TESTIMONY OF
M.E. RHETT FLATER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMERICAN HELICOPTER SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
108^TH CONGRESS

REGARDING
AVIATION INDUSTRIAL BASE AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROTORCRAFT INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

4 MARCH 2004

Mr. Chairman, my name is Rhett Flater and I am the Executive Director of the American Helicopter Society. It is a pleasure to appear before you today as you receive testimony on the fiscal year 2005 national defense authorization request and review United States' rotorcraft programs, the supporting industrial base and future technology initiatives.

The American Helicopter Society is the leading professional, technical society in the world dedicated to the advancement and promotion of vertical flight technologies, including the helicopter and tiltrotor. The Society was founded in 1943 by Igor Sikorsky and other industry pioneers, who recognized the benefits which vertical flight technologies offer mankind. Today, the Society is international in membership, with more than 6,000 members, most of whom are managers, engineers, scientists and technicians. Our membership also includes most large members of the U.S. rotorcraft industrial base, including airframe manufacturers Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing Helicopter Division of Boeing Defense and Space Group, Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Technologies, and Kaman Aerospace, engine manufacturers GE Aircraft Engines, Honeywell, and Rolls-Royce Corporation, and systems integrators BAE Systems, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon.

I appear before you today to discuss the state of the United States rotorcraft industrial base, specifically as it relates to the ability of the industry to respond to future national and homeland security needs. More specifically, I wish to comment on the recent decision by the U.S. Army to terminate the Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche and the impact that decision will have on the domestic industrial base.

General Overview

In its 2004 world military forecast, updated since the termination of Comanche, Forecast International based in Newtown, Connecticut predicts that production of new-build military rotorcraft will rise in 2004 compared to 2003 and will continue to rise through 2011. In that year, Forecast International predicts that a total of 447 military rotorcraft will be produced, compared to the 318 expected to be built in 2004. The firm predicts that the value of this annual production, as measured in constant FY04 dollars will show an upward trend through 2012. The annual growth rate in production value will be considerably higher than the rate of growth in unit production. This is due to increased production of such relatively complex aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey and the NH-90. The value of military rotorcraft production in 2012 is projected to be $9.9 billion, compared with $4.4 billion forecast for 2004.

During the 2004-2013 time frame, Forecast International projects that a total of 3,960 new-build military rotorcraft will be produced. They expect this production will be worth an estimated $73.7 billion. (By comparison, world civil rotorcraft production during the same time frame is valued at $18.8 billion.)

These totals do not include major modification programs. During the next 10 years, Forecast International predicts a total of 1,414 major modifications, all military, with a value estimated at $12.1 billion. Examples of such programs include the Bell AH-1Z and UH-1Y, the Boeing AH-64D and CH-47F, the Kaman SH-2G and the Sikorsky UH-60M.

The U.S. Helicopter Industrial Base

Currently, the U.S. helicopter industrial base consists of three major primes: Bell Helicopter Textron based in Fort Worth, Texas; Boeing's helicopter division based in Philadelphia and Mesa, Arizona; and Sikorsky Aircraft, a division of United Technologies Corporation, based in Stratford, Connecticut. It also includes several engine manufacturers, e.g., GE Aircraft Engines based in Lynn, Massachusetts; Honeywell (formerly AlliedSignal) based in Phoenix, Arizona; and Rolls-Royce (formerly Allison) based in Indianapolis. In addition, it includes key suppliers, such as Kaman Corporation based in Bloomfield, Connecticut; Hamilton Sundstrand based in Windsor Locks, Connecticut; Goodrich Aerospace based in Charlotte, North Carolina; Lord Corporation based in Erie, Pennsylvania; Raytheon based in Arlington, Virginia; Moog, Inc. based in East Aurora, New York; Smiths Industries based in Grand Rapids; Michigan, and systems integrators such as Lockheed Martin (Owego, New York, and Orlando, Florida), BAE Systems (Vergennes, Vermont), Northrop Grumman (Baltimore, Maryland), Honeywell, and others.

