Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128
Testimony of Assistant Secretary Beth Jones
before the
House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe
Thursday, March 13, 2003
Written Statement
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to review
with you the Administrations priorities in Europe, including Russia and the
Caucasus. At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on becoming
chairman of this subcommittee. Mr. Gallegly, we appreciate your past work on the
subcommittee and we look forward to working with you on the Subcommittee on
International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights.
As you suggested in your invitation letter, it is a timely moment to assess the
health of the overall trans-Atlantic relationship. While we are seriously
concerned by differences between the U.S. and some European countries on the
best way to achieve our agreed goal of Iraqi disarmament, it is also fair to say
there are many areas in which the U.S.-European relationship is as strong as
ever.
Our European Allies and friends are vital partners in the campaign against
global terrorism. We are opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
addressing barriers to American exports and investment. We have achieved
important milestones in our relationship with Russia. Progress in the Balkans is
ongoing. Our efforts continue to promote regional stability in Cyprus, Northern
Ireland, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Europe is changing in momentous and important ways. Thus, our relationship with
Europe will continue to evolve as we adapt to, and in some cases participate in,
these changes. Both NATO and the EU are expanding eastward, bringing in
countries that are embracing democracy and market economies. These twin
expansions bring us closer to President Bushs vision of a Europe whole, free
and at peace. The invitees bring a new perspective and a new energy to the EU
and NATO.
These expanded boundaries challenge European nations to build a new concept of
themselves. They challenge the U.S. to work constructively with this new
reality.
The tensions with some of our traditional Allies are acute, but our longer-term
common interests remain. Our economic relationship with Europe amounts to about
$2 trillion in trade and investment. Millions of travelers cross the Atlantic
each year. We cooperate closely on matters of regional and global significance,
from trafficking in persons, to trade liberalization, to terrorism financing.
Europe remains our most important partner in promoting human rights, Europe
joins us in seeking peace in the Middle East and supporting development in
Africa.
We recognize that the bonds forged so firmly in the Second World War and the
Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe are matters of history to the younger
generation of Western Europeans. For those in Central Europe, Russia and
Eurasia, however, Cold War traditions of conflict and confrontation are legacies
they would like to leave behind. The Secretary, Department Principals, my
colleagues in EUR, and our Embassies abroad are actively using public diplomacy
and other tools to reach both of these generations, in order to lay the
groundwork for strong and vibrant U.S.-European relations for decades to come.
Iraq
The most pressing challenge for U.S.-European relations today is how to ensure
that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein complies with the requirements of more
than 17 UN Security Council resolutions and fully disarms. Plainly, there is
sharp disagreement among European and Eurasian countries about how to enforce
compliance with the Security Council.
Some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, Spain, and Bulgaria,
agree with us that Saddam Hussein has missed his final opportunity to disarm.
They and others understand that the international community must be prepared to
back up its writ with the use of force, as anticipated by UNSCR 1441. A number
of countries in Central Europe and Eurasia have pledged forces and specialized
units to the coalition we have assembled.
At this juncture, however, other European countries -- notably UNSC members
France, Germany, and Russia -- favor giving the inspection process more time.
These countries generally acknowledge that the Iraqis engaged only in limited
and truculent compliance, but hope that more time and intensified inspections
can achieve results. The German government insists that force should not be used
under any circumstances.
We believe that, in the absence of a genuine commitment by the Iraqi regime to
disarm, more time for inspections or more inspectors -- as proposed recently by
France -- will not solve the fundamental problem of Iraqi non-compliance.
We know what genuine disarmament looks like. We have seen it in Ukraine and in
Kazakhstan. Governments that accept the priority of disarmament don't dribble
out concessions. They take on obligations and make commitments willingly, and
they list their weapons sites freely.
We welcome expressions of support for our policy on Iraq from a number of
European leaders. This includes the January 30 letter signed by eight European
leaders (from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal,
Spain and the UK) and the February 5 statement by the "Vilnius 10" (Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia). We also appreciate the statement of the EU Summit on Iraq on February
17, emphasizing the focus must be on Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441.
In the United Nations, we are working intensively with the UK and Spain to
ensure broad support for our draft resolution. We would like to see the Iraqi
threat addressed through the Security Council, thus strengthening its
credibility.
