• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD IN LATIN AMERICA

Statement by:
Arturo Valenzuela, Professor of Government and Director
Center for Latin American Studies
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
House Committee on International Relations
United States Congress
Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building
Thursday March 1, 2007

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear today before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House International Relations Committee to discuss the current state of Inter-American relations and the challenges that United States foreign policy faces in the Hemisphere as President George W. Bush plans his forthcoming trip to the region.

With the end of the Cold War dramatic changes took place in the Americas. Whereas most countries in the region had endured prolonged periods of authoritarian government and several Central American nations faced long-standing armed civil conflicts, the eighties ushered in the longest period of democratic governance since independence almost two centuries ago.

Moreover, with the demise of the Soviet Union and beginning in the second Reagan administration United States engagement with its hemispheric neighbors evolved from one of almost exclusive concern for stemming the inroads of the communist left to a broader multi-pronged partnership aimed at encouraging democratic governance, resolving border disputes, implementing economic reforms and open markets, and addressing common problems such as organized crime and drug trafficking. Not since the failed experiment of the Alliance for Progress, had the United States become a genuine partner in a common effort that served the national interests of all countries-one that differed from the perceived role of a super-power attempting to impose its will on the destinies of the peoples of the region. Multilateral institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States were strengthened and the Summit of the America's process opened up a broad agenda of cooperation that included expanding hemispheric trade, promoting education, encouraging sustainable development and poverty alleviation, and addressing the challenges of organized crime, drug-trafficking and terrorism.

Of particular significance was the collective defense of democracy embodied in the adoption in 1991of the Organization of American States' Resolution 1080 that called for a hemispheric response in case the "democratic process" was interrupted in a "sudden or irregular manner." From the early 1980s until today only one classic military coup followed by outright military rule occurred in a continent once characterized by praetorian politics-- the overthrow of President Aristide in Haiti. And while 16 elected heads of state were not able to finish their terms in office, for the most part such transitions took place according to democratic precepts.

A quarter of a century after that transformational process began we confront a new and less optimistic reality. It is important, nonetheless, to place it in a broader historical context. The Western Hemisphere is still a continent ruled by governments elected by the people and remains the only continent in the world where irredentist politics is largely absent-that is politics that seek to establish sovereign states based on ethnic, linguistic or religious identities- a phenomenon that has become the most destabilizing force in the contemporary world. At the same time the early economic reforms did open-up markets and introduce fiscal discipline while developing new economic institutions and norms.

Nevertheless, it is clear today that the assumptions many made that the establishment of democratic institutions would automatically lead to their consolidation, proved premature as did the belief that economic reforms and free markets would in themselves strengthen and consolidate democracy and the rule of law. Democracy remains fragile and the inability of governments to significantly reduce poverty and inequality have placed additional burdens on the fledgling institutions of representative government and undermined adherence to the rule of law. Policies aimed only at opening trade and markets without addressing structural problems of poverty and inequality have contributed to disenchantment with those very policies among wide sectors of the population.

Populist responses that seek to address these problems with quick solutions and redistributive policies further corrode governing institutions placing democratic gains in peril while jeopardizing long-term strategies for achieving sustainable growth. Democratic institutions and the rule of law don't simply stem from economic reforms or even economic success. Those countries in Latin America that have been most successful in addressing fundamental social problems are also those countries where institutions are the most solid.

What is the state of U.S. Latin American relations in this more sobering context? Unfortunately, in over forty years of study of the region I have rarely seen a moment where there is as much mistrust of the United States and as strong a rejection of the U.S. posture in the World. Even at the height of the Cold War important sectors of mass and elite public opinion in Latin America approved of a U.S. policy aimed at containing the advance of a leftist movements linked in some measure to Soviet designs in the world. Today, by contrast, in country after country public opinion and elite public opinion from left to right takes strong issue with the actions of the United States in the world. In a recent Gallup poll, an average of only 27% of the public in 18 Latin American countries approved of United States leadership in the world and that percentage was lower in Mexico, El Salvador, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela and Argentina (with a low of 9%).

The views of average citizens are paralleled by elite public opinion. A Zogby survey conducted in 2005 of leaders in Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina revealed that 86% disagreed with the United States' handling of world conflicts, with two of every three (61%) saying they strongly disagreed

These findings appear paradoxical because the United States received overwhelming support in the Hemisphere after the attacks of 9/11. The Organization of American States invoked the Rio Treaty proclaiming that an attack on one member of the alliance was tantamount to an attack on all. The outpouring of solidarity with the United States led to strong backing for the war against Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban in Afghanistan. And yet, that support quickly soured after the Bush administration decided to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power, despite its inability to gain approval of a second resolution at the United Nations authorizing such action.

