Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command,
I thank you for this opportunity to testify on the posture of our command,
including an assessment of security in the Asia-Pacific region.
Dramatic events of the past year in Southwest Asia, for which Pacific
Command has been a primary force provider, have not eclipsed the importance
of Asia-Pacific threats to global security.
First and foremost, we remain keenly focused on the Korean peninsula,
where although I believe the likelihood of war is low, the stakes would
be very high if war occurred - and even higher if North Korea continues
to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. Our role at Pacific Command
has been to ensure diplomacy is backed by viable military capabilities.
We continue to do so.
Next, we are actively working to prevent miscalculation resulting in
conflict between India and Pakistan or in the Taiwan Strait. Recent
dialogue between India and Pakistan and the resulting relaxation in
tensions are very positive signs. Our modest but constructive military-to-military
relationship with China features high level exchanges like Defense Minister
Caos visit to Washington and Hawaii last year, and events that
demonstrate the high quality of our forces, such as the recent port
call of USS BLUE RIDGE in Shanghai. Meanwhile, Taiwan clearly remains
the largest source of friction in our relationship with China. We remain
prepared and committed to meet our obligations under the Taiwan Relations
Transnational threats are a continuing concern in the Pacific region.
Despite recent and notable successes in the War on Terrorism, we remain
deeply concerned about transnational terror organizations including
Al Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah, and by more localized groups like the
Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines. We also sense increasing
synergy between transnational threats like terrorism, illicit drugs,
trafficking in humans, piracy, and especially the proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction. We have a number of creative initiatives ongoing
to address these transnational concerns.
It is against this backdrop of security challenges and opportunities
that we reach my final primary concern transformation. Responding
to the new threat context, recent strategic guidance directs the global
transformation effort. Our initiatives at Pacific Command reflect that
guidance and support the global effort, starting with updated plans
and extending to resulting improvements in command and control, immediately
available capabilities, and force posture. We are coordinating with
our friends and allies in the region to effect enduring improvements
while strengthening our ability to respond to emerging threats.
Our relationships in the region, including five treaty allies and numerous
friendships, are as strong as ever. I am gratified to report nations
within our region are making smart and generous contributions to regional
and global security, including support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
and IRAQI FREEDOM. Since 9/11, the region has demonstrated a heightened
awareness of our interdependent vulnerabilities and the resulting necessity
of cooperation for security. This mutually supportive environment facilitates
both our forward presence in theater and the security programs necessary
to promote a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.
This security context is reflected in our five top priorities at U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM). The following update on our defense posture
is organized within those five priorities.
SUSTAINING AND SUPPORTING THE WAR ON TERRORISM (WOT)
Sustaining and supporting the war on terrorism is our highest priority
at USPACOM. In addition to addressing terror threats in the Pacific
Area of Responsibility (AOR), we are also a primary force provider to
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
Nations of the region continue excellent cooperation against terror
threats. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines
have detained and arrested over 200 members of the Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI) terror group. Thailand has both publicly articulated its terrorism
concerns and taken aggressive steps to eliminate them. And despite significant
domestic complications, Indonesia, too, has been particularly effective
in the arrest and prosecution of 34 JI members who committed the October
2002 bombing in Bali, 27 of whom have now been sentenced for their crimes.
But regional and local terrorist groups with ties to the al-Qaida network
continue to pose dangerous threats to U.S. and our friends, especially
in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is a crucial front in the War on Terror.
The destabilization of the governments of this region moderate,
secular, legitimately elected, with large Muslim populations
would sentence the region to decades of danger and chaos.
The Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI an al-Qaida network
affiliate - directly targets the region for instability, through terrorism,
supporting its ultimate goal of a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.
The JI followed up its October 2002 bombing in Bali with a deadly attack
on the JW Marriott hotel in the heart of the Indonesian capital just
Several of the JIs key leaders are now in custody, including
spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir and interim leader Abu Rusdan, who
was recently convicted for his role in the Bali bombing. Most notable
was the 2003 capture by Thai officials of terrorist Hambali, the JIs
operational head and direct link to Al Qaida.
But the JI is resilient and pervasive. Other key leaders remain at
large, and new terrorist generations are being trained. And we are learning
more about the degree of JI involvement in terrorist operations in southern
Thailand and the southern Philippines.
The Philippines is a strong partner both globally and regionally in
the War on Terrorism. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recently identified
the JI as her governments top terrorism priority.
Of course the Philippines is coping with other terror threats as well,
including the New Peoples Army and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
Primarily a hostage-for-ransom enterprise, the ASG was responsible for
the death of a U.S. Special Operations soldier in 2002, conducted several
bombings in 2003, and most recently claimed responsibility for the bombing
of an interisland ferry in late February. The Philippine Armed Forces
(AFP) have improved their effectiveness against the ASG, highlighted
by Decembers arrest of terrorist Galib Andang, aka Commander
Robot, on Jolo Island.
We are concerned about Jemaah Islamiyah influence in the activities
of some of these indigenous terror groups, including sponsorship of
bombings in Davao City last spring that left 38 people dead. We continue
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Philippines to provide training, advice,
and assistance to the AFP to improve their capability and capacity to
deal with terror threats.
Philosophically, our approach to the terror threat has both near-term
and long-term components. In the near term, we have to stop immediate
threats against our citizens, our friends, property, and vital infrastructure
in short, we have to stop the violence. So this near-term effort
includes defeating actual attacks, disrupting the enemys plans,
and proactive defensive measures. Clearly, we dont see military
action as the sole or even primary instrument of national power in this
fight - intelligence sharing and law enforcement lead much of this effort.
These near-term efforts are an essential but incomplete solution, because
the war on terrorism, like the fight against other transnational threats,
cannot be won by attrition alone. Terrorists can multiply faster than
they can be captured or killed.
So our long-term effort is focused on strengthening the regions
democratic institutions that provide security at the economic, social,
and physical (i.e., education, law enforcement, basic services) levels.
Many of our efforts, including the Theater Security Cooperation Program
(discussed below) directly support this long-term goal. We believe well
reach a tipping point in the War on Terrorism when sound governance
prevails, and citizens value their institutions more than they fear
Meanwhile, near term efforts include both proactive defenses and direct
efforts to go on the offensive, if necessary, to capture or kill terrorists
in the Pacific theater.
Homeland Defense And Civil Support. The USPACOM Homeland Defense AOR
includes the State of Hawaii, the territories of Guam and American Samoa,
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States
of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau,
referred to as Compact States; and the following possessions: Wake Island,
Midway Islands, Johnston Island, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra
Atoll, Kingman Reef, and associated territorial waters. We are leveraging
our Theater Security Cooperation Program to build support and capabilities
throughout the USPACOM AOR to support overarching HLD efforts. We are
coordinating with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to ensure the same
seamless strategy for defense in depth of the U.S. mainland.
Our Strategic Concept Plan for HLD is in the final stages of coordination,
but many aspects of the plan are already operational. All USPACOM service
components contribute to the mission. Programs such as the Joint Rear
Area Coordinators, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Homeland Air
Security, Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-yield explosives (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations
are just a few of the activities coordinated under the HLD Plan. We
appreciate your continued support to ensure we have the resources necessary
to continue these essential missions.
USPACOMs Biological Warfare Countermeasures Initiative (BWCI)
was established last year, leading DoD efforts to incorporate BW mitigating
measures into deliberate plans, coalition needs, and domestic interagency
efforts. We are partnered with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and
Department of Homeland Security in this initiative.
Civil Support (CS) is another key part of the overall Homeland Security
effort. CS operations enhance our existing Domestic Support Operations
to civil authorities. We have well-established relationships and mutual
cooperation plans with these authorities and provide support as directed
by the Secretary of Defense. Our HLD plan addresses the full spectrum
of CS responses from terrorist acts to natural disasters like recent
typhoons in Guam. I support a standardized security clearance system
that facilitates the immediate sharing of appropriate time-sensitive
intelligence with local law enforcement and civil authorities.
Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) in Guam, Hawaii, Japan, and Korea
(and Joint Task Force Alaska) provide the command and control
construct to synchronize our DoD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP)
efforts for military installations and property with federal, state,
and local agencies and with host nations in the cases of Japan and Korea.
Once again, we are coordinating our efforts and procedures with USNORTHCOM.
USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program for our
DoD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas throughout the AOR.
We use assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
the services, and our components to ensure our facilities have updated
assessments and proactive AT/FP plans. We also work closely with the
State Department to ensure host-nation support is adequate to help protect
our deployed forces using the latest AT/FP procedures.
Theater and country specific Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are
continually reviewed and updated as necessary. Random Antiterrorism
Measures are employed to complicate terrorist planning. PACOM also employs
a travel restriction program, providing a tool to declare entire countries
or portions thereof "off-limits" to DoD members as necessary.
In addition, Force Protection plans are required for all travel in our
AOR, from major unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource
commitment for increased FPCONs, however, presents a formidable challenge,
both in terms of manpower and essential technologies. Your continued
support to PACOMs Force Protection objectives is necessary to
sustain the progress we are making in this area.
Our Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program assesses infrastructure
upon which PACOM depends for missions ranging from offensive combat
operations to Homeland Defense. This broad-based program includes personnel,
health operations, financial services, logistics, transportation, space,
defense information, C3, intelligence, and public works sectors. We
recently published the first CIP Appendix to one of our primary theater
Operational Plans and fielded a CIP database that identifies relationships
between mission-critical supporting assets, associated vulnerabilities
and protection requirements. Another building block is the development
of our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, which describes how we
fundamentally conduct CIP throughout the AOR. Additionally, our bilateral
CIP activities with friends and allies in the region have laid the groundwork
to protect infrastructure outside the U.S. upon which we depend to fulfill
our regional security obligations.
The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF) provides
commanders additional resources to defend against emergent terrorist
threats. PACOM has received $9 Million in CbT RIF funds in FY04 and
hopes to receive additional funds after completion of the second round
of CbT RIF. The first submission of FY04 CbT RIF included 58 new and
20 revalidated projects from FY03 totaling $26 million. Our FY04 requests
include a barrier wall for the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies,
hydraulic gates for the PACOM headquarters, a Mobile Observation Post
for Yokota airbase, and closed circuit TV and intrusion detection systems
in Japan, Korea, and Camp Pendleton. Thank you for supporting this fund.
