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Testimony of Robert B. Charles,
Former Assistant Secretary of State, INL (2003-2005)
For Hearing of Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
International Affairs Committee
US House of Representatives
April 24, 2007

Why All Americans Should Support Plan Colombia

Good Morning. I want to thank members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today on America's current and future relationship with Colombia, including achievements to date and challenges ahead.

Let me also say, I have read the writings of my colleagues on this panel, and am also aware of the sincere commitment by many on this subcommittee to Colombia.

Fifteen years ago, Colombia was a footnote in American foreign policy. Today, that country is at the center of our hemisphere's compass rose, not just geographically, but politically and economically.

For reasons easier to overlook than to explain, Colombia's future will directly affect our future. There is no question about that. Colombia's struggle with internal security, regional terrorism, narcotics, economic development, civil-military relations, democratic governance, adherence to rule of law, and human rights - in one way or another - do already affect us. Progress - or lack of progress - in each of those categories will affect us greatly in the future.

That is why we are engaged. What is happening in Colombia, for better and worse, is felt in America, from New York to California, Massachusetts to Florida, Indiana to Arizona. America's commitment - and this Congress' uncompromising commitment - to that South American nation is truly important.

That is why, even before the events of 9-11, Democrats and Republicans put aside differences in foreign and domestic policy to focus, together, on establishing a meaningful trajectory for economic and security improvement in Colombia and the Andean Region. Our shorthand, of course, was calling the policy "Plan Colombia."

While Colombia seems far away, and explaining its relevance takes time, that time is well spent. At different points in the past decade and a half, I have worked directly with Democratic and Republican members on this committee, testified before you, organized hearings on Plan Colombia, worked and re-worked the legislative e language, and traveled with you to the region. I know there is a depth of knowledge on this committee.

Accordingly, I want to limit my testimony today. I want to offer you confirmation for the theory behind Plan Colombia, on both the security and development sides of the ledger. I want to offer you new and compelling facts. And I want to offer you thoughts for innovation.

The theory first - Former Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, for whom I once worked, President Clinton, Former Drug Czar and General Barry McCaffery and a remarkable collection of bipartisan leaders in both the House and Senate, including majority and minority members with foreign policy savvy, teamed in the late 1990s to tackle a vexing, previously ignored, but rising international tragedy. Colombia was becoming the hub of interwoven terrorist and narcotics trafficking activities that, by wide consensus, threatened stability, democracy and economic progress across the region.

The potential for both implosion and explosion was considerable. That is, the potential for expanded civil war within Colombia's borders and the export of everything from increased narcotics to displaced persons, from terrorist activities and organizations to arms trafficking, from skyrocketing homicide and kidnapping rates to loss of control over local governments, from massacres of indigenous peoples and trade unionists to basic flight of capital and vanishing jobs was very real.

No one disagreed about the need for economic development, the need to train army and police officials in human rights, or the need to provide sustainable, baseline security across the country.

Assisting Colombians with a will to secure their country meant providing Colombians with the tools for sustainable security. In a country with few roads outside major population centers, vast tracts of ungoverned jungle, and too few trained and equipped security forces, that necessarily meant - and still means - providing helicopters and firearms together with the know-how for using these security and measures that allow both US monitoring and accountability.

That twin commitment to security and economic progress has also meant building and protecting police stations, courthouses and prisons, establishing and supporting educational and social programs from soup to nuts.

Finally, from the beginning, this effort to secure a longstanding democracy, gripped by the specter of rising drug-funded terrorism, required a full commitment to deter industrial-sized drug trafficking organizations, apprehend their leadership, institutionalize non-existent extradition protocols, and begin the long climb to reversing what the so-called narco-terrorist threat to the region.

Starting down the path toward credible deterrence meant tackling cultivation, production and shipment of cocaine and heroin. By the numbers, the stated counter-narcotics aim of Plan Colombia was to deter cultivation by 50 percent within five years, thus putting in train a chance to increase security, renew economic growth, reduce overall violence, and seed the rule of law. A high-tech crop eradication effort, which has required deployment of fixed-wing spray planes on computerized grids of coca and heroin poppy, was paired with a commitment to sustainable alternative development. To intercept more of what was produced by narcotics trafficking groups, interdiction was reaffirmed as a priority in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean.

