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TESTIMONY OF DR. HERSCHELLE S. CHALLENOR
Former Team Leader for Democracy and Governance, USAID/Guinea
Hearing on Prospects for Peace in Guinea, March 22, 2007
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

Mr. Chairman,

Members of the Subcommittee,

I am very pleased to appear before this important Subcommittee that has distinguished itself over the years by providing pivotal insights and policy guidance on U.S. foreign policy and economic assistance to Africa. As requested, my remarks this afternoon will focus on the challenges to democracy in Guinea and several policy recommendations to Congress and the administration to address this situation. However, with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I first want to suggest that the key issue for Guinea is not peace, it has experienced nearly a half of century of relative peace imposed by authoritarianism. What Guinea needs instead is political and social justice combined with economic prosperity, in short good political and economic governance.

Over the past two months, Guinea has undergone the most remarkable, yet tragic events in the 49 years of its independence. As a result the third national strike in Guinea begun January 10, 2007 led by the joint public and private USTG-CNTG labor union federations with the active support of Guinean civil society, the Guinean people assisted by the mediation of the Economic Commission for West Africa (ECOWAS) envoys, have succeeded in convincing President Lansana Conté to appoint a consensus Prime Minister and Chief of Government.

This victory was achieved at an intolerably high price of at least 130 reported deaths, thousands of wounded, and untold numbers of people arrested, beaten and women raped by of Guinean defense and security forces. President Conté and other persons responsible for these flagrant crimes against humanity should be brought to justice. President Conté's appointment of a consensus Prime Minister on February 27th hopefully will signal the beginning of the end of 23 years of his patrimonial, kleptocratic rule since 1984. The new Prime Minister, Lansana Kouyaté from Kouroussa is the former Representative to the Côte d'Ivoire of the intergovernmental Association of Francophone States and he has served in several ambassadorial posts abroad.

However, in view of the pattern of President Conté's "one step forward and two steps backwards" political actions over the period of his regime and especially during the past three years, it is difficult to believe he will relinquish all political power. Nearly one month has passed since Lansana Kouyaté's appointment and, although he announced last week that the new government will have only 19 instead of 33 ministers and that and that the incumbent cabinet members should resign, he still has not named the members of his cabinet. A Guinea Internet news service reported on March 20 that the Cabinet will be announced this week, but also noted that the President will have 3 ministers who report directly to him, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister. Since President Conté's previous actions have demonstrated that he does not live up to his commitments and during the strike he told union leaders that he has :never lost a battle," that he "has killed before and will kill them," the crisis in Guinea had not ended. Therefore, this is a critical juncture in what could either lead to a decisive transition of power in Guinea, or more unrest, and even conflict that could create political instability in the neighboring states of Liberia and Sierra Leone that are trying to rebuild their societies after their own devastating civil wars.

An examination of the reasons the USTG-CNTG gave in announcing their national strike on January 10, 2007, which are listed below, reveal the failure of the Guinean government to respect its own commitments. Union leaders called this strike-the third one since the first union national strike February 27, 2006, because of the

  • President's interference with judicial decisions by liberating in December 2 citizens, Mamadou Sylla, a businessman and Fodé Soumah,[1] following their arrest for corruption;
  • Inability of the Central Bank to provide foreign reserves required by the commercial banks in Guinea for trade operations, which resulted in a large Guinea government (GoG) debt to the Central Bank, thereby increasing the cost of living for Guineans;
  • Demonstrated inability of the GoG to stop the depreciation of the Guinean Franc, leading to inflation and the dramatic decline of Guineans' purchasing power;
  • Violation of Article 18 of Guinea's Constitution and ILO Conventions Nos. 87, 98, which guarantee the independence of labor unions;
  • Notable severe incapacity of the President [after seven years of increasing failing health and recent dementia] to correctly perform the duties conferred upon him by the Guinean people;
  • Notorious indifference of the National Assembly, Supreme Court, and the National Economic and Social Council to this calamitous situation; and the
  • Fact that the USTG-CNTG no longer have any credible leaders either from the government or the private sector (Patronat) [following Mamadou Sylla's arrest and removal as President of the Patronat] to meet with in order to ensure the full and comprehensive implementation of the tripartite accords (among the GoG, Patronat, and labor unions) agreed to on March 3 and June 16, 2006.

What is clear is that the labor union movement, as a result of its exceptional organization, broad appeal to issues that resonate with Guinean citizens, and the refusal of its two main leaders, Dr. Ibrahima Fofana and Ms. Rabiatou Serah Diallo, to use their success as a stepping stone to political power, have replaced the opposition political parties as the institution that commands the respect and full cooperation of the Guinean people.

The U.S. Special Responsibility to Assist Guinea

Regrettably the events in Guinea have been virtually noticed in the United States. Yet, it was in large measure America's refusal to aid the first President of Guinea, Sékou Touré, in 1959, after the French abruptly ended economic support in an effort to punish Guinea for opting for independence in 1958, that forced Touré to align himself with the Soviet Union and establish 26 years of brutal Marxist rule in that country. Touré instilled a climate of fear and intimidation from 1961 until his death in 1984. Camp Boiro in the capital city of Conakry was Guinea's "Gulag' where nearly 5,000 political detainees including the country's intellectual, military, commercial and political elite were killed from starvation, torture, or gunfire. Nearly 2 million people fled the country between 1961-984.The military took over after Touré died in March 1986 in American hospital and then appointed General Lansana Conté as President. He has ruled with an iron hand ever since.

