Military

Submitted as testimony by Dr. Dimitri Simes

Washington, D.C.
September 2003

The Commission on America’s National Interests and Russia is an outgrowth of the Commission on America’s National Interests, a group of Americans convinced that U.S. global leadership is essential in the 21st century and concerned that this leadership could suffer in the absence of clear priorities. The previous Commission’s Reports in 1996 and 2000 sought to focus thinking on defining American national interests in the world. The current Commission addresses the specific issue of American national interests and Russia.

The Final Report of this new Commission will be issued next spring in an effort to inform debate during U.S. presidential and congressional campaigns. In light of the recent U.S.–Russian conflict over Iraq, the Commission has issued an Interim Report addressing more immediate challenges in the U.S.–Russian relationship. The Commission is supported by Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and The Nixon Center.

The public reconciliation of Presidents Bush and Putin in St. Petersburg and at the G-8 Summit in Evian has fostered the impression that all is well in the U.S.-Russian relationship. This is a dangerous misimpression. The U.S.-Russian dispute over Iraq exposed conflicts in the U.S.-Russian relationship and even cracks in its foundation that must be addressed to advance vital American interests.

The tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon rapidly crystallized American thinking about the interrelated threats of terrorism and proliferation. Containing these threats has become the principal aim of U.S. foreign policy. Today’s Russia can play a major role in advancing this aim—or in undermining it.

The combination of Russia’s size and strategic location; its relationships with, intelligence about and access to key countries; its arsenal of nuclear and other weapons and technologies; its enormous energy resources; and its ability to facilitate or block action by the United Nations Security Council places Moscow among America’s most important potential partners. Fortunately, the interests America and Russia share greatly outweigh the interests that divide us. Nevertheless, even before the dispute over Iraq, lingering resentment on both sides was undermining the relationship. Russian opposition to one of the most significant American foreign policy initiatives of the last decade raised further questions and must be correctly understood not simply to avoid further problems, but also to get the most out of the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Many Russians now believe that Moscow’s opposition to U.S. policy toward Iraq was a strategic blunder. It also reflects shortcomings in America’s approach, however, including the delay in deepening the U.S.-Russian relationship, the concomitant absence of equities that would have encouraged Moscow to accommodate U.S. preferences, and the undisciplined pursuit of contradictory policies.

Moving forward requires that Russian officials understand that the United States has been making a special effort to develop bilateral relations and that obstructionist conduct on key U.S. priorities is not cost-free. It also requires a review of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the development of more reliable means to advance American interests within it and through it.

First, as the Iraq experience demonstrates, changes in the format and style of communications with Russia are necessary. Better communication is not a panacea. Communication with Russia is complicated by Russian unrealistic expectations of symmetry that have not yet fully accommodated very real asymmetries in the bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, extra attention to Moscow—through earlier and more frequent consultations, including private dialogues, and by easing Russian travel to the U.S.—is appropriate in view of Russia’s crucial geopolitical role.

Second, the Bush Administration must take a series of steps to improve counter-terrorism cooperation. These include promoting intelligence sharing, developing joint threat assessments and counter-terrorism strategies and plans, working with Russia and other states in Central Asia to secure borders, and clarifying U.S. interests and objectives on Russia’s periphery. Practical cooperation in countering terrorism is complicated by resentments and suspicions in bureaucracies on both sides, as well as justifiable reluctance to share sensitive information. But the contribution such cooperation could make to American security is considerable.

Third, the U.S. and Russia should take the lead in creating an Alliance against Nuclear Terrorism. This new Alliance should address North Korea, Iran and other nuclear aspirants; the dangers of "loose nukes"; and the non-proliferation regime. Specific elements should include joint threat assessments and coordinated strategies, including agreement that if non-proliferation measures are successful and if North Korea and Iran comply, regime change will not be pursued. More broadly, the U.S. should seek Russian cooperation in establishing new standards for the security of nuclear weapons and materials, cleaning out weapons material at research reactors in third countries, and strengthening institutions like the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Finally, U.S. leaders should recognize that economic modernization is Russia’s number one national priority that it is likely to remain so for some time, and that a successful relationship must help Russia achieve this goal. This is not a call for charity or foreign aid. Moscow has much to bring to the table as the world’s largest producer of energy (oil and gas) and a reservoir of extraordinary scientific and technical talent. The expansion of economic cooperation with Russia can to be one of the most effective means available to build a "positive" constituency for the U.S.-Russian relationship in both Russia and the United States. Accordingly, President Bush should make Russia’s removal from the largely symbolic constraints of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment a genuine priority. The administration should also exercise greater leadership in advancing bilateral trade with Russia and remain supportive of Russia’s WTO accession process, though the burden is primarily on Moscow in meeting the appropriate criteria. Moreover, if Russia cooperates in stabilizing post-war Iraq, the U.S. should be "imaginative" in honoring Russian interests there.