To be clear, the champions of this comprehensive effort to improve regional security, reduce terrorism, cut back cultivation, increase interdiction and extraditions -and thus, slowly but surely, improve Colombia's security position and economic prospects, while deterring expansion of the drug trade, were BOTH Democratic and Republican. They included Senators Leahy, Dodd, Biden, Feinstein and Graham, as surely as included Senators Hatch, Hutchison, Dole, DeWine and Coverdell. This was - and should remain - a bipartisan effort to secure our hemisphere.

At root, the theory is simply common sense. One of the oldest democracies in our hemisphere, and a leading economy that does hundreds of millions of dollars in trade with states as diverse as Vermont and California, New York and Florida, is at risk to both narcotics instability and widening terrorism.

We have made major gains. John Locke himself, in his seminal Second Treatise, made the point that people will not "mix their labor with the land" until there is a semblance of security. We see that in places other than Colombia. The difference is that, in Colombia, we are seeing a remarkable turn-about. It has taken more than give years, but the time is now to assess the progress and consolidate our mutual gains.

Yes, from Colombia comes a narcotics threat to America that ends tens of thousands of American lives annually, as surely as cancer silences thousands of Americans annually. We have not given up finding a cure for cancer, and we must press our gains each year to that end. Likewise, we cannot give up on the prospect of a revitalized, secure and democratic Colombia, free from the dehumanizing plague of narcotics - and we must press our gains to that end also.

Some note that, despite a resounding record of success along many indicia, Plan Colombia is not perfect. They are right. Despite a sustained, inspirational and truly courageous effort by President Uribe over the past four years to investigate, remove and bring to justice drug traffickers, terrorists, murderers, kidnappers, those in the government who are who are corrupt, those who have committed heinous crimes and those who violate human rights in any form, his society is still plagued.

Just as a Democratic or Republican president in America cannot answer for the crimes of those in his party elsewhere in government, more than to investigate, remove and prosecute them honestly, President Uribe cannot control all elements of government and society in his country.

But consider the alternative to his courage and commitment to his countrymen. Through President Uribe's determined cooperation with the United States Departments of State, Justice, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, USAID, DEA, FBI and others, we have made unprecedented inroads on countless social and security bases.

If our Defense and State Departments were not allowed, under the US Foreign Military Financing and US International Military Education and Training Programs, to train Colombian military and police officers in human rights and rule of law - no matter what the human imperfections between teaching and deployment are - exactly who would be doing that difficult job? The answer is simple - no one.

Accordingly, aside from all other statistical gains, some common sense should shine through here. Holding up vital military and law enforcement assistance at this critical time, even if the principle behind it is to seek more transparency, is self-defeating. Every day that passes without a sustained push toward progress in the security environment is a lost day. Too many lost days, and you will find the stone rolling backwards.

Denying a longtime and dedicated ally, like President Uribe's government, critical security resources and training at this time will be not just self-defeating. That course creates a self-fulfilling prophesy. After all, we can easily defeat our allies - and thus defeat gains to America's own security - by raising our allies expectations, making them dependent upon us for security assistance, offering to train and equip them against emerging threats - and then walk away, or delay aid so often that their confidence and progress toward security collapses .

Would that in the best interests of America? I think it would not be in our best interests. Rather, it seems to me that we live in a world where security should be cherished, rather than casually put at risk, even for what may seem a competing and noble aim.

Plan Colombia - and the progress that President Uribe has made to date, with American help, is nothing short of remarkable. The will of his countrymen, his personal courage, and the commitment of a bipartisan group of American leaders has allowed Colombia to turn a critical corner. These gains are a bright spot on a dark international canvas. We should all see that clearly, and plan for ways to consolidate these gains.

In the end, sound foreign policy does not mean we can insist on perfect outcomes, even from staunch allies. It means we live up to commitments made, set expectations high, remain true our word if progress is made, and continue along the often muddy road toward a better time. Doing this not only preserves current relationships with allies, but is the best chance of delivering both security and counter-narcotics gains for all Americans.