Coordination with law enforcement. We have established a model for
theater counter-intelligence (CI) operations by fusing DoD, law enforcement,
and other government agency information, and incorporating allied contributions.
DoD intelligence analysts embedded in the FBIs Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) - Hawaii markedly enhance our ability to identify
threats and gain insights into terrorist organization planning and operations.
JTTF members participate in USPACOM planning for counter-terrorist operations
in the region while simultaneously supporting HLD efforts. The Patriot
Act, which facilitates such interagency coordination, has enhanced our
ability to share information on terrorist threats.
Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT)
is the PACOM staff entity responsible for coordinating DoD and other
government agency CT activities within the USPACOM AOR. Last year, the
JIACG combined intelligence, operations, and training goals with interagency
representation to produce our first theater CT Campaign Plan. This plan,
aligned with Department of State goals embedded in embassy Mission Performance
Plans, focuses on both near-term and long-term WOT efforts. These efforts
include CT resource creation, terrorist identification and destruction,
and the long-term effort to strengthen democratic institutions of governance.
As the lead staff element in USPACOMs fight against transnational
threats, the mission of JIACG-CT is being broadened to include coordination
of our counter-drug and counter-proliferation efforts.
The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) has long been
USPACOMs premier operational counter-drug entity. Formerly based
in California, JIATF-W is relocating to Hawaii to better confront the
narcotic threat in the western Pacific. Its experience, assets, and
interagency relationships will also be relevant against related transnational
threats like narco-terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and especially
weapons proliferation. JIATF-Ws interagency approach facilitates
contributions of law enforcement, host nations and special operations
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). The ungoverned littoral
regions of Southeast Asia are fertile ground for exploitation by transnational
threats like proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in humans or drugs,
and piracy. The Presidents Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
and State Departments Malacca Strait Initiative are designed to
improve international cooperation against these threats.
RMSI is USPACOMs effort to operationalize these initiatives.
Fundamentally, we need to gain an awareness of the maritime domain to
match the picture we have of our international airspace. Working first
with other navies of the region, our approach is to assess and then
provide detailed plans to build and synchronize interagency and international
capacity to fight threats that use the maritime space to facilitate
their illicit activity. And of course there are other government agencies
that play a key role here, too. We have found this concept well received
by our friends and allies in the region.
This is a large undertaking that requires us to harness available and
emerging technologies to develop that maritime situational awareness.
It also requires responsive decision making architectures and the right
kinds of immediately available, expeditionary forces to take action
when the decision has been made to do so.
Our long-term effort in the War on Terrorism focuses on strengthening
democratic institutions to enhance governance and address the underlying
problems that give rise to terrorist movements in the first place. This
element includes civil-military education programs and especially our
Theater Security Cooperation Program.
Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship (RDCTF) funds are a valuable
tool in our efforts to combat terrorism in the Pacific. Through this
flexible and responsive program, weve trained over 130 students
from seven partner nations (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal,
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) and are building a community of
counter-terrorism experts and practitioners who share a common perspective
on the proper response to terror threats.
International Military Education And Training (IMET) exposes future
leaders to U.S. values, including commitment to the rule of law, the
role of a professional military in a democratic society, and overall
military professionalism. Grant funding has removed financial barriers
to U.S. military education and training for friends and allies located
in regions subject to untoward influences, and has contributed to the
readiness of troops providing post-hostility engineering and peacekeeping
support in Afghanistan and Iraq. Combined with training offered through
the Foreign Military Sales process, IMET promotes U.S. military education
and training as the recognized standard worldwide. Consequently, demand
has surpassed supply as it relates to school capacity. Innovation has
addressed this issue in the near-term but real capacity increases are
necessary to build upon our success. I appreciate your support of this
Our Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) is the vehicle through
which we extend U.S. influence, develop access, and promote competence
among potential coalition partners. These activities directly support
the War on Terror and enhance readiness for contingency actions against
emerging threats. We also coordinate the TSCP with the country teams
in our embassies to ensure our efforts complement their Mission Performance
Plans. TSC activities clearly help strengthen institutions of governance,
directly contributing to our long-term counter-terrorism effort.
IMPROVING READINESS AND JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY OF PACIFIC
Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of USPACOM
forces is critical to assuring our friends and allies, dissuading military
competition, deterring threats against U.S. interests, and defeating
an adversary if deterrence fails. This priority includes providing the
spare parts, operating dollars, and training needed to maintain ready
forces. It also means innovating, transforming, and improving those
capabilities and technologies needed to keep our forces ready for a
wide range of alternative futures.
Past investments in readiness paid off in 2003. Approximately 51,000
PACOM active duty personnel have or are scheduled to deploy in support
of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Pacific Fleet units deploying
to OEF and OIF last year included the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CARL VINSON,
CONSTELLATION, NIMITZ, and KITTY HAWK Carrier Strike Groups; independently
deploying submarines; maritime patrol aircraft; Naval Mobile Construction
and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units, and a significant portion of
our reserve force including Harbor Defense, Coastal Warfare, Mobile
Inshore Undersea Warfare, and Inshore Boat Units. The TARAWA and ESSEX
Amphibious Ready Groups deployed with the 15th and 31st Marine Expeditionary
Units embarked. The seven-ship Amphibious Task Force West, built around
amphibious assault ships BOXER and BONHOMME RICHARD deployed with the
First Marine Division, and the year closed out with the initial deployment
of Expeditionary Strike Group ONE with flagship USS PELELIU and the
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) embarked.
About 2,000 Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) personnel already have deployed
to Southwest Asia supporting Aerospace Expeditionary Forces for OEF
and OIF. Our Army Forces in the Pacific - active, reserve and guard
- are also making important contributions in the USCENTCOM AOR. An airborne
task force from Alaska and an aviation maintenance unit from the Hawaii
Army National Guard have been in Afghanistan for the past six months.
More USARPAC contributions are in progress. The 25th Infantry Division
(25th ID) Headquarters and one Brigade Combat Team (BCT) are deploying
to Afghanistan now, and another 25th ID BCT is currently serving in
Northern Iraq. CH-47 aircraft of the Hawaii Army National Guard and
the 411th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve) are also en route Iraq.
The 1st Brigade of the 25th ID at Fort Lewis, Washington, now a Stryker
Brigade Combat Team, will deploy to Iraq later this year, replacing
the 3d Brigade of the 2d Infantry Division, also stationed at Fort Lewis.
At the peak, approximately 16,500 USARPAC forces will be assigned to
In light of our impressive combat performance in Southwest Asia, it
would be easy to conclude that our current programs are more than adequate
to meet every conceivable threat. But even as we incorporate the lessons
learned from those conflicts, and with great appreciation for the exceptional
quality of our people and equipment, we also recognize that many of
USPACOMs most demanding current and future warfighting challenges
were simply not stressed in Southwest Asia. These missions include missile
defense, undersea warfare, and air superiority.
Missile Defense. Cruise- and ballistic missile threats are rapidly
increasing in the USPACOM AOR. Our ability to defend against them is
fundamental to homeland defense, regional peace and stability, and to
successful execution of our contingency plans. We need an integrated,
tiered missile defense system.
Our Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Command and Control elements, and
interceptor assets will be ready to support Missile Defense Initial
Defensive Operations on or before 1 October. We still need to increase
the numbers of PATRIOT GEM and PAC-3 missiles ashore and develop a sea-based
terminal missile defense capability. Sea-based systems reduce our overall
footprint ashore while providing flexible, more secure options. I applaud
your efforts to date supporting development and fielding of our missile
Undersea Superiority. USPACOM faces the greatest undersea warfare challenge
in the world. 250 submarines call the Pacific home - but only 30 percent
of these submarines belong to allied nations. A robust and integrated
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) architecture, more capable force structure
and a committed investment in future technologies are essential to counter
the growing submarine threat.
Submarines remain the premier ASW asset. Our new VIRGINIA class boats
will meet our ASW needs well into the future, particularly in the challenging
littoral environment. Congressional efforts last year also provided
funding to refuel two additional 688 Class submarines. To ensure sufficient
submarines are available to counter future threats and defeat anti-access
strategies, we must seriously consider funding the remaining refuelings
of 688 Class submarines and sustain an adequate VIRGINIA class submarine
Maritime Patrol Aircraft provide quick responding long range ASW and
high demand ISR capabilities. The P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft sustainment
program and follow on Multi-Mission Aircraft are critical to respond
to emergent submarine threats. I also strongly support the acquisition
of Automatic Periscope Detection technology for both surface ships and
Maritime Patrol Aircraft employed in littoral regions.
Air Superiority. The F/A-22 Raptor will deliver quantum air power improvements
with great relevance in the Pacific theater. Combining stealth, high
speed, and precision weaponry, Raptor will buy back battlespace and
increase warfighting options for the joint force commander. We need
your support to fund and field this aircraft.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The WOT and traditional military threats
demand ever-increasing agility and innovation in intelligence. SIGINT
remains critical to our requirements for timely threat information.
Access to signals is challenging and requires a concentrated effort
to expand collections capacity and increase technical capabilities to
ensure we can adapt to changes in adversary Command and Control (C2)
systems and processes.
The National Security Agency (NSA) and Service SIGINT capabilities
are crucial to our counter-terrorism efforts. The ability to integrate
both National and Tactical SIGINT is key to daily operations and the
execution of deliberate and contingency plans. However, rapid advances
in telecommunications technologies, and their use by our adversaries,
are outpacing intelligence-gathering capabilities.
I strongly support the NSAs transformation efforts to meet the
challenges of the digital technology revolution. They must have the
resources necessary to remain technically strong and provide capabilities
to meet our requirements. NSAs capabilities against modernized
militaries and transnational entities such as terrorists and weapon
proliferators remain key to PACOM objectives.
Regarding tactical systems, I continue to advocate the accelerated
development and fielding of joint, interoperable, modular, rapidly reconfigurable
land, sea, and air SIGINT platforms. These improvements should be integrated
into collaborative intelligence processing systems to make the best
use of the increased data gathered.
Without concurrent improvements in NSAs capabilities and in Service
tactical cryptologic systems, it will be increasingly difficult to predict,
find and target the most serious threats to U.S. national security interests.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Improving our HUMINT collection capability
against key PACOM challenges, especially as it relates to hard and deeply
buried C2, WMD facilities, proliferation, and terrorist activities is
critical. Sustained resources for both CIA and DOD (Defense HUMINT Services)
will yield the progress we need. Our military commanders must have insight
into the plans and intentions of our potential adversaries - something
that HUMINT is uniquely capable of providing.
