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Military


Statement of Chairman Marty Meehan
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Hearing on Development and Operational Capability of
Iraqi Security Forces: Perspective from the Field
June 12, 2007

"Good morning, and welcome to this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

"Today, we continue our examination of the most pressing issue facing the country: the war in Iraq. In past weeks, the subcommittee has looked into a number of aspects of the complex mission to man, train, and equip the Iraqi Security Forces. We have also looked at whatever plans we have been able to obtain to turn security over to them. We know how much hard work our armed forces have put into this difficult and dangerous project.

"Today's hearing will begin with a brief opening statement from Mr. Mark Kimmett from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is the Deputy Secretary for the Middle East and South Asian Affairs. He will be followed by testimony from General Martin Dempsey who until recently was the commander of MNSTC-I. I understand that you have been nominated to be the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Commander.

"In previous hearings we had hoped to hear from witnesses on the command relationships and responsibilities of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq - called MNC-I - and the Iraq Assistance Group - called the IAG. We would have benefited from their operational perspectives. In today's hearing we will hear about the Multi-National Security Transition Command -Iraq (called MNSTC-I) and its Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (called CPATT). These organizations are charged with training and equipping the Iraqi Police Service and military, as well as managing transition advisory teams for the Ministries of Defense and Interior. CPATT also supervises the contractors who are International Police Liaison Officers and International Police Trainers working with the Iraqi local police.

"Other issues we want to address include the role that military and police unit readiness and operational effectiveness reports play in assessing the performance of Iraqi Security Forces, particularly how they help commanders adjust to conditions on the ground. More importantly, we want to hear about the actions generated by these assessments, and how feedback is provided to Iraqi leaders.

"We want to hear our guests' frank appraisals of whether these performance assessments, called TRAs, provide an accurate picture of the operational competence of the Iraqi Security Forces. And, we would like to hear your view, General Dempsey, on whether they are a relevant and adequate tool to help commanders judge whether the Iraqi forces are ready for transition. Our sense is that the military has shown some progress, the Iraqi police are not operating effectively, and the Ministries are not close to taking over responsibility. We're very surprised, given this impression, the Iraqi Police Service responsibility has already been turned over to the MOI. I hope you can explain your perspectives on these issues.

"Part of the reason for this hearing is that the Department has been slow to get us relevant documents and it has been difficult for the subcommittee to get our preferred witnesses. The witnesses and briefers we have been offered have had to take numerous committee questions for the record. The responses to those questions have also been very slow in coming. I hope we do not have the same problem today.

"Our Members and the public should know, without disrespect intended towards General Dempsey that it has taken a long time to get him before us today. We appreciate his appearance at our hearing, but I would note that we have been not been supported in our efforts to secure testimony from the commanders of Multi-National Force - Iraq, the Coalition Police Advisory Training Team and the Iraq Assistance Group, or their knowledgeable deputies, even by video-teleconference. General Dempsey, we were assured that you would be able to answer questions on these other organizations, but trust that if you can't, that you will take them for the record.

"While we have been able to obtain the 2006 version of the Joint Campaign Plan, there will be specific questions about the contents of a critical document that we have not been able to obtain, the 2007 Joint Campaign Plan signed by the Commander of the Multinational Forces Iraq and the Embassy as it pertains to developing the Iraqi Security Forces. We have been able to obtain the 2007 unclassified Campaign Plan for MNSTC-I for developing the ISF, but wonder how the new Joint Campaign Plan may affect it.

"Thank you for coming, Mr. Kimmett. I understand you were warned that you may be neglected in our questions because the subcommittee is more focused on General Dempsey's experiences and observations from the theater. I hope your remarks will be brief. I do have one question which I'd like you to address in your opening. Originally the HASC staff was to be briefed yesterday on the Department's quarterly report on Iraq (the 9010 report). Now that briefing will take place this afternoon. I believe the explanation was that the Director of J5, Strategy Division was on leave and no one else could do it. I believe in the past you and also the Deputy J5 have briefed the staff. Given the difficulty in getting General Dempsey and the inability to get the other witnesses we wanted, don't you think it would have benefited these members and the General both to have had that briefing before this session? I continued to be appalled at the Department's lack of situational awareness on these issues.

"Today, because we have a lot of ground to cover we will be more formal than usual. We will use at the gavel and the 5 minute rule. I would like to remind everyone that this is an open hearing so no classified information will be discussed. However, if necessary, when we are finished here members and cleared staff will move to a separate room for a classified briefing.

"Welcome again to our witnesses. We're looking forward to your remarks. We will take your whole text for the record, but I ask that you keep your prepared remarks brief so we can get to our questions.

"Now, I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our ranking member, for any opening remarks he might have."



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