So, what are some of the gains to date from Plan Colombia? Here, the original bipartisan coalition of Democrats and Republicans should be proud of what they have accomplished. They have - with President Uribe's unflagging cooperation and commitment - accomplished a lot.

For example, while there is a modest increase in cocaine price and reduction in purity being recorded in the lagged DEA STRIDE data across the United States -not be discounted - there are also highly encouraging gains in the regional security and prosperity.

While we need to evolve our training and management into the hands of our South American neighbors, and rally greater European commitment to this counter-narcotics and security mission, an objective review of Plan Colombia's achievements makes the case for a solid return on the American investment, as well as for a follow-on push for congressional and administration action through at least 2012, or for a Plan Colombia, Version II. Here are some of the gains we do not want to lose.

  • Plan Colombia, by US, UN and Colombian estimates, has produced a reduction of 58 percent in heroin poppy cultivation and more than 50 percent in coca cultivation during its first five years. That is the definition of deterrence; consistent spraying means less planting. Less planting means more legitimate farming and less raw produce to refine. In 2006, the addition of newly surveyed lands, outside the original target area of State Department and Colombian eradiation, will require a sustained commitment even as the overall area under cultivation across the region continues to shrink.
  • Over the original five years, there has been a 97-percent decline in coca production in the onetime breadbasket of coca, the Puamayo region.
  • Discrediting the so-called "balloon effect," overall coca cultivation across the Andean Region fell by eight (8) percent in 2003. Across the area originally surveyed and targeted, reductions continued until uncertainty created by what appears to be uncommitted political leadership in Bolivia.
  • Relying on support from the US Departments of State, Justice and Defense, Colombia extradited more than 180 drug traffickers to the US between 2003 and 2005, including Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, head of the Cali Cartel. Prior to Plan Colombia, there were no such extraditions. Extraditions hit a record high in 2006, at 145. Even in 2002, there were only 34 drug-related extraditions to the United States.
  • Plan Colombia resources have helped the United States law enforcement community to convict and jail of more than 100 members of Colombia's Cali drug cartel, destroying the leadership and industrial capacity of the nation's largest cartel during this period.
  • Colombian and American forces have seized more than 500 tons of cocaine and coca base since 2003, with an estimated street value in the United States of more than five billion dollars. Since 1999, cocaine seizures have topped 850 tons. In 2006, eradication programs terminated an estimated 320 metric tons of cocaine production, and another 178 metric tons were interdicted. The estimated street value of those two figures is $847 million dollars not sent back to the narco-terrorist leadership. Without question, this money would have returned to feed narco-terrosim across the region, and would have contributed directly in the United States to more cocaine and crack-related street violence, addiction, automobile and workplace accidents, domestic violence, addiction and overdose deaths among young people.
  • "Cocaine seizures in Colombia have steadily increased every year since 2001," and "the 2004 seizures [145 metric tons] represent an increase of almost 120 percent over the 80 metric tons seized in 2001."[1] Moreover, "since August 2002, Colombian forces have seized nearly 1,200 kilograms of heroin."
  • Looking at the production side differently, Plan Colombia monies have allowed Colombia to dismantle far more production facilities. The number of cocaine-producing laboratories being destroyed annually has risen from 241 in 1999 to 2,198 in 2006. Again, the aim is deterrence and the numbers will eventually taper under the threat of enforcement.
  • In 2003, the Colombian Air Bridge Denial Program forced down or destroyed at least 28 aircraft laden with narcotics, visibly deterring air traffic in drugs, a program which continues to deter narcotics trafficking over covered regions.
  • In Colombia, one of the basic obstacles to establishing a lasting peace has been the absence of well-trained, ready, mobile and effective fighting forces - or security forces - to respond, in proper numbers and proportion, to the threat presented by narcotics-funded and motivated terrorism. The US Departments of State and Defense have been the pivot point in this effort. The Defense Department, for example, "provides human rights training and vets units with regard to abuses before it authorizes support" under ACI or Plan Colombia;[2]
  • By the end of 2005, the Defense Department had raised critical Colombian police and military troop strength to 374,000, a 34 percent increase over 2002, improved readiness with a wide range of specialized training, created more than 50 mobile police squadrons, and 15 mobile army brigades and "high mountain brigades.[3]
  • US training and support has allowed Colombia's security forces to put terrorists on the defensive. Colombian Government estimates suggest that the AUC membership numbers have been falling precipitously as desertions increase. The ELN is withering under similar pressures. FARC strength, while considerable, has fallen from a high near 17,0000 [some suggest 25,000] in 2002 to less than 12,000, unprecedented gains in the face of a drug-funded foe that operates across a jungle nation the size of the Eastern United States, and which cannot support law enforcement with an established transportation infrastructure across much of the country.
  • Notably, Plan Colombia has "helped fund [and sustain] the establishment of police units in 158 municipalities, many of which have not seen any government presence in decades." As a result, "for the first time in the recorded history of Colombia, all 1,098 of Colombia's municipalities . are under the control of federal authorities .an enormous step forward for the people of Colombia and their democratically elected government.[4]
  • Consistent with this restoration of order, fear is not as high as it was in many municipalities formerly overrun by terrorist or insurgent forces. Accordingly, the number of mayors who were required to exercise authority outside their municipality in 2002 was 131. Today, that number is zero, according to the most current State Department data.
  • Objective indicators of rising national stability in Colombia, resulting from our long-term and increased commitment, are also quite clear. For example, between 2002 and 2006 the homicide rate dropped 59.9%, from 28,837 murders recorded in 2002 to 17,277 in 2006. That is, for the record, a faster drop than the drop accomplished by former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani during his celebrated mayoral tenure.
  • More remarkably, State Department data confirm that kidnappings in Colombia fell by 254% from 2002 to 2006, from 1,645 recorded kidnappings to 646.
  • Similarly, but even more encouraging, recorded terrorist events have fallen over the period of Plan Colombia by more than 420%, from 2,882 in 2002 to 687 in 2006, a drop on par with the historic restoration of order in Peru and El Salvador during the 1990s.
  • Economic investment, growth and job creation have, as John Locke would have predicted, followed in suit. As national expectations have evolved toward greater security, economic growth has leaped upwards by more than five-fold since 2002. In 2002, Colombia struggled with a reported 1.47% growth rate and flight of capital. By 2006, the growth rate was a startling 7.68%, after a growth rate of 5.2 percent in 2005 and 4.79 percent in 2004.

