(As prepared for delivery)
Statement of Madeleine K. Albright
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
January 17, 2007
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
I am pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and to have the opportunity to testify regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq.
To maximize time for discussion, I will speak both plainly and bluntly.
There are no good options.
If there were, many of us would not have objected to the timing of the invasion in the first place.
At this point, we can go or stay, de-escalate or surge, change our tactics or not, and disturbing-even horrifying--events will continue to occur.
The goal of our policy must be to minimize the damage.
The question is how.
The first step is to clarify what our interests are.
Three nightmares come to mind.
First, an Iraq that serves as a training and recruiting ground for Al Qaeda.
Second, an Iraq that is subservient to Iran.
Third, an Iraq so torn by conflict that it ignites a region-wide war.
As a direct result of U.S. policy, all three nightmares are possible.
We have brought this on ourselves.
In so doing, we have put our armed forces in an absurd position.
In Iraq, the enemy has been variously described as the supporters of Saddam Hussein, Al Qaeda, the Sunni insurgency and Shiite militias.
Our ally, presumably, is the government which includes people responsible for those Shiite militias.
The military and police, which we have tried to train, include many good soldiers, but also kidnappers, killers, torturers and thieves.
If I were a soldier in Iraq, I wouldn't know whom to shoot at until I was shot at, which is untenable.
Like many of you, I have talked to some of the Iraqi leaders who have come through town.
The Sunnis want our troops to protect them from the Shiites and the Shiites want us to get out of the way so they can consolidate their power.
What sense does this make?
Is our mission to play the role of hired gun for one side against the other?
Is it to be to be a referee trying to prevent mayhem in a game without rules?
Or is it to protect all sides from violence by all sides? That is impossible.
I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces in Iraq to succeed.
Those troops are the finest in the world and will accomplish any mission that is within their power, but it is the responsibility of our civilian authorities to assign them missions that it is reasonable to hope they can achieve.
I agree with the president it would be a disaster for us to leave under the present circumstances.
But it may also be a disaster to stay - and if our troops are no longer in a position to make the difference, we have an overriding moral obligation to bring them home.
James Baker and Lee Hamilton recommended a more limited role for US troops - with an emphasis on training, working in tandem, and providing a back up rapid reaction capability.
Their view, which I share, is that Iraqis must take responsibility for their own security - because although we can assist - we cannot do the job for them.
We do not have enough people; we do not speak the language; we do not know the culture and, quite frankly, we do not have the recognized legal and moral authority to go into Iraqi homes and order people around.
Each time we do, we lose as much ground politically as we might hope to gain militarily.
This is crucial because, if there is to be a solution in Iraq, it will come about through political means.
This has been obvious for years.
An arrangement must be worked out that will give each side more than they can obtain through continued violence.
Such an arrangement would allow the Shias to look forward to majority control in a major Arab country for the first time in 800 years.
It would give the Sunnis minority rights, including the security they need from Shia militias, a role in the police and military, a fair deal in Kirkuk and a healthy share of oil.
The Kurds would be assured of a high degree of regional autonomy and continued significant representation in the national government.
If Iraq's leaders should decide to move in this direction, we would likely see progress on the security front.
And I think the American people would be more patient about the continued presence of our troops.
But from the evidence thus far, this is neither a likely outcome, nor one we can dictate.
Secretary Rice says she has told Iraqi leaders, "You have to perform."
I say that we cannot have it both ways.
We cannot celebrate an elected government in Iraq and then demand that it act like a performing animal in our circus.
For better or worse, the Iraqis think they know their own society and their own interests better than we do.
They have responsibilities to each other that they must meet, but no reason, based on our recent record, to take our advice.
They have no appetite, after Abu Ghraib and Haditha, to listen to our lectures about human rights.
And they know that President Bush has ruled out leaving, so where is our leverage?
That is why the president's speech last Wednesday night should be viewed less as a statement of policy than as a prayer.
It was not about reality. It was about hope.
But hope is not a strategy.
Iraqis will continue to act in their own best interests as they perceive them.
We must act in ours.
This begins with the fact that Iraq is not the central front in the war against those responsible for 9/11; it remains instead the main distraction from that war.
Iraq's Sunni insurgents may be terrorists but their goals are local and national, not global.
There are elements of Al Qaeda in Iraq only because we are in Iraq.
As for Iran, its influence in its neighboring country is inevitable, but no Arab population will take orders from Iran if it has an alternative.
Iran will dominate Iraq only if Iraq's Shiite population feels it must turn to Tehran for protection.
In judging Iraq's Shiites, we should remember that they endured two years of attacks before they began to retaliate.
The idea that U.S. troops should take on the job of defeating Iraq's Shiite militias is madness.
