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Testimony of Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.)
Director, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Washington, DC

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
"Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go from Here?"
15 February 2007

Chairman Lantos, Ranking Republican Ros-Lehtinen, and Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Thank you for the invitation to offer my views on the current security, political, and economic circumstances in Afghanistan today, to include addressing sources of instability and prescriptions for U.S. and allied actions to address those sources of instability.

As a serving member of the Defense Department in my capacity as the Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University, I continue to have a responsibility to represent the views of the U.S. Government in some capacities. That said, I understand that the source of my invitation today is my nineteen months of service as the overall U.S. and coalition commander in Afghanistan from late 2003 to mid-2005. Although I have been back from Afghanistan for over eighteen months, and have since left active military service, I continue to follow events there closely. I will endeavor to present my candid views on all topics discussed, and will clearly note where opinions and judgments reflect my personal views, particularly where they might differ with current U.S. policy.

I would begin with a few highlights of the "big picture," if you will, regarding Afghanistan. Some observations on the positives in Afghanistan are important to note -- and often get overlooked. Afghanistan is emerging from over twenty-five years of continuous warfare -- beginning with the Soviets starting in 1979, then in a brutal civil war which wreaked devastation on the country surpassed only by that of the Soviets, and then finally a battle with the Taliban, which, with U.S. help, eventually led to their overthrow in late 2001. The Afghan people today are deeply tired of fighting.

Since 2001 the Afghans -- with broad and deep international support­ -- have approved one of the most moderate constitutions in the Islamic world, registered 10.5 million Afghans to vote (against expectations of half that number), voted President Karzai into office in their first-ever presidential election with 55% of the vote among eighteen candidates, selected a cabinet and conducted a peaceful inauguration, elected a parliament a year later, and have continued to fight off Taliban encroachments. During this time the Afghan people have not only tolerated but welcomed foreign military forces for the first time in their history -- with the understanding that only through foreign assistance would Afghanistan be able to move forward and prosper.

I often heard the refrain from Afghans of all stripes: "You Americans are not going to abandon us again, are you?" referring to their perceptions of U.S. flight following the defeat of the Soviets -- a perceived abandonment seared deep into Afghan consciousness, and one which they credit for the rise of the widely despised Taliban regime. Afghans have the experience of living under Taliban rule for years -- and virtually none want to return to that state, a powerful inoculation against the blandishments of any insurgent appeal.

Today, over 5 million Afghan children are in school, to include over 2 million girls -- prohibited during Taliban times. Hundreds of clinics and new schools are now open to serve the population as a result of international aid. The Afghan economy is growing at 8% per year, and the extensive outpouring of international support for Afghanistan has resulted in three donor conferences pledging over $24 billion since 2002. Most importantly in my estimation: the majority of Afghans want the international community, to include the military, to be in Afghanistan to accelerate and ensure Afghanistan's modernization. In many ways, Afghanistan is ours to lose.

A few comparisons with Iraq might be of interest since inevitably the two theaters of conflict are often juxtaposed. You may find that the differences are immense, and often, surprising. Afghanistan boasts both a population and a land mass larger than Iraq: 31 million Afghans as compared to almost 27 million Iraqis, and over 647,000 square kilometers of land vs. only 437,000 in Iraq -- an over 40% greater expanse of Afghan territory. Afghanistan's population is overwhelmingly rural and 80% agricultural, as compared with Iraq which is heavily urbanized. Afghanistan possesses few if any natural resources, although recent energy exploration has held out the promise of untapped reserves. Its statistics for infant and maternal mortality compete for rock bottom in the world in UN measurements. Literacy is about 36%, road networks are primitive to non-existent -- smaller Iraq has nearly five times the paved road mileage found in Afghanistan. Electricity remains rare throughout the country, and is still sporadic in the capital city, Kabul -- similar to Baghdad.

Where we are working in Iraq to restore a nation's economy, infrastructure, and standard of living -- in Afghanistan, by contrast, we are working to create capacity where virtually none has ever existed. Iraq's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is $94.1 billion compared to Afghanistan's nearly $8 billion. And might I add that this includes almost $3 billion of Afghanistan's GDP that comes from the illicit drug trade. More telling, the Iraqi government's budget comes in at $30.8 billion compared to Afghanistan's paltry $800 million - making Afghanistan's budget substantially smaller than the budget of: Fairfax Country, Virginia; San Mateo County, California; or Miami-Dade County, Florida. Afghanistan's relentless rejection of foreign armies has had the paradoxical effect of precluding the establishment of a residual civil service, agricultural system, road network, and nationwide infrastructure that are often the legacy of colonial powers -- despite colonialism's other onerous effects. Afghanistan has experienced none of those positive effects, and thus finds itself perhaps hundreds of years behind its neighbors in the structural trappings of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Finally, distinct from Iraq's sectarian divides, Afghanistan is dominated by a tribal system perhaps unique to that nation. Five key tribes - Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras - dominate national politics and many elements of Afghan life. While rivalries between tribes remain strong, it is worthy to note that Afghanistan throughout the centuries has put aside the often bloody competition among tribes to maintain a national identity as Afghanistan. Despite numerous opportunities to fragment into different sub-nations along tribal lines, Afghanistan has remained together. Shi'a-Sunni conflict was muted during my time there (only the Hazaras are Shi'a), and I believe it remains a relatively minor factor in Afghan politics today. As a number of knowledgeable observers on Afghanistan have said, "Afghanistan is a strong nation, but a weak state." Institutions are simply near non-existent as measured against a functioning model -- with only few exceptions.

