Military

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on the posture of our command, including an assessment of security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Dramatic events of the past year in Southwest Asia, for which Pacific Command has been a primary force provider, have not eclipsed the importance of Asia-Pacific threats to global security.

First and foremost, we remain keenly focused on the Korean peninsula, where although I believe the likelihood of war is low, the stakes would be very high if war occurred - and even higher if North Korea continues to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. Our role at Pacific Command has been to ensure diplomacy is backed by viable military capabilities. We continue to do so.

Next, we are actively working to prevent miscalculation resulting in conflict between India and Pakistan or in the Taiwan Strait. Recent dialogue between India and Pakistan and the resulting relaxation in tensions are very positive signs. Our modest but constructive military-to-military relationship with China features high level exchanges like Defense Minister Cao’s visit to Washington and Hawaii last year, and events that demonstrate the high quality of our forces, such as the recent port call of USS BLUE RIDGE in Shanghai. Meanwhile, Taiwan clearly remains the largest source of friction in our relationship with China. We remain prepared and committed to meet our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Transnational threats are a continuing concern in the Pacific region. Despite recent and notable successes in the War on Terrorism, we remain deeply concerned about transnational terror organizations including Al Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah, and by more localized groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines. We also sense increasing synergy between transnational threats like terrorism, illicit drugs, trafficking in humans, piracy, and especially the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. We have a number of creative initiatives ongoing to address these transnational concerns.

It is against this backdrop of security challenges and opportunities that we reach my final primary concern – transformation. Responding to the new threat context, recent strategic guidance directs the global transformation effort. Our initiatives at Pacific Command reflect that guidance and support the global effort, starting with updated plans and extending to resulting improvements in command and control, immediately available capabilities, and force posture. We are coordinating with our friends and allies in the region to effect enduring improvements while strengthening our ability to respond to emerging threats.

Our relationships in the region, including five treaty allies and numerous friendships, are as strong as ever. I am gratified to report nations within our region are making smart and generous contributions to regional and global security, including support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Since 9/11, the region has demonstrated a heightened awareness of our interdependent vulnerabilities and the resulting necessity of cooperation for security. This mutually supportive environment facilitates both our forward presence in theater and the security programs necessary to promote a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

This security context is reflected in our five top priorities at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The following update on our defense posture is organized within those five priorities.

SUSTAINING AND SUPPORTING THE WAR ON TERRORISM (WOT)

Sustaining and supporting the war on terrorism is our highest priority at USPACOM. In addition to addressing terror threats in the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR), we are also a primary force provider to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

Nations of the region continue excellent cooperation against terror threats. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have detained and arrested over 200 members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror group. Thailand has both publicly articulated its terrorism concerns and taken aggressive steps to eliminate them. And despite significant domestic complications, Indonesia, too, has been particularly effective in the arrest and prosecution of 34 JI members who committed the October 2002 bombing in Bali, 27 of whom have now been sentenced for their crimes.

But regional and local terrorist groups with ties to the al-Qaida network continue to pose dangerous threats to U.S. and our friends, especially in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is a crucial front in the War on Terror. The destabilization of the governments of this region – moderate, secular, legitimately elected, with large Muslim populations – would sentence the region to decades of danger and chaos.

The Jemaah Islamiyah, or “JI” – an al-Qaida network affiliate - directly targets the region for instability, through terrorism, supporting its ultimate goal of a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia. The JI followed up its October 2002 bombing in Bali with a deadly attack on the JW Marriott hotel in the heart of the Indonesian capital just last August.

Several of the JI’s key leaders are now in custody, including spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir and interim leader Abu Rusdan, who was recently convicted for his role in the Bali bombing. Most notable was the 2003 capture by Thai officials of terrorist Hambali, the JI’s operational head and direct link to Al Qaida.

But the JI is resilient and pervasive. Other key leaders remain at large, and new terrorist generations are being trained. And we are learning more about the degree of JI involvement in terrorist operations in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines.

The Philippines is a strong partner both globally and regionally in the War on Terrorism. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recently identified the JI as her government’s top terrorism priority.

Of course the Philippines is coping with other terror threats as well, including the New People’s Army and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Primarily a hostage-for-ransom enterprise, the ASG was responsible for the death of a U.S. Special Operations soldier in 2002, conducted several bombings in 2003, and most recently claimed responsibility for the bombing of an interisland ferry in late February. The Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) have improved their effectiveness against the ASG, highlighted by December’s arrest of terrorist Galib Andang, aka “Commander Robot”, on Jolo Island.

We are concerned about Jemaah Islamiyah influence in the activities of some of these indigenous terror groups, including sponsorship of bombings in Davao City last spring that left 38 people dead. We continue Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines to provide training, advice, and assistance to the AFP to improve their capability and capacity to deal with terror threats.

Philosophically, our approach to the terror threat has both near-term and long-term components. In the near term, we have to stop immediate threats against our citizens, our friends, property, and vital infrastructure – in short, we have to stop the violence. So this near-term effort includes defeating actual attacks, disrupting the enemy’s plans, and proactive defensive measures. Clearly, we don’t see military action as the sole or even primary instrument of national power in this fight - intelligence sharing and law enforcement lead much of this effort.

These near-term efforts are an essential but incomplete solution, because the war on terrorism, like the fight against other transnational threats, cannot be won by attrition alone. Terrorists can multiply faster than they can be captured or killed.

So our long-term effort is focused on strengthening the region’s democratic institutions that provide security at the economic, social, and physical (i.e., education, law enforcement, basic services) levels. Many of our efforts, including the Theater Security Cooperation Program (discussed below) directly support this long-term goal. We believe we’ll reach a tipping point in the War on Terrorism when sound governance prevails, and citizens value their institutions more than they fear the terrorists.

Meanwhile, near term efforts include both proactive defenses and direct efforts to go on the offensive, if necessary, to capture or kill terrorists in the Pacific theater.

Homeland Defense And Civil Support. The USPACOM Homeland Defense AOR includes the State of Hawaii, the territories of Guam and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, referred to as Compact States; and the following possessions: Wake Island, Midway Islands, Johnston Island, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, Kingman Reef, and associated territorial waters. We are leveraging our Theater Security Cooperation Program to build support and capabilities throughout the USPACOM AOR to support overarching HLD efforts. We are coordinating with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to ensure the same seamless strategy for defense in depth of the U.S. mainland.

Our Strategic Concept Plan for HLD is in the final stages of coordination, but many aspects of the plan are already operational. All USPACOM service components contribute to the mission. Programs such as the Joint Rear Area Coordinators, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Homeland Air Security, Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield explosives (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations are just a few of the activities coordinated under the HLD Plan. We appreciate your continued support to ensure we have the resources necessary to continue these essential missions.

USPACOM’s Biological Warfare Countermeasures Initiative (BWCI) was established last year, leading DoD efforts to incorporate BW mitigating measures into deliberate plans, coalition needs, and domestic interagency efforts. We are partnered with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Department of Homeland Security in this initiative.

Civil Support (CS) is another key part of the overall Homeland Security effort. CS operations enhance our existing Domestic Support Operations to civil authorities. We have well-established relationships and mutual cooperation plans with these authorities and provide support as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Our HLD plan addresses the full spectrum of CS responses from terrorist acts to natural disasters like recent typhoons in Guam. I support a standardized security clearance system that facilitates the immediate sharing of appropriate time-sensitive intelligence with local law enforcement and civil authorities.

Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) in Guam, Hawaii, Japan, and Korea (and Joint Task Force – Alaska) provide the command and control construct to synchronize our DoD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) efforts for military installations and property with federal, state, and local agencies and with host nations in the cases of Japan and Korea. Once again, we are coordinating our efforts and procedures with USNORTHCOM.

USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program for our DoD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas throughout the AOR. We use assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to ensure our facilities have updated assessments and proactive AT/FP plans. We also work closely with the State Department to ensure host-nation support is adequate to help protect our deployed forces using the latest AT/FP procedures.

Theater and country specific Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and updated as necessary. Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate terrorist planning. PACOM also employs a travel restriction program, providing a tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof "off-limits" to DoD members as necessary. In addition, Force Protection plans are required for all travel in our AOR, from major unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource commitment for increased FPCONs, however, presents a formidable challenge, both in terms of manpower and essential technologies. Your continued support to PACOM’s Force Protection objectives is necessary to sustain the progress we are making in this area.

Our Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program assesses infrastructure upon which PACOM depends for missions ranging from offensive combat operations to Homeland Defense. This broad-based program includes personnel, health operations, financial services, logistics, transportation, space, defense information, C3, intelligence, and public works sectors. We recently published the first CIP Appendix to one of our primary theater Operational Plans and fielded a CIP database that identifies relationships between mission-critical supporting assets, associated vulnerabilities and protection requirements. Another building block is the development of our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, which describes how we fundamentally conduct CIP throughout the AOR. Additionally, our bilateral CIP activities with friends and allies in the region have laid the groundwork to protect infrastructure outside the U.S. upon which we depend to fulfill our regional security obligations.

The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF) provides commanders additional resources to defend against emergent terrorist threats. PACOM has received $9 Million in CbT RIF funds in FY04 and hopes to receive additional funds after completion of the second round of CbT RIF. The first submission of FY04 CbT RIF included 58 new and 20 revalidated projects from FY03 totaling $26 million. Our FY04 requests include a barrier wall for the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, hydraulic gates for the PACOM headquarters, a Mobile Observation Post for Yokota airbase, and closed circuit TV and intrusion detection systems in Japan, Korea, and Camp Pendleton. Thank you for supporting this fund.

