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TESTIMONY OF
JUDITH S. YAPHE, Ph.D.

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REGARDING IRAQ: THE ROAD AHEAD

 APRIL 21, 2004

I would like to begin by listing some questions and assumptions that I find very troubling:

1. Why aren't the Iraqis grateful for their liberation from Saddam's oppression?  They are, but gratitude is a short-lived commodity at best. Joy at liberation lasts a day or so. After that, it is occupation.  Our aim was not to defeat Iraq as we did Germany and Japan in a total war; the aim was to liberate it from Saddam Husayn's regime. We did that. So, ask many Iraqis, why are you still here?

2. Do elections assure democracy and a pro-US government that views regional security, economic, and political issues as we do? They don't and we should not assume they do.  We assume that institutions and constitutions confer legitimacy, establish the rule of law, create checks and balances in government, and guarantee equal rights and protections for all. They don't. Parliaments are buildings and constitutions are written on paper. It takes more than that to create a free people and an open society. It takes time and trust. In 1920, the British created institutions of government (parliament), imported a foreign Arab and had him "elected" by a plebiscite of hand-picked "natural leaders" known to favor pro-British rule, and selected a rainbow coalition drawn from all the communities of Iraq (including a Christian and a Jew) as Cabinet ministers. Now, I am a fan of King Faysal I, and the majority of Iraqis-Sunni and Shia-welcomed him as their choice. The government established by Britain-the king, the parliament, municipal and regional councils, and the so-called natural leaders-lacked power and authority to rule Iraq. Not only did the British rule indirectly and closely through political commissioners and officers chosen in Whitehall, they wrote the constitution and the treaties the Iraqis had to sign to gain independence.  Even after the League of Nations recognized an independent Iraq in 1932, the British retained their control over security and military decision making until the 1958 revolution.  There is a danger that we will repeat the errors of the British in Iraq if we do not pass decisionmaking power to them.

3. Is democracy compatible with Iraqis' views of the role of Islam and governance? Yes.  This is not to say that Iraqis are not and cannot be "democrats" or that they cannot be governed by democratically elected representatives. They can be. Many have lived in democratic countries, but more importantly, in my view, many Iraqis have an idea of what democracy can be and they know how fragile their country is now.  The question is, "How do we get from here to there, from where we are now to where we would like to be and do it by ourselves." Democracy represents two values: majority rule and protection of the rights of minorities.  It took Britain nearly 900 years and a civil war (from the time of Magna Charta in 1215) to evolve into a truly representative government; it has taken us more than 225 years and a civil war to achieve our current state of democracy.  How can we expect the Iraqis to achieve this in one year?

4. Is there an Iraqi nationalism?  Two assumptions about Iraqi nationalism are commonly and mistakenly made:
   1. We assume that because Iraq was "invented by the British and French after World War, it must be an artificial state. It isn't and they didn't. Modern Iraq incorporates the historical provinces that were the historical Land Between the 2 Rivers-Mesopotamia (Basra and Baghdad provinces) and Mosul.  Iraq is as legitimate a state as Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran-all of whom were affected by post-World War reinvention.
   2. We assume that because Iraq is an amalgam of Shi'a Arab (approximately 60 percent), Sunni Arab (20 percent) and Kurd (Sunni and Shia, approximately 20 percent), then Iraq can be defined and divided mathematically.  Some people go further and say Iraq is ungovernable as it is, so split it up into 3 parts. They aren't and it can't. The numbers of representatives in parliament, the appointments to ministry posts, the composition of military units-all are being allocated according to ethnic-sectarian identity.  But identity is more than your religion and ethnic origin, and an Iraqi is more than the sum total of his/her parts.

