TESTIMONY
OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWARD G. USHER III
DIRECTOR
LOGISTICS PLANS, POLICIES AND STRATEGIC
MOBILITY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BEFORE THE
HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING LOGISTICS
March 30, 2004
Introduction
Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, and distinguished Members of the Committee; it is my privilege to report to you on the state of logistics modernization of your Marine Corps. Your Marines are firmly committed to excellence in logistics, which supports warfighting excellence. The support of the Congress and the American people has been indispensable to our success in the Global War on Terrorism. Your sustained commitment to improving our Nation's armed forces to meet today's challenges and those of tomorrow is vital to the security of our Nation. On behalf of all Marines and their families, I thank the Committee for your continued support and commitment to the readiness of your Marine Corps.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - Our Successes
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) saw the Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) fighting over the longest ground distances in our history and at speeds never before traveled. The tremendous combat power of I MEF played an instrumental role in breaking the back of the Iraqi regime and I MEF's logistics backbone made it possible. Our success was a new benchmark in Marine combat operations and logistics, as seen by our ability to travel 450 miles from Kuwait to Tikrit in roughly 21 days.
As the Commanding General of I MEF's 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG), my biggest challenge was maintaining the agility required to adapt to rapid changes on the battlefield in a ground fight of unprecedented speed. 1st FSSG's greatest accomplishment was sustaining a reinforced MEF's swift attack across those 450 miles from Kuwait to Tikrit. In doing so, we established 8 Support Areas extending our sustainment depth and established 18 hasty Resupply and Replenishment Points (RRPs) in direct support of the 1st Marine Division. The average duration of these RRPs was 48 hours. The Combat Service Support Battalion, in support of 1st Marine Division, was responsible for this last accomplishment, while they maneuvered with the Division displacing 21 times in 3 weeks.
Notable successes, which proved to be combat multipliers, included the Hose Reel System built by Marine engineers from Breach Point West in Kuwait 83 miles into Iraq, the Forward Resuscitative Surgical Support (FRSS) Detachments that maneuvered with the 1st Marine Division, and the integration of our reserve logisticians from 4th FSSG.
The Hose Reel System, a resounding success, was designed to link together fuel bladders within a fuel farm. We engineered it into a pipeline system. Though we had experimented with it in Southern California before deploying, it was an unproven concept never tested greater than a distance of 17 miles. In combat, during the worst sandstorm of the war, engineers from the 6th and 7th Engineer Support Battalions built the first 67 of the eventual 90 mile system from Breach Point West in Kuwait to our Forward Operating Base at Jallibah, Iraq. The Hose Reel System quickly moved over 8 million gallons of fuel forward freeing up fuel trucks to concentrate forward on the fight.
The FSSG's FRSS units, another innovation developed on an experimental basis within the Surgical Companies of our Medical Battalions, were pressed into service for OIF. The small, self-contained, 16-man surgical teams embedded with the Division used two HMMWVs with trailers to transport equipment. The FRSSs placed our critically wounded Marines and Sailors in the hands of trauma surgeons well within the "Golden Hour". Not one Marine or Sailor placed in the hands of the FRSS Teams was lost.
Nearly one-third of 1st FSSG's force was comprised of reservists - 4,696 of the 21,316 Marine Reservists who deployed. My Chief of Staff was a Marine reservist. One of three Direct Support Groups was commanded and staffed by 4th FSSG Marine Reserves; a significant portion of my transportation capability was built around a reserve Motor Transport Battalion; our Military Police Battalion was predominantly Reserve; and the Hose Reel System construction mission mentioned earlier was assigned to the 6th Engineer Support Battalion - a Reserve battalion.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the successful integration of U.S. Army and Navy units into the 1st FSSG. The 319th Army Medium Truck Company (Packaged Oil and Lubricants - bulk fuel distribution) and the 727th Army Medium Truck Company (Pallet Loading System) were instrumental to our distribution efforts. The 716th Army Military Police Battalion superbly provided route security and force protection. An Army Chemical Company augmented our Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense efforts. And last, but not least, the U.S. Navy's Expeditionary Medical Facility 3 linked with our forward medical teams providing indispensable Level III medical care.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - Challenges and Shortfalls
OIF was a logistics war, and the success of I MEF was a testimony to the support and sustainment capabilities of the Marine Corps. However significant our logistics successes, we did experience challenges in our prosecution of the war as a result of some key shortfalls.