The public reconciliation of Presidents Bush and Putin in St. Petersburg and at the G-8 Summit in Evian may have fostered the impression that all is well in the U.S.-Russian relationship. This is a dangerous impression. The U.S.-Russian dispute over the United Nations Security Council’s role in Iraq exposed irritations in the U.S.-Russian relationship and even cracks in its foundation. These problems have yet to be addressed and further attention to the U.S.-Russian relationship is needed.

Of late, nonetheless, there have been some encouraging developments. Russia’s collaboration in dealing with North Korea at the recent six-way meeting in Beijing, the firming up of its position toward Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and signs of cooperation in post-war Iraq, especially after the bombing of the UN headquarters there, are all illustrative of the difference Moscow can make in the complex and dangerous world of the 21^st century. President Bush has said that the destruction of the UN headquarters was a sign that we are in a war between civilization and those who would undermine it; Russia, with its special access in Iraq and in the region, can serve our common interests at a critical moment by joining the United States and the United Kingdom in a concerted effort to limit sharply the future of the most barbaric expressions of Islam. Russia can also assist the U.S. in other key areas.

But advancing American interests in a sustainable manner requires the construction of a U.S-Russian relationship substantially different from that of the Cold War or even the post-Cold War transition. The possibility of all-out nuclear war has receded as the principal threat to America’s well-being. Dangers posed by the new Russia’s weakness are slowly subsiding. On the contrary, the role of today’s Russia in advancing, retarding, or even endangering American vital interests will be defined largely by the quality of Moscow’s cooperation with the United States in combating the "dark side" of globalization: the nexus between terrorism, proliferation and other transnational threats to which September 11 was only an introduction.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s telephone call offering immediate and unconditional assistance to the United States that day had a defining impact on President George W. Bush’s personal relationship with the Kremlin leader, sharply accelerating positive developments already underway in the bilateral relationship. Unprecedented cooperation in the destruction of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime promised what President Bush called a qualitatively "new strategic partnership." This promise has yet to be realized.

Even before the September 11 attacks, the relationship was changing for the better. Key trends in Russia, its region and the world required a re-examination of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the definition of new American priorities in dealing with Moscow. These trends included:

At the same time, U.S. leaders increasingly recognized the emerging, inter-related threats of terrorism and proliferation. Though policy makers and experts had devoted some attention to these issues earlier, the tragic events of September 11 rapidly crystallized American thinking about these threats and transformed the struggle to contain them into the principal aim of American foreign policy. Notwithstanding its diminished status and curtailed ambition, Russia has considerable influence in its neighborhood and a significant voice elsewhere as well. Moscow can contribute importantly to U.S. interests if it chooses to do so. Accordingly Russia can markedly decrease, or increase, the costs of exercising American leadership both directly (by assisting the United States, or not) and indirectly (by abetting those determined to resist, or not).

For this Commission’s purposes it is American interests, not the U.S.-Russian relationship per se, that are paramount. The relationship should serve U.S. interests—not vice versa. This does not mean that Russian interests are unimportant. Russian cooperation on specific issues will reflect Russian judgment of how these actions affect its interests. Fortunately, Russia’s national interests converge with our own interests much more than they diverge. The real interests Russia and America share—including Russia’s successful integration into the West as a market-oriented democracy—greatly outweigh the interests that divide us. But since short term interests and narrower political advantage can cloud perceptions, U.S. policy must have a more ambitious objective than simply demonstrating to Moscow how its cooperation with the U.S. advances Russian interests. Wise policy will also seek to create significant equities in Russian society and among leading political forces in cooperative action, which provides the context for managing unavoidable differences on other issues.

The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia—or any other country—is the candid question: why does Russia matter? How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about Russia? Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests?

As the Report of the Commission on American National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests. Why?