Should military action against Iraq take place, we are seeking the broadest
possible international coalition. We have held private talks with many European
governments about possible coalition action. In a number of cases, acting on a
bilateral basis, we have requested and obtained base access and overflight and
transit clearances. Some countries are already committed to providing military
forces to participate. Should military action prove necessary, we would also
look to our Allies and friends in Europe for post-conflict support, including
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.
NATO
For over fifty years, the United States and its European Allies have been joined
in a common cause through NATO. We have been working hard since the September
11th attacks to transform the Alliance to address these new security threats.
The Summit meeting of heads of state and government in Prague last November
represented an historic milestone in this process. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
take this opportunity to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly and to thank you for your advocacy of U.S. interests in
that organization. I also want to applaud your deep engagement at Prague and
your continuing support for NATOs transformation.
At the Prague Summit, NATO members agreed on an ambitious program proposed by
the U.S. to develop "New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships" to
transform the Alliance. Our European Allies agreed to improve their military
capabilities, through resource pooling and specialization, helping NATO to
undertake collective action against the new threats that we face around the
globe. The Allies also endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response
Force, which will give the Alliance a cutting-edge land, air and sea capability.
We agreed to streamline the NATO command structure to make it more lean,
efficient and responsive to today's threats. Work on implementing our new
capabilities initiative is well underway.
Our decision to invite seven new members to join the Alliance will extend the
zone of NATO security and stability from the Baltic to the Black Sea, helping to
further secure a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. We are pleased that
each of the seven invitees has already made significant military contributions
to the war on terrorism and we will look to them to provide specialized niche
capabilities to the Alliance in the future.
Prague also celebrated the establishment of a new relationship between NATO and
Russia. NATO states and Russia are working together in the NATO-Russia Council
as equal partners on selected projects aimed at expanding and deepening our
mutual cooperation. Current projects are focused on peacekeeping, civil
emergency planning, non-proliferation and missile defense. I am pleased to
report that so far the NATO-Russia Council has been relatively successful.
Russian participation has been constructive and cooperative. As this process
continues, we will seek ways to broaden and deepen the NATO-Russia relationship.
The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at Prague provides a roadmap which, if
implemented by Ukraine, will draw Ukraine closer to the Alliance and bolster
internal reforms.
It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies chose, at least
initially, to confuse the obligation of the Alliance to provide purely defensive
assistance to Turkey with the broader debate over the question of what we should
be doing about Iraq in the UN and elsewhere. This is not the first time NATO has
experienced disagreement on a difficult and important issue. One only has to
think back to the debate over the INF deployment in the 1980s. The fact is that
NATO remains the fundamental means by which the Allies guarantee their common
security and the indispensable defense link that binds North America to Europe.
NATO is also outward looking. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and
Partnership for Peace are important tools in enhancing cooperation with the
Eurasian countries. Given the increased importance of Central Asia and the
Caucasus as frontline states in the war on terrorism, we would like to see NATO
do more to reach out to these countries.
EU
While NATO forms the foundation of the trans-Atlantic security framework, our
relations with the EU underpin our economic and political relationship with
Europe. The European Union has become increasingly important to our interests.
As the only entity on the world stage with an ability similar to ours to project
economic, political, and cultural power, the EU has an important influence on
the environment both within and beyond Europe.
Some observers suggest the gulf dividing the U.S. and EU has never been wider.
Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, Kyoto, ICC, steel, FSC, beef hormones, and
biotech are the most contentious issues. Putting the situation into context, we
have been here before, with the Soviet pipeline, Helms-Burton and ILSA. Our
common interests, bonds, and values proved stronger than these divisions. For
all the differences, our areas of common belief and objectives with the EU
remain greater than with any other potential partner. A perception of
fundamental divergence is neither in our interest nor accurate.
Over $500 billion in trade between the U.S. and EU takes place each year,
creating jobs and boosting growth on both sides of the Atlantic. We are also
each others largest foreign investors, and those flows continue. The vast
majority of trade and investment occurs without headlines, without rancor,
without dispute. At the Doha meeting of the WTO, the U.S. and the EU came
together to launch a new round and provide new momentum for free trade. At the
last U.S.-EU Summit, we agreed to develop a Positive Economic Agenda. This is a
mechanism to find common approaches to regulatory issues across a broad range of
sectors, and to advance our active dialogue on access to financial markets.