Guinea matters to the United States for at least four reasons. First, because this West African country of more than 9 million people has been the island of stability in the volatile sub-region of Africa that includes the neighboring states of Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau that have all experienced serious political tensions or civil wars over the past decade. Senegal and Mauretania have just had their elections, but Benin, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea have all scheduled important national elections this spring. Political instability in Guinea might derail the elections in Liberia and Sierra Leone and require the postponement of Guinea's legislative elections that were to take place in June 2007. Secondly, Guinea is important because it possesses the world largest supply of bauxite required for aluminum and also gold and diamonds. North America's Alcoa-Alcan consortium and Global Alumina are the largest investors in bauxite in Guinea. In addition, Hyperdynamics, an American company, recently received the concession to explore offshore oil in the Gulf of Guinea. Thirdly, eight-five percent of Guinea's population is Muslim and many of its younger clerics study in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and return to Guinea as proponents of the more conservative Wahaabi beliefs that inspired Al Qaeda. The Lebanese, many of whom support Hezbollah, dominate the middle class export-import sector. Fourthly, Guinea has been the one Francophone African country that looks first to the United States, rather than to France, as a friend and a model. In addition, the United States initiated the first U.S.-Guinea Binational Consultations in March 2006 and just invested in a modern multimillion dollar Embassy inaugurated in Guinea last summer. Moreover, many Guineans, such as our distinguished co-panelist Dr. Lansine Kaba and Cellou Dalein Diallo, the reformist former Prime Minister of Guinea fired by Lansana Conté in April 2006, have immigrated to or reside in the United States. And we should never forget Amadou Diallo, the innocent Guinean brutally riddled with bullets by New York city police a few years ago, when he reached in his pockets to get his keys.

Since it was U.S. government assistance, managed by the USAID Mission in Guinea, that supported civic education and civil society advocacy training that contributed to the new assertiveness and increased participation in the political process of the Guinean people, I contend that our nation has a responsibility to provide its full financial, technical and moral support to them. Civil society's peaceful initiatives to bring about political change are consistent with Guinea's Constitution. Article 19 of the Guinean Constitution provides that, "The Guinean people freely and with sovereign authority determine their institutions and the economic and social organization of the Nation."

On March 13, the Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice expressed U.S. concern about the 50 members of the opposition beaten in Zimbabwe as she should have. But, there has been no condemnation either by the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa of the atrocities in Guinea. That is why I commend the Subcommittee for inviting the representative of the State Department to make a statement this afternoon.

Prior to outlining recommendations for policy actions by the Congress and the Administration, I would like to share with you, as requested, my views about the main constraints to Democracy in Guinea.

Views on the Main Constraints to Democracy in Guinea

In response your main question about my observations on the biggest challenges to democracy in Guinea, I would list the following.

1. Poorly educated, unenlightened leadership with little commitment to address the needs and concerns of Guinean citizens. President Lansana Conte has been critically ill with diabetes and leukemia for at least 7 years. His health started deteriorating rapidly in 2005 such that he rarely attends Cabinet meetings, lapses into comas, and has demonstrated dementia over the past year. He spends most of his time on his farm about 10 minutes from Conakry and rarely attends Cabinet meetings

2. The prevalence of traditional beliefs and patterns of behavior that often is inconsistent with western democratic values. We Americans tend to forget that democracy is first a system of values and it is those values that inform the institutional framework of the political system. Without democratic values the functioning of regular multi-party elections and democratic institutions, as we have seen in many parts of the world will be flawed. In countries like Guinea, where there is a 44.2% literacy rate and most people live in rural areas, there is a tendency for people to act more like "subjects" than "citizens" with rights to question authority and engage in the political process. Many believe that the President serves at the will of God and they as mere mortals have little power to change that reality. Family and society pressure remain powerful forces that encourage conformity and one's primordial identity to and responsibility for the well-being of the extended family and ethnic group remains sacred obligations.

3. Absence of effective constraints on executive power. Rather than serve as constraints to executive branch power, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court in Guinea have historically reinforced decisions taken by President Conté.

4. The historically quiescent, mutually distrustful civil society fearful of confronting authority because of the legacy of the First Republic in Guinea that required ideological conformity, and engaged in brutal repression, arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture. That is why the recent massive non-violent march in Guinea on January 22 is historic.

5. Historical isolation within its sub-region and with respect to a free flow of diverse sources of information. Not only do most Guineans know relatively little about the rest of the world, but also few people in the world know much about Guinea, hence, except since this January, there has little active pressure by international human rights NGOs and peace groups.

6. Abject poverty and underdevelopment which leave little time for active political participation, or resources to run for office or exert leverage on political leaders, establish independent newspapers or radio stations. It is costly for poor governments to fund elections

7. Modalities and focus of U.S. foreign assistance policies

  • There is no Congressional earmark for D/G programs as there exists for education and health sector funding; hence when funds are cut, D/G programs suffer most. In Guinea D/G funds historically accounted for less than 10% of the USAID Mission's budget. In addition, while D/G funds have increased overall in recent years, the State Department administers the majority of these resources as ESF funds or special program in other regions of the world.

  • Virtually no financial flexibility to respond quickly to important new developments, except for humanitarian assistance. Congress did not grant authority to former USAID Administrator Andrew Natios to use quick disbursing transition assistance funds in fragile states, such as Guinea.

  • Greater centralization of planning and budgeting authority in Washington, not the field, particularly since the appointment of Ambassador Randall Tobias as the new Administrator and Director of Foreign Assistance.
    There is a greater chance for economic development to occur when assistance is multisectoral and country specific.

  • Inadequate understanding of the resources or time required to bring about behavioral change, which is the goal of development; and the unpredictability of funding levels

  • Possibility for "blowback" of D/G development activities if they are unbalanced or not sustained. For example USAID/Guinea supported training for civil society activism knowing that there was widespread impunity for illegal actions by GoG officials, without doing anything to foster respect for the rule of law.

  • Prohibition or unwillingness to directly fund local NGOs. The Congress insists that high percentage of U.S. economic assistance is implemented by American PVOs with the result that at least 70% of the aid funds go to American technical assistance or equipment. More than 40 years after beginning U.S. foreign aid to Africa, this policy should be revisited.

  • USAID does not really fund economic growth which is necessary to sustain democracy, but rather social development, which instead increases citizen demands on fragile governments, without providing the income generation required to sustain the recurring costs of social development programs. The Millennium Challenge Corporation programs have the possibility of addressing some of these issues, but I understand they have been slow to disburse funds.

