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TESTIMONY OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAUDE V. CHRISTIANSON
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REGARDING
LOGISTICS READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

 March 30, 2004 

Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today. I want to thank each of you for the tremendous support you continue to provide our men and women in uniform and their families.  Thank you, too, for the opportunity to answer your questions on the state of Army logistics.

INTRODUCTION

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a spectacular logistics achievement.  Without question, the overriding reason for our success was the skill, dedication and commitment of our integrated logistics team of Soldiers, civilians, and contractors, all of whom developed innovative solutions to a range of challenges caused by major capability gaps in our current logistics processes.  These men and women were well trained and worked with a sense of purpose.  I could not be more proud of what they accomplished, and all Americans should share in that pride. Our Army has been blessed with a corps of competent logistics professionals that ensured victory in Iraq.

Their achievements are especially spectacular in light of the fact that we supported a 21^st Century battlefield with a mid-20^th Century logistics structure.  With some exceptions, our logistics systems, procedures and organizations were not ideally suited to support the rapid combat operations that characterized the vast Iraqi battlefield.

The pace of combat operations, the distances covered and the harshness of the environment combined to challenge our logisticians like never before.  The accomplishments of all logisticians during OIF are unmatched, and their professional commitment is without equal.  History will show that their ability to adapt outdated procedures, inadequate structure and old equipment to today's modern battlefield was seen as our logisticians' most significant accomplishment.

Today we fight on a battlefield that is characterized by widely dispersed operations - islands of combat separated by tenuous, unsecured lines of communications.  Operational commanders face an enemy who is different from any we have seen before and whose defeat necessitates rapid and constant reorganization of our forces.  Gone is a battlefield with clear lines of distinction between enemy and friendly territory or forces.  Today's battlefield is joint and combined all the time, and presents new and difficult challenges for logisticians.

These challenges demand a change in the way the Army sustains its forces.  We no longer have the time required to build-up stocks of supplies - we need a shared awareness of requirements, resources and priorities to deliver critical support on time.  There is no assurance that our next mission will have a friendly government and mature infrastructure to support our efforts.

To address these challenges, the logistics community must meet three fundamental imperatives.  First, we must be able to "see" the operational requirements in real time - anyplace, anywhere.  Second, we must be able to respond to those requirements with speed and precision.  And third, we must be able to rapidly open a theater in support of a joint expeditionary force.  The remainder of this testimony addresses these imperatives by describing how we plan to fix the problems that made supporting OIF so difficult.

Difficulties experienced during operations in Iraq should be viewed as indicators of systemic problems in logistics processes.  The solutions to these problems must address core issues rather than individual symptoms.

Shortfalls noted by both Army leadership and other government agencies include:  a backlog of cargo pallets and shipping containers at various points along the distribution system; substantial demurrage charges against the Army by the owners of these backlogged containers; a discrepancy of $1.2 billion in materiel shipped versus materiel acknowledged by our systems as received; the ubiquitous cannibalization of parts from vehicles; the accumulation of excess materiel without required documentation at the Theater Distribution Center; duplication of requisitions and circumvention of the supply chain; and inadequate physical security for supplies.

These shortfalls can be attributed to one or more of five interrelated causes:  1) inadequate connectivity from the foxhole to the industrial base; 2) a layered and disjointed theater distribution system; 3) the lack of a unit organized to run distribution operations on the ground; 4) a container management policy designed for peacetime operations; and 5) the lack of discipline in some organizations in executing supply policies and procedures.

We addressed these problems in our December 2003 Army Logistics White Paper, "Delivering Materiel Readiness to the Army," which now serves as the basis for corrective actions and prioritization of resources for related programs in the current budget and across the program years.  Army logisticians recognize that our most critical task is to sustain the combat readiness of our deployed forces while maintaining the operational readiness of the remaining force.

We will accomplish this vital task by focusing our efforts on four clear objectives that address our experiences in OIF.  To sustain combat power, we must have the ability to "see" requirements on-demand through a logistics information network.  We must develop a responsive distribution system enabled by in-transit and total asset visibility and managed by a single owner who has positive end-to-end control in the theater. The Army needs a robust, modular force-reception capability - a dedicated and trained organization able to quickly open a theater and support flexible, continuous sustainment throughout the joint operations area. Lastly, we need an integrated supply chain with a single proponent who can leverage all resources in a joint, interagency and multinational theater.