While these efforts hopefully will minimize areas of future trade disputes,
where we have disagreements now, such as over agricultural biotechnology, we are
pressing the EU to open its markets to us without delay. We will use all
available tools, including where appropriate the WTO, to protect our interests.
Increased U.S.-EU cooperation receives little publicity in non-economic areas.
In counter-terrorism, we negotiated an agreement that facilitates the exchange
of information between EUROPOL and U.S. law enforcement. We have concluded
negotiations toward a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty/Extradition Treaty, which
must now enter the approval process. Coordinated U.S. and EU diplomacy and
assistance have been key to Balkans stabilization. In Afghanistan, we jointly
prevented a humanitarian crisis, and we continue to work together to build
democratic government, infrastructure and jobs. Another example of EU-U.S.
cooperation is the joint application of visa restrictions on the leadership of
the secessionist Transnistria regime in Moldova. Together, we are sending a
strong signal to the Tiraspol regime that it must negotiate seriously to bring
this longstanding issue to a rapid settlement.
The accession of ten new countries to the European Union in 2004 is a
significant EU achievement. It has also been a longstanding U.S. policy
objective. EU enlargement will cement these nations, most of which were members
of the former Soviet bloc, into the West. The accession process and adherence to
the EUs body of law will also improve and standardize regulations, resulting in
better business climates, improved human rights standards and treatment of
minorities, and stronger capacity for law enforcement cooperation.
We are also working with the EU to encourage more engagement with the nations of
the Caucasus and Central Asia, all of whom will become Europe's "new neighbors"
after EU enlargement. We are seeking EU political engagement as well financial
support for the kinds of reforms that will make these nations stable, democratic
and prosperous members of Europe.
Finally, we support the EU's efforts to establish a European Security and
Defense Policy that is closely coordinated with NATO, and that would allow the
EU to take on tasks such as peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions in
which NATO decides not to be engaged. We were pleased that in December last year
the long-standing impasse over the participation of non-EU NATO Allies in ESDP
operations was resolved.
Since that time, NATO and the EU have been working to finalize other elements of
"Berlin-plus" arrangements that will set out the basic elements of cooperation
between NATO and the EU. We expect that the Berlin-plus package will be
completed in the next few weeks.
Once all arrangements are in place and NATO decides to end Operation ALLIED
HARMONY, we will welcome the EU's assumption of that mission at the request of
the Macedonian government.
The OSCE
For the United States, the OSCE serves as an invaluable forum for protecting
security, economic well-being, and human rights and democratization throughout
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Let me recognize the U.S. members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from this
Chamber, who have also used the OSCE with profound impact to advance U.S. values
and interests.
The OSCE is engaged in improving the lives of citizens in numerous countries,
with programs that range from election observation, to police training, to
promoting civil society. OSCE human rights rapporteurs serve as beacons of
credibility and frankness. This spring, at our urging, the OSCE will tackle the
troubling increase in anti-Semitic violence throughout Eurasia with a special
meeting on anti-Semitism.
In the aftermath of September 11, our partners at OSCE have also focused on
combating terrorism. Through the OSCE we are assisting our most critical
partners -- the Central Asian and Caucasus nations -- in the War Against
Terrorism to address an entire agenda of measures that will help secure their
regions and all of Europe against the threat of terror.
Counterterrorism Cooperation
A year and a half after September 11, our European and Eurasian allies continue
to be strong supporters in the war against terrorism.
Most European countries, especially our NATO partners, acted quickly to
participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the follow-on
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UK in particular played a
central role with the U.S. in rooting out the Taliban and al-Qaida from
Afghanistan. Although the countries of Central Asia are not part of the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee, they are part of my bureau, so I wanted to
note their important contribution to OEF as well, both in hosting coalition
bases and in working with us on infrastructure improvements.
The nations of Europe and Eurasia continue to play a vital role in rebuilding a
secure and democratically governed Afghanistan, with contributions of funds,
military assets, supplies, humanitarian aid and infrastructure development.