Coordination with law enforcement. We have established a model for theater counter-intelligence (CI) operations by fusing DoD, law enforcement, and other government agency information, and incorporating allied contributions. DoD intelligence analysts embedded in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) - Hawaii markedly enhance our ability to identify threats and gain insights into terrorist organization planning and operations. JTTF members participate in USPACOM planning for counter-terrorist operations in the region while simultaneously supporting HLD efforts. The Patriot Act, which facilitates such interagency coordination, has enhanced our ability to share information on terrorist threats.

Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT) is the PACOM staff entity responsible for coordinating DoD and other government agency CT activities within the USPACOM AOR. Last year, the JIACG combined intelligence, operations, and training goals with interagency representation to produce our first theater CT Campaign Plan. This plan, aligned with Department of State goals embedded in embassy Mission Performance Plans, focuses on both near-term and long-term WOT efforts. These efforts include CT resource creation, terrorist identification and destruction, and the long-term effort to strengthen democratic institutions of governance. As the lead staff element in USPACOM’s fight against transnational threats, the mission of JIACG-CT is being broadened to include coordination of our counter-drug and counter-proliferation efforts.

The Joint Interagency Task Force – West (JIATF-W) has long been USPACOM’s premier operational counter-drug entity. Formerly based in California, JIATF-W is relocating to Hawaii to better confront the narcotic threat in the western Pacific. Its experience, assets, and interagency relationships will also be relevant against related transnational threats like narco-terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and especially weapons proliferation. JIATF-W’s interagency approach facilitates contributions of law enforcement, host nations and special operations forces.

Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). The ungoverned littoral regions of Southeast Asia are fertile ground for exploitation by transnational threats like proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in humans or drugs, and piracy. The President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and State Department’s Malacca Strait Initiative are designed to improve international cooperation against these threats.

RMSI is USPACOM’s effort to operationalize these initiatives. Fundamentally, we need to gain an awareness of the maritime domain to match the picture we have of our international airspace. Working first with other navies of the region, our approach is to assess and then provide detailed plans to build and synchronize interagency and international capacity to fight threats that use the maritime space to facilitate their illicit activity. And of course there are other government agencies that play a key role here, too. We have found this concept well received by our friends and allies in the region.

This is a large undertaking that requires us to harness available and emerging technologies to develop that maritime situational awareness. It also requires responsive decision making architectures and the right kinds of immediately available, expeditionary forces to take action when the decision has been made to do so.

Our long-term effort in the War on Terrorism focuses on strengthening democratic institutions to enhance governance and address the underlying problems that give rise to terrorist movements in the first place. This element includes civil-military education programs and especially our Theater Security Cooperation Program.

Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship (RDCTF) funds are a valuable tool in our efforts to combat terrorism in the Pacific. Through this flexible and responsive program, we’ve trained over 130 students from seven partner nations (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) and are building a community of counter-terrorism experts and practitioners who share a common perspective on the proper response to terror threats.

International Military Education And Training (IMET) exposes future leaders to U.S. values, including commitment to the rule of law, the role of a professional military in a democratic society, and overall military professionalism. Grant funding has removed financial barriers to U.S. military education and training for friends and allies located in regions subject to untoward influences, and has contributed to the readiness of troops providing post-hostility engineering and peacekeeping support in Afghanistan and Iraq. Combined with training offered through the Foreign Military Sales process, IMET promotes U.S. military education and training as the recognized standard worldwide. Consequently, demand has surpassed supply as it relates to school capacity. Innovation has addressed this issue in the near-term but real capacity increases are necessary to build upon our success. I appreciate your support of this valuable program.

Our Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) is the vehicle through which we extend U.S. influence, develop access, and promote competence among potential coalition partners. These activities directly support the War on Terror and enhance readiness for contingency actions against emerging threats. We also coordinate the TSCP with the country teams in our embassies to ensure our efforts complement their Mission Performance Plans. TSC activities clearly help strengthen institutions of governance, directly contributing to our long-term counter-terrorism effort.

IMPROVING READINESS AND JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY OF PACIFIC COMMAND FORCES

Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of USPACOM forces is critical to assuring our friends and allies, dissuading military competition, deterring threats against U.S. interests, and defeating an adversary if deterrence fails. This priority includes providing the spare parts, operating dollars, and training needed to maintain ready forces. It also means innovating, transforming, and improving those capabilities and technologies needed to keep our forces ready for a wide range of alternative futures.

Past investments in readiness paid off in 2003. Approximately 51,000 PACOM active duty personnel have or are scheduled to deploy in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Pacific Fleet units deploying to OEF and OIF last year included the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CARL VINSON, CONSTELLATION, NIMITZ, and KITTY HAWK Carrier Strike Groups; independently deploying submarines; maritime patrol aircraft; Naval Mobile Construction and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units, and a significant portion of our reserve force including Harbor Defense, Coastal Warfare, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare, and Inshore Boat Units. The TARAWA and ESSEX Amphibious Ready Groups deployed with the 15th and 31st Marine Expeditionary Units embarked. The seven-ship Amphibious Task Force West, built around amphibious assault ships BOXER and BONHOMME RICHARD deployed with the First Marine Division, and the year closed out with the initial deployment of Expeditionary Strike Group ONE with flagship USS PELELIU and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) embarked.

About 2,000 Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) personnel already have deployed to Southwest Asia supporting Aerospace Expeditionary Forces for OEF and OIF. Our Army Forces in the Pacific - active, reserve and guard - are also making important contributions in the USCENTCOM AOR. An airborne task force from Alaska and an aviation maintenance unit from the Hawaii Army National Guard have been in Afghanistan for the past six months.

More USARPAC contributions are in progress. The 25th Infantry Division (25th ID) Headquarters and one Brigade Combat Team (BCT) are deploying to Afghanistan now, and another 25th ID BCT is currently serving in Northern Iraq. CH-47 aircraft of the Hawaii Army National Guard and the 411th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve) are also en route Iraq. The 1st Brigade of the 25th ID at Fort Lewis, Washington, now a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, will deploy to Iraq later this year, replacing the 3d Brigade of the 2d Infantry Division, also stationed at Fort Lewis. At the peak, approximately 16,500 USARPAC forces will be assigned to CENTCOM.

In light of our impressive combat performance in Southwest Asia, it would be easy to conclude that our current programs are more than adequate to meet every conceivable threat. But even as we incorporate the lessons learned from those conflicts, and with great appreciation for the exceptional quality of our people and equipment, we also recognize that many of USPACOM’s most demanding current and future warfighting challenges were simply not stressed in Southwest Asia. These missions include missile defense, undersea warfare, and air superiority.

Missile Defense. Cruise- and ballistic missile threats are rapidly increasing in the USPACOM AOR. Our ability to defend against them is fundamental to homeland defense, regional peace and stability, and to successful execution of our contingency plans. We need an integrated, tiered missile defense system.

Our Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Command and Control elements, and interceptor assets will be ready to support Missile Defense Initial Defensive Operations on or before 1 October. We still need to increase the numbers of PATRIOT GEM and PAC-3 missiles ashore and develop a sea-based terminal missile defense capability. Sea-based systems reduce our overall footprint ashore while providing flexible, more secure options. I applaud your efforts to date supporting development and fielding of our missile defense systems.

Undersea Superiority. USPACOM faces the greatest undersea warfare challenge in the world. 250 submarines call the Pacific home - but only 30 percent of these submarines belong to allied nations. A robust and integrated Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) architecture, more capable force structure and a committed investment in future technologies are essential to counter the growing submarine threat.

Submarines remain the premier ASW asset. Our new VIRGINIA class boats will meet our ASW needs well into the future, particularly in the challenging littoral environment. Congressional efforts last year also provided funding to refuel two additional 688 Class submarines. To ensure sufficient submarines are available to counter future threats and defeat anti-access strategies, we must seriously consider funding the remaining refuelings of 688 Class submarines and sustain an adequate VIRGINIA class submarine build rate.

Maritime Patrol Aircraft provide quick responding long range ASW and high demand ISR capabilities. The P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft sustainment program and follow on Multi-Mission Aircraft are critical to respond to emergent submarine threats. I also strongly support the acquisition of Automatic Periscope Detection technology for both surface ships and Maritime Patrol Aircraft employed in littoral regions.

Air Superiority. The F/A-22 Raptor will deliver quantum air power improvements with great relevance in the Pacific theater. Combining stealth, high speed, and precision weaponry, Raptor will buy back battlespace and increase warfighting options for the joint force commander. We need your support to fund and field this aircraft.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The WOT and traditional military threats demand ever-increasing agility and innovation in intelligence. SIGINT remains critical to our requirements for timely threat information. Access to signals is challenging and requires a concentrated effort to expand collections capacity and increase technical capabilities to ensure we can adapt to changes in adversary Command and Control (C2) systems and processes.

The National Security Agency (NSA) and Service SIGINT capabilities are crucial to our counter-terrorism efforts. The ability to integrate both National and Tactical SIGINT is key to daily operations and the execution of deliberate and contingency plans. However, rapid advances in telecommunications technologies, and their use by our adversaries, are outpacing intelligence-gathering capabilities.

I strongly support the NSA’s transformation efforts to meet the challenges of the digital technology revolution. They must have the resources necessary to remain technically strong and provide capabilities to meet our requirements. NSA’s capabilities against modernized militaries and transnational entities such as terrorists and weapon proliferators remain key to PACOM objectives.

Regarding tactical systems, I continue to advocate the accelerated development and fielding of joint, interoperable, modular, rapidly reconfigurable land, sea, and air SIGINT platforms. These improvements should be integrated into collaborative intelligence processing systems to make the best use of the increased data gathered.

Without concurrent improvements in NSA’s capabilities and in Service tactical cryptologic systems, it will be increasingly difficult to predict, find and target the most serious threats to U.S. national security interests.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Improving our HUMINT collection capability against key PACOM challenges, especially as it relates to hard and deeply buried C2, WMD facilities, proliferation, and terrorist activities is critical. Sustained resources for both CIA and DOD (Defense HUMINT Services) will yield the progress we need. Our military commanders must have insight into the plans and intentions of our potential adversaries - something that HUMINT is uniquely capable of providing.