The U.S. government invested substantial sums in basic rotorcraft research during the period 1960 - 1980 through vehicles such as the Army - NASA Joint Agreement on Rotorcraft Research Collaboration. Investments in engine technology during the 1970s produced the T700 engine which powers the Black Hawk and the Apache. This engine was ahead of its time and gave the U.S. medium lift capabilities unmatched by other countries for many years. But the once strong technical base for rotorcraft declined during the 1990s as government investment steadily dwindled. With NASA's unilateral determination in 2002 not to invest further in rotorcraft R&D, government investment has been reduced by half. Compounding the problem, NASA is in the process of closing RDT&E infrastructure, such as the National Full Scale Aerodynamics Complex (NFAC), essential to aeronautics, and rotorcraft research and development. The Army research community has therefore become isolated in its mission to broaden rotorcraft applications through improvements in performance (increased speed and payload, reduced empty weight, reduced noise and vibration) and safety. Industry continues to invest independent research and development funds in new designs such as the Collier Award-winning S-92 transport and the BA-609 civil tiltrotor as well as lean manufacturing technologies.

The Non-US Rotorcraft Industrial Base

While the U.S. is reducing its investment in rotorcraft research and related test and evaluation infrastructure, just the opposite is happening in other countries. The EU, as part of its Sixth Framework Initiative, has recently doubled its investment in aeronautics, including rotorcraft research, and related test and evaluation facilities. Several European airframe manufacturers now have capabilities comparable to those of U.S. companies. The most technically advanced of these is Eurocopter, an EADS company based in Marignane, France, and Donauwoerth, Germany. Eurocopter, which grossed nearly $2.9 billion in 2002, played a leading role in designing, building and fielding the NH-90, an advanced, medium-lift transport featuring an all-composite airframe, fly-by-wire control technology, and a second-generation bearingless-main-rotor system. It also builds the Tiger, a medium reconnaissance / attack helicopter also featuring fly-by-wire controls and a bearingless main rotor system (the Tiger recently won two international competitions in Spain and Australia); and a full line of military and civil helicopters for every market niche except heavy lift (only the U.S. has invested in modern heavy lift capabilities). Italy's Agusta and England's GKN Westland have teamed to produce the EH-101, a medium lift advanced transport helicopter now in service in nine countries in Europe and North America (Canada). Lockheed Martin is proposing a U.S. version of the same aircraft for the White House's presidential helicopter replacement. Russia's Mil Design Bureau designed and built the Mi-26, a relatively low-technology (1970s) airframe capable of lifting extremely heavy payloads, in excess of 44,000 pounds. Meanwhile, Japan, China and India continue to increase investments in their respective rotorcraft industrial bases with the desire to fulfill any shortfall in U.S. or world needs.

Compared to the U.S., European host governments consistently, and heavily, subsidize rotorcraft research and development. In Vision 2020, the European Commission lays out its plan to dominate the world aerospace industry, including rotorcraft, and its willingness to achieve that goal by funding its industrial base research. Rotorcraft research funding in France is supplied by the military (64%) and by the civil (36%) sectors of the government. Of these funds, 34% support basic research and 66% technology and development programs. The European Union supplements its member state basic R&D funds via European Commission "framework programs." European government test facilities are modern to state-of-the-art compared to those in the U.S. Examples include the DNW (Netherlands) wind tunnel, CIRA's (Italy's) new crash test facility and icing wind tunnel, both located at Padua. Russia's TsAGI has three large low speed tunnels that are used extensively for studies of helicopter rotors and complete configurations, e.g., the T-101, T-104 and T-105. As the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry recently reported, "in contrast to declining NASA and FAA funding, framework funding has increased dramatically since 1987." EU supplemental funding for aeronautics research jumped to more than $1.5 billion in the sixth EU framework program (2002-2006). This is in addition to even larger investments made by individual countries such as France, Germany, England and Italy, and government agencies supporting various economic regions in Europe.

There are also a number of new centers of rotorcraft excellence emerging beyond Europe, again with the help of government funding. These include the helicopter industries of India, China, Japan and Korea. Closer to home, Canada also continues to support home-grown rotorcraft technology development through its TPC funding programs.

The State of Basic Rotorcraft Research in the U.S.

Attached as Appendix #3 is the Society's best estimate of the state of DoD rotorcraft science and technology and NASA research and technology programs for the period 1994 through 2004, with projections for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Please note that during the period from 2001 through 2003, rotorcraft research performed by DoD and NASA declined from $113.6 million to $56.3 million, largely because of NASA's failure to fund rotorcraft research.

