Military


Testimony of:

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; General Peter Pace, USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John P. Abizaid, Commander, United States Central Command

Before The U.S. Senate Committee on The Armed Services

Hearing On:
To Receive Testimony on Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism
Washington, D.C.
August 3, 2006

 

List of Speakers

U.S. SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER (R-VA) CHAIRMAN

U.S. SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ)

U.S. SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE (R-OK)

U.S. SENATOR PAT ROBERTS (R-KS)

U.S. SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL)

U.S. SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS (R-ME)

U.S. SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV)

U.S. SENATOR JIM TALENT (R-MO)

U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)

U.S. SENATOR LINDSEY O. GRAHAM (R-SC)

U.S. SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE (R-NC)

U.S. SENATOR JOHN CORNYN (R-TX)

U.S. SENATOR JOHN THUNE (R-SD)

U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI) RANKING MEMBER

U.S. SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA)

U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WV)

U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN (D-CT)

U.S. SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI)

U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA (D-HI)

U.S. SENATOR BILL NELSON (D-FL)

U.S. SENATOR BEN NELSON (D-NE)

U.S. SENATOR MARK DAYTON (D-MN)

U.S. SENATOR EVAN BAYH (D-IN)

U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)

WITNESSES:

DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

GENERAL PETER PACE (USMC), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID (USA), COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

WARNER:

Good morning, everyone.

The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from the distinguished secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General John Abizaid, commander, the United States Central Command, on progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism and such other aspects as relative to your area of operations.

The committee will also look in for their insights on the ongoing crisis involving Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon, to some extent Palestine.

Secretary Rumsfeld, the committee appreciates the changes you've made in your schedule you've outlined to me very carefully. And we welcome you this morning.

Last week, in a historic visit, the prime minister of Iraq met with President Bush, addressed a joint session of Congress, spoke with military personnel at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. I was privileged to be present at all of those events. I think it was an extremely important chapter in the ongoing developments in Iraq that he took that time to come over here. It demonstrated the resolve of the Iraqi people to build a free and stable country.

During the meeting with military personnel and their families -- and I witnessed this -- he, in a very passionate and sincere way, conveyed to those military people present at Fort Belvoir, and for broadcast to military people all over the United States and the world, the gratefulness in their hearts of the Iraqi people for their sacrifices of life and limb and that of their families, in order to enable the people of Iraq to gain a measure of democracy, elect their government, share in the freedom that we all have in this country.

In meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, President Bush reaffirmed America's commitment to support Iraq's constitutional democracy, to help Prime Minister Maliki's government succeed.

July 25th, President Bush said, "The Iraqi people want to succeed, they want to end this violence." The president also said that "America will not abandon the Iraqi people."

I am, however, gravely concerned by the recent spike in violence and sectarian attacks, the instability in Baghdad and recent decisions to extend the deployment of 3,500 American troops in Iraq, relocated additional American forces to reinforce Baghdad. Those were important decisions made by you, Mr. Secretary, General Abizaid, of course, you, Chairman. I hope that you will share with us this morning the reasons for doing so.


WARNER:

I don't question the seriousness of this situation, the need to do it, but we should have a very clear explanation. Because we had, I regret to say, expectations -- largely generated by certain reports of General Casey -- about the hope to draw down our forces in the near future.

And that's a question that I hope that we address this morning, because I do not like to see the hopes of the men and women of the armed forces raised and then have to be changed, and the impact on their families and, indeed, the confusion that results here at home when those decisions have to be made.

But we recognize -- the president has said, as the secretary said -- that ground conditions vary, and they must be the determining factor.

Additionally, I've expressed concerns about the potential impact of events in Lebanon and Israel, and their cascading effect on the wider Middle East region, and specifically on United States and coalition forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

My concern is -- and I've expressed this publicly -- that Israel was wrongfully attacked by Hezbollah; no one disputes that whatsoever. They have an unequivocal right to defend themselves; no one disputes that.

But as our nation engages in this situation -- and historically we've been an honest broker in that region -- our nation engages in that conflict to try and resolve it, we must do so in a way to be mindful of the implications on our commitments in the Iraq theater.

The messages we send by virtue of our support to try and bring about a cessation of this conflict transmitted throughout the Muslim world straight up into Iraq.



WARNER:

It's my fervent hope that our men and women serving in uniform and others in Iraq not be put at greater personal risk as a consequence of the rhetoric that flows, the decisions that are made in trying to resolve that conflict.

I'll have further to say about that in the question period.

In the nearly five years since U.S. forces initiated operations to liberate Afghanistan from the brutal rule of Taliban and to eliminate Al Qaida training bases and sanctuaries, there's been remarkable progress in Afghanistan on the political, economic and security fronts.

The Afghan people have spoken in favor of freedom and democracy. And I'm pleased that NATO is taking an increasing and very important role in Afghanistan.

And you're to be commended, Mr. Secretary, for initiating that move, together with General Jones, who has been a strong advocate of trying to achieve that goal.

However, reports from Afghanistan of recent show that the violence is on the rise. We will learn from you, I hope, your concern as to that AOR, General, and what the future holds in the face of a resurgence of the Taliban forces.

While some in the West take freedom and liberty for granted, Americans everywhere should remain so proud of the contributions of our service men and women deployed in harm's way.



WARNER:

They're bringing the best hope for freedom and democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan, after decades of cruel oppression. And their sacrifices have enabled us, here at home, to fully enjoy the freedoms that we have.

As the current conflict in Lebanon and north Israel proceeds, there is obvious concern that the crisis could spark a wider war.

The firebrand Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr said, quote, "We, the unified Iraqi people, will stand with the Lebanese people to end the ominous trio of the United States, Israel and Britain, which is terrorizing Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and other occupied nations."

He also said that he is ready to go to Lebanon to defend it.

Now, we've all recognized that he's just a hothead and a firebrand. But he's a troublemaker.

And I hope, General Abizaid, you can give us some assessment of the courage and the will of the Iraqi people, under the leadership of the prime minister, to begin a step that must be achieved. And that's the disbanding of these private militias, notably Sadr's.

Back to Osama bin Laden, his deputy issues a worldwide call for Muslims to rise up against Israel and join the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza, raising again the specter of an Islamic caliphate that I clearly remember General Abizaid discussed in testimony before the committee last year.

We hope you'll bring us up to date on the Osama bin Laden situation and the ongoing activities of our forces, together with others, trying to bring about this man being brought to justice or otherwise taken care of.

In light of all these developments, the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan is even more critical.



WARNER:

Your time with us today is critical.

General Pace and General Abizaid, I want to express our gratitude to both of you and the countless men and women that you represent for your continued service and historic efforts of our nation's military to bring freedom and liberty to Iraq, Afghanistan and to preserve it here at home.

Secretary Rumsfeld, once again the committee welcomes you.

Now, just before the committee meeting started, General Abizaid offered to meet with Senator Levin and myself for information to members of the committee. And he outlined the progress being made with the various reports examining the activities of the chain of command relative to certain incidents in Iraq.

And it's our understanding, General Abizaid, that those reports will soon be given to you. There is a convergence of the criminal investigation together with the chain of command investigation under General Chiarelli. It is now in the overall command of the Marine forces, General Sattler. And then it comes to you and it is your hope and expectation that, working with the secretary, those reports can be made available to this committee early on in September.

Senator Levin?


LEVIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing.

And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here this morning.

The American service men and women in Iraq, Afghanistan and other trouble spots around the world are performing their duties magnificently. We salute them and their families. We thank them for their unselfish service and devotion to our nation.

Despite their heroic efforts, the security situation in Iraq continues to worsen. Sectarian violence is not only on the rise, it has eclipsed the Sunni insurgency and the terrorism of Al Qaida in Iraq, in terms of the toll it has taken and the threats to Iraq's chances of stability.



LEVIN:

Our military leadership has identified Baghdad as the key, what they call the center of gravity, to success or failure in Iraq. The highly vaunted recent plan to stabilize Baghdad hasn't worked, and we're going back to the drawing board and sending more U.S. troops to the Iraqi capital. We're having difficulty finding sufficient troops for that purpose.

The fact that the Army Stryker brigade that is being sent to Iraq, being sent to Baghdad, is being extended past its 12-month rotation date by another three to four months speaks volumes about how our military is overextended, unable to find other units ready for immediate reinforcement in Iraq.

And while there appears to be an immediate necessity for additional troops in Baghdad, more troops will not be the ultimate answer. Our military leadership has repeatedly said there is no military solution, and that there must be a political solution in Iraq.

Iraqis reaching the political compromises now is more important and more critical to diffusing the violence and conflict in Iraq. And that is why we need to clearly tell the Iraqi political leaders that our commitment to Iraq is not open-ended, and we will begin the phased redeployment of our troops by the end of the year and that they must make the political compromises necessary to avoid all-out civil war and to defeat the insurgency.

When General Casey was asked at a press conference recently whether he still believed that there would be fairly substantial troop reductions over the course of this year, he said "I think so."



LEVIN:

Marine General Conway testified before us last week at his hearing to be the next commandant that, quote, "I personally believe that you will have Iraqis who have started to look at us as occupiers and are resisting us in some instances, whereas they would not resist an Iraqi force doing precisely the same thing."

He also testified that, "It is critical that the Iraqis understand that our presence is not open-ended and unlimited. The president has assured the nation that as Iraqi forces stand up, we will stand down."

General Dempsey, our senior general responsible for the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces has said publicly that, quote, "The Iraqi army will be built by the end of this calendar year," and that their army would be, quote, "fully capable of recruiting, vetting, inducting, training, forming into units, putting them in barracks, sending them out the gate to perform their missions," close quote.

Congress has been told that over 70 percent of Iraqi combat battalions are capable of independent counterinsurgency operations, are capable of taking the lead in those operations.

The Iraqi security forces are standing up. And we need to begin to stand down, with a phased redeployment starting by the end of this year.

It's time for the Iraqis to take greater responsibility for the security of their own country.

It's time to do what the president repeatedly said he would do. Now that the Iraqis have done a significant amount of standing up their troops, surely by the end of this year we should begin to stand down some of our troops.



LEVIN:

Now, not only do the operations in the Central Command region have broad implications on the future of that region, they're also having a serious impact on our own military.

Our ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, are under enormous strain due to several years of large-scale redeployments and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Because a large amount of equipment has been left in Iraq, and because the remaining equipment has been subjected to large amounts of wear and tear, there is a lack of readiness for Army and Marine Corps units which have redeployed to their home bases.

Now, it's argued that our units that are more capable now because of organizational changes and the infusion of technology and better equipment. But that is only true if the units actually have the equipment on hand; and only if what that have on hand is in a high state of maintenance so that they can train for that potential contingencies.

Hypothetically, if 50 combat units could now do what 100 units could do in the past, that would be true only if those units are ready to do so.

Over two-thirds of the Army's combat brigades are not in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the Army's own statistics show that the vast majority of those are not C-1 or C-2; in other words, by the Army's own measurements, are not ready to respond to those contingencies for which they must be prepared to do by Department of Defense war plans.

Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for calling this hearing. And I thank our witnesses, all of them, for making the arrangements which they had to make in order to be with us this morning.


WARNER:

Thank you, Senator Levin.



WARNER:

Secretary Rumsfeld?


RUMSFELD:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. And thank you for the invitation to testify.

Senator Clinton, thank you for seconding the motion.

(LAUGHTER)

I know we all agree that the American people deserve a healthy, preferably constructive, exchange on matters that so directly affect the lives, their lives, their families' lives and their country's security.

I'm joined by General Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Abizaid, the combatant commander of the U.S. Central Command. We will be providing an update on the global struggle against violent extremists and certainly will welcome questions.

In the past few weeks, in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, in Iraq and now by Hezbollah, we've seen the face of the early part of the 21st century. In this period of asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, one side puts their men and women at risk in uniform and obeys the laws of war while the other side uses them against us; one side does all it can to avoid civilian casualties while the other side uses civilians as shields and then skillfully orchestrates a public outcry when the other side accidentally kills civilian in their midst; one side is held to exacting standards of near perfection -- the other side is held to no standards and no accountability at all.

This enemy has called Iraq the central front on the war on terrorism, while some on our side seem to argue that the outcome in Iraq is not part of that global war on terror.

Sixteen years ago this week, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, killing civilians, unleashing environmental devastation, provoking a crisis that led to Iraqi attacks on Israel and threats to Saudi Arabia and others in the region.

Last week, by contrast, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the new Iraqi prime minister, who was elected by the Iraqi people under a constitution the Iraqi people wrote and ratified, came to the United States to thank the American people for their assistance in building a new future for the people of Iraq.



RUMSFELD:

He had spent 25 years in opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime. And before a joint session of Congress, he noted that if terror were permitted to triumph in Iraq, then the war on terror will never be won elsewhere.

The enemy understands this as well. They're waging a psychological war of attrition, planning attacks to gain the maximum media coverage and the maximum public outcry.

They want us to believe that perseverance by us is futile, rather than necessary. They want us to focus on our casualties and losses, not on the people causing the casualties and losses. They want us to think about what will happen if our forces stay in Iraq, as opposed to the consequences if our forces were to leave prematurely. They want us to be divided, because they know that when we are united they lose. They want us pointing fingers at each other, rather than pointing fingers at them.

I know there are calls in some quarters for withdrawal or arbitrary timelines for withdrawals. The enemies hear those words as well.

We need to be realistic about the consequences. If we left Iraq prematurely, as the terrorists demand, the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East. And if we left the Middle East, they'd order us and all those who don't share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines. And then we would face not only the evil ideology of these violent extremist, but an enemy that will have grown accustomed to succeeding in telling free people everywhere what to do.

We can persevere in Iraq or we can withdraw prematurely until they force us to make a stand nearer home. But make no mistake, they're not going to give up whether we acquiesce in their immediate demands or not.

Decisions about conditions for a drawdown of our forces in Iraq are best based on the recommendations of the commanders in the field and the recommendations of the gentleman sitting beside me.



RUMSFELD:

We should strive to think through how our words can be interpreted by our troops, by the people of Afghanistan and Iraq, by our 42 allies in our coalition in Afghanistan, and our 34 allies in our coalition in Iraq. And we should consider how our words can be used by our deadly enemy.

The war on terror is going to be a long struggle. It's not something we asked for, but neither is it something we can avoid. But I remain confident in our mission, in our commanders, in our troops and in our cause. And I remain confident in the good common sense of the American people.

Americans didn't cross oceans and settle a wilderness and build history's greatest democracy only to run away from a bunch of murderers and extremists who try to kill everyone that they cannot convert and to tear down what they could never build.

Over the past few years, I've had the honor of meeting countless young men and women in uniform, all volunteers, who have answered our country's call.

I remember a service man outside of Afghanistan who looked me in the eye and said, "I can't believe that we're being allowed to do something so important," unquote.

Our troops represent the finest and the most professional troops in history. I think of these remarkable people every day. I know that everything we do in the Department of Defense and what you do on this committee affects them and their wonderfully supportive families.

Thank you.


WARNER:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General Pace?


PACE:

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it truly is an honor to be before you today, representing the incredible young men and women in your armed forces.

Since 9/11, over 1 million young men and women in uniform have served this country in the Central Command area of operations.



PACE:

And they've done so with incredible bravery and sacrifice and performance that has made us all proud.

And their families have served this nation as well as anyone who has worn a uniform, especially those families today in the 172nd Stryker Brigade whose loved ones are not coming home when they thought they would be coming home, and who, once again, are sacrificing that we might provide the strength needed on the battlefield.

It's now almost five years since September 11th, 2001. And the number of young men and women in our armed forces who have sacrificed their lives that we might live in freedom, is approaching the number of Americans who were murdered on 9/11 in New York, in Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania.

We've come a long way in Afghanistan. We've come a long way in Iraq and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. We have a long way to go. We are a nation at war.

Fortunately, most of our fellow citizens are not affected by this war every day. Some 2.4 million Americans, active, Guard and Reserve, have the privilege of defending over 300 million of our fellow citizens and countless millions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Our enemy knows they cannot defeat us in battle. They do believe, however, that they can wear down our will as a nation. They are wrong. How do I know they're wrong?

First, this committee and this Congress continues to provide the resources we need to defend this nation. And I thank you for that.

Second, our service men and women are proud of what they are doing and they are reenlisting in record numbers to continue to have the privilege to do what we do for this nation.

Third, as the secretary mentioned in his comments, the American people have, in the past, are now, and will in the future, respond to attacks on our way of life. Two hundred and thirty years, we have met the challenges.

This will not be easy, this will not be quick and this will not be without sacrifice. But we will persist and we will prevail.



PACE:

And I look forward to answering your questions today, and working together with you in the future to defend this nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


WARNER:

Thank you, General.

General Abizaid?


ABIZAID:

Thank you, Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to testify today.

A couple of days ago I returned from the Middle East. I've rarely seen it so unsettled or volatile. There's an obvious struggle in the region between moderates and extremists that touches every aspect of life.

Such extremism, whether state-sponsored by Iran or ideologically motivated by Al Qaida and its associated movements, remains a serious danger to global peace and stability.

My duties took me to both Iraq and Afghanistan, Central Asia and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf, where our troops continue to perform with great professional calm and determination under dangerous and difficult circumstances.

Of course, over the past several weeks, the media has been filled with images of war in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine. Indeed, U.S. forces under CENTCOM helped evacuate nearly 15,000 Americans from Lebanon's war zone.