Cryptologic Linguists. To be successful in counterterrorism we require linguists with a high degree of proficiency in many different languages and dialects. The minimum requirement is for 3/3 language capability; many targets require 4/4 (native) speakers. Maintaining a permanent cadre of cryptologic linguists with that degree of proficiency across a wide range of low-density languages and dialects is prohibitively expensive. So in addition to expanding training and recruiting initiatives, we must ensure the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Automated Language Finder database tracks those personnel who are native speakers or who have acquired the requisite skills, and that the Defense Language Institute can test for those language skills.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). The requirement for electro-optical, radar and infrared imagery remains crucial. IMINT converted into geospatial data and integrated with other source material is critical to the commanders in the field and provides much-needed context to decision makers.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The broad expanse of the USPACOM AOR and lack of access into denied areas make surveillance a significant challenge. We need a dynamic mix of national and airborne assets capable of maintaining access for IMINT and SIGINT coverage over target areas for extended periods. Persistent ISR assets greatly enhance our ability to perform counter-proliferation and counter-narcotics missions, combat piracy, and combat terrorism. Scientific and technical advancements like multispectral imaging aboard high altitude, high endurance assets such as the U-2 and Global Hawk UAV are ideally suited to support our requirements. Early fielding of Global Hawk in the USPACOM AOR is essential.

Tactical level systems like the Predator UAV are also of great value in this theater. However, limited airframes, sensors, and dissemination systems prevent us from taking full advantage of these capabilities. This complementary arrangement of persistent surveillance using both theater and national systems is critical to ensuring sufficient warning and situational awareness.

Tasking, Planning, Exploitation & Dissemination (TPED). PACOM requires a complete, joint TPED architecture to support future plans and contingencies. This architecture must accept inputs from a multitude of ISR assets and share this data freely among service Deployable Common Ground System (DCGS) nodes as well as intelligence users worldwide. Effective TPED of geospatial intelligence is crucial to providing the Combatant Commander, operational, and tactical forces with an incontrovertible view of the battlespace. Limited resources, coupled with great distances make interoperability among service DCGS nodes a critical element to accomplishing TPED and ISR missions within the theater.

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMPUTER, COMMUNICATION (C4) IMPROVEMENTS

C4 Modernization. We have made significant improvements in bandwidth availability through leases with commercial providers. We are on track with Satellite Communications Programs to replace failing satellites. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) assures bandwidth will be available whenever and wherever needed, at least to an installation’s “front door.”

But we cannot deliver sufficient bandwidth from the front door of the installation to the warrior. The dated wires, cables, and switches installed on our bases have insufficient capacity to support applications and services that are based on the steady improvements in telecommunications technology. There is also a digital gap between strategic and tactical environments. Most tactical users rely on Radio Frequency (RF) links, but RF links can only deliver a fraction of same bandwidth available from landlines. As we greatly expand landline capacity through the Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion, we must tailor applications for the bandwidth capacity that tactical users have available to perform their missions.

Joint Information Capabilities Enhancement Environment (JICEE). True transformation involves changing the way we implement information systems from industrial-age, single-purpose systems, to information-age methods, wherein we define the framework of the entire information infrastructure then align programs-of-record to capability-areas within the framework.

To move this transformation along, we need to develop a Joint Information Capabilities Enhancement Environment (JICEE). This requires decomposition of existing programs, reassembling associated systems into a common networked environment. We’ve defined a framework, and with the support of the Command Information Superiority Architecture (CISA) program, have partnered with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop and test a model to capture existing programs and costs to illustrate their contribution to end-to-end capability for gap and duplication analysis. We intend to use JICEE to define the objective information and knowledge services network with the roadmap that shows how to integrate, interface, leverage and decompose when necessary, projects, initiatives and programs-of-record to get there.

Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System. (CENTRIXS) is the effort to establish permanent, classified coalition networks between U.S. and coalition partners. Today, CENTRIXS networks support maritime forces and shore planning staffs for escort and maritime interdiction missions for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. The communities of interest for CENTRIXS now include Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and New Zealand. CENTRIXS provides e-mail, web access, chat and common operational picture capabilities with our coalition partners. With CENTRIXS we’ve made significant strides working with our allies to support the War on Terrorism and have planned extensive expansion of these networks for the near future. USPACOM is working in concert with other Regional Combatant Commanders, USJFCOM, and the CENTRIXS Program Management Office toward a common network architecture that continues to support global joint operations.

Agile Coalition Environment (ACE). Our ability to connect networks to, and share information with, our allies and security cooperation partners is a major challenge. The Agile Coalition Environment (ACE) effort is developing crypto devices agile enough to create virtual private networks (VPNs) to support bilateral and tailored multi-lateral relationships without having to build or lock-down unique networks for each community-of-interest security enclave. ACE enables CENTRIXS to converge from a set of independent networks to a single network that supports multiple security enclaves on an on-demand basis.

Computer Network Defense (CND) is a major part of our comprehensive Information Assurance strategy. Our adversaries are constantly developing new ways to use computer vulnerabilities to deny access to or exploit our information resources. We need constant training on the latest tools, techniques, and vulnerabilities to sustain a highly trained team of CND professionals. This team maintains a strong relationship with the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations, the DISA Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the DoD CERT to stay abreast on the latest information assurance advisories to maintain the tightest perimeter security possible.

Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) is critical to the success of future joint task force operations across the operational spectrum from Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) to high intensity warfare. This communications-enabling package has significant potential to strengthen command and control for the JTF by providing a rapid deployment capability, standardized C2 processes across the components, and standardized C4 systems from the strategic to operational levels. I am concerned, however, that DJC2 lacks organic mobility and the ability to interface anticipated C4 systems with our coalition partners. Both USJFCOM and OSD are working to resolve these issues, but these capabilities may require additional resources to ensure they are delivered on schedule in March 2005.

EXERCISES. Exercise events provide essential opportunities to hone a spectrum of security skills in multilateral settings, and are a key component of both our Joint Training Plan and Theater Security Cooperation plan.

Exercises such as Cooperative COPE THUNDER provide an opportunity for engagement in the Pacific Alaska Range Complex (PARC), a facility more than five times the size of the RED FLAG range in Nevada. This year’s COPE THUNDER participants included: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Germany, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom.

Our BALIKATAN series in the Philippines is a critical element of our continuing effort to build an enduring CT capacity and capability in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It also provides excellent training opportunities for U.S. forces, and does so in a manner that both exercises contingency access and relieves training pressures due to encroachment elsewhere in theater.

Our premier multilateral exercise in the Pacific is COBRA GOLD, an annual event hosted by Thailand. This exercise is specifically designed to promote capabilities and cooperation to deal with foreign consequence management, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping/enforcement operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, and transnational threats like terrorism and illicit narcotics.

Our Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program allows us to influence and leverage our nation’s investment in science and technology, expediting advanced technologies to our warfighters.

Today USPACOM is sponsoring 18 ACTD projects - more than any other regional combatant command. We have distributed the workload across the whole theater - almost all service component and Sub-Unified Commanders and most of my Staff Directors have responsibility for at least one ACTD. A number of our ACTDs have accelerated state-of-the-art technologies into Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. For example, the Thermobaric Weapon ACTD accelerated its tunnel-penetrating-munition development for combat use in Afghanistan. The Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) ACTD currently provides language translation support for intelligence collection and ongoing operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. And the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal ACTD has provided networked reachback support for hundreds of explosive ordnance events in Iraq and Afghanistan. In all, eight PACOM ACTD projects are directly contributing to the War on Terrorism.

We have been awarded three new ACTD Projects starting in FY04. These include the Theater Effects Based Operations (TEBO) ACTD, which is a partnership with USFK and USJFCOM and has direct application in the work of our Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

TRAINING FACILITIES AND RANGES

Transformation of the Pacific Alaska Range Complex (PARC) into a 21st Century Joint Training Complex and Joint National Training Capability venue is important. Integrating virtual capabilities with existing training ranges is the next step in providing our warfighters the optimum combat training environment.

USPACOM forces are performing an increasing number of missions ranging from major combat in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to humanitarian assistance. Mission success requires realistic training – something inert ordnance cannot completely provide. The first exposure to live fire faced by our forces must not come in a hostile combat environment, but rather in a controlled but authentic training environment where they can learn from their experiences and condition themselves to face the “real thing.” We are integrating virtual training technologies with live facilities and exercises to maximize training value within existing physical restrictions.

However, we are increasingly limited in our ability to conduct this training, because of restrictions on space, hours, ordnance, and radio frequencies. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) work closely with state and federal agencies to minimize range encroachment and to mitigate the environmental impacts associated with the Pacific Alaska Range Complex (PARC). Our primary live-fire range in the western Pacific, Farallon de Medinilla (FDM) is heavily used now only because we received legislative relief associated with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.

Training at Makua Range on Oahu is limited in the number and type of training cycles we can conduct, so more of our annual small unit training is achieved via deployment to the Pohakuloa range which also supports battalion level and higher combined arms live-fire exercises on the Island of Hawaii. We have also established a Joint Training Requirements Group to ensure effective use of available training areas in support of all service components and allies training in Hawaii and the Pacific AOR. This initiative will be fully integrated with the Joint National Training Capability through our new Pacific Warfighting Center. Finally, we are leveraging our Theater Security Cooperation Program to supplement our training locations as encroachment continues to restrict our training opportunities.

Many military facilities are also becoming foci for biodiversity, with development and expansion encroaching on our facilities. Where once our bases and training areas were remote sites, urban expansion now surrounds them, forcing some species, including some endangered species, into relatively safer environments of military facilities.

We are very good stewards of the environment. We have set aside space for protected species, altered or deferred some units’ training to avoid interference in nesting areas, and developed specific programs to increase the populations of protected or endangered species.

