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Lansiné Kaba
Madeleine Haas Russell Distinguished Visiting Professor
Brandeis University, Waltham MA 02454
Disclosure: None

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
Hearing March 22, 2007

PREVENTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST AUTOCRACY IN GUINEA

Chairman Tom Lantos and Distinguished Members of the Committee, I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to discuss with you about the events in the Republic of Guinea. The views being expressed here today represent mine alone, although they are shared by the vast majority of Guineans. Before making the recommendations that I consider urgent to improve the chances for democratic change in Guinea, I will present an introduction addressing the diverse questions that your staff sent to me.

INTRODUCTION

General Situation

Guinea under its current authoritarian, inept, and corrupt regime is disrupting the orderly conceived scheme of development and security involving the whole Gulf of Guinea region. The assets (natural and human resources) of this region import very much in global security terms. The general dissatisfaction of the youth, the civilian and business elites, the general strikes of January and February 2007, which were followed by a ruthless military crackdown, all these point to a deep crisis. In other words, Guinea under Lansana Conté has become another failed state with a leadership that has lost its legitimacy. It is in the U.S. national interest to take preventive measures to avert the worsening of the disaster.

After saying "No" to General De Gaulle in 1958 and opting for liberty, Guinea experienced a one-party state dictatorship under Marxist leaning President Sékou Touré, who cooperated, however, with the U.S. on strategic and investment issues. Guineans have lived under two forms of authoritarian rule. The first, led by Sékou Toure between 1958 and 1984, belonged to what may be labeled as a "totalitarianism of history". It was disciplined and brutal, rigid and visionary, for it obeyed an ethic of government. On the other hand, President Conté's rule is a "one man's authoritarianism". It relies on corruption with impunity, a coercive and disorderly administrative system with deregulation aimed at enriching the president and his acolytes.

Misuse of power, poverty, and danger of Islamic extremism

Misrule and theft have exacerbated poverty and lawlessness. Guinea, with its impoverished population living on less than two dollars a day ranks at the bottom of the U.N. development index. Guineans have neither electricity nor running water. This is a paradox for a country that has immense agricultural and hydro-electric potential and West Africa's main sources of water.

Income disparity has resulted in a harsh social inequality that has fostered the climate of crime and insecurity that mars Guineans' daily life. Such conditions pose serious security risks in this region including important Muslim communities in war-recovering Liberia and Sierra Leone and civil-war divided Côte d'Ivoire. Impoverished young people may be easily indoctrinated to join terrorist organizations. Indeed young Muslims are responding to newer and more radical forms of Islam.

Like most former colonies, Guinea is an amalgamation of various pre-colonial entities. Sunni Islam appeared there in the middle of the 11th century, in its tolerant and peaceful form carried by traders and itinerant teachers. This pre-colonial integration has somehow contributed to the solidarity and unity of Guinean peoples, although every one is not a Muslim. This Islamic culture has been associated with the Sunni Maliki tradition that has been prevalent in West Africa; it has also involved the two Qadiri and Tijani brotherhoods. These two orders have long dominated the Muslim scene, with their vertical and horizontal structures linking the leaders and the disciples and seeking to serve the spiritual and material needs of their followers. Brotherhoods have been known for both their quietism and their capacity to involve their members into political activities. A newer Islamic doctrine imported from Egypt in the late 1940s radicalized the religious and political ideologies at the time of decolonization. After 1958, President Sékou Touré controlled both the traditional and radical trends by giving Islam an official status and by strengthening the ties with the international Muslim organizations. Touré, with the kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco, was a co-founder of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC). Islam has played a vital role in Guinea.

Economic hardship under the existing regime has fostered a reawakening among some groups against the "corrupt and mixed Islam" associated with the government and against the "evils of modernity", as the unrest in Fouta Djallon in the 1990s indicated. Moreover, the influx of refugees from war-torn neighboring countries, including a sizable number of migrant Lebanese, Iranian and Indo-Pakistani traders who follow the Shi'a Islam, has led to the rise of a small and secretive group of new fundamentalists. These individuals are actively involved in proselytizing on the margins of the larger Muslim communities. It is difficult to predict whither this new trend. If the current crisis persists, there is no doubt that some members of these new radicals may be attracted to Islamic extremism and even to al-Qaida. It is equally thinkable that the teachers and students in the traditional Koranic schools may react against the corruption symbolized by Conté's regime by positively responding to the fundamentalists' call to revive the faith and build a more just society.