Recommendations for Congress and the Administration

Taking into account the current situation in Guinea and my observations about the constraints to democracy in that country, I would like to make the following recommendations.

Once is it clear that Prime Minister Kouyaté is committed to genuine reform, Congress should provide to Guinea as soon as possible at least $3 to $5 million in emergency supplemental assistance to support its political transition. These funds should be used to (1) support a policy planning process to develop and implement a plan for genuinely democratic economic, political and social governance; (2) fund a comprehensive training process to improve the management capacity of ministers and other top level government officials, including local government Prefects; (3) provide improved computer and internet capacity for labor union and civil society headquarters and provide funds for their programs; (4) strengthening the rule of law; and (5) expand technical training and equipment support for private radio and the press; and (6) provide additional resources to support free and fair elections, training for political parties, and technical training and logistical support if Guinea establishes an independent Electoral Commission.

Comprehensive Planning Process - The GoG has never undertaken a comprehensive planning process to find out how to establish genuinely democratic political governance, develop a free market economy, and invest in its people. This transition period presents a unique opportunity to do so. Among the priority areas that require attention are: how to mobilize and effectively use more local and international resources to improve and maintain infrastructure development e.g., reliable urban and rural electricity, potable water and establish a public works program that will create jobs; establishing a merit based recruitment and performance appraisal system in the national and local civil service; transforming the judicial system, especially the legal, regulatory and judicial framework for private investment; ending export and import monopolies that stifle competition; increasing agricultural productivity and raising produce standards to meet requirements of external export markets; strengthening educational accountability at all levels; fostering entrepreneurship; and creation of an institutional framework that can organize genuinely free and fair elections.

Management Training - Virtually all Guinean adults were socialized directly or indirectly via their parents, with whom many still live, by the authoritarian practices of Sékou Touré. Therefore, they resist taking initiatives and while many have good technical skills, they have inadequate management capability. Guinea needs a critical mass of officials to develop a new work ethic in support of the interests of the nation, rather than their personal, family, ethnic or regional identities. U.S. should support a comprehensive management training program that focuses on: management and planning techniques, leadership skills and ethics, budget planning and fiscal accountability, and computer skills. This should not be one-off training, but rather an intense, hands-on, one week training process in-country every quarter over a year-with assignments in between. Such training should take place over a three year period at least with a new cohort each year. The 2 to 4 best performers in the class should be included in an annual State Department Public Diplomacy International Visitors program on National Governance and Public Policy.

Technical Support for Labor Unions and Civil Society Organizations - Recent events have demonstrated that civil society organizations have "graduated" as a result of past USAID training efforts. The Unions and National Council of Civil Society Organizations now need better equipped office space with computers and regular access to the internet as well as funds for town hall public affairs meetings.

Rule of Law - There is virtually no respect for the rule of law in Guinea. The U.S. should provide funds for law courses, such as Human Rights, Torts, and Commercial Law at both the Ministry of Justice in service training program and the Law Program at the university. A Ministry of Justice official told me last summer that of the approximately 250 judges in Guinea, none has been hired in the past10 years. They will be recruiting new judges and this presents an opportunity for training in ethnics and accountability. The courts are corrupt and government officials, police, and soldiers, constantly prey upon Guinean citizens with impunity. The average citizen has no reliable recourse to the law or protection from the predation of government officials and defense and security forces. I have personally witnessed police shakedowns of taxi drivers, transporters and average citizens in broad daylight, and have seen security forces strip naked, beat, then arrest youth in the streets for no apparent reason. It is not uncommon for Prefects to require farmers to give them cattle or farm produce, and persons unlawfully arrested have to pay funds to prison officials to get released.

Electoral Assistance- Guinea has never had a free and fair election since President Conté authorized multi-party elections in 1992. Training for political parties to develop successful campaign techniques and membership develop is critical before the next legislative elections. Training and institutional support for an independent Electoral Commission as well as for national and international election observers. A more transparent electoral process will lead to a more politically diverse, independent, and better functioning National Assembly. Therefore the new legislators and their staff will require training on drafting legislation, National Assembly procedures, improving constituent services, and organizing town hall meetings in their districts.

Expand Support for Private Media - The GoG has historically controlled radio and television and restricted stringers for the international media. Consequently, Guineans know little about the rest of the world, are not given air time to comment on their government's policies, and while the EU countries are better informed, other people the world--particularly Americans--know virtually nothing about Guinea. It took at least 18 months after the GoG finally authorized private media in August 2005 for it to provide licenses to 3 private radio stations. During the recent strike, private radio stations and at least one of the private Guinea internet news sources were shut down, some of their equipment was destroyed, and both radio and print journalists were arrested. The U.S government also should accelerate negotiations for Voice of America (VOA) FM radio transmissions in Guinea.

Even if the U.S. will not lead, it should support efforts by the EU and others in the international community to bring the perpetrators of the atrocities in Guinea during the strike to justice. Guineans, who have an extraordinary capacity to forgive, desperately need to have an in-depth conversation about government ordered past human rights abuses under President Sékou Touré and President Conté. More than 6 of USAID/Guinea's and undoubtedly at least as many, if not more, of the Embassy Foreign Service Nationals are wives, sons, daughters or other close relatives of Guineans who perished in Camp Boiro.

Relocate President Conté to another country, as was done with Idi Amin, Aristide, and Charles Taylor and others, since Conté will remain a continuing constraint to democratic governance in Guinea

Take the lead in an international effort working through the World Bank and African Development Bank, in cooperation with the European Union, to provide reliable and affordable electricity in Guinea and train managers to properly administer and maintain these facilities. Guinea is the watershed of West Africa. This will stimulate jobs; improve education and health care services, and have other tangible development impacts. One reason there are no whistle blowers in the Guinea government and high level officials do virtually anything to retain their positions is that there are no alternative private jobs with comparable pay. It should be noted that the average official salary for high level Guinean officials is around $75-$100 per month.

