Military

Testimony on Circumstances as They Exist in the Republic of Liberia, Presented to the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa. Congress of the United States of America

By Nohn Rebecca Kidau

On behalf of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial, Center for Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group

October  2, 2003

Chairman Ed Royce, members of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Congress of the United States of America. I am deeply gratified and indeed humbled for the privilege extended me to address this august body on behalf of the faceless, innocent people of my country, Liberia. I join my countrymen in salute of this great country for the critical role it has played and continues to play in our search for lasting peace and stability for our beloved Liberia. The people of Liberia, having endured so much pain, death, and destruction for nearly two decades now, especially those of the past 13 years, are filled with anxiety about this hearing, hoping that it serves as a springboard from which a blueprint for continued support by the US government for peace in Liberia will come.

We only ask two simple but critical things:

1. That the United States of America takes the lead and active role in Liberia’s future;
    
2. That the United States of America backs up its role and leadership with the necessary resources to make Liberia a showcase for democracy in all of Africa.

I would like to acknowledge at this time the contributions of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, in particular its Director, Mr. Todd Howland and Dr. Abdelilah Kadili, who have provided important support to us throughout our struggle. Special thanks also go to Professor Katherine S. Broderick, Dean of the University of the District of Columbia School of Law, Professor William L. Robinson and Professor Fariborz S. Fatemi, co-chairs of the Liberia Support Group created by the Center for Human rights to support the work of Archbishop Francis.

The Liberia Support Group has endeavored to chart a course of action that would bring maximum publicity to bear on the situation in Liberia, as well as make certain that the international community is, at all times, apprised of the circumstances as they exist. This testimony is an attempt to further buttress this objective by providing a realistic view of the Liberian conflict and efforts to resolve it, and to help bring lasting peace to our war-torn country. 

The Viability of the Peace Agreement

The peace agreement reached in Accra, Ghana between the warring factions, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD, Movement for Democracy in Liberia, MODEL, and the Charles Taylor Government, GOL, sets the stage for implementing lasting peace in Liberia.  It is my considered opinion that the peace agreement, though flawed, represents our best hope for achieving peace in our country, Liberia. I refer to the document as being flawed because it allocates too much power to the warring factions, but given the prevailing circumstances under which this agreement was reached, there seemed to be no other alternative to move the process forward so as to affect a cessation of the fighting.

As you are well aware, no agreement is worth the paper it is printed on without the means to enforce the terms of the agreement. Likewise the viability of the Liberian Peace Agreement is dependent upon the availability of a force with a mandate to enforce its terms. The document is in no way a panacea for addressing the atrocities that have been perpetrated on an innocent populace; however, within the framework of this agreement lay the desire of the Liberian people to rise up from the ashes of destruction and rebuild our country brick by brick.  

Another factor that influences the viability of the peace agreement is the lack of funding to foster reintegration programs for refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as former combatants. In my opinion, this is one of the keys to the success of this agreement. Without the means to adequately address the needs of these people, we run the risk of having them remain indefinitely in limbo, thus creating an environment conducive to starting more strife. We appeal to you,  to assist us in this regard to provide for our people the basic necessities to begin life.

Since the beginning of hostilities in Liberia, in December 1989, there have been numerous attempts at resolving the conflict between warring factions. These efforts, at best, have achieved only temporary cessation of the fighting. This conflict has resulted in the deaths of approximately 250,000 Liberians, according to estimates by the United Nations.

Our best hope for peace came in the form of an agreement attained by forcing the warring parties to attend a peace conference in the Ghanaian capital, Accra. The conference was organized under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and attended by members of the international community, including representatives of the government of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and other friendly governments. The former head of state of Nigeria, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, served as facilitator of the conference, while the President of The Republic of Ghana, H.E. John Kuffour, Chairman of ECOWAS, served as host and general chairman.  The results of this conference are proving to be the best vehicle yet for attaining lasting peace in Liberia, providing the framework for putting into place an interim government charged with the responsibility of leading the country to democratic civilian elections.