And while the media's eye often directs public attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, it's important to remember that U.S. and coalition forces serve throughout Central Asia, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, increasing regional states' capacity to battle extremism and keeping open the vital air and sea links of the region.

In the broader struggle against extremism, we face complex and potentially intersecting problems. Our strategic imperatives are formidable.

With the continuing help of our friends, we must focus on three strategic objectives: We must synchronize the appropriate diplomatic, economic and military means to defeat Al Qaida and its associated movements; we must deter Iranian designs for regional hegemony, to include its sponsorship of terrorist organizations and its development of nuclear weapons; finally, we must find a comprehensive solution to the corrosive Arab-Israeli conflict.



ABIZAID:

I fully recognize that each of these tasks is filled with danger and enormous difficulties. I also realize that trying to solve any of these problems will take a considerable amount of time and effort.

But failure to apply coordinated regional and international pressure against these three problems will further encourage extremism and could eventually lead to a broader, even more dangerous conflict.

The arming of independent militias and the subsequent undermining of state institutions by these militias is the curse of the region.

In many ways, interconnectedness brought on by 21st-century globalization has been turned to the advantage by non-state actors. Globalization brings with it great benefits, but it also accelerates the dissolution of sovereignty in weak or corroded states.

If this century is to be dominated by non-state actors with no responsibility to the international community, we are in for even greater dangers.

It should not be lost on us, for example, that Hezbollah fields greater and longer-range weapons than most regional armed forces. If left unchecked, it is possible to imagine chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons being transferred to militias or terrorist organizations by a state actor.

In the highly unsettled Middle East, the problem of extremist- sponsored terror and intimidation is complicated, but we must be willing to talk about Al Qaida's ideological designs and face the implications of revolutionary Iran's ambitions so often and so clearly stated by its president.

There is no doubt that these are dangerous times for the world, but there should also be no doubt that with concerted international action and the application of our own substantial power these dangers can be overcome.

Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional problem. Al Qaida and Shia extremists form terrorist groups and death squads to challenge the new government and undermine confidence in a better future. Iran talks about stabilizing Iraq, but just as in Lebanon, it arms, trains and equips local extremist Shia militias to do Iran's bidding.

As the primary security problem in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni insurgency to sectarian violence, Al Qaida terrorists, insurgents and Shia militants compete to plunge the country into civil war.

Prime Minister Maliki and his new government know what must be done, and in three short months in office are responsibly tackling the complex and difficult problems of security and governance. Iraqi security forces, in conjunction with coalition forces, must bring Baghdad, the center of sectarian violence, under control. Illegal militias must be disbanded. National reconciliation must proceed. Death squad leaders must be brought to justice.

It is a decisive time in Baghdad and it requires decisive Iraqi action with our clear support.



ABIZAID:

Despite the many challenges, progress does continue to be made in Iraq, and I am confident that there are still many more people in Iraq trying to hold that country together than there are trying to tear it apart.

Our ongoing support of their efforts is essential for their success, especially as they assume more and more responsibility for their own security.

I know the committee wants to focus these hearings on Iraq. But I close with the reminder that Iraq is only one part of a broader regional struggle under way -- one which requires the wise application of all our resources.

Our own troops, along with NATO ISAF forces, continue to operate in Afghanistan. Pakistani and Saudi forces are fighting extremists daily. Insurgencies, secular violence and terror sponsored by Sunni and Shia religious extremist groups are pervasive throughout the region.

Fortunately, as in our own society, the vast majority of the people in the region do not want extremists to win. Our challenge is to help these moderate forces help themselves in the struggle.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the entire region remain dangerous and often deadly. Our continued involvement in shaping regional security forces and providing the framework for action against extremist groups is essential for our own safety and prosperity at home.

Finally, we must be ever mindful of the sacrifice of our young men and women in uniform. Out of the over 1.5 million service personnel who have rotated through the Central Command region since September 11th, 2001, over 3,000 have given their lives.



ABIZAID:

We owe them and their families an enormous debt of gratitude.

Today, nearly 200,000 of our troops serve in harm's way. These are incredibly dedicated and resourceful professionals. Thank you for your continued support to these great Americans who willingly fight for all of us.

Thank you.


WARNER:

Thank you very much, General. That's a very incisive and important statement that you've just made.

We're going to depart from our normal rotation here. Senator Levin and I both serve on the Intelligence Committee. They are now having a meeting. And the senator from Michigan has to go to that meeting. Therefore, I'll offer you the first opportunity to initiate questions.


LEVIN:

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invariable courtesies.

General Abizaid, when General Casey was asked at a press conference recently whether he still believed what he said last year, that he predicted that there would be troop reductions over the course of this year, he said that he still believes there will be such reductions this year.

Do you personally share that view?


ABIZAID:

Senator, since the time that General Casey made that statement, it's clear that the operational and the tactical situation in Baghdad is such that it requires additional security forces, both U.S. and Iraqi.

I think the most important thing ahead of us throughout the remainder of this year is ensuring that the Baghdad security situation be brought under control.

It's possible to imagine some reductions in forces, but I think the most important thing to imagine is Baghdad coming under the control of the Iraqi government.



LEVIN:

When you say it's possible to imagine some reduction in forces, you mean this year?


ABIZAID:

It's possible, depending upon how things go in Baghdad and how Prime Minister Maliki and his government grab ahold of the security situation.


LEVIN:

Is it important that the Iraqis understand that our commitment is not open-ended?


ABIZAID:

Sir, I think they fully understand it is not open- ended.


LEVIN:

Some of their statements have not reflected that full understanding. But I'm glad -- but in any event, would you agree that it is important that they do understand our commitment is not open- ended?


ABIZAID:

I believe they do understand it's not open-ended. And they know our commitment and they know the necessity for, over time, to increase their capacity against the extremists.


LEVIN:

Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, the president has assured the nation frequently that as Iraqi security forces stand up, we will stand down.

They have stood up. The majority now of their combat battalions are capable of either independent counterinsurgency or capable of taking the lead in those operations.

Shouldn't we, at least by the end of this year, begin to do what the president said we would do? Since security forces of Iraq have stood up in such significant measure, should we not begin to stand down, as the president said we would?


RUMSFELD:

Senator, you're correct. The Iraqi security forces are now up to something like 275,000. They are headed toward 325,000 by the end of the year, unless the prime minister makes an adjustment in those numbers, which, as a new government, he has every right to do in a sovereign nation.

I guess the issue of drawdown depends on what you think your base is. We were up at 160,000. Today we're at -- we've gotten as low as, I think, about 127,000. Today we're at a 133,000.

And certainly everyone, from the Iraqis, the troops and the president, would hope that those troops could be drawn down as conditions permit.

The question -- the only difference between the way you phrase it and the president phrases it, as he ends by pointing out that he intends to succeed here and he believes that the determinant should be the conditions on the ground as opposed to some timetable.

I do think the point you raise, the core of what you're asking, is important, and that is the tension that exists between having too many troops and having it feed an insurgency, as you, I believe, indicated General Conway may have referred to, and having too few so that you don't have a sufficient number to allow the security situation to permit the political and the economic activities to go forward.

And that's a fair tension that exists there. And it's an art, not a science; there's no guidebook that says how to do that.

And so, clearly, we would all hope that there could be drawdowns on those forces as the conditions permit.


LEVIN:

Thank you.

The press reported that Iraqi President Talabani said yesterday that the Iraqi government is confident that Iraqi troops will take over security duties for the entire country by the end of this year. And then he also reportedly said that the recent increase in violence by insurgents is, quote, "the last arrows in their quivers," close quote.



LEVIN:

Now, that phrase is reminiscent of Vice President Cheney's claim a year ago that the insurgency was in its last throes.

General Abizaid, does our intelligence on the insurgency provide any basis for the assertion that the recent surge in violence represents the last arrows in the insurgents' quivers?


ABIZAID:

Well, Senator Levin, I think it's clear that the insurgency has a lot of resiliency, it's probably going to last for some time even after U.S. forces depart and hand over security control completely to the Iraqis.

The question is for President Talabani, as I've discussed with him before, whether or not over time the Iraqis can control it. And I believe they will be able to.


LEVIN:

You don't agree, then, that it's in its last throes or that they're shooting the last arrows?


ABIZAID:

I'm making no comment about what he said about last arrows or last throes.


LEVIN:

Why?


ABIZAID:

I don't see any reason to dispute what the president says. I know that I think it's a long-term problem for Iraq that they'll be able to work through over time.


LEVIN:

The British ambassador made the following assessment, according to USA Today: that the British ambassador to Iraq -- it's Mr. Patey, I believe, P-A-T-E-Y -- has warned that Iraq is descending toward civil war. And he said it's likely to split along ethnic lines. And he's reported as predicting that Iraq's security situation could remain volatile for the next 10 years.

Do you agree, General, with the ambassador from Britain to Iraq that Iraq is sliding toward civil war?


ABIZAID:

I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I've seen it in Baghdad in particular, and that if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war.


LEVIN:

Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time's up. And thank you again for allowing me to go ahead of you.


WARNER:

I want to go back to, Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld, the observations I made in the opening statement.

On July 17th, at about 8 o'clock, I went to the floor of the Senate.



WARNER:

The Senate was about to consider a resolution -- an important resolution, reaffirming our support for Israel. But I said the following: I said I was concerned that we should take into account America's broader interests in the region as we approach this resolution.

I said specifically America's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken the lives of more than 2,500 American service men, over 20 some odd thousand still severely wounded, and over $436 billion of our taxpayers' money over these three years.

That's an enormous investment of this country. And the credibility of our country in many respects rests on the conclusion of that conflict in such a way that the Iraqi government can exercise sovereignty and bring about a measure of freedom and democracy.

We're committed to that. And I stand strongly with our president to achieve that goal.

America's participation with other nations in achieving a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis -- I can think of no problem of greater significance than our resolve to not let Iran possess nuclear weapons.

The stability of the Lebanese government -- that must survive, that government, such that they can once again take an even stronger grip on that nation and govern it.

In our relationship with other Arab nations, a lot is at stake in a region which our distinguished witness, General Abizaid -- who spent much of your lifetime in that region -- just said, "Rarely have I seen it so volatile."



WARNER:

And it is subject to the corrosive relationships coming out of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

My concern is that, as we go into this situation -- and we have an obligation to try and work as an honest broker, I hope, in resolving the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah -- as we pursue that and as our actions are interpreted by the Muslim world -- and I have read some of the statements of the clerics, of recent, in the last few days. I do not want to see our forces put at greater personal risk, subject to greater intensity brought against them by the adversaries in Iraq.

So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, as we take up our role, hopefully, as an honest broker in this, are we mindful of the broader picture and the enormity of our investment in Iraq, as we try to do what we can to bring about a cessation of the fighting in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah?


RUMSFELD:

Mr. Chairman, in the meetings that I've been in with the president and the secretary of state and those that are intimately involved in the situation in Lebanon and Israel with respect to the Hezbollah, there is a sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or our interests or our forces put at greater risk as a result of what's taking place between Israel and Hezbollah.

I think I'd suggest that it be phrased slightly differently, because there are risks, as you point out, but it's a matter of relative risk. There are also risks, if one thinks about it, that Iran is the principal sponsor of Hezbollah.



RUMSFELD:

Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, as you posed. Iran is the supplier of weapons to Hezbollah. The rockets that are heading into Israel by Hezbollah tend to be, in a number of cases, Iranian rockets.

And clearly, to the extent that Iran were to achieve weapons of mass destruction, and with a history of a willingness to work intimately with a terrorist organization like Hezbollah, there is that risk as well.

So there are a variety of risks that we face in that region. And it's a difficult and delicate situation.

As I indicated in my opening remarks, I do believe what we're seeing is really the face of the 21st century. The wars we're engaged in and we see are not wars between militaries only. They're clashes between systems: political, economic and military. And they are being fought with asymmetric and irregular warfare, which is very much to the advantage of the attackers.


WARNER:

Mr. Secretary, that situation in Iraq is fragile. We need only look at the Baghdad situation. Baghdad could literally tilt this thing if it fails to be brought -- about a measure of security for those people -- tilt it in a way that we could slide toward a civil war that General Abizaid recalled.

General Pace, I go back to the resolution of October the 16th, 2002, which I participated in, my good friend to the left, in drawing up that resolution for the Senate.

It authorized the president of the United States to use the armed forces of the United States to: one, defend the national security of our country against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; two, enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

Many of those missions set out and envisioned by the Congress when it gave this authority, namely the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime, have been achieved.



WARNER:

But now, in the words of General Abizaid, we're on the brink of a civil war.

And I don't have the exact words before me, but I was struck by General Chiarelli's statement the other day that in his 35 years of military training, he really never had spent a day preparing for what faces him as our commander of forces in Iraq: sectarian violence, civil war.

What is the mission of the United States today under this resolution if that situation erupts into a civil war? What are the missions of our forces?


PACE:

Sir, I believe that we do have the possibility of that devolving to a civil war, but that does not have to be a fact.

I believe that U.S. armed forces today can continue to do what we're doing, which is to help provide enough security inside of Iraq for the Iraqi government to provide governance and economic opportunity for their citizens.

The weight of that opportunity rests with the Iraqi people. We can provide support. We can help provide security. But they must now decide about their sectarian violence.

Shia and Sunni are going to have to love their children more than they hate each other. If they do that and seize the opportunity that the international community has provided to them, then this will be what we want it to be, which is a success for ourselves and the Iraqi people.



PACE:

But the weight of that shift must be on the Iraqi people and Iraqi government.


WARNER:

I think we have to examine very carefully what Congress authorized the president to do in the context of a situation if we're faced with an all-out civil war and whether we have to come back to the Congress to get further indication of support.

General Abizaid, I've had the privilege of knowing you for a long time, and I really think you speak with remarkable candor and draw on an extraordinary career professionalism. You spent one year of your career in Lebanon. Lebanon is a part of your area of responsibility as CENTCOM commander.

Do you agree with the premise that in this current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, recognizing that Hezbollah attacked Israel, recognizing that Israel has got a perfect right to defend itself, but in so executing their military campaign, it is essential, in my judgment, the Lebanese government not be toppled as a consequence of the infrastructure that's being destroyed during the course of this war.

And can they achieve in this military operation such degradation of Hezbollah, its command and control, its inventory of weapons, as to result in a situation whereby a multinational force can eventually come in, subject to some form of a cease-fire, and begin to shore up, stabilize that government and allow it to take firm control over the entirety of all aspects of sovereignty of that nation of Lebanon?



ABIZAID:

Mr. Chairman, U.N. Resolution 1559 clearly calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the extension of Lebanese sovereignty all the way from its northern border to its southern border.

Had that resolution been implemented or started to move toward implementation, the current problem would be much less severe than it has become.

The Iranians, who have armed Hezbollah with cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, missiles that can reach as far as Haifa and beyond, have given Hezbollah a state-like existence and capacity that is unlike any other militia anywhere in the region.

It is absolutely essential that the Lebanese government regain its sovereignty over its own territory. It will, in my opinion, need an international force to help it do that.

There are ways that, in conjunction with the international community, Hezbollah can be disarmed over time and the Shia people that participate in the political life of Hezbollah can be readily accommodated within the Lebanese body politic.

The question as to whether or not they can -- the Israelis can degrade Hezbollah, over time degradation can take place.

And I think it's also very clear to say that over time the consensus of holding Lebanon together under external pressure starts to break down. It's very important that Lebanon stay together as a sovereign country. It is key to stability in the Middle East. And it's essential that that take place. And the international community needs to move in that direction.


WARNER:

Thank you very much, General.

Senator Kennedy?


KENNEDY:

Thank you very much.

General, just to -- first of all, thank you, General Abizaid, General Pace. Thank you very much for your service.

Welcome Secretary Rumsfeld. I think you can understand why it's so important for your presence here, given these range of issues that are front and center for the American people.

Let me ask you, General Abizaid, if we have difficulty with 130,000 troops in Iraq trying to disarm the insurgency, how in the world do we think we're going to be able to get an international force that's going to disarm Hezbollah?


ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, I think with the weight of the international community and the right rules of engagement and the right participation of the various parties concerned that over time Hezbollah can be disarmed.



KENNEDY:

Just to come back to a point that the chairman had mentioned about the costs in Iraq -- the $400 billion total, 2,579 have been killed, 19,000 wounded, 54 casualties in my own state of Massachusetts, 70 percent of these from IEDs -- we've been in Iraq for 40 months and 13 days. The Korean War, 37 months. World War I, 19 months. Persian Gulf War, three months. World War II, 42 months, V.E. Day -- 42 months for V.E. Day; 45 months for V.J. Day. Civil War was 48 months.

We've been in there now for 40 months and 13 days with the finest military that's ever been developed in basically rather a third-rate military situation.

How much more do we really expect our military can do? How much more can we demand of them when they are out there doing such a proud and noble job of serving our country? How much more can we demand of them?

And why isn't this demand for political accommodation? Why isn't that front and center so that we can start to bring our Americans home with honor?


RUMSFELD:

Senator, I think there is a demand for a combination of military, political and diplomatic activity that moves toward a solution that brings Iraq toward stability.

I think over time, it becomes less military and more diplomatic and more political. And I believe that this current government, that's a four-year government, has that opportunity.