Cryptologic Linguists. To be successful in counterterrorism we require
linguists with a high degree of proficiency in many different languages
and dialects. The minimum requirement is for 3/3 language capability;
many targets require 4/4 (native) speakers. Maintaining a permanent
cadre of cryptologic linguists with that degree of proficiency across
a wide range of low-density languages and dialects is prohibitively
expensive. So in addition to expanding training and recruiting initiatives,
we must ensure the Defense Manpower Data Centers Automated Language
Finder database tracks those personnel who are native speakers or who
have acquired the requisite skills, and that the Defense Language Institute
can test for those language skills.
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). The requirement for electro-optical,
radar and infrared imagery remains crucial. IMINT converted into geospatial
data and integrated with other source material is critical to the commanders
in the field and provides much-needed context to decision makers.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The broad expanse of the USPACOM AOR
and lack of access into denied areas make surveillance a significant
challenge. We need a dynamic mix of national and airborne assets capable
of maintaining access for IMINT and SIGINT coverage over target areas
for extended periods. Persistent ISR assets greatly enhance our ability
to perform counter-proliferation and counter-narcotics missions, combat
piracy, and combat terrorism. Scientific and technical advancements
like multispectral imaging aboard high altitude, high endurance assets
such as the U-2 and Global Hawk UAV are ideally suited to support our
requirements. Early fielding of Global Hawk in the USPACOM AOR is essential.
Tactical level systems like the Predator UAV are also of great value
in this theater. However, limited airframes, sensors, and dissemination
systems prevent us from taking full advantage of these capabilities.
This complementary arrangement of persistent surveillance using both
theater and national systems is critical to ensuring sufficient warning
and situational awareness.
Tasking, Planning, Exploitation & Dissemination (TPED). PACOM requires
a complete, joint TPED architecture to support future plans and contingencies.
This architecture must accept inputs from a multitude of ISR assets
and share this data freely among service Deployable Common Ground System
(DCGS) nodes as well as intelligence users worldwide. Effective TPED
of geospatial intelligence is crucial to providing the Combatant Commander,
operational, and tactical forces with an incontrovertible view of the
battlespace. Limited resources, coupled with great distances make interoperability
among service DCGS nodes a critical element to accomplishing TPED and
ISR missions within the theater.
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMPUTER, COMMUNICATION (C4) IMPROVEMENTS
C4 Modernization. We have made significant improvements in bandwidth
availability through leases with commercial providers. We are on track
with Satellite Communications Programs to replace failing satellites.
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) assures bandwidth will be
available whenever and wherever needed, at least to an installations
But we cannot deliver sufficient bandwidth from the front door of the
installation to the warrior. The dated wires, cables, and switches installed
on our bases have insufficient capacity to support applications and
services that are based on the steady improvements in telecommunications
technology. There is also a digital gap between strategic and tactical
environments. Most tactical users rely on Radio Frequency (RF) links,
but RF links can only deliver a fraction of same bandwidth available
from landlines. As we greatly expand landline capacity through the Global
Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion, we must tailor applications for
the bandwidth capacity that tactical users have available to perform
Joint Information Capabilities Enhancement Environment (JICEE). True
transformation involves changing the way we implement information systems
from industrial-age, single-purpose systems, to information-age methods,
wherein we define the framework of the entire information infrastructure
then align programs-of-record to capability-areas within the framework.
To move this transformation along, we need to develop a Joint Information
Capabilities Enhancement Environment (JICEE). This requires decomposition
of existing programs, reassembling associated systems into a common
networked environment. Weve defined a framework, and with the
support of the Command Information Superiority Architecture (CISA) program,
have partnered with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop and
test a model to capture existing programs and costs to illustrate their
contribution to end-to-end capability for gap and duplication analysis.
We intend to use JICEE to define the objective information and knowledge
services network with the roadmap that shows how to integrate, interface,
leverage and decompose when necessary, projects, initiatives and programs-of-record
to get there.
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System. (CENTRIXS)
is the effort to establish permanent, classified coalition networks
between U.S. and coalition partners. Today, CENTRIXS networks support
maritime forces and shore planning staffs for escort and maritime interdiction
missions for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. The communities
of interest for CENTRIXS now include Australia, Canada, United Kingdom,
United States, Japan, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and
New Zealand. CENTRIXS provides e-mail, web access, chat and common operational
picture capabilities with our coalition partners. With CENTRIXS weve
made significant strides working with our allies to support the War
on Terrorism and have planned extensive expansion of these networks
for the near future. USPACOM is working in concert with other Regional
Combatant Commanders, USJFCOM, and the CENTRIXS Program Management Office
toward a common network architecture that continues to support global
Agile Coalition Environment (ACE). Our ability to connect networks
to, and share information with, our allies and security cooperation
partners is a major challenge. The Agile Coalition Environment (ACE)
effort is developing crypto devices agile enough to create virtual private
networks (VPNs) to support bilateral and tailored multi-lateral relationships
without having to build or lock-down unique networks for each community-of-interest
security enclave. ACE enables CENTRIXS to converge from a set of independent
networks to a single network that supports multiple security enclaves
on an on-demand basis.
Computer Network Defense (CND) is a major part of our comprehensive
Information Assurance strategy. Our adversaries are constantly developing
new ways to use computer vulnerabilities to deny access to or exploit
our information resources. We need constant training on the latest tools,
techniques, and vulnerabilities to sustain a highly trained team of
CND professionals. This team maintains a strong relationship with the
Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations, the DISA Pacific Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the DoD CERT to stay abreast on the
latest information assurance advisories to maintain the tightest perimeter
Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) is critical to the success
of future joint task force operations across the operational spectrum
from Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) to high intensity warfare. This
communications-enabling package has significant potential to strengthen
command and control for the JTF by providing a rapid deployment capability,
standardized C2 processes across the components, and standardized C4
systems from the strategic to operational levels. I am concerned, however,
that DJC2 lacks organic mobility and the ability to interface anticipated
C4 systems with our coalition partners. Both USJFCOM and OSD are working
to resolve these issues, but these capabilities may require additional
resources to ensure they are delivered on schedule in March 2005.
EXERCISES. Exercise events provide essential opportunities to hone
a spectrum of security skills in multilateral settings, and are a key
component of both our Joint Training Plan and Theater Security Cooperation
Exercises such as Cooperative COPE THUNDER provide an opportunity for
engagement in the Pacific Alaska Range Complex (PARC), a facility more
than five times the size of the RED FLAG range in Nevada. This years
COPE THUNDER participants included: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Germany,
India, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
and the United Kingdom.
Our BALIKATAN series in the Philippines is a critical element of our
continuing effort to build an enduring CT capacity and capability in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It also provides excellent training
opportunities for U.S. forces, and does so in a manner that both exercises
contingency access and relieves training pressures due to encroachment
elsewhere in theater.
Our premier multilateral exercise in the Pacific is COBRA GOLD, an
annual event hosted by Thailand. This exercise is specifically designed
to promote capabilities and cooperation to deal with foreign consequence
management, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping/enforcement operations,
non-combatant evacuation operations, and transnational threats like
terrorism and illicit narcotics.
Our Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program allows
us to influence and leverage our nations investment in science
and technology, expediting advanced technologies to our warfighters.
Today USPACOM is sponsoring 18 ACTD projects - more than any other
regional combatant command. We have distributed the workload across
the whole theater - almost all service component and Sub-Unified Commanders
and most of my Staff Directors have responsibility for at least one
ACTD. A number of our ACTDs have accelerated state-of-the-art technologies
into Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. For example, the
Thermobaric Weapon ACTD accelerated its tunnel-penetrating-munition
development for combat use in Afghanistan. The Language and Speech Exploitation
Resources (LASER) ACTD currently provides language translation support
for intelligence collection and ongoing operations in both Afghanistan
and Iraq. And the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal ACTD has provided
networked reachback support for hundreds of explosive ordnance events
in Iraq and Afghanistan. In all, eight PACOM ACTD projects are directly
contributing to the War on Terrorism.
We have been awarded three new ACTD Projects starting in FY04. These
include the Theater Effects Based Operations (TEBO) ACTD, which is a
partnership with USFK and USJFCOM and has direct application in the
work of our Standing Joint Force Headquarters.
TRAINING FACILITIES AND RANGES
Transformation of the Pacific Alaska Range Complex (PARC) into a 21st
Century Joint Training Complex and Joint National Training Capability
venue is important. Integrating virtual capabilities with existing training
ranges is the next step in providing our warfighters the optimum combat
USPACOM forces are performing an increasing number of missions ranging
from major combat in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to humanitarian assistance.
Mission success requires realistic training something inert ordnance
cannot completely provide. The first exposure to live fire faced by
our forces must not come in a hostile combat environment, but rather
in a controlled but authentic training environment where they can learn
from their experiences and condition themselves to face the real
thing. We are integrating virtual training technologies with live
facilities and exercises to maximize training value within existing
However, we are increasingly limited in our ability to conduct this
training, because of restrictions on space, hours, ordnance, and radio
frequencies. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK)
work closely with state and federal agencies to minimize range encroachment
and to mitigate the environmental impacts associated with the Pacific
Alaska Range Complex (PARC). Our primary live-fire range in the western
Pacific, Farallon de Medinilla (FDM) is heavily used now only because
we received legislative relief associated with the Migratory Bird Treaty
Training at Makua Range on Oahu is limited in the number and type of
training cycles we can conduct, so more of our annual small unit training
is achieved via deployment to the Pohakuloa range which also supports
battalion level and higher combined arms live-fire exercises on the
Island of Hawaii. We have also established a Joint Training Requirements
Group to ensure effective use of available training areas in support
of all service components and allies training in Hawaii and the Pacific
AOR. This initiative will be fully integrated with the Joint National
Training Capability through our new Pacific Warfighting Center. Finally,
we are leveraging our Theater Security Cooperation Program to supplement
our training locations as encroachment continues to restrict our training
Many military facilities are also becoming foci for biodiversity, with
development and expansion encroaching on our facilities. Where once
our bases and training areas were remote sites, urban expansion now
surrounds them, forcing some species, including some endangered species,
into relatively safer environments of military facilities.
