Linda Thomas-Greenfield
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State
March 22, 2007
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon and thank you, Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith for calling a hearing on the west African nation of Guinea. This is a timely and important issue. I am pleased to represent the Department of State and to highlight our ongoing efforts in pursuit of peace and democratic change in Guinea. Our efforts in Guinea are a prime example of Transformational Diplomacy as we are using "America's diplomatic power to help others better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures." The people of Guinea are doing just that, and we are supporting them on that journey.
After two months of historic grassroots mobilization, sometimes violent unrest, and political stalemate throughout Guinea, political, labor union and civil society leaders reached a settlement with the government at the end of February. We are cautiously optimistic about the viability of this agreement. Lansana Kouyaté's appointment as the new consensus prime minister and head of government may represent Guinea's best chance to move forward toward greater transparency and democratic governance. Failure on the part of Guinea's leadership to implement the accord or to meet the legitimate demands of the Guinean people for positive change would signal the final loss of the leadership's credibility and would prove a sad legacy for President Lansana Conté.
The United States Government deplores the violence and destruction that took place during the general strike and the subsequent state of siege declared by President Conté. We are saddened by the loss of life and the many injuries. We have publicly demanded that the perpetrators be held accountable through a credible investigation.
We welcome the progress evidenced by the January 27 and February 25 accords. Prime Minister Kouyaté possesses strong qualifications to confront the challenges at hand: 20-plus years of diplomatic and political experience with the Government of Guinea, the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), La Francophonie, and other governmental organizations. Equally important, Kouyaté's name appeared on all lists submitted to mediators as acceptable choices for consensus Prime Minister. The Guinean people have invested their trust, confidence, and hopes in him.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The recent developments represent a new chapter in Guinea's history. The general strike and public demonstrations mark the first time since Guinea gained independence in 1958 that the people have taken to the streets en masse to demand political change from the nation's leadership. It was the culmination of a series of political and social advances over the last 18 months that awakened civil society, mobilized union leaders, and empowered citizens to give voice to their concerns. U.S. Government programs and initiatives have played a key role in encouraging these developments by bringing together the relevant stakeholders and encouraging dialogue among civil society, political parties and the military.
President Conté's acceptance of ECOWAS' mediation represents an important first for Guinea. While we do not expect that the ongoing situation to have an immediate, deleterious effect on regional stability, the long-term possibility remains. Several regional leaders have privately and publicly expressed their concerns about Guinea. We are working closely with regional leaders and institutions to ensure the long-term stability of this volatile sub-region. We welcome the energetic efforts of ECOWAS, in addressing regional security problems and will continue to support their initiatives.
The United States has always stood firmly with the people of Guinea in their quest for stability, greater democracy, improved governance and more responsible management of Guinea's vast natural resources. The assistance we provided to help Guinea protect its borders during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts has placed the United States in a unique position of influence among Guinea's friends in the international community. We will continue to use that position to advocate for democracy and good governance in Guinea, in keeping with our policy in the region and throughout the world.
SUPPORT FOR GUINEA'S POPULAR MOVEMENT
Throughout the January and February crises in Guinea, the United States actively sought a peaceful, negotiated resolution that would move Guinea toward improved democratic governance. There has been a severe lack of transparent or accountable resource management. That, coupled with poor overall economic governance, has been a primary source of fragility within Guinea. In almost 50 years since independence, no government has succeeded in transforming Guinea's great potential into a minimally acceptable standard of living for the vast majority of the population.
The United States has sought to combat corruption, promote civic participation, and build civil society's capacity to advocate for, and insist upon, government accountability. Since 2001, the U.S. Mission in Guinea has supported a series of constructive national level dialogues, which have assembled the main stakeholders to discuss the major issues of governance and political reform, including media liberalization, electoral processes, and civil-military relations.
Several events precipitated the general strike in January; Guinea's third such strike in less than a year's time. In December, President Conté personally released from prison two of his close associates, Mamadou Sylla and Fodé Soumah, who had been under investigation for embezzling funds from Guinea's Central Bank. Later that month, Conté-just days after dismissing Ibrahima Keira, the Minister of Transportation, who was allegedly connected to the central bank controversy-reversed the decision and reinstated Keira, reportedly because of family pressure.
The union confederation, which through 2006 had been fighting for improved labor conditions, reacted with dismay. Already concerned that the government was not meeting earlier commitments, labor leaders stopped ongoing dialogue and called for the general strike, suspended since last June, to recommence on January 10. For the labor unions and, indeed, most Guineans, President Conté's actions highlighted his autocratic style and his complete disregard for the separation of powers. The unions charged that the Government of Guinea was no longer a credible interlocutor.