5.  Are we seeing the outbreak of sectarian warfare-Sunni versus Shi'a-and are the Shi'a wedded to an Iranian-style cleric-dominated regime as Iran has? No and no. In my judgment, the confrontations in Fallujah and Najaf do not yet constitute a civil war or a rebellion. They do, however, reflect carefully planned and coordinated attacks on our forces and on civilians working on Iraq's reconstruction. What is important is what is not being heard, to paraphrase Sherlock Holmes referring to "the dog that did not bark in the night." We are not hearing about the rounds of negotiations between Muqtada al-Sadr and representatives of the Ayatollahs of Najaf, including the son of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. We are not hearing about the negotiations in Fallujah. And no cleric has yet issued a decree (fatwa) sanctioning rebellion against the foreign occupier.  Despite the murders of Iraqis cooperating with the CPA, including a minister on the Governing Council, clerics in the Sunni and Shi'a communities over the past year, and the attacks on the offices of both Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, civil war-meaning between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, or Sunni and Shi'a-has not erupted and in my judgment is not likely to do so.
1. Sunni-Shi'a strife is not the same historical pattern in Iraq as it is in Iran and the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. Iran's tribes were Shi'a for generations before the Shah of that period made Shi'a Islam the official religion of the state in the 16^th century. Most of Iraq's tribes in southern Iraq converted to Shi'a Islam in the 18^th and 19^th centuries, with many families, tribes, and clans-including Saddam Husayn's-having Sunni and Shi'a members.  Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a communities have intermarried and live intermingled in many cities and towns, including Baghdad and Tikrit, Sadddam's home region. Iraq's Shi'a were excluded from participation in the Sunni Ottoman Establishment that ruled the Iraqi provinces for 4 centuries, but they also chose to separate themselves from Sunni schools, Sunni academies, and Sunni governance. Nevertheless, Shi'a Arabs served in government under the monarchy, including several prime ministers, joined the Communist and Ba'thist parties beginning in the 1950s, and served as loyalists to Saddam Husayn through the 1990s.  They saw these secular movements as offering a more level playing field than the Arab nationalist parties that had dominated the state since independence and favored Arab Sunni nationalist causes.  In my view, the likelihood of civil war in Iraq is higher between religious extremists (Sunni and Shi'a) against everyone else, than it is between Sunni and Shi'a. Generally speaking, Sunni and Shi'a Arabs share a belief in Iraqi nationalism and in maintaining the political and territorial integrity of the country as defined by the 1922 San Remo treaty and the 1932 treaty of independence. They have cooperated in the past and lived together for hundreds of years.
2. What do the Shi'a want?  Iraq's Shi'a are not one monolithic community sharing a common vision of Iraq's political future. They are multiple communities, with multiple goals and visions of a new Iraq.

1.   Secular Shi'a: tend not to be religious; they favor a secular state and joined secular parties-the Communist Party of Iraq and the Ba'th Party, one of whose founders was an Iraqi Shi'a Arab. Sadun Hamadi, for example, served as head of the National Assembly by order of Saddam; another example was a long-time party loyalist and Cabinet member who Saddam ordered executed for his failure to quell the 1991 Shi'a revolt.

2.   Traditional Shi'a: tend to be more village and tribal centered and more pious and observant. Many follow Grand Ayatollah Sistani as their guide (marja al-taqlid); they probably favor some sort of Islamic governance, with Islam as "a" source of state law, but do not support an Islamic republic styled after the principles of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Islamic revolution. They provided most of the recruits for Saddam's army and were loyal to the state, if not Saddam, during the 8 long years of war with the Persians. Sistani, who is portrayed as anti-U.S., is more accurately described as pro-Iraqi, in my view. He opposed non-Iraqis writing a constitution for Iraq and demands direct elections for the new government and parliament. Some observers believe his insistence on elections reflects his belief that the majority Shi'a population would naturally choose Shi'a candidates and thereby create a Shi'a-dominated state. I am not so sure.

3.   Extremist Shi'a: Iraq has several extremist factions. They share a vision of an Islamic republic governed by Islam as "the" source of all law, and have little tolerance for western values or practices, including the emancipation of women.

a)  SCIRI: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq was established by Iran in the early 1980s as an umbrella group to tie together anti-regime Iraqis in exile in Iran. Its leader was Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, who was assassinated in August 2003 after returning from more than 20 years in exile in Iran; his brother Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim serves on the Governing Council and heads the Badr Brigade, the SCIRI militia.