We are very good stewards of the environment. We have set aside space
for protected species, altered or deferred some units training
to avoid interference in nesting areas, and developed specific programs
to increase the populations of protected or endangered species.
For the most part, the military's answer to encroachment challenges
has been to work around the immediate problems while attempting to minimize
the impact on the quality and quantity of training. For example, environmental
concerns now impose noise restrictions that force important low altitude
maneuvers to use unrealistically high altitudes and limit the use of
ranges. Maneuver space is reduced, training lanes become narrow, and
our individual maneuvers become too predictable or repetitive. The central
question is how all these important interests can be advanced in a balanced
and cooperative way.
As part of our efforts to seek this balance, we sought and received
narrowly focused clarifications to the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) and the Endangered Species Act that provide us the needed flexibility
to train our forces for combat while continuing our commitment to environmental
stewardship through necessary protection of marine mammals and endangered
You also clarified the Endangered Species Act by specifying that Integrated
Natural Resource Management Plans (INRMPs) be used in lieu of designating
critical habitat. DoD is already obligated under the Sikes Act to develop
INRMPs for lands under military control. INRMPs are prepared in cooperation
with the Fish and Wildlife Service and state agencies, which recommend
ways for DoD to better provide for species conservation and recovery.
While we understand there are attempts to roll back these new provisions,
it is critical that we be given an opportunity to implement them on
our military ranges and operating areas. We will use the increased flexibility
to ensure that we have access to ranges and operating areas vital to
training our forces for future conflicts. We appreciate your efforts
to help us maintain our readiness while protecting the environment.
LOGISTICS AND MOBILITY
We continue to improve our ability to adapt plans and rapidly flow
forces and equipment. At the same time, we must efficiently sustain
these forces as they move forward. Working in partnership with U.S.
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), we have made steady progress identifying
and prioritizing existing strategic air and sealift infrastructure improvement
projects to support the WOT, or if required, a major theater war in
the Pacific. Our Pacific Command En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee
(PERISC) commissioned the study of several strategically located airfields
in the theater, gathering appropriate infrastructure data and applying
this information to model personnel and cargo throughput capability.
Our current enroute airlift system includes Elmendorf AFB Alaska, Hickam
AFB Hawaii, Andersen AFB Guam, and Japans Iwakuni MCAS, Kadena
AB, Misawa AB, and Yokota AB. The PERISC has validated and championed
over $100M in fuel hydrant, ramp and runway projects at these locations
to support the National Military Strategy and Mobility Requirements
Study 2005. We also identified seven projects at Elemendorf AFB, Alaska
and Hickam AFB, Hawaii in FY05 to support the assignment of C17
aircraft at both locations. These and other investments throughout the
AOR will ensure we have the required infrastructure readiness.
Theater In-Transit Visibility is required to allow the Joint Force
Commander to see force closure for deployments and avoid unnecessary
costs and inefficiencies for sustainment and distribution. In the past,
in-transit visibility was typically provided to Joint Force Commanders
from Ports of Embarkation (POE) to Ports of Debarkation (i.e. the USTRANSCOM
air and sea channels). End-to-end visibility for either deployment or
sustainment distribution prior to the POE, or in-theater from the Port
of Debarkation to the ultimate destination did not exist.
In October 2003, OSD published the first Department-wide Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) policy. Recently updated in February 2004, this
policy mandates the implementation and expansion of Active RFID. The
immediate implementation of this policy will provide USPACOM with enablers
for both In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and Total Asset Visibility (TAV).
USPACOMs current RFID infrastructure is limited and Army-centric,
primarily supporting Army deployments to the Korean theater. To meet
OSDs mandate and USPACOMs requirement for Total Asset Visibility,
extensive RFID instrumentation must be obtained and installed in PACOM.
Instrumentation locations encompass our strategic and multi-nodal ports,
including transload locations, and extend to supply activities and originating
bases of deploying forces, ultimately including final destinations.
To mirror USCENTCOMs current capability for TAV in our theater,
every effort should be made to fund and train personnel needed to activate
Preferred munitions. Emergent requirements in support of Operations
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM resulted in reduced availability
of preferred munitions and have forced us to rely on older stocks for
a period of time. A robust near term inventory of GPS-aided and laser-guided
bombs such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Wind Correct
Munitions Dispensers (WCMD) and GBU-10/12 pre-staged ashore, supplemented
by more weapons available from afloat or deployable stockpiles would
provide PACOM with a more accurate, reliable capability. In the future,
well also need significant quantities of emerging weaponry, such
as Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) and Joint Air to Surface Standoff Munition
(JASSM). Positioning these weapons forward in theater will reduce lift
requirements in the early stages of a conflict when those assets are
C-17 aircraft. PACOM strongly supports U.S. Air Force and USTRANSCOM
efforts to procure at least 222 C-17 aircraft as the minimum baseline
to ensure responsive global mobility and provide the flexibility and
capacity to support DoD warfighting transformation. Our number one strategic
lift shortfall is airlift due to retirement of aging C-141 aircraft,
poor C-5 reliability. The C-17 is one of only two strategic airlift
platforms in the Air Mobility Command inventory capable of providing
over- and outsized cargo lift capacity. The only other aircraft is the
less reliable C-5. The current Air Force POM funds 180 C-17 aircraft,
however, in light of increasing War on Terrorism demands, additional
C-17 aircraft should be procured.
USPACOM anticipates basing eight C-17s each at Hickam AFB, Hawaii in
December 2005 and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska starting in 2007. Active duty
Air Force and Air Reserve Component forces Hawaii Air National
Guard and Alaskan Air Force Reservists will operate these strategic
mobility aircraft. These aircraft will bring vastly increased reliability,
versatility and large capacity to and through the Pacific theater.
High Speed Vessels (HSV) provide a flexible alternative for intra-theater
movement in USPACOM, including its use to augment airlift. Since October
2001, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) has been testing a leased
HSV with great success and cost savings for exercise deployments and
redeployments, as well as operational employment. JOINT VENTURE HSV
X1, the Joint Army/Navy HSV that participated in Millennium Challenge
2002 and other exercises, was scheduled to support U.S. Army training
in the USPACOM Theater from March to April 2003, but was diverted to
support USCENTCOM for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
Without a doubt, HSV capabilities were critical to the early success
of OIF. The speed and range of the HSV-X1 allowed it to rapidly deploy
to USCENTCOM. There, it was successfully employed as an afloat staging
base for Naval Special Warfare combatant craft operations. In Oct 03,
a new HSV-X2 SWIFT, replaced the HSV-X1, and is serving as a Mine Warfare
Command and Support ship. In the USPACOM AOR, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)
will use HSV-X1 to conduct exercises and training under our Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. We fully support continued
leasing of tailorable High Speed Vessels as force projection and lift
Tanker Aircraft. Our National Security Strategy cannot be executed
without air-refueling tankers, yet many of ours are nearly 50 years
old. The average age of the fleet is 43 years, and the cost of keeping
these aging aircraft mission capable is increasingly prohibitive. In
the Pacific Command, air-refueling tankers are critical to execution
of theater war plans as early deployers in support of the Pacific Tanker
Air Bridge. Meanwhile, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and
NOBLE EAGLE have demonstrated the operational impact air refueling capability
has in support of the WOT. The KC-135 aircraft comprises 90% of the
tanker fleet, and their usage has increased 45% over employment programmed
before 11 Sept 01. The FY02 DoD Appropriation Bill authorized the Air
Force to negotiate the lease/purchase of 100 commercial B-767 aircraft
for air refueling use an issue currently under DoD Inspector
General investigation. Regardless of the tanker lease resolution, we
still need a viable option to replace the aging tanker fleet.
Aircraft Mission Capable Rates. We continue to be concerned about low
Pacific Command aircraft Mission Capable rates. Aging aircraft inventory
and parts shortages continue to drive reduced Mission Capable rates,
reduced fill rates for our "go to war" Readiness Spares Packages,
and high cannibalization rates. Although funding for spare parts has
improved over the past several years, shortages still exist. As an example,
only 1 of 6 Pacific Air Forces A-10, F-15, and F-16 wings maintained
minimum Mission Capable standards during FY 03. The F-15Cs at Kadena
Air Base are, on average, 26 years old 11 years beyond the Air
Forces maximum desirable age for fighter aircraft. We must recapitalize
our fighter force structure.
IMPROVING QUALITY OF SERVICE FOR OUR MEN AND WOMEN
Improved Quality of Service (QoS) for our men and women is our third
priority. Inseparable from combat readiness, it is certainly more than
just good Quality of Life. It also means providing the high quality
operating facilities, the tools, and the information technology necessary
for our personnel to achieve their goals and execute their missions
with efficiency and a minimum of frustration. The QoS initiatives included
in the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act demonstrate the commitment
of military and congressional leadership to meet the needs of our deserving
service members and their families.
Quality of Life in PACOM is good and improving. In the near term, were
focused on retention, operating tempo, and housing and school improvements.
Competing for and retaining the best people. We must not take current
high retention rates for granted. High operating tempo associated with
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, coupled with a recovering
economy, could challenge our ability to retain quality personnel at
required levels. A proactive approach featuring competitive compensation
and thoughtful force management is required.
On behalf of the men and women of Pacific Command, thank you for your
support of recent initiatives including: an average 4 percent pay raise,
increases in allowances for family separation, housing, and cost of
living, and pay premiums that recognize special sacrifices like Assignment
Incentive Pay in Korea and Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay. Deployed
personnel in harms way will also be more at ease knowing that
additional family assistance has been provided in the form of child
care, education, and youth services for their loved ones back home.
These initiatives will help us recruit and retain our highly skilled
troops and their families.
Operating Tempo. Our forces have performed magnificently during Operations
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2003, USPACOMs forward-based
forces largely remained in place during these conflicts to help maintain
our deterrent posture. Air and naval forces that did participate were
quickly returned to their home bases for rest, repair, and readiness
for further assignment. As we enter 2004, Marines from the III Marine
Expeditionary Force and Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division are
beginning rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq. We will work to mitigate
resulting impacts on these troops and their families while compensating
with additional forces to maintain our readiness posture forward.
Reserve Mobilization: We continue to rely on our Reserve and Guard
members to help us accomplish our missions in the Pacific. These outstanding
citizen-service members contribute hard work and unique talents. As
a matter of policy, Pacific Command relies heavily on volunteers. Since
9/11, we have mobilized approximately 5,000 service members who have
served tours up to 2 years in length.