Use the 2nd U.S.-Guinea Binational Consultations, once it is clear that Kouyaté is serious about fundamental change, to discuss concrete financial and technical assistance deliverables the U.S. can provide to support a genuine political transition and good political and economic governance in Guinea. The U.S. should make it clear that continued assistance will be based upon genuine improvements.

Finally the Congress needs to rethink its foreign assistance programs in Africa. Approximately thirty years ago that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs proposed a major restructuring of U.S. foreign economic assistance, that accorded priority to "Basic Human Needs." Times have changed. What the recent crisis in Guinea and virtually every other post independence conflict in Africa demonstrate is that underdevelopment, combined with poor governance, breeds instability and conflict. Continuing what has become a social development instead of an a genuine economic development program that generates additional resources for economic growth wastes taxpayers resources and fosters continued dependency of developing countries, or worse, as fragile states collapse under the pressure of a more activist population who demand more support for social programs.

Lest Members of the Subcommittee consider the recommended $3 to $5 million in supplemental transition assistance to be extravagant, I recall in the late seventies during a mark-up of the foreign aid bill, that Stephen Solarz proposed a $20 million addition to India's foreign aid to send a signal of the U.S. appreciation of then Indira Gandhi's policies to implement more democratic governance following a particularly period of political restrictions. It sailed through without comment.

As can be seen in the table below, USAID funding for democracy and governance programs in Guinea that historically was only around 10% of the total budget has declined in recent years. I am pleased to see in the FY 08 CBJ an important increase in funding requested for Guinea D/G programs. Although funding levels are still far below the budget levels received by USAID/Guinea in the past. Moreover as the figures of an estimated $13,500,000 in FY 2007 and a requested $15,593,000 for FY 2008 are the amounts of the integrated budgets of USAID and the Department of State, it is difficult to know what amounts are requested for USAID alone.

Background

No Guinean living in Guinea today has ever experienced genuine democracy and good governance in that nation. Guinea is a unique country of paradoxes:

  • It is a dictatorship without order
  • It is potentially wealthy, but its citizens live in abject poverty;
  • It has a democratic Constitution, but its government does not respect its human rights provisions or the rule of law
  • Guinea's defense and security forces effectively defend its territorial integrity, but they systematically prey on its people
  • It is the watershed of West Africa, but few Guineans have reliable electricity or potable water

As a result of its years of relative isolation, fierce nationalism, policies of self reliance, and perhaps its status as a former French, rather than British colony, Guinea is not well known in the United States. Therefore, my prepared statement contains some background to the crisis that has been unfolding in Guinea over the past six weeks.

Guinea was the only former French colony to vote against joining the French Community of General De Gaulle's Vth Republic in France in 1958. This decision had severe economic and political consequences for the newly independent nation. Brutally cut off from French economic support and subsequently refused aid by the United States, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Guinea's first President, turned to the then Soviet Union for assistance.

As a result of Soviet influence, Guinea became a socialist country with a command economy, an entrenched Communist single party structure, the PDG, with political cells down to the village and district level, and a system of informants to enforce political orthodoxy. During several real, but often alleged, coup and destabilization attempts from 1961 through 1980, Sékou Touré systematically arrested, tortured, killed or made disappear thousands of the intellectual, entrepreneurial, military, government, Peul and other elites from every region of the country of the country. Among the best known of the nearly 5,000 persons who died in Camp Boiro were Diallo Telli, the first Secretary General of the Organization of African Union (OAU); the founder on the national Guinea Ballet, Fodebo Keita; and Achar Maroff, a former Guinean Ambassador to the United Nations. One might suggest that Sékou Touré was Africa's Stalin and Camp Boiro in Conakry was its Gulag. During his regime nearly 2 million Guineans fled the country. Several days after Sékou Touré's died in a hospital in the United States in March 1984, the military assumed power and General Lansana Conté became Guinea's Chief of state, a post he has held to this day.

Among the key legacies of Sékou Touré's regime that have been constraints to democracy in Guinea are: a quiescent civil society riddled by fear and mutual distrust that resists open defiance of presidential authority, a tightly controlled radio and television system that provides no space for external or differing citizen views, a protected mercantile middle class of Lebanese who are beholden to "friends" of the President for their economic security, rather than to their Guinean customers; a high illiteracy rate of around 55.8%, and a majority adult population, particularly in the rural areas, who communicate almost exclusively in local languages, who lead mainly traditional lives, and have little knowledge of western values.

Guinea's Second Republic led by Conté is a traditional patrimonial "kleptocracy" characterized by governance based not on a series of sound, coherent, well thought out policies, but rather on reaction to events, external pressures and predictions from his soothsayers. Although reputed to be a very good soldier, General Conté has little formal education, is rooted in traditional values and practices, and believes he is President of Guinea through the will of God.

Initially President Conté's government made some progress towards democratization until around 1996. A liberal Constitution, which guaranteed a broad range of human rights, was adopted in 1990; the government authorized multi-party elections in 1992; it dismantled the state terror and informant apparatus, allowed greater economic freedom, and allowed a relatively free press, albeit with limited circulation. Guinea experienced an average 3.5% to 4% growth rate and serviced its debts in a timely manner. However, every election since the first multi-party presidential elections in 1993 through the most recent local elections in December 2005 has been fraudulent. The government political party, the Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) emerged as the dominant victor in the country's two legislative elections since 1984 and President Conté has won landslide victories in the three Presidential electoral contests between 1993 and December 2003.