Two Latin American countries, Chile and Mexico, sat on the Security Council of the United Nations when the United States sought the second resolution. Both were arguably the closest allies the United States had in the Americas. The Bush administration had made a point of noting that the bi-lateral relationship with Mexico deserved to be considered among the most important for the United States in the world-and the United States was just concluding a free trade agreement with Chile as the centerpiece of its Hemispheric-wide trade policy.

Both countries were strongly pressured by the United States to support the second resolution authorizing military action. Neither was particularly comfortable with the French position. Both took their cues from the UN inspectors and both concluded that there did not appear to be an imminent danger of use of weapons of mass destruction. They also concluded that the Hussein's ability to initiate armed hostilities was severely constrained by the embargo and the monitoring of Iraqi airspace. Chile's position was close to that expressed by Canada and, working with the British, the country was prepared to have the UN institute clearer benchmarks for its inspectors and a shorter time frame for Iraq to comply as a prelude to a war authorization.

It is now well known that the Bush Administration was not prepared to delay an invasion that was already in motion and chose the path to war without UN sanction, only later assembling an ad-hoc coalition of supporters. For Mexico and Chile, the disregard for the UN process was a severe blow to long- standing commitments in both countries to the resolution of international conflicts through peaceful means within the framework of international institutions in conformity to international norms.

Unfortunately, the United States chose to "punish" both countries for doubting the imminent danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction and for refusing to provide UN sanction for the war effort. President Fox' phone calls were not returned and Chile, which initiated its free trade discussions with the United States at the same time as did Singapore, discovered that its Asian counterpart would sign its free trade agreement at the White House, while its own ceremony marking the beginning of a unique commercial relationship with the greatest power on earth would be relegated to a ministerial level meeting in Miami.

Mexico and Chile's position was widely praised in the region and received strong support from across the political spectrum in both countries- marking the beginning of strong dissent from the administration's response to the terrorist threat. The administration did succeed in enlisting support from governments in Central American governments, the Dominican Republic and Colombia for the coalition of the willing, although Colombia refrained from sending troops. In no country, however, did support for the war receive strong backing from the electorate. In the recent Gallup poll approval of U.S. world leadership is highest in Panama, with only 44% approval levels.

Mr. Chairman I have dwelt on this matter because it is difficult to understate the damage US global actions and some of their ramifications, such as the allegations of torture by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib or the irregular rendition of prisoners to other countries, have done to the United States' ability to provide moral and political leadership in the Hemisphere.

The predicament with which the United States finds itself in the Americas is not due solely, however, to profound skepticism with the rationale and conduct of the war in Iraq. The United States' response to various crises in the region over the last few years (Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Haiti) contributed to the souring of the relationship. I will refer briefly refer to two crises, both in President Bush's first term, that contributed to setting a negative tone: the Argentine financial crisis of 2000 and the coup attempt against of President Hugo Chavez in 2002. I will then briefly refer to the administration's failure to move ahead with comprehensive immigration reform and its impact on U.S. Mexican relations.

The Argentine financial crisis came to a head with the resignation of President Fernando de la Rua in December 2001. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neil made it clear from the outset that the new administration would be reluctant to follow the policies of the Clinton administration that had provided substantial financial assistance to countries like Brazil and Mexico to stabilize their currencies and prevent a massive devaluation with severe recessionary possibilities. When Argentina's fixed exchange rate set through a currency board became increasingly untenable following devaluation of the Brazilian real, the U.S. Treasury made it plain that American "taxpayers" would not come to Argentina's assistance.

While it is true that the drop in the value of the Argentine currency would have a limited effect on the international financial system compared to the feared effect of the earlier Mexican financial crisis, Argentina's currency collapse generated the largest sovereign default in history, plunged Argentina into recession, forced the resignation of a president, and set-back the evolution of Argentina's competitive party system and its fledgling democratic institutions. The effects were devastating for Argentina-and cast a pall over the economic fortunes of neighboring countries such as Bolivia by sharply discouraging regional foreign investment that had propelled growth.

Perhaps the single most damaging misjudgment in crisis management occurred in April 2002 when elements of the Venezuelan military together with leaders of the civilian opposition attempted to overthrow President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Chavez, elected president in 1998 and again in 2000 under a new constitution, had swept into office as a result of long standing and deep dissatisfaction in the Venezuelan electorate, which had grown weary of a political establishment viewed as venal and corrupt and incapable of preventing the sharp drop in the living standards experienced by average Venezuelans with the decline of oil prices in the 1980s. Chavez, who in 1992 had attempted to overthrow the elected government of former President Carlos Andes Perez by force as a young army officer, was intent on transforming Venezuelan politics by depriving the traditional political establishment of the oil generated resources that had kept its patronage system going for a generation. A polarizing figure with deep hostility towards the United States, which had barred him from traveling to the United States after his failed coup, he made clear his intent to make use of his new-found majority to transform Venezuelan institutions while weathering crippling demonstrations by his opponents intent on cutting his term short.

