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Statement by Lee H. Hamilton
Co-Chair of the Iraq Study Group
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives
January 19, 2007

Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs: It is a distinct honor to appear before you this morning. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report.

Introduction

Let me begin by noting some common elements in the Study Group report and the President's recent speech. We agree with President Bush:

• "The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people."
• "The consequences of failure are clear." and
• "Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people."

We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units with the goal that the Iraq government will assume control of security in all provinces in Iraq by November 2007.

We recommended many of the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq, and agree that now is the time for the Iraqi government to act.

As part of my prepared statement, I have attached a statement that Secretary Baker and I released after the President's speech. Also attached is a chart from the January 11th Washington Post comparing key proposals from the Iraq Study Group Report with the President's proposal.

The report of the Study Group already has been analyzed at length. If it is agreeable to the Chair, I would like to be fairly brief in my opening remarks and concentrate on making a few points on:

• the security mission;
• benchmark performance;
• diplomacy;
• economic assistance;
• the military surge; and
• the Maliki government.

Training the Iraqi Army: Primary versus Essential Mission

There are points of similarity between the Study Group report and the President's plan. Both keep rapid reaction and special operations forces in place to strike al Qaeda in Iraq. Both increase the number of U.S. personnel embedded with Iraqi Army units. Both emphasize the training mission.

The President stated: ".we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq."

The Study Group stated (p. 70): "The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations."

While there are similarities between these two proposals, it is my belief that there is still a very large gap between them.

The Study Group states flatly that training should become the primary mission for U.S. forces.

The President states that training "remains the essential.mission." The President's plan also makes clear that U.S. forces will be sent to Baghdad to "help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods." That means door-to-door sweeps. That means combat operations.

Training cannot become the primary mission for U.S. forces in Iraq if the mission includes a stepped-up security mission in Baghdad.

The Administration will tell you that our soldiers can carry out both missions.

I agree - our soldiers can do both missions. I am also confident that if you do both, the training mission suffers. All of the attention now is on the surge, not on the training mission.

We were told on several occasions that more U.S. forces can bring stability on a temporary basis in a specific area, but only the Iraqis can step up and secure their country. Sometimes the presence of U.S. forces can inflame tensions and enable the Iraqis to put off responsibility.

Unless the training mission is the primary mission:

• You delay the date of completion of the training mission;
• You delay the date of a handover of responsibility to the Iraqis;
• You delay the date of departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Now, the Iraq Study Group set no timetables and set no deadlines, but it did set a clear goal and direction for policy: "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades could be out of Iraq."

The President's plan gives no indication how long the training mission or the security mission in Baghdad will take.

The key point of difference is that the Study Group believes that a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.

The President's proposal spells out no comparable plan for a transition of combat forces out of Iraq.

Performance on Benchmarks

No security plan can work in the absence of national reconciliation. The Study Group report stated that U.S. forces "cannot stop the violence - or even contain it - if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country."

The Study Group, the President, and Prime Minister Maliki agree on key measures the Iraqis need to take. Those measures include: legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis; provincial elections later this year; reform of the de-Baathification laws; and a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's Constitution. The Study Group sets dates for performance. It calls on the United States to consult closely with the Iraqi government to develop additional milestones tied to calendar dates.

Prime Minister Maliki's words on behalf of these goals have been good, but his performance has been weak. I commend the President for his statement:

I have made clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act.

What is lacking in the Administration's approach, however, is holding Iraqi leaders to specific benchmarks and to specific dates for performance. The United States needs to use its leverage to get Iraqi leaders to perform. We use conditionality with many other recipients of U.S. assistance. We should do so with Iraq. The Study Group stated in its Recommendation 21 (p.61):

If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

In the absence of pressure, the Iraqi government will not perform. In the absence of pressure, there will be no national reconciliation. In the absence of national reconciliation, there will be sectarian violence without end.

Diplomacy

The President stated in his speech that "We will use America's full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East."

Iran and Syria. The President did not endorse a diplomatic effort including all of Iraq's neighbors. The Study Group took the view that "the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues."

Iran and Syria have influence in Iraq. That's simply a fact. There are things they are doing that we want them to stop doing. There are things they could be doing that they are not doing. We cannot wish that influence away. Yes, they are part of the problem. It is the view of the Study Group that we must try to make them part of the solution.

Sometimes the argument is made that Iran has momentum in the region, and the United States should not negotiate until it has more leverage over Iran. I do not accept that the United States of America is too weak to negotiate. We negotiated with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We certainly can and should negotiate with Iran on behalf of stability and our interests in Iraq.

Arab-Israeli peace. The Study Group also calls for a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to an Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts. The Secretary of State has been traveling in the region. Her efforts to launch informal talks between Palestinians and Israelis are a positive development.

Some have asked us: What does the Arab-Israeli conflict have to do with the war in Iraq? Why make one problem harder by taking on two?

