
TESTIMONY
OF
VICE ADMIRAL KEVIN P. GREEN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR
PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOTAL FORCE
REGARDING
ADEQUACY OF THE TOTAL FORCE
March
10, 2004
Introduction
Chairman
McHugh and distinguished members of this
Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity
to be with you today. It is an honor to
report to you on our current force structure
and how it is being used to continue our
operations worldwide in the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). Your generous support has
been instrumental in our efforts to
transform our war fighting as well as
improve the combat readiness and capability
of our Navy. The results of your assistance
are evident in the strong forward deployed
posture and readiness for combat of our
Sailors and their units.
I'll begin my statement today by briefly
reviewing the past year, where we stand
today and how the newly instituted Fleet
Response Plan (FRP) enhances our readiness
posture to surge combat ready forces for
crises and contingencies, providing our
leadership with increased options in the
execution of the national security
strategy. Secondly, I will address end
strength considerations and Active/Reserve
component impacts and how they support our
Navy's improved readiness and increased
capabilities to provide decisive combat
power to the joint commander.
This Time Last Year . . .
At
this time last year, 168 Navy ships and over
77,000 Sailors were deployed around the
world supporting the Global War on Terrorism
and in position to execute Operation
Iraqi Freedom. In total, 221 of our 306
ships-representing 73% of our force-were
underway; including 7 of 12 carrier strike
groups, 9 of 12 expeditionary strike groups,
and 33 of 54 attack submarines. The Navy
and Marine Corps alone had nearly 600
aircraft forward deployed in support of
these operations. SEALs, construction
battalions, explosive ordnance disposal
teams, port operations support units,
maritime patrol squadrons, medical teams,
and naval coastal warfare units were also
deployed overseas, all well-trained and
ready for real world combat operations.
Twenty-one combat logistics and 76 sealift
ships provided for the movement and
sustainment of this fighting force.
These forces were seamlessly integrated into
joint and coalition operations in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In
the case of OIF, our forces provided the
joint force commander a capability to
project force deep inland from the sovereign
operational sea bases provided by our
aircraft carriers and other naval
combatants. Navy flew nearly 9,000 sorties,
fired over 800 Tomahawk missiles and
delivered 15,000 Marines to the fight. In
fact, OEF and OIF were the most joint
operations in our history, providing
valuable lessons that we continue to apply
today to further enhance our power
projection, our defensive protection and the
operational independence afforded by the
freedom to maneuver on the sea. The lessons
learned thus far reaffirm that the
capabilities-based investment strategy, new
war fighting concepts and enabling
technologies we are now pursuing in the Sea
Power 21 vision are right on course.
To accomplish this level of deployed forces,
shipyard and intermediate maintenance
facility maintenance schedules were
accelerated, training timelines compressed
and many of our Sailors found themselves
deploying much earlier than expected. Our
experience in OIF and our analysis of future
campaign scenarios make it obvious that the
readiness of both our forward deployed
forces and the forces that must surge
forward will continue to be critically
important to our success in future
campaigns.
To meet this
readiness challenge, we launched the Fleet
Response Plan (FRP) in May of this past
year. The FRP resets the force in a way
that will allow us to surge about 50 percent
more combat power on short notice and at the
same time potentially reduce some of the
personnel strain of forward rotations.
Sustaining
Readiness - The Fleet Response Plan
The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is among the
most important in the Navy's transformation
plans and is the real reason we can provide
immediate surge capability close on the
heels of major combat operations. The FRP
fundamentally changes the way we operate our
Fleet, institutionalizing a higher level of
overall sustained readiness, and therefore
employability, providing a surge capability
necessary in the global security
environment.
Our defense strategy requires joint forces
to be prepared to rapidly transition from a
posture of forward deterrence into joint
campaigns to swiftly defeat the efforts of
adversaries, placing a premium on rapidly
surging ready forces from bases at home and
abroad to augment forward-deployed forces.
In the past, the capability to have
routinely available, rapidly deployable
forces was hampered by our maintenance
schedules and a rigid training schedule that
targeted peak readiness for the next
regularly scheduled deployment. For
example, in the pre-FRP deployment and
maintenance cycle, a ship was surge ready or
deployed 9.5 months of a 24-month cycle.
Under FRP, that ship is now surge ready or
deployable 15.8 months of a 27-month cycle.
To achieve this added employability, we
transformed the inter-deployment cycle by
expanding the time between maintenance by
three months (from 24 to 27 months), by
commencing the training process as soon as
possible following the completion of
maintenance, and by completing both as soon
after deployment as possible. Further we
aligned FRP training processes to
progressively enhance crew proficiency as
ships achieve readiness milestones through
basic, intermediate and advanced
phases of
training. The missions for which
they can be surged are determined by the
level of training they have completed at the
point when they are ordered to deploy. We
use the terms "emergency surge capable" and
"surge capable" to differentiate the
training progress of our surge forces.
The result of
the new process is a significantly higher
sustained operational competency and
improved readiness.