Our greatest shortfall during OIF was the lack of in-transit visibility information to incorporate into our command and control effort. The FSSG had large, extended convoys moving hundreds of miles in unsecured terrain supporting Marine forces spread across thousands of square miles in demanding weather conditions. The lack of asset visibility on unit stocks and in-transit visibility on ordered items made it difficult to identify actual shortages, to locate needed items within stocks for reallocation, and to direct and track the movement of ordered items to requesting units. This lack of visibility resulted in delays, shortages, and at times an inability to expedite critical parts.
Another challenge was the difficulty in passing requisitions to the supporting Theater Support Command for common item support due to the non-compatible supply and warehousing information systems.
The materiel distribution process was cumbersome at best. Containers and pallets that were multi-packed for various units across the services had to be broken down and manually sorted then rebuilt before delivery to the tactical end user and added significantly to the distribution timeline.
Based on our OIF experiences, we are working both near term and long range solutions to the challenges that we experienced.
The Near Term Way Ahead
In preparation for OIF II, we have made a major effort to analyze lessons learned from OIF and are determining how best to apply them in the current operating environment. Included in this effort is participation in the Army's Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force, a joint effort to share the technology, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to counter the IED threat. [A1]
We are hardening about 3,000 vehicles for protection from small arms fire and IEDs. We procured advanced body armor for every Marine in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our deploying combat support and combat service support units have completed an extensive combat training course, adhering to our fundamental tenet, "Every Marine a rifleman".
Our single greatest concern as we look beyond OIF II is setting the force for subsequent operations and training. In our preparation for current global operations, the maintenance, repair, or replacement of equipment is our focus; but as we set the force, we also have modernization and transformation in mind.
Department of Defense (DoD) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). One of our greatest challenges during OIF was visibility of materials and supplies in distribution. A recent initiative to mitigate those challenges is the implementation of RFID.
We are using RFID tags on all sustainment cargo for OIF II and will apply tags and interrogate down to the tactical level. We plan to use RFID technology to obtain visibility to the battalion level and to push "tagged" shipments as far forward as possible. Distribution teams with "interrogators" are established at key nodes in theater to employ RFID visibility to the tactical level. While we are working the initial RFID implementation now, the endstate is full integration into the End-to-End (E2E) distribution process.
Electronic End-to-End Combat Contracting Tools. We continue to refine and to improve processes and technology. I deployed to theater with two Contingency Contracting Teams and in no time, realized these teams were force multipliers. The teams contracted transportation, food service, and maintenance support from the global market place. During OIF, Combat Contracting supported commanders by providing all classes of supply, minus ammunition and personal demand items. From September 2002 to November 2003, Combat Contracting Marines awarded over 2,000 contracts totaling over $700 million. The adoption of the Battle Ready Contingency Contracting System will provide deployed contracting officers with the ability to support automated contract writing. The system provides the "front end piece" for use by deployed supported units to submit requirements not available through the supply system or Host Nation Support. The Marine Corps is deploying this capability in support of OIF II. The Battle Ready Contingency Contracting System will provide contracting data into the DoD procurement database for future analysis and contingency planning.
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Performance Based Agreement. An agreement between the Director, DLA and the Marine Corps' Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, its focus is to streamline material through the collaborative efforts of the DLA and the Marine Corps. Key parts of the initiative are:
National Inventory Management Strategy (NIMS). DLA has traditionally been a wholesale distributor. NIMS extends DLA's supply chain management functions to the Service-managed retail inventory level. It will replace distinct wholesale and retail inventories with a nationally integrated inventory. It will provide DLA with a much clearer view of immediate stock requirements by replacing redundant levels of management.
Pure Pallet Initiative. During OIF, the Marine Corps realized enormous inefficiencies in processing incoming cargo and trying to distribute it to the proper units. "Pure Pallet" builds Marine Corps sustainment cargo pallets and containers for shipment by air/sea, designated to Marine Corps units within a specific geographic location. The "Pure Pallet" initiative, with RFID application, greatly reduces distribution process time-lines and significantly enhances In-Transit Visibility. The pallets are built at distribution centers with RFID and optical memory card technology that will preclude the need to break down the cargo at various stages in the transportation pipeline and greatly improve In-Transit Visibility.