Whereas the unions' demands during the March and June 2006 strikes were primarily economic, the January strike began with a political tone. In addition to their economic agenda for improved wages and retirement benefits, the unions demanded that the two prisoners be returned to jail and that Conté rescind his decision to reinstate the Minister of Transportation.
When the unions met President Conté face-to-face on January 16, they provided him with a written list of demands and called for his retirement. By the next day, the security situation began to deteriorate rapidly, as protesters barricaded roads, threw rocks, burned tires and skirmished with police. On January 17, President Conté publicly dismissed the unions' political demands for change. In response, the unions and civil society organizations called for increased public protests.
On January 22, the Guinean people demonstrated that they had had enough of corrupt governance. Tens-if not hundreds-of thousands of ordinary Guineans poured into the streets calling for change. The military, especially the "red beret" presidential guard, reacted, opening fire on the peaceful crowds and killing dozens in Conakry and throughout Guinea. Security forces arrested union leaders, who were released later that evening, but only after the U.S. Ambassador and others protested, emphasizing that the eyes of the international community were on Guinea. President Conté denied authorizing the arrests.
On January 27, union, business and government representatives signed a tripartite agreement to suspend the strike. President Conté agreed to name a new "consensus" prime minister, with delegated executive powers. For the first time, the new prime minister of Guinea would carry the title of "head of government" and exercise certain powers previously held by the President of the Republic. The Government of Guinea also agreed to new price controls for rice and fuel, as well a one-year ban on the exportation of food and fuel. President Conté signed the accord on January 31.
On February 9, President Conté announced the selection of Eugène Camara as Guinea's new prime minister. Within hours, the announcement sparked another wave of violence and protests. A longtime member of the government and currently serving as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, Camara's loyal service to Conté over the preceding 10 years disqualified him in the eyes of the unions and general public, who viewed his selection as a provocation and a rejection of the January 27th agreement. Throughout Guinea, the people rose, targeting government offices and the properties of government officials. Governors, prefects, subprefects, and other centrally appointed government representatives were driven out of many towns, leaving large areas of Guinea without governance, except that provided by local elected officials and traditional leaders.
On February 12, President Conté declared a "state of siege," which conferred broad powers on the military, and implemented a strict curfew. According to media reports, the following days saw military and police forces scour Conakry and towns in the hinterlands where they committed serious human rights abuses.
The declaration of the state of siege sent shockwaves across Guinea, as it reminded many people of the brutal repression of the Sékou Touré regime. The strict military curfew and the presence of armed soldiers in the streets effectively ended negotiations as the unions and civil society, the objects of threats and intimidation by Conté supporters, feared for their lives.
On February 14, through the U.S. Ambassador in Conakry, we put the Guinea Chief of Defense Staff, General Kerfalla Camara, on notice that he and the men under his command would be held accountable for their actions, including grave violations of human rights. We urged the immediate lifting of the state of siege and the resumption of political dialogue.
On February 16, we issued a strongly worded public statement condemning the state of siege, the use of lethal force against the civilian population, the abrogation of basic freedoms, and the roll-back of the democratic process. The statement called for restraint and reaffirmed that Guinean armed forces, security forces, and civilian officials involving in abuses against the civilian population must be held accountable. It stated that the disorder that plagues Guinea reflects widespread popular discontent caused by decades of poor governance. We called for the lifting of the state of siege, the return of the military to their barracks, the restoration of basic freedoms, the resumption of political dialogue, and the restoration of civilian rule. Most importantly, the statement called on all Guineans to use constructive dialogue and the constitutional means at their disposal to bring about the changes necessary to resolve the crisis and to establish effective, democratic governance.
Behind the scenes, the U.S. Mission intervened to support the political process. The U.S. Ambassador successfully urged Guinea's military leadership to ensure for the safety of the union leaders so that negotiations could recommence in a secure context. We also reached out to union leaders and encouraged them to give negotiations another chance.
From February 14 through February 22, we intervened with Prime Minister Eugène Camara, Foreign Minister Mamady Condé, National Assembly President Aboubacar Somparé, Supreme Court President Lamine Sidimé, Chief of Defense Staff Kerfalla Camara, and other generals of the military command. The U.S. Ambassador expressed our concerns and urged these top Guinean leaders to face the reality that the country was teetering on the edge of chaos due partially to a leadership vacuum at the top. Reiterating U.S. policy against coups and other extra-constitutional changes of government, we sought to persuade these senior officials that it was time for them to use the constitutional means at their disposal to initiate a political transition that would address Guinea's need for strong, democratic leadership.