Simply put, rather than
having only two or three Carrier Strike
Groups (CSG) forward deployed at any one
time - and an ability to surge only a
maximum of two more - the FRP enables us to
now consistently deliver six forward
deployed or ready to surge Carrier Strike
Groups almost immediately - within 30 days,
plus two additional CSGs that are in the
basic training phase in 90 days or less.
This FRP capability is commonly known as
"six plus two.
"The
improved readiness afforded by the FRP
process makes more forces "available" and
affords more flexibility to provide forces
when needed by the Combatant Commanders.
Though the time that platforms are available
for employment will increase, the total time
Sailors are deployed will not. The framework
of FRP will allow enough structure for
Sailors and their families to plan their
lives, while also keeping our adversaries
off balance by the unpredictable potential
of operations.
While
flexibility has advantages, FRP must also
provide Combatant Commanders and allies the
level of predictability needed to plan U.S.
Navy participation in exercises, engagement
with overseas partners and provide
assurances of our nation's commitment to the
security of friends and allies. Equally
important, during the additional months of
readiness to surge, FRP will not increase
the burden on our Sailors by keeping them in
a constant alert status, uncertain when, if,
and for how long they will be summoned to
respond. Of course, for any major national
crisis, the Navy will surge all the ships
and aircraft it can put to sea. Our Sailors
understand that when the nation is
threatened, their duty is to answer the
call. However, for those increasingly
frequent situations that warrant a response,
but do not imminently threaten the U.S. or
its interests, a new employment concept was
required.
The Navy developed the Flexible Deployment
Concept (FDC) as a complement to FRP to
ensure a proper balance between readiness to
surge versus the practical need to place
responsible limits on the OPTEMPO of our
Sailors. To provide safeguards for our
people, FDC proposes the establishment of
two windows when ready ships could be
available for employment, either on routine
deployments in support of Combatant
Commander objectives, or on shorter "pulse"
employment periods in response to emerging
requirements. These windows provide
predictability. Sailors will know when they
might be expected to deploy, and Combatant
Commanders will know which forces are ready
to respond to emergent needs.
FRP and FDC, when applied with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff deployment processes,
provide ready forces able to defend the
homeland, respond quickly to deter crises,
defeat the intentions of an adversary, or
win decisively against a major enemy.
"Presence with a Purpose" - - employing
forces for specific capability requirements
- - is our employment goal and is a sea
change from heel-to-toe presence deployments
of the past. Together they implement the
type of force employment transformation
envisioned by national and military leaders
and are the most significant change in the
Navy's operational construct in decades.
FRP/FDC implementation will be accomplished
with the resources already planned and do
not require increases in force structure.
Since we will gain resource efficiencies in
maintenance and training, FRP/FDC is budget
neutral and costs are not disproportionately
larger than costs to support our current
presence policy. In fact, when considering
the increased force availability gained
through this transformational change, the
taxpayer gets a larger return on investment
with our current force structure.
I
have focused the discussion on carrier
strike groups (CSGs) because they are the
most complex components to prepare for
deployment. Certainly my FRP discussion
could be extended over portions of our
entire fleet. With the implementation of
FRP, half of Navy forces could be ready to
provide homeland defense and be either
forward deployed or ready to surge forward,
ready to provide the joint commander with
the necessary combat power to respond to any
contingency.
Sustaining Readiness and Transforming the
Workforce
Three years ago, the Navy
reported to Congress significant concerns
with the material aspect of our current
readiness. As one of the CNO's top five
priorities, Navy current readiness received
significant attention, and with focused
effort, careful planning and congressional
resource support, we have made tremendous
gains in ship and aviation material
readiness. Training readiness is another
success story.
To meet the demands of our new readiness
process, we continue to place great emphasis
on use of simulation and other means of
finding efficiencies that can be captured
and diverted into other readiness accounts.
Inherent in our employment shift to a
rotational force that is surge-capable, we
have found innovative ways to achieve an
acceptable level of surge readiness earlier
in a battle group's deployment cycle.
Adjustments to key training and scheduling
events during the inter-deployment training
cycle are resulting in ships and squadrons
being capable of accelerating to a
deployable status sooner.
The efficiencies gained through improved
training readiness and greater material
readiness, when coupled with the highest
retention in history and reduced attrition
rates, resulted in the best trained and led
Navy in our history. Matching these highly
skilled Sailors with newer, more technically
advanced equipment has given our Navy more
capability while requiring fewer personnel.
This trend will continue as older, manpower
intensive platforms are retired and more
advanced platforms requiring fewer overall
personnel continue to join the fleet.
To preserve the specialties, skill sets and
expertise of our Sailors and to shape this
professional and technologically proficient
force, the following programs and
initiatives have proven fruitful:
-
Pay raises and enhancements to special pays (especially career sea pay) enacted over the past three years are yielding impressive results.
-
The use of Selective Reenlistment Bonus to increase the number of enlistments in critical, highly technical or hard to retain ratings and Navy Enlisted Classifications.