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) - Distribution Process Owner (DPO). The Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum in September 2003 designating USTRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). The DPO is tasked to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of DoD distribution related activities - deployment, sustainment and redeployment support during peace and war - and to serve as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of DoD strategic distribution.
As the DPO, USTRANSCOM established a flag-level Distribution Transformation Task Force (DTTF) to champion distribution initiatives and to work distribution issues. We fully support and are actively engaged with the DTTF. In addition to the DTTF, the Marine Corps is represented in the United States Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) to synchronize deployment and distribution, and to optimize strategic and operational capabilities for the combatant commander. The CDDOC (7 of the 63 are Marines) deployed to Southwest Asia in January 2004.
Setting the Foundation for the Future
Achieving our vision for the future of the Marine Corps requires key modernization and transformational programs. Along with our top acquisition priorities, such as the MV-22 Osprey, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and the Lightweight
155-mm Howitzer, is the Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics' number one priority - the Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps (GCSS-MC). It is our foundational effort to move forward with Logistics Modernization and Command and Control efforts.
Logistics Modernization. Our renewed focus on logistics modernization is the cornerstone for improving the overall effectiveness of our MAGTF as an agile, expeditionary force in readiness. The Marine Corps Logistics Operational Architecture is a blueprint of our logistics chain, to include roles, functions, and processes. It defines the future Marine Corps logistics "techniques and procedures", from the forward edge of the battlefield back. It also provides and defines the requirements for GCSS-MC.
The Logistics Operational Architecture establishes processes and associated system functions for planning, managing and fulfilling MAGTF logistics requirements. These capabilities position the Marine Corps to provide agile, lean, effective, and sustainable forces to the Combatant Commanders. Furthermore, they enable the Marine Corps to reduce its deployment footprint and increase the lethality of our expeditionary MAGTFs.
The Logistics Operational Architecture is based on lessons from academia and best practices from the commercial sector and DoD. We built it around an expeditionary warfare template and developed a set of end-to-end logistics functions - from the supported unit requesting a logistics need to its fulfillment - that span the entire logistics chain, while remaining within the limited bandwidth environment of expeditionary combat operations. The Marine Corps is the first Service to complete a Logistics Operational Architecture that is compliant with the DoD's Business Enterprise architecture, as mandated by the Clinger-Cohen Act.
Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps (GCSS-MC). The heart of logistics modernization is GCSS-MC. Born Joint, it is the Marine Corps member of the overarching GCSS Family of Systems, as identified by the GCSS Capstone Requirements Document and designated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. It is a Marine Corps acquisition program that will procure and integrate commercial off-the-shelf software to satisfy the MAGTF and Combatant Commander Joint Task Force information requirements, and support the Marine Corps Logistics Operational Architecture.
The goal of GCSS-MC is to provide modern, deployable Information Technology tools for supported and supporting units. Existing Logistics Information Systems used today are either not deployable, (mainframe based) or are deployable with limited capability (tethered client server). This forces Commanders to gather critical information manually at a significant cost of manpower and time. GCSS-MC Block 1 tools will include a web-based portal to provide a single point of entry to request products and services and track fulfillment in a clear, straight forward manner. Block II will focus on logistics command and control and decision support tools to support the Commander's decision-making process.
End-to-End (E2E) Distribution. MAGTF E2E Distribution provides the tactical Marine the methods and tools to seamlessly execute inbound and outbound movements for all classes of supply while maintaining Total Asset Visibility/In-Transit Visibility throughout the distribution pipeline. These capabilities do not currently exist, resulting in unsynchronized and sub-optimized distribution support to the warfighter.
The scope of MAGTF E2E distribution focuses on managing, coordinating and executing the logistics functions of transportation, traffic management, warehousing, inventory control, material handling/packaging, transshipment, inventory site/location analysis, data processing and sharing, Total Asset Visibility/In-Transit Visibility, and flow of information necessary for effective and efficient management of responsive distribution to the operating forces. MAGTF E2E distribution will facilitate the flow of material through the logistics chain, both in deployed and garrison operating environments.