Liberia should not be viewed as a burden on the United States and the international community-we are a founding member of the United Nations, and the closest friend of the United States in Africa. We were there for you during the cold war and we played a role, however small, in your victory. It was Liberia whose signature broke the tie to create the state of Israel. Above all, Liberia and the United States have a unique relationship dating as far back as the 1800s. For that, the world looks to the United States to take the first step and lead the efforts to lift Liberia out of the ashes of the bloody civil war and save it from itself just as France did for the Ivory Coast and Great Britain for Sierra Leone.

Liberia needs you now more than ever before. You cannot and should not abandon Liberia now when it needs you most. The world is not only watching you, but it is calling on you to do right by Liberia so that there can be lasting peace in the West African Sub-region. 

Archbishop Francis’ visit to the United States and the United Nations:

The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group were instrumental in helping to put together a series of events that eventually led to intense pressure being brought to bear on Taylor which culminated in his resignation and departure to Nigeria. One such event was the recent visits Archbishop Michael K. Francis, the Robert F. Kennedy 1999 Human Rights Award Laureate, made to the United States in February and July, 2003. Archbishop Michael Kpakala Francis, the most outspoken critic of the brutal Taylor years, provided a very detailed insight of the ills of the Taylor administration.

During his first visit to the US, from February 27 to March 7, 2003, at the invitation of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia (MDCL), Archbishop Francis gave a very powerful and moving address in which he outlined the atrocities being committed by the Taylor administration against the citizens of Liberia. He also met with Mr. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, members of the United States House of Representatives, as well as Members of the United States Senate, the Director of The Agency for International Development and representatives of local and international human rights organization. In each of these meetings, Archbishop Francis insisted on the need for the U.S. to adopt a more proactive role towards the situation in Liberia.  He also made it clear to all that peace and security were considered sine none qua to free, fair and democratic elections in Liberia.

Archbishop Francis visited the United States a second time from July 27 to 30, 2003. He then met with Mr. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor’s Assistant for Africa, Senator Ted Kennedy and other members of the U.S. Senate, as well as members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Archbishop Francis also met with the Secretary General of the United Nations Mr. Kofi Annan. There again Archbishop Francis made the case for a strong and unequivocal intervention of the U.S. in the warring situation in Liberia. These two visits helped to spur calls from Members of Congress, the UN Secretary General, the press, as well as from some European and African leaders for intervention by the United States.

Liberians salute Archbishop Francis, recipient of The Robert F. Kennedy 1999 Human Rights Award, laureate and a Champion of Human Rights in Liberia for his gallant efforts toward peace in our country.

UN Representative Jacques Paul Klein

The appointment of Mr. Jacques Paul Klein as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General to Liberia is certainly a positive development for Liberia.   Liberians are very excited about the prospects for peace that this man brings to the country. It is our hope and expectation that the international community with the backing of the US government will provide him the support he needs to succeed. 

political presence such as the UN Special Representative is useful in enhancing the following:

Strategic Objectives

There are strategic objectives being cited repeatedly by Archbishop Francis and others in Liberian civil society, through several leading organizations in the country and from around the world.  These objectives were reiterated by Archbishop Francis during meetings held with representatives of the US government earlier this year. They are in fact recognized by Liberian organizations as the best way to ensure that the country is definitely out of the civil war and headed toward peace and democracy. The strategies include the need to:

Their achievement requires a thoughtful planning process; one that, far from any rush to quick fixes or semi-solutions, takes into account the realities on the ground and the complexity of the situation; and factors in the importance of the help Liberian society needs to heal its wounds, and make peace with decades of civil war and social unrest.

The United Nations, individual members of the Security Council and other parties involved should neither consider that the cease-fire is a finality of and by itself and therefore abandon the process any time soon, nor should they rush to try to achieve any other objective short of those already defined by Liberian civil society. Adequate consideration needs to be given to, on one hand investing as much time as the planning phase requires, and on the other, providing the process with the necessary means, tools and most importantly, financial resources to guarantee its real success.

The United Nations and the parties involved should ensure that the following requirements are met and that the ensuing tasks are fully implemented as they constitute essential conditions to free, fair, democratic and transparent elections. 