CONNECTIVITY

Current logistics battlefield communications processes lack the flexibility, speed, and availability to support expeditionary logistics.  Army logisticians in OIF could not "see the requirements" across the widely dispersed battlefield, and operational forces on the battlefield could not "see the support" coming their way.  Difficulty getting and keeping connectivity among logisticians, combat units, and the industrial base caused confusion, led to shortages and resulted in a lack of confidence in logistics systems.

By connecting our logisticians, we will enable the entire logistics community to "see and know" what the Soldier needs as soon as it is needed.  Through the use of a dedicated satellite communications (SATCOM) network, tomorrow's logisticians will be able to send and receive data continuously, from the Soldier in the foxhole all the way back to the U.S. sustaining base.   We have already made significant improvements to our communications capability in theater by purchasing and employing commercial very-small-aperture terminals (VSAT) to give non-line-of-sight (NLOS) connectivity to critical sustainment nodes.  Additionally, we have programmed $160 million to provide this capability to the entire Army.

In future years, we must continue to improve the logistics information network.  This includes investing in the Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface (CAISI) wireless equipment to provide local area network capability at the tactical level, and a commercial expeditionary data communications capability comprised of man-portable SATCOM terminals to provide non-line-of-sight connectivity down to the battalion level. Finally, to plan and control logistics operations at the tactical level, the Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3) will be the logistics component of the Army's battle command system.

THEATER DISTRIBUTION

In OIF, limited transportation assets coupled with heavy and unpredictable requirements meant that resupply had to be accomplished with great difficulty and often at the very last minute.  Our current distribution system lacks the flexibility, situational awareness, communications capacity, and unity of effort needed to effectively respond to the needs of our Army.  The ability to track the movement of and communicate with trucks using the Movement Tracking System (MTS) was limited because not all trucks were properly equipped.  This meant that distribution managers did not have the information required to make effective use of their resources.  Our inability to "see" supplies as they moved through the distribution system added to the difficulty of getting materiel to the right unit at the right time.  Finally, moving supplies forward was delayed, and backlogs at distribution points throughout the theater increased because supplies were not packaged in a way that facilitated rapid throughput to the Soldier.

To address these shortfalls, the Army is developing a modernized theater distribution system with an end-to-end capability that delivers materiel readiness from the source of supply to the point of need at the last tactical mile.  This modernized theater distribution system will provide: unity of effort with a single control element; modern delivery platforms that are enabled for continuous operations with satellite tracking, two-way communications, night-vision capabilities, enhanced reliability, and integrated force protection capabilities; end-to-end visibility enabled with Automatic Identification Technology (AIT); and updated doctrine and processes that focus on rapid, reliable, precise time-definite delivery.

A key component of this modern distribution system will be the ubiquitous Army truck. Today, we treat Army trucks as second-class citizens.  Tomorrow, on a distributed battlefield, Army trucks will be the lifeblood of our success. They require mobility, communication and protection capabilities that will permit them to survive, keep pace and sustain the maneuver and maneuver support units across a very dangerous battlefield.  Our trucks must be equipped with on-board materiel-handling capabilities, which will allow direct transloading of common distribution platforms to and from all potential delivery systems.  Finally, our current truck fleet must be modernized through a long-term program of spiral technology insertions across its entire lifecycle to meet these critical needs.

To enable end-to-end control of our distribution system, we must integrate Automatic Identification Technology (AIT) as an enabling function. The use of new Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) during OIF afforded a much-improved view of the supply chain, but we still lacked complete visibility, especially below the theater level.  We intend to integrate RFID/AIT into the distribution process, thereby enabling our process owner with the capability to see and control distribution operations. We will install RFID equipment at a variety of key locations in theater to include supply support activities, movement control elements, and cargo distribution hubs.  We will achieve the desired level of visibility by combining the use of RFID equipment in theater with an overarching joint and Army architecture, coupled with a comprehensive joint policy to standardize the tagging and tracking of all defense shipments - from the source of supply to the point of need at the tactical level.