Today there are about 40 mobilized reservists working at our headquarters
and about 1,700 mobilized reservists throughout the USPACOM AOR, serving
within the ranks of our service components. All of these members are
making important contributions in key roles such as force protection,
planning, logistics flow, and myriad other critical areas.
We will continue to promote judicious use of our Reserve forces. We
actively support Secretary Rumsfelds initiatives to relieve the
pressure on the Guard and Reserve and to rebalance the force for the
future. America can be proud of the way our reserve forces have responded
to our nations needs.
Force Health Protection. We are working with OSD to ensure Smallpox
and Anthrax Vaccines are authorized and will be available for those
who need it. Last year, the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) posed a new global threat. Although we didnt have a single
case among our troops, we remain vigilant, and will take steps to limit
our forces exposure whenever possible. Another continuing threat
in the Pacific is HIV/AIDS. Weve partnered with select countries
for HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs in their militaries a significant
step in fostering both healthy peacekeepers and economic stability.
I also want to emphasize the need for integrated and standardized medical
information systems across DoD. Unified Commands, among others, are
responsible for reporting and tracking disease surveillance and vaccination
data. However, no military wide automated systems exist to support these
tasks. To this end, I support a USPACOM-led demonstration project to
test and evaluate DoDs Theater Medical Information Program, currently
under development, to integrate a joint medical information system,
both in garrison and deployment.
Military Housing. Quality housing provides peace of mind for our forces
and underscores our commitment to Quality of Life. Recent increases
in Basic Allowance for Housing support the DoD goal of zero out-of-pocket
housing expenses by FY05 for personnel living on the economy.
Meanwhile, our service components remain committed to replace or renovate
substandard military family housing, relying on housing privatization
initiatives (such as Public Private Venture and Residential Communities
Initiative) and Military Construction. These initiatives are a win-win
for the community and serve to provide high quality, well-designed military
housing developments. Pacific service components and US Forces Korea
(USFK) are in the process of adding or replacing over 1,200 family housing
units in FY04 alone. Your continued support of military housing privatization
initiatives is appreciated. Still, MILCON is required to meet DPG goals,
especially overseas. In our FY05 program, we have nearly $300 million
in MILCON family housing projects.
Continued funding is also essential to improve bachelor housing. For
FY05, $291 million is required to keep all components on plan. Navy,
Air Force, and Marine components are on track to eliminate open bay
and central latrine barracks. Army will meet this goal in Hawaii and
South Korea by FY08 and FY09, respectively.
Schools. Competitive schools are a top quality of life concern, especially
in Guam and Hawaii. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA)
school projects in Guam will provide a new high school (FY05 at $28
Million) and a new elementary/middle school in the future.
In Hawaii, we are leveraging our Joint Venture Education Forum (JVEF)
to improve school quality, strengthen our partnership with the state
and its citizens, and increase attractiveness of Hawaii as a duty station.
The JVEF is a collaborative effort between the Hawaii Department of
Education and Pacific Command to improve education and facilities in
the military impacted public schools. Over the past four years, the
Forum has focused on repair and maintenance, and on upgrading textbooks
and technology. More recently the JVEF has focused on the transition
issues of military dependent children by helping schools develop transition
assistance programs and offering a military culture course to school
staffs. Subsequent USPACOM school surveys reveal significantly improved
perceptions of Hawaii schools by military families.
Transformation. Improved Quality of Service is an intended and essential
product of our transformation initiatives. As we posture forces to ensure
security in the new threat context, we also seek to place forces such
that they can be efficiently employed against unpredictable threats
minimizing optempo while posing a minimal burden on friends and
allies in the region. In short, we want to be relevant, welcomed, and
Base facilities and infrastructure. Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
(SRM) of facilities and infrastructure throughout USPACOM remains an
important concern. Current funding levels limit our ability to achieve
the 67-year recapitalization rate directed by DoD. We have equally important
infrastructure requirements above SRM needs, including environmental
requirements and new mission bed-downs for transformational capabilities
like C-17 aircraft and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. We are working
to ensure transformation-related changes are integrated into our MILCON
plans to prevent wasted expenditures.
Military Construction (MILCON) in Korea. As Commander, U.S. Forces
Korea is testifying, our facilities in Korea remain among the worst
in USPACOM. MILCON is essential to rectify these shortcomings and to
advance our transformation initiatives. We plan on consolidating U.S.
Forces in Korea into two hubs of enduring installations an air-oriented
hub focused on Osan Air Base (AB), and a sea-oriented hub in the southeast
near Pusan. These consolidations will improve unit readiness, force
protection, and quality of life while reducing adverse impact on our
host nation. This long term but essential program requires stable MILCON
We appreciate your support for FY04 projects in South Korea to upgrade
hardened aircraft shelters and to construct family housing, barracks
complexes and dormitories. We also understand your reservations about
reprogramming MILCON projects before achieving the precondition of obtaining
necessary land on which to construct them. We are working closely with
the ROK government to pursue the land purchases necessary to make these
projects viable, and we will abide by the provisions of the 2004 Military
Construction Appropriations Act regarding their planning and construction.
We request your support for the FY05 MILCON projects submitted by the
services for South Korea, including U.S. Air Force family housing and
dormitory projects and the sewer system upgrade at Camp Humphreys.
Guam MILCON. Guams geostrategic importance cannot be overstated.
Both Navy and Air Force facilities will continue to figure prominently
in Guams increasing role as a power projection hub. But Guams
environment can be harsh, and major infrastructure improvements are
needed to support its further utility. USPACFLT plans to upgrade the
KILO Wharf near Orote Point in FY05 ($13 million) to better support
weapons handling, and has further plans to develop the Orote peninsula
into a fully capable munitions hub in the out years. Three future projects
are also essential to improve wharves at Apra Harbor. In FY05, USPACAF
plans to construct a $20 million war reserve material storage facility
at Andersen AFB, and has out year projects to repair the south runway
and construct munitions storage igloos.
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). The JPAC stood up on 1 October
2003, combining assets of Joint Task Force Full Accounting and
Central Identification Lab Hawaii (CILHI), with a global mission.
The command will eventually be housed in a new combined facility at
Hickam Air Force Base that will improve efficiency while reducing overall
footprint. We are requesting appropriation of funds to begin construction
In 2003, joint field activities in Vietnam, Laos, Burma, North Korea,
and Cambodia recovered 26 possible human remains believed to be those
of unaccounted-for Americans. Meanwhile, the Central Identification
Laboratory identified a total of 64 Americans previously unaccounted-for:
37 from the Vietnam War, 5 from the Korean War, and 22 from World War
II. We remain fully committed to this mission.
Pacific Warfighting Center. PACOMs exercise simulation and support
infrastructure is obsolete. This shortfall significantly reduces the
ability to train USPACOM and Joint Task Force commanders in crisis action
readiness procedures, limits their ability to rehearse key operational
orders, and degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability
with friends in the region. The current exercise simulation facility
also does not support future technologies or meet force protection requirements.
A planned, state-of-the-art operations and simulation center will improve
total force readiness by exploiting emerging technologies to create
a networked, live, virtual, and constructive training and mission rehearsal
environment for joint and combined force commanders and their staffs.
The PWC will be a key node on DoDs global grid of warfighting
centers that create the Joint National Training Capability. PWC will
be fully integrated with, and extend the capability of, USJFCOMs
Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center and U.S. European Commands
Warrior Preparation Center. It will also be home to our most important
new joint command and control development the Standing Joint
Force Headquarters, discussed below.
PWC promises to save exercise funds and enhance regional security cooperation
using INTERNET-based information exchange opportunities via the Asia-Pacific
Area Network (APAN). We estimate a $30 Million need in FY06 for this
Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific Command Center (NMPCC). The NMPCC is complete
and will be dedicated on 14 April. This modern facility and its robust
information technology will fundamentally change the way we command
and control forces in the Pacific theater. We are working hard on information
and knowledge management processes to maximize efficiency while minimizing
frustrations. Thank you for making this important headquarters a reality.
REINFORCING THE CONSTANTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY
Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, our
friendships both old and new, and the presence of our forward-deployed
combat forces continue to be the foundation of the regions peace
and stability. Based upon my extensive travels throughout Asia and the
Pacific, it is clear that more and more nations appreciate the constructive
role forward-based American forces play in regional peace and stability.
We are capitalizing on these sentiments to build bilateral relationships
while nurturing multinational efforts that support regional security
The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) enhances U.S.
influence, expands U.S. operational access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed
and forward-based combat forces, and increases competence of our coalition
partners. Every TSCP activity is designed to enhance our joint/combined
capabilities and communicate assurance to our friends while dissuading
or deterring our enemies. Seminars and multilateral exercises continue
to be inexpensive but powerful ways to develop the capabilities to work
effectively as partners against all manner of transnational threats.
Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint
Training and Experimentation plans, solidifies the link between national
strategy and focused, enduring regional security.
The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSCP are clear our treaty
allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF, the War
on Terrorism, and now OIF as well. And we have new security partners.
Mongolia, for example, has made historic contributions in the War on
Terrorism and in the reconstruction of Iraq. Many other countries within
the Asia-Pacific region also share our security interests, and it is
due in part to their efforts to combat terrorism that the analytical
depth and breadth of shared actionable intelligence on the terror threat
has improved so significantly. Their demonstrations of support are positive
signs that meaningful regional cooperation on these threats will continue.
Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most important pact in the
Pacific and is as strong as it has ever been. Nearly 54,000 U.S. armed
forces personnel are stationed in Japan, including units of the 5th
Air Force, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and 7th Fleet. Without these
forces, it would be very difficult to meet our commitments both to Japan
and to the rest of Asia-Pacific region. Last year, Japan contributed
about $4 Billion just to host our forces - the most generous of any
Since becoming Prime Minister nearly three years ago, Prime Minister
Koizumi has stressed the importance of the alliance and has exerted
exceptional leadership in support of both regional and global security
efforts. Japan acted swiftly and historically after 9/11 to provide
airlift services and over 89 million gallons of fuel to coalition ships
in the Arabian Sea in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Last year,
the Government of Japan (GOJ) approved an extension to the Basic Plan
to continue these valuable contributions to the WOT. Japans Coast
Guard also participated in the first Proliferation Security Initiative
exercise last September.
