• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Remarks of David Makovsky
Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on Middle East Peace Process, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Middle East Subcommittee, House International Relations Committee
February 14, 2007

Chairman Ackerman, Ranking Member Pence, and Distinguished Members of the Middle East Sub-Committee,

I am pleased to appear before you today. The Israeli-Palestinian political landscape has been rather bleak over the last several years. Between 2000-2004, the second Intifada brought almost unremitting terror and violence. Despite Israel's pullout from Gaza in the summer of 2005, the parliamentary victory of the rejectionist Hamas party in January 2006 contributed to this downward trend.

Compounding the problem of peacemaking today has been inadequate leadership of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. At times, Abbas has been outmaneuvered by Hamas, while at other times he has shown a willingness to yield to rather than confront his Hamas rivals. This trend was embodied last week at the Mecca summit. The agreement signed there will greatly complicate Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's effort to reach a "political horizon" between Israelis and Palestinians, which is scheduled to be launched this Sunday in Jerusalem at a meeting with Olmert and Abbas. For his part, Olmert has been on the defensive. His coalition is solid but he and his inexperienced Defense Minister Amir Peretz have --at best--anemic public support, according to a wide variety of polls. This is because of widespread public perception that his government slipped into war last summer and then subsequently mismanaged the conflict by overstating political objectives and by not matching military moves to meet those objectives. Allegations of corruption have not helped the embattled Prime Minister's public standing either. Olmert's future may be brought into sharper focus next month as the Winograd Committee examining the conduct of the Lebanon war of last summer issues its interim report.

Secretary Rice's mission is to create a "political horizon" for the Palestinians - specifically a discussion rather than a formal negotiating channel between Olmert and Abbas --- to see if they agree on principles that would underline the contours of a final deal. According to this view, Rice sees her "political horizon" discussions as both validating Abbas' focus on negotiations instead of violence and as satisfying Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's belief that such a wide ranging discussion avoids ensuring that Israeli concessions are made in a contextual vacuum. Livni, and apparently Rice, believe that only under the rubric of discussing principles about a final status agreement can significant tradeoffs can be reached and a grand bargain can be struck. Both Rice and Livni have made clear that once such a grand deal has been struck then the interim steps called for under the moribund Roadmap could be implemented since all side know if there is light at the end of the road, and this means confidence building when it comes to security, improving daily life for the Palestinians, and settlements.

It is critical to understand how the recent Mecca summit has undercut this endeavor. On the favorable side of the ledger, the accord does bring about the prospect of halting internecine Palestinian violence which has claimed 100 Palestinian lives since December 2006. This is probably the main reason that Abbas agreed to the accord, as he is known for his non-confrontationalist style and he wanted to stop the killing. Another potential benefit is that the agreement could potentially narrow Iranian interference in the Palestinian debate through increased Saudi support. Other favorable prospects include a government with a Hamas minority in ministers, and the increased possibility that the new government will witness the release of captured Israeli soldier Gilead Shalit, which could in turn boost public support for Olmert.

However, these favorable possible outcomes must be weighed against the negative side of the ledger, and unfortunately, the drawbacks outweigh the benefits. By forging a unity government, the Mecca accord is a victory for Hamas, as a "unity government" has been a goal of Hamas. Since its victory, the movement has viewed such a wide coalition, which would enable it to be legitimized by Fatah, as a means of consolidating its electoral gains, thereby positioning itself to restart international funding without conceding any of the three principles put forward by the Quartet-US, EU, Russia and UN-namely commit to recognizing Israel, disavowing violence and adherence to past written agreements. At Mecca, Hamas resisted Abbas' insistence that Hamas "commit" to these principles, due to reasons linked perhaps to heartfelt ideology which is often underestimated by people outside of Middle East and amid hope that they could drive a wedge within the international community. Despite the avowal to cease intra-Palestinian fighting, there is no mention of either recognizing Israel, or desisting from violence against Israelis.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that Abbas has legitimized an unrepentant Hamas. Current Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniye will remain in his office. Accordingly, before the ink at Mecca was dry, Hamas spokesmen openly declared that they will never recognize Israel. By agreeing to join a coalition with Hamas, it is very possible the distinctions between Abbas and Hamas have blurred. Under such conditions, how can Abbas call a new election and win? If Abbas and Hamas are joined, there is less incentive among people in the international community to bolster Abbas at Hamas' expense. The rationale of Rice's political horizon initiative was being done precisely for this purpose, namely to demonstrate to Palestinian moderates that it is Abbas and not Hamas who can reap major diplomatic gains. The most vocal advocate in Israel who favors Rice's "political horizon" concept is Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who accepted its logic, and who believed it would heighten the differences between Abbas and Hamas. She is certainly bound to be less than enthusiastic after Mecca. It is fair to predict that the very premise of the Rice exercise will come under greater scrutiny on Sunday, as Israeli officials may wonder how will it be possible to proceed with such weighty issues with an Abbas who joins a government will the rejectionist Hamas. Olmert, who did not share Livni's enthusiasm from the outset and has been skeptical of the political horizon idea because he does not think the Arabs will do their share of compromising, is likely to feel vindicated. In short, even if Abbas is willing to make a deal, Mecca has proved to many that he will not break from Hamas. As such, the ostensible blurring between Fatah and Hamas at Mecca is actually a clarifying moment. The onus is on Abbas to prove otherwise.