It is evident that differences over Iraq did not rupture the U.S.-Russian relationship. On the contrary, Presidents Bush and Putin had constructive conversations during both their St. Petersburg meeting and the G-8 summit in Evian, France. In fact, Moscow’s support of the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing American-British governance of Iraq and signs of a harder line vis-B-vis Iran and North Korea suggest that cooperation on terrorism and proliferation may improve. Nevertheless, closer cooperation will be required to ensure that U.S. and Russian vital interests are not compromised due to a lack of cohesion in policy.

Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, the lingering resentment on both sides should not be underestimated. More important, many questions about the dispute—why it happened, what it says about America’s ability to count on Russian cooperation in related efforts and how similar problems can be avoided or minimized in the future—remain unanswered. The fact that U.S. policy toward Iraq was perhaps the most significant American policy initiative of the last decade makes these questions central to the future of the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Why Russia Opposed the United States

Russia not only refused to support U.S. policy on Iraq but actively opposed it. While we believe that this was a strategic blunder for Moscow, it was also the product of missteps in American policy toward Russia. Understanding the reasons behind the Kremlin’s decision—and the American conduct that contributed to it—is essential both to avoid similar problems in the future and to move forward in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Conversations between Commission members and senior Russian officials, key parliamentarians, business magnates, opinion leaders and analysts suggest several explanations for Russia’s eventual position in the Iraq dispute.

First, there were genuine differences between Russian and American interests and perspectives with respect to Saddam Hussein’s regime. In contrast to the Taliban in Afghanistan—which Russia viewed as a threat well before the United States saw it as such—Hussein’s government in Iraq was simply not seen as a clear and present danger to Russia. Russian officials had few illusions about the nature of Saddam’s tyranny and were well aware of its noncompliance with United Nations resolutions, its use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Iraqi people and its financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. But Moscow’s own experiences with Saddam Hussein were quite different from Washington’s, and President Putin and his advisors were not persuaded by American public and private presentations about imminent threats from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, or the necessity for war rather than a continued United Nations process. As a result, Russian officials repeatedly told their counterparts in Washington, including President Bush, that they did not see Iraq as an urgent danger that required immediate military action.

Second, Russia valued (and continues to value) its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and wants to preserve the UN’s role in shaping the world order. Russia’s claim to being a major power in the modern world depends on its size, its decreasingly relevant nuclear weapons and its role in the Security Council. All of this almost inherently leads to attempts to restrict America’s ability to act unilaterally. Under the circumstances, Moscow’s efforts to give United Nations weapons inspectors more time to work in Iraq were based less on faith in the inspectors’ effectiveness than on a desire to maintain and enhance the role of the United Nations. Ironically, by overplaying their hands, Russia and France weakened the Security Council rather than strengthening it.

Third, Russian domestic politics played an important part in the Kremlin’s calculations. Public opinion polls in Russia regularly demonstrated 80-90% opposition to military action against Saddam Hussein. Opposition was also notable among the foreign policy elite, where nostalgia for Russia’s superpower role and a resentful sense of being unappreciated by the United States are particularly strong. This bitterness was visible every day in the Russian media’s hostile coverage of the prelude to the war in Iraq and the war itself, which focused almost exclusively on American setbacks and civilian casualties and did so in a very negative tone. (Eventually, after it became apparent just how quickly and effortlessly the United States would destroy Hussein’s regime, the Kremlin began to exercise its influence over the Russian media to discourage this kind of reporting.)

President Putin was especially sensitive to public opinion because of Russia’s forthcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for December, and its presidential elections, which are to take place in March 2004. Though few doubt that Mr. Putin will win re-election next year, he and his advisors were determined to avoid allowing the Communist Party to wrap its candidates in the banner of patriotism during the election campaign—and appear to have been concerned that the war in Iraq could have lasted into the fall. A December victory by the Communists could significantly undermine the Russian president’s ability to advance his policy agenda and might damage his chances of winning in the first round of balloting (by obtaining the support of a majority of voters) as well. If a second round of voting were necessary, or even appeared likely to be necessary, the Kremlin could be sorely tempted to guarantee its preferred result through reliance on "administrative resources"— that is, by putting the full power of the Russian state behind Mr. Putin’s campaign. Though the outcome of such efforts would be certain, this course could seriously undermine the legitimacy of Mr. Putin’s victory both at home and abroad.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s position on Iraq was not objectively predetermined; in fact, the Kremlin initially considered tacit acceptance of U.S. plans for Iraq. Russian officials were aware that Boris Yeltsin’s futile opposition to NATO’s 1999 air campaign against Serbia resulted only in highlighting Moscow’s weakness and the United Nations (where Russia could have had a key role) being sidelined by a powerful European mainstream appalled by conditions in Kosovo. To avoid such an outcome in the Iraq debate, the Putin Administration was for a time prepared to balance its misgivings about an American use of force against the risk of isolating itself from the U.S. in a way that would seriously damage improving relations with Washington without actually stopping the war.