Such an attempt would drive great chunks of Iraq's population in the political direction of Iran; it would cost many American soldiers their lives; and it won't work.
As for the risk of a regional war, the good news is that no one except Al Qaeda wants it.
The bad news is that events may get so far out of hand it will happen anyway.
I have no magic wand.
I expect this year to be brutal.
Ordinarily, civil wars end in one of three ways. One side defeats the other. An outside force intervenes to compel peace. Or the sides exhaust themselves through violence. The first outcome is unlikely in Iraq and the second unrealistic.
My recommendations are designed to make the best of a truly bad situation.
First, we must recognize that US credibility could not be lower. If we are going to influence events anywhere in this region, we have to revive a meaningful peace process in the Middle East.
I know the Palestinians are in dire straits, but the perception-not the reality, but the perception--has been universal that this administration doesn't care.
That makes it far harder for moderate Arabs to cooperate with us and easier for extremists of all descriptions to find support.
Secretary Rice understands this and has begun to engage. I only worry that it is too little, too late. Middle East diplomacy is a full time job. It requires a willingness to be blunt and the resources and prestige to encourage real compromise. A road map does no good if it is never taken out of the glove compartment.
After the past six years, the prospects for peace may seem dim, but the logic of peace has never been more compelling. Although we should focus first on Israel and the Palestinians, the question of the Golan Heights must also be addressed. The basic outlines of a just and lasting peace are well known. America's urgent commitment to such a peace should also be clearly understood.
Second, both in Iraq and in the region, we must avoid the temptation to take sides in the millennium old Sunni-Shiite split.
It would be an error to align ourselves with the Shiites (because Saddam Hussein's loyalists and Al Qaeda are Sunni) or the Sunnis (because Iraq's worst militias and Hezbollah are Shia). We must be mindful of the interests of all factions and willing to talk to every side, but our message should not vary.
We should pledge support to all-Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze, Jew, Arab, Kurd, Persian-who observe territorial borders, honor human rights, obey the rule of law, respect holy places, and seek to live in peace.
Third, congress should continue to support efforts to build democratic institutions in Iraq including the next step-provincial elections. Though the odds seem long, the best news coming out of Iraq these past few years have been the rounds of balloting, the approval of a constitution, the convening of a national parliament, and the beginning of a multi-party system. Given where Iraq began, these events have occurred with startling rapidity. As chair of the National Democratic Institute, I am not neutral about this but neither is America. It was always unrealistic to believe that a full-fledged democracy could be created in Iraq even in a decade. But it is equally unrealistic to think that a stable and peaceful Iraq will ever be created if democratic principles and institutions are not part of the equation. Security is necessary to create democracy; but in the long run, democracy will be essential to create real security. Give up on democracy and you give up not only on Iraq, but also on America.
Fourth, we should make one more effort to encourage others, especially our NATO allies, to expand training assistance to Iraq's military and police. Every country in Europe has a stake in Iraq's future; every country should do what it can to help.
Finally, we should call on religious leaders from all factions and faiths to take a stand against the violence in Iraq. Given our own lack of credibility, we can't get too close to this initiative without poisoning it - but there are figures of respect - Mustafa Ceric (Grand Mufti of Sarajevo), Mohammed Khatami (former president of Iran), King Abdullah of Jordan, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Ayatollah Sistani - who might be able to articulate the religious case for reconciliation in Iraq. It's worth a try. Everyone is so convinced they have God on their side; we should at least make the case that God is on the side of peace.
At the same time, we should re-iterate our own pledge - on moral grounds - to minimize harm to civilians and guarantee humane treatment to prisoners. An element of confession in this would not hurt.
The bottom line is that there must be a political settlement in Iraq that will end the civil war and reduce the level of insecurity to something that can be managed. With a settlement, we could withdraw gradually, with mission accomplished. Without a settlement, our troops can do little good and might as well come home sooner rather than later. In that case, we should do all we can to help the Iraqis who have taken risks to support us these past few years.
Overall, I am not optimistic. I do, however, oppose efforts at this point to cut off funds for military operations in Iraq. There are more constructive ways to express concern about administration policies.
Mr. Chairman, America's own War Between the States lasted about as long as the current war in Iraq. It went on so long that Abraham Lincoln said in frustration that the Heavens were hung in black. We might say the same today.
I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the resilience of our nation. We can, in time, regain our balance and restore our reputation.
All that is required is that America become America again.
We must use the full array of our national security tools.
We must live up to our own democratic principles.
We must, in the words of John Kennedy, pursue peace as the necessary rational end of rational man.
And we must honor the men and women of our armed forces by ensuring that they have the right equipment, the right leadership AND the right missions.
Thank you very much, and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.
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