So far, the response to Mecca from the international community has been rather muted. The Quartet issued a statement making clear that its three criteria, mentioned above, need to be met. The muted response may be partially explained as a show of deference to Saudi Arabia, which facilitated the agreement and in so doing, departed from its historically passive position on internal Palestinian affairs. However, the lack of a response is also due to the Quartet holding out hope that the new actual PA government guidelines will prove more practical and moderate than what was mandated at Mecca, given its new composition with Hamas as the minority.

However, there is ample reason for skepticism that the PA coalition policy guidelines will substantially be substantially different from Mecca. Yes, Hamas might not be a majority in the new government, but it will have key posts. Haniye will be the Prime Minister and Hamas has the right to put forward an "independent" name as Interior Minister. Such a minister in the Middle East does not deal with national parks, but rather is usually the strongman of the regime. Failure to reach an agreement on an Interior Minister, which has long been a sticking point between Fatah and Hamas, could lead to the non-implementation of the agreement, as could deep disagreements of power-sharing between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestine Liberation Organization. Moreover, as of this writing, there is no indication that Hamas is willing to dismantle its "Executive Force" - a nascent militia in Gaza which could easily grow with fresh infusions of cash. Instead, Hamas would like the Executive Force legitimized as another PA security force. All this has implications for US policy. People who felt there was a logic to bolstering Abbas so he not be intimidated by Hamas' growing strength and therefore supported the security mission of Gen. Keith Dayton and $86 million in non-lethal military assistance, must now wonder if the new Palestinian coalition alignment could now lead to a very different outcome. While the US will not talk to Hamas ministers, the key question about who controls the Palestinian Security services seems to have an impact about how or whether, if at all, the US can or should proceed on both fronts. These are questions that require serious examination as Rice meets with Olmert and Abbas on Sunday.

Irrespective of the Dayton and $86 million questions, the Quartet should keep to its three criteria. It should urge the Saudis to refrain from delivering aid until the conditions are met. Such a commitment by the Quartet does not mean that Gaza will worsen. According to the UN Special Coordinator's office in the Mideast earlier this week, overall foreign aid to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza reached $1.3 billion in 2006. Of this, some $750-$800 million was channeled through the Temporary International Mechanism, World Bank and Arab donors. Another $430-$450 million was channeled via the UN system and non-government organizations for humanitarian programs, mainly in the form of direct food and cash assistance to the people. Virtually no aid was programmed through government line ministries. It is estimated that the $1.3 billion of 2006 was 10% above the year before, although there was an obvious shortfall of tax revenue passed by Israel.

The Mecca accord has made it clear that Abbas is more dependent upon Hamas than ever before. He is demonstrating that he will prefer Palestinian unity to peace with Israel. As such, many wonder if Rice is doomed to fail in such an ambitious effort to reach common principles that will end the conflict. Therefore, the only way to prove the opposite it can be argued is that Rice pursue her course and see if Abbas will pick peaceful compromise with Israel over Palestinian unity on the core issues needed to resolve the conflict. The odds are slim. The litmus test will be the refugee question. The territorial demands made upon a weakened Olmert will be overwhelming, but without Abbas willing to compromise, as well, there is no chance that an overall deal can be reached. If Abbas can demonstrate that he can compromise on a core issue like refugees, Olmert could be politically energized to make requisite territorial compromises as well.

It is hard to see how the Rice mission on creating a "political horizon" can succeed without the active involvement of the Saudis and Egyptians so they back compromises, including this key issue. Without their participation, Abbas will not likely feel he has the Arab backing to proceed. Therefore, as the Saudis move from back-stage to center-stage when it comes to Mideast diplomacy, there need to be urgent US-Saudi high-level consultations about whether or not the two countries share a common outlook towards peacemaking. The Mecca accord raises key questions about whether the US and Saudi Arabia are aligned, or whether they are working at cross-purposes.