The hardening of the Russian position into a decision to oppose the United States was, however, more than just a massive Russian miscalculation. It was also in part a result of three failures in American policy. The first of these was the failure to court Russia aggressively. U.S. officials appeared too optimistic about winning Russian acquiescence due to improving bilateral ties and what was seen as a close personal relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin. Consequently, the Bush Administration devoted insufficient effort to finding a formula to prevent active Russian opposition to U.S. policy. This occurred despite repeated signals from Moscow that such a formula could have been within reach if diplomatic creativity and extra attention were applied to the problem. American officials also seem to have spent notably less time meeting with and telephoning their Russian counterparts than French and German leaders. This facilitated an active Paris-Berlin program to seduce the Kremlin.

The combination of vigorous French and German opposition to U.S. military action and their aggressive efforts to win over Moscow fundamentally altered Russia’s decision calculus in four ways. First, it provided essential political cover vis-à-vis the United States; after all, France and Germany were key American allies in NATO. Second, it sharply escalated the potential domestic political costs of appearing to support the U.S. (even through inaction) as the Kremlin could not afford to look more pro-American, and less courageous, than Paris or Berlin. Third, it created an opportunity for Moscow to "transcend" old Cold War divisions by working together with traditional American allies in an effort to persuade the U.S. either to abandon military action or to delay it sufficiently to give the war a UN/Russian stamp. Finally, Moscow took it as a sign that some governments were more interested in close relations with Russia—and might have more similar objectives—than America.

Russian officials appeared to comprehend the possible consequences of their actions for the U.S.-Russian relationship and signaled on a number of early occasions that while Moscow would not support the war, neither would they oppose it actively. This also changed, however, in the face of frequent telephone calls from President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder to President Putin and analogous conversations between their subordinates. At the same time, the Kremlin did not seem to understand why the Bush Administration was so much more eager to accommodate British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s preference for a clearly-worded new Security Council resolution at the expense of their own preference for no resolution or, if necessary, a vague resolution subject to various interpretations. Ultimately, Russia vigorously opposed a U.S.-led war and Russian rhetoric in the dispute differed little from that offered by France and Germany.

The second problem was the slow deepening of U.S.-Russian relationship, and thus the absence of equities that would have encouraged Moscow to accommodate American preferences. In fact, resentment of the "one-sided" U.S.-Russian relationship remains widespread among Russia’s foreign policy establishment. Russia’s foreign policy community was bitter at being forced to accommodate NATO enlargement, U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and American military bases in formerly Soviet Central Asia. Despite its negligible impact on bilateral trade, the continued existence of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (which both President Clinton and President Bush had promised to lobby the Congress to repeal) has grown to symbolize how little the administration is prepared to do for Russia in Russian eyes.

Of course, while the U.S.-Russian relationship has clearly not lived up to Russian expectations, Russian frustration with a "one-sided" relationship is simply not fair. The swift and (from a Russian perspective) almost cost-free destruction of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime was a big plus for Moscow, which had long been troubled by its support for Islamic extremism and lacked the resources and tools to address the problem effectively. Relatedly, the Bush Administration accepted Russian claims of al Qaeda involvement in Chechnya and reversed Clinton Administration policies on Russia’s intervention by demonstrating considerably greater understanding of the Russian predicament there, pressuring Georgia to tighten its border with Chechnya and drive Chechen militants from the Pankisi Gorge region, and taking steps to block outside financial support of Chechen rebel groups. And after Moscow’s October 2002 hostage crisis, the Bush Administration stopped recommending Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov as an appropriate interlocutor for ending the conflict. Finally, without delving into the contentious history of the bilateral relationship during the Clinton-Yeltsin years, Washington did make a special effort to assist Russia during that period both directly and through its influence over the International Monetary Fund. The ultimate benefits of the loans from the IMF are still subject to debate—and their evaluation is colored substantially by negative Russian views of Yeltsin’s legacy—but it does belie the notion that America has done nothing for Moscow.