To facilitate a more rapid throughput of sustainment to our forces, the Army, working with U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), is changing the way we package our supplies in the continental United States (CONUS).  We have begun shipping "pure" pallets of supplies to facilitate direct delivery to the customer. Pure pallets contain materiel destined solely for a single organization and do not require sorting and repackaging at interim distribution nodes. These pallets move from depots to aerial ports of embarkation and then directly to the ultimate destination, such as a forward supply support activity, before being unloaded.  The Army is mandating the use of pure pallets and has released a policy message outlining this requirement.  This change will create a second-order effect within DLA.  We will now see increased times required to build the pure pallet at the Defense Distribution Center depots.  However, the overall delivery time to the Soldier is reduced, as is the workload in the forward battlefield, which is absolutely necessary for a throughput distribution system.

We will continue to build upon the ongoing improvements in the strategic and theater distribution processes.  The Army is committed to work in harmony with TRANSCOM as the Defense Distribution Process Owner to establish a seamless distribution system in support of the joint force.   Ultimately, our military distribution system must provide reliable and predictable support that builds confidence in the warfighter and empowers the logistician.  Our success will be measured at the last tactical mile with the Soldier.

THEATER OPENING

With your support, the Army and the joint community have invested heavily over the past 10 years to improve our ability to deploy rapidly from the continental United States. These "fort to port" upgrades of deployment facilities on installations, coupled with enhanced sea and air deployment capabilities (large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off, or LMSR, ships and C-17 aircraft) delivered land combat power to the joint force commander in OIF in record time. The vast improvement in our capacity to deploy forces has, however, exacerbated our force reception weaknesses. We can move forces from CONUS faster than we can receive them in the theater.  To address current weaknesses, we must begin the necessary transformation of our force reception capabilities.  As we transform our military into a rapidly employable, globally oriented force, the manner in which we receive these forces in the area of operations must change. We will not have the luxury of time to "build" a theater base for this expeditionary force.

The joint and expeditionary Army is hampered by the lack of an organizational structure singularly focused on joint theater-opening tasks. Today, the Army is forced to build ad hoc support organizations to open theaters. Force reception operations, strategic communications, initial sustainment support, and joint logistics command and control are critical if our military expects to simultaneously deploy, employ and sustain a joint expeditionary force. OIF gave us a picture of such an operation: as the lead elements of the 3^rd Infantry Division and the 1^st Marine Expeditionary Force attacked into Iraq, the reception of forces in Kuwait continued at a hectic pace. This was an unprecedented accomplishment, but it also exposed weaknesses in our current force reception capabilities.

The Army will design an integrated capability that can deploy on the same timeline as its combat forces. Immediately upon entry, this organization will execute critical theater opening tasks enabling the combat force to focus on the combat mission. This organization will give the commander a single logistics command-and-control element focused on joint force generation and sustainment.

This theater-opening capability will not be an ad hoc organization. It will be a support headquarters that has trained to the task with habitually aligned subordinate modules. It should be able to interact with support units from sister Services and coalition partners, and it must be able to expand quickly to meet theater growth. This organization will be capable of receiving sustainment modules as theater sustainment requirements grow and, conversely, can quickly detach modules as the situation dictates.

This theater-opening command-and-control headquarters must be able to plug into a logistics information network through secure, on-demand satellite communications. It must maintain real-time visibility of forces and supplies inbound to the theater and sustainment requirements within the theater   through a logistics common operating picture that is populated by joint and Service information. Initial studies are underway to determine the feasibility of reconfiguring one of the Army's Corps Support Groups to execute this mission by fiscal year 2005. We will work with the other Services to gain support for an organization that can leverage joint assets to receive the joint force.

Another key to rapidly opening a theater is the Army's pre-positioned equipment.  One of the many success stories of OIF was the availability and readiness of the brigade sets of equipment drawn from pre-positioned stocks by the 3^rd Infantry Division. However, our success with the pre-positioned equipment was underwritten by time.  We had time in OIF to execute critical maintenance tasks before operations began - we may not have this luxury next time.  As a result, we have changed our strategy for employment of pre-positioned stocks.

The most significant change in our pre-positioning strategy is a move toward a regionally focused, sea-based capability. Three Army Regional Flotillas will now make up the afloat portion of our prepositioning program.   These flotillas will be located at Guam/Saipan, Diego Garcia and in the Mediterranean Sea. This distributed sea-basing strategy provides a new set of modular capabilities designed to give regional Combatant Commanders a menu of flexible response options.

At the core of each of the flotillas are two large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships. One of these ships contains a maneuver brigade task force set of equipment. This ship will deliver the capability of one armored and one mechanized infantry battalion, a package of brigade combat support and combat service support capabilities, and 15 days of supplies. The second of these ships will contain equipment for units echeloned above brigade.