A benign interpretation of Riyadh's intentions is that the Saudis realize the risk of radicalism and are ready to take the plunge into Arab-Israeli peacemaking. According to this view, there is a changing regional context for the US that could create opportunities. There is little doubt that the Saudis, along with Egypt and Jordan where I just visited, fear that an ascendant Iran could change the balance of power in the Middle East. These governments fear Iran gaining nuclear weapons and Iran as a destabilizing force in the Mideast seeking to upend any existing order. The wake-up call was last summer's war between Israel and Hizbullah, where Riyadh took the unprecedented step of denouncing Hizbullah for being "reckless" and repeated it despite public criticism. The calculus is simple: If Iran supports sub-state Shia actors such as Hizbullah in Lebanon under a Sunni-led coalition of Fuad Siniora, it is well within the realm of possibility that Tehran could support similar sub-state Shia groups in Saudi Arabia, where the benefits of the world's largest oil reserves are enticing. Moreover, if a Shia Iran has a demonstrated willingness to provide material support to a Sunni-Hamas in Gaza, why would not replicate this formula and support other Sunni groups of similar extremist ideology to destabilize other Arab regimes like Egypt? According to the benign interpretation, the fear of Iran driven home the risk of rejectionism to Riyadh and they view Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking as at least one means to defeat it.

There is a less benign interpretation. It states that what is driving Saudi Arabia is sectarianism, not moderation. Under this view, Riyadh has no problem supporting Hamas' program, so long as they are Sunni and can keep Iranian money and influence at bay. According to this view, the Saudis have not changed at all and are not a partner for peace.

It would be useful for the US to explore Saudi objectives and strategies. This would be beneficial not just to avoid surprises in Mecca, but to see if support for Hamas would be linked to a change of its platform. Furthermore, the US needs to know if a political horizon between Israel and the Palestinians can succeed. Specifically, contrary to assertions of former President Jimmy Carter and others, this entire conflict is not merely about land. Indeed, land is the most solvable part of this conflict. There are sufficient land swap formulas to resolve the territorial dimension of this conflict if one accepts the premise that both Israel and Palestine are entitled to a state of their own. This idea is accepted by Israel and Abbas, but not the Islamists. Moreover, apart from this recognition, there is a need to resolve Arab sections of east Jerusalem, and how to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem so they know that they can inhabit a new Palestinian state without inundating Israel and fundamentally altering its demographics.

The Arab Initiative of 2002 is often touted by Arab states, but at least in its current form, it is an inadequate framework for such talks. There are at least three major problems with the initiative as it is currently worded. First, the issue of refugees in the Arab Initiative is addressed in a manner that, semantics aside, is best interpreted as meaning no compromise at all. Second, it gives little flexibility on how territorial arrangements are reached. Third, it essentially gives the Syrians veto over the Palestinian track, since there must be full withdrawal on all fronts or else, there is no normalization. Fourth, the Arab Initiative is completely back-loaded. It is currently structured that Israel does all the heavy lifting of getting out of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Only after Israel does everything, will the Arabs provide Israel with the flag of normalization. There are no efforts to take parallel steps that could revive the Israeli center as it undertakes such herculean tasks. So far, the Israeli public has seen its pullouts from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005 met with Katyusha and Qassem rockets, respectively, and this reinforces a sense among some that peacemaking is not possible. Such parallelism, I have argued for years, would require an Arab roadmap to go in parallel with Israeli territorial withdrawals. It needs to be demonstrated by deeds that withdrawal will make Israel more secure rather more vulnerable. For the Initiative to be useful, it needs substantial modification.

If Secretary Rice is genuine in pursuing a political horizon in an era of weak leadership, one needs to consider whether Riyadh and Cairo are willing to do something that they were not willing to do in 2000 at the time of the Camp David (July) and the Clinton Parameters (December). Namely, they need to provide the requisite political cover for Abbas to make the key compromise so that the Palestinian refugees can inhabit the Palestinian state, go to a third country, or receive financial compensation, but not go back to Israel. Unless there is Arab cover on such core issues - especially the refugee issue which could likely trigger an Olmert response and lead to parallel action - it is hard to see how Rice can succeed.

In short, if the Bush Administration is really serious about a political horizon, it needs to have a dialogue not just with Israelis and Palestinians but also with our Arab friends to discern the depth of their commitment to peacemaking in a very specific way. The Mecca experience suggests that not everyone is on the same page. It is not a good omen, as peacemaking requires broad support. Without such assistance, there is a prospect that a very well-intended Rice mission could constitute motion without movement.

Thank you.