For the most part, the military's answer to encroachment challenges has been to work around the immediate problems while attempting to minimize the impact on the quality and quantity of training. For example, environmental concerns now impose noise restrictions that force important low altitude maneuvers to use unrealistically high altitudes and limit the use of ranges. Maneuver space is reduced, training lanes become narrow, and our individual maneuvers become too predictable or repetitive. The central question is how all these important interests can be advanced in a balanced and cooperative way.

As part of our efforts to seek this balance, we sought and received narrowly focused clarifications to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Endangered Species Act that provide us the needed flexibility to train our forces for combat while continuing our commitment to environmental stewardship through necessary protection of marine mammals and endangered species.

You also clarified the Endangered Species Act by specifying that Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans (INRMPs) be used in lieu of designating critical habitat. DoD is already obligated under the Sikes Act to develop INRMPs for lands under military control. INRMPs are prepared in cooperation with the Fish and Wildlife Service and state agencies, which recommend ways for DoD to better provide for species conservation and recovery. While we understand there are attempts to roll back these new provisions, it is critical that we be given an opportunity to implement them on our military ranges and operating areas. We will use the increased flexibility to ensure that we have access to ranges and operating areas vital to training our forces for future conflicts. We appreciate your efforts to help us maintain our readiness while protecting the environment.

LOGISTICS AND MOBILITY

We continue to improve our ability to adapt plans and rapidly flow forces and equipment. At the same time, we must efficiently sustain these forces as they move forward. Working in partnership with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), we have made steady progress identifying and prioritizing existing strategic air and sealift infrastructure improvement projects to support the WOT, or if required, a major theater war in the Pacific. Our Pacific Command En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee (PERISC) commissioned the study of several strategically located airfields in the theater, gathering appropriate infrastructure data and applying this information to model personnel and cargo throughput capability.

Our current enroute airlift system includes Elmendorf AFB Alaska, Hickam AFB Hawaii, Andersen AFB Guam, and Japan’s Iwakuni MCAS, Kadena AB, Misawa AB, and Yokota AB. The PERISC has validated and championed over $100M in fuel hydrant, ramp and runway projects at these locations to support the National Military Strategy and Mobility Requirements Study 2005. We also identified seven projects at Elemendorf AFB, Alaska and Hickam AFB, Hawaii in FY05 to support the assignment of C—17 aircraft at both locations. These and other investments throughout the AOR will ensure we have the required infrastructure readiness.

Theater In-Transit Visibility is required to allow the Joint Force Commander to see force closure for deployments and avoid unnecessary costs and inefficiencies for sustainment and distribution. In the past, in-transit visibility was typically provided to Joint Force Commanders from Ports of Embarkation (POE) to Ports of Debarkation (i.e. the USTRANSCOM air and sea channels). End-to-end visibility for either deployment or sustainment distribution prior to the POE, or in-theater from the Port of Debarkation to the ultimate destination did not exist.

In October 2003, OSD published the first Department-wide Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) policy. Recently updated in February 2004, this policy mandates the implementation and expansion of Active RFID. The immediate implementation of this policy will provide USPACOM with enablers for both In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and Total Asset Visibility (TAV).

USPACOM’s current RFID infrastructure is limited and Army-centric, primarily supporting Army deployments to the Korean theater. To meet OSD’s mandate and USPACOM’s requirement for Total Asset Visibility, extensive RFID instrumentation must be obtained and installed in PACOM. Instrumentation locations encompass our strategic and multi-nodal ports, including transload locations, and extend to supply activities and originating bases of deploying forces, ultimately including final destinations. To mirror USCENTCOM’s current capability for TAV in our theater, every effort should be made to fund and train personnel needed to activate this capability.

Preferred munitions. Emergent requirements in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM resulted in reduced availability of preferred munitions and have forced us to rely on older stocks for a period of time. A robust near term inventory of GPS-aided and laser-guided bombs such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Wind Correct Munitions Dispensers (WCMD) and GBU-10/12 pre-staged ashore, supplemented by more weapons available from afloat or deployable stockpiles would provide PACOM with a more accurate, reliable capability. In the future, we’ll also need significant quantities of emerging weaponry, such as Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) and Joint Air to Surface Standoff Munition (JASSM). Positioning these weapons forward in theater will reduce lift requirements in the early stages of a conflict when those assets are most critical.

C-17 aircraft. PACOM strongly supports U.S. Air Force and USTRANSCOM efforts to procure at least 222 C-17 aircraft as the minimum baseline to ensure responsive global mobility and provide the flexibility and capacity to support DoD warfighting transformation. Our number one strategic lift shortfall is airlift due to retirement of aging C-141 aircraft, poor C-5 reliability. The C-17 is one of only two strategic airlift platforms in the Air Mobility Command inventory capable of providing over- and outsized cargo lift capacity. The only other aircraft is the less reliable C-5. The current Air Force POM funds 180 C-17 aircraft, however, in light of increasing War on Terrorism demands, additional C-17 aircraft should be procured.

USPACOM anticipates basing eight C-17s each at Hickam AFB, Hawaii in December 2005 and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska starting in 2007. Active duty Air Force and Air Reserve Component forces – Hawaii Air National Guard and Alaskan Air Force Reservists – will operate these strategic mobility aircraft. These aircraft will bring vastly increased reliability, versatility and large capacity to and through the Pacific theater.

High Speed Vessels (HSV) provide a flexible alternative for intra-theater movement in USPACOM, including its use to augment airlift. Since October 2001, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) has been testing a leased HSV with great success and cost savings for exercise deployments and redeployments, as well as operational employment. JOINT VENTURE HSV X1, the Joint Army/Navy HSV that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 and other exercises, was scheduled to support U.S. Army training in the USPACOM Theater from March to April 2003, but was diverted to support USCENTCOM for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Without a doubt, HSV capabilities were critical to the early success of OIF. The speed and range of the HSV-X1 allowed it to rapidly deploy to USCENTCOM. There, it was successfully employed as an afloat staging base for Naval Special Warfare combatant craft operations. In Oct 03, a new HSV-X2 SWIFT, replaced the HSV-X1, and is serving as a Mine Warfare Command and Support ship. In the USPACOM AOR, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) will use HSV-X1 to conduct exercises and training under our Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. We fully support continued leasing of tailorable High Speed Vessels as force projection and lift platforms.

Tanker Aircraft. Our National Security Strategy cannot be executed without air-refueling tankers, yet many of ours are nearly 50 years old. The average age of the fleet is 43 years, and the cost of keeping these aging aircraft mission capable is increasingly prohibitive. In the Pacific Command, air-refueling tankers are critical to execution of theater war plans as early deployers in support of the Pacific Tanker Air Bridge. Meanwhile, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and NOBLE EAGLE have demonstrated the operational impact air refueling capability has in support of the WOT. The KC-135 aircraft comprises 90% of the tanker fleet, and their usage has increased 45% over employment programmed before 11 Sept 01. The FY02 DoD Appropriation Bill authorized the Air Force to negotiate the lease/purchase of 100 commercial B-767 aircraft for air refueling use – an issue currently under DoD Inspector General investigation. Regardless of the tanker lease resolution, we still need a viable option to replace the aging tanker fleet.

Aircraft Mission Capable Rates. We continue to be concerned about low Pacific Command aircraft Mission Capable rates. Aging aircraft inventory and parts shortages continue to drive reduced Mission Capable rates, reduced fill rates for our "go to war" Readiness Spares Packages, and high cannibalization rates. Although funding for spare parts has improved over the past several years, shortages still exist. As an example, only 1 of 6 Pacific Air Forces A-10, F-15, and F-16 wings maintained minimum Mission Capable standards during FY 03. The F-15Cs at Kadena Air Base are, on average, 26 years old – 11 years beyond the Air Force’s maximum desirable age for fighter aircraft. We must recapitalize our fighter force structure.

IMPROVING QUALITY OF SERVICE FOR OUR MEN AND WOMEN

Improved Quality of Service (QoS) for our men and women is our third priority. Inseparable from combat readiness, it is certainly more than just good Quality of Life. It also means providing the high quality operating facilities, the tools, and the information technology necessary for our personnel to achieve their goals and execute their missions with efficiency and a minimum of frustration. The QoS initiatives included in the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act demonstrate the commitment of military and congressional leadership to meet the needs of our deserving service members and their families.

Quality of Life in PACOM is good and improving. In the near term, we’re focused on retention, operating tempo, and housing and school improvements.

Competing for and retaining the best people. We must not take current high retention rates for granted. High operating tempo associated with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, coupled with a recovering economy, could challenge our ability to retain quality personnel at required levels. A proactive approach featuring competitive compensation and thoughtful force management is required.

On behalf of the men and women of Pacific Command, thank you for your support of recent initiatives including: an average 4 percent pay raise, increases in allowances for family separation, housing, and cost of living, and pay premiums that recognize special sacrifices like Assignment Incentive Pay in Korea and Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay. Deployed personnel in harm’s way will also be more at ease knowing that additional family assistance has been provided in the form of child care, education, and youth services for their loved ones back home. These initiatives will help us recruit and retain our highly skilled troops and their families.

Operating Tempo. Our forces have performed magnificently during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2003, USPACOM’s forward-based forces largely remained in place during these conflicts to help maintain our deterrent posture. Air and naval forces that did participate were quickly returned to their home bases for rest, repair, and readiness for further assignment. As we enter 2004, Marines from the III Marine Expeditionary Force and Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division are beginning rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq. We will work to mitigate resulting impacts on these troops and their families while compensating with additional forces to maintain our readiness posture forward.

Reserve Mobilization: We continue to rely on our Reserve and Guard members to help us accomplish our missions in the Pacific. These outstanding citizen-service members contribute hard work and unique talents. As a matter of policy, Pacific Command relies heavily on volunteers. Since 9/11, we have mobilized approximately 5,000 service members who have served tours up to 2 years in length.