Long-term cooperative efforts between NASA and the Department of Defense in rotorcraft research, in particular the 1969 Army NASA Joint Agreement, are in serious turmoil. Facing internal budget pressures, NASA eliminated all of its rotorcraft R&D activity in fiscal year 2002. Effective 2003, however, NASA restored funding for rotorcraft but only to $15 million annually as part of its Vehicle Systems Technology program. In the face of a growing European rotorcraft industry, the future competitiveness of U.S. capabilities in both military and commercial rotorcraft technology development is in jeopardy. If the trend continues, the U.S. Defense Department may eventually become dependent on non-U.S. suppliers for future mobility requirements. In its Third Interim Report, the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry ("the Commission") issued a recommendation that "the Administration and Congress should direct NASA and the DoD to coordinate R&D efforts in areas of common need and provide the appropriate funding for joint programs. For example, funding for joint Army/NASA rotorcraft R&D efforts should be restored." See Commission Recommendation 5.

The rotorcraft industry is a significant part of the U.S. aerospace industrial base. Several findings by the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry regarding the industrial base are especially relevant to the rotorcraft industry. For example:

There is a major workforce crisis in the aerospace industry. Our nation has lost over 600,000 scientific and technical aerospace jobs in the past 13 years. These layoffs initially began as a result of reduced defense spending following the end of the Cold War. But subsequent contraction of the industry through mergers and acquisitions and the events of September 11 have made the situation worse.
Aerospace is a technology-driven industry, heavily dependent on defense, research and manufacturing. Yet aerospace procurement by the military fell nearly 53 percent from 1987 to 2000. The DoD also reduced its overall investment in research, development, testing and evaluation by nearly 20 percent from 1987 to 1999. The recent decision by the Army to terminate the RAH-66 Comanche program will exacerbate this decline unless Congress reallocates the $14.6 billion which would have been spent on Comanche to Army aviation transformation accounts.
Maintaining a world-class national aerospace RDT&E infrastructure is essential to ensure that this country's research programs can be performed successfully. Yet much of the U.S. RDT&E infrastructure is 40 to 50 years old and marginally maintained. Currently, NASA has suspended all operations of the 40x80 Foot and 80x120 Foot wind tunnels, known as the National Full Scale Aerodynamics Complex, located at NASA Ames and threatens to close it permanently effective September 30, 2004. This is a significant blow to the rotorcraft industry which depends on full-scale testing and access to NASA RDT&E test facilities. In addition, NASA has closed the nation's only crash-safety flight test facility located at NASA Langley. Accordingly, crash safety tests planned for existing and future U.S. aerospace industry products must now be performed in European facilities or cancelled altogether.
Industry-funded aerospace research and development fell by 37 percent from $8.1 billion in 1986 to $5.1 billion in 1999 (in inflation adjusted dollars). Absent government procurements, private firms have little incentive to fund basic research on their own because capital markets and stockholders shy away from risky investments with indeterminate returns.
During the same timeframe, the number of major U.S. aerospace prime contractors shrank from more than 50 to just five. Meanwhile, aerospace firms continue to consolidate to maximize resources, eliminate excess capacity, and access new market segments. Parts suppliers have undergone a similar contraction and consolidation.

Given (1) the loss in U.S. rotorcraft market share brought about by the decline in U.S. investment (NASA, DoD, and Industry) in basic research; (2) the termination of the Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche and the corresponding loss of investment in rotorcraft research and development; and (3) the availability of equivalent or better European technology supported by aggressive R&D programs with the stated objective of overtaking the U.S. in rotorcraft sales, it should be clear that the U.S. government must support sustained research. Specifically, the DoD and NASA must provide sustained and predictable investments in basic aeronautics research, including rotorcraft. If this does not occur, the U.S. rotorcraft capability - until recently regarded as the best in the world - will cease to be competitive in world military markets.