Requirements for Implementation:

 The implementation of these tasks requires:

A UN Security Council mandate that authorizes the dispatch of a robust military presence that would stabilize the country and deter anyone who would pose a threat to the peace, and create a secure environment;

The military force should be provided the necessary resources, authority and  flexibility to undertake the following:

1. Disarm and demobilize all combatants;
    
2. Provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees;
    
3. Support the establishment of law and order and assist in the restructuring of the military and security forces. 

In addition to the challenges we have listed above, we specifically recommend the following for effective governance and security during the transitional period.

1. Consider the young people who, either willingly or unwillingly, joined the killings in the 1990s as well as those involved in the current insurgencies as victims.  Their plight must not only be considered a priority, but also the international community should commit substantial resources for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This problem is the “landmine” in the peace process.  There can be no lasting peace in Liberia until it is dealt with head-on and resolved.  The future of Liberia is at stake because its younger population is less educated than its older population.
    
2. There is, indeed a need to cut off the line of communication between Charles Taylor and the current government of Liberia to stop his micro-managing of the affairs of that government. Taylor is in continued contact with his allies giving them orders to undermine the peace process. That must stop now.
    
3. We strongly encourage you to stay closely engaged in our efforts in fashioning an interim process to fix the country and ready it for the political process.  We do not only request that you support a process that puts the national interest above all else, but also we believe strongly that honest and reputable Liberians from within the ranks of Liberian civil society who commit not to participate in the national elections will be useful instruments for national reconstruction. We believe that these individuals will seek the national interest and do everything possible to secure the future of our country.

The International Contact Group on Liberia and Economic Community of West African States

We appreciate the efforts of the International Contact Group on Liberia, comprised of Britain, France and the United States, (ICGL), and the ECOWAS, for their role in bringing peace to Liberia, as well as making possible the removal of Mr. Taylor from Liberia. We are very happy to note that on Friday, September 19, 2003 a resolution passed unanimously in the Security Council, authorizing the deployment of 15,000 troops for peace keeping in Liberia.

The comprehensive peace agreement

In addition with the ongoing war the mediator, facilitators and organizers of the peace conference refused to begin the talks unless an unconditional cease-fire was in place. There was nearly a two-week deadlock in the peace process, as the three warring parties (the Government of Liberia, (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, (MODEL), struggled over the terms of the cease-fire. Endless hours were spent trying to convince the belligerents to sign the cease-fire agreement. Finally, on June 17, the accord was signed.

Included in the cease-fire agreement were timelines set for certain things to happen so that the cease-fire could hold. A joint verification team, (JVT), should have immediately been deployed to verify each warring party’s position. Once that was done, ECOWAS would have immediately established and deployed an interposition force in Liberia, to secure the cease-fire, create buffer zones to separate the aggressive forces, provide a safe passage for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to ready the country for an international stabilization force to go to Liberia to keep the peace. As you know, the cease-fire was constantly violated-making it nearly impossible to make any progress.

Lack of funding

The lack of adequate funding played critical role in delaying the process leading to the signing of the accord. This problem still hampers this process. ECOWAS had requested that a $100 million fund be established for the implementation of a mandate for peace. As you may be aware, there was very little money available at the time. The U.S. Government pledged an initial sum of $10 million dollars, while The European Union pledge an initial sum of $6.4 million dollars. With initial funding available, as soon as a ceasefire agreement was secured, the first Nigerian Troops began arriving in Liberia to secure territory given up by warring factions.

Division among political parties

In Accra, Ghana, there were initially the group of eight, (“G-8”) political parties, (those who had not been bought by Taylor), and a group of nine, (“G-9”) political parties (those who were basically in Taylor’s pocket). The “G-8s” seemed more objective and tended to work well with the civil society. Both the G-8s and the civil society worked with all warring parties to bring all the opposition political parties together. The “G-9ers”, of course, worked alongside the ruling party and the Government of Liberia. Their moods changed with what was happening in Monrovia. When Taylor seemed weak, they would soften their position, but when he seemed strong, they would become unwilling to cooperate with the rest of us.  We managed to reduce G-9 to G-3 and increased G-8 to G-14 at one time. Then finally, all 17 opposition political parties came together, even though the bond was very fragile.