The 1996 mutiny of discontented soldiers in Conakry that prompted some mid-level army leaders to undertake an abortive attempt to overthrow President Conté was a major threat to President Conté's power. President Conté displayed what has been his characteristic reaction to crises, that is, to undertake a series of reforms to get past the crisis, then take action to weaken the impact of those reforms or renege on the commitments altogether in order to retain his power and privileges. The military revolt destroyed the Presidential offices and killed several dozen Guineans. Captured and taken to the main military camp in Conakry, President Conté gained his release by promising a series of reforms, increased military benefits, and amnesty for the coup leaders. Instead, in a classic maneuver of promises later broken through presidential action, Conté arrested hundreds following his release and tried 98 soldiers and citizens in 1998, many of these soldiers languished in prison until 2006.

To demonstrate his commitment to reform, in July1996, President Conté appointed technocrats to his cabinet and selected as Prime Minister Sidya Touré, the Guinean former Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister in Cote d'Ivoire. Conté granted responsibility for coordinating all government actions, including economic planning and finance functions, and promised financial reforms, rationalization of public expenditures, improved government revenue collection and reform of the judicial system. In fact, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank agreements in 1996 and 1998, Guinea continued to pursue fiscal reforms, privatization of public sector utilities, and increased more government expenditures on education, health, infrastructure, and the banking and justice sectors. But out of concern that he was loosing control over the government's finances, in 1997 President Conte transferred most of the budget and finance responsibilities to a newly appointed Minister of Budget and Finance loyal to him. Sidya Toure currently leads the UPR, one of the 5 major opposition parties in Guinea.

After President Conté's re-election in 1998, and basking in some improvements in the economy, Conté replaced many of the technocrats in his cabinet with loyalists, mainly from his own Soussou ethnic group. This decision initiated a period of greater political restrictions, cronyism, corruption, and a steady deterioration in the country's economy, particularly after the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Sierra Leonean rebel incursions in Guinea's Forest Region, supported by Liberia's President Charles Taylor.

The 2000/2001 rebel attacks on Guéckédou, in the western part of Forest Region of Guinea, which borders on Sierra Leone and Liberia, greatly damaged that city and neighboring villages and displaced tens of thousands of Guineans. Guinea's military, bolstered by an effective unit of Rangers that had been trained by the United States successfully defended its territorial integrity without any assistance from ECOMOG. It is important to note at this juncture that during the decade of civil wars in neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia, Guinea hosted nearly 1 million refugees in several camps and many repatriated Guineans. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided significant support to the refugee populations but their presence did impose economic pressure on the Guinean government. Buffeted by the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the GoG invested heavily in arms and increased its defense budget to secure its borders and protect its territorial integrity, as well as provide covert support to the Liberian ULIMO rebel movement to retaliate against the 2002/2001 incursions into Guinea financed largely by Charles Taylor.

As a result of the incursions, President Conté postponed the 2000 legislative elections until 2002. Then in 2001 he succeeded in modifying the Constitution in a referendum that removed the two term limit and age restrictions for presidential candidates and extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years. Troubled by these maneuvers to retain power and the lack of a level playing field in the electoral system, several of the opposition political parties boycotted the 2002 legislative elections with the result that the government PUP party gained 91 of the 114 seats in the unicameral legislature. The UFR opposition parties won 20 seats and other parties received 3 seats.

Greatly concerned about the inequities in the electoral system, thirty-three political parties, including the PUP, met in July 2003 and agreed to a memorandum on electoral reform that was sent to the governmental. They called for five main changes: (1) the creation of an independent Electoral Commission; (2) the strict neutrality of government officials during elections, (3) media liberalization and the authorization of private radio ownership, (4) institution of transparent ballot boxes, and (5) the use of a single ballot during elections. President Conté's regime did not agree to these conditions, so opposition parties boycotted the December 2003 presidential elections, a decision which again gave a landslide victory to President Conté.

IMF and EU Economic Sanctions and a New Cycle of Reform and Repression

A. The Sanctions

As a result of poor economic and political governance, the IMF, World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European Union (EU) suspended economic assistance to Guinea in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Under the Conté administration, the IMF/World Bank and the European Union have been the largest donors to Guinea. The major bilateral donors include Japan, the United States, Canada--until September 2005when Canadians withdrew from Guinea-France, and Germany.

In 2002 the IMF suspended assistance to Guinea under its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) because the GoG was not servicing its debt and failed to meet certain performance criteria. This decision occurred as Guinea was about to reach the Decision Point under the Bank HIPC program to reduce the debt of highly indebted developing countries. As a result of the above mentioned increased defense expenditures and widespread corruption, the GoG experienced double-digit inflation and the accompanying increased prices for such basic commodities as rice and cooking oil; it had failed to deliver effective, reliable public and social services to its people, particularly electricity, water and telephone services, as well as adequate resources to the education and health sectors. The EU suspended all but humanitarian assistance to Guinea in 2003 for reasons related to the country's flawed electoral system and failure to honor other governance provisions of the European Union-ACP Cotonou Accords.

Corruption is endemic in Guinea and this privatization of public resources is led by the President who goes to the Central Bank or Customs Office personally to withdraw tens of thousand of dollars or Euros at will. The judicial system has broken down as decisions in the courts are purchased, and a culture of impunity has permeated the country, including unrestricted, open shakedowns of taxi drivers, transporters and ordinary citizens by police and security forces day and night. Citizens have no reliable recourse to the law whatsoever, unless they are prepared to bribe the judges.

These were the conditions in Guinea when I arrived in Conakry in mid-October 2004 to assume my position as Team Leader for Democracy and Governance at the USAID Mission in Conakry.

B. The Proposed Reforms

During the summer and fall of 2004 there was a series of anomic demonstrations against high prices of rice and fuel, in Conakry and several cities in the interior that were brutally put down by security forces, as well as student protests in Kankan, the second largest city, and in Conakry. Facing continued pressure to do something, President Conte appointed a new Prime Minister on December 9, 2004 to institute political and economic reforms. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Cellou Dalein Diallo, is a Peul, who had held various ministerial positions under Conté's regime for 8 years, most recently as the Minister of Fisheries. Diallo was the 5th Prime Minister President Conté had appointed since 1984. Diallo's immediate predecessor, the highly respect François Lounceny Fall, assumed his position in February 2004 and resigned in April after only 3 months in office.