The Decision to Terminate the RAH-66 Comanche And Its Impact on the Domestic Rotorcraft Industrial Base

The U.S. Army on February 23, 2004 announced its decision to terminate the Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche Program. The program was conceived nearly 20 years ago and in recent tests it has performed well demonstrating revolutionary new capabilities. Boeing and Sikorsky and other members of the industrial base were already producing EMD aircraft and were poised to begin production of 650 Comanche aircraft which would have performed manned, armed, deep reconnaissance and surveillance missions for the service. Unfortunately, the Army has determined that the world's operating environment and its own priorities have changed since Comanche was conceived in 1983 and that it must restructure Army aviation immediately. To fund this restructuring, Comanche must be ended. The Society understands that President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld have approved the Army's recommendation to submit an amendment to the previously submitted FY05 budget request that reflects the Comanche program cancellation and other changes.

According to the Army, termination of the Comanche program enables the reallocation of approximately $14.6 billion that had been slated for Comanche to other Army aviation efforts in the FY04 - FY11 time period. The funds will be used to underwrite procurement of Block III Apaches, which will give Apache the same fire control radar, and the same digital connectivity, that the Comanche would have had. The Army will procure additional CH-47F Chinooks and UH-60M Black Hawks, plus 368 new armed reconnaissance helicopters and up to 303 light utility helicopters. Some of the technologies developed for Comanche will be "migrated" to existing airframes in future upgrades. For example, the Army will introduce fly-by-wire capabilities to its Apache and Black Hawk fleets. Chinooks and Black Hawks will be given common cockpits. In sum, the service will buy 796 new aircraft and recapitalize 1,400 existing aircraft. Finally, the Army is considering investing in a new Joint Multi-Role helicopter, which might possibly be a Joint VTOL Heavy Lift aircraft capable of delivering payloads such as the Future Combat System to distant battlefields. While this Joint Multi-Role helicopter is not believed to be part of the Army's immediate plan for the use of former Comanche funding, it nevertheless is under consideration as a possible future "new start."

Whether this will happen - and it is vital to the future of Army aviation that it happen - will depend on the continued support of the Bush Administration and the Department of Defense, but most importantly it will depend on the wishes of the United States Congress. The Society strongly endorses the Army's plan and urges Congress to "fence off" the entire $14.6 billion investment which would have been made in Comanche for the purpose of supporting Army aviation transformation.

Before closing on this topic, let me offer the comments of several knowledgeable observers.

Dr. Robert F. Loewy, the current Chairman of AHS International and also William R.T. Oakes, Jr. Professor and Chair, School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, observed in a recent communication to me:

"If there are sound reasons for man in space, as part of a program of exploration, there must be still more reasons for manned airborne systems, considering the limitless abilities of an enemy to adapt to whatever technologies we develop. Experienced warfighters know that flexibility in our ability to respond is always essential. UAV's may be great in many respects, but they are unlikely to be as flexible, regarding the unexpected, as a manned helicopter. Comanche is generations ahead of military aircraft currently being fielded by the U.S., and if we are to have technologies comparable to the NH-90 and the Eurocopter Tiger, we had better field a new generation rotorcraft or be ready to be second class."

Here's another comment which appears as a recent editorial in the highly-respected magazine, Aviation Week & Space Technology:

"The decision to terminate Comanche is a high-stakes gamble on the Pentagon's part. And riding along on the roll of the dice will be the future of the U.S. rotorcraft industry. While the Pentagon's plan calls for a slew of programs, most are upgrades or refurbishments. These alone will not provide the engineering challenge to keep a robust helicopter industry alive. The U.S., in recent years, has shown little support for its helicopter industrial base, but it may be too early to discard the notions of future helicopters altogether - unless Congress wants to buy them in Europe.

To minimize the risk to the industrial base, a new development should be started quickly. The Army needs an intra-theater transport to move Future Combat System equipment. But funding for the effort has lagged. The requirement exists, so this doesn't have to be a subsidy that serves no direct national security purpose. And this is a niche where industrial need and military requirements overlap.

Paradoxically, killing Comanche offers an opportunity to revitalize the U.S. military rotorcraft sector. But it is a high-risk strategy that will require both government and industry to avoid almost any misstep."

In sum, the domestic helicopter industrial base is currently sound, but the loss of the Comanche places it at risk unless former Comanche funding is retained and applied to current Army aviation needs. Let there be no question. The Army's termination of the Comanche will directly impact a large portion of the rotorcraft industrial base, more than 300 subcontractors, in addition to Sikorsky Aircraft and Boeing and engine manufacturers Rolls-Royce and Honeywell. Unless a competitive new start program is initiated near term, the loss of Comanche and subsequent drop in the subcontractor labor base will adversely affect other unrelated programs, such as the V-22 Osprey and the CH-53E Sea Stallion.