b)  Dawa Party: A clandestine Iraqi Shi'a faction founded in Najaf in the 1960s by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr Sadr, who was martyred by Saddam's regime in 1980. He was a companion of Khomeini during the latter's 15-year exile in Iraq, and he wrote a political treatise advocating a role for clerics in governance (this became Khomeini's principle of vilayati faqih, or rule by religious jurisprudent). Dawa members were involved in anti-U.S. and anti-western terrorism with the Lebanese Hizballah terrorist infrastructure in Kuwait during the 1980s. They have never been comfortable in their alliance with SCIRI and indicators suggest the 2 have split. They also have a representative on the Governing Council.

c)  Muqtada al-Sadr: A 30-something junior cleric who seems to appeal primarily to disgruntled young unemployed males with a taste for sacrifice and violence.  His Mahdi militia and rhetoric portray the struggle against U.S. forces as a holy war (jihad) against the infidel; he wraps himself in a white shroud to show he is ready for death. He is implicated in the murder of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoie, moderate leader of a popular and prominent foundation who had returned to Iraq and was trying to reconcile factions in Najaf when he was brutally murdered in April 2003. Sadr follows an Iraqi exile in Iran as his marja (source of emulation or guide)-Ayatollah Ha'iri, who resides in Qom. It is not clear that Sadr finds much favor with Iran's clerical leaders-in my view, they find him a dangerous source of instability and civil strife where they would prefer quiet manipulation and a more subtle exercise of their assumed influence. Sadr's father, Sadiq Sadr, was an important ayatollah appointed by Saddam to head a major mosque in Baghdad; when Sadiq Sadr tried to restore practices banned by Saddam, Saddam had him and 2 of his sons murdered in 1999. This Sadr clan is related to a very important clerical family in Iraq that has figured in Shi'a political activism. Muqtada seems not to have his father's brilliance or leadership skills, but he plays on the family's Arabism and loyalty to Iraq, saying they stayed and suffered under Saddam while "others" (the al-Hakims and SCIRI) fled to safety in Iran.

d)  Iranian clerics. Many of the senior and mid-level Shi'a clerics in Iraq have been and still are Iranian in origin. Sistani came to Iraq to study more than 50 years ago; the Khoies were Iranian in origin as were the Sadrs.  Their contact with the Iraqi Shi'a community is apparently limited, but in times of strife they could play a more important role.

3. What do the Sunnis want? Attention historically has focused on the secular Iraq created by the British and continued by the monarchy and the several revolutionary regimes that ruled Iraq between 1920 and 2003.  Saddam Husayn long feared a resurgence of Islamic extremism as the most serious threat to his regime. He supported the Sunni extremist Syrian Muslim Brotherhood because of their common antipathy to Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, but Saddam suppressed all religious activism inside Iraq that he could not control. Saddam reinvented Iraq and himself in the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq war, to demonstrate his personal piety. He built new mosques, refurbished old ones, had his genealogy traced back to the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and allegedly donated blood to be used as ink to write a Quran. He permitted more public observance of Islam, wearing of beards and veils by students at university, and proclaimed himself a hero of Islam in removing the corrupt and un-Islamic regime of the Al Sabah in Kuwait. 

1.  Islamic activism has been growing in Iraq, despite Saddam's efforts to contain it. He suspected, correctly, that "Wahhabi" influences (the name given to any Sunni extremism) from Saudi Arabia was infiltrating Iraq, and he was almost certainly correct.[1] Saudi Wahhabi clerics and the Saudi-sponsored Muslim Brotherhood were sent to northern Iraq and among the Sunni tribes of central and western Iraq to woo them back to a strict and observant Islam. They are building mosques in areas of northern and central Iraq. Iraq's Sunni clerics lacked the power and influence exercised by Shi'a clerics.  Where the latter were more independent of the state in terms of wealth and status, Sunni clerics were state employees and hence very controllable by the government.

2.  Sunni Arab activists have been joining Shi'a activists to protest the U.S. presence in Iraq. This may seem an unusual phenomenon but it is not a new one. In the 1920 revolt, Sunni and Shi'a clerics prayed and preached in each other's mosques; they denounced the British occupation and organized joint anti-British demonstrations. The Shi'a clerics worked with Sunnis and with secular Arab nationalists to oppose the British but ultimately, it was a Shi'a cleric who issued a decree (fatwa) authorizing rebellion against the British that led the Shi'a tribes of southern Iraq to revolt. We are witnessing similar joint meetings in mosques now, which raises the question: Are we seeing a replay of events exactly 84 years ago this month, when Sunni and Shi'a prayed together, and the arrest of angry Shi'a led to an anti-British decree and a rebellion?

