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STATEMENT OF REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN, CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN
MARCH 21, 2007

Pakistan has long presented the United States with one of our most difficult foreign policy challenges. The issues that dominate this bi-lateral relationship range from terrorism and nuclear proliferation, to democratic reform, to respect for basic human rights and religious freedom. Since 9/11 though, terrorism, and the fight against it, has come to dominate the relationship and frames any conversation we may have about all of the other issues. It is obvious that we need Pakistan's help in fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban. And they have provided some of that help. But their inability or unwillingness to control their own territory along the Afghan border continues to raise the perennial question about Pakistan: is their uneven effort against terrorists a question of political will or simply one of capabilities.

For almost 6 years, the Administration has suggested, and the Congress has largely agreed, that it was a lack of capability that was holding Pakistan back from greater cooperation. And to that end, the United States has provided billions of dollars in military and economic assistance and agreed to the sale of sophisticated fighter aircraft. There doesn't seem to be any problem in Pakistan that can't be cured with a little more U.S. assistance. So two weeks ago, the Administration asked Congress for an additional $110 million for economic assistance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and another $71.5 million in military assistance to equip the Frontier Corps to try and stop Taliban and al Qaeda from crossing freely back and forth, and to keep them from enjoying something they desperately need: sanctuary.

The question before the Congress is not whether we should stop the Taliban and al Qaeda from using Pakistan as a sanctuary, the question is whether all the money we've provided to date has produced the result we want and need. I don't believe that it has. In fact, I believe that the government of Pakistan will use the threat of terrorists to extract as much from us as they possibly can and we have proven willing time and again to oblige. It is long past time for the Congress to add benchmarks on aid to Pakistan to ensure that progress against terrorism and towards restoring democracy is actually made and that we stop responding to every crisis in Pakistan with the refrain of more money. The government of Pakistan, may lack certain capabilities, but we are naïve to think that this is the only problem. Pakistan long ago made a strategic decision to help us with al Qaeda but also to turn a blind eye towards the Taliban in the belief that their former allies will once again prove useful to them in their regional maneuvering against India and Iran. What other conclusion could one draw when our own military commanders testify that it is "generally accepted" that Taliban leaders operate openly in Quetta, one of Pakistan's largest cities? Indeed the showboat arrest of the former Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah, in Quetta, during Vice President Cheney's visit reinforces the conclusion that Pakistan could act against the Taliban, if they were only willing. Even if you believe that Pakistan is doing all it can to assist us in the war on terror, the evidence shows that it is not enough, and it is harming U.S. interests in Afghanistan and undermining Afghan efforts to establish a stable, secure and democratic government.

But uneven effort against terrorism is not the only place where Pakistan's cooperation has fallen short. There are still grave concerns about the nature and extent of the "nuclear Walmart" run by A.Q. Khan. To date no agent or investigator of the United States has had any direct access to him. We have only the purported information from Khan passed to us by the Government of Pakistan, a government which in one breath places him under house arrest and in the next celebrates him as a national hero. Meanwhile, we are left to wonder whether Dr. Khan's former associates have been arrested, or if they decided it was time for a career change or merely changed aliases.

Rioting this past weekend in the streets of Lahore over President Musharraf's decision to remove the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for as yet unspecified reasons highlights the fact that the return of Pakistan to democracy is an issue that has slipped in emphasis if not in actual importance. For six years now, the Congress has authorized the President to waive the provision of law which would ordinarily cut off assistance to a military government after a coup. In return for that waiver and $3.5 billion, we have seen very little in the way of progress back toward democracy. Elections are scheduled for later this year or early next year, but if past is prologue, these elections will be no freer and no fairer than any others. Those candidates who might actually be able to mount a significant political challenge to President Musharraf will either be undercut or barred outright from participating, clearing the field for only a challenge from Islamist candidates and setting before the voters the false choice of Musharraf or militants in control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The choice is obvious, but not appetizing and clearly one we should be working to change.

What we truly need in Pakistan is someone else to talk to. The Administration seems content to only speak with President Musharraf and portrays him as the indispensable man. The truth is, for our goals to be achieved in Pakistan there should be more than one phone number there to dial.