Before the peace agreement was reached, there were various strands of opinions that are important to mention as an evaluation of the evolution of the talks. The major points of disagreement lied within the structure of the transitional government as indicated below:

a.      Term of office for the transitional government;

b.     Numbers of cabinets to be activated during the transition period;

c.      Numbers of cabinets to be activated during the transition period; 

d.     Transitional head and vice head(s);

e.      The question of whom serves as president or vice president(s);

f.       Number of seats in the unicameral transition legislature;

g.      Distribution of the unicameral transition legislative seat;

h.      The process of selecting the transitional president and vice president(s).

The Challenges

While we are ever thankful for all that has been achieved thus far, there is a great deal more to be done to avoid risking the time, efforts, and other resources that have been invested in this process and reverting back to fighting. We cannot and we must not jeopardize what we have achieved. Yes, the cost may be great, but the alternative is unthinkable. H.E. Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa could not have put it any better when she said in a speech on March 1, 2003 that “The cost may be great, but the cost of doing nothing will undoubtedly be even greater for the Government of Liberia, for the Government of the United States, and for the international community, and most importantly, for you the citizens of Liberia…” 

Since the start of the Liberian conflict in December of 1989, Liberians have been bearing the brunt of the human suffering.  Yet, as keen observers know, the conflict has been and remains in no small measure an international one.  In the 1990s, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal were in the thick of efforts to restore peace in Liberia. Nations which were not only involved in the Liberian peace process, but also have been affected immeasurably by the violence sown in Liberia include, among others, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Gambia.  All of these nations suffered untold civilian or military casualties either in Liberia or on their own territories. 

Our goal now is not to go back in time, but to focus on the second chance Liberians have been given to reclaim their nationhood.  Liberians want a place among the community of civilized nations.  Additionally, they want to put behind them, forever, the culture of violence that has engulfed Liberia and the sub-Africa region and caused unspeakable human suffering.  But even more importantly, Liberians want to put behind them those practices that have been the cause of violence - political and social injustice, dictatorship, class manipulation and the squandering of national economic resources.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot overemphasize the need for the United States Government to heed the calls of innocent Liberians and the international community at-large and take the lead now in bringing some form of normalcy to Liberia. We count on you to ensure that the peace process moves forward and reaches a successful outcome. As I have indicated, the United States should take the leadership to bring peace, security and democracy to Liberia. If the United States can spend billions of dollars and sustain human and material casualties in the conflict in Iraq, we have no doubt it can put a fraction of those resources to help out a friend of more than 170 years. We do not want another bloodbath in Liberia.

Bringing the belligerent parties in Liberia to the negotiating table, where they were able to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement, signed on August 18, 2003, was certainly an important achievement that brought hope back to the hundreds of thousands of traumatized and war-wary Liberians. Members of the International Contact Group on Liberia and representatives of the different countries that helped with the process are certainly to be commended for their efforts, which led to this important breakthrough.

It should, however be stressed that the peace agreement and the formation of a transitional government is but the necessary first step of a laborious and lengthy process aimed at establishing democracy and the rule of law in Liberia. Members of the Contact Group and representatives of the governments involved in the negotiations are therefore to be strongly reminded that the process could well fail if other important steps are not taken to begin laying down the infrastructure that the country needs to move toward democracy and the respect of the rule of law.

The situation on the ground is by all counts still very precarious as was demonstrated by the eruption of hostilities only a few days after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.  The ceasefire could be broken again at any time and send the country spiraling back into violence. The strengthening of the process hinges on the measures the United Nations and those members of the Security Council involved in the peace negotiations are willing to take, and the efforts they are willing to dedicate in order to keep the country from sinking into a worse situation. The success or failure of the process depends largely on the targeted strategic objectives, on the amount of planning the parties involved are willing to undertake, and a clear definition of the tasks ahead as well as fulfilling the requirements for their implementation.  Finally, the success of the process depends on the full participation of Liberian and international Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs, particularly those which have been at the forefront of the struggle, such as the Justice and Peace Commission and the Inter Religious Council of Liberia, both headed by Archbishop Francis.

I would like Mr. Chairman to have your permission to include in the record the testimony of Mr. Cyril Jones, a Liberian lawyer, law professor and member of the Liberia Support Group; and also a letter the Human Rights Directors sent to Secretary Powell about the situation in Liberia.

Once again, I thank you on behalf of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group. We hereby assure you of our continued commitment to the establishment of durable peace and democratic governance in Liberia. Thank you.