Why a U.S. Rotorcraft Industrial Base Is Needed

NASA's withdrawal since fiscal year 2002 from rotorcraft research, and the loss of access to NASA RDT&E facilities, has compromised the future competitiveness of the U.S. rotorcraft industry. The recent closure of the NFAC (NASA's 40x80 foot and 80x120 foot windtunnels) has interrupted further testing of revolutionary rotary wing technologies, specifically individual blade control combined with "smart" materials. Meanwhile, the European Union and Eurocopter continue to conduct tests using similar technologies at the German - Dutch DNW wind tunnels located near Amsterdam.

The principal arguments supporting the need for sustaining a U.S. rotorcraft industrial base are stated below. While the arguments are stated primarily in terms of the U.S. airframe community, they apply equally to the engine and systems communities, as well as the supplier base.

1. Maintaining a U.S. rotorcraft industrial base supports an independent U.S. foreign policy. Rotorcraft or low disk-loading aircraft capable of vertical take off and landing in austere environments have proven to be essential assets in fighting asymmetric, three-dimensional, non-battlefront centric, modern wars. They are the only VTOL vehicles capable of providing practical and affordable solutions to military needs for utility transport, cargo, combat search and rescue, reconnaissance and surveillance, and close-in attack. They are critical to 21^st century military transformation efforts focused on developing lighter, more mobile, more lethal, and more agile military combat capabilities.

2. Maintaining a U.S. helicopter industrial base is essential to preserve the ability to perform emergency upgrades, provide instant modifications and sustain the current 6,000 airframe-plus existing U.S. military helicopter fleet in the field. Because of their complexity, high vibration, and heavy loading, helicopters are maintenance-intensive vehicles, requiring constant support in the field in order to assure high combat availability. In addition, many combat environments require that the fleet undergo emergency upgrades to address adverse local conditions, such as Afghanistan's hot-high environment or the sandstorms of Iraq, or new threats on the battlefield. Engine and rotor system instant modifications are frequently required to enable military helicopters, such as the CH-47 Chinook, the CH-53 Sea Stallion, the AH-64 Apache, the AH-1 Cobra, the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior and the UH-60 Black Hawk, to operate in such environments. Access to a stable, secure and reliable domestic industrial base, which cannot be compromised by disagreements within the international community, is essential to meeting the needs for flight safety, technical expertise, quality control, and quality spares in a timely and effective manner.

3. The failure to maintain a U.S. helicopter industrial base could have a significant impact on non-DoD domestic and foreign policy initiatives, such as homeland defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Global War on Terrorism, disaster response, and medical evacuation. In all such initiatives, helicopters perform roles which fixed-wing aircraft and ground transportation are not capable of executing in a safe and timely manner - roles which only helicopters can perform.

4. The failure to maintain a U.S. helicopter industrial base could compromise advanced combat systems embedded in modern helicopter airframes, such as advanced low-observable technology, countermeasures, and sensor capabilities. Dependence on a non-U.S. industrial base for design, sustainment and aftermarket support might compromise the ability to protect sensitive technologies and capabilities purchased by the DoD with U.S. taxpayer funds.

5. The development of new requirements for heavy lift replacement could assure the development of advanced technology that would preserve the future of the U.S. rotorcraft industrial base. Such an effort would include possibilities for classical rotorcraft, advanced compound rotorcraft configurations, tiltrotor and tiltwing aircraft to meet any such requirement. U.S. national security needs are likely to impose unique requirements on our military posture, such as strategic mobility and world-wide operations without fixed bases. A case in point is that only the U.S. and Russia have developed heavy lift helicopters and only the U.S. has developed tiltrotor aircraft. A new initiative for heavy lift might achieve results similar to those the DoD successfully accomplished in the case of the Joint Strike Fighter and U.S. military fighter industrial base. (Note that the core lift design and aerodynamics R&D efforts were allocated to U.S. firms rather than the international partners.)