By any standard, these metrics or measures represent astonishing progress, a thorough justification of the original bipartisan investment in regional ally for security, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics reasons, and a resounding endorsement for consolidating these gains with new investment.

One measure of success not often discussed is the degree to which we are leveraging Colombian commitment and resources. The struggle to hand-off or "Colombianize" the program, without dangerous backsliding that would imperil gains made for the United States and region, has been slow.

As in other parts of the world, we aim to create institutional capacity and empower the Colombians, not create lasting dependence. That balance is hard to achieve however, and requires continued security and economic support so long as the outcome of instability is probable without continued comprehensive engagement.

Our foreign policy has historically been one of empowering and assisting allies over hurdles, not becoming a rooted buttress in perpetuity. That said, the Colombians have been gaining ground and taking control of elements that they are confident they can handle.

President Uribe has taken the lead in police reinsertion across the country, and - as a matter of leveraging outcomes and dollars - Colombia reportedly spent $7 (seven) billion dollars on Plan Colombia programs between 2000 and 2005, matching the US commitment in those years of $4 (four) billion dollars. Looking forward, our commitment is likely to be matched again, based on an estimated "wealth tax" proposed by President Uribe over the next four years, and likely to produce an added $3.6 billion. That, again, is a promising indicator and justification for our continued support at present or higher levels.

The debate over the "proper balance" of security or "hard" foreign assistance - including law enforcement and military training and equipment - versus wider economic and social assistance, is deceptive.

First, security assistance is necessary for economic and social assistance to succeed in the long run.