In military terms, since the initial U.S. operations there in 2001 to depose the Taliban, U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan has been dramatically less than in Iraq -- today standing at its highest point with 24,000 Americans deployed, plus another 22,000 non-U.S. NATO troops -- the highest totals in each category since our involvement began. By contrast, when I arrived in Afghanistan in October 2003, our U.S. troops numbers were about 14,000 and NATO less than 6,000. This "light footprint" in my view has been a beneficial and useful component of our overall strategy, and reflected the accurate concerns for the potential impacts of very large numbers of foreign troops in a land famous for its successful rejection of foreign armies. That situation may, however, be changing today.

Our involvement in Afghanistan should also be viewed in a broader context than simply the nation of Afghanistan -- our national interests should look to "the neighborhood." Central Asia is a historic area of great power conflict and a quick scan of Afghanistan's neighbors should serve to reinforce why our efforts in Afghanistan today have strategic consequences.

To the south, along a 1,500 mile border, Afghanistan abuts Pakistan - the second largest Muslim nation in the world and one with a stockpile of nuclear weapons. The Pakistani-Afghan border area - poorly defined in many spots - comprises some of the most rugged terrain in the world, and roughly spans the distance between Washington, DC and Denver, Colorado - much of it covered by Rocky Mountain-like terrain. On the northeast corner of Afghanistan is China, sharing a small but extraordinarily mountainous border in the Hindu Kush range. Its northern border finds Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan - former republics of the now defunct Soviet Union, but always torn between looking north to Russia or aiming south toward trade and warm water access to the Arabian Sea - through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, to the west lies Iran - a growing power in the region, and one also aspiring to nuclear arms.

This neighborhood defines strategic location and influence -- and the significance of our role in assuring Afghanistan's success as a democratic Muslim state in the center of this region cannot be underestimated. Both China and Russia have clear designs on increasing their influence in this critical part of the world and, via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- a regional six-country cooperative -- have made it clear that they seek the departure of the U.S. military presence.

Whether or not the Central Asia of today is emerging as the nexus of a new "Great Game," the realties are that the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 now has vital interests in this part of the world - and must play a leadership role in helping to shape a positive outcome for the region. American actions over the next five years will send a clear and unambiguous message to friends and adversaries alike about the importance the U.S. attaches to both the region and, more importantly, to our friends who seek encouragement and reinforcement against countervailing currents. Our physical distance from this key part of the world only makes our leadership more important -- the geography is not going to change and Afghanistan's neighbors will always remain neighbors -- whereas the U.S. presence can turn out to be a fleeting one. We must actively guard against these perceptions.

In looking at the nature of the threats inside Afghanistan, I often drew out a diagram of interlocking circles I characterized as the "Three Wars of Afghanistan." This diagram outlined not only the activities U.S. and coalition forces were involved with daily, but also highlighted the interrelated aspects of Afghanistan's challenges. It neatly defines in graphic form many of the sources of instability in Afghanistan as well. The first circle reflects the war against the senior leadership of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbi Islami Gelbuddin (HiG) -- the three primary enemy organizations, all affiliated with each other in a marriage of convenience. Senior leadership of these organizations includes Usama bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar, as well as their most senior lieutentants -- the brainpower of each terrorist group. The center of gravity to effect this first "war" was intelligence -- timely, accurate, and actionable -- crucial information that could be validated and acted upon before the target might disappear. Not surprisingly, this was the most difficult set of objectives to collect readily usable intelligence upon, but we continue to have a dedicated 24/7 capability in Afghanistan oriented toward this focus. The American people would expect no less.

The second circle represented the war against the organizations led by the culprits noted above -- Al Qaeda, the Taliban , and HiG. This "war" was the primary battlefront which consumed most of our military effort on a day-to-day basis. Its center of gravity was the Afghan people -- the group that formed the overarching center of gravity for our entire integrated political-military effort in Afghanistan. Ultimately, it was our view that the Afghan people would choose their future -- either with their own elected government, or with the terrorists and insurgents if other hopes were extinguished. This effort was, at root, about keeping hope alive among ordinary Afghans -- to insure they could always see a better day ahead for their children. We preserved this center of gravity foremost in our efforts.