KENNEDY:

Mr. Secretary, just to continue, the exact words that General Chiarelli said just last week, quote, "Quite frankly, in 33 years in the United States Army, I've never trained to stop a sectarian fight. This is something new." Now we hear General Abizaid talk about the increase in sectarian violence.

How are our troops trained to deal with sectarianism?

We know that they weren't trained as well as they should have been. We first went into Iraq when they weren't trained at Abu Ghraib.

How are they trained now with this new sectarian? How are they trained not to take sides?

And is this new addition of troops in Baghdad the beginning; we're going to have to have more troops to deal with this?

And what are our troops told in Baghdad now to quell the violence in this sectarian? How are they going to not get drawn in to one side or the other with the escalation of the sectarian violence?



KENNEDY:

What is in their background, what's in their training, what's been in their leadership that would give them the ability to not be involved in this, to quell the violence, and to eventually help President Maliki disarm and dismantle the militias?


RUMSFELD:

Senator, I think your point is a valid one: that ultimately, the sectarian violence is going to be dealt with by Iraqis. And it's going to be dealt with by Iraqi security forces as a part of the solution, but it's going to be dealt with through a reconciliation process, a political process that will -- Maliki, the prime minister, and others in the country are trying to design in a way that it will pull together elements within the country and thereby reduce sectarian violence.

I'd rather have either the generals comment on the training, except to say that the situation in Iraq, with 18 provinces, is really quite different in different provinces. And we have forces in most provinces. And the training is different for the different circumstances that they face.

One of the things that the department has done is have extensive lessons learned from what's taking place in Iraq in different parts of the country brought back to the joint forces command and the national training center and the troops are being trained up, carefully, to assure that they have the best kind of training they can have for the circumstances that we believe at the time they're going to find in the areas they're going to be assigned to.


KENNEDY:

My time's just about up.

General Abizaid, could you, sort of, expand on this, about their getting in with the growth of the sectarian violence? How do our troops get in there, not get embroiled in the sectarian violence?

What is your estimate: Is this the beginning or is this the end of the increased numbers of troops that we're going to need over there?

And how is their background and training actually going to quell that sectarian violence that you have identified as escalating at the present time?


ABIZAID:

Senator Kennedy, the first line against sectarian violence is the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi armed forces know where the problem's coming from. They know how to deal with the problem.



ABIZAID:

They can recognize it easier than our troops can.

But I would also tell you that our forces do have the capability to precisely target the cellular death squad structure that is responsible for this activity. And more and more over time we have become proficient at being able to attack the cellular structure of Al Qaida, and we intend to use that capability and intelligence activities that we have used before to target the militia death squads that we are seeing operate now in Baghdad with a certain degree of freedom.


WARNER:

Thank you.

For the record, this is the General Chiarelli's full statement. It is July 27, 2006. He said, quote, "For the military the plant is uncharted ground. Quite frankly, in 33 years in the United States Army I never trained to stop a sectarian fight," he said. "This is something," end quote. That's the quote to which I referred to and Senator Kennedy referred to.

Senator McCain?


MCCAIN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the witnesses.

And I want to repeat at the outset my firm belief that we can and must win in Iraq and that the consequences of failure would be catastrophic.

General Pace, you said there's a possibility of the situation in Iraq evolving into civil war. That correct?


PACE:

I did say that, yes, sir.


MCCAIN:

Did you anticipate this situation a year ago?


PACE:

No, sir.


MCCAIN:

Did you, General Abizaid?


ABIZAID:

I believe that a year ago it was clear to see that sectarian tensions were increasing. That they would be this high, no.


MCCAIN:

So, General Abizaid, we're moving 7,500 troops into Baghdad, is that correct?


ABIZAID:

The number is closer to 3,500.


MCCAIN:

Three thousand five hundred?


ABIZAID:

Plus military police that were going there for other duties that are being used in the outer cordon areas, military policemen in particular.


MCCAIN:

And where are these troops coming from?


ABIZAID:

The troops, the Stryker brigade, is coming down from Mosul.


MCCAIN:

From Mosul. Is the situation under control in Ramadi?


ABIZAID:

The situation in Ramadi is better than it was two months ago.


MCCAIN:

Is the situation under control in Ramadi?


ABIZAID:

I think the situation in Ramadi is workable.


MCCAIN:

And the troops from Ramadi came from Fallujah, isn't that correct?


ABIZAID:

I can't say, Senator. I know...

(CROSSTALK)


MCCAIN:

Well, that's my information.

What I worry about is we're playing a game of whack-a-mole here. It flares up. We move troops there. We all know that Fallujah was allow to become a base of operations and insurgency, so we had to go into Fallujah and fight one of the great battles in Marine Corps/Army history.

Then when I was back there not too long ago, they said, "We're got big problems in Ramadi. Everybody knows we've got big problems in Ramadi." And I said, "Where you going to get the troops?" "Well, we're going to have to move them from Fallujah." Now we're going to have to move troops into Baghdad from someplace else.

It's very disturbing. And if it's all up to the Iraqi military, General Abizaid, and if it's all up to them, then I wonder why we have to move troops into Baghdad to intervene in what is clearly sectarian violence.


ABIZAID:

Senator, also Iraqi troops are being moved into Baghdad. The number of Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area are greater than our troops. We are in support with them in the main operational areas, and I believe that under the current circumstances that the Iraqi forces need to benefit from our command and control capabilities and the systems of a unit such as the Stryker brigade that's been moved to the south.



MCCAIN:

I would anticipate putting American troops into this very volatile situation means that American casualties will probably go up.


ABIZAID:

I think it's possible that in the period ahead of us in Baghdad that will take increased casualties. It's possible.


MCCAIN:

The situation in southern Iraq -- I was briefed by British military and others that there is a grave concern about Iranian penetration throughout southern Iraq. Is that a serious issue?


ABIZAID:

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds force, intelligence agencies, arm and train and equip what I would call rogue Shia groups. And, yes, it is a concern.


MCCAIN:

Is Basra in control of the militias?


ABIZAID:

I think that the militias have greater control in Basra than they need to have, and that is why Prime Minister Maliki has appointed a military officer to go down there to get the security situation back under control.


MCCAIN:

Do you have confidence in the Iraqi minister of interior?


ABIZAID:

I don't know the Iraqi minister of interior the way I know the defense minister. I have no reason not to have confidence in him.


MCCAIN:

Well, all the reports we have is that day after day is that people are running around in police uniforms and army uniforms and they're actually malicious and they're killing people. Story after story, they say when you see the people come in uniform, it's an emergency, that people are going to be killed.

Which brings us, obviously, to the state of the training not of the Iraqi military but of Iraqi police and law enforcement. Can you comment on that situation?


ABIZAID:

During the period after the national election, when no governance formed, the Interior Ministry in particular did not develop its forces in the way that we had anticipated that they would or should.

Military forces, on the other hand, continue to develop well, they continue to perform well. But there is no doubt that police units -- especially local police units -- were infiltrated, in Basra, in particular, but elsewhere as well, by local militias. And they put their allegiance to the militias ahead of their allegiance to the state.

It's vital that we turn this around.


MCCAIN:

The cleric al-Sadr continues to be a major obstacle to progress in Iraq. And I believe there's still an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Are we going to address that issue?


ABIZAID:

The issue will be addressed by the Iraqi government.



MCCAIN:

Not by us?


ABIZAID:

Be addressed by the Iraqi government.


MCCAIN:

All of my colleagues are here, so I want to not take time. I just want to conclude.

Secretary Rumsfeld, we passed an amendment on the armed services authorization bill, which I am confident will be accepted in conference. And that requires that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, funding for it, be included in the regular budgetary process.

We're hearing story after story about mismanagement of funds, corruptions, et cetera. We must have sufficient congressional oversight.

I hope you are making plans to include the expenses involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the normal budgetary process and not as a, quote, "emergency supplemental."

And I think you should be able, at this time, after this many years involved in this conflict, to be able to predict what those costs might be.

And I want to say, again, we will have a showdown, both within this body and with the executive branch, unless we start going through the normal budgetary process to fund this conflict, which I think all of us agree we'll be involved in for a long period of time.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.


WARNER:

I'd have you respond, Mr. Secretary.


RUMSFELD:

We're aware of the amendment. And, needless to say, we'll comply with the law.

From our standpoint, we can do it either way. And it's been a matter that's been worked out, generally, over the years, between the White House, the Office of Management and Budget and the leadership in Congress.

And the reality is that what we would have to do, as you suggested, would be to provide the best estimates that we can, and projections, and then make adjustments for them as time actually passed. And we'd be happy to do that.


MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


PACE:

Mr. Chairman, can I make one clarification, so that the parents watching this do not believe that, somehow, their sons and daughters are not properly trained to handle the kind of violence that the sectarian violence is creating?

What General Chiarelli said is exactly true: that we do not train to separate sectarian violence and that that is very much a responsibility of the politicians. And as we've talked about already, the Iraqi people need to do that.

With regard to Lieutenant Pace, who's on patrol in Baghdad with his platoon and the kind of violence that he's going to come across, regardless of it's Sunni, Shia or whoever, if it's an armed group, our soldiers and Marines certainly are well trained to handle that.

So there's a difference between the kind of violence they have to handle and what will prevent that violence. And preventing that violence is very much the role of the political leaders in Iraq to solve, sir.



WARNER:

Well, that's the purpose of this hearing: to allow you and other witnesses to clarify these bullet statements that come before us and the American public.

Thank you, Chairman Pace.

Senator Reed?


REED:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid, in your opinion, is the Mahdi Army a terrorist organization with the implicit -- at least -- support from the Iranian government?


ABIZAID:

In my opinion, there are groups within the Mahdi Army that are under the pay of the Iranian government that are terrorist organizations. I'm not sure I can say that's necessarily true about the entire organization.


REED:

And, as Senator McCain pointed out, there was an outstanding warrant for Muqtada al-Sadr, who is the leader of the Mahdi Army. But also his followers are prominent members of the Iraqi government, is that correct?


ABIZAID:

That's correct.


REED:

So when you say the Iraqi government will dispose of Sadr and the Mahdi Army, he, in fact, is part of that government.


ABIZAID:

Well, I believe that the prime minister and his government will take the steps necessary to get the sectarian violence under control and do what has to be done against the death squads.


REED:

Do you have any, sort of, sense of the timing of this, particularly with respect to the Madhi Army and to Sadr?


ABIZAID:

Again, I wouldn't characterize the target as being either Sadr or the Mahdi Army.

I would say there are elements within the Jaish al Mahdi that will be targeted because they're participating in death squad activities.


REED:

With the encouragement, the permission, the tolerance of Sadr?


ABIZAID:

I couldn't say whether there's a permission or tolerance or anything of Sadr.

I can say that the prime minister knows and has been very forceful about saying that militias must be brought under control. He has a wide range of points that go all the way from direct military confrontation to agreement with various militias.


REED:

But we will not be involved in that process? It'll be exclusively up to the prime minister and his security forces?


ABIZAID:

I wouldn't say it would be exclusively the work of Iraqis. It's very clear that our forces, in conjunction with the Iraqis, will help target known death squad organizations.


REED:

Mr. Secretary, the chief of staff of the Army testified before the House Armed Services on June 27th that $4.9 billion in funding that the Army requested for reset, which is to repair equipment and replace equipment, was denied before the request was submitted to the Congress.

Did you deny this request? Or did the Office of Management and Budget deny the request?


RUMSFELD:

Senator, as you know, the normal process is that the department is given a budget by the Office of Management and Budget, and we take that budget and work within the department to try to fashion a budget that is balanced and makes sense.

And then, in the event that there's from time to time a need to go back to the Office of Management and Budget or the president and request additional funds, we've done that.

I don't know precisely which $4.9 billion I think...


REED:

Mr. Secretary, did you go back to the president and ask for more funds because of the critical needs of the Army and the Marine Corps for reset?


RUMSFELD:

We have certainly gone to the president and the Office of Management and Budget and explained the need for reset and negotiated it extensively with the Office of Management and Budget.

And regrettably, there have been cuts made by Congress every year in the defense budget. There have been not only reductions in our budget, there have been things that have been added in that we did not request that required us to take money from other things.



RUMSFELD:

And, third, there have been things required of us that we were prevented from making savings.

And the net effect of it, if you look just today in the authorization and appropriation bills between the House and the Senate, it runs somewhere between $10 billion, $15 billion or $20 billion, depending on how you calculate it.


REED:

So the White House did turn down your request for additional money for reset?


RUMSFELD:

That would not...


REED:

Yes or no.


RUMSFELD:

... be correct.


REED:

So you did not ask?


RUMSFELD:

I can't say that because we went through an extensive discussion and negotiation, and we ended up with the budget we ended up with, which was then reduced by Congress.


REED:

Last Tuesday evening, the Senate passed an appropriation for $13 billion of additional funding for reset. Is that money appropriate, or is it in some way a waste of resources?


RUMSFELD:

It is clearly needed.


REED:

And why didn't you ask the White House before they sent the request to Congress for that clearly needed money?


RUMSFELD:

We did talk to the White House about it and that's where the number came from, was from the Department of Defense.


REED:

Mr. Secretary, what you're saying, I think, is either you asked for the money and they said no, or you accepted a limit despite the needs that you recognized for reset. It's one or the other.


RUMSFELD:

You've lost me. At first you were talking about...


REED:

I think you've lost everyone with this dialogue.


RUMSFELD:

First you were talking about $4.9 billion, I thought. Now we're talking about the $13.1 billion, I think. And we have requested that of OMB and they have requested of Congress, and Congress has put it in the bill, as I understand it has.


REED:

Well, when did you request the $13 billion, Mr. Secretary?


RUMSFELD:

Within the last period of months -- weeks.


REED:

Weeks?


RUMSFELD:

Yes, weeks.


REED:

Days.

Why didn't you request the $13 billion when the budget was being prepared to be sent to the Congress?


RUMSFELD:

When the budget was being prepared to be sent to the Congress, it would have been January of last year for the budget that's being -- still has not been passed by the Congress this year.



RUMSFELD:

And for the supplemental, it would have been late last year -- not the beginning of last year, but late last year -- when those budgets are prepared.

We gain knowledge every month that goes by. And it's very clear the Army has a reset problem. And it's also clear that the $13 billion is needed.


REED:

Mr. Secretary, it's very clear that two-thirds of the Army operating force, active and reserve, is now reporting as unready. There's not a single nondeployed Army brigade combat team in the United States that is ready to deploy.

The bottom line is that we have no ready strategic reserve. And this is a stunning indictment of your leadership.


RUMSFELD:

I think it's an inaccurate statement.


REED:

How so? Have you seen the readiness reports, Mr. Secretary?


RUMSFELD:

I have.


REED:

And it's inaccurate to say that the readiness report for the Army does not indicate severe equipment shortages leaving many brigades in the United States as nondeployable?


RUMSFELD:

If you'll allow me a few minutes to respond. It's complicated, but I'd be happy to do so.

I stand with what I say. I think the characterization that you made is not accurate.

And it is complicated. If one sees a chart that shows a deterioration like this over a five-, six-, seven-, 10-year period, one has to assume that the readiness of the military, in this case the Army, has deteriorated.

Now, the fact of the matter is, if you begin with a standard, a requirement that is X, and then you show the beginning of the chart, and then at the end you have changed your requirement because you've decided you need different things, you've learned from the experiences of the last period of years, and you've increased your requirements to 5X, and then you compare yourself against 5X -- so if you've improved 300 percent -- you were at 100 percent to begin at 1X, and now you need 5X -- you've decided your requirement's different -- and you've improved 300 percent to get there, you're still short of that requirement. And that's what shows the deterioration.

The fact of the matter is, the equipment that the military has today is vastly better today than it was five years ago. The readiness of our capabilities are -- if you measure them against full spectrum, you can say they're not ready to do everything that anyone conceivably might need to do.



RUMSFELD:

On the other hand, if you ask the readiness of the forces with respect to what they're being asked to do -- ask General Abizaid, "Are the forces over there capable of doing what they're doing, equipped and trained to do what they're doing?" he will tell you, "Yes."

If you ask General Schoomaker, "Are the armed forces of the United States considerably better today, more capable, better equipped than they were five years ago?" he will say, "Yes."

And if you ask General Pace the question, "Is the United States today capable of fulfilling the requirements that the country has put on them?" the answer is, "Yes."


REED:

Well, let me take that opportunity.

General Pace, have you seen the last readiness...


WARNER:

Senator, wait a minute. You're way over your time...


REED:

Excuse me.


WARNER:

Now, just a minute. We need to allow the witness to fully respond to your question. And I think your question's been stated. We'll have another round and you can pursue this at that time. But I have to accommodate other members -- quite a bit over your time.

Has the witness had the opportunity to fully reply to the question before him?


RUMSFELD:

I have. I think it would be useful just for the context if the senator's last question could be responded to by General Pace.


REED:

Listen, Mr. Chairman, would you allow me to ask my question rather than have the secretary ask my questions for me?


WARNER:

Well, now, Senator -- just two minutes.


REED:

And if I've given up my time, then my time is gone.


WARNER:

We allowed you to ask your question very fully. It was stated. It is in the record, I think, with clarity, and the secretary was responding.

We'll have a second round, at which time you can further pursue this important subject. I recognize the importance of this subject.

Now, the secretary's asked for General Pace to give his perspective in response to the senator's question.