3.  Iraq's Kurds are predominantly Sunni as well. A small number belong to the Ansar al-Islam, which is linked to al-Qaida. I am not aware of their support for larger Sunni extremist activities. Some Kurds are also Shi'a, but many are Sufis (Islamic mystics). In any event, Iraq's Kurds are nationalists first (Iraqi as well as Kurdish?) and tend not to identify themselves by Muslim sect.  They prefer a secular Iraq, opposed inserting Islam into the interim constitution, and appear to be watching the current battles for Fallujah and Najaf from afar. Attempts to take advantage of the turmoil in the south and Baghdad by occupying lands claimed by the Arab and Turkman communities in Kirkuk, for example, could result in Iraq's Arabs regrouping to battle them after the U.S. is gone from Iraq.

Is Iranian Influence in Iraq Exaggerated?

Iran tends to overstate its ability to influence people and events in Iraq.  Just as it did in the early days of its war with Iraq, Iran looks at Iraq's Shi'a community in a somewhat condescending manner. The feelings are part religious (we are better Muslims) and part nationalist (Persians are better than Arabs). By the end of the 1991 war and abortive rebellions, Iran played host to nearly one million Iraqi refugees, some of whom were Kurds, most of whom were Arab Shi'a Muslims fleeing the wars or forced into exile by Saddam's ethnic cleansing operations.  Moreover, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei views himself as leader of the world Shi'a Muslim community.

Iran tried to catch Washington's attention as it observed growing American interest in regime change in Iraq. Tehran had been one of the first governments to extend its sympathies to the victims of 9/11 and cooperated with the U.S. in the UN 6 plus 2 Committee that monitored Afghanistan and planned for regime change there. Iran signaled Washington that it wanted to be consulted about U.S. intentions in Iraq. Iran made clear it had no interest in intervening on behalf of Saddam Husayn; in fact, they were almost certainly grateful that we were eliminating the second of 2 major threats to their security (the Taliban in Afghanistan being the first). 

Regardless of which faction rules in Tehran-conservative or reformist-Iran's government will watch very closely for signs of unrest, rebellion, or potential spillover. Iran has long monitored events in Iraq; it has always had diplomats, scholars, clerics, pilgrims, intelligence agents, and networks of informants watching this dangerous neighbor. Iranians long dominated the religious schools and courts of Najaf and Karbala, and many clerical families have spent generations in the shrine cities, owning property and burial plots in the grounds near the mosques. Iran, however, seems unable to capitalize on its "influence." It probably had the closest ties to Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, but he was murdered last August. Their long support-safe haven, training, arms, and political support-to his organization, SCIRI, and other Iraqi exiles has not paid off.  One of the major reasons for the growing split within the SCIRI infrastructure appears to be the Dawa organization's complaints that SCIRI is tied too closely to Iran. Nor does Iran appear to have influence over Muqtada al-Sadr. Its efforts to negotiate with Sadr and the Sistani elements in Najaf last week failed, according to press reports. The Iranians were unable apparently to arrange a meeting with Ayatollah Sistani or his organization, while a senior Iranian diplomat was murdered in Baghdad.

Is Iran's Islamic Revolution a model for Iraq? Most Iraqis, in my opinion, would you tell you that it is not a model for emulation. Iraq's hard-core Islamists-Shi'a and Sunni-seem insistent on an Islamic state under strict Islamic law, but the majority of Iraqis are not hard-core religious extremists. A great many will follow the decisions of Ayatollah Sistani on whether to comply with or oppose the plans for an interim government, elections, and a new constitution. Sistani has indicated he opposes a role for clerics in government.  The decision will probably be made on the Iraqis' perception of how much power they will have after 30 June, progress on holding direct elections, and the role of the U.S. and the UN in determining the shape and authority of an interim government.  The failure of Iran's experiment in democracy by theocratic rule will have little impact on Iraq.

What Lies Ahead?