6. Maintaining a strong civil helicopter industrial base supports national security as well as the U.S. economy. Not only do U.S. manufacturers provide rotorcraft for the U.S. defense market, but both Bell Helicopter and Sikorsky Aircraft also manufacture helicopters for the civil market and foreign military sales. Boeing has exited the civil market, but participates heavily in foreign military sales, which has largely sustained the CH-47 Chinook production line through the 1990s. Civil market and FMS sales support the U.S. helicopter industrial base, including skilled technicians and a capable research, engineering, development, test and evaluation community (technology is "people"), as well as the necessary manufacturing infrastructure to build helicopters, particularly during times when cyclical defense needs are at a low ebb. The helicopter industrial base which supports civil market requirements is largely the same base which supports military needs. Stated more emphatically, there can be no military helicopter industrial base without a civil helicopter industrial base. Conversely, given the rapid pace of technology advancement in our industry, there can be no viable civil turbine helicopter industry without a viable military industrial base. From a macroeconomic perspective, civil helicopter exports and foreign military sales of helicopters and helicopter spares support the U.S. economy, create high-paying skilled jobs, and contribute positively to U.S. international trade balances.

The decision whether to sustain a domestic rotorcraft industrial base should be made soon, since the failure to make a decision, or to modify current government policies, will contribute to the continued erosion of the U.S. rotorcraft industrial base during the coming decade. The loss of specific aerospace industrial bases and capabilities (or, stated another way, the transfer of the aerospace industrial base abroad) has proven irreversible during the past 10 to 20 years. The United States has ceded leadership - and any continuing role - in the market for regional, commuter jets. Canada's Bombardier and Brazil's Embraer now dominate that market. Similarly, Airbus in recent years has overcome Boeing's lead in large commercial aircraft and currently enjoys a 50 percent or greater market share. By comparison, the DoD made a decision in the early 1990s to assume a lead role in developing the Joint Strike Fighter and made appropriate R&D and S&T investments to assure that result. As a result, today the U.S. military fighter industrial base dominates the world military fighter market.

Investments in Rotorcraft Technology Needed

There are a number of areas in which further investment in rotorcraft technology is needed by DoD and NASA.

Concepts for innovative new configurations can radically improve rotorcraft speed, affordability, and mission effectiveness, while retaining superior VTOL and low-speed characteristics.
Applications of information and computing technologies will result in safer, more affordable, environmentally-friendly rotorcraft and far more effective and survivable military systems. These technologies can enable safe near all-weather operation in confined urban areas, particularly important for scheduled transport and public service operations.
Active and adaptive controls have demonstrated the potential to improve performance, and reduce external noise, internal noise, vibration, and weight and mechanical complexity.
Noise reducing design and operational methods have demonstrated noise reductions totaling 20 dB (i.e., 75% reduction), but continued research is needed to achieve this for future rotorcraft configurations.
New design tools can reduce development cycle time by 50%, speeding up the application of technology improvements. These include physics-based models, such as advanced structural analysis and computational fluid dynamics, that lead to improved performance, noise, and vibration characteristics. These methods are needed to optimize designs and to "get it right the first time," avoiding costly redesign and retest, particularly for innovative aircraft configurations.
Deice and anti-ice concepts and certification methods are needed for affordable and reliable all-weather operation. Operation of rotorcraft in icing conditions currently requires complex (hence costly and sometimes unreliable) systems and is difficult, costly, and time consuming to certify for civil operation.

Future research addressing these barrier technologies will bring about radical improvements that will achieve the characteristics needed to contribute to national security as well as the air transportation system of the future.

Conclusion

Companies such as Bell, Boeing and Sikorsky and their supporting suppliers are innovative. They also have responsive, can-do senior managers and proven, experienced management teams which partner well with their customer. When called upon, they are capable of responding with alacrity to national security and civil market needs.

In conclusion, I wish to make four recommendations.

First, Congress and this Committee should support the Army's plan to redirect the approximately $14.6 billion originally slated for Comanche to meet current and future needs of Army aviation transformation during Fiscal Years 2005 - 2011.

Second, the DoD and NASA should be directed to make further investments in basic 6.1 and 6.2 rotorcraft research - particularly efforts to refine and simplify the rotor system, control systems and the drive train - a high priority.
Third, given the importance of transforming the U.S. military to become more mobile and more agile - a requirement in fighting future 21^st century wars - the DoD should fund private industry to design, develop and fly a series of innovative VTOL prototype aircraft.
Fourth, this Committee should pay particular heed to implementing the recommendations of the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry contained in the Commission's Final Report issued November 17, 2002 highlighted in Appendix 2 to this testimony.