In his New Year's speech December 31, 2004 President Conte stated that since that the military threats to its territorial security had ended, Guinea was now free to institute democratic reforms. In February 2005, shortly before the armed attack on the President's motorcade January 19th, Prime Minister Diallo announced President Conté's five point reform program to: (1) achieve greater macro-economic stability, (2) improve governance and fight corruption, (3) provide reliable public services, especially potable water, electricity, cellular telephone services, (4) resume political dialogue with opposition parties, and (5) to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS. In an effort to restart economic assistance from the IMF and World Bank, Guinea started to repay its debts, restrict the parallel currency exchange market, gave increased lip service to the fight against corruption, and the Prime Minister embarked upon a process of political dialogue with the opposition political parties, mainly with respect to the arrangements for the 2005 local elections.

In response to these initiatives the EU and the bilateral donors, prompted by the UNDP Resident Representative agreed, "to accompany" the government in its tentative reform process and provide financial support for the 2005 local elections, provided that the Government,

  • Become current in its debt repayments;
  • Rationalize its currency exchange regulations and take concrete measures to bring about macro economic stability;
  • Resume political dialogue with the opposition political parties and that their Constitutional rights of freedom of speech and assembly be respected; and
  • Establish an independent or autonomous Electoral Commission in time for the 2005 local and communal elections; and authorize private radio ownership

The Tense Spring and Summer of 2005

Although Prime Minister Diallo succeeded in obtaining agreement from the IMF and the World Bank for an IMF Staff Monitoring Program in April 2005 and the EU agreed to normalize its economic relations with Guinea, no new funds were received in the summer of 2005. Tensions increased in May 2005 following a series of events including the GoG decision to increase the price of gas by 52% and the continuing failure of the GoG to reach a political consensus on the organization of the elections with all of the key opposition parties. Violent demonstrations over the spiraling price of a 50 kilo bag of rice, which had increased from 26,000 Guinean Frances (GF) in 2004 to 110,000GF in early July 2005, exacerbated an already difficult situation. President Conté's pressure on rice importers and retailers to force them to sell rice at 75,000GF in fact made the situation worse, Unable to obtain foreign reserves from the Central Bank to pay for imported rice, combined with the increasingly high price of foreign currency because of the steady depreciation of the Guinean Franc, many rice sellers simply decided that they could not afford to sell it at all. Meanwhile the President's failing health further deteriorated thereby causing many to question his capacity to rule.

The triumphant return to Guinea from political exile in France in July 2005, of the militant leader of the RPG opposition party, Alpha Conde, created serious concern not only among PUP militants, but also among some opposition political parties. Conde had been a serious presidential contender during the 1998 presidential elections, but was arrested by the government on bogus charges.

While the transparency of the local elections was considered one key indicator of the government's commitment to genuine reform, another key indicator was President Conté's continued political support of the reform minded Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo. Three main events cast doubts about President Conté's commitment to enact genuine reforms. First, despite President Conté's commitment to fight corruption and authorization for Prime Minister Diallo to make Mamadou Sylla, repay the $22 million he allegedly owes the government, Conté later publicly voiced his support for Sylla in March 2005 and quietly told the Prime Minister to drop the matter. Mamadou Sylla is a Guinean entrepreneur and was the President of the Patronat, the local Chamber of Commerce, and a close confidant of the President. The President's decision to personally release him from prison in December 2006 was one of the main factors that triggered the third national labor union strike on January 10, 2007.

Secondly, in July 2005 the Prime Minister had undertaken steps to assign a 4th cellular telephone license to SONATEL, a Senegalese company backed by the French company France Telecom, in order to help address the very problematic functioning of the Guinea parastatal telephone company, SOTELGUI. Around the same time the Minister of Telecommunications, Jean Sultan, the former Vice President of the Central Bank when Sylla borrowed money, and key ally during Conté's 2003 presidential campaign, made a questionable deal to award the 4th license to another company. Despite a consensus of the Cabinet to offer the license to SONATEL, President Conté yielded to pressure from Minister Sultan and once again did not support the Prime Minister he had appointed to lead the reform process.

Thirdly during a World Bank review of the status of their loan portfolio in Guinea, Bank officials noted that $30 million for a rural road project still had not been expended. Consequently, they requested that these funds be transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Public Works, a decision favored by the Prime Minister. The Minister of Agriculture--who uses his government's resources mainly to maintain the President's farm-did not want to transfer the funds and the President once again failed to back up his Prime Minister. Faced with the inability to obtain firm, unchanging instructions from the President it was rumored in the summer of 2005 that the Prime Minister was considered resigning.

The local elections initially scheduled to be held in June did not take place until December 2005, because the GoG failed to undertake the required reforms in a timely manner and since it did not have adequate resources to finance elections on its own. The EU, the largest donor for the elections had stipulated that it would not release funds until the government had made sufficient progress in meeting several conditions, including a dialogue with all political parties to reach a consensus on the organization of the elections, an agreement to establish an independent or autonomous Electoral Commission and the effective liberalization of the media and authorization for private radio ownership. Although the cabinet approved the provisions in June, President Conté delayed signing the media liberalization Decree until August 2005. He did not issue the Decree establishing the Autonomous Electoral Commission (CENA) until October, less than 2 months before the elections December 18, 2005.

Even though the GoG agreed to use a single ballot and transparent election boxes, allowed opposition parties to campaign in the interior relatively free from interference, and granted free air time for opposition party candidates, the government took other measures to ensure PUP majorities in the December local elections. The members appointed to the CENA were old line party loyalists, who rendered that body relatively ineffective and no private radio stations were authorized until the summer of 2006, at least 6 months after the local elections. More seriously, the GoG was able to throw the elections by 3 main methods: rejecting the electoral slates of many opposition candidates; selectively distributing the papers, printed to address the problem that few rural voters had identity cards, to mainly PUP members; and falsifying the election results to increase PUP winners in many local districts during the voting centralization process.