PACE:

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Readiness is reflected in personnel, in training and in equipment. Anytime a unit comes back from any deployment -- when I was battalion commander -- the unit has people change out and, therefore, the personnel numbers go down. The training as a result of the unit coming back starts out anew into the new cycle. And equipment is taken from what has been used and put into depot maintenance. That's in normal peacetime.

In wartime, we are using equipment at much greater rates.



PACE:

So we have a notional unit that has 100 trucks. And they deploy and they come back. And the trucks normally will be driven 1,000 miles in a year and they're driven 10,000 miles in combat.

You have a larger number of those vehicles that end up being put into the depot maintenance, which for the unit that is home them reduces their readiness based on availability of equipment.

The units that are forward have had not only the equipment that they went over with but have been augmented, thanks to the Congress providing the funding -- for example, our up-armored Humvees. The requirement globally, when we started in September of '01, was about 2,000. That number, now, is up at 12,000.

We have bought up to those 12,000 and we have used them in combat. And now a number of those 12,000 are currently in depot maintenance waiting.

So we're way over the 2,000 we started to begin with, but now, because of maintenance, usage and combat losses, we're below the 12,000 that folks are asking for today.

So it's very difficult, when you turn the kaleidoscope, to see all the pieces. And it does not allow itself to have a straight, easy answer.

Fundamentally, the United States Army is much more capable today. Fundamentally, the Army that is fighting, our war force, today deployed is in tremendous shape, personnel, training and equipment- wise.

But it is absolutely a fact that, for various budgetary reasons, some of which are result of actions taken by the Congress, that we do not have enough funding currently to provide for the repair of all of the equipment that currently sits at our depots waiting to be repaired. And I believe that's where the dialogue is, about how much money is needed.

That $13.1 billion, as I understand it, if approved by Congress, will, in fact, allow the Marine Corps and the Army to take the equipment that is currently stacked up at their depots, hire the workforce and begin the process.

But what has happened when we've not had budgets and we've had continuing resolutions, some of the workforce has had to be let go. And we cannot have the depots not know whether or not they are going to be able to have the funding, long term, to hire people. We cannot go out and hire a mechanic Pace for six months and then to let him go and expect to hire him back again.

I would ask, as we look at this, that we look at some kind of no- year funding that is focused on the backlog of equipment repair that will allow the depots to consciously go out and hire people who can stay in the workforce long enough to get this work done.

Thank you.


WARNER:

The senator from Rhode Island raises a very important question. And we will further explore it in the course of this hearing.

Mr. Secretary, I'm going to seek to get documentation that I looked at where you did engage with OMB about the need for these funds. So I think that documentation will be put in this record.



WARNER:

Senator Inhofe? But before you begin, Senator, I'm advised by the cloak room that we have two back-to-back votes. It's my intention to go over quickly and vote the first vote.

And, Senator McCain, I would ask that you chair because I'm going to be absent for that vote.

And we'll keep the hearing going, colleagues, as members come and go on these votes.

Senator Inhofe?


INHOFE:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I do want to thank you for giving General Pace the opportunity to respond to that question. I think that was an excellent response.

Let me just make a couple of observations if I might.

I find it really interesting -- I think most of the members of this committee have been to Iraq varying numbers of times. There are some of them who have not been at all. And when you get the reaction, the response and opinions that are formulated by those who have not been there, it's totally different than those who have really been there and they understand first-hand what's going on.

There's no better example of that than an article that was in the paper in USA Today, just this morning, that said the only -- without quoting a source -- at least I didn't see a source -- of the 18 provinces, only one was able to be secured just with the Iraqis.

On the other hand, Dr. Rubaie, who is a person I've known for quite some time, the new NSA, has said that right now, four out of 18 are under the protection and security of Iraqi security forces and there are nine more that will be in a very short period of time, which is 13 out of 18.



INHOFE:

When you hear people who have not been there and depend on press reports, there's no way that they can get the resolve that our troops have. There's no way.

I will share with you, General Pace, since this is up in the Marines' area in Fallujah, an experience up there with this Dr. Mahdi that you've met many times I'm sure. Dr. Mahdi or General Mahdi was actually the brigade commander for Saddam Hussein. He hated Americans, until he started embedded training with the Marines.

And he learned to love them so much that he said that, when they rotated him out, that they cried. And he then renamed the Iraqi security forces at Fallujah the Fallujah Marines.

Things like that that are going on that you can only get by being there and experiencing it.

Now I came back from my 11th trip to the CENTCOM AOR. And I timed that trip so that it was right after Zarqawi saw his demise and after the new cabinet appointments were put into place. And you hear a lot about Maliki and so forth and perhaps even Jasim.

But when you sit down and spend quality time with them, you get a different impression than you do by looking at the media here. And, certainly, Dr. Rubaie is the same way.

Jasim at that time, General Pace, said -- or maybe General Abizaid could respond to this -- he said at that time that, of the 36 brigades, 17 -- we're talking about the Iraqi brigades now -- 17 were at level 2 or, in other words, were capable of autonomous operations. And of the 112 battalions, 62 were at level 2.

Now this was two months ago. Do you agree with his assessment at that time of those who are trained and equipped --Iraqi security forces -- and has that changed in the last two months?



ABIZAID:

Senator Inhofe, I think the best way to characterize where the Iraqis are doing well has to do with their units that are in the lead -- in the lead in the security structure in whatever area that's been assigned to them.

In October of '05, one division, four brigades and 23 battalions of the Iraqi armed forces were in the lead in their sectors. Today, it's four divisions, 21 brigades and 77 battalions. That's a pretty impressive gain.

And I think it's really important for people to understand that while there are a lot of very important warning signals that can't be lost to us about where sectarian violence is heading in Baghdad, the most important point that we've got to keep in mind is that the army is holding together and that the government is committed to bringing the sectarian violence under control.

So the question is, am I optimistic whether or not Iraqi forces with our support, with the backing of the Iraqi government can prevent the slide to civil war? My answer is, yes, I'm optimistic that that slide can be prevented.


INHOFE:

Well, that is consistent with what we get from the other side. I like these hearings here where we get it from you, but also to go over there and see what they have to say about it.

And I have to say this, I was incredibly impressed. I mean, we all are familiar with Maliki, but Minister Jasim and this Dr. Rubaie, someone I had known sometime before, they are very, very optimistic about their level of professionalism.

And when you talk to the troops, getting back up to Fallujah, I was up there during the elections, and knowing that they were actually risking their lives, they were just rejoicing at that time, asking them the question, "Do you see the time in the future where you're going to be able to take over your own security?" they just very enthusiastically say it is.

There's one area...


ABIZAID:

Senator Inhofe, if I may, I just want to say the Iraqi soldiers are fighting, they're taking casualties, they are fighting for their nation, they are trying to get the sectarian violence and the insurgency under control. And they deserve an enormous amount of our respect and support.

And so I think sometimes we seem to think that we're the only forces there. We're not. There's 220,000-plus Iraqis that are out there fighting and doing a pretty good job. And, yes, there are some problems within their organizations, but they are maturing and they are doing better, and they'll continue to do better.


INHOFE:

And they're committed. I happened to be in Saddam's hometown when the training area was bombed by the terrorists.



INHOFE:

And about 40 of them -- 41, I think it was -- were either killed or very seriously injured.

Those families -- those 40 families resupplied a member of their family to replace the one that was killed. I mean, this is the type of thing, the stories you don't hear.

I know my time has expired, but for the record, Senator McCain, I'd like to ask them to give us some information.

According to Chiarelli and several others, including the Iraqis, probably one of the most serious problems, even though it doesn't have a lot of sex appeal to it, is the logistics, both civilian and military, and the problem that we -- the organizational structure to distribute civil equipment and supplies isn't there.

And I'd like to get your opinions as to what we're trying to do to correct the problem of logistical problems.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.


MCCAIN:

Senator Ben Nelson?


BEN NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I think your testimony in response to questions has been very helpful.

In connection with the number of Iraqi troops who are combat- capable, out of the over 250,000-plus security forces that are there, is there any estimate of the number who would be combat-capable?


ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, for the record, the number of trained Iraqi police, border security and Iraqi military forces -- the number is closer to 275,000.

The combat capability within the army -- I think, again, the best measure are those units that are in at the lead, which are four divisions, 21 brigades and 77 battalions. But there's a very detailed list of what unit is at what level that we can certainly provide to you.


BEN NELSON:

That would be very helpful. Then, of the...


ABIZAID:

They are much improved and they continue to improve every month.


BEN NELSON:

Which is part of the emphasis on standing their military up so that we can stand ours down. The faster and the more capable they are, hopefully then there should be some sort of connection with the reduction of our forces as a result of that.

In terms of the police -- let's say the municipal police -- do we know what percentage or what number of the total number you would look at as being not only capably trained but honest and as part of the overall government, as opposed to a militia?


ABIZAID:

It's a difficult question to answer. There are some places where the local police are exceptionably efficient and very honest, very capable.



ABIZAID:

There are other areas where we know that they've been infiltrated by various militias, such as in Basra, where the government and the British forces that are down there are doing their best to stand down those units, retrain them and bring them on-line in a credible and capable manner.

As far as the national police forces are concerned, in Baghdad it's clear that there are a number of battalions -- again, without my notes in front of me; I'd take it for the record -- but there are a number of battalions that need to be stood down and retrained. And General Casey and Dempsey are working to do that now.


BEN NELSON:

Do we know whether approximately 50 percent or 30 percent?


ABIZAID:

No, I'd say it's probably 30 percent.


BEN NELSON:

Thirty percent.


ABIZAID:

That's national police, which is separate and distinct from municipal and/or the military.


BEN NELSON:

You know, I think the debate about whether we have a date for withdrawal or there's an open-ended commitment -- hopefully the debate will continue. But I wonder about an approach that is different than setting a date for withdrawal and to close any question about whether it's an open-ended commitment would be better approached on setting conditions for staying with the prime minister, with the Iraqi government.

In other words, there's a lot of slippage on how we have standing up to stand down in terms of their military versus our military because things change on the ground.

But do we have some idea of what our conditions for staying are? Is there a tipping point in terms of their ability or inability to get to a certain level so that they can deal with sectarian violence on their own or the Sunni insurgency, to govern themselves but also to secure themselves?

I guess I would feel more comfortable if we could establish some sort of metrics to know what it takes in terms of percentage, numbers and what it would take in terms of time so that we can say that they are capable of not only governing themselves with the elected government but also in terms of securing themselves so they can govern themselves.



BEN NELSON:

I don't know who would like to take that question, but I throw it out to all three of you.


ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, the government's been in existence now for three months. They've got a lot of work to do to cement their capability of governance. It's a very difficult thing to bring in a new government under these conditions of sectarian violence and insurgency.

I think it's very important for people to understand that, while there may be a military metric to units in the Iraqi army that are equipped and trained and them taking over a certain battlespace, there is also a very, very important political aspect to this reduction of sectarian violence, which is the various communities getting together and agreeing upon ways to reduce the sectarian violence themselves.

It's important that there be a national reconciliation effort. And it's important that there be agreed-upon measures to move forward with various militias that are operating outside of government control.

I think a combination of those things will lead to less violence over time, establish the role of the national government in Iraq, and allow us to bring our level of forces down as appropriate.


RUMSFELD:

Senator Nelson, I'd just add that the U.S. ambassador and General Casey have established a committee or a commission with the new Iraqi government and the national security officials in that government to address the very issues that you're raising as to what are the things that need to be done because, as General Abizaid correctly points out, they reach well beyond military capability.


BEN NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your answers.


WARNER:

Senator Thune?


THUNE:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, General, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and for your responses to the questions.



THUNE:

General Abizaid just asked a question. I talked to a soldier last week who has had two deployments to Iraq, and raised the question about whether or not the objectives and the goals that we have in Iraq are aligned with the goals that the Iraqi people have, and that they aren't.

And one of the reasons -- it seems to me, at least, if we're going to get control of the sectarian situation there, the Iraqi people have to buy in to what's happening in Iraq. And his suggestion was that they haven't.

And I know that when we've travelled to Iraq, and I was there a couple of months back with Senator McCain's delegation, you know, we hear from, obviously, the commanders and we talked with some of our troops. In most cases, we don't have a lot of interaction with the Iraqi people.

But I just wanted you to comment about the overall -- the interaction that we have with the Iraqi people, our troops on the ground over there, the temperature, in terms of their willingness to be a part of a national unity government, a democratic Iraq, and that sort of thing, relative to what we're trying to accomplish there.

I mean, this was one soldier who says he visits with these folks all the time and thinks that their interest and their objectives and goals are not aligned with what ours are over there.


ABIZAID:

Well, there's certainly people in Iraq that don't want Iraq to come together as an independent state. There are terrorist groups that have views that they want Iraq to descend into a state of anarchy and chaos so they can establish safe havens for terrorism in the region.

But I think that, as I go around and I talk to Iraqi military officers, Iraqi government officials, and people throughout the country -- and I think General Casey certainly would echo this -- the majority of the people want Iraq to come together as a free and independent nation that is capable of being a meaningful member of the community of nations in that part of the world, that's not dominated by either Iranians or dominated by Sunni extremist groups.



ABIZAID:

And I believe that know they have to fight in order to achieve that.


RUMSFELD:

I think it ought not to be surprising, Senator, that an American soldier would visit with Iraqis and see that they do have a different perspective. They live in a different part of the world, they have a different history, and it's fully understandable.

On the other hand, 12 million of them went out and voted, and they went out and fashioned a constitution and then ratified it that's there for the world to see, and they have been voting in increasing numbers.

So while you're right and General Abizaid is certainly right that there are Baathists who want to take back the country, there are Shi'a who would like to dominate it to the detriment of the Sunnis. The fact of the matter is that 12 million Iraqis went out and voted for that constitution, and that's not nothing, it's something important.


THUNE:

Yes. And I appreciate General Abizaid's comment, which I've heard you make previously as well, that the forces that want to hold the country together and see it succeed outnumber and are greater than those that want to see it fail.

But I just wanted to get your assessment of sort of on the ground, the average Iraqi on the street type view of what's happening there, because it seems to me at least that that's a key component in starting to turn over information on some of the bad guys who are committing the violence there and really making this thing work.

One other question has to do again with the borders and how are we doing with respect to Iran and Syria. Foreign arms serve as the lifeblood of the insurgent groups. Does the Iraqi government see that as a threat to their sovereignty and are they stepping up and doing some of the work to protect the borders and make sure that a lot of the arms that are coming in are cut off?

What's your assessment of that? I've asked a lot of questions of your colleagues who have been in front of this committee about IEDs, for example, and where are they getting the materials to make these IEDs. And seems, at least, a lot of that's coming from some of these other countries.

And I know it's important with the length of the borders and everything else to completely shut it off, but are there efforts being made to regulate and control the materials that are coming in that are being used to inflict causalities on our troops?



ABIZAID:

Yes, Senator, there is a lot of effort building a border force. The border force is effective in some areas, less effective in others. The Iraqi armed forces also back up the border forces.

The Syrian border remains the primary conduit for foreign fighters. I think those numbers remain less than 100 or so that are transiting back and forth.

The vast majority of the munitions that are used inside Iraq come from inside Iraq. There are certainly smuggling routes that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds force people are using to bring in IEDs into the south and into some of the northern portions of Iraq that have been used, and it's clear that that's taking place.


THUNE:

Were those weapons caches that were discovered this last week -- has it been determined whether those were leftovers from the previous regime are those that have come in -- that flooded in from other countries?


ABIZAID:

Sir, I'd have to see the specific report. There are weapon caches found every day.


THUNE:

Yes, all right.


PACE:

Sir, just to help with that number, we've had 420,000 tons of ammunition captured and destroyed in some over 14,000 locations in- theater. So it's a huge cache location and we find them every day.


THUNE:

Thank you. I thank you for your outstanding service to our country.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.


MCCAIN:

Senator Clinton?


CLINTON:

Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Mr. Secretary, we're glad you're here.

In your opening statement, you reference the common sense of Americans. Well, I think it's fair to say that that collective common sense overwhelmingly does not either understand or approve of the way you and the administration are handling Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under your leadership, there have been numerous errors in judgment that have led us to where we are in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have a full-fledged insurgency and full-blown sectarian conflict in Iraq.

Now, whether you label it a civil war or not, it certainly has created a situation of extreme violence and the continuing loss of life among our troops and of the Iraqis.

You did not go into Iraq with enough troops to establish law and order.



CLINTON:

You disbanded the entire Iraqi army. Now, we're trying to recreate it.

You did not do enough planning for what is called Phase Four and rejected all the planning that had been done previously to maintain stability after the regime was overthrown.

You underestimated the nature and strength of the insurgency, the sectarian violence and the spread of Iranian influence.

Last year, Congress passed the United States Policy in Iraq Act, which I strongly supported. This law declares 2006 to be a year of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq.

However, we appear to be moving in the opposite direction, with the number of U.S. troops in Iraq scheduled to increase, not decrease. That's the only way I think you can fairly consider the decision with respect to the 172nd Stryker Brigade.

So, Mr. Secretary, as we returned to our states for the August recess, our constituents have a lot of questions and concerns about the current state of affairs in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

I don't need to remind any of us that we continue to lose our young men and women: 120 from New York alone.