Reallocation of the entire unused $14.6 billion investment in Comanche to address major shortfalls in Army aviation capabilities and rapid passage of the "Aeronautics Revitalization Act of 2005," which has broad, bipartisan support, would go far in addressing these national concerns.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Appendix 1

Rotorcraft Industry Trends
For the Period 1993 - 2003

Year Total Employees Total Revenues (Billions US)

1993 28,293 $5.086

1994 27,606 $5.121

1995 26,190 $5.445

1996 25,821 $4.632

1997 27,526 $4.505

1998 27,214 $5.048

1999 25,534 $5.072

2000 24,899 $5.482

2001 25,324 $5.865

2002 24,182 $6.616

2003 24,916 $6.388

* Includes total revenues and employees for the years ending December 31, 1993 through December 31, 2003 for Bell Helicopter Textron, The Boeing Company (rotorcraft revenues only), McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (1993-1996), and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.

Appendix 2

Stakeholder's Coalition

"Final Report of the Commission on the
Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry"

Summary Findings
Research and Development Committee

The Stakeholder's Coalition R&D Committee has identified several key recommendations relating to the need for national R&D goals contained within the Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, consolidated, reworded and modified as follows:

The White House and Congress must increase and sustain funding in long-term research and associated RDT&E infrastructure to develop and demonstrate new breakthrough aerospace capabilities. (Rec. #123; Com. Rep. at 9-8 and 9-12; see also Rec. #111; Com. Rep. at 4-6)

(a) NASA should reenergize its aeronautics research efforts and, within the next five years, double its investment in aeronautics. (Rec. #9; Com. Rep. at 9-3, 9-11, 9-13; Rec. #123; Com. Rep. at 9-8 and 9-12)

(b) The Federal government must assume responsibility for providing, sustaining, and modernizing critical aerospace RDT&E infrastructure to ensure that this country's research programs can be performed successfully. (Rec. #116; see Com. Rep. at 4-12 and 4-14; Rec. #123; Com. Rep. at 9-7 and 9-12.)

(c) DoD's annual science and technology (6.1-6.3) funding must be sufficient (not less than 3 percent DoD obligation authority) and stable to create and demonstrate the innovative technologies needed to address future national security threats. (Rec. #113; see Com. Rep. at 4-7.)

(d) The Administration and Congress should direct NASA and the DoD to coordinate R&D efforts in areas of common need and provide the appropriate funding for joint programs. (Rec. #24; Com. Rep. at B-39.)

Industry and government should accelerate research transition reducing the time from concept definition to operational capability by 75 percent through coordinated national goals; aggressive use of information technologies; incentives for real government, industry, labor, and academia partnerships; and an acquisition process that integrates science and technology as part of the product development process. (Recs. # 103, 104, and #8; Com. Rep. at 9-10/12).

To focus U.S. aerospace research investments on developing breakthrough capabilities, the Administration should adopt - as a national priority - the achievement of the following aerospace technology demonstration goals by 2010

Demonstrate an automated and integrated air transportation capability that would triple air system capacity by 2025;
Reduce aviation noise and emissions by 90 percent;
Reduce aviation fatal accident rate by 90 percent;
Reduce transit time between any two points on earth by 50 percent.
Reduce cost and time to access space by 50 percent;
Reduce transit time between two points in space by 50 percent;
Demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and surveil the earth, its atmosphere and space for a wide range of military, intelligence, civil and commercial applications;

(Rec. 8; Com. Rep. at 9-8)

Other Committee Items of Interest:

As the Commission found, "there is a workforce crisis in the aerospace industry" which must have access to a scientifically and technically trained workforce. The recommendations of the Commission relating to "Workforce" contained at Chapter 8 of the Final Report are of considerable importance to the future health of U.S. R&D, particularly recommendations #22, #23, #118, #119, and #122.

Kathryn Holmes, ASME
M.E. Rhett Flater, AHS Int'l
Co-chairs, R&D Committee

House Armed Services Committee
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

NEWSLETTER

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Military

General Overview

The State of Basic Rotorcraft Research in the U.S.

Investments in Rotorcraft Technology Needed