There are 18 European coalition partners with forces deployed in Afghanistan,
with either ISAF or in support of OEF. European countries have contributed air,
sea and land assets, and have placed elite troops on the ground. European units
are taking part in maritime interdiction operations. All of the countries that
have led ISAF are from the European region.
Afghanistan must one day be able to ensure its own security, and to that end,
European partners are center stage in building the Afghan National Army (ANA).
The ANA now consists of seven combat battalions, with one more in training. Our
European partners have trained four of these battalions. A number of European
countries have provided equipment valued at over $20 million.
Afghanistans shattered infrastructure is another essential element in
reconstruction and security. The European Union earmarked $93 million for road
reconstruction in Afghanistan for the next two years. European countries both
donated and transported large amounts of humanitarian relief and reconstruction
supplies. It has been a united effort in every sense.
In Georgia, Russian bombings of northern Georgia beginning in 2000 were a clear
and unacceptable violation of Georgian sovereignty. Russia accused the Georgian
government of failing to control Georgia's territory in the Pankisi Gorge and
allowing the region to become a safe-haven for criminals, terrorists, and
Chechen rebels. The Russians were demanding action against terrorism.
Our immediate response was to draw a clear "red line" against any further
violation of Georgian territory. We made clear to the Georgian government that
it could not allow its territory to act as a safe-haven for terrorists and urged
its support for the Global War on Terrorism. We made clear to the Russian and
Georgian governments that Georgia should be left to resolve the problems within
its own territory.
As part of our effort to help Georgia develop the capabilities necessary to face
this problem and protect its territory, we developed the Georgia Train and Equip
Program (GTEP), which began in May 2002. GTEP is designed to assist Georgia in
border security, anti-terrorism, crisis response and military reform. The goal
of the program is to train four Georgian Army light infantry battalions and a
mechanized company team. Selected elements of the Georgian Border Guards and
other security forces are participating with the goal of providing greater
interoperability with MOD in time of crisis. In December 2002, the program
graduated its first combat battalion, which is now ready for deployment against
international terrorists on Georgian territory. In our view, the program is
successfully addressing the need to enhance Georgias security and guarantee its
sovereignty.
Efforts by coalition partners have helped thwart impending terrorist actions
against the United States. Our European counterparts are sharing law enforcement
and intelligence information, conducting investigations into the September 11
attacks, and strengthening laws to aid the fight against terrorism.
Additionally, we are working with the OSCE to improve the capacity of member
states to fight terrorism.
In Greece, several members of the November 17 terrorist group are now standing
trial. In February the authorities arrested four suspected members of the
Revolutionary Peoples Struggle (ELA), another domestic terrorist group.
European police and intelligence agencies have also provided unprecedented
practical help in investigating and bringing terrorists to justice, denying
financing to terrorists and their supporters, and strengthening security against
terrorist attacks. Many European and Eurasian countries have joined with us to
place several individuals/entities on the asset freeze list maintained by the
UNs 1267 Sanctions Committee.
On the Eurasia front, Russia has been generous in its support for the coalition,
from OEF planning to intelligence exchanges to support in the UN. It has also
changed its financial enforcement infrastructure to block terrorist assets.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have also provided vital support in the war
against terrorism. They have offered unequivocal political and military support,
are playing critical roles in OEF, and have provided vital intelligence and law
enforcement cooperation and information sharing on terrorist groups and assets.
Given the importance of European opinion in our counterterrorism efforts, we
plan to enhance public diplomacy efforts to boost support for our policies and
actions. We will reach out to the diverse Muslim communities in both Europe and
Eurasia in an effort to improve the image of the U.S.
Russia
Over the past year we continued to develop strong cooperation with Russia. Our
relationship covers a broad spectrum. On strategic issues, we reached agreement
with Russia last May on the Moscow Treaty, radically reducing strategic
offensive weapons. We are pleased that the Senate ratified this treaty last
Thursday.
Russia continues to be a key partner in the global war on terror, and we have
cooperated in important ways on key regional problems, such as supporting the
Middle East Peace Process in the Quartet and defusing tensions between India
and Pakistan. On some other international issues, Russias support has not been
as solid. Thus far they have not been helpful on Iraq in the UN as noted
earlier. And we are urging Russia to engage more actively on the DPRK nuclear
problem.