Beside the U.S. losses, violence does seem to be increasing. From January to June of this year, there were 14,338 Iraqi civilian casualties, at least as far as anyone can count; in May and June alone, more than 5,000 deaths and 5,700 injuries.

In a July 22 article in the New York Times, General Abizaid was quoted as saying, "Two months after the new Iraqi government took office, the security gains that we had hoped for had not been achieved."

Then there was the big, ballyhooed announcement of Forward Together and the commitment by the new Iraqi government to secure Baghdad.



CLINTON:

Two months into that, it's clear it's not working and we are now putting in more American troops and -- following the lead of Senator McCain's line of questioning -- removing them from other places that are hardly stable and secure.

In Afghanistan, your administration's credibility is also suspect. In December 2002, you said, "The Taliban are gone." In September 2004, President Bush said, "The Taliban no longer is in existence."

However, this February, DIA Director Lieutenant General Maples said that, in 2005, attacks by the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces were up 20 percent from 2004 levels, and these insurgents were a greater threat to the Afghan government's efforts to expand its authority than in any time since 2001.

Further, General Eikenberry made a comparable comment with respect to the dangers that are now going on in Afghanistan and the failure to be able to secure it.

Obviously, I could go on and on. A recent book, aptly titled "Fiasco," describes in some detail the decision-making apparatus that has led us to this situation.

So, Mr. Secretary, when our constituents ask for evidence that your policy in Iraq and Afghanistan will be successful, you don't leave us with much to talk about. Yes, we hear a lot of happy talk and rosy scenarios, but because of the administration's strategic blunders and, frankly, the record of incompetence in executing, you are presiding over a failed policy.

Given your track record, Secretary Rumsfeld, why should we believe your assurances now?


RUMSFELD:

My goodness.

First, I tried to make notes and to follow the prepared statement you've presented.

First of all, it's true: There is sectarian conflict in Iraq and there is a loss of life.



RUMSFELD:

And it's an unfortunate and tragic thing that that's taking place.

And it is true that there are people who are attempting to prevent that government from being successful. And they are the people who are blowing up buildings and killing innocent men, women and children, and taking off the heads of people on television. And the idea of their prevailing is unacceptable.

Second, you said the number of troops were wrong. I guess history will make a judgment on that. The number of troops that went in and the number of troops that were there every month since and the number of troops that are there today reflected the best judgment of the military commanders on the ground, their superiors, General Pace, General Abizaid, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the president of the United States.

I think it's not correct to assume that they were wrong numbers. And I don't think the evidence suggests that, and it will be interesting to see what history decides.

The balance between having too many and contributing to an insurgency by the feeling of occupation and the risk of having too few and having the security situation not be sufficient for the political progress to go forward is a complicated set of decisions. And I don't know that there's any guidebook that tells you how to do it. There's no rule book. There's no history for this.

And the judgments that have been made have been made by exceedingly well-trained people: the gentleman sitting next to me, the people on the ground in Iraq. They were studied and examined and analyzed by the civilian leadership and by the president, and they were confirmed. And so I think your assertion is, at least, debatable.

The idea that the army was disbanded, I think, is one that's, kind of, flying around. My impression is that to a great extent that army disbanded itself. Our forces came in so fast -- it was made up of a lot of Shia conscripts who didn't want to be in it and thousands -- or at least many, many hundreds -- of Sunni generals who weren't about to hang around after Saddam Hussein and his sons and administration were replaced.

The work to build a new army has included an awful lot of people from the prior army, and it has benefited from that.

Third, the assertion that the government rejected all the planning that had been done before is just simply false; that's not the case. The planning that had been done before was taken into account by the people who were executing the post-major combat operations activities.

The comments about Baghdad I'll possibly let General Abizaid comment on.



RUMSFELD:

The goal is not to have U.S. forces do the heavy lifting in Baghdad. There are many, many more Iraqi forces in Baghdad.

The role of the U.S. forces is to help them, to provide logistics, to assist them as needed, and to create a presence that will allow the Iraqi security forces to succeed, and then, as our forces step back, allow the Iraqi security forces to be sufficient to maintain order in the city.

I can't predict if it will work this time. It may or it may not.

It happens to represent the best judgment of General Casey, General Chiarelli and the military leadership. And General Abizaid and General Pace and I have reviewed it. And we think that it is a sensible approach, as General Abizaid testified earlier.

Afghanistan -- I don't know who said what about whether the Taliban are gone, but, in fact, the Taliban that were running Afghanistan and ruling Afghanistan were replaced. And they were replaced by an election that took place in that country. And in terms of a government, or governing entity, they were gone. And that's a fact.

Are there still Taliban around? You bet.

Are they occupying safe havens in Afghanistan and other places -- correction -- in Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are.

Is the violence up? Yes.

Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and spring, summer and fall months? Yes, it does. And it tends to decline during the winter period.

Does that represent failed policy? I don't know. I would say not. I think you've got an awful lot of very talented people engaged in this. And the decisions that are being made are being made with great care after a great deal of consideration.

Are there setbacks? Yes.

Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes.

Does the enemy have a brain and continue to make adjustments on the ground, requiring our forces to continue to make adjustments? You bet.

Is that going to continue to be the case? I think so.

Is this problem going to get solved in the near term about this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I don't believe it is, I think it's going to take some time.

And I know the question was, some wars lasted three years, some wars lasted four years, some wars lasted five years. The Cold War lasted 40-plus years.

And the struggle against violent extremists who are determined to prevent free people from exercising their rights as free people is going to go on a long time, and it's going to be a tough one.

That does not mean that we have to spend the rest of our lives, as the United States armed forces, in Iraq. The Iraqis are going to have to take that over. We can't want freedom more for the Iraqi people than they want for themselves. And Senator Thune mentioned earlier about that issue.

And I would point out the number of tips that have been coming from Iraqi people have been going up steadily. They're at a very high level. And it does suggest to me that the Iraqi people do want to have a free country, as I mentioned, because of their voting pattern.

So I would disagree strongly with your statement.


CLINTON:

Well, Mr. Secretary, I know you would, and I know you feel strongly about it, but there's a track record here. This is not 2002, 2003, 2004, '5, when you appeared before this committee and made many comments and presented many assurances that have, frankly, proven to be unfulfilled. And...


RUMSFELD:

Senator, I don't think that's true. I have never painted a rosy picture. I've been very measured in my words. And you'd have a dickens of a time trying to find instances where I've been excessively optimistic. I understand this is tough stuff.


CLINTON:

Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to submit for the record a number of the secretary's former comments. And also, may we keep the record open for additional questions?


WARNER:

The record will remain open until the close of business today for all members to contribute additional questions.


CLINTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


PACE:

Senator, may I go on record, sir?


WARNER:

Yes, of course.


PACE:

Thank you, sir.

I think it's very important that I, as chairman, having been vice chairman since 1 October of 2001, having been part of the dialogue, having worked closely with General Franks, General Casey, General Abizaid, all of the Joint Chiefs, the numbers of forces that have been requested up the chain of command have been thoroughly discussed, pros and cons of the balance, what was needed, how we might provide it, the equipment, the tactics of the major operations. All of those things have come up through the Joint Chiefs. We have given our best military advice.

The collaborative nature between our leaders here in Washington and those in the field is as thorough and complete as I could imagine. I have personally been part of each of those decisions. And I want to go on record as saying that I, along with the Joint Chiefs, have been, continue to be part of the decision process.

And everything, to my knowledge, that we have ever asked for with regard to equipment or personnel has been provided to us.



WARNER:

Thank you very much, General.

Again, I've listened to this very important colloquy, but I do believe, Mr. Secretary, having followed this, as is my responsibility, these many years, I think both Secretary Rumsfeld, your predecessor, General Myers, and you, General Pace, have always made statements which were in balance and definitely indicating the seriousness of the conflict, the fact that it's going to be a long and a drawn-out one.

And our record has many, many entries in it to the effect that the president and the secretary of defense have relied upon the advice of the senior military commanders in structuring those force levels.

And we'll be happy to include in the record some material of our own on that point.

And I think, given the number of questions coming about the record, I'll hold the record open until close of business on Friday.

Senator Dayton?


DAYTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank sincerely each of you for your service to our country. I know that all of you live with enormous demands of your positions and the conditions around the world.

With respect, I say that we, and more importantly the American people, deserve to be told I think more candidly perhaps than we have so far, why the Iraqis remain incapable of succeeding in Iraq, and, since our success is predicated on their success, what we and they are going to do about it.

Secretary Rumsfeld, you said in your remarks that you remain confident in the good common sense of the American people. And I agree with you that that confidence is well placed. And the American people can tell the difference between succeeding and failing. They perceive, I think, correctly, that the Iraqis are failing in Iraq and that our courageous troops continue to bear the brunt of the Iraqi failures and that the realities there, overall, are getting worse, not better.

I believe that all of you are mistaken to cast the failures in Iraq as a test of our citizens' will and resolve. I think it's unfair to the American people to do so.

I respectfully disagree with your assertion, General Pace, that most Americans are not affected by this war every day. Most of them lived through 9/11, as you did and we did.

They remain profoundly affected by it. They accepted the president's assertion that the United States invasion of Iraq was essential to protect our national security, that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, as the president and the vice president said immediately and urgently threatened the United States.

The American people continue to support the war even after no weapons of mass destruction or found, even when their sons and daughters and husbands and wives -- as you said, General, over a million of them -- have been sent halfway around the world, risking their lives, giving their lives to carry out the orders of their commander in chief.



DAYTON:

It isn't their will -- the will of the American people that's being tested, it's their tolerance for failure.

Over 2,600 Minnesota National Guardsmen and -women are now serving in Iraq. They're away from their families for 18 months. Some of them will never return alive. They come from 80 of Minnesota's 87 counties. They're the best and brightest in their communities. So it's not just their families but it's entire communities that are affected by their absences.

And so those families and their fellow citizens deserve to know when the Iraqis are going to be able to take over responsibility civically and militarily and security, so that they can come home with that victory that they achieved when they toppled the Saddam Hussein regime is secured.

I've attended -- as all of my colleagues have, I'm sure -- far too many funerals and wakes in Minnesota, where hundreds or even thousands of grateful and grieving citizens attend. Every one of those funerals is a leading news story in all of the statewide media.

So the people of Minnesota, and in this country, are asking us -- you and we, their leaders, is to tell them what is really going on there, not with political spins from either side of the aisle, but truth, the basic facts.

What is the situation in Iraq? Why is it seemingly getting worse not better, as evidenced as others have said, by the need to bring more U.S. troops into Baghdad, the capital city? What is our strategy? What is our strategy for reversing that slide?

What is the solution to getting the inability of the Iraqis -- I remember being with General Petraeus in Iraq in December of 2004. He talked candidly there about, he said, the most difficult situation he had ever faced in his career, trying to train these forces to stand up -- not to the American army, but to the fellow citizens to these insurgents.

Some terrorists, we're told again and again, ate least in most of the briefings, 95-plus percent of this violence is generated by indigenous Iraqis. So their inability to stand up to their fellow citizens has caused, according to the reports I've read, some 850,000 Iraqi citizens to flee the country because they can't even go to work every day, can't go to school without basic security.

Again, by the indicators that I can look at -- they're mixed -- but predominantly this is a failed effort by the Iraqi people and it continues to be. And when are we going to see some indications of their ability to succeed, and if not, what are we going to do about it?

Secretary, maybe I'll ask you and then others respond.


RUMSFELD:

Would you like to respond?


DAYTON:

General?


ABIZAID:

Senator Dayton, thank you.

I disagree.

I believe the Iraqis are capable of succeeding. I believe they do want to succeed. I believe they are honorable people who want to live a better life and have security for their children just like we do.



ABIZAID:

These forces of extremism are strong. They are very, very ruthless. They are well connected, not only inside Iraq, but globally. And they present a formidable force that has to be dealt with.

We are not operating in the region in some sort of a battlefield where the enemy doesn't exist. The enemy exists in Iraq. It exists in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, in Jordan, in Lebanon. You name the location in the region and they exist there.

People say the war started on September 11th, 2001, but you can make a case for the war having started in October of 1983, when Hezbollah destroyed the Marine barracks and killed over 200 American Marines that were stationed there.

You could say the war played itself out to a certain extent at a lower level in Somalia, where we stayed there for a short period of time and then left.

You could say that throwing a few TLAMs at this enemy created the circumstances by which we had to end up facing this enemy with greater force and greater perseverance and greater patience and courage than we had been able to muster before then.

This is a very serious problem that requires the application of our national might and will, along with that of the international community, to face down the extremist threat, whether it's sponsored by Iran or whether it comes from Al Qaida, or we will fight one of the biggest wars we've ever fought.

Weapons of mass destruction may not have been found in Iraq, but this enemy is trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. We know that from just looking at any unclassified Web site you want to look at. They are working at it day after day and they want to use it against us. And we can simply not walk away from this enemy until the people in the region have the capacity to deal with it themselves. And they want to do that.

We have got to shape the environment that allows them to help themselves.

And it's a slow process. When I think of how long it took us to win the Revolution, and then to solidify our own independence and freedom through the Constitution, and eventually through our own Civil War, this is not an easy task. This is a very, very difficult task.

And I think we should give the people in the region credit for wanting to live a better life and achieve greater security and stability. We have to help them if we are going to keep our own children safe from the greater dangers that lurk out there.


DAYTON:

General, I don't say this is about walking away from the enemy. I don't think the American people -- I think it's a very unfair characterization.

I can say I voted against the resolutions to set a timetable to begin (inaudible) American troops. I've got a lot of heat back home; so be it. Because I agree that the military command needs to decide what force level is necessary to carry out the mission that they're assigned by their commander in chief. And I'm not going to second- guess that.

But I expressed a concern that that force level is going to remain there indefinitely because of the incapacity of the Iraqi society. I recognize that after living 25 years under a severe dictatorship, it takes some time.

But we heard testimony last week from Iraqis that the Health Ministry is more corrupt than it was under Saddam Hussein. The amount of electricity in Baghdad, we're told, is eight hours a day. I was there with the chairman in July of 2003 -- as you well know, sir, being there, it can get 115-degree temperatures and no air conditioning and no running water and sanitation and no refrigeration, you know, you've got a crisis on your hands. And people, as I said earlier, can't go to work without fearing and they're fleeing.

So, again, you can't paint it all one way or the other. But it seems to me that the incompetence, the corruption and the incapacity of the Iraqi forces, despite our three years of the best training of forces we have capable -- when you can train Americans in eight weeks of basic training to go over and perform -- I mean, to me it's inexplicable that after three years, they can't take more responsibility than they have so far.

And, again, if you extrapolate from those three years so far to a decade, the prediction that we would have to have a sizable force level there for a decade is a moderate -- maybe even an optimistic prediction, I mean, if we're going to be there for a decade or two decades at this kind of force level in order to hold that country together.


RUMSFELD:

Certainly no one anticipates having forces in Iraq at these levels in a decade.

And the Iraqi security forces, as I say, have gone from zero; they've been trained and equipped up to 275,000; they're going to complete 325,000 by the end of this year. And I don't know what the new government will say is the appropriate number. Maybe that number, maybe something more.

But then the support systems and the strengthening of the ministry will be required as that is occurring. And I think that your characterization is going to prove to be not correct.


DAYTON:

I'm sorry, which characterization, sir?


RUMSFELD:

That they could be there up to a decade.


DAYTON:

I hope it's not.


RUMSFELD:

Yeah, I'm sure ...


DAYTON:

That's not my characterization, it's that of others.


WARNER:

Thank you very much, Senator.


DAYTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



RUMSFELD:

Mr. Chairman?


WARNER:

Yes.


RUMSFELD:

Something came to my attention that I'd like to just comment on. We were discussing the reset costs early on.


WARNER:

And in the interim, I've got some material to put in the record, the documents. But I think it's important...


RUMSFELD:

Good, I'd just like to say three or four...


WARNER:

... we, at this point, continue our colloquy on that, and that that part of your response be inserted in the record following my comments after the senator from Rhode Island's.

So, please?


RUMSFELD:

Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The reset costs have historically been in supplementals, not in the original budgets.

The president's budget request for fiscal year '07 contains $50 billion request for a supplemental allowance or a bridge fund. This bridge fund is intended to partly cover fiscal year '07 reset costs.

I say "partly" because we fully expect to request additional supplemental funds in the spring, as we have in prior periods.

Reset costs have always been funded in supplementals. The $13.1 billion in the Stevens amendment, as I understand it, is an advance payment on reset costs that would be covered in the spring supplemental.


WARNER:

Thank you.

And I've done this research and will put this in the record following Secretary Rumsfeld's statement.

I'm going to address a document dated August 2 from the Executive Office of the President. And it reads as follows. It clearly, in my judgment, supports your statement that you have been in constant consultation with the Office of Management and Budget on this important issue.

This document reads in part -- and I'll put the whole document in the record -- "The administration welcomes the committee's strong support for our troops fighting the war on terror. The funds provided are critical to continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while keeping our military well equipped and ready to respond.

"The administration urges the Senate to fully support the procurement request and provide full funding for Afghan and Iraqi forces to enable them to assume full responsibility for their own security and fully fund our coalition support to ensure timely reimbursement of critical partners."



WARNER:

Now, this is right on point. "The administration supports the Senate's acceleration of $3.1 billion into the bridge that would have been requested next year in the spring supplemental, bringing the total level of bridge funding in this bill to $63.1 billion.