Finally, the third circle depicted the war against the "centrifugal forces" that daily worked to pull Afghanistan apart -- drugs, warlords, factionalism, crime, corruption, poverty, lack of education -- factors that were centuries-old characteristics of the Afghan landscape, and continue to exert a powerful and debilitating influence on the nation's future even today. The center of gravity of this third "war" was "extending the reach of the central government" to project its authority and benefits into the farthest regions of the country, to assert the rule of law, to alleviate local suffering and shortfalls, and to provide the benefits of government to areas that had seen precious little presence or effects -- perhaps for decades or more.

This "Three Wars of Afghanistan" construct depicts in many ways the dilemmas that face both the government and people of Afghanistan today, but also describes the nature of the challenges the U.S. faces in moving forward in the next several years.

And now I turn to my own personal views and judgments:

The Enemy

The enemy in Afghanistan today remains elusive and notably more powerful -- in my estimation -- than the enemy of two or three years ago. His tactics are changing and becoming more deadly. Employment of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bomber attacks have grown exponentially since 2005, perhaps reflecting a sharing of technology and tactics drawn from terrorists in Iraq. The Taliban and associated foreign fighters -- to include Al Qaeda -- remain the "spoilers" in Afghanistan. The Taliban cannot win -- hostility from a population still scarred and embittered from years of living under Taliban rule is overwhelming. But the Taliban can force the West to quit -- and thus ultimately prevail.

Of particular concern in this regard is what appears to be to be a significant growth in Taliban capabilities since 2005. By the spring of 2005, during the waning days of my tenure as U.S. and coalition overall commander, we were looking carefully at a number of staff analyses that began to suggest the Taliban was exhibiting signs of defeat. I believe in retrospect that this was not an inaccurate assessment -- but I also believe that some significant change took place in 2005 that re-energized the Taliban movement and ultimately delivered this "new Taliban" which we see today -- emboldened, aggressive, employing new tactics, seemingly well supplied, trained and evidently possessing plenty of new recruits. Today's Taliban -- from my news account assessment -- is not the Taliban force we fought in 2004 and 2005. I can speculate on the reasons, and note ruefully as well that we did not seem to have the "read" on the enemy which would have seen this developing.

Regional Perceptions of U.S. Resolve

In mid-summer 2005, shortly after my departure from Afghanistan, the U.S. announced that NATO was assuming control from the U.S.-led coalition for the entire Afghan mission -- and shortly thereafter, we also announced we were withdrawing over 1,000 U.S. troops from the combat zone. This, in my personal estimation, sent a most unfortunate and misinterpreted signal to friend and foe alike -- that the U.S. was leaving and turning the mission over to some largely unknown (in that part of the world) organization of 26 countries directed from Europe. Tragically, I believe that this misunderstood message caused both friends and enemies to re-calculate their options -- with a view toward the U.S. no longer being a lead actor in Afghanistan. The truth, of course, is much different but many of the shifts in enemy activity and even the behavior of Afghanistan's neighbors, I believe, can be traced to this period. All of this leads us inexorably to the topic of Pakistan.

Pakistan

The Pakistani government has been one of the most aggressive and reliable supporters of the United States in our war against Al Qaeda since 9/11. The Pakistanis have made more arrests of Al Qaeda associated figures - to include Al Qaeda kingpin Khalid Sheik Mohammed - than any other nation. That said, it is my personal opinion that since mid-2005, Pakistan has also re-calculated its position vis-à-vis Afghanistan in light of concerns for a diminished and less aggressive U.S. presence in the nation that lies in Pakistan's backyard. Pakistan has had a long-standing relationship with the Taliban since its origins, and I believe maintains some degree of influence, however limited, with the insurgent group. Moreover, after courageous -- and bloody -- Pakistani fighting with regular army troops against Taliban and other foreign fighters in the tribal areas of South Waziristan in 2004, Pakistan has now chosen to create "truces" with groups in North Waziristan, apparently to avoid further bloody and inconclusive conflicts. This "arrangement" -- citing news accounts from the area as well as from our U.S. military commanders -- has resulted in a three-fold increase in insurgent activity across the border inside Afghanistan opposite the 'truce" area. This is far from a welcome development, and highlights the ambiguity of Pakistan's role in this conflict -- perhaps to include tipping the ultimate outcome in one way or the other.