The answer is simple. You cannot get anything done in the Middle East without addressing the Arab-Israeli issue. We want these other countries, especially the Sunni Arab countries, to help us. When we go to talk to them about Iraq, they will want to talk to us about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The United States says it wants to empower "moderate Muslims." Yet the only way to empower the moderates is to take away the most potent grievance of the extremists: that the United States does not care about the Palestinians.

A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace will deal the extremists a blow in Baghdad and Beirut. It will bolster American prestige. And - above all - it will guarantee the long-term security of America's ally: Israel.

All of us understand that the peace process is difficult, and that results will be measured in years, not months. But a sustained effort counts. A sustained effort will help us with Iraq and will win us important diplomatic leverage across the board in the Middle East.

Economic Assistance

The President asked for over $1.1 billion in additional economic assistance for Iraq. That is a step in the right direction. The Study Group believes the commitment should be substantially larger - $5 billion per year. Why? -because our current approach needs balance. It is too heavily weighted toward the military mission. We are spending $ 2 billion a week on the military alone. We need to do many things right in Iraq if we are going to succeed. We need to devote resources to job creation and capacity building.

Job creation is necessary to give some hope and purpose to young Iraqis. Too many of them are frustrated and cannot provide for their families. Too many have turned to militias and the insurgency. Our commitment to job creation should include the Commander's Emergency Response Program, but it must be broader. We need to help Iraqis restart their many idle factories.

Capacity building is necessary because the Iraqi government is weak. It cannot deliver the basic services of government. It falls short in providing electricity and water. It falls short in providing security. The current government of Iraq can succeed only if it starts to win the confidence of those it governs. Capacity building means technical assistance and advice. It means better procedures in government agencies, including a greater delegation of authority and better internal controls.

The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad. That may be helpful, but that is not the problem we described in our report. The problem of coordination is interagency, and it is most acute in Washington. The new coordinator is capable, but he is the Secretary of State's appointee, not the President's appointee. He cannot chair NSC meetings in Washington and make other agencies do what he tells them to do.

Conclusions

Mr. Chairman, the President has decided on a new strategy. Its hallmark is a surge of U.S. forces, especially five additional combat brigades for Baghdad.

The Study Group stated that it could "support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad," complemented by comprehensive political, economic and diplomatic efforts.

All of the attention right now is on military aspects of policy. That is true of the President, and true of his critics. To some degree it is understandable: We are all concerned when more of our young men and women get sent in harm's way.

But make no mistake: The violence in Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation. The violence will not end unless Iraq's leaders step up and make difficult decisions about the future of their country.

The President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence. We are placing all of our bets on the performance of the Iraqi government. The Prime Minister's rhetoric is good. His performance, so far, has been disappointing. He has not been effective. He has not proved reliable, nor have many of Iraq's other leaders. Too often, they have acted in their sectarian interest, not the national interest.

The Study Group believes in a comprehensive military, diplomatic, economic and political approach.

• The primary U.S. military mission in Iraq must shift from combat to training;
• Iraq's neighbors - and the international community - must be engaged to play a more constructive role on behalf of stability in Iraq;
• We need a robust economic program focused on job creation and building the capacity of the Iraqi government; and
• Above all, Iraq's government must be held to performance benchmarks on national reconciliation.

As an American General in Baghdad told us, if the Iraqi government does not make political progress, "all the troops in the world will not provide security."

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Appendix #1
Statement of the Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group
January 11, 2007
James A. Baker, III and Lee Hamilton

We are pleased that the President reviewed the report of the Iraq Study Group carefully and seriously. Some of our recommendations are reflected in the new approach that he outlined Wednesday, while others have not been adopted.

We agree with President Bush that, "the situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people," the consequences of failure are severe, and "only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people." As the President said, "the essential U.S. security mission" in Iraq is the training of Iraqi forces. We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units with the goal that the Iraq government will assume control of security in all provinces in Iraq by November 2007. We recommended many of the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq, and agree that now is the time for the Iraqi government to act.

We hope the President and his Administration will further consider other recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. The President did not suggest the possibility of a transition that could enable U.S. combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The President did not state that political, military, or economic support for Iraq would be conditional on the Iraqi government's ability to meet benchmarks. Within the region, the President did not announce an international support group for Iraq including all of Iraq's neighbors, nor mention measures we suggested to reach a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.

The Iraq Study Group indicated that it could "support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad" complemented by comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. Questions, of course, remain about the nature of the surge. We are encouraged by the President's statement that "America's commitment is not open-ended" and Secretary Gates' statement that the addition of 21,000 troops would be viewed as a temporary surge. The violence in Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation.

America's political leaders have a responsibility to seek a bi-partisan consensus on issues of war and peace. We want to be helpful in forging that unity of effort. We welcome President Bush's commitment to form a working group with congressional leaders that will work across party lines in pursuit of a common policy. #