"This action will facilitate the needed resetting of the armed forces to continue their important missions and provide needed certainty to military planners.

"This additional funding is necessary to accelerate planned efforts to repair or replace war-damaged equipment." The point that you addressed, General Pace. "In particular these funds address Army and Marine Corps depot and unit maintenance requirements, procurement needs, including Abrams, Bradley, Apache and other helicopters, tactical vehicles, trailers, generators and bridge equipment."

And this is the document that I also insert, which states the OMB funding levels and they were followed by the Appropriations Committee in that amendment. So that will be placed in the record as I stated. And I thank the secretary for bringing that to our further attention and clarifying it.

I'll also put in a memorandum that I've had prepared, giving a chronological history of this funding.

I see that we are now joined by several colleagues.

Senator Dayton, having finished his testimony, Senator Chambliss, you are now recognized.


CHAMBLISS:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you all for being here.

And as always, General Pace...


WARNER:

Senator Chambliss, the colleague to your left has indicated to the chair that you have to depart to preside over the Senate.


GRAHAM:

At noon, but I can defer.


WARNER:

Well, go ahead.


GRAHAM:

Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

(CROSSTALK)


GRAHAM:

It just speaks well of Georgia, that's all I can say.

(LAUGHTER)


CHAMBLISS:

This will cost him, Mr. Chairman.


GRAHAM:

It will. I know I'm going to pay a heavy price for this.

Well, gentlemen, thank you for coming and I think it's important to be here and publicly talk about the war and what's going right and what's going wrong.



GRAHAM:

But let's do Insurgency 101.

The political situation in Iraq, Mr. Secretary, I think, has dramatically improved. We've got a government constituted, made up of all three groups. People voted in high numbers. It's something we should be proud of.

I was with Senator Chambliss and Cantwell and Biden on December the 15th, the national voting day. It was something to behold.

So I'd like to put on the record that the Iraqi people are very brave. They went to vote that day with people shooting at them. And they voted in larger numbers than our primary in South Carolina.

So the Iraqi people really have sacrificed a lot to get to where they're at now. And I'd like to see them get this process completed on their terms, not the terrorists' terms.

But when it comes to the Sunni insurgents, how many do we believe there are and who is their leader?


ABIZAID:

I think the number of Sunni insurgents is consistent with the intelligence estimates of at the bottom side around 10,000, up to about 20,000. And there is no distinct group that's in charge of it.


GRAHAM:

What is their goal?


ABIZAID:

Their goal is to -- it all depends on which group it is, from within the Sunni insurgency.

If it's the former Baathists, it's to come back to power. If it's Al Qaida, it's to establish chaos so that they can achieve a safe haven in the region.

And then there are other various groups within the Sunni community that keep violence on the table because they feel that it is the only thing that they have to negotiate with against the other communities' advantages that they see that have grown at their own expense.


GRAHAM:

On the Shia side, what is the goal of the Shia insurgency? And how many do we think there are?


ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, I think it's not quite what I would call a Shia insurgency.


GRAHAM:

What would you call it?


ABIZAID:

I think there are Shia extremist groups that are trying to ensure that the Iraqi government, as voted, fails and that they become ascendant. And you see this within parts of the Jaish al-Mahdi under Muqtada al-Sadr.


GRAHAM:

How many people are in that camp?


ABIZAID:

I think that those numbers are difficult to quantify because there are parts that are in various militia groups and there are other parts that are actively working against the government. But I think the number is in the low thousands.


GRAHAM:

OK, Al Qaida: After Zarqawi's death, how would you rate their capability and their make-up in terms of numbers?



ABIZAID:

Al Qaida is significantly depleted. I think their numbers are less than a thousand. I think they are a tenacious and cellular group that needs continued work, but we're making good progress against them and will continue to make good progress against them.


GRAHAM:

The reason I bring this question up is when you add up all the numbers, we're talking maybe less than 30,000 people, 40,000 people? The question for our country and the world at large is how can we let 40,000 people in a nation of how many million in Iraq...


PACE:

Twenty-five, 26 million.


GRAHAM:

Twenty-five million. Well, why can't 200,000 armed people, working together, contain 30,000 or 40,000?


RUMSFELD:

Well, a couple of comments.

One, it's a country the size of California, I suppose. And it is a heck of a lot easier to go around killing innocent men, women and children and hiding, without uniforms, and not in any organized military activity which another military could go address.


GRAHAM:

And that goes to the point: It seems to me that if the 25 million were united against the 40,000, that they wouldn't put up with this. So it seems to me that the country is not united, because if you have 25 million people, minus 40,000 that were on one side of the ledger, versus the 40,000, this thing would come to an end over night.

There's something more going on in Iraq at a deeper level from a common-sense perspective for this violence to be sustained so long and grow, not lessen. What do you think that something is?


PACE:

Sir, I think you're fundamentally correct that if the Iraqi people as a whole, decided today that, in my words now, they love their children more than they hate their neighbor, that this could come to a quick conclusion.

Many, about 4,500 to 5,000 per month, are currently feeding tips to their government and to our armed forces about potential aggressive movements.



PACE:

We need the Iraqi people to seize this moment. We provided security for them. Their armed forces are providing security for them and their armed forces are dying for them. They need to decide that this is their moment.


GRAHAM:

Well said.

And the question for the American people, I think, as we go forward: Will they ever seize this moment any time soon? And I would like each of you to give me an evaluation as to whether or not the 25 million, less 40,000, will seize this moment any time soon.

And what is the general view of the average Iraqi on the street about our military presence and the role that we're playing in their future? Are they more or less supportive of us being there now than they were a year ago?

And I would stop there.


PACE:

Sir, I think they will seize the moment.

I do not know how soon that will be. I think the Iraqi people need to get to the point where the amount of pain they're inflicting on each other goes beyond their ability to endure.

And I don't have, based on my upbringing and understanding of how much they can endure or how their society accepts that kind of violence. But, clearly, there's a point in time were the amount of violence that they're inflicting on each other is going to reach the point where they are fed up with it and they stand up to be counted.

I cannot tell you when that moment is. But I do know that Prime Minister Maliki and his team and his cabinet and those who have been elected as part of their parliament are the leaders of that nation and are standing up to this challenge and are working with their people to get to that day.


GRAHAM:

And has the Iraqi public turned against us or are they still with us?


PACE:

I think they would like us to leave, but not before it's time. I think that they are still with us, but they would like, as we would like, to have foreign troops off their soil.


GRAHAM:

Mr. Secretary?


RUMSFELD:

It's an interesting question.

I think back over the several years and the situation has evolved, unquestionably.

The Kurds were and remain very supportive of our presence, concerned that we would leave.

The Shia, in many instances, where pleased with the opportunity to assert their majority over the country that was provided by our presence.

The Sunni, clearly, were powerfully against our presence.



RUMSFELD:

More recently, the Sunnis see the role of the Shia, they see influence of Iran, and they are less powerfully against our presence.

The Kurds remain where they are and the Shia, if one talks to the elected leader of the country, who represents the Shia coalition, it is very clear in his mind that it would be very harmful to him and to his administration and to the country were we to leave precipitously.

So it is something that has evolved.


ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, I certainly agree with the way General Pace characterized it. We took a society like this and we turned it like this, and now it's moving like this. And there's a tremendous amount of friction associated with those moves. It's a society that must either move toward equilibrium or toward break-up.


GRAHAM:

What do you think will happen?


ABIZAID:

I think it will move toward equilibrium.


GRAHAM:

How long?


ABIZAID:

I think it will move toward this equilibrium in the next five years. That doesn't mean that we need to keep our force levels where they are, but I am confident that the Iraqi security forces, with good governance, coupled together, will bring the country toward equilibrium because the alternative is so stark.

They've had the experience of Lebanon. All you gotta do is go ask the Lebanese how long a civil war will last, and you'll know that you must move toward equilibrium.


GRAHAM:

Thank you all.


WARNER:

Thank you very much.

Senator Bill Nelson?


BILL NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

General Abizaid, the special inspector general in Iraq, in a report last month, stated that corruption is costing is $4 billion per year.



BILL NELSON:

The U.S. controller, David Walker, testified that 10 percent of Iraq's refined fuels and 30 percent of its imported fuels were being stolen.

Can you explain, in your strategy, how it is tailored to prevent the corruption and theft of the investments and the Iraqis' own resources, as we get into the reconstruction?


ABIZAID:

Senator, clearly, corruption is endemic in this part of the world. It was very heavily part of Saddam's society. It continues to be part of the current Iraqi society.

But I believe that there are many forces within Iraq that recognize the problem, that the good governance that will emerge from representative government and accountability will, over time, move this is a positive direction.

I think that corruption in this part of the world is one the great corrosive influences that causes extremism flourish. And in order to be successful against the extremists, governments must be held more and more accountable. And I believe this Iraqi government will be held accountable by their people, over time.


RUMSFELD:

I would add one other thing, Senator Nelson, if I might.

One of the real problems, in my view, has been the fact that, historically, the Iraqis have been paying a very small fraction for their fuel, of what the market price is.

So, as we all know -- it ought not to be a surprise.



RUMSFELD:

If you can buy it at that price, you can immediately take it across the border and sell it for a higher price. And that has been a problem because the government is now in the process of raising the price towards a market price; has not gotten there, but is in that direction. But, in the meantime, it's very damaging and it does lead to corruption.


BILL NELSON:

That same inspector general's report stated that the deteriorating security situation has had a particularly deleterious effect on the establishment of our U.S. provisional reconstruction teams, the PRTs, only five of which have begun operations in Iraq.

And they went on to tell how the concept, the PRT concept, had worked well in Afghanistan. And it was thought to be a key component in the Iraq reconstruction strategy.

So, General Abizaid, in your discussions with the Iraqi government and our State Department, what is your thinking in the strategy to implement the PRT in every province to aid in the transition?


ABIZAID:

Well, the PRTs are the strategic responsibility of the ambassador. And I think it's too soon to say that they haven't been successful.

I was in Mosul the other day and I talked to the provincial reconstruction team up there, and it was clear to me that they were making good progress, that they had good access to the Iraqi provincial leadership, and then other parts of the country, the vast majority of the country, by the way, which is fairly secure and fairly stable, the PRTs will, over time, gain more access and become more efficient.

Certainly in those areas around Baghdad where the sectarian violence is extreme, it's difficult for the PRTs to do the work. But I'm confident that the strategy that the ambassador has adopted to move the PRTs forward will be successful, especially provided that the other agencies of the U.S. government -- USAID, State Department, et cetera -- provide their manning in those teams and give them the strength that they're capable of giving them.


BILL NELSON:

How committed do you think Maliki is to disbanding the militias?


ABIZAID:

Sir, I've talked to him personally about. General Casey talks to him almost every day about it. And he has conveyed time and time again that he's committed to it. I believe that to be the case.


BILL NELSON:

What are the prospects that people like Sadr and Hakim and Hashemi (ph) will disband their militias?


ABIZAID:

I think that the prospects of the militias over time disbanding are good.


BILL NELSON:

What's that time frame?


ABIZAID:

I'm not sure I could say. I think the prime minister is in the middle of working with his cabinet -- he's only been there for three months -- to figure out how he's going to move towards militia disbandment. You know, in Afghanistan, it's taken us a long time to move in that direction. It's a long process, depending upon how dangerous the militia is to the state.

Those that are benign or that are working in conjunction with the state to provide some additional security don't need to be disbanded right away. Those that are sponsoring death squads need to be dealt with immediately.


BILL NELSON:

Is that the key, the disbanding of the militias, to the preventing of the sectarian violence that you testified to from going into all-out civil war?



ABIZAID:

Well, Senator Nelson, I said in my opening statement that militias are the curse of the region, and they are. Whenever non-state actors have the attributes of the state, yet bear no responsibility for their actions, it brings the region into very unpredictable directions, as you see Hezbollah moving with regard to -- inside of Lebanon.

So it's very important that militias be controlled, but it's not something that can be achieved easily overnight. But it is something that has to be accomplished.


BILL NELSON:

Are they the biggest part of stirring up the sectarian violence that you testified about?


ABIZAID:

In my opinion, yes.


WARNER:

Thank you, Senator.


BILL NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


WARNER:

Colleagues on my side, Senator Chambliss had begun his questions when he had to be interrupted. I'd like now to recognize you for your full time.

Senator Chambliss?


CHAMBLISS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, to all three of you, thank you for your service and your great leadership. General Abizaid, General Pace, when you see your troops on the ground, just let them know how much we appreciate the great job they continue to do. I'm always very humbled to be in their presence.

Let me give you my quick assessment. It's more complex than the way I'm going to lay it out there. But here's what I see having happened in the three-plus years that we have been involved in this conflict.

We started out with a basic ground war, which would move very quickly toward Baghdad. Then, we began to face the nonconventional enemy out there and the IEDs and the VBIEDs became a major factor.

They're still a major factor, but the fact is that we're not seeing that type of conflict directed toward the American soldier now as much as we have been in the past.



CHAMBLISS:

So it's pretty obvious we've done something right, both in the original ground war, as well as our defense against the enemy from an IED standpoint.

And I don't think we talk about that enough. And I want you to comment on that. But now, we're in, kind of, another phase, where the violence is primarily being directed toward the Iraqi people -- a lot of intimidation, a lot of threats. And they aren't just idle threats. They're being carried out.

We're seeing gangland-style executions. We're seeing, literally, gangs of individuals, numbering from 12 to 25, coming in and, for example, going into the Olympic committee meeting and taking hostages. It's an entirely different type of reaction.

And when Senator Levin said that Mr. Talabani said that this is their last quiver -- I'm not sure whether it's their last quiver or not, but it's pretty obvious that we've done some things right. And we forced them to change their tactics.

Now, obviously, we can't talk in an open hearing about what we are doing relative to this new type of tactic. But can you comment on that type of assessment?

And can you talk about some of the things that we have done right relative to the IEDs?

And what are we doing relative to this new type of offensive that's coming from the insurgents?


ABIZAID:

Senator, I think it's very clear to us that, if you look at the recent experience that the Israelis are having as they operate in Lebanon and you look at how other armed forces -- say Pakistani armed forces -- operate in their northern territories, that asymmetric warfare is here and with this.

And it's the warfare of the 21st century, where the enemy seeks to attack the weaknesses of their opponent, and where they will attempt to win media victories as opposed to military victories.

It should go without saying that, in five years of war, we have never lost a major engagement to the enemy anywhere in the region, yet there is considerable loss of confidence because the enemy is so agile and capable in purveying the notion that the situation is not winnable.

Certainly, the IED fight has been a difficult fight. And it is a fight that we see not only in Iraq, but we see it in Afghanistan and Pakistan. You see it in southern Lebanon. You see it in other places, such as in Egypt, where they're using IEDs, occasionally, there, as well.

Their tactics, techniques, and procedures are shared. We're learning a lot about it. We've gotten pretty good about it. And, I think, in the closed session, we could talk to you about some of the great successes we've had.

With regard to other situations with tactics, techniques, and procedures that the enemy have applied across the battle space, I think we'll continue to adjust. And again, I'm very, very confident that our forces are not only capable but very, very effective against what the enemy has put against us.


CHAMBLISS:

Senator Graham was talking about the fact that it's difficult for the American people to understand why 40,000 military insurgents can't be controlled by 127,000, or whatever, Mr. Secretary, you said we had over there now, plus the Iraqi army.

Well, I think the numbers in Lebanon, of Hezbollah insurgents, is probably very insignificant, particularly when compared to the force, as long as they're moving and hostile and agile, as you referred to them, General Abizaid.

It's pretty obvious that that does present significant problems.



CHAMBLISS:

Lastly, let me just say that Senator Graham referred to our trip over there in December. We met with eight members of the Iraqi election commission, all of whom happened to be Sunnis. And every one of them made the comment -- unsolicited on our part -- about the presence of the American soldier.

And the comment was: Do we want to see the American soldier leave? And if you ask the Iraqi people that today, they'd say: Sure. But if you ask, "Do you want the American soldier to leave today?", the answer is overwhelmingly no.

And I think that's borne out in a newspaper story today where there's a number of quotes here in the Washington Times from Iraqi citizens with regard to the troops, General Abizaid, that you put into Baghdad to run the militia out of the various neighborhoods.

And the fact now that these Iraqi citizens are quoted as saying that for the first time in months that they are able to come out of their homes now, to reopen their shops and for commerce to once again be present within the city of Baghdad speaks volumes about the American soldier. And there's nothing but compliments about the job that the American soldiers are doing.

And it still goes back to the fact that they do want us to leave. But they don't want us to leave until the job is done.

So I hope that the Iraqi leadership is right by the end of the year, that they are able to take over control of the entire country. But in the meantime, it's pretty obvious that our troops are doing the right things over there today under your leadership.

So with that, thank you and appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman?


WARNER:

Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Bayh?


BAYH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today.

General Abizaid, I would be interested in your opinion. Some observers have commented that there remain unresolved political questions for the Iraqis involving their constitution -- division of oil revenues, that sort of thing -- and that this is in significant part fueling the insurgencies and the continuing conflict.



BAYH:

I'd be interested in your opinion about whether you think that's true and, if so, what you think we can do to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to resolve their remaining political disputes.


ABIZAID:

Senator, as General Casey has said to me on numerous occasions, this conflict has gone from essentially insurgency to a discussion within the internal Iraqi groupings about the distribution of power, resources and future control.