A third vessel in the flotilla, a roll-on/roll-off ship with a shallow draft, will provide the capability to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.  Finally, each flotilla will include a fourth ship with sustainment stocks and a fifth vessel will be loaded with ammunition. The current requirement calls for these last two ships to carry sufficient supplies for 2.5 present-day divisions for 30 days, but the Army is reviewing the mix of commodities to best support its forces under modularization. 

SUPPLY CHAIN

Over the past several years, the Army has taken inventory reductions at many echelons for a variety of reasons.   We changed our stockage policy to reduce the amount of items carried on unit prescribed load lists, while simultaneously reducing stock levels in many authorized stockage lists throughout the force.    Additionally, at the strategic level, we have not fully funded the strategic spares program. The cumulative result of these reductions is a leaner supply chain without the investment in information technology or distribution systems to enable success. Consequently, Soldiers today find themselves at the end of a very tenuous supply chain, without readily available critical supplies, and at the mercy of a fragile theater distribution system.

The Army needs an integrated supply chain that has a single proponent, allowing logisticians to "see" available resources in a joint, inter-agency and multi-national theater. To address this problem, we are developing the capability for logisticians to view the supply system in its entirety.  The current Army supply system is designed in a series of horizontal layers from the user to the depot.  This horizontal layering makes it difficult to understand the impact of actions across the entire supply chain. 

Our solution is an enterprise view of the supply chain and an integration of joint processes, information and responsibilities.  Customers and logisticians from all agencies and Services will enter local supporting systems, plug into the sustainment network, and be afforded end-to-end joint total asset visibility.  Combatant Commanders will be capable of seeing inventory, both in motion and in available storage locations, and with that knowledge rapidly making decisions that will maximize operational effectiveness.

To build a system that provides this required holistic view of the supply chain, the joint logistics community must designate a supply process owner, similar to the designation of U.S. Transportation Command as the Defense Distribution Process Owner.  The joint logistics community must also partner to develop Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software, which completely integrates total asset and in-transit visibility across the enterprise.

SUMMARY

The Army is working toward making its sustainment capability more strategically flexible.  We recognize that a flexible, reliable, networked, joint sustainment capability, built around an expeditionary mindset, is essential.  Under this new paradigm, Army logisticians will have the capability to "see" requirements in real time and to control a distribution system from factory to foxhole.  Both Army logisticians and combat commanders will make decisions based on accurate, timely logistics information. Units that conduct force reception operations will be organized and trained to rapidly transition from peace to war.  Army logisticians will set conditions to execute the joint concept of simultaneous deploy-employ-sustain operations.  

The Army's logistics transformation effort is taking place amidst other dramatic changes that impact our logistics systems. Among these are the move towards expeditionary and modular formations, the development of Future Combat Systems, the need to support the simultaneous deployment, employment and sustainment of joint forces, and the globalization of the defense industrial base.  Each of these changes will contribute to logistics transformation while posing additional challenges.

Achieving these ambitious goals will require the fusion of all logistics communities, Army and joint, as well as the full support of Congress. The window of opportunity is narrow. If we do not connect Army logisticians, improve the capability of the distribution system, modernize force reception, and provide integrated supply management, we will study these same lessons after the next major conflict. These four goals must be achieved as one - they are interdependent, and the capability delivered by all four is much greater than their sum.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to again recognize the outstanding achievement of our logisticians during Operation Iraqi Freedom.   

To get our forces into theater, logisticians deployed more than 1.2 million tons of equipment over 8,000 miles.  During the high-intensity combat phase, they used an average of 1,200 fuel tanker trucks to deliver 1.5 million gallons of bulk fuel per day, and our transporters drove an average of 2,000 trucks every day over the hazardous 876-mile supply route from Kuwait to northern Iraq.  Military trucks have logged almost 50 million miles since the beginning of operations.  Logisticians provided water to 307,000 troops who drank 2.1 million gallons on an average day, and they delivered enough Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) to feed the population of Spokane, Washington for over a year.   Logisticians have taken the fight to the enemy and endured the elements to make sure American and coalition forces have what they need.  I'd like to publicly thank those who carried the load, and I want to recognize the 55 logistics Soldiers who have died supporting our forces. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, for your continued support of Army logisticians. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today, and look forward to answering your questions.

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