From a military council to autocracy

Conté and the senior officers who seized power in 1984 claimed their allegiance to liberalism and human rights. In reality, except for the sectors of trade and production, there was no liberalization, no freedom of expression and association. In 1984, Conté might not have been considered an autocrat. He impressed people by his inquisitiveness, his calm detachment as well as his eagerness to learn. He delegated authority to cabinet members and his aids, thereby making them responsible for their actions. Yet, he presided over a military council that displayed the problems inherent in regimes that are born out of coups d'état, notably, in-fighting amongst the officer-corps that is followed by arrests and summary trials.

The military regime's image drastically changed on July 4, 1985, with the announcement of the discovery of a coup attempt by Conté's foes among Mandinka officers. This maneuver enabled Conté and his cohorts to summarily execute their foes and the dignitaries of the previous regime. This amounted almost to the beginning of genocide. Since then, Colonel Conté, who got promoted to the rank of general, has assumed full power.

In 1989, President Conté he declared his intention to make Guinea a constitutional multiparty democracy, and such a new constitution was approved in December 1990. He ignored, however, the rules by flagrantly tampering with the presidential elections of December 18, 1993. Since then, Guinea has been known for its illegitimate institutions born out of a fraudulent voting system favorable to the president and his ruling party. The state, the judiciary, the army, the school and the health system, all is corrupt.

For President Conté, what is honorable is to act with distinction and to come to terms with the inevitable, that is, to honorably retire from political life. This is the only way to restore his dignity and to deserve a praiseworthy place in history. Guineans can then elaborate a national reconstruction plan under the government mandated by the revolution of January-February 2007. They will transform poverty into abundance, by transcending the sorrow of the past or the feelings of revenge. Guinea must not go the way of Rwanda and Liberia. From their spiritual and collective experiences, Guineans know that "the essence of a nation is that all the individuals have many things in common and that all have forgotten many things." This view of Ernest Renan speaks to the power of dialogue and reconciliation that, acting like a catharsis, creates the energy to progress.

The current crisis and the role of the unions

Guineans have lived in the midst of an unprecedented poverty since 2000. Poverty has propelled them to challenge their government. Consistent with the history of Guinean decolonization, union protests and popular mobilization have galvanized the struggle and have driven Conté into a corner. Having become the impediment to progress, he should relinquish power.

Historically, the unions and the student groups have been the only forces to resist successfully the regime. Like elsewhere in autocratic regimes, "student dissidents have long been a fixture" in Guinean politics, while protest by unions have been periodic. When the two agitations coalesce to form a broad-based movement, the situation becomes critical. For example, in October 1990, civil servants and students challenged the government on social issues. The police wounded many students, and some died. In early December 1990, the army occupied the campus of the University of Conakry. From March until May 1991, a long strike by students and teachers, followed by a general strike, showed the unpopularity of the government. In October 1991, following agitation by students, the city of Kankan was placed on military curfew, and some civilians were killed. The unrest continued in the schools until the end of the year, with many acts of brutality by the security forces. In 2004 and 2005, the students of Conakry and Faranah led a strike that the army violently repressed.

President Conté's refusal to meet with the opposition leaders, let alone to create a unity government, heightened the crisis. By January 2006, Guinea had entered a period of unrest associated with demands by the unions for greater wages and better social welfare. They also demanded payments of arrears of months of unpaid salaries and compensations. In June 2006, the strike paralyzed the country, and the police, the military, and the presidential guards used deadly force against the throngs of demonstrators. The government made many promises but failed to honor them.

In January 2007, the conditions were ripe for new unrest and even more violent protest. The unions launched a nationwide strike with the support of civil society, students and the whole nation. Their demands shifted from working conditions to political reform. The armed forces, including, it is alleged, Liberian and Bissau fighters, opened fire in war-type operations that made hundreds of victims. This brutal and bloody repression could not stop the protest. President Conté declared martial law, and the whole country was under siege for two weeks. When martial law was removed, the negotiations resumed. The government once again made promises; but it did not carry them out.

On February 9, 2007, the unrest resumed upon the nomination of a prime minister whom the whole nation unanimously rejected. By the intensity of the revolt and the level of the repression, this marked a turning point in the struggle. The entire country became the theater of massive riots, looting, and destruction of government buildings. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed and wounded. These events made international news. The union leaders demanded that the president relinquish power to a "consensus" prime minister who will lead the country with his own appointed government until the next presidential election in 2009. The future of Guinea under Conté remains bleak.