The U.S. Mission in Guinea fielded 40 Election Observers that covered all 7 Administrative Regions and Conakry and our reports systematically documented these anomalies. Indeed in the Kankan Region, where I personally observed elections, the Prefect in Kourossa instructed his two body guards to fire AK-47s into a crowd of voters who were posing no threat to his safety. Three people were hit and a young student almost died of his wounds. I carry the AK-47 shell with me to this day. The official who perpetrated this criminal act was never brought to justice.

The Post Election Climate and the Radicalization of Civil Society

The fraudulent actions of GoG officials and PUP supporters during the elections, that delivered majority PUP victories in the 38 Urban and Rural Development Councils at the local level in Guinea turned out to be a double-edged sword. The election fraud not only heightened popular discontent, but also further undermined donor confidence in the government's commitment to fundamental change. As a result, the EU decided to withhold the assistance it had promised and the government desperately needed.

The groundswell of popular discontent, reflected in three major events that followed in rapid succession at the end of February through most of March 2006 dramatically shifted the political equation in Guinea. The first event was the historic national labor strike from February 27 through March 3 organized by the combined federations of the public and private labor unions, CNTG and USTG. This was a seminal event, because it was virtually universally effective throughout the country. Even after President Conté appealed to workers to return to their positions on the local language radio stations, they ignored him. The streets were empty; shops remained closed, as did most of the market stalls. The success of the strike shocked the government, surprised the unions, and gave civil society a greater sense of empowerment.

The USAID funded Civil Society Forum on "Civil Society, the Elections and the Political Process," organized March 8-10 in cooperation with the National Council of Civil Society Organizations in Guinea (CNCSOG) through the assistance of USAID/Guinea's implementing partner, capitalized on this climate of discontent. It brought together representatives of 68 local NGOs and officials of the CNSCOG from each of Guinea's 7 Administrative Regions and Conakry. The purpose of this Forum was to examine the irregularities that took place during the local elections, the lessons learned, and devise a strategy to address these issues prior to the legislative elections in June 2007.The Forum's Final Declaration, which openly criticized GoG policies and called for a series of political and economic reforms, reflected civil society's maturity and increased assertiveness as result of USAID's interventions over past four years.

Sandwiched in between these two meetings were the first U.S. - Guinea Binational Consultations. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Linda Thomas-Greenfield led the U.S. delegation. Although this Binational Consultation was originally scheduled for another time, the dates had to be changed because of other intervening commitments. However, coming as it did at this time, gave the appearance that the United States was forging closer links with the Guinean government when the unions and civil society were at greater odds with the Conté regime than they had been at any previous time in during his regime.

The important National Consultation of the Key Forces in the Society to address the current crisis in Guinea, March 17-20, was convened jointly by 15 opposition parties and the CNCSOG. This meeting was patterned after the National Conferences of 1990 that began in Benin and led to the new democratic openings in several Francophone African states. It brought together several hundred Guineans from all walks of life to debate over three days in plenary and workshop sessions the problems facing Guinea and make recommendations of ways to address them. The National Consultation's far reaching final recommendations called for a series of socio-economic changes and, more pertinent for our concerns, a political transition led by a Prime Minister, selected by consensus, and the replacement of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court by two new bodies. Guinea government officials immediately condemned the political recommendations as a violation of the Constitution which outlines procedures for succession in case of the incapacity of death of the incumbent president in office, and said they were tantamount to a verbal coup d'état. Certain embassies, including that of the United States, also considered the political recommendations to be totally inappropriate.

In any case, the surprising emergency medical evacuation to Switzerland of President Conté early in the morning of the second day of the National to Switzerland in the early morning of March 18, 2006 provided added drama and sense of urgency to the conferees deliberations. The President's evacuation not only focused the attention of the administration, Guinean citizens, and the donor community on issues of political succession, but also raised fears of a possible military coup.

According to Article 34 of Guinea's Constitution,

In case of vacancy of the function of the President of the Republic following death or resignation of the President of the Republic, or any other major obstacle, the interim is assured by the President of the National Assembly or, if he is unable to do so, by one of the Vice Presidents of the National Assembly, by order of seniority; The vacancy is stated by the Supreme Court, who is seized of this question by the President of the National Assembly, or if he cannot, by one of the Vice Presidents.

The Constitution further calls for new presidential elections within 60 days. It is widely known that El Hadj Aboubacar Somparé, the clever, cosmopolitan President of the National Assembly, served as the Guinean Ambassador to France during Sékou Touré's regime and as a former President of the government PUP party. Therefore Somparé is viewed as a representative of the old guard and hence suspect. During President Conté medical treatment in Switzerland, Somparé reportedly had private consultations with military leaders and certain cabinet officials. Fodé Bangoura, Chief of Staff in the Office of the President and eminence grise, allegedly called the National Assembly President on the carpet for what Bangoura considered inappropriate behavior. Fodé Bangoura made certain that President Conté had a triumphal return to Conakry by ensuring that crowds were at the airport and lining the streets to greet him.

Nevertheless, concerned about the widening gap between the government and the people, Aboubacar Somparé noted during his closing remarks on the occasion of the closing of the National Assembly Budget Session at the end of March 2006, that Guinea was "undergoing a historically unprecedented economic crisis, he then stated,

It is necessary to resume the dialogue, for a democracy cannot exist without discussion, without exchanges [of views]. In a democratic regime, discussion necessarily precedes action..In the current national context it seems to me to be absolutely necessary to recall one more that nothing important, nothing solid, nothing that is durable, nothing that is good, and finally nothing that is legitimate can take place without the institutionalization of a community of reflection and without effective communication.