And you can approach it one or two ways. One way is by violence; the other way is by compromise.

It's my opinion that the forces of compromise will eventually understand that violence gets them nothing, and that the compromise is absolutely essential; just like we had to determine that in our own constitutional mechanisms after our own independence.

And so do I think that they can compromise? I think there'll be a period of violence. I think that people are looking at very severe violence in Baghdad now that can be brought under control; and that the constitutional discussion they know has to be one of compromise, national reconciliation and sharing of resources.

If you look at their neighborhood, I think they have all come to the conclusion that an Iraq that is not united and independent will be one that will be dominated by unfriendly neighbors in a way that will be very bad for the Iraqi people.

And I believe they're determined to hold the country together, to stabilize the country, to compromise their way through it. But I think it'll be a violent period and one that will ultimately lead to stability.


BAYH:

So your opinion is that these unresolved political disputes are contributing in a material way to the ongoing...


ABIZAID:

Certainly. They do contribute. But I believe that this is part of the resolution process.


BAYH:

Well, perhaps I can ask both you and the secretary if he thinks it's appropriate. Maybe this is going on behind the scenes, but what is keeping them from getting on with this business of revisiting the constitutional disputes that basically were put off until after the last election?

That would be number one.

And number two -- Mr. Secretary, perhaps this is appropriate for you -- some other commentators have opined that perhaps something similar to what happened in Dayton to help resolve the Balkans conflict would be appropriate to try and bring this to some political closure so that we can deal with this and move on about that.


RUMSFELD:

Senator, it's a fair question -- what's keeping them. They've gone from an election in January of last year to the drafting of a constitution to a referendum on the constitution in October of last year to an election December 15th of last year, electing these people under the new constitution, to a relatively long period of some months -- longer than have with an election in early November and then finally getting our Cabinet put in place sometime in February or March here -- they're doing it for the first time.

And it's a permanent government, and the issues are tough.

And some of them were reasonably intractable. For example, we urged them to not put sectarian, unskillful ministers in Defense and Ministry of Interior. And the prime minister designate fought it and fought it and fought it, received a lot of pressure from people to put political people in there in a way that didn't have the confidence and might have been sectarian.

And he prevailed. He ended up getting people that he accepted as being nonsectarian and competent. Time will tell. But it showed a lot of courage, but it took time.

The issues you raised about the constitution were set aside. They kicked the can down the road just like we did. I mean, we still didn't have women voting or we still had slavery with our original constitution.



RUMSFELD:

So it's not as though -- cause those things come out perfectly formed in the first five minutes. It takes some time. And they're going to have to work on them.

The Dayton process idea, I don't know the answer. All I know is that Zal, our ambassador, Khalilzad, is, in fact, trying to serve, along with the British officials, a facilitating role in encouraging things to move faster because time hurts. People have been killed while that time is being taken. And there is no question about that.

But my impression is that our ambassador is doing a very skillful job, with the assistance of coalition countries, and General Casey is, trying to facilitate the different groups working out some darn tough issues.


BAYH:

It's understandable why they wouldn't get all these things resolved in the first effort and some were postponed, but if -- I think we all agree that this is fueling the insurgency.

I guess what we're looking for, Mr. Secretary, we have a greater sense of urgency and perhaps something of a higher-profile nature like a Dayton-like process would assist the ambassador with his efforts to really focus the minds of the participants, as well as the world, "Now look, we need to get this done, and the sooner the better, because some of the trend lines here, frankly, are not positive."


RUMSFELD:

Well, certainly the president and the secretary of state and the U.S. ambassador, chief of mission, who worry through those issues are aware of that possibility. And I'm sure they're considering it.


BAYH:

General, back to you for one moment.

You mentioned that -- and several others have mentioned that -- we can argue about the semantics and what constitutes a civil war, but that it is a real possibility if things don't go as we hope. If it does come to that, which side are we on?


ABIZAID:

I don't think it's a civil war because the institutions of the center are holding. And I believe that before we start talking about what we're going to do if there is civil war, that we do everything in our power to prevent it from moving that way.

I don't believe that Iraq will move toward civil war as long as we apply the necessary military, diplomatic and political actions necessary to bring the Baghdad situation under control in the short term.


PACE:

Senator, if I may, both General Abizaid and I have been asked if it was possible that this could lead to civil war. And the answer is, "Yes, it is possible."

Speaking for myself, I do not believe it is probable. And I do not believe it is probable for the exact same reason that General Abizaid just stipulated, which is that the government is holding, the army is holding solid and is loyal, when they had the Golden Mosque bombing, it was the Iraqi army that went into the streets and helped keep calm. So I don't expect this to dissolve into civil war.


BAYH:

Well, we all hope that's right, General. But if it takes a course that is not as optimistic as we would all like to see here, and it does come to civil -- the reason for my question is essentially, if it does come to that, then what is our role in the country?

Many people would say we would not have a -- that's why I asked you which side would be on? We'd be put in a very difficult situation where we wouldn't want to take sides, but the Iraqis themselves would have chosen up sides. And at that point, the mission would become much different.

Mr. Secretary, my last question, back to you again. On the Dayton ...


WARNER:

Just a minute, Senator, I think you have posed a question in your preliminary comments. Is it? Or do you wish to go to your last question?


BAYH:

My last question, assuming I...

(CROSSTALK)


BAYH:

I have a couple blue cards here; I hope I haven't...


WARNER:

No, but I want to make sure the panel had adequate opportunity to answer.


BAYH:

Well, let me pose it as a question, then.

If it does come to that, do we have a continuing mission in Iraq? If the Iraqis themselves have not been able to hold the center, and they have chosen up sides along sectarian lines, at that point, do we have a continuing mission in Iraq or not?


WARNER:

And that will be your last question? But let's get the panel.

It's directed to whom? All three or the...


RUMSFELD:

I'm reluctant to speculate about that. It could lead to a discussion that suggests that we presume that's going to happen. And both General Abizaid and General Pace have offered their comments on that.

Our role is to support the government. The government is holding together. The armed forces are holding together. And we are functioning in a very close relationship with that government in providing them assistance in achieving their goals.

We've seen what happens when governments pull apart, militaries pull apart. We saw it in Lebanon, and it's not a pretty picture.

And obviously, that would be a set of decisions that the president and the Congress and the country would address. But I think that beyond that, it would be not my place to be discussing it.


WARNER:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I think that disposes of the question, unless either of the other witnesses want to add any views.

If not, Senator Sessions?


SESSIONS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One discussion that we've had here, and had some votes -- I think the last vote we had was on a question of whether we should set a firm date for pulling out regardless of the situation in Iraq. It was voted down to 83 to 16 or something to that effect.



SESSIONS:

Senator Warner made the reference, General Abizaid, to the fact that the emotional reactions to the Lebanon situation could make the situation more difficult, perhaps, for our soldiers in Iraq. I'd like to ask a little bit different question.

It would be: What kind of reaction, what kind of impact would their be with regard to the Islamic extremists in the Middle East -- and you're a student of that region, you've spent time in that region as a young person, you speak Arabic and you've been with us conducting this Iraq war from the beginning -- what kind of impact would result if we were to precipitously withdraw?

Would mollify the extremists? Would it make them say, "Well, the United States is a nicer place and we don't have to be so aggressive now"? Or would they likely be emboldened and empowered and more aggressive?


ABIZAID:

Emboldened, empowered and more aggressive.


SESSIONS:

And, in your opinion, would a failure in Iraq embolden and empower these radical extremists?


ABIZAID:

Yes, it would.


SESSIONS:

And, in your opinion, would setting a fixed date, regardless of the situation, in Iraq for a withdrawal embolden or empower the extremist forces?


ABIZAID:

Embolden.


SESSIONS:

General Pace, this is a matter we've discussed. Fortunately, it's had very little support in the Senate. But there's a political election coming up, and people float this idea that we should just pull out.

You've heard General Abizaid's comments. He's been in the region for years and been leading this effort. Would you agree with his comments?


PACE:

Sir, I agree with each of General Abizaid's responses to each of your questions.


SESSIONS:

And as Senator Warner has said for some time, we have asked much of our nation. We have asked much of our soldiers. They have gone willingly with the most -- almost without any single objection, they've gone and served in harm's way to carry out a policy that this Senate and this Congress has voted for, the American people ratified with the re-election of President Bush. It was an issue in that election.

And don't you think we owe it to them to continue to work in every way possible to make the sacrifice of those who've gone before be successful, General Pace?



PACE:

Sir, I was in Afghanistan last Thursday and Friday. Our troops are so proud of what they are doing. We do owe them and their families the continued support of this nation and especially those who have sacrificed their lives that we might live free.


SESSIONS:

Well, I just hope that we put an end in this political season to any suggestion that we may just precipitously withdraw without regard to the circumstances there.


ABIZAID:

Senator Sessions?


SESSIONS:

General Abizaid?


ABIZAID:

Sir, what I'd like to say is the troops that serve in the region are not afraid of what's happening there. They would be afraid of what would happen if we just precipitously left there.


SESSIONS:

I have heard that repeatedly. On the anniversary of the Army, I was with the Army to celebrate that day recently, and this young guy told me, "Senator, we want to win. We want to be successful."

General Pace, you made reference to the re-enlistment rate. I'm told that our re-enlistment rates of National Guard units that deploy to Afghanistan or Iraq and return exceed that of units who haven't gone.

Do you think that bespeaks of the military's belief that they're doing something that's worthwhile and meaningful?


PACE:

Sir, I think it does. I think that our troops know what they're doing. They get it. They're proud of what they're doing.

And as General said, the main question they ask is, "Do the American people support what we're doing?" And when we point to the numerous ways in which the American people support it, including what this Congress does to provide resources, it reinforces with them the goodness of what they've dedicated their lives to do.


SESSIONS:

Well, we have people say, "Well, we're spending too much on this war." And then they come forward and say, "Well, you didn't spend enough. You didn't have enough equipment."

Let's talk about that a little bit, General Pace. I'm familiar with just one depot, Anniston Army Depot. I know that they're vigorously and aggressively hiring new people to reset the equipment.



SESSIONS:

I was also aware that we didn't have enough money, apparently, in this budget to meet high challenges that we were facing with the reset.

The Defense Department blessed the Army's concern in that. It was made known to the Congress. We just added another $13 billion in another amendment by Senator Dodd that would allow another $6 billion and allow another $6 billion to meet that challenge.

First, I will ask you -- let me just ask you: Do you think we are going to, with those funds, be able to meet that reset problem?


PACE:

Sir, the money that was just -- the $13.1 billion will meet the current Marine Corps and Navy -- I'm sorry -- Marine Corps and Army backlogs at the depots. It will allow for hiring of the additional shifts of skilled workers to get the job done.

And that is why I mentioned before that as best that Congress can provide a no-year funding stream that the depots can depend on so they can go out and hire workers who know they will have a job for the foreseeable future, we can start working off this backlog, sir.


SESSIONS:

I think you're exactly right. And I'm glad we've taken steps on that. And if we need to do more, I believe this Congress will meet your demand.

One more thing. With regard to readiness, I was in an Army Reserve unit, and they raised us whether we were ready or not in the '70s and '80s. And if you don't have all your vehicles, you're not rated ready. And when a unit comes off any major deployment, particularly coming off a combat deployment, isn't it inevitable -- I think you indicated -- that you will not be rated ready?



SESSIONS:

And one of the complicating factors for an effort like we're undergoing in Iraq, it seems to me, is units take their equipment with them, and it's cheaper and smarter to leave that equipment over there for the next unit that replaces them.

Therefore, when they get back, they may not have the full complement of equipment they need to be rated in your strict standards of readiness as ready.


PACE:

Sir, you're exactly right. And the reset money has been in the supplements. The money for the Reserve and Guard to build the 28 fully manned, trained, equipped brigades that the Army has stipulated they need is in the baseline budget to the tune of $21 billion over the next five years.


SESSIONS:

Well, General Pace, you've been at this quite a number of years.

Would you say that we are moving to have the best equipped, most ready military the world has ever seen at least this Army, in peacetime, before this war started?

And as we go forward, aren't we better equipped and moving to a way to have our Guard and Reserve have the kind of equipment they've never had before?


PACE:

Sir, we are today the best equipped, manned, trained, battle-hardened that we've ever been. And, with your continued support in the Congress, we'll be able to maintain the equipment and replace the combat equipment that's been lost.

It takes of upwards of 36 months from the time you lose a helicopter in combat till the time the replacement helicopter comes on line. That does not mean that people are not trying to do the right thing or that the system isn't working; it just takes that amount of time for that kind of equipment to be identified as lost, put into the budget process, funded, contracted and built.


SESSIONS:

Thank you very much.


RUMSFELD:

It argues, Senator Sessions, for the possibility of the Congress looking at the idea of a reset fund.

That is to say, if you want to shorten that period of time, the time it takes for the analysis as to what's been lost or degraded, the time the Congress takes to consider it and weigh it, the time it takes to place the orders and have the contract validated, and then the time it takes to produce it, which is, as General Pace said, it can be up to three years -- if you had a reset fund that the Congress approved and it was only for those purposes, the funds could then be drawn down in a much shorter period of time. Depots could plan their hiring earlier. And you would have the ability to shorten that.

And I don't know, I guess I haven't talked to the Office of Management and Budget about this, but inside the Department of Defense we've been talking that there has to be a way to shorten that time period.

And one of the ways would be for Congress to act more rapidly on budgets than happens each year. Another way would be for the Congress to approve a reset. And another way would be for us in the department to find a way to try to cut in half the period of time it takes to actually let a contract and go through that whole procedure.



RUMSFELD:

And if the three of us did those things, it's conceivable we could abbreviate that period and solve some of the problem General Pace is talking about.


SESSIONS:

General Pace, just briefly, the idea that was stated earlier about a number of our brigades not being ready, in your opinion, does that misrepresent the status of our capability at this time? Would it cause someone to have a higher degree of concern than is warranted?

I know we want to do better. We want every unit to be ready. But isn't it inevitable that as units transition off combat that there will be a period when they don't meet your high standards of readiness?


PACE:

Sir, there will be a period like that. Our readiness reporting system has been accurately reported to the Congress as is required every quarter. We've been talking about the need to repair equipment now for about the last year to 18 months.

So it's not wrong to say that we have equipment deficiencies and that we need to spend the money to do that. That's an accurate use of the data that's available.

But if you say to me, would I rather have 100 percent of the 2,000 up-armored Humvees that I thought I needed in 2001 or 50 of he 12,000 up-armored Humvees that I say I need today and which army is better, I would tell you that although my reporting system would tell you I'm now at 50 percent and therefore C-4, that the army I have built is three times better with regard to Humvees. And you can multiply that toward the hundreds of thousands of end items.

And that's why it's really a kaleidoscope. And to try to have a discussion that just lays out exactly precisely what the readiness rating are lends itself to misinterpretation and misunderstanding.


SESSIONS:

Well said.

Thank you.


WARNER:

Thank you, Senator.

Senator Collins?


COLLINS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


RUMSFELD:

Could I say...


WARNER:

Oh, yes...


RUMSFELD:

I'm sorry. I apologize.


WARNER:

No, that's all right. We...


RUMSFELD:

I think it is important that we be careful how we describe the capabilities and the readiness of the U.S. armed forces. We have multiple audiences and Iran listens and North Korea listens and other countries listen. And it's important to be precise, it's important to be accurate, and it's important to not leave an impression that might entice someone into doing something that would be a mistake on their part, because we have an enormously capable armed force.


WARNER:

Mr. Secretary, I associate myself with your remarks. You are absolutely right.

Unfortunately, some of the remarks have come from your department from very high-ranking officials in connection with this budget process. So we're trying to do our very best with that.

Senator Collins?


COLLINS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid, Senator Sessions has done an excellent job of pointing out the pitfalls of an abrupt withdrawal on a set timeline from Iraq.



COLLINS:

But I want to talk to you about my concerns about what our exit strategy does seem to be. It is premised on the ability of Iraqi troops to assume full responsibility for the security of their country.

Over and over again, we've heard the phrase that, as Iraqi forces stand up, our troops will stand down. We've heard that time and again.

Our troops are the best equipped, the best trained, the best led in the world. And I am enormously proud of them. And I have the utmost confidence in their ability to handle any mission.

Yet sectarian violence is worse than ever, in Baghdad, in particular. And I wonder about the validity of a strategy that says that less capable troops that are not as well equipped, trained, and led as the best trained in the world can handle the security of this country.

If the upswing in violence has occurred despite the presence of the best troops in the world, it doesn't give me a lot of confidence in our underlying strategy. And it suggests to me that what we need is a political rather than a military solution.


ABIZAID:

Thanks, Senator Collins. I believe you have to have a combination of political action and military action that moves toward a lessening of the sectarian tensions.

But I would try to make people that are listening to this understand that there's no better troops to deal with the sectarian problem than well-led Iraqi troops that are loyal to the government.



ABIZAID:

They don't want their nation to fall apart. They have a much better intrinsic view of what's happening. They have instincts about what goes on within their own culture that, as well trained and as well equipped as we might be, we don't have.

And so I would never sell the Iraqi armed forces short on their ability to make a difference. But the Iraqi armed forces must be well led by their military leaders. The military leaders must be well connected with the political leadership, and they must share a common vision of where Iraq is headed.