In law enforcement matters, new Russian legislation on money laundering helped
remove it from the Financial Action Task Forces list of countries of concern.
Yet corruption remains a serious problem.
We strongly support democratization and economic reform in Russia, largely
through U.S. assistance under the FREEDOM Support Act. There have been major
advances in democratic freedoms in Russia, such as the introduction of jury
trials and reform of the criminal code. But media freedom continues to be a
problem, while the freedom of foreign clergy to enter Russia became a problem
last year.
This year we are witnessing what may be the first serious effort at a solution
to the Chechnya conflict, beginning with a constitutional referendum slated for
March 23. We are concerned over the security and political conditions under
which the referendum is being held. However, we hope this can be the basis for a
political solution to that tragic conflict. As indicated by our February 28
designation of three Chechen organizations as terrorists, there are definitely
terrorist elements among Chechen fighters. But our broader policy on the
Chechnya conflict remains unchanged. In addition to seeking a political
solution, the Russian government needs to exercise greater discipline over its
forces, and there must be meaningful accountability for human rights violations
committed by Russian forces against civilians.
In economic matters, the Russian government has made progress on market reforms.
Large Russian companies are adopting more Western practices and becoming more
transparent. But much remains to be done - the government must provide a more
welcoming environment for investors, crack down on corruption, continue reforms
and enforcement of the rule of law, improve IPR protection, uphold court
decisions, support the growth of small and medium enterprises, and pursue the
breakup of monopolies. WTO accession for Russia remains a priority, as this will
be a major force for reform. As we move to expand U.S.-Russian economic
relations, there is a natural fit between Russia's desire to play a greater role
in providing oil and gas to global energy markets and our interest in
diversifying supply.
Jackson-Vanik graduation remains an Administration priority. The law has
achieved its purpose, and we now have other more effective tools to manage the
U.S.-Russian trade relationship.
Ukraine
Our relationship with Ukraine has gone through a difficult period. President
Kuchma's authorization of the Kolchuga transfer to Iraq has eroded trust. Yet
Ukraine remains strategically important; its future will have a significant
impact on the future of its neighbors and Europe as a whole. Despite the
Kolchuga authorization and serious concerns about democracy and human rights, we
are convinced that we must maintain our broad-based engagement with all segments
of Ukrainian society, and especially with those promoting political and economic
reform. This is in our long-term interest - and Ukraines. Our agenda supports
Ukraine's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Whatever
limitations Ukraines leadership has demonstrated to date in fostering economic
and political change, a new generation of leaders is waiting in the wings for a
chance to give reform new impetus.
Our goal is to confront bilateral problems and find practical solutions that can
inject positive momentum into the relationship. We plan to pursue reform of
Ukraine's export control regime as a way to prevent future Kolchuga episodes. We
have offered U.S. assistance for this purpose. Outstanding questions on Kolchuga
remain and might never be fully answered. For now, we believe we should
concentrate our energies in helping to implement reforms that will head off
proliferation problems.
We continue to shift assistance resources from programs benefiting the central
government to those that more directly support civil society. One of our
particular areas of focus is media freedom, which we believe has been under
attack in Ukraine and which will be crucial in helping to ensure free and fair
Presidential elections in 2004. We will be watching closely the Ukrainian
authorities treatment of independent journalists and media outlets,
particularly as the 2004 elections draw closer.
We will continue to deepen the good cooperation we have with Ukraine on
strategic issues. The Ukrainian authorities have indicated that they are
actively considering deploying a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense
battalion to the Gulf, in case frontline states are targets of attack by Iraqs
weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine has also stood shoulder to shoulder with us
in the war on terror. They have allowed more than 5,000 overflights connected
with Operation Enduring Freedom, and have fully equipped a battalion in the
Afghan National Army.
We also want Ukraine's help in solving the Transnistria conflict in Moldova -
one of Ukraine's neighbors. Ukraine has an important role to play, both as a
constructive mediator in the ongoing Transnistria political settlement talks and
as a partner for Moldova in increasing security along their common border.