-
Efforts to reduce out-of-pocket housing expenses, authorization for our Sailors to participate in the Thrift Savings Plan, improvements in medical care, and retirement reforms approved by Congress are among the significant factors that have helped us retain the Sailors we need today.
-
The Perform to Serve (PTS) program has been successful in reshaping the force, preserving specialties, skill sets and expertise needed to continue properly balancing the force. This program's success in moving sailors from where we have excess inventory to undermanned ratings where vacancies have been hurting us has been essential to properly shaping the force. The pilot program was so successful it has been expanded and will continue in 2005.
-
Innovative personnel employment practices are being implemented throughout the fleet. Optimal manning experiments in USS BOXER (LHD 4), USS MILIUS (DDG 69) and USS MOBILE BAY (CG 53) produced revolutionary shipboard watch standing practices while reducing overall manning requirements and allowing Sailors to focus on their core responsibilities.
-
The Navy's Sea Swap initiative, is experimenting with exchanging forward deployed crews. The first "sea swap" occurred aboard USS FLETCHER in the Western Australian port of Fremantle, and today FLETCHER is on her fourth crew. We will continue to assess their condition and deep maintenance needs to develop and apply lessons learned to future Sea Swap initiatives.
As we continue to balance the Fleet, the stresses placed on our Reserve Components as a result of the GWOT, OEF and OIF demonstrated the need for additional capability in the Active Component. As a result, we are actively pursuing changes in the Active and Reserve Component mix to bring some of these critical skills to the Active forces, giving us more capability to respond in a crisis without having to immediately mobilize the Reserves.
Total Force:
AC/RC mix
The Navy's goal is to
properly balance Active and Reserve
resources to ensure operational readiness
for forward presence and surge
capabilities. The global war on terrorism
tested our surge capability to meet rapid
response contingencies. As a result, Navy
proactively addressed imbalances in three
particular areas: enhancement of early
responsiveness, resolving stressed career
fields, and employment of innovative
management practices. I will summarize some
of the actions the Navy has taken:
-
Added over 7,200 new Active and over 1,800 Reserve antiterrorism / force protection billets. This effort started after the attack on USS COLE. As a result the Active Component can now man Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Bravo continually and FPCON Charlie for more than a month without involuntarily activating Naval Reservists.
-
Rescinded an earlier decision to decommission an active Seabee battalion, and instead decommissioned several Reserve Seabee units as a neutral cost action. As a result the Navy retained the ability to meet construction engineering requirements in the first 60 days of surge operations using Active Seabee forces.
-
Reducing stress on medical support to Marine Reserve units, Navy restructured 525 Reserve Corpsman billets so that when mobilized our Marine reserve units will be supported by active duty rather than all Reserve Corpsmen.
-
Converting one Naval Coastal Warfare squadron on each coast, approximately 600 total billets, from the Reserve Component to the Active Component over the next year. Prior to this action Naval Coastal Warfare was a capability that resided 100 % in the Navy Reserve. This will also allow us to meet the first 15 days of potential contingency requirements without mobilization of our reserve forces. The Navy is also in the process of activating and certifying 4 active duty Mobile Security Force Squadrons no later than the end of 2006, approximately 1,200 billets, in order to improve our force protection posture and responsiveness to surge requirements.
Navy efforts to integrate the force and
verify balance have eliminated the need to
involuntarily activate Reservists in the
first 15 days of surge operations and have
reduced stress on our Reserve Component.
These rebalancing actions are in keeping
with Secretary Rumsfeld's guidance and allow
us to more efficiently use the Navy's
Reserve while capitalizing on Navy Reserve
strengths.
To further enhance the integration of the
Reserve into the Navy mission, the Navy's
Reserve is undergoing a "redesign" based on
a comprehensive study co-sponsored by the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the
Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs. This study focuses on three main
areas: Personnel Management, Readiness and
Training, and Organizational Alignment. The
study identified 14 key actions that are
being addressed by the Assistant Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and
Operations).
The
Navy is committed to extending our culture
of readiness into the future.
We must continue to attract,
develop and retain a more highly skilled and
educated workforce of warriors that will
lead the 21st century Navy.
Continued Congressional support for the
resources and tools to support our strategy
in training and maintaining these highly
skilled professionals is essential to our
success.
Conclusion
The U.S. Navy is fulfilling its requirements of the National Security Strategy and we are successfully transforming . I offer as evidence the ability to surge deploy the force in OIF - - and the ability to offer the President enhanced employment options from the FRP. Your Navy is built to take credible combat power to the far corners of the globe, and every day our volunteer Sailors are dedicated to providing flexible, forward deployed, combat ready power on a moment's notice to ensure the safety and vital interests of United States. We are this way because of the tremendous support we have received from the American people and from the Congress-your continued support is vital to our readiness today and to the preparedness of the Navy of tomorrow. Again, I would like to thank the members of this Committee for this opportunity to discuss the Fleet Response Plan and our plans for the future readiness of the Force.
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
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