Indeed, Lula of Brazil seeks to establish his nation as the indisputable leader of South America, and is therefore more rival than ally for Chávez.
This means that we should listen and respond to these leaders' concerns. Regarding specifics:
- We should consider renewal of trade preferences rather than insisting on FTAs
- We could strengthen labor provisions in pending FTAs
- We could consider expanding access to the Millennium Challenge Account
- We should reassess our longstanding anti-drug policy, which has accelerated violence and corruption throughout the region, and focus more on demand reduction than upon supply control.
In these and other ways, we should reach out to leaders of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and even Nicaragua.
Lula represents a different case. Elected as a leftist, he has nonetheless managed to establish a cordial relationship with President Bush. But we should not think of him as "our man in South America." On the contrary, it is important to give him space and opportunity to maintain his political credibility. We must not demand or expect compliance. We should acknowledge the plausibility of his objections to America's policy on agriculture. For Lula, too close an embrace with the United States could well amount to a kiss of political death.
Outside of South America, we should take at least two additional steps:
- Closing down Guantánamo, as Colin Powell has recently suggested, and
- Rescinding (or at least modifying) the decision to extend the wall along the U.S.-Mexican border, since this is an inordinately expensive project that will deter neither immigration nor drug trafficking.
We should adopt these initiatives not out of generosity, but because they would be in our interest.
South America is important not only for what it is, but also for what it is not. It is not the Middle East. It is neither Africa nor South Asia nor Central Asia. It is a relatively peaceful place. Over the years, this long-term stability has been highly beneficial to the United States.
Citizens of the region are distressed, frustrated, and angry. But they're not heading for the mountains, they're not ransacking cities, and they're not mounting terrorist assaults. They are voting, and that is excellent news. Protection of democracy is therefore in our interest as well as theirs.
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