Today there are about 40 mobilized reservists working at our headquarters and about 1,700 mobilized reservists throughout the USPACOM AOR, serving within the ranks of our service components. All of these members are making important contributions in key roles such as force protection, planning, logistics flow, and myriad other critical areas.

We will continue to promote judicious use of our Reserve forces. We actively support Secretary Rumsfeld’s initiatives to relieve the pressure on the Guard and Reserve and to rebalance the force for the future. America can be proud of the way our reserve forces have responded to our nation’s needs.

Force Health Protection. We are working with OSD to ensure Smallpox and Anthrax Vaccines are authorized and will be available for those who need it. Last year, the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) posed a new global threat. Although we didn’t have a single case among our troops, we remain vigilant, and will take steps to limit our forces’ exposure whenever possible. Another continuing threat in the Pacific is HIV/AIDS. We’ve partnered with select countries for HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs in their militaries – a significant step in fostering both healthy peacekeepers and economic stability.

I also want to emphasize the need for integrated and standardized medical information systems across DoD. Unified Commands, among others, are responsible for reporting and tracking disease surveillance and vaccination data. However, no military wide automated systems exist to support these tasks. To this end, I support a USPACOM-led demonstration project to test and evaluate DoD’s Theater Medical Information Program, currently under development, to integrate a joint medical information system, both in garrison and deployment.

Military Housing. Quality housing provides peace of mind for our forces and underscores our commitment to Quality of Life. Recent increases in Basic Allowance for Housing support the DoD goal of zero out-of-pocket housing expenses by FY05 for personnel living on the economy.

Meanwhile, our service components remain committed to replace or renovate substandard military family housing, relying on housing privatization initiatives (such as Public Private Venture and Residential Communities Initiative) and Military Construction. These initiatives are a “win-win” for the community and serve to provide high quality, well-designed military housing developments. Pacific service components and US Forces Korea (USFK) are in the process of adding or replacing over 1,200 family housing units in FY04 alone. Your continued support of military housing privatization initiatives is appreciated. Still, MILCON is required to meet DPG goals, especially overseas. In our FY05 program, we have nearly $300 million in MILCON family housing projects.

Continued funding is also essential to improve bachelor housing. For FY05, $291 million is required to keep all components on plan. Navy, Air Force, and Marine components are on track to eliminate open bay and central latrine barracks. Army will meet this goal in Hawaii and South Korea by FY08 and FY09, respectively.

Schools. Competitive schools are a top quality of life concern, especially in Guam and Hawaii. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) school projects in Guam will provide a new high school (FY05 at $28 Million) and a new elementary/middle school in the future.

In Hawaii, we are leveraging our Joint Venture Education Forum (JVEF) to improve school quality, strengthen our partnership with the state and its citizens, and increase attractiveness of Hawaii as a duty station. The JVEF is a collaborative effort between the Hawaii Department of Education and Pacific Command to improve education and facilities in the military impacted public schools. Over the past four years, the Forum has focused on repair and maintenance, and on upgrading textbooks and technology. More recently the JVEF has focused on the transition issues of military dependent children by helping schools develop transition assistance programs and offering a military culture course to school staffs. Subsequent USPACOM school surveys reveal significantly improved perceptions of Hawaii schools by military families.

Transformation. Improved Quality of Service is an intended and essential product of our transformation initiatives. As we posture forces to ensure security in the new threat context, we also seek to place forces such that they can be efficiently employed against unpredictable threats – minimizing optempo while posing a minimal burden on friends and allies in the region. In short, we want to be relevant, welcomed, and immediately employable.

Base facilities and infrastructure. Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) of facilities and infrastructure throughout USPACOM remains an important concern. Current funding levels limit our ability to achieve the 67-year recapitalization rate directed by DoD. We have equally important infrastructure requirements above SRM needs, including environmental requirements and new mission bed-downs for transformational capabilities like C-17 aircraft and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. We are working to ensure transformation-related changes are integrated into our MILCON plans to prevent wasted expenditures.

Military Construction (MILCON) in Korea. As Commander, U.S. Forces Korea is testifying, our facilities in Korea remain among the worst in USPACOM. MILCON is essential to rectify these shortcomings and to advance our transformation initiatives. We plan on consolidating U.S. Forces in Korea into two hubs of enduring installations – an air-oriented hub focused on Osan Air Base (AB), and a sea-oriented hub in the southeast near Pusan. These consolidations will improve unit readiness, force protection, and quality of life while reducing adverse impact on our host nation. This long term but essential program requires stable MILCON funding.

We appreciate your support for FY04 projects in South Korea to upgrade hardened aircraft shelters and to construct family housing, barracks complexes and dormitories. We also understand your reservations about reprogramming MILCON projects before achieving the precondition of obtaining necessary land on which to construct them. We are working closely with the ROK government to pursue the land purchases necessary to make these projects viable, and we will abide by the provisions of the 2004 Military Construction Appropriations Act regarding their planning and construction.

We request your support for the FY05 MILCON projects submitted by the services for South Korea, including U.S. Air Force family housing and dormitory projects and the sewer system upgrade at Camp Humphreys.

Guam MILCON. Guam’s geostrategic importance cannot be overstated. Both Navy and Air Force facilities will continue to figure prominently in Guam’s increasing role as a power projection hub. But Guam’s environment can be harsh, and major infrastructure improvements are needed to support its further utility. USPACFLT plans to upgrade the KILO Wharf near Orote Point in FY05 ($13 million) to better support weapons handling, and has further plans to develop the Orote peninsula into a fully capable munitions hub in the out years. Three future projects are also essential to improve wharves at Apra Harbor. In FY05, USPACAF plans to construct a $20 million war reserve material storage facility at Andersen AFB, and has out year projects to repair the south runway and construct munitions storage igloos.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). The JPAC stood up on 1 October 2003, combining assets of Joint Task Force – Full Accounting and Central Identification Lab – Hawaii (CILHI), with a global mission. The command will eventually be housed in a new combined facility at Hickam Air Force Base that will improve efficiency while reducing overall footprint. We are requesting appropriation of funds to begin construction in FY07.

In 2003, joint field activities in Vietnam, Laos, Burma, North Korea, and Cambodia recovered 26 possible human remains believed to be those of unaccounted-for Americans. Meanwhile, the Central Identification Laboratory identified a total of 64 Americans previously unaccounted-for: 37 from the Vietnam War, 5 from the Korean War, and 22 from World War II. We remain fully committed to this mission.

Pacific Warfighting Center. PACOM’s exercise simulation and support infrastructure is obsolete. This shortfall significantly reduces the ability to train USPACOM and Joint Task Force commanders in crisis action readiness procedures, limits their ability to rehearse key operational orders, and degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with friends in the region. The current exercise simulation facility also does not support future technologies or meet force protection requirements. A planned, state-of-the-art operations and simulation center will improve total force readiness by exploiting emerging technologies to create a networked, live, virtual, and constructive training and mission rehearsal environment for joint and combined force commanders and their staffs.

The PWC will be a key node on DoD’s global grid of warfighting centers that create the Joint National Training Capability. PWC will be fully integrated with, and extend the capability of, USJFCOM’s Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center and U.S. European Command’s Warrior Preparation Center. It will also be home to our most important new joint command and control development – the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, discussed below.

PWC promises to save exercise funds and enhance regional security cooperation using INTERNET-based information exchange opportunities via the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN). We estimate a $30 Million need in FY06 for this facility.

Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific Command Center (NMPCC). The NMPCC is complete and will be dedicated on 14 April. This modern facility and its robust information technology will fundamentally change the way we command and control forces in the Pacific theater. We are working hard on information and knowledge management processes to maximize efficiency while minimizing frustrations. Thank you for making this important headquarters a reality.

REINFORCING THE CONSTANTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, our friendships both old and new, and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces continue to be the foundation of the region’s peace and stability. Based upon my extensive travels throughout Asia and the Pacific, it is clear that more and more nations appreciate the constructive role forward-based American forces play in regional peace and stability. We are capitalizing on these sentiments to build bilateral relationships while nurturing multinational efforts that support regional security needs.

The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) enhances U.S. influence, expands U.S. operational access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and forward-based combat forces, and increases competence of our coalition partners. Every TSCP activity is designed to enhance our joint/combined capabilities and communicate assurance to our friends while dissuading or deterring our enemies. Seminars and multilateral exercises continue to be inexpensive but powerful ways to develop the capabilities to work effectively as partners against all manner of transnational threats.

Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and Experimentation plans, solidifies the link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.

The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSCP are clear – our treaty allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF, the War on Terrorism, and now OIF as well. And we have new security partners. Mongolia, for example, has made historic contributions in the War on Terrorism and in the reconstruction of Iraq. Many other countries within the Asia-Pacific region also share our security interests, and it is due in part to their efforts to combat terrorism that the analytical depth and breadth of shared actionable intelligence on the terror threat has improved so significantly. Their demonstrations of support are positive signs that meaningful regional cooperation on these threats will continue.

Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most important pact in the Pacific and is as strong as it has ever been. Nearly 54,000 U.S. armed forces personnel are stationed in Japan, including units of the 5th Air Force, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and 7th Fleet. Without these forces, it would be very difficult to meet our commitments both to Japan and to the rest of Asia-Pacific region. Last year, Japan contributed about $4 Billion just to host our forces - the most generous of any U.S. ally.

Since becoming Prime Minister nearly three years ago, Prime Minister Koizumi has stressed the importance of the alliance and has exerted exceptional leadership in support of both regional and global security efforts. Japan acted swiftly and historically after 9/11 to provide airlift services and over 89 million gallons of fuel to coalition ships in the Arabian Sea in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Last year, the Government of Japan (GOJ) approved an extension to the Basic Plan to continue these valuable contributions to the WOT. Japan’s Coast Guard also participated in the first Proliferation Security Initiative exercise last September.