Even on the issues where Russia has particular grievances, the Bush Administration has taken important steps to develop benefits for Moscow. For example, the administration pressed for more meaningful cooperation through the new NATO-Russia Council and has launched and supported an Energy Dialogue bringing together key American and Russian companies. Nevertheless, President Bush’s personal cultivation of President Putin has sometimes been undermined by the imperious conduct of other administration officials, who have on occasion displayed what can only be described as an "in your face" attitude toward their Russian counterparts. There have been too many such instances for comfort.

The endurance of what Russian critics call "complexes"—attitudes of resentment and suspicion that are both holdovers from the Cold War and new products of Russia’s huge decline in absolute and relative power—are one of the special challenges of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Russian complexes about the U.S.-Russian relationship can distort Moscow’s perceptions of American actions in a variety of ways and must be understood if the United States is to work most effectively with Russia. However, the United States should not attempt to "solve" the problem of Russian complexes with concessions injurious to our interests. In addition to undermining U.S. objectives, this could ironically reinforce some Russian complexes by encouraging false impressions of Moscow’s leverage. The failure to adequately manage these complexes has contributed to the differing U.S. and Russian views of the lopsidedness of the relationship by strengthening Russian mistrust of American intentions.

American policymaking toward Russia must also recognize that Russian leaders and elites share with other countries a genuine apprehension about the magnitude of American power relative to other actors. Russia is likewise concerned by America’s lack of accountability to anyone other than its leaders and voters, and in the case of some important dimensions of "soft" power in economics and culture, not even to them. These apprehensions need to be heard, understood, where possible addressed by genuine efforts to draw international legitimacy to our actions, and where necessary met head-on by our best arguments as to why the gravity of our interests requires unilateral action. Ultimately, however, the U.S. must help Russians to understand that overcoming their complexes (and forgoing some of the complaints they produce) will be necessary to developing a productive relationship with America. Many in Russia’s elite already acknowledge that it is unrealistic to expect symmetry in a relationship that is no longer symmetrical.

The third weakness of the Bush Administration’s policy toward Russia has been a failure to define priorities or, more precisely, to pursue them in a disciplined and coherent manner. The Bush Administration has been more effective than the Clinton Administration in establishing and sticking to a hierarchy of U.S. interests vis-à-vis Moscow, but U.S. officials often still appear to be working at cross-purposes in their dealings with Russia.

The State Department’s excessive promotion of GUUAM—a multilateral regional organization composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova and originally founded to oppose Russia—is one example of misplaced priorities. Even as the White House seeks strategic partnership with Moscow, the State Department has been discouraging disaffected members of GUUAM from leaving the group and is providing it with substantial financial assistance. It is one thing to support the aspirations of GUUAM governments to establish a regional organization; it is another matter entirely to pressure some of the governments to remain in a group that they do not appear to believe serves their interests. The latter action gratuitously irritates Russian officials and provokes Russians concerned about U.S. intentions in the former Soviet Union while buying the United States very little in return. The origins of American interest in GUUAM were tightly linked to concern over pipeline routes through the region that has now largely been overtaken by events.

Similarly, despite efforts by Georgia’s President Eduard Shevardnadze, the United States should not allow itself to be drawn into the Georgian-Russian debate over Abkhazia. Moscow’s official position on the matter, stated recently by President Putin, stresses maintaining Georgia’s territorial integrity and protecting the rights of the Abkhaz within it. The Abkhaz do not want to remain within Georgia, however, and the issue is complex and sensitive. Washington should state the obvious—that it favors a peaceful resolution to the dispute that reduces tension in the region—and should be careful in proceeding further unless circumstances change.

Understanding Russian priorities is also important. Oil contracts in Iraq and nuclear cooperation with Iran are clearly important to Moscow. But neither reaches the level of Russian concern about the former Soviet space—particularly in Ukraine, which is historically closest to Russia and has a large ethnic Russian minority, and in the unstable new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Though Russian sensitivities here are undoubtedly fueled in part by nostalgia, most of the region does border Russia directly. The United States should be prepared to do whatever it must there, regardless of Russian views, if it should become necessary to safeguard American vital interests. But the U.S. interest in the existence or demise of GUUAM as an institution hardly seems vital. Efforts to keep the group together against the apparent will of some of its members exact a cost in the U.S.-Russian relationship that could affect more substantial interests, in part by reinforcing the worst instincts of some of those in Russia’s military and security services upon whom effective cooperation in part depends. Russian officials themselves have indicated that the irritation resulting from this and other U.S. actions on Russia’s southern periphery limited their willingness to accommodate Washington on Iraq.