But arguably the most significant symbol of Japans commitment
to regional and global security was its December 2003 decision to contribute
up to 1,000 Japan Self-Defense Force personnel for Iraq a plan
they are now implementing. Additionally, theyve pledged $5 Billion
in loans and grants for Iraqi reconstruction, second only to the United
States. We take every opportunity to express our appreciation to the
GOJ for Japans incredible support.
We continue to strengthen this vibrant alliance through open dialogue
and a continuing infusion of creativity. We benefit from robust relationships
with the Japan Self Defense Forces, all of which have greatly matured
in the last two decades. Although our deepest ties lie with the Maritime
and Air Self Defense forces mainly due to the day-to-day presence
of the 7th Fleet and 5th Air Force we are also looking for ways
to increase interactions with the Ground Self Defense Force.
The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) provides an important forum
for deliberating alliance improvements. Working closely with OSD, the
State Department, and our country team, we are consulting with the GOJ
on ways to improve our command structures, assist the Self Defense Forces
in their own transformation efforts, and make modest adjustments to
address noise and safety concerns in places like the Kanto plain and
Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee Okinawa
(SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been completed,
12 are still being worked. Two of five noise reduction initiatives and
10 of 11 SACO land release initiatives have yet to be completed. Considerable
progress on the 12 outstanding initiatives has been made, and the initiatives
are continually being pursued.
The cornerstone of the SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement
Facility (FRF). GOJ approval of a Basic Plan for the offshore portion
of the FRF highlights the progress made in the SACO process last summer.
However, we continue to emphasize to the GOJ that a complete replacement
facility as identified in the SACO Final Report not just the
offshore portion - is required before Futenma can be fully returned.
We continue our frank and open dialogue with Japan to nurture this
robust alliance. We will also continue to improve U.S.-Japan coordination
with other countries in the region to address cooperation on regional
Republic of Korea (ROK). Our solid partnership with South Korea has
contributed to peace and security on the peninsula for 50 years. Today,
units of the Eighth U.S. Army and 7th Air Force comprise the majority
of our 38,000-troop strength in Korea. We have also witnessed continued
growth in the capability and capacity of Republic of Korea forces. They
are modern, professional, and growing rapidly in tactical sophistication.
Of course our partnership is focused on the most immediate security
threat to the South Korean people - North Korea (DPRK). Although the
likelihood of war on the peninsula remains low, the stakes posed by
the North Korean conventional threat remain high, and are even higher
if North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear programs. The DPRK maintains
more than 70 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its military first
policy, keeping its large force fed, equipped, and trained while average
citizens face deprivation and starvation.
North Korean missile and missile technology exports pose a grave proliferation
concern. Its missile inventory includes over 500 short-range SCUD missiles
and medium range NO DONG missiles capable of delivering conventional
or chemical payloads well beyond the peninsula. Ongoing research on
a multiple-stage variant of the TAEPO DONG missile may provide North
Korea the means to target the continental United States. And its other
illicit activities, including probable state-run narcotics and currency
counterfeiting enterprises, also pose a broad threat to regional security.
After trilateral talks in April 2002 and two rounds of Six Party Talks
to date, it is clear diplomacy must continue to be backed by a strong
ROK-US defense partnership to eliminate North Koreas nuclear programs
and reduce the North Korean conventional threat.
We recognize the importance of reconciliation efforts to the Korean
people and support those efforts by maintaining a position of mutual
strength. Nations of the region are aligned on the goal of achieving
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean
Meanwhile, the ROK has steadily increased its regional security role.
USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure our regional security
cooperation efforts are in consonance with one another and integrated
where appropriate. The return of Korean troops from UN peacekeeping
duty in Timor-Leste in October 2003 underscored Koreas commitment
to regional peace and stability. The ROK continues to support PACOMs
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program. South Koreas
growing security role provides regional contributions while meeting
its peninsular defense responsibilities.
The ROK continues to support our global security efforts as well. In
September 2003, we released the last of four ROK amphibious ships after
their 18 months of logistical support and aircraft recovery operations
related to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In December 2003, the ROK Air
Force completed two years of airlift support, having logged almost 3000
flight hours and moving over 300 tons of cargo and passengers throughout
the AOR. The ROK Army has deployed a Construction Engineer unit and
medics to Bagram, Afghanistan since February 2003. And by May 2003,
over 600 ROK engineers and medical service personnel were working in
Iraq along side the U.S. military.
Most significantly, we anticipate the ROK government will dispatch
up to three thousand more troops to Iraq later this year, making it
the third largest coalition troop contributor to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
These contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to
global security, and we thank the Korean people for their support.
Occasional anti-American sentiment reminds us that South Korea is a
vibrant, democratic society, with a profusion of free and diverse voices.
Nevertheless, we clearly have reached an important juncture in ROK-U.S.
relations. While the majority of South Koreans support the alliance,
we know we must strengthen the alliance to meet the challenges of the
new international security environment.
ROK Minister of Defense Lee Jun and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld established the Future of the ROKU.S. Alliance Policy
Initiative at the 34th Security Consultative Meeting in Washington D.C.
on December 5, 2002. Its charter is to develop options and make recommendations
to adapt the alliance to reflect the changing regional and global security
circumstances. The ultimate objective is to build a balanced and enduring
alliance that will be more effective but less intrusive in the lives
of the Korean people.
Despite this challenging political environment, Future of the Alliance
meetings have produced considerable progress. Most notable are the agreement
to relocate U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area, a more regional
role for USFK, greater information sharing to coordinate force improvement
plans, terms of reference for a command relations study, and the transfer
of appropriate military missions to ROK forces. Final details to relocate
U.S. forces from Seoul and consolidate U.S. forces into two hubs south
of the Han River remain for ongoing ROK-U.S. discussions.
Australia is a strong ally and special partner in the Pacific. Australias
support for a new joint anti-terrorism center in Indonesia and its Regional
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands are just two recent examples
of Australias solid leadership throughout Oceania. The Australian
people have demonstrated a steadfast commitment to winning the War on
Terror, and they continue to make valuable contributions to Operations
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
Improving the already high level of interoperability between U.S. forces
and the Australian Defense Force remains a top priority. A comprehensive
two-year study on Strategic and Operational Level Interoperability has
just concluded. The implementation of its recommendations will ensure
interoperability continues to advance.
Australia has the most robust set of range and training facilities
for air, land and sea operations in the Pacific Rim. The facilities
range from well-developed, instrumented training ranges to austere sites
with little existing infrastructure. We have embarked on a comprehensive
plan to study expanded use of these training areas to support the TALISMAN
SABER exercise series and other future training initiatives. Future
Australia/U.S. combined training events will exercise Combined Task
Force-level air, land and sea operations to a level rarely found outside
the United States.
Republic of the Philippines (RP). Designated a Major Non-NATO Ally
in October 2003, the RP is a strong partner in the War on Terror. Our
bilateral relationship promotes mutually beneficial training, Philippine
military reform, and increased counter-terrorism capacity and capability.
Despite significant domestic security concerns, the RP generously supported
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with access to facilities and airspace, and
recently deployed approximately 100 medical, engineering, and security
personnel for Iraqi reconstruction.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Philippines (OEF-P) continues. Last
year, we executed a focused Security Assistance plan to support our
CT objectives in the Philippines. Five security assistance modules enhanced
near-term needs like light infantry training, night vision skills, and
intelligence fusion. We also executed the regions most robust
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan to improve
AFP tactical mobility on both land and sea. In February, a refurbished
180 patrol craft (ex-USS CYCLONE) was provided to the RP under
the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. This vessel is now the most
capable maritime interdiction platform in the Philippine Navy.
The Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) have improved their effectiveness
against the Abu Sayyaf Group, highlighted by Decembers arrest
of ASG terrorist Galib Andang, aka Commander Robot, on Jolo
Island. We continue OEF-P to provide training, advice, and assistance
to the AFP to improve their capability and capacity to deal with terror
Incremental progress toward our mutual defense goals has prompted a
complete review of the pace and direction of the AFP as an institution.
The resulting Joint Defense Assessment is both a template for long-term
AFP reform and a mechanism by which we are managing near-term CT improvements.
Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) is the engine by which these improvements
will proceed. The PDR is a broad-based, multi-year cooperative effort
between the Philippine and U.S. governments. PDR recommendations, implemented
in a coordinated and deliberate fashion, are designed to address systemic
organizational deficiencies, correct root causes of strategic and operational
shortcomings and achieve long term, sustainable institutional improvements
in management, leadership and employment of the AFP. While we will assist
the Philippines through normal security assistance processes and through
routine military-to-military exchanges and exercises, the reforms are
principally the responsibility of the Philippine Government. The Philippines
most senior military and civilian leaders are completely supportive
of the PDR process. We appreciate your continued support of the Philippines
through Security Assistance funding.
Thailand also was granted Major Non-NATO Allied (MNNA) Status in December
2003. Thailands valuable contributions to regional security stem
in large part from the capacity building we have mutually pursued.
Since the Oct 02 Bali bombings in Indonesia, Thailand has been
particularly open and cooperative in the War on Terrorism, highlighted
by the arrest on Thai soil of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader Hambali and
other JI operatives. Thailand currently has about 450 engineers and
medical personnel supporting Iraqi reconstruction, completed a significant
engineering deployment to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan,
and led military peace observers in Aceh, Indonesia, building on the
Thai militarys previous sustained peacekeeping effort in East
Thailand routinely supports our access and training requirements and
plays generous host to USPACOMs premier multilateral exercise,
COBRA GOLD. COBRA GOLD 2004 will be our 23rd combined/joint bilateral
exercise with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. COBRA GOLD is our flagship
vehicle for building regional competencies to respond to an expanding
range of transnational security situations. By adding this multinational
exercise dimension in an environment that trains for peacekeeping in
addition to responding to transnational threats, Thailand assumes an
active role in promoting South East Asia security and demonstrates capability
as a regional leader.
Singapore is emerging as a regional leader and eager contributor to
Asia-Pacific security. Its aggressive approach to important issues ranging
from SARS to counter-terrorism to maritime security, coupled with its
outspoken support for a strong U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, make
this relationship among the most important in the Pacific theater.