On February 23, the National Assembly rejected a Conté initiative for the first time ever by refusing to extend the "state of siege" declaration. That rebuke by the National Assembly clarified that the popular protests had widespread support, even among leaders of the PUP, Conté's own majority party. Concurrently, an ECOWAS delegation led by former Nigerian President Ibrahima Babangida and ECOWAS Secretariat President Ibn Chambas arrived to mediate.
Two days later, ECOWAS special envoy and former Nigerian President Babangida announced that President Conté had agreed to name a new consensus prime minister from lists of acceptable candidates submitted by the unions and civil society. Lansana Kouyaté arrived in Conakry on February 27, just hours after being announced as the new Prime Minister and head of the government.
IMPACT OF REGIONAL INTERVENTION
Throughout the crisis, regional leaders continued to express their concern about the situation in Guinea and the possibility that unrest might unsettle the peace-building efforts elsewhere in the fragile sub-region. Despite President Conte's twice refusing ECOWAS delegations led by Senegalese President Wade and Nigerian President Obasanjo, ECOWAS mediation, under former Nigerian President Babangida proved key to resolving to the crisis.
Both during and after the crisis, the Bush Administration has continued to work with ECOWAS. We have cooperated in our effort to identify the best means of encouraging a democratic, peaceful, constitutional, and civilian-led political transition within Guinea.
In addition to the Babangida-led ECOWAS mediation, several of the sub-regional governments have sent representatives to visit Guinea and express their support for the negotiated settlement to the crisis. Presidents Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone met with Conté and other officials on February 20. In speaking with regional leaders, the Department of State has repeatedly heard the refrain that President Conté's time has passed and Guinea must begin its transition to a post-Conté environment. However, despite the nearly unanimous consensus among these regional leaders - excluding notably African Union leader Alpha Konaré - many of these same leaders are hesitant to call publicly for Conté to retire.
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
While Prime Minister Kouyaté's appointment has significantly eased tension within Guinea, the underlying sources of instability remain, because a clear process of political transition is still lacking. Kouyaté has initiated the process of forming a new government, consulting widely with all sectors of Guinean society. He has taken control of government spending to prevent further embezzlement or mismanagement of funds. He succeeded in persuading President Conté to allow a significant restructuring of the government, reducing the number of ministers from 32 to 19.
That said, President Conté has not yet signed a draft decree dissolving the current government nor has he named a new government of consensus. Whether Conté and the old-guard political elite allow Kouyaté to form a new consensus government will determine whether the current calm is fleeting or sustainable. If Conté and the old guard continue to refuse to share power and fail to respond to the demands of Guineans, we are likely to see a new round of political unrest and violence. And this time, we may see the end of the Conté regime.
We are now studying how the United States Government can best assist a new Kouyaté-led government, once it is named, and continue to demonstrate our desire for improved governance and transparency in Guinea. If Kouyaté succeeds in naming an entirely new, broad-based government, we will quickly reach out to that government and offer significant assistance for the legislative elections, independent media, and nationwide political dialogue. We encourage the government to lead a national effort to involve all Guineans in a process to envision and plan for the future of the country. Long-term resolution of Guinea's conflict will require the participation and contributions of all citizens in the country and in the diaspora in creating a new roadmap for progress and reform. .
CONCLUSION
Today, Guinea stands at a crossroads. It is incumbent upon President Conté and his inner circle to demonstrate that they are heeding the people's demand for political change. In fact, this is almost certainly their last chance. Prime Minister Kouyaté must demonstrate concretely and publicly that he has heard the people and will bring positive, free, and open political change to Guinea. The United States has an ongoing role to play, as a friend, in helping the new government succeed in these efforts.
Through diplomatic persuasion, the United States and African leaders have succeeded in promoting dialogue and negotiation as the best way to end the political crisis and strengthen the consensus-building process in Guinea. Before, during, and after the crisis, U.S. engagement has consistently focused on building Guinea's capacity to work its way through this tough political transition. We will continue to encourage Guinea's citizens to employ constitutional means to change the system from one that caters to a few to one that represents and delivers services to all Guineans.
The United States and the broader international community stand ready to support the efforts of Guinea's population to establish more representative, democratic, and transparent governance. President Conté appointed a new consensus Prime Minister with delegated powers as head of government, but it remains uncertain whether Conté has heard and understood the demands of his people and will allow democratic change to take root in earnest.
Thank you again, Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith, for calling today's hearing. I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
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