In the year since Saddam Husayn and his brutal regime were removed from power, we have won a war with surprising ease only to be confronted with a growing and violent opposition to our continuing military presence and political role. Certainly, anyone looking at the situation in Iraq in April 2004 would have to be troubled by the violence, political uncertainty, and economic instability that is Iraq today. But who can argue that removing Saddam was wrong? I can't. Anyone who has studied Iraq-as I have for more than 30 years-and who knows Iraqis who suffered at his hands cannot say that it was wrong to remove him from power or that his removal increased the risk of terrorist attacks against us. At the same time, anyone who thought the transition from a brutal 35-year reign of terror to democracy and the rule of law would be easy was living in a dream world. Sadly, neither Iraqis nor Americans seem to have much patience or tolerance for the time and effort it takes to rebuild civil society and reconstruct a country damaged by long years or war and repression..

One year ago, expectations for the future were high on both the Iraqi and American side.  We found more damaged economic, social, and industrial infrastructure (damaged by years of neglect by Saddam) and more opposition to our efforts than we had anticipated.  And we made mistakes, including a too sudden demobilization of all military and security services, a too deep de-Ba'thification process, and a too dependent relationship with a few favored exiles who lacked a popular base in country. We should not be surprised that Iraqis who welcomed us in 2003 now fear us and wish us gone. Yes, most Iraqis want democracy and economic reconstruction, and they acknowledge they need for our assistance. But they need security and economic stability more. Without safe streets and jobs, freedom will have little meaning for them. Most Iraqis acknowledge that these are dangerous times, that the U.S forces should leave, but many also say we should not leave until order and a new government have been established.  That is their dilemma and ours.  Ambassador Bremer speaking to a group of Iraqi women on 19 April 2004 put it best: 

We understand that security is the main problem facing most Iraqis - men, women, and children. We have a responsibility to ensure security, and we have 130,000 troops here to do that. But as the events of the last few weeks have shown, it is also the responsibility of the Iraqi people to provide security. And we've had some disappointments in the last few weeks with the police and the civil defense force, even the army. Because in the long run this is your country. It's not our country. It's your country. And we have to find ways to ensure that Iraqis are more and more involved in their security.

We are faced with several difficult options.

• We could continue to support the current Governing Council of 25 that we appointed last year, and we could increase the number of Iraqis on the Council. Many of its members and the recent appointees to ministerial posts are professionals and technocrats who are honestly going about their jobs under threat of assassination. Yet, the most powerful members, including the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord lack a popular base and credibility, while SCIRI, and the 2 Kurdish factions led by Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, exercise virtual tribal-style control over their supporters. All have armed militias, allowed by the CPA, and they are fighting among themselves for greater control and influence. Ahmad Chalabi has enjoyed U.S. backing but is wooing the Shi'a of Najaf and the south, including Ayatollah Sistani, in hopes of gaining support by appearing to attack U.S. interests. He has the most to lose if the other options are chosen.

• We could disband the Governing Council and appoint a president and 2 deputy presidents (one from each sector) as called for in the transitional administrative law (TAL). The president would, in turn, appoint the prime minister, who would then choose the new interim government.  I doubt this option or the one above would satisfy the critics of U.S. policy, including Sistani. In my view, his reasons for opposing the TAL and calling for direct elections reflect his deep dislike of the current Governing Council and its control by predominantly exile elements who lack credibility with Iraqis.

• We could accept the apparent recommendations to be made by UN emissary Lakhdar Brahimi to appoint an interim government that would serve only while the elections are being prepared.  We could agree to work with the UN, especially if that brings old friends and former Coalition members to help us in Iraq.  Appointing Mr. Negroponte as Ambassador to Baghdad would seem a step in this direction.  The interim government should have real power, the right to make decisions without having to get permission from an American or UN minder.  In turn, the UN should offer a resolution legitimizing the presence of a U.S./Coalition military and security presence in Iraq. Giving the UN a greater political role in Iraq will not end attacks by insurgents or terrorists; the UN is not popular with many Iraqis, who blame it for implementing U.S.-imposed sanctions. A role for the UN as impartial mediator, however, could be critical to obtaining support from Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Iraqis seeking a moderate road to self-rule.