Second, the military and law enforcement support allows an open and conditional "door" for teaching, monitoring and enforcing human rights with the very recipients of the aid.

Third, security assistance - to be competent - must be acquired, flown, managed and maintained at a threshold level that makes it worth the investment. That means that the prerequisite for social stability - the security that permits education, jobs, training and growth to flourish - must be adequate.

Fourth, trend lines have been in gradually moving in opposite directions for "hard' and "soft" program support, with security-related costs high but dropping slightly and slowing getting more support from Colombia, while social program needs have been slowly rising. The United States has reflected the trend lines with similar, if necessarily small, changes in assistance aid provided. Over time, the trend lines may both rise, plane out or fall off, but at present Colombia has been assuming more of its own "hard side" requirements, even in a threatening environment.

Fifth, some common sense applies. Utility and security helicopters, basic firearms and fixed wing aircraft cost more than books, bricks, mortar, seeds and fertilizer.

Likewise, pilot and security training can be more expensive and longer in duration than less technical social training. Costs are not one-for-one on either the assets needed to achieve an outcome or the costs of training. Accordingly, security equipment and personnel training - as in the United States - is often more costly, time consuming and perishable than support to manual labor or classroom training programs, even if both have equal value in the progress of the nation.

  • Perhaps the strongest argument for more "soft side" support by the United States Congress - and appeals to often silent and un-contributing European allies - is that the difficult task of securing a nation has begun and is well underway, as the metrics above indicate. We will need to continue to support that mission over the years ahead, as we have in places as diverse as Panama, Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti and Afghanistan. But we must now also add the push that will assist Colombia in education, employment, crop substitution, and demobilizing tens of thousands of former insurgents and those who will then gain a vested interest in longer term security.

Continuing Challenges

These achievements argue strongly for a second round of investment in Colombia on the military and civilian sides, whether through the next three years, five years or on some other timeframe. That having been said, major challenges remain. "Consolidating gains" will take time.

These challenges double as important reasons for making a well-benchmarked and overseen federal commitment to this regional ally.