The GoG's leadership crisis became more obvious on April 5, of 2006, when, following pressure from Fodé Bangoura and other close advisors, President Conte fired the Prime Minister. Bangoura was not consulted about the proposed cabinet reshuffle Prime Minister Diallo had gotten President Conté to sign and disapproved of Diallo's proposals. So Bangoura convinced President Conte that the Prime Minister was trying to usurp power and convinced him to retract his Decree authorizing the new cabinet changes. Not satisfied, the President's closest aides convinced him the next day that Prime Minister Diallo's actions were illegal and that he should be fired and possible punished. Perhaps more than any other occurrence, this strange series of events on April 4th and 5th increased public concern that President Conté was not acting with a full deck and demonstrated the lengths to which the President was willing to jeopardize the country's economic well-being to maintain power.

Prime Minister Diallo's dismissal was one of the main reasons the IMF, which was on the verge of approving a normal lending program for Guinea, decided later that month to delay its final consideration of a new financial assistance program. Obtaining these additional resources had been an essential component of the government's economic commitments in the tripartite accord (government, private sector and unions) the government had signed with the unions to end the first strike on March 3rd. Now these resources would not be available.

During the Labor Day celebrations on May 1, 2006, USTG leader issued a scathing critique of the government and the President of the National Assembly. At that time, the USTG and CNTG union federations also issued a joint Manifesto calling for a series of administrative and economic reforms, which the GoG failed to implement. A subsequent ministerial reshuffle of May 29, 2006 consolidated the power of the Fodé Bangoura, the President's Chief of Staff, who was elevated to Minister of State for Presidential Affairs with supervisory responsibility over the Ministry of Economic and Financial Control. Former conservative PUP Ministers returned to the government, such as Moussa Solano, the arch conservative former Minister of Territorial Administration, who was appointed Minister of State for the Interior and Minister of Territorial Administration has legal responsibility for organizing all elections in Guinea. Alseny Gomez, a Camp Boiro survivor and Minister of Security when Alpha Conde, RPG leader, was arrested during the presidential elections of 1998, was appointed at the new Minister of Justice.

After the GoG failed to address their grievances, the joint Unions launched a second National Strike on June 8. While the strike was largely respected for the first four days, things deteriorated on June 12 when the Baccalaureate examinations were to take place. The GoG announced on June 11, that the military would proctor the Baccalaureate, examinations, after the teachers made clear they intended to support the national strike and could not do so. Students showed up for the examination on Monday June 12 and found that few schools had made provisions for them to take the examinations. Frustrated, the students throughout the country left the schools in anger or despair. Those in Conakry began to march peacefully to protest their inability to take the baccalaureate examinations. Others in Labe and other towns in the interior burned tires and threw stones in protest. The GoG deployed security forces to maintain order, and they killed an estimated 21 people, on that day, most of whom were students. The GoG has blamed the opposition parties for the June 12th disruptions and then called for a Dialogue and the restoration of order.

In late June USAID implemented a very successful Civilian-Military Seminar on "Civil-Military Relations in Guinea. Despite the tensions between Guinean civil society leaders and security forces over the killings during the second strike on June 12, every civil society leader and defense and security official invited agreed to participate. This meeting was attended by the two main union leaders, Dr. Ibrahima Fofana and Ms. Rabiatou Serah Diallo, leaders of the PUP and main opposition parties, as well as representatives of the National Assembly, the religious community, the media, private sector, women's and youth groups, and the bar association. By providing an occasion for civilians and military and defense forces to meet on neutral ground and talk about issues that affected both groups defused some tensions. The participants adopted a Plan of Action and elected a Civilo-Military Follow-Up Committee co-haired by a member of the National Assembly and the highest ranking security official participating in the sessions. What emerged clearly from these sessions was the irrefutable evidence that the Guinean people seek dialogue, want better governance, improved economic conditions, and a feeling of human security in order to raise their children, and live in harmony with their fellow citizens.

By July 2006, it was apparent that the new Minister for Territorial Administration and spokesman for the government was not prepared to be as open to electoral reform as had been his predecessor Kiridi Bangoura, who had been transferred from that Ministry to one on pre-university education during the cabinet reshuffle of May 2006.

USAID/Guinea democracy and governance program's final action, for the cycle, beyond the electoral activities that are ongoing, was to attempt a major National Dialogue at the ministerial level on key political, social, economic, and cultural recommendations in an effort to end the political stalemate between the government on one hand and the opposition parties and civil society on the other. Although I participated in all of the preparatory meetings, actual Dialogues did not occur until after my departure. However, the government continued to remain intransigent.

Conclusions

I am convinced that the government led by President Conté has no interest in good political and economic governance. Ministers are afraid to take initiatives for fear of reprisals. The vacuum in political leadership at the level of the President has merely encouraged top officials to take what they can while they can. President Conté will remain an obstacle to democracy in Guinea as long as he is on the scene. If it has done nothing else, the tragic events during the January strike and particularly the atrocities of January 22nd and during the period of Martial Law have ended what had been widespread acceptance of the possibility of a military transitional government in Guinea similar to the Mauritanian model. My conversations with civil society leaders in Guinea during the strike make me believe that this has been a major turning point and that they will continue to be vigilant in their quest for justice, improved economic well-being and good governance. They have shed their blood and now require full support of the U.S. and others in the international community to prevent any recurrence of such brutality. At a time when the U.S. is supporting a Pan-Sahelian initiative to prevent sanctuaries for would be Islamists, it is critical to openly support popular forces for freedom and justice I this majority Muslim state. Not to do so would make hypocrisy of our government's stated commitment to transformational development and democracy throughout the world.

[1] Mamadou Sylla, President of the Patronat (association of businessmen in Guinea) is an intimate friend of President Conté, who stands accused of owing around $32 million to Guinea's Central Bank BCGC and Fodé Soumah, former Minister of Youth and Sports, another close presidential ally, who was Vice President of the BCGC when Sylla borrowed the millions from the Bank and until he was fired in late 2006 was the Minister of Youth and Sports. The last Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo and most recently the Minister of Presidential Affairs Fodé Bangoura, were fired for having tried to make Sylla repay the funds owed.



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