The success of any next stage-of any post-30 June government-will depend on our willingness to empower the new Iraqi authority, to stay the course and maintain an effective presence while the new governments (interim and permanent) stabilize and acquire the capability to protect themselves and the nation, and to support an international effort to rebuild Iraq economically and psychically. We cannot appoint advisers for multi-year terms in the Iraqi government; that is for the Iraqis to do. We cannot write their legislation or constitution although we can encourage secular government, the rule of law, and opportunities for all Iraqis-men, women, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shias, Turkmen, and Christian.  We should not favor one party or politician at the expense of others but should encourage the emergence of the middle class, professionals, technocrats, civil servants, and military officers to a new Iraq.

I will conclude with 3 brief points:

• There is an Iraqi nation and a deep sense of Iraqi nationalism and pride. 

• Iraq does not naturally, historically, ethnically, or religiously divide into 3 separate parts-the insurgency/terrorism of the past few weeks suggests a different division: religious and political extremists versus everyone else.

• Cult of Personality is definitely not part of Iraq's historical or political tradition. It was part of Saddam's methods of control patterned on the Dear Ones of History-Stalin, Hitler, and Kim Il Sung. My final thought is this: Saddam used fear and armed militias and personal loyalty to rule Iraq, balance and confuse his opponents real and imagined, and intimidate the people. Let us not create the circumstances for another Dear Leader to arise.

Annex: Basic Facts

Estimated population: from 14 million in 1984 to 19 million in 1990 to 25 million in 2003; 42 percent under the age of 14; mainly urban; 2.7% annual growth rate.

Ethnic Iraq

• Arabs:  75% (Sunni, Shia, Christian)
• Kurds: 20 percent (includes Christian, Jewish, and Fayli Kurdish tribes); modernization and urbanization have weakened traditional power of aghas (landholding class) but tribal politics prevail-Kurdistani Democratic Party led by Masud Barzani; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani, and several Islamic Kurds groups, including the Ansar al-Islam.
• Others: 5-10 percent minorities, includes Turkmen (2-3% in Kirkuk and Irbil, are Sunni and Turkish speakers); Assyrian and Syriac Christians, Mandaens, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc.) and Iranian Shia with close ties to Iran (were 1-2% of population until mass expulsions 1980); concentrated in Najaf, Karbala, Kazimiyah
   

Religious Iraq

• Sunni-30-35 percent (Arab and Kurd; Sunni Arabs are less than 20 percent). Sunni Arabs were the key to Saddam's political survival. Sunni Arabs from northern Tigris and Euphrates region and western Iraq have dominated Iraqi politics since Ottoman times. Historically, they were considered to be more cosmopolitan and less tribal than their Shi'a counterparts, but this not true today.  . 

• Shia-60-65 percent (mostly Arab, some Iranian, few Kurds).  Most are 12er Shia, as are the Iranians, some customs and practices differ. 3 communities: urban and secular; tribal, religious, and rural; and Iranian-origin clerics. Majority of Iraq Shi'a tend to reject Khomeini concept of vilayat-i faqih. Participated in early Bathist Party and governments but did not buy into Arab nationalism of Bathist ideology.  Loyal to Baghdad in Iran-Iraq war; majority of Iraq's army foot soldiers Shia. Some saw opportunity in Feb 1991 retreat from Kuwait and apparent encouragement from U.S. to stage revolt-revolt was incoherent, uncoordinated, Iran failed to back sufficiently, mullahs carrying portraits of Khomeini frightened many-rebellion failed. Role of clerics-most of whom are Iranian-not always central to lives of most Iraqi Shia, except in times of great stress, as in intifada and under occupation. Unlike Sunnis, Shi'a Muslims follow a living mujtahid (religious scholar such as Khomeini or Sistani) who can interpret Quran and issue fatwas.  Over centuries Iraq's Shi'a community acquired the characteristics of a persecuted minority-alienation from the larger society, intense feeling of cohesion, and pervasive sense of oppression and injustice.  Iraq's Shias see themselves, for the most part, as Arab, Iraqi, and Shia.. 