Although the circumstances surrounding Chavez' alleged resignation may have appeared murky, the Bush administration through a White House statement was quick to note that he had resigned his post and offered full support to a "transitional government" headed by Pedro Carmona, the leader of the Venezuelan business association. Such a government, named by the architects of the movement to remove Chavez, was patently unconstitutional and sought to remove not only the president, but close the National Assembly, dismiss the Supreme Court and bar from office all elected governors and mayors.

For the first time since the adoption of Resolution 1080 the United States countenanced a "sudden and irregular" interruption of the democratic process without seeking to mobilize the members of the Organization of American States to evaluate the crisis. By the time Chavez' supporters within the military and the streets were able to reassert control and the president resumed his post, the credibility of the United States as a supporter of the fundamental principle that the crises of democracy must be addressed within the framework of the democratic constitutional order was severely damaged. This misstep undermined the political and moral authority of the United States to exhort other hemispheric partners to expand the Democratic Charter of the OAS to include serious challenges to the democratic governance stemming from the personalization of power among elected leaders who have managed to garner strong majority support, a worrisome trend that applies to several countries in the region, not only Venezuela.

Mr. Chairman, in my view, the biggest disappointment in U.S. policy towards the region was the failure of the Bush administration to make genuine progress on the signature foreign policy objective articulated in the 2000 campaign- giving the bilateral relationship with Mexico the highest priority. In the early months of the new administration considerable progress was made in establishing a joint agenda while conducting a dialogue that would lower tension in matters involving trade, narcotics and law enforcement. But the single most important issue between both countries that share a 2000 mile border and experience 300 million legal border crossings a year is immigration. In preliminary talks, both governments made considerable progress mindful of the fact that immigration reform requires managing the border, expanding temporary work programs and regularizing the status of illegal aliens within the United States. The administration, however, pressured by elements on the right in the Republican party, backed away from immigration reform even before 9/11, and later invoked 9/11 as the principal reason the reforms could not be implemented.

Ironically, 9/11 rather than making the reforms less feasible, should have made them more urgent on national security grounds. Domestic security requires a well-regulated temporary worker program that can meet US labor demands while discouraging illegal immigration. At the same time, the presence of approximately 12 million people working in the country without proper documentation aggravates the problem of monitoring potential security risks.

But politics trumped national security. The administration lost a golden opportunity to push immigration reform when the president was at the peak of his popularity, even if he had had to do so by forging a bipartisan coalition with democrats as President Clinton did by obtaining NAFTA ratification with Republican support. The loss of Republican majorities in Congress in 2006 provides an opportunity for the President to seek comprehensive immigration reform, although his low levels of popular approval place him in a weaker position as an advocate for reform than say in the immediate aftermath of his reelection.

Mr. Chairman, the essential problem with United States policy towards Latin America, and it is not simply attributable to the current administration-is that it is not driven by strategic considerations. That is, policy makers don't assess the degree to which the United States has vital interests at stake in the Western Hemisphere and seek to implement policies to advance those interests. In a world of uncertainty and instability it is in the vital interest of the United States that democracies succeed in Latin America and that the countries of the region become more prosperous. A democratic and prosperous Hemisphere will provide markets for United States goods and decrease the pressures to migrate north for better jobs. A democratic and prosperous Hemisphere will also help contain transnational treats such as organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. The Western Hemisphere is also a critical in addressing the energy needs the United States will face in the coming decades as world energy demand climbs, domestic oil production declines and the Middle East continues to be a volatile and costly source of supply.

And yet more often than not Latin America policy is derivative of other policy priorities elsewhere in the world-as the treatment of Mexico and Chile in the aftermath of the failed second United Nations vote illustrated. Another example is the initial support the Bush Administration gave to President Francisco Flores of El Salvador to serve as Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Despite his personal merits, and I personally have very high regard for him, a conservative president form a small Central American was not the best choice to head up an organization when electorates are increasingly turning to the Left .

And yet, his candidacy was pushed as a reward for El Salvador's support for U.S. policy in Iraq. Insistence on his candidacy needlessly polarized the region leading to the creation of a false dichotomy between countries supporting the United States and those supporting Venezuela. The final outcome was a felicitous one, the choice of Chilean Jose Miguel Insulza as Secretary General, a socialist from a country that has more than any other in the region fully and successfully embraced globalization.

The immigration debate illustrates how often domestic policy is discussed without considering our vital foreign policy priorities. Mexico is going through one of the most complex transitions of the contemporary era - a shift away from one party rule to a competitive democracy. It has made significant progress, by comparison for example with the countries of the former Soviet Union. And yet, its democratic institutions are still weak and the country has an enormous deficit in the full implementation of the rule of law.