Our friendship with Singapore more than just a friendship -
has matured beyond expectations. Soon we will conclude a Strategic Framework
Agreement providing structure and organization to our bilateral efforts
with sufficient flexibility to continue to mature along with our relationship.
Together, we are exploring opportunities for expanded access to Singaporean
facilities while increasing information and technology exchange.
Malaysia. Our relations with the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) continue
to weather periodic hurdles, most often characterized by opposition
to U.S. policies in general and military operations in the War on Terrorism
in particular. Despite the rhetoric, our military ties are cordial and
cooperative, sharing information and best practices in maritime security
Malaysias influence extends beyond Southeast Asia. It currently
holds the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Conference and
the Non-Aligned Movement. Regionally, Malaysia is an influential leader,
focused on the terror threat from Jemaah Islamiyah. The recently inaugurated
Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur and combined
Celebes Sea patrols with the Philippine Navy are but two examples of
its willingness to contribute to regional security.
India. Our military-to-military program with India leads the larger
bilateral relationship and is already providing security benefits in
South and Southeast Asia. In the past year, mutual understanding has
improved, exercise complexity has increased, and interest in foreign
military sales has risen dramatically.
All USPACOM components have conducted a number of successful training
events with the Indian military, including the first ever exercise between
U.S. front line fighter jets and Su-30K FLANKERs. These events contribute
to the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces.
We have developed a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial activities
that build upon this momentum. These programs are designed to increase
our proficiency and interoperability with Indian forces while addressing
shared interests like maritime security. Our military cooperation directly
contributes to the expansion of our strategic partnership with India.
Indonesia is the worlds most populous Muslim nation and third
largest democracy. Sitting astride vital trade routes and targeted for
destabilization by terrorists, Indonesias success is crucial to
peace in the Pacific. Its democratic development requires both effective
CT efforts and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) professional reform.
The government has effectively responded to the bombings in Bali and
Jakarta, arresting and convicting many key participants and sharing
information with its neighbors. We continue to assess opportunities
to increase Indonesias capacity and cooperation against the Jemaah
The TNI is the most coherent government institution and will play a
central role in shaping the future of the democracy. It is also an organization
tainted by past human rights abuses, a lack of accountability, and corruption
conditions that led to restrictions on our military-to-military
relationship. Indonesia now acquires non-Western military hardware and
training that is incompatible with our own. These conditions move Indonesia
further away from the U.S. sphere of influence.
The TNI appears committed to reform, and there is evidence of positive
change in the military. To positively shape that reform, and working
with our embassy country team in Jakarta, we have developed a plan of
activities that meets all legal constraints. We will leverage E-IMET,
Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowships, and other authorized
multilateral venues to expose Indonesian officials, including appropriate
TNI officers, to non-lethal U.S. professional military standards.
East Timor is hard at work developing the governing institutions and
the political culture for enduring democracy. Though progress is being
made, this is a long-term and daunting challenge. The country faces
a weak economy, high youth unemployment, and low literacy levels.
Our security goals for Timor-Leste are to support the development of
a civil-military defense establishment that is fully subordinate to
civilian authority and the rule of law, and to assist in the development
of the 1,500-man Falantil-Force Defense Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) as a credible
self-defense force. Our program is coordinated with Australia. IMET
and FMF programs are being used to fund English language training, and
Mobile Training Teams are being planned to provide education and training
to support the development of civil/military defense capabilities. We
are also conducting small unit exercises that enable USPACOM forces
to train with the F-FDTL. This allows our forces to take advantage of
the F-FDTL's jungle warfare experience in challenging mountainous terrain.
China. Our modest but constructive military-to-military relationship
with China continues. Guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA 2000), it is limited
to non-warfighting venues such as high-level exchanges and Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief cooperation.
The last year has featured US warship visits to Zhanjiang and Shanghai.
The Chinese reciprocated with a two-ship visit to Guam in October. Late
last year, USPACOM also hosted the Nanjing Military Region Commander,
LTG Zhu Wenquan, and Defense Minister, General Cao. These exchanges
communicate our values and demonstrate the high quality of our people.
Taiwan. Our relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA) of 1979. Taiwans ability to defend itself remains the
focus of our efforts, given added emphasis by the Chinese military buildup
across the Strait. Our relationship supports development of a modern
and joint military institution that promotes stability, democracy, and
prosperity for Taiwan.
Vietnam. Our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam is progressing
on a modest but positive vector. The Vietnamese Defense Ministers
historic visit to Washington last year was followed in November by our
first port call to Ho Chi Minh City since 1975. These events, combined
with my visit to Vietnam in February 2004, represent straightforward
but symbolic steps in our relationship.
We share a number of security concerns with Vietnam. Of course, our
most robust military-to-military program focuses on POW/MIA recovery.
But there may also be room to cooperate in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
and peacekeeping. We hope the next year will benefit from Vietnams
new openness to build a relationship that looks to the future while
respecting the past.
Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies (APCSS) continues to bring
together current and future military and civilian leaders to discuss
non-warfighting security concerns in programs that promote our regional
security cooperation objectives. Through its Executive Courses and Conference
program, the APCSS provides Asia-Pacific leaders a premier venue to
address security challenges from a multinational perspective. We are
careful to include countries like Pakistan and Russia, which though
not within USPACOMs AOR, clearly have security stakes in the Pacific.
The Center is attracting the right people to reinforce U.S. policy,
address relevant regional issues, and assure access to nations in the
region. Congressionally appropriated Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program funding will be used to develop and conduct a semiannual
course designed to facilitate comprehensive regional solutions in the
fight against terrorism.
Center of Excellence (COE), a PACOM Direct Reporting Unit established
by Congress in 1994, manages capacity building programs in peacekeeping,
stability operations, HIV/AIDS mitigation for military forces, and disaster
response and consequence management planning. These activities, typically
conducted on a multilateral basis with current and potential coalition
partners, reinforce relationships and develop confidence across the
AOR. They also expand regional capabilities to support multinational
coalition and peacekeeping operations around the world.
Through its tailored education programs for U.S. force components,
COE improves understanding of and relations with civilians active in
complex contingencies, crisis transition and peace support operations.
For example, COE supports U.S. Army Pacifics coordination of responses
to CBRNE incidents at U.S. installations in Hawaii, Alaska, and across
the AOR. I ask for your continued support of this important institution.
Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD). One of our premier senior level
theater security cooperation activities, USPACOM annually hosts this
regional conference that brings together Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense
(CHOD) (CJCS equivalents) for a series of discussions on regional defense
issues of mutual interest. The October 2003 conference was held in Honolulu,
with senior military leaders from twenty-three nations, including our
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, in attendance.
The conference theme, Security Transformation in the Asia-Pacific
Region, provided an open forum for candid dialogue among the largest
group of CHODs to participate since the conferences inception
in 1998. The Transformation theme focused on three areas;
Emerging Concepts for Maritime Security, Responding to Terrorism and
Insurgencies, and Multilateral and Intra-governmental Operations. The
CHODs Conference continues to provide an excellent forum to foster
understanding, build confidence, strengthen relationships, and promote
stability. Next year, the conference will be co-hosted by the Japan
Self Defense Force in Tokyo.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides vital support to developing
countries involved in combating terrorism and other transnational threats.
Funds provided in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Appropriations Act, 2003 and the emergency FMF Supplemental directly
supported security cooperation priorities throughout the AOR. Foreign
Military Financing and Sales contributed directly to the successful
prosecution of al-Qaida network-linked terrorists in the Philippines
and met basic needs to improve the security environment in several other
USPACOM typically receives approximately 7% of the discretionary FMF
funds. Legislative proposals to improve the Security Assistance process
and add flexibility in the use of O&M funding have been submitted
by my staff for your consideration.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) continues to be
an effective, low-cost component of the Security Assistance effort.
The program provides U.S. access to and disproportionate influence with
foreign governments. Furthermore, it exposes future leaders to U.S.
values and commitment to the rule of law, the role of a professional
military in a democratic society and promotes military professionalism.
Grant funding has removed financial barriers to U.S. military education
and training for friends and allies located in regions subject to untoward
influences and contributed to the readiness of troops providing post-hostility
engineering and peacekeeping support in Afghanistan and Iraq. Combined
with training offered through the Foreign Military Sales process, IMET
has supported the promotion of U.S. military education and training
as the recognized standard worldwide. Consequently, demand has surpassed
supply as it relates to school capacity. Innovation has addressed this
issue in the near-term but real capacity increases are necessary to
build upon our success. I appreciate your support of this valuable program.
Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic Support
Agreement (MLSA) have enhanced interoperability, readiness, and provided
a cost-effective mechanism for mutual logistics support for U.S. and
allied forces supporting the WOT. USPACOM forces that participated in
FY 03 Bilateral/Multinational Exercises (COBRA GOLD and BALIKATAN) were
able to greatly reduce their logistics footprint by using ACSAs. Countries
that deployed outside the AOR (Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea
and Thailand) in support of OEF and OIF have benefited significantly
from these ACSAs as well.
PACOM currently has eleven ACSAs in place (Australia, Philippines,
South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Mongolia, Thailand, New Zealand,
Fuji, and Tonga). Nine other countries are ACSAeligible (India,
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Brunei, Maldives, Madagascar, Mauritius
and Sri Lanka), and we anticipate completing three agreements in the
very near future. Additionally, we are renegotiating Malaysias
ACSA (expires in March 2004) and just signed a revision to Japans
ACSA to make it more inclusive for support to the WOT. Last year we
finalized Mongolias ACSA in May and renegotiated Thailands
PROMOTING CHANGE AND IMPROVING OUR ASIA-PACIFIC DEFENSE POSTURE
FOR THE FUTURE
Our top security concerns in the Pacific include the possibility of
conflict on the Korean peninsula, miscalculation in places like Kashmir
or the Taiwan Strait, and transnational threats like terrorism. These
concerns some longstanding and others just emerging - form only
a subset of the global security challenges to which we and our partners
must respond. This new threat context demands profound and enduring
improvements in the way we command, equip, and employ our forces. Guidelines
for these improvements have been clearly articulated by DoD.
At Pacific Command, like all regional combatant commands, our job is
to transform that guidance into action. Several principles direct our
First and foremost, it is clear that our longstanding alliances, our
strong friendships, and the forward presence of our combat forces will
continue to form the foundation for our security posture in the Asia-Pacific
region. This fact is reflected in the reinforcing the constants
priority outlined earlier. Posture improvements and capability improvements,
discussed below, are being developed in full consultation with our allies.