At the end of the day, neither NATO nor Afghan forces can overcome the existence of a sanctuary for the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and various other foreign fighters. If the Taliban has a protected location in which they can rest, recruit, train, re-arm, treat their wounded, and bury their dead without any threat of military attack -- no amount of effort to curb the Taliban inside Afghanistan will be successful. This requires a solution that spans both sides of this volatile border area.

Possible Prescriptions

Although I have focused primarily on the security situation, I follow the political and economic linkages as well -- and all must be addressed in order to arrive at a comprehensive set of solutions that can contribute to Afghanistan's future as a regional success story. Some thoughts, strictly my own-

Unity of Effort

The assumption by NATO of military command across Afghanistan provides a unique opportunity to use NATO as a rallying point around which to build -- perhaps in partnership with the very effective United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) -- a core of leaders devoted to a holistic set of solutions to the many diverse challenges inside Afghanistan. "Fragmentism" as I put it -- the tendency to divide all immense challenges up into small lanes of competing interests with no unifying leadership -- undercuts both the U.S. and international effort in Afghanistan as it does in other parts of the world. The closer the endeavor can get to one person (or small group) in charge, with full authority, resources, longevity, trust, and accountability for results -- the sooner success will be achieved and the fewer resources wasted. This will not be easy, but there is precedent for achieving this effect in the 2003 -- 2005 era of Ambassador Khalilzad's tenure.

Institution-building and Lack of Human Capital

I often describe the challenge of delivering results in Afghanistan as an hourglass -- at the top is the amount of foreign aid available, which is substantial. At bottom, is the breadth of the Afghan people's need for help in virtually every sector. In the middle is the bottleneck -- the lack of human capital in Afghanistan today that can convert dollars, euros, yen, and pounds into effects felt in cities and towns across the country. Managerial and technical support is in short supply, only exacerbated by the difficult security situation broadly found in the southern half of the country. A serious effort must be made to grow Afghan managerial capacity, perhaps by the creation of a robust civil service. A key component of this effort must be to incentivize foreign managerial expertise to share in this great undertaking -- and to assist in training Afghans as well. This is a necessary but alone insufficient step in building Afghan institutions which are today largely defunct.

A major U.S. interagency- and internationally- supported effort should be undertaken to craft plans for wide-scale training and broad governmental mentorship programs. These efforts have potential -- guided by the Afghan government's expressed needs and a culturally respectful approach -- to transform Afghanistan's executive, judicial, and legislative arms. The Afghan government should supervise the prioritization of this "best practices" support, including, where appropriate, from Islamic countries. Elections do not ensure democracy, but solid institutions can -- now the time has come to focus on building the long-term effectiveness of the Afghan government through focus on effective Afghan institutions.

Poppy

To counter the pernicious effects of illegal agriculture in Afghanistan, a fully-resourced system of legitimate agriculture must be created. Today in Afghanistan, if you want free seed for your crop, if you want advice on how to grow your crop, if you want assured transport of your crop to market, if you want a guaranteed price for your crop, you can only get all of these supports from drug lords. Legitimate farmers must have access to the same kind of farm supports if they are to have a chance at being successful -- and to incentivize others to leave poppy farming and grow legal crops. As I said earlier, Afghanistan remains an agricultural economy at core, with 80% of its population being agricultural. Despite this fact, little has been done to energize and grow capacity in this central sector of the Afghan economy that impacts the livelihood of millions of Afghans annually.

Infrastructure Building

The President's budget just submitted to Congress -- on which I am not an expert witness -- is an excellent and much-needed step to dramatically ramp up financial support for our long-term objectives in Afghanistan. Significantly increasing funding for Afghan security force growth as well as dollars dedicated to infrastructure improvement will pay immense dividends. These dollars must be accompanied by the management structures needed to efficiently and effectively use the money to deliver enduring results -- a much more difficult proposition in a nation with limited human capital, as noted. A robust infusion of U.S. interagency management talent could help offset this indigenous shortfall, as well as serve as a civil service role model for the Afghan government.

Pakistan

A renewed effort on the diplomatic front seems to me to be in order to convince Pakistan of American staying power in the region. Recent U.S. approaches to India have also cast a new light upon Pakistani perceptions vis-à-vis the U.S., and should not be overlooked in this equation. Pakistan has been a loyal and assertive ally in the war against Al Qaeda, but now must turn its attention to ensuring that the government of its neighbor Afghanistan remains unburdened by a threat emanating, at least in part, from Pakistan. Both nations -- Afghanistan and Pakistan -- share a common enemy in terrorist groups, one of which has twice attempted to assassinate the Pakistani president. This common threat must form the basis for a renewed commitment by both countries to forswear any "deals" with terrorists that offer them protection inside either nation. Sanctuary -- on both sides of the border -- must be eliminated and must be the top security priority of both nations in this fight.

Thanks for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you.