But arguably the most significant symbol of Japan’s commitment to regional and global security was its December 2003 decision to contribute up to 1,000 Japan Self-Defense Force personnel for Iraq – a plan they are now implementing. Additionally, they’ve pledged $5 Billion in loans and grants for Iraqi reconstruction, second only to the United States. We take every opportunity to express our appreciation to the GOJ for Japan’s incredible support.

We continue to strengthen this vibrant alliance through open dialogue and a continuing infusion of creativity. We benefit from robust relationships with the Japan Self Defense Forces, all of which have greatly matured in the last two decades. Although our deepest ties lie with the Maritime and Air Self Defense forces – mainly due to the day-to-day presence of the 7th Fleet and 5th Air Force – we are also looking for ways to increase interactions with the Ground Self Defense Force.

The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) provides an important forum for deliberating alliance improvements. Working closely with OSD, the State Department, and our country team, we are consulting with the GOJ on ways to improve our command structures, assist the Self Defense Forces in their own transformation efforts, and make modest adjustments to address noise and safety concerns in places like the Kanto plain and Okinawa.

Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been completed, 12 are still being worked. Two of five noise reduction initiatives and 10 of 11 SACO land release initiatives have yet to be completed. Considerable progress on the 12 outstanding initiatives has been made, and the initiatives are continually being pursued.

The cornerstone of the SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ approval of a Basic Plan for the offshore portion of the FRF highlights the progress made in the SACO process last summer. However, we continue to emphasize to the GOJ that a complete replacement facility as identified in the SACO Final Report – not just the offshore portion - is required before Futenma can be fully returned.

We continue our frank and open dialogue with Japan to nurture this robust alliance. We will also continue to improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries in the region to address cooperation on regional security issues.

Republic of Korea (ROK). Our solid partnership with South Korea has contributed to peace and security on the peninsula for 50 years. Today, units of the Eighth U.S. Army and 7th Air Force comprise the majority of our 38,000-troop strength in Korea. We have also witnessed continued growth in the capability and capacity of Republic of Korea forces. They are modern, professional, and growing rapidly in tactical sophistication.

Of course our partnership is focused on the most immediate security threat to the South Korean people - North Korea (DPRK). Although the likelihood of war on the peninsula remains low, the stakes posed by the North Korean conventional threat remain high, and are even higher if North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear programs. The DPRK maintains more than 70 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its “military first” policy, keeping its large force fed, equipped, and trained while average citizens face deprivation and starvation.

North Korean missile and missile technology exports pose a grave proliferation concern. Its missile inventory includes over 500 short-range SCUD missiles and medium range NO DONG missiles capable of delivering conventional or chemical payloads well beyond the peninsula. Ongoing research on a multiple-stage variant of the TAEPO DONG missile may provide North Korea the means to target the continental United States. And its other illicit activities, including probable state-run narcotics and currency counterfeiting enterprises, also pose a broad threat to regional security.

After trilateral talks in April 2002 and two rounds of Six Party Talks to date, it is clear diplomacy must continue to be backed by a strong ROK-US defense partnership to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear programs and reduce the North Korean conventional threat.

We recognize the importance of reconciliation efforts to the Korean people and support those efforts by maintaining a position of mutual strength. Nations of the region are aligned on the goal of achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program.

Meanwhile, the ROK has steadily increased its regional security role. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one another and integrated where appropriate. The return of Korean troops from UN peacekeeping duty in Timor-Leste in October 2003 underscored Korea’s commitment to regional peace and stability. The ROK continues to support PACOM’s Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program. South Korea’s growing security role provides regional contributions while meeting its peninsular defense responsibilities.

The ROK continues to support our global security efforts as well. In September 2003, we released the last of four ROK amphibious ships after their 18 months of logistical support and aircraft recovery operations related to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In December 2003, the ROK Air Force completed two years of airlift support, having logged almost 3000 flight hours and moving over 300 tons of cargo and passengers throughout the AOR. The ROK Army has deployed a Construction Engineer unit and medics to Bagram, Afghanistan since February 2003. And by May 2003, over 600 ROK engineers and medical service personnel were working in Iraq along side the U.S. military.

Most significantly, we anticipate the ROK government will dispatch up to three thousand more troops to Iraq later this year, making it the third largest coalition troop contributor to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to global security, and we thank the Korean people for their support.

Occasional anti-American sentiment reminds us that South Korea is a vibrant, democratic society, with a profusion of free and diverse voices. Nevertheless, we clearly have reached an important juncture in ROK-U.S. relations. While the majority of South Koreans support the alliance, we know we must strengthen the alliance to meet the challenges of the new international security environment.

ROK Minister of Defense Lee Jun and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld established the Future of the ROK—U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative at the 34th Security Consultative Meeting in Washington D.C. on December 5, 2002. Its charter is to develop options and make recommendations to adapt the alliance to reflect the changing regional and global security circumstances. The ultimate objective is to build a balanced and enduring alliance that will be more effective but less intrusive in the lives of the Korean people.

Despite this challenging political environment, Future of the Alliance meetings have produced considerable progress. Most notable are the agreement to relocate U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area, a more regional role for USFK, greater information sharing to coordinate force improvement plans, terms of reference for a command relations study, and the transfer of appropriate military missions to ROK forces. Final details to relocate U.S. forces from Seoul and consolidate U.S. forces into two hubs south of the Han River remain for ongoing ROK-U.S. discussions.

Australia is a strong ally and special partner in the Pacific. Australia’s support for a new joint anti-terrorism center in Indonesia and its Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands are just two recent examples of Australia’s solid leadership throughout Oceania. The Australian people have demonstrated a steadfast commitment to winning the War on Terror, and they continue to make valuable contributions to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

Improving the already high level of interoperability between U.S. forces and the Australian Defense Force remains a top priority. A comprehensive two-year study on Strategic and Operational Level Interoperability has just concluded. The implementation of its recommendations will ensure interoperability continues to advance.

Australia has the most robust set of range and training facilities for air, land and sea operations in the Pacific Rim. The facilities range from well-developed, instrumented training ranges to austere sites with little existing infrastructure. We have embarked on a comprehensive plan to study expanded use of these training areas to support the TALISMAN SABER exercise series and other future training initiatives. Future Australia/U.S. combined training events will exercise Combined Task Force-level air, land and sea operations to a level rarely found outside the United States.

Republic of the Philippines (RP). Designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in October 2003, the RP is a strong partner in the War on Terror. Our bilateral relationship promotes mutually beneficial training, Philippine military reform, and increased counter-terrorism capacity and capability. Despite significant domestic security concerns, the RP generously supported Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with access to facilities and airspace, and recently deployed approximately 100 medical, engineering, and security personnel for Iraqi reconstruction.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines (OEF-P) continues. Last year, we executed a focused Security Assistance plan to support our CT objectives in the Philippines. Five security assistance modules enhanced near-term needs like light infantry training, night vision skills, and intelligence fusion. We also executed the region’s most robust Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan to improve AFP tactical mobility on both land and sea. In February, a refurbished 180’ patrol craft (ex-USS CYCLONE) was provided to the RP under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. This vessel is now the most capable maritime interdiction platform in the Philippine Navy.

The Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) have improved their effectiveness against the Abu Sayyaf Group, highlighted by December’s arrest of ASG terrorist Galib Andang, aka “Commander Robot”, on Jolo Island. We continue OEF-P to provide training, advice, and assistance to the AFP to improve their capability and capacity to deal with terror threats.

Incremental progress toward our mutual defense goals has prompted a complete review of the pace and direction of the AFP as an institution. The resulting Joint Defense Assessment is both a template for long-term AFP reform and a mechanism by which we are managing near-term CT improvements.

Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) is the engine by which these improvements will proceed. The PDR is a broad-based, multi-year cooperative effort between the Philippine and U.S. governments. PDR recommendations, implemented in a coordinated and deliberate fashion, are designed to address systemic organizational deficiencies, correct root causes of strategic and operational shortcomings and achieve long term, sustainable institutional improvements in management, leadership and employment of the AFP. While we will assist the Philippines through normal security assistance processes and through routine military-to-military exchanges and exercises, the reforms are principally the responsibility of the Philippine Government. The Philippines’ most senior military and civilian leaders are completely supportive of the PDR process. We appreciate your continued support of the Philippines through Security Assistance funding.

Thailand also was granted Major Non-NATO Allied (MNNA) Status in December 2003. Thailand’s valuable contributions to regional security stem in large part from the capacity building we have mutually pursued.

Since the Oct ‘02 Bali bombings in Indonesia, Thailand has been particularly open and cooperative in the War on Terrorism, highlighted by the arrest on Thai soil of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader Hambali and other JI operatives. Thailand currently has about 450 engineers and medical personnel supporting Iraqi reconstruction, completed a significant engineering deployment to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and led military peace observers in Aceh, Indonesia, building on the Thai military’s previous sustained peacekeeping effort in East Timor.

Thailand routinely supports our access and training requirements and plays generous host to USPACOM’s premier multilateral exercise, COBRA GOLD. COBRA GOLD 2004 will be our 23rd combined/joint bilateral exercise with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. COBRA GOLD is our flagship vehicle for building regional competencies to respond to an expanding range of transnational security situations. By adding this multinational exercise dimension in an environment that trains for peacekeeping in addition to responding to transnational threats, Thailand assumes an active role in promoting South East Asia security and demonstrates capability as a regional leader.

Singapore is emerging as a regional leader and eager contributor to Asia-Pacific security. Its aggressive approach to important issues ranging from SARS to counter-terrorism to maritime security, coupled with its outspoken support for a strong U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, make this relationship among the most important in the Pacific theater.