• Non-Muslims are about 5-6 percent of population: include Christians (Mandaen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and all kinds Catholics), Jewish

• Yazdi:  related to Kurds, near Mosul, religion derived from Zoroastrian dualism of devil and fire worshippers; Sabians

Historical Iraq

• Iraq is both 6,000 years old and 80 years old.  Dates to ancient Mesopotamia; 1920 date of the mandate-British and French agreed on 3 provinces from Ottoman Empire of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra; separated Kuwait, which had been governed from Baghdad by Turks. Independence 1932. Borders artificial but also reflect ancient land between 2 rivers. 

• Mesopotamian heritage: first agricultural settlement at Kirkuk 6500 BCE; invented the wheel, writing, ziggurat (temples); square roots in math; calendars, concept and structure of (ruthless) centralized, autocratic empire under Akkadians 2400 BCE then Babylonians; first lawgiver Hammurrabi.

• Islamic heritage: source of modern identity; home of the Abbasid Caliphate 650-1250 CE.  Shrine cities of Shia Islam-Najaf (Imam Husayn slain and buried here), Karbala (Imam Ali, father of Imam Husayn, slain and buried here), Kufah, Kazimiyah (Baghdad)-sites of tombs of Ali, Husayn, and other Imams-umra pilgrimages important to Iranian Shia.  Baghdad center of high civilization, culture under Islamic Abbasid Empire.  Devastated by Mongol invasions of 13^th and 15^th centuries, destroyed irrigation systems and, hence, agriculture and civil society.

• Ottoman heritage, 1514-1918: Established civil government and military institution; Shia excluded from government, military, educational institutions. These practices led to Shia excluding themselves from Sunni schools and courts well into the 20^th century-this mistake they acknowledge and vow not to repeat; Arab nationalism born under Young Turks.

• Bloody and violent history of military coups, political violence, repression of minorities.  Saddam did not invent the violence and oppression common in his Republic of Fear; he refined the methodology, increased the practices of violence, terror, recriminations used by Nuri al-Said, the evil Regent Abdillah, the 1940 pro-German coups, etc. Assyrian massacres of 1933, attempted and successful coups of 1936, 1941, 1958, 1963, 1966, 1968 ; hanging of Jews from Liberation Square 1970; gradual murder (consolidation of power) by Saddam of all real and imagined political opponents 1968-1979 to Great Declaration and Great Purge of 1979.

• History as a participatory republic?  Not really. British included Sunnis, Christians, and a Jew in the 1920 government; Shi'as opted out of political power. Governments from King Faysal I (1920) through Nuri al-Sa'id (1958) manipulated, isolated and occasionally included democrats, communists, tribals, intellectuals and others in government. Saddam created the early Ba'thist Party to appeal to all Iraqis-Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd-as the New Iraqi Man and Woman; Iraq was to be a new secular state in continuity with ancient Mesopotamia (proof is Saddam's name on all the bricks used to rebuild ancient Babylon). Ba'thism, however, was based on Arab unity as well as equality, economic and social justice. This held little appeal to Shi'a who saw Arabism as union with Sunni Syria; the Kurds were not interested.  But Shi'a served in government, including several prime ministers and cabinet ministers, and Kurds served in the military.

Tribal Iraq

• Tribal legacy: Iraq's tribes lacked links to the land, settled villages until recent times; loyalty to family, clan, and tribe more important than loyalty to the land, village- Phebe Marr, in her Modern History of Iraq (2^nd edition 2003) notes that the legacies of tribalism in Iraq are personal honor, factionalism, loyalty, and an intense individualism that resists central authority. As cities, towns and political parties like the Ba'th (most of whose members were Sunni Arabs from the tribal towns of central Iraq) grew in power and as source of wealth, they transferred these tribal characteristics into the state.

• Powerful tribal confederations: Sunni and Shi'a in same tribe; Dulaym, Jabur, Ubayd, Muntafiq Federations formed core of Iraq's security, military and intelligence service under Saddam; were also source of virtually all attempted coups against him. British policy had been to weaken confederations by establishing land ownership and catering to shaykhly class of new landowners. Saddam's policy was anti-tribal in 1970s but became pro-tribal in 1990s.

• Saddam reliance on his family, clan, and tribe: in 1980s eliminated tribal parts of name--al-Tikriti-from name to mask how many Tikritis in government, military, RG.

• Saddam re-instituted tribal leaders, customs after Gulf War when law and order and support of prominent tribal leaders important for his security.