We have established a MAGTF Distribution Center that is the operational link between the strategic/operational distribution network and the battlefield/tactical operating environment. We are also working with the United States Navy to synchronize the distribution process with Navy-Marine Corps logistics integration initiatives.
Naval Logistics Integration (NLI). On 30 July 2003, a Terms of Reference was signed between the Naval Services Logistics Chiefs, in order to coordinate logistics operations in the naval environment. Naval logistics will always operate in support of joint operations and through NLI the Naval Services are striving to better support Combatant Commanders. The Marine Corps' transformation is inherently linked with that of our sister service, the United States Navy. The Navy - Marine Corps Team's transformation encompasses and integrates powerful extensions to current joint capabilities, as well as a range of innovative new capabilities.
The Integrated Naval Logistics Working Group is looking at current capabilities to improve and enhance naval logistics operations with an eye to the future. The group's immediate focus is on the Expeditionary Strike Groups and ways to streamline logistic support to them. Naval forces provide unique and complementary warfighting capabilities from the sea to joint force commanders to enhance deterrence and secure swift and decisive military victory. It is within this backdrop of multi-dimensional joint warfare that the Navy and Marine Corps will integrate Naval logistics.
Maritime Prepositioning Force - Future (MPF-F) and Sea Basing
The Marine Corps continues to refine plans for the Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 2015. The Analysis of Alternatives for MPF-F, a critical component of Sea Basing, will provide valid choices for achieving Sea Basing capabilities that complement amphibious lift and forcible entry capability. Sea Basing, and by extension MPF-F, is the overarching expression of our shared vision, incorporating the initiatives that will allow the joint force to fully exploit one of this nation's asymmetric advantages - command of the sea.
Sea Basing. Sea Basing describes capabilities that allow naval forces to exploit maneuver space provided by U.S. control of the sea, to include unimpeded mobility and persistent sustainment. Incorporating the complementary characteristics of amphibious, maritime prepositioning, and critical connecting platforms, Sea Base capabilities provide movement without the need for permission or infrastructure and logistics without fixed and vulnerable stockpiles ashore. New Sea Base capabilities include At-Sea Arrival and Assembly, Selective Offload, and Reconstitution at Sea, among others. It can negate or minimize an adversary's anti-access strategy.
Maritime Prepositioning Force - Future (MPF-F). MPF-F will enhance the operational maneuver and sustainability capabilities of a sea-based MAGTF. Unlike any other prepositioning ship, the MPF-F will not rely on a port facility, greatly reducing our dependence on international support and mitigating area denial capabilities of future adversaries. An MPF-F Squadron will be a key enabler for the Enhanced Network Sea Base. It will provide both deployment and employment capabilities to the Naval forces. MPF-F ships will continue to carry equipment and sustainment for embarked forces based on the improved capabilities of Naval logistics.
MPF-F vessels will be able to conduct ship to objective distribution and network-based, automated logistics information to provide in-stride sustainment for maneuvering and fighting naval expeditionary forces. By keeping most of the supplies and support activities at sea, Naval Expeditionary Forces reduce both the vulnerability of logistics operations to enemy attack and allow greater maneuverability of forces ashore and afloat.
Future MAGTF logistics will change as forces operate more from a Naval Sea Base. Responsive distribution processes and supporting Information Technologies across Joint, Naval, and Marine Corps activities globally is key. The integration of Naval logistics between the Naval Services is a key effort for this significant change leading our logistics into 2010 and beyond.
Sea Based logistics employs logistic tactics, techniques, and procedures that deliver flexible, highly responsive support based on Sea Power-21 to Naval and Joint operations. More fundamentally, it precludes a dependence on robust or extensive Host Nation Support within a Joint Operations Area.
The advancement of the MPF-F and Sea Basing into actual capabilities will bring significant ability to achieve the operational capabilities envisioned in Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The Naval Services are developing a viable and scaleable Sea Base that provides joint operational independence.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to again thank the members of the Committee for their continuing support for the Marine Corps, and for the opportunity to address our logistics readiness issues. The young men and women of your Marine Corps, the good stewards of the trust and commitment that this Nation has bestowed on us, are doing an exceptional job in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II and around the world. Their accomplishments and recent successes are a direct reflection of your continued support and commitment to maintaining our Nation's expeditionary warfighting capability. Your Marine Corps remains a truly expeditionary force in readiness.
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
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