Recommendations

Therefore, the situation calls for urgent actions. Although catastrophic, it can be saved through pressure and diplomacy, mobilization and determination, assistance and self-reliance. Major economic and humanitarian interests are at stake and require immediate attention. Furthermore, the U.S., the European Union and their allies have a security interest in this region of West Africa. If Guinea 'falls apart', an unpredictable chaos will ensue. This has serious consequences for its people, its neighbors and its partners.

To begin improving the conditions, it will be useful to put at work the doctrine of "Transformational Diplomacy" advocated by Secretary Condoleezza Rice. If my reading is correct, this doctrine requires that people in jeopardy of privation and tyranny help themselves first. Guineans have died in great numbers for their struggle to end corruption and administrative lawlessness and to promote democracy and development. They believe now that it is incumbent upon the international community, and especially the U.S., the European Union and other Guinea's partners and the Gulf of Guinea countries to assist them in their struggle against a despotic and unproductive regime.

*1. In my judgment, the U.S. leadership in this transformational project is paramount. Guineans view the U.S. as a powerful partner in the struggle for good governance, democracy and economic growth. They know that the U.S. has trained hundreds of Guinean troops in counterinsurgency against Liberia's Charles Taylor, and therefore believe that Washington can put strong pressure on President Conté.

The U.S. leadership is vital. Its effort should include a clear and forceful statement about what is unacceptable in Conté's regime. Within this perspective, the American ambassador statement about martial law in February 2007 was most encouraging. Such statements must be followed by concrete actions if President Conté insists on derailing the advance of good governance and democracy. He should know that the U.S. thinks that it is time for him to relinquish power and to remove the military from the political arena.

I also think that the U.S. should initiate high level discussions with other states interested in Guinea in order to develop a common position on issue of transfer of power to democratically elected leaders and to embark on a program of isolation of the regime if Conté refuses to take the path of democracy.

The U.S. government should also get the American corporations working in Guinea to become players in good governance. I know that corporations refrain from open involvement in political matters in their host countries in order not to jeopardize their activities. In their home countries, however, they should apply all their leverage with the government and Congress to improve the climate in Guinea. They can also assist Guinean private sector, women, grassroots and other organizations through seminars and any other useful means. International donors can also affect the cause of change by working with non-governmental organizations that are active in Guinean productive and social arena.

*2. The U.S. should intensify its contact with the Guinean army. Training Guinean armed forces in human rights, in civilian-soldiers relations and appreciation of international issues is imperative, given their role in the repression of the strikes in 2006 and 2007. Such projects will require extensive training in English, which may be achieved within the country.

*3. In other words, a vigorous political will to change the regime in Guinea is mandatory. Guineans want it and are ready for it. Such an action need not be viewed as interference with Guinea's sovereignty. For Conté tampered with elections to accede to the presidency and to make his party the ruling party at the National Assembly. In the eyes of majority of Guineans he lacks legitimacy.

*4. The departure of Conté and the vigilant involvement of the new generation in the fight against embezzlement will reduce corruption and will ensure more investments in Guinea's immense mineral deposits. Such funds will enhance the orderly growth of the economy, will boost Guinean entrepreneurial class and will give the people an opportunity to improve their livelihood. A stronger and more stable Guinea will be a reliable partner in securing peace and stability in the Gulf of Guinea region. Such an achievement will contribute to the multi-faceted war on terror, including drug smuggling, arms-trafficking and religious fanaticism that threaten the whole world.

*5. Conté's decision on January 27, 2007 to delegate part of his powers to a fully responsible, 'consensus' prime minister and his subsequent appointment of Ambassador Lansana Kouyaté to this new office seem to be a good sign. However, the crisis is far from being resolved because Conté abhors power sharing. Hence, for the sake of peace and security, the U.S. and the international community must use all their leverage to compel him to adopt an immediate and realistic plan that involves:

- The establishment of constitutional guarantees that legitimize and strengthen the authority of the prime minister as a true chief of government;
- A broad based government of transition;
- The end of Conté's habit of interfering with the activities of government, banks and the courts;
- The submission of army senior officers to the prime minister;
- The introduction of major program of juridical and financial assistance to strengthen efficiency and integrity in the administration.

Prime Minister Kouyaté and his government should be encouraged to organize a national consensus on a framework for future elections and major developmental and security issues that will make Guinea a respected partner in ECOWAS, the Gulf of Guinea countries and in the international community.

All means must be put in place to oblige President Conté to abide by these principles. If he persists in impeding the advance of democracy and development, he deserves, as other dictators, to be ousted. The survival of a country is more important than that of an individual.