Again, I'm emphasize that Prime Minister Maliki and his current government's only three months old. I believe they very much share a vision of a unified Iraq where the armed forces will impose its will upon the people of Iraq and defeat the insurgency and the groups that are sponsoring sectarian violence, especially the terrorists.

I think that what General Casey has embarked upon, which is a very artful form of trying to gauge the capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces and at the same time bring down our forces so that the Iraqis will do more to defend their own turf, is one of the most difficult strategies that any wartime commander has ever had to execute. And I think he is doing it enormously well.

And there will come times in the campaign, such as the current period, where the sectarian violence is showing us a level of concern which means that we've got to take time to apply the military pressure necessary and that Zal Khalilzad will help apply the political pressure necessary to get it back on the right path.

Again, don't want to be mischaracterized by what I've said here today. I'm very confident that that can be done.


COLLINS:

The prime minister, one of his very first initiatives, was a new national security plan. I realize it's only been three months since he's been in office, but that plan does not seem to have been effective in quelling the upsurge in sectarian violence.



COLLINS:

Do you think that it's too soon to judge that plan, or has it failed?


ABIZAID:

Senator, it's a great question. I don't think that the plan has failed. I think what you're seeing is an adjustment to a plan that wasn't working with the speed that we had hoped.

And so General Casey and his commanders are adjusting the plan. And they are doing it in conjunction with the Iraqi commanders. And, of course, the enemy is attempting to really make the sectarian divide become the decisive point at a point in time where the Iraqi government hasn't quite gotten itself together yet.

And I'm very confident that, over time, you'll see the Iraqi forces, in conjunction with our forces, primarily with Iraqis at the lead, will bring the sectarian problems under control.

And you know, Senator, nothing in the Middle East moves in a straight line. Things get worse; they get better. The question is whether or not the trend line is a trend line that can lead to success.

And my belief is, so far, the answer is yes. And it will continue that way.


COLLINS:

Thank you.


WARNER:

Go ahead, Senator. Go ahead.


COLLINS:

Mr. Secretary, yesterday, I chaired a hearing at which the special inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction testified.

He described massive cost over-runs, schedule delays, half- completed projects for which the money had run out. It was not a pretty picture. It seems that everything in Iraq is costing more than was anticipated, by a considerable amount.



COLLINS:

And, as many of us have discussed, earlier this week the Senate added $13.1 billion in emergency spending to replace the worn-out equipment that we've discussed this morning. The chairman mentioned that we've spent some $437 billion, I believe, over the last three years. I think the current spending rates is $2 billion a week.

There has been an enormous cost to this war and an enormous impact on the federal budget.

Looking ahead to next year, what are your projections for the spending on the war?


RUMSFELD:

The Iraqi reconstruction is something that the Department of State works on and requests funds for. And you're quite right, there have been a number of inspector general reports about open investigations into fraud and corruption and the like. And there also are a number of projects that, because of security problems, have cost a great deal more than had been anticipated.

And, as we know, a number of them are instances where the insurgents have actually gone in and blown up something that had been halfway built. And we've seen that happen.

I don't have a number that I can give you. I know the Office of Management and Budget can. But...


COLLINS:

I'm not talking about the reconstruction projects which, I realize, are under the State Department largely, and USAID. I'm saying, for the Defense Department, as you look ahead to the next year -- as you know, many of us believe that the spending for the war needs to be part of the regular budget and not just dealt with in emergency supplementals.

So I'm asking you to look ahead because we, as a Congress, need to budget more accurately for the cost of the war. And we can only do that based on your projections.


RUMSFELD:

I understand.

We do not know yet what we will get for this year's budget. And we do not know what the supplemental will be.

We do know that we're in the process of preparing the budget for next fiscal year, and that that will be presented by the president in February.

But I can try to get back to you for the record to give you something that the Comptroller's Office in the Pentagon would take out as a discrete piece for the Department of Defense's portion, if that would be helpful.


COLLINS:

That would be. I'm just trying to get a sense, Mr. Chairman, of whether we can expect indefinitely approximately $2 billion a week from our budget to be spent on this war.


WARNER:

Well, Senator, that's a question that's constantly in the minds of the American people. And it's an important one. And, as you well point out, the success of our ability to bring about a democracy in this country requires a certain amount of infrastructure rebuilding. And that has to be done at a constant level and make some progress.

But, as the secretary said, we take two steps forward and all of a sudden we look around and have to take a step backward because of the internal disruption.

I'd like to...


COLLINS:

Thank you.


WARNER:

Thank you, Senator.

I'd like to, before calling on Senator Talent and then the senator from Rhode Island has an opportunity to speak, but our panel of witnesses must appear before the whole Senate at 2:00 o'clock sharp. And, consequently, within the period of roughly 1:00 o'clock and 2:00 o'clock, they have other obligations to perform.



WARNER:

So it is my hope to conclude this session here in a matter of 10 minutes or so.

Senator Talent, your time is now recognized.


TALENT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all three of you for your service. I was going to say...


PACE:

He'll be right back, sir.


TALENT:

In absentia, General Abizaid, in particular, for being in that crucible...


WARNER:

He go a telephone call and...


TALENT:

I understand entirely. And I'll direct my questions at the secretary anyway.

Mr. Secretary, I agree with an awful lot of what you said in your opening statement. And I think it's important to remind people about what this is about.

I agree this is an existential struggle, and that's how they view it -- a struggle for existence. I agree that there are no conceivable accommodation with them that would cause them to stop attacking us. We do not have the choice of them not attacking us. They're going to attack us. We, therefore, have to fight the war.

I also agree that the war in Iraq, the mission in Iraq was a good strategic option and maybe the only strategic option. I've always said that mission was to remove Saddam, who was an organic threat, and replace him with a multiethnic democracy that would be an ally in the war on terror. I also believe that we are making progress toward that end.

And, you know, if we're talking about whether the circumstances are such that we can withdraw, we're talking about whether the mission's been completed.

I mean, I think we need to understand that as long as the terrorists are prepared to concentrate to the extent they are in Iraq, we can't guarantee that it's going to be a pacified country. But we're getting closer to the point where the Iraqi government can sustain itself with less American help.

And so I do think there's been progress, and I'm pleased about all that.

What I want to ask you about, Mr. Secretary, is this: Given that we are involved in this war and in this existential struggle, how can we be in a situation where we are allowing the budgets that you think you need to be reduced by the Office of Management and Budget year after year?

And I refer to the budget reduction in the fall of '04 -- $30 billion over the FYDP; in the fall of '05, $32 billion over the FYDP; April of this year, indications there'll be another 2 percent cut.

I'm concerned that we may see a cut in the fall of this year. And these cuts are coming from the Office of Management and Budget.



TALENT:

Now, we're in an existential struggle. I just don't think -- you've referred appropriately, I think, that we have to be concerned about the message we're sending. And I'm concerned that these budget cuts, coming from people who are not warfighters, are sending the message that we're weakening, that we're not prepared to bear the cost of this.

Before you answer, I'll just make one other point, with reference to something Senator Collins said.

Yes, this is a difficult struggle. We've spent over $400 billion in three years. Our gross domestic product in that period of time has been $36 trillion. So we're spending about -- what -- 1.2 percent of our gross domestic product on this?

Given the importance of this struggle to the country, we're fighting, it seems to me, at a cost that this economy can afford. We are so strong. And I think sometimes that we forget that.

So if you would address that, I'd appreciate it. This is what is frustrating me. We need to give you what you think you need, not what the bean counters at OMB think you need.


RUMSFELD:

Senator, you're experienced, you know how this town works. And let me say that I agree with you that the United States of America spending 3.8 percent of gross domestic product on our entire national security is a relatively small percentage of the GDP.

When I came to Washington in the Kennedy and Eisenhower era, we were spending 10 percent of GDP. Thirty years ago, when I was secretary of defense for President Ford, we were spending, I think, 5 percent of GDP. Today we're down to 3.8 percent of GDP.

This country can afford to spend what is necessary.

You've mentioned the Office of Management and Budget. Let me talk about the Congress for a minute. This year, if you take the House and the Senate, the authorization and the appropriation committees, and drop a plumb line through all of it, we're looking at somewhere between $15 billion to $20 billion that we will not have to spend on the things we need to spend it on.

If you look at the time it takes to pass an authorization, to pass an appropriation, the delays that are incurred, and the gyrations that the services have to go through to try to cash drawer what they're doing, take money from this and spend it on that, the inefficiencies, the inability to plan ahead, the inability to get the depots to hire the people they need in advance because we don't have this depot -- correction: the reset fund that I mentioned might be a way to help solve this problem.

It's a combination of cuts. I guess the Senate Appropriations Committee wanted to cut something like $9 billion this year. Then, it's the member adds, all the things that have been added on top that we, without money, simply things that we need to spend on that we don't want.

Then a series of things that we have offered to not do -- a second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, a 12th carrier that we don't believe we need because it cost too much to repair it -- and we're being forced to do those things.



RUMSFELD:

And then we came in and said we can save money doing a series of things with respect to health care and a variety of things that we were told you may not do that. The combination of all of that is big dollars. And it hurts.


TALENT:

And, Mr. Secretary, you are looking here at two committee members who offered and got passed an amendment raising the top line for the Defense. And that was reallocated away.

So I could not agree with you more about it. I just think -- all of who understand, who have sat on these committees or been in your chair or the chair of the generals there and know what we need have to find a way to insist on getting what we need.

And I would encourage you very, very strongly because you mentioned the Congress. And I'm not trying to -- I'm just saying it's harder for those of us here who understand this to hold this if we're getting cuts from the administration that the economic and the budget people are recommending.

I mean, I don't think there is any way we can lose this war unless "we" lose it. And I think you're saying the same thing in general terms. And I agree with you completely. Let's just agree not to let this happen. And I certainly will do my part. The chairman certainly has done his part. And I know Senator Reed has, as well.

So I wanted to make that point.

Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, too. And I know we have time constraints.


WARNER:

Thank you very much.

Senator Reed, I had indicated that you would have opportunity for a follow-up question.


REED:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Pace, you are familiar with the current readiness reporting of the Army and Marine Corps, but particularly the Army?


PACE:

Yes, sir, I am.


REED:

Would you dispute the conclusion of former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry that two-thirds of the Army's operating force, active and reserve, is now reporting as unready?

And the conclusion of General Schoomaker in response to this question from Mr. Skelton, "Are you comfortable with the readiness level for the non-deployed units that are in the continental United States?" -- General Schoomaker's reply: No, he's not comfortable.


PACE:

I think that the readiness reporting system, as it is constructed has been accurately described, that the number of brigades in the United States Army whose equipment requirements have changed dramatically over the last five years are being accurately described.

I absolutely agree with General Schoomaker in his comments about additional funding needed to buy back combat losses, to buy back the reset.



PACE:

All those things are absolutely accurate, Senator. All I want to make sure we understand is that the system itself is reporting pure math. But, as one example again, the pure math is based on, in 2001, needing 2,000 up-armored Humvees, in 2006 needing 12,000; and, therefore, the capacity of the Army to wage war is significantly greater than it was, even though the reporting system properly utilized is highlighting places where we need to put more money.


TALENT:

Well, General, I can recall when General Abizaid and I were lieutenants together in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment -- I'll just speak for myself -- we took this reporting system very seriously because we understood, and I think you do, that soldiers and Marines, as good as they are, need equipment to fight.

And we presumed that the leadership -- both uniformed and civilian -- of the Department of Defense took those reports seriously also, and that they would not require us to report on equipment which were really tangential to the needs of the unit.

In fact, we all recalled where individuals were relieved because they could not maintain adequate levels of readiness under the current reporting system at the battalion level, but it does not appear that takes the place at the national level, because you have a readiness crisis.



REED:

We've tried to address it with $13 billion last Tuesday, noting that this document was submitted Wednesday, a day late, and $13 billion short...


WARNER:

Let the record show the document that you're referring to is the one that I introduced, the OMB (inaudible).


REED:

So I think the signal that you're sending to those lieutenants, sergeants, captains is that, you know, this reporting system is either illogical and nonsensical or it's being disregarded at the highest levels, because it was not the Department of Defense that was asking for this money to the president -- forget OMB, to the president. Turned out that, I think, within the Army there was such concern about their troops that they went around you all and approached the Congress.

I think that's a sad commentary on the leadership of Department of Defense. And this might not be a question, but a comment, but I am particularly incensed with some of the suggestions that this is all just kind of some subjective evaluation we do, and the readiness reporting has no real impact in the world. And also the suggestion that if we talk about readiness, particularly when it's in a crisis like this, we're somehow giving unfair advantage to our adversaries.

But I recall in 2000, when then Governor Bush stood up and said: The president of the United States, if he called on his Department of Defense, they'd have to report two divisions not ready for duty, based upon the reporting system.

 

How many divisions will we have to report that way to that question today based on the reporting system, General Pace?


PACE:

First of all, sir, we're not doing divisions anymore, we're doing brigades, as you have already pointed out.


REED:

I know that.


PACE:

About two thirds of the brigades, as you have pointed out, would report C-3 or C-4.


REED:

Not ready for duty.


PACE:

I will stand by my comments first and foremost.


REED:

Thank you, General.


PACE:

Sir, may I finish?


REED:

Yes, sir.


PACE:

Thank you.


WARNER:

Thank you very much.


PACE:

We do take, with great integrity and responsibility, the Readiness Reporting System. That is exactly why, for every quarter as required, we report to the Congress the exact accurate reporting for readiness.

I am saying that we do need more money. I am not disputing that at all, sir. We do need more money for all the reasons I have articulated.

All I was trying to point out, Senator, is that the way that the system functions, the time it takes to build a new helicopter, for example, the fact that in combat we are learning and, as a result of learning, we have changed our requirements -- we currently have 40,000 armored vehicles in Iraq that didn't even exist five years ago.

Sir, all I'm saying is that we are providing for our soldiers and Marines on the ground the finest equipment ever fielded. We are using it up at rates faster than we budgeted for.

And, therefore, to use the readiness system to identify, as you have, the requirement for more funding is absolutely correct. I'm just trying to make sure that everybody listening to this conversation understands how you can go from 2001 with 2,000 vehicles, 2006 with 12,000 vehicles, and not have all 12,000 vehicles and still feel better about our Army's capacity to get the job done.


WARNER:

Thank you very much, General.


PACE:

Thank you.


WARNER:

May I say to my colleague from Rhode Island, General Schoomaker is visiting with me on this issue this afternoon at 4.



WARNER:

I would be pleased to have you join us. I've invited Senator Levin. He's likewise going to join us. And it may well be that he will wish to put his comments in the record of these proceedings today a section relating to your questions.


REED:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


WARNER:

Thank you very much.

One last question, and then we will conclude this, I think, an excellent hearing.

Last week, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair agreed to seek a U.N. resolution calling for the creation of a multinational force to help the Lebanese government extend control in southern Lebanon.

I strongly support those initiatives by our president. And given that that country, Lebanon, is in your area of operations, and given your long experience, first I'd like to have your assessment of: What is the capability of the Lebanese Army today, and what training and equipment would they require for the mission of their government to go out and begin to maintain control, give the assumption that there will be a multinational force eventually put together?

So if you could include your assessment of the size and the capability of such force that would be needed to fulfill the commitments that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made to our respective nations and the world.


ABIZAID:

Senator, certainly I don't want to let any of my comments get in the way of the diplomacy that's going on right now. It's very important that the diplomats do their work.

The Lebanese armed forces is a professional armed force. It has one of the most educated officer corps in the Middle East. It is a small force for Middle Eastern standards, about 50,000 or so. And it needs significant upgrade of equipment and training capability that I believe the Western nations, in particular the United States, can assist with.

We recently, before the current difficulties started, visited the Lebanese armed forces, did an assessment of where they happen to be in readiness. We saw that they needed some significant spare parts. I think we've made our desires known through the department as to how we could help them immediately.



ABIZAID:

I think there will be need for other assistance to the Lebanese armed forces because it'll never work for Lebanon if, over time, Hezbollah has a greater military capacity than the Lebanese armed forces.

The Lebanese armed forces must extend the sovereignty of the nation throughout the country. I believe that they can do in assistance with the international community and with a robust peacekeeping force for peace-enforcement force, depending upon what the diplomats decide is the right equation.

I would say that I served with UNIFIL back in the mid-'80s, and it was not capable of really enforcing peace and security in the region.

So whatever force goes in has to have robust rules of engagement.


WARNER:

Robust rules?


ABIZAID:

Robust rules of engagement, very clear and unambiguous mandate, and clear cooperation from the Lebanese government and any other parties.


WARNER:

Could you further define your professional definition of "robust rules of engagement"? That was the second part of my question.


ABIZAID:

"Robust rules of engagement" means that the commander has the ability to effect the mandate that's been given to him by the international community to include the use of all available means at his forces' disposal.

And I think, in the case of southern Lebanon, it'll have to have capabilities that are just not minor, small arms, but would include all arms.


WARNER:

Thank you.

My distinguished colleague from Minnesota indicated the hopes to have a second round. We have had some. But the intervention of two votes precludes a further second round of questions by members. But I invite you to provide for the record your question. It will be open until tomorrow close of business.

And I'd like to say in conclusion, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, General Abizaid, this has been a very thorough and constructive hearing. And I thank each of you for your participation and forthrightness in the responses.

The hearing is now recessed.

 




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