The Mexican economy also cannot fully assimilate new workers, creating a potentially volatile social mix in a country that requires much higher growth rates to raise standards of living. The United States cannot simply address the complex issue of Mexican migration as a matter of sealing the border-- not only because of the domestic implications of labor shortages in certain sectors-but also because the United States seriously needs to consider the impact of its policies on the success of Mexico's transition. Over the long run, the country's ability to raise its living standards is the only sure way to deal with the problem of illegal immigration.

As the president embarks on this trip to Latin America, what policies should we be doing to get Latin America policy back on track and advance our vital interests??

• Democracy and Good Governance: The trends in the region are still positive-where in the past the problems of democracy led to military intervention-today elections determine who governs. And yet the progress of democratic consolidation is uneven and there are disquieting trends. The most serious stems from popular frustrations with the perceived failings of democracy and the search for a leader that will solve the nation's problems. Leaders with majority support often mistake democracy for majority rule. Democracy is not the rule of the majority-rather it is government of the people in which the rights of minorities and future majorities are protected through constitutional restraints on the actions of majorities- the very essence of constitutional democracy. Countries in the region need to improve democratic governance while safeguarding fundamental rights. It is difficult for the United States to take an active leadership role on this issue because of its own credibility problems. Quiet diplomacy with countries committed to democratic governance is essential. A push back on authoritarian tendencies in the region cannot be led directly by the United States-but the United States must work with hemispheric partners to keep the issue on the agenda and seek mechanisms, through the OAS and the democracy clauses of organizations such as Mercosur to ensure that fundamental democratic freedoms are safeguarded. It will take time for the U.S. to regain credibility on this issue as a valid interlocutor. An important step forward is to emphasize the importance of good governance and to avoid a Manichean logic that sees the continent as divided between good guys and bad--- when what is at stake is the success in consolidating over the longer haul viable institutions of democratic governance.

• Trade: The mantra used to be "it's trade, not aid." It should be clear today that trade is not enough. And yet market-opening strategies are still important if the region is to compete in a globalized world. In trade negotiations, however, the United States needs to safeguard its interests, but also ensure that its requirements are not injurious to the wellbeing of fragile economies-our foreign policy priorities should trump our trade priorities particularly in the case of smaller economies. This means taking seriously trade adjustment strategies not only for American workers, but also for workers in partner countries by addressing labor and environment issues as key aspects of sustainable development. It also means seriously examining the degree to which U.S. insistence in subsidizing and protecting domestic agricultural interests seriously affects vital foreign policy objectives. The Congress should work with the administration to ratify free trade agreements with Peru and Colombia- of vital interest to both countries and to the United States. These should be viewed as expansions of the trade preferences given to Andean countries that struggle to control illicit drugs- trade both presidents elected support. US credibility.

• Assistance: Assistance for the Western Hemisphere is down once again with a considerable portion aimed as support for counter-drug assistance. While the Millennium Challenge account holds out a promise of support for some countries, the United States should make available more resources to help improve the competitiveness of Latin America through infrastructure investment and more directly investment in people, including programs to address poverty. To that end the Congress should adopt the Social Investment and Economic Development Fund that Senator Menendez has been promoting for years.

• Immigration: While in Mexico president Bush should outline a strong agenda of support for Mexico including comprehensive immigration reform that is of interest not only to Mexico but to many countries in the region, notably Central America.

• Criminal violence and public insecurity: The United States rightly continues to focus on anti-drug policies and measures to improve cooperation against terrorist threats. And yet there are few issues that are as central to the wellbeing of citizens in the Hemisphere than public security. Criminality and gang violence undermines public confidence in democratic institutions and is injurious to the rule of law. US policy often works at cross-purposes with an effective policy to deal with this matter by encouraging the redirection of police forces to the drug war-when assuring public security in its own right would enhance, and not undermine, the effort to reduce the scourge of illegal drugs. The United States also needs to reexamine policies that lead to the transfers of violent criminals to their home countries. Finally, the United States should sing the Small Arms Treaty preventing the easy export of small arms that aggravates crime and public insecurity in countries such as El Salvador.

• Energy: There are few issues as vital to fundamental U.S. interests as securing ready access to energy sources, renewable and non- renewable. The governments of Brazil and the United States should be applauded for concluding a bio-fuels agreement that will be signed during President Bush's trip to Brazil. As Senator Lugar and OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza argued in a recent op-ed in the Miami Herald that agreement should be expanded to provide a broader regional focus. The Organization of American States will also address energy issue in its General Assembly meeting in Panama. As regional integration efforts such as the Andean Community and Mercosur falter, a focus on energy integration could be an important first step in developing a meaningful integration scheme in the Hemisphere, just as the Coal and Steel Community served as a catalyst for European integration efforts. The United States should work with its hemispheric neighbors to help make this possible. Energy self-sufficiency in the Southern Hemisphere is clearly in the interests of the United States.

Thank you.