Our friendship with Singapore – more than just a friendship - has matured beyond expectations. Soon we will conclude a Strategic Framework Agreement providing structure and organization to our bilateral efforts with sufficient flexibility to continue to mature along with our relationship. Together, we are exploring opportunities for expanded access to Singaporean facilities while increasing information and technology exchange.

Malaysia. Our relations with the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) continue to weather periodic hurdles, most often characterized by opposition to U.S. policies in general and military operations in the War on Terrorism in particular. Despite the rhetoric, our military ties are cordial and cooperative, sharing information and best practices in maritime security and counter-terrorism.

Malaysia’s influence extends beyond Southeast Asia. It currently holds the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Regionally, Malaysia is an influential leader, focused on the terror threat from Jemaah Islamiyah. The recently inaugurated Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur and combined Celebes Sea patrols with the Philippine Navy are but two examples of its willingness to contribute to regional security.

India. Our military-to-military program with India leads the larger bilateral relationship and is already providing security benefits in South and Southeast Asia. In the past year, mutual understanding has improved, exercise complexity has increased, and interest in foreign military sales has risen dramatically.

All USPACOM components have conducted a number of successful training events with the Indian military, including the first ever exercise between U.S. front line fighter jets and Su-30K FLANKERs. These events contribute to the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces.

We have developed a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial activities that build upon this momentum. These programs are designed to increase our proficiency and interoperability with Indian forces while addressing shared interests like maritime security. Our military cooperation directly contributes to the expansion of our strategic partnership with India.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation and third largest democracy. Sitting astride vital trade routes and targeted for destabilization by terrorists, Indonesia’s success is crucial to peace in the Pacific. Its democratic development requires both effective CT efforts and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) professional reform.

The government has effectively responded to the bombings in Bali and Jakarta, arresting and convicting many key participants and sharing information with its neighbors. We continue to assess opportunities to increase Indonesia’s capacity and cooperation against the Jemaah Islamiyah.

The TNI is the most coherent government institution and will play a central role in shaping the future of the democracy. It is also an organization tainted by past human rights abuses, a lack of accountability, and corruption – conditions that led to restrictions on our military-to-military relationship. Indonesia now acquires non-Western military hardware and training that is incompatible with our own. These conditions move Indonesia further away from the U.S. sphere of influence.

The TNI appears committed to reform, and there is evidence of positive change in the military. To positively shape that reform, and working with our embassy country team in Jakarta, we have developed a plan of activities that meets all legal constraints. We will leverage E-IMET, Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowships, and other authorized multilateral venues to expose Indonesian officials, including appropriate TNI officers, to non-lethal U.S. professional military standards.

East Timor is hard at work developing the governing institutions and the political culture for enduring democracy. Though progress is being made, this is a long-term and daunting challenge. The country faces a weak economy, high youth unemployment, and low literacy levels.

Our security goals for Timor-Leste are to support the development of a civil-military defense establishment that is fully subordinate to civilian authority and the rule of law, and to assist in the development of the 1,500-man Falantil-Force Defense Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) as a credible self-defense force. Our program is coordinated with Australia. IMET and FMF programs are being used to fund English language training, and Mobile Training Teams are being planned to provide education and training to support the development of civil/military defense capabilities. We are also conducting small unit exercises that enable USPACOM forces to train with the F-FDTL. This allows our forces to take advantage of the F-FDTL's jungle warfare experience in challenging mountainous terrain.

China. Our modest but constructive military-to-military relationship with China continues. Guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA 2000), it is limited to non-warfighting venues such as high-level exchanges and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief cooperation.

The last year has featured US warship visits to Zhanjiang and Shanghai. The Chinese reciprocated with a two-ship visit to Guam in October. Late last year, USPACOM also hosted the Nanjing Military Region Commander, LTG Zhu Wenquan, and Defense Minister, General Cao. These exchanges communicate our values and demonstrate the high quality of our people.

Taiwan. Our relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. Taiwan’s ability to defend itself remains the focus of our efforts, given added emphasis by the Chinese military buildup across the Strait. Our relationship supports development of a modern and joint military institution that promotes stability, democracy, and prosperity for Taiwan.

Vietnam. Our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam is progressing on a modest but positive vector. The Vietnamese Defense Minister’s historic visit to Washington last year was followed in November by our first port call to Ho Chi Minh City since 1975. These events, combined with my visit to Vietnam in February 2004, represent straightforward but symbolic steps in our relationship.

We share a number of security concerns with Vietnam. Of course, our most robust military-to-military program focuses on POW/MIA recovery. But there may also be room to cooperate in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping. We hope the next year will benefit from Vietnam’s new openness to build a relationship that looks to the future while respecting the past.

Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies (APCSS) continues to bring together current and future military and civilian leaders to discuss non-warfighting security concerns in programs that promote our regional security cooperation objectives. Through its Executive Courses and Conference program, the APCSS provides Asia-Pacific leaders a premier venue to address security challenges from a multinational perspective. We are careful to include countries like Pakistan and Russia, which though not within USPACOM’s AOR, clearly have security stakes in the Pacific. The Center is attracting the right people to reinforce U.S. policy, address relevant regional issues, and assure access to nations in the region. Congressionally appropriated Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program funding will be used to develop and conduct a semiannual course designed to facilitate comprehensive regional solutions in the fight against terrorism.

Center of Excellence (COE), a PACOM Direct Reporting Unit established by Congress in 1994, manages capacity building programs in peacekeeping, stability operations, HIV/AIDS mitigation for military forces, and disaster response and consequence management planning. These activities, typically conducted on a multilateral basis with current and potential coalition partners, reinforce relationships and develop confidence across the AOR. They also expand regional capabilities to support multinational coalition and peacekeeping operations around the world.

Through its tailored education programs for U.S. force components, COE improves understanding of and relations with civilians active in complex contingencies, crisis transition and peace support operations. For example, COE supports U.S. Army Pacific’s coordination of responses to CBRNE incidents at U.S. installations in Hawaii, Alaska, and across the AOR. I ask for your continued support of this important institution.

Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD). One of our premier senior level theater security cooperation activities, USPACOM annually hosts this regional conference that brings together Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) (CJCS equivalents) for a series of discussions on regional defense issues of mutual interest. The October 2003 conference was held in Honolulu, with senior military leaders from twenty-three nations, including our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, in attendance. The conference theme, “Security Transformation in the Asia-Pacific Region,” provided an open forum for candid dialogue among the largest group of CHODs to participate since the conference’s inception in 1998. The “Transformation” theme focused on three areas; Emerging Concepts for Maritime Security, Responding to Terrorism and Insurgencies, and Multilateral and Intra-governmental Operations. The CHOD’s Conference continues to provide an excellent forum to foster understanding, build confidence, strengthen relationships, and promote stability. Next year, the conference will be co-hosted by the Japan Self Defense Force in Tokyo.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides vital support to developing countries involved in combating terrorism and other transnational threats. Funds provided in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act, 2003 and the emergency FMF Supplemental directly supported security cooperation priorities throughout the AOR. Foreign Military Financing and Sales contributed directly to the successful prosecution of al-Qaida network-linked terrorists in the Philippines and met basic needs to improve the security environment in several other countries.

USPACOM typically receives approximately 7% of the discretionary FMF funds. Legislative proposals to improve the Security Assistance process and add flexibility in the use of O&M funding have been submitted by my staff for your consideration.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) continues to be an effective, low-cost component of the Security Assistance effort. The program provides U.S. access to and disproportionate influence with foreign governments. Furthermore, it exposes future leaders to U.S. values and commitment to the rule of law, the role of a professional military in a democratic society and promotes military professionalism. Grant funding has removed financial barriers to U.S. military education and training for friends and allies located in regions subject to untoward influences and contributed to the readiness of troops providing post-hostility engineering and peacekeeping support in Afghanistan and Iraq. Combined with training offered through the Foreign Military Sales process, IMET has supported the promotion of U.S. military education and training as the recognized standard worldwide. Consequently, demand has surpassed supply as it relates to school capacity. Innovation has addressed this issue in the near-term but real capacity increases are necessary to build upon our success. I appreciate your support of this valuable program.

Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA) have enhanced interoperability, readiness, and provided a cost-effective mechanism for mutual logistics support for U.S. and allied forces supporting the WOT. USPACOM forces that participated in FY 03 Bilateral/Multinational Exercises (COBRA GOLD and BALIKATAN) were able to greatly reduce their logistics footprint by using ACSAs. Countries that deployed outside the AOR (Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) in support of OEF and OIF have benefited significantly from these ACSAs as well.

PACOM currently has eleven ACSAs in place (Australia, Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Mongolia, Thailand, New Zealand, Fuji, and Tonga). Nine other countries are ACSA–eligible (India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Brunei, Maldives, Madagascar, Mauritius and Sri Lanka), and we anticipate completing three agreements in the very near future. Additionally, we are renegotiating Malaysia’s ACSA (expires in March 2004) and just signed a revision to Japan’s ACSA to make it more inclusive for support to the WOT. Last year we finalized Mongolia’s ACSA in May and renegotiated Thailand’s in September.

PROMOTING CHANGE AND IMPROVING OUR ASIA-PACIFIC DEFENSE POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Our top security concerns in the Pacific include the possibility of conflict on the Korean peninsula, miscalculation in places like Kashmir or the Taiwan Strait, and transnational threats like terrorism. These concerns – some longstanding and others just emerging - form only a subset of the global security challenges to which we and our partners must respond. This new threat context demands profound and enduring improvements in the way we command, equip, and employ our forces. Guidelines for these improvements have been clearly articulated by DoD.

At Pacific Command, like all regional combatant commands, our job is to transform that guidance into action. Several principles direct our work.