  • Support regional counter-drug efforts through continued deterrence. Regional deterrence of narcotics cultivation, production and transshipment requires a continuing effort to permanently deter major narcotics cultivation and drug-funded terrorism in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Panama - deterrence requires consistency and predictability.
  • Build momentum toward reduced drug availability on American streets. We must continue to strive to build on the momentum created by modest changes in price and purity of Colombian cocaine and heroin arriving on US shores, and this may become more likely as the synergy of border legislation, increased interdiction of all kinds, intelligence sharing and regional counter-drug efforts tie-in with Plan Colombia's efforts to stabilize, diminish coca and heroin poppy cultivation and production, spur legitimate trade, and reduce overall drug transshipments to the United States.
  • Buttress regional democracy by support to Colombia's democracy. Colombia's democratic future could have a direct effect on the future of democracy in the region and other nations in the immediate proximity, of special note, Venezuela and Bolivia, both of which are presently governed by strongly anti-American leadership.
  • Support continued legitimate economic growth. Colombia's progress - a favorable security and economic growth trend line - requires a US effort to sustain that trend line, and we must not drop our end of the lifeline we have offered too soon. Toward this end, support the widening of legitimate trade to open new markets for legitimate crops and products and diminish the draw of illegal crops and products.
  • Enlist greater European support for counter-drug efforts. Colombian cocaine is now spreading across Europe, and we must press European allies to contribute more and become more engaged, for their sake, ours and Colombia's.
  • Stay vigilant for terrorism from south in Western Hemisphere. Post-911, the threat of terrorist infiltration or coordination with drug trafficking organization in this hemisphere has grown and remains significant. We must not underestimate the direct threat posed to US borders from the south. A robust and multi-tiered level of commitment to Colombia and the region assists in blunting that threat, through shared intelligence and operations.
  • Assist Colombia in stabilizing through demobilization of insurgents. A demobilization solution may lie in well-articulated conditions - of a kind that the United States can live with legally and politically - together with a clear recognition that the Colombian People must move this effort forward. Needed will be a clear, swift and full synthesis of the legal restrictions inherent in the FTO listing process, legal limits on provision of material aid to former members of an FTO organization, legal or legislative permission to pursue or support various types of demobilization (not violating other restrictions) and an understanding of the conditions presently on the ground in Colombia.
  • Stay firm on extradition to US of primary terrorists. Needed will be an unequivocal stand on extradition requirements and expectations of the United States to assure respect for rule of law, honoring of US indictments, and future cooperation, as well as a firm, consistent and robust commitment at this critical time to the resources necessary to consolidate gains in the peace process, as well as the collateral and related realms to assure longer term deterrence.
  • Set benchmarks, measures and timelines for partial transition to Colombians. Specifically, we will need a reasonable timeline agreed by Congress, in the interagency and with Colombians for official "hand-off" to Colombia (or "to Colombianize)" much of the existing Plan Colombia commitment - and ultimately major parts of the Plan Colombia (ACI) commitment to the region. While we should remain engaged and supportive, for reasons tied directly to our national interest and oversight, a reasonable timeline should, after a date certain for evolved management by the Colombian government, affect overall appropriations, potential authorization language for State and Defense Department authorization bills, and even multi-lateral commitments.
  • Congressional and Administration unity and forward movement is key. The perfect cannot be allowed to become the enemy of the good. High level unity behind a next step over the three to five years ahead is needed. Without sustained authorization for the US Departments of Defense, State and Justice, as well as a continuing funding commitment for training and supporting the Colombian security forces, we will lose precious time and allow instability to rise in Colombia and across the region.
  • The comprehensive Plan Colombia architecture, which has worked well in the Andean Region and Colombia, can and should be applied - swiftly and with benchmarking - to Afghanistan to save that fledgling democracy. The support should be at least on par with support in Colombia. In Colombia, which has established substantial gains under Plan Colombia to date, and in Afghanistan, which has much further to travel on all key indicators of success, all security-dependent achievements are placed at risk by inaction. New risks will likely expand if continuity on security and counter-narcotics are exchanged for short-term budget savings. In Colombia, as in Afghanistan, regional instability will grow without a sound counterweight, economically and politically. In both locations, different as they are, drug-production and drug-funded terrorism could ricochet across the region, and outside the region, with increased intensity.
  • Bipartisan support for steady security and eradication programs, as well as increased social support to encourage demobilization, is vital. Absent bipartisan and coordinated effort, democratic and criminal justice reforms could be sidetracked for more authoritarian or socialist agendas across the region. In the Western hemisphere, American dependence on Colombian, Venezuelan and South American oil and mineral supplies could trigger a crisis in confidence, if not imports, with associated price spikes.
  • Wide area information and intelligence sharing in the Western Hemisphere is protected by continuing Plan Colombia. Intelligence and information sharing multilaterally and bilaterally could plunge without a continuation at present levels of the Plan Colombia formula for advances. Such a development could have unpredictable effects on regional and U.S. security. Not least, a generation of movement forward on counter-narcotics, security cooperation, economic development, human rights, environmental dialogue and hemispheric co-dependence could be lost.

At the end of the five years concluding in 2005, we can look back with some sense of real progress made. We now must look forward, and press for a second period of well-planned, meaningful, operationally robust, strategically sound security and counter-narcotics gains. The time is upon us for taking action, yet again. For America - and for our allies - we must step up and reach outward, come to consensus and set new goals. Plan Colombia - in fact - saves lives every day in every state America. We must congratulate those who produced its first phase, and move swiftly and decisively to the second. Thank you.

Robert B. Charles, former Assistant Secretary of State, INL (2003-2005).

[1] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (INL) Jonathan D. Farrar, before US House International Relations Committee, May 11, 2005.

[2] CRS Report to Congress, "Colombia: Issues for Congress," January 19, 2005, at 16.

[3] See, e.g., Stephen Johnson, The Heritage Foundation, "Helping Colombia Sustain Progress Toward Peace," Backgrounder No. 1887, October 19, 2005, at 7.

[4] Id.



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