Several mechanisms facilitate our dialogue, including the Defense Policy
Review Initiative (Japan), Future of the Alliance Initiative (South
Korea), Australia Ministerial/Military Representatives, Mutual Defense
Board (Philippines) and the pending Strategic Framework Agreement with
Second, our posture improvements must meet both current and future
threats. Each change we make is intended to enhance our capability to
meet security commitments not just in the Pacific, but also around the
While studying and incorporating the lessons learned from Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, we also recognize that many of our
warfighting challenges in the Pacific were not stressed in those conflicts.
Missions like missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and air combat
figure prominently in many potential conflicts and must continue to
Of course, clearly we recognize that just as our own capabilities have
improved, so too have the military forces of our friends and allies.
By incorporating these advances into our planning, we will improve the
effectiveness of combined operations and reduce our reliance on forward
based support functions.
And finally, we intend these adjustments to be enduring improvements
that not only meet our mutual security needs over the long term but
in doing so, ease the burden we pose on friends and allies in the region.
With those principles in mind, Pacific Command has developed a six-element
construct within which to organize our initiatives. We call it, Operationalizing
the Asia-Pacific Defense Strategy.
Operationalizing the Asia Pacific Defense Strategy
Updating Plans. Our plans and our planning process are being updated
to reflect the new threat context. Essentially every plan is being revised
to support the 4-2-1 force planning construct while addressing both
state- and non-state threats. This construct calls for regionally tailored
forces, forward stationed and deployed in four primary areas of the
globe to assure our allies and friends and deter potential aggressors.
If deterrence fails, our forces must be able to swiftly defeat the efforts
of two aggressors and, if the President so directs, decisively defeat
one of those two enemies. In the process, we are incorporating improvements
in our capabilities speed, precision, and lethality while
taking into account advancements in the capabilities of friends and
allies. Lessons learned from OEF and OIF also inform the process.
The revision process is being accelerated, and resulting plans feature
inherent flexibility. In short, we recognize that success against emerging
threats requires us to sense, decide, and act inside the enemys
Were also integrating the resources of relevant government agencies
into our day-to-day planning and operations. Our inclusion of diplomatic,
economic, and public diplomacy efforts reflects the fact that there
simply arent any strictly military solutions to todays security
Strengthening Command And Control. Benefiting from habitual command
relationships, and using common tactics, techniques, and procedures,
the synergy offered by joint command arrangements provides the speed
of command necessary to successfully meet future threats.
Our evolving command and control constructs benefit from interagency
relationships. The JIACG-CT and JRAC mentioned earlier are two examples
of joint staff elements that support combatant command and joint task
force efforts. And the expanding mission of the JIATF-W demonstrates
the great facility of interagency integration.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Last year, PACOM stood up and exercised
its first Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). In its current
configuration, the SJFHQ rapidly augments a Joint Task Force command
element to accelerate its readiness for action. When not specifically
tasked, core SJFHQ staff plan and train to prepare for a variety of
My vision for the SJFHQ is to have a habitually trained organization
that reduces long lead times routinely experienced in standing up Joint
Task Forces. This organization will be trained on cutting edge planning
and communication processes, tools and equipment in order to rapidly
deploy and immediately facilitate command and control. The SJFHQ needs
to be supported with adequate manning. Our SJFHQ is currently manned
with 22 permanent and 36 augmented personnel. As we go forward in developing
the SJFHQ (and its processes) for the Pacific, we are working closely
with USJFCOM, which has been assigned overall responsibility for SJFHQ
We have also developed several concepts and tools to facilitate coalition
contributions to regional security efforts. Our Multinational Planning
Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is one such initiative that has enjoyed
great success. MPAT is designed to facilitate the rapid and effective
establishment and/or augmentation of multinational coalition task force
One of the first products of the MPAT program was a Multinational Force
Standing Operating Procedure (MNF SOP). These procedures standardize
processes, promote cooperation, increased dialogue, and provide baseline
concepts of operation for coalition task force efforts. They also serve
as a centerpiece for multinational workshops, seminars and exercises
aimed at improving coalition interoperability and operational readiness
within the region. The MNF SOPs support the Secretarys Transformation
Plan and have been shared with USJFCOM to support their coalition transformation
efforts. Developed by the combined efforts of 30 MPAT nations, the procedures
are truly a multinational initiative.
Multinational participation in the MPAT program is robust, with 31
nations participating to date. Participation is not limited to Asia-Pacific
nations. Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have also supported
MPAT program events and the development of multinational force standing
Currently, programs to support coalition building are financed by headquarters
O&M funds. Additional funding marked specifically for multinational
transformation efforts would greatly improve the Unified Commanders
ability to improve on-going efforts and develop new transformation efforts.
As we strengthen ties with multinational and coalition partners, USPACOM
continues to develop restricted-access and secure Internet opportunities
with programs such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange
System (CENTRIXS) and the Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN). Protection
of our coalition networks with information assurance technologies is
a key component of our experimentation and transformation effort. Were
also transforming our capability to communicate with coalition partners
using machine language translation through a variety of text, voice,
and pictorial translators.
The ability to place instructional material on the Asia-Pacific Area
Network (APAN) to provide Internet-based training and Advanced Distributed
Learning would benefit our Asia-Pacific partners and support our Theater
Security Cooperation Program. We could more effectively use focused
military education programs to develop regional skills required to accomplish
cooperative security missions, improve civil-military relations, increase
respect for human rights, and strengthen democratic principles. For
this reason, legislative initiatives have been drafted aimed at amending
law to allow for the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the
Secretary of State, to authorize the Combatant Commander to provide
traditional and Internet-based education and non-lethal training to
military and civilian government personnel of friendly foreign nations.
Partnering with USJFCOM on a joint fires initiative, PACOM has integrated
leading-edge time-sensitive targeting technology into joint operations
across the strategic and operational force levels. Over the next two
years, with your help, we envision extending our joint fires capabilities
to the tactical level through a mix of fires and common picture technologies,
such as Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network (JTF WARNET) and FORCEnet.
Weve already reduced the targeting cycle from hours to minutes
by improving cross-component collaboration and targeting efficiencies,
but theres still room to improve. The end result will be a more
seamless battle space with coordinated fires and reduced risk of fratricide.
We are increasing our capabilities for immediate employment, emphasizing
expeditionary combat power. Each of these capabilities has been evaluated
to ensure support for regional contingency plans while meeting global
requirements. Missile defense has already been discussed.
Stryker Armored Vehicle. The Stryker armored vehicle combines adaptability,
firepower, and high technology in an expeditionary package. Lifted by
C-17 aircraft or High Speed Vessels, Strykers have great relevance throughout
the theater and are currently proving themselves under combat conditions
in Iraq, demonstrating a readiness rate that exceeds current requirements.
We look forward to the future Stryker brigades in Hawaii and Alaska.
F/A-22 Raptor. We need your support to fund and field the F/A-22 Raptor
in the USPACOM AOR. The transformational capabilities of this remarkable
aircraft will have enduring relevance for our warfighting needs, and
promise to directly enhance both warfighting effectiveness and war plan
options in the near future.
SSGN. The conversion of four TRIDENT class submarines to cruise missile/Special
Operations Force (SOF) carriers has particular appeal in the Pacific,
where our most demanding potential warfights and the continuing threat
of terrorism converge. We appreciate your far-sighted support of this
New Operating Patterns And Concepts. These immediately employable forces
are in turn integrated into operating patterns and concepts that satisfy
both peacetime and wartime requirements. For example, the Navys
first Expeditionary Strike Group recently completed a very successful
deployment to Southwest Asia and the western Pacific. Tailored air packages,
based and launched from such maritime platforms, can satisfy a variety
of missions ranging from non-combatant evacuation to maritime interdiction.
This concept is particularly adaptable in joint and combined settings.
As yet another example, we routinely deploy bomber elements to Guam,
demonstrating both the responsiveness and flexibility of the U.S. Air
Force and Americas ability to respond quickly to any crisis in
Improving Force Posture And Footprint. Changes in the global security
environment provide both the opportunity and the necessity to improve
our force posture, positioning forces where they have the greatest warfighting
relevance while reducing irritants to host nation citizens. We are considering
a number of posture improvements each of them a response to new
threats, updated plans, and increased capabilities of allied and friendly
This element of our transformation strategy is underwritten by five
primary assumptions. First, our network of alliances and partnerships
in the Pacific region is a strategic asset for the nation - it will
not be undermined. We also know that our posture must allow us to deal
with uncertainty because in the future, we probably wont
fight from our current positions. Of course, we are designing posture
adjustments to facilitate employment of forces both within and across
combatant command regions. Fourth, the immediately employable forces
discussed above argue for forward force presence. In short, were
not looking to move combat power back toward the US mainland. And finally,
technological advances allow us to focus on capabilities, as numbers
no longer reflect actual combat power.
We are well aware of the domestic and international political sensitivities
associated with these changes. We also appreciate the complexity these
changes add both to the upcoming BRAC process in 2005 and to our continuing
MILCON programs. We will keep our friends, allies, and the Congress
Diversifying Access And Enroute Logistics. Finally we want to diversify
contingency access opportunities in the Pacific region. Increasing our
access options improves training opportunities, contributes to theater
security cooperation objectives and, most important, provides warfighting
flexibility when we need it most. We are looking at a number of Cooperative
Security Locations (CSLs) throughout the Pacific - places
rather than bases that meet these goals.
In the U.S. Pacific Command, our dedicated men and women, both in and
out of uniform, continue to operationalize our nations strategic
guidance, assuring our allies, dissuading our adversaries and deterring
aggression. The combined talents and energies of our regions friends
and allies continue to promote peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific
region. We are fully committed in every conceivable way
to winning the war against terrorism. Meanwhile, we are maintaining
a ready and viable fighting force capable of decisively defeating any
adversary, all the while mindful that our personnel, our friends and
allies and our progressive transformation efforts will continue to improve
our Asia-Pacific defense posture for the future.
As you know, our finest citizens wear the cloth of the nation. They
have never doubted nor failed to appreciate your advocacy. On behalf
of the men and women of U.S. Pacific Command, thank you for your support,
and thank you for this opportunity to testify on our defense posture.