First and foremost, it is clear that our longstanding alliances, our strong friendships, and the forward presence of our combat forces will continue to form the foundation for our security posture in the Asia-Pacific region. This fact is reflected in the “reinforcing the constants” priority outlined earlier. Posture improvements and capability improvements, discussed below, are being developed in full consultation with our allies. Several mechanisms facilitate our dialogue, including the Defense Policy Review Initiative (Japan), Future of the Alliance Initiative (South Korea), Australia Ministerial/Military Representatives, Mutual Defense Board (Philippines) and the pending Strategic Framework Agreement with Singapore.

Second, our posture improvements must meet both current and future threats. Each change we make is intended to enhance our capability to meet security commitments not just in the Pacific, but also around the world.

While studying and incorporating the lessons learned from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, we also recognize that many of our warfighting challenges in the Pacific were not stressed in those conflicts. Missions like missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and air combat figure prominently in many potential conflicts and must continue to be improved.

Of course, clearly we recognize that just as our own capabilities have improved, so too have the military forces of our friends and allies. By incorporating these advances into our planning, we will improve the effectiveness of combined operations and reduce our reliance on forward based support functions.

And finally, we intend these adjustments to be enduring – improvements that not only meet our mutual security needs over the long term but in doing so, ease the burden we pose on friends and allies in the region.

With those principles in mind, Pacific Command has developed a six-element construct within which to organize our initiatives. We call it, “Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Defense Strategy.”

Operationalizing the Asia Pacific Defense Strategy

Updating Plans. Our plans and our planning process are being updated to reflect the new threat context. Essentially every plan is being revised to support the 4-2-1 force planning construct while addressing both state- and non-state threats. This construct calls for regionally tailored forces, forward stationed and deployed in four primary areas of the globe to assure our allies and friends and deter potential aggressors. If deterrence fails, our forces must be able to swiftly defeat the efforts of two aggressors and, if the President so directs, decisively defeat one of those two enemies. In the process, we are incorporating improvements in our capabilities – speed, precision, and lethality – while taking into account advancements in the capabilities of friends and allies. Lessons learned from OEF and OIF also inform the process.

The revision process is being accelerated, and resulting plans feature inherent flexibility. In short, we recognize that success against emerging threats requires us to sense, decide, and act inside the enemy’s timelines.

We’re also integrating the resources of relevant government agencies into our day-to-day planning and operations. Our inclusion of diplomatic, economic, and public diplomacy efforts reflects the fact that there simply aren’t any strictly military solutions to today’s security challenges.

Strengthening Command And Control. Benefiting from habitual command relationships, and using common tactics, techniques, and procedures, the synergy offered by joint command arrangements provides the speed of command necessary to successfully meet future threats.

Our evolving command and control constructs benefit from interagency relationships. The JIACG-CT and JRAC mentioned earlier are two examples of joint staff elements that support combatant command and joint task force efforts. And the expanding mission of the JIATF-W demonstrates the great facility of interagency integration.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Last year, PACOM stood up and exercised its first Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). In its current configuration, the SJFHQ rapidly augments a Joint Task Force command element to accelerate its readiness for action. When not specifically tasked, core SJFHQ staff plan and train to prepare for a variety of contingencies.

My vision for the SJFHQ is to have a habitually trained organization that reduces long lead times routinely experienced in standing up Joint Task Forces. This organization will be trained on cutting edge planning and communication processes, tools and equipment in order to rapidly deploy and immediately facilitate command and control. The SJFHQ needs to be supported with adequate manning. Our SJFHQ is currently manned with 22 permanent and 36 augmented personnel. As we go forward in developing the SJFHQ (and its processes) for the Pacific, we are working closely with USJFCOM, which has been assigned overall responsibility for SJFHQ operating procedures.

We have also developed several concepts and tools to facilitate coalition contributions to regional security efforts. Our Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is one such initiative that has enjoyed great success. MPAT is designed to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of multinational coalition task force headquarters.

One of the first products of the MPAT program was a Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedure (MNF SOP). These procedures standardize processes, promote cooperation, increased dialogue, and provide baseline concepts of operation for coalition task force efforts. They also serve as a centerpiece for multinational workshops, seminars and exercises aimed at improving coalition interoperability and operational readiness within the region. The MNF SOPs support the Secretary’s Transformation Plan and have been shared with USJFCOM to support their coalition transformation efforts. Developed by the combined efforts of 30 MPAT nations, the procedures are truly a multinational initiative.

Multinational participation in the MPAT program is robust, with 31 nations participating to date. Participation is not limited to Asia-Pacific nations. Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have also supported MPAT program events and the development of multinational force standing operating procedures.

Currently, programs to support coalition building are financed by headquarters O&M funds. Additional funding marked specifically for multinational transformation efforts would greatly improve the Unified Commander’s ability to improve on-going efforts and develop new transformation efforts.

As we strengthen ties with multinational and coalition partners, USPACOM continues to develop restricted-access and secure Internet opportunities with programs such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) and the Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN). Protection of our coalition networks with information assurance technologies is a key component of our experimentation and transformation effort. We’re also transforming our capability to communicate with coalition partners using machine language translation through a variety of text, voice, and pictorial translators.

The ability to place instructional material on the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) to provide Internet-based training and Advanced Distributed Learning would benefit our Asia-Pacific partners and support our Theater Security Cooperation Program. We could more effectively use focused military education programs to develop regional skills required to accomplish cooperative security missions, improve civil-military relations, increase respect for human rights, and strengthen democratic principles. For this reason, legislative initiatives have been drafted aimed at amending law to allow for the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to authorize the Combatant Commander to provide traditional and Internet-based education and non-lethal training to military and civilian government personnel of friendly foreign nations.

Partnering with USJFCOM on a joint fires initiative, PACOM has integrated leading-edge time-sensitive targeting technology into joint operations across the strategic and operational force levels. Over the next two years, with your help, we envision extending our joint fires capabilities to the tactical level through a mix of fires and common picture technologies, such as Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network (JTF WARNET) and FORCEnet. We’ve already reduced the targeting cycle from hours to minutes by improving cross-component collaboration and targeting efficiencies, but there’s still room to improve. The end result will be a more seamless battle space with coordinated fires and reduced risk of fratricide.

We are increasing our capabilities for immediate employment, emphasizing expeditionary combat power. Each of these capabilities has been evaluated to ensure support for regional contingency plans while meeting global requirements. Missile defense has already been discussed.

Stryker Armored Vehicle. The Stryker armored vehicle combines adaptability, firepower, and high technology in an expeditionary package. Lifted by C-17 aircraft or High Speed Vessels, Strykers have great relevance throughout the theater and are currently proving themselves under combat conditions in Iraq, demonstrating a readiness rate that exceeds current requirements. We look forward to the future Stryker brigades in Hawaii and Alaska.

F/A-22 Raptor. We need your support to fund and field the F/A-22 Raptor in the USPACOM AOR. The transformational capabilities of this remarkable aircraft will have enduring relevance for our warfighting needs, and promise to directly enhance both warfighting effectiveness and war plan options in the near future.

SSGN. The conversion of four TRIDENT class submarines to cruise missile/Special Operations Force (SOF) carriers has particular appeal in the Pacific, where our most demanding potential warfights and the continuing threat of terrorism converge. We appreciate your far-sighted support of this important platform.

New Operating Patterns And Concepts. These immediately employable forces are in turn integrated into operating patterns and concepts that satisfy both peacetime and wartime requirements. For example, the Navy’s first Expeditionary Strike Group recently completed a very successful deployment to Southwest Asia and the western Pacific. Tailored air packages, based and launched from such maritime platforms, can satisfy a variety of missions ranging from non-combatant evacuation to maritime interdiction. This concept is particularly adaptable in joint and combined settings.

As yet another example, we routinely deploy bomber elements to Guam, demonstrating both the responsiveness and flexibility of the U.S. Air Force and America’s ability to respond quickly to any crisis in the AOR.

Improving Force Posture And Footprint. Changes in the global security environment provide both the opportunity and the necessity to improve our force posture, positioning forces where they have the greatest warfighting relevance while reducing irritants to host nation citizens. We are considering a number of posture improvements – each of them a response to new threats, updated plans, and increased capabilities of allied and friendly forces.

This element of our transformation strategy is underwritten by five primary assumptions. First, our network of alliances and partnerships in the Pacific region is a strategic asset for the nation - it will not be undermined. We also know that our posture must allow us to deal with uncertainty – because in the future, we probably won’t fight from our current positions. Of course, we are designing posture adjustments to facilitate employment of forces both within and across combatant command regions. Fourth, the immediately employable forces discussed above argue for forward force presence. In short, we’re not looking to move combat power back toward the US mainland. And finally, technological advances allow us to focus on capabilities, as numbers no longer reflect actual combat power.

We are well aware of the domestic and international political sensitivities associated with these changes. We also appreciate the complexity these changes add both to the upcoming BRAC process in 2005 and to our continuing MILCON programs. We will keep our friends, allies, and the Congress informed.

Diversifying Access And Enroute Logistics. Finally we want to diversify contingency access opportunities in the Pacific region. Increasing our access options improves training opportunities, contributes to theater security cooperation objectives and, most important, provides warfighting flexibility when we need it most. We are looking at a number of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) throughout the Pacific - “places” rather than “bases” that meet these goals.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

In the U.S. Pacific Command, our dedicated men and women, both in and out of uniform, continue to operationalize our nation’s strategic guidance, assuring our allies, dissuading our adversaries and deterring aggression. The combined talents and energies of our region’s friends and allies continue to promote peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. We are fully committed – in every conceivable way – to winning the war against terrorism. Meanwhile, we are maintaining a ready and viable fighting force capable of decisively defeating any adversary, all the while mindful that our personnel, our friends and allies and our progressive transformation efforts will continue to improve our Asia-Pacific defense posture for the future.

As you know, our finest citizens wear the cloth of the nation. They have never doubted nor failed to appreciate your advocacy. On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Pacific Command, thank you for your support, and thank you for this opportunity to testify on our defense posture.