Turkey
Among our priorities in Europe is our relationship with Turkey. As a key NATO
ally located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Turkey is always a top
priority. We have strongly supported EU membership for Turkey, and have worked
hard with them in an effort to resolve the Cyprus issue.
Right now, the focus is on Iraq. We are seeking Turkish cooperation because the
northern option can help shorten an eventual war, leading to fewer casualties
and lower economic costs to all. On March 1, the Turkish Parliament did not
approve permitting U.S. troop deployments to Turkey for a possible conflict with
Iraq. This can be attributed, in part, to polling data indicating 90-95 percent
of the Turkish public is opposed to war in Iraq. In addition, there was a lack
of unity in the ruling party. This is a setback with regard to planning for
Iraq, but we are consulting with the Turks on next steps in the spirit of the
strategic partnership between our countries.
Both we and the Turks have very serious concerns over economic costs to Turkey
of a war, as in 1991. Turkey also cites to us concern over northern Iraq,
including Kurdish ambitions and the status of the oil fields. Turkey feels that
ethnic Turkomen are not sufficiently represented in the Iraqi opposition
leadership and we are working to resolve this issue.
We still hope we will be able to stage a Northern Option through Turkey. We are
discussing options with the Turkish authorities.
In any case, we are also making clear that Turkey must not move into Iraq
unilaterally.
In addition to ongoing discussions on Iraq, we are working with Turkey and
international financial institutions to bolster the Turkish economy. Turkey must
take adequate measures to get back on track with its IMF reform program.
The Balkans
Our goal and that of the Balkan governments is to promote democracy, market
orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into NATO and the
European Union. While challenges remain, there is progress. International troop
levels are down. Refugee returns are up. Zagreb and Belgrade successfully
negotiated an end to their dispute over the Prevlaka Peninsula without
international mediation. Economic growth in the region was good at around four
percent last year. There have been a number of successful elections in the
region. The United States' level of involvement is decreasing as our European
partners are picking up more diplomatic and military responsibility for the
region.
The overall military presence in the region has been reduced significantly, with
our European Allies now comprising over 80 percent of the forces there. SFOR has
declined from its peak strength of approximately 60,000 to 12,000; KFOR from its
peak strength of approximately 50,000 to 25,000.
NATOs presence in the region remains under periodic review to ensure that our
forces are adequate but not excessive in light of conditions on the ground. The
Alliance should continue to play a role in the international communitys efforts
in the region by gradually shifting its focus from stabilization to long-term
engagement through institutions like the Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile, we
are working closely with the EU and with NATO to pursue the European Unions
offer to take on the military mission in Macedonia, once the important details,
as envisaged in the "Berlin Plus" agreement, are worked out and NATO has decided
to end its Operation ALLIED HARMONY.
The democratic process is taking root: elections were held in Serbia and
Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia, and were considered free and
fair by international observers -- although not all ended in a conclusive
result.
Providing real opportunities for refugee and IDP returns is important for
long-term stability and European integration. Refugee returns to Bosnia have
gained their own momentum, and minority returns to Kosovo have outpaced minority
departures. Still, refugee returns to Kosovo and Croatia have been disappointing
overall, and we need to continue to press for progress.
Many countries in the region are reliable and vigorous partners in the global
war on terrorism and have taken close and cooperative steps with us to combat
proliferation and the gray arms trade.
Despite these positive developments, challenges remain. We seek to help resolve
remaining post-conflict issues -- including war criminals and refugee return --
while we encourage the post-Communist transition through political and economic
reform. We are focused significantly on building the rule of law through our
assistance under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act. It is
particularly important to address ineffective law enforcement, corruption and
porous borders, which make the region attractive for organized crime,
trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity, and unattractive for
legitimate investment and entrepreneurship. We continue to work closely with the
countries of Southeast Europe, our European Allies, and the international
community as the region moves towards European integration. Much progress has
been made since Milosevic presided over wars, ethnic cleansing, and the forced
displacement of approximately four million people. But U.S. engagement in the
region - in partnership with our European Allies - will be needed for some
years to come.
Regional Stability: Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Caucasus, Baltics
Outside the Balkans, we are promoting regional stability in other areas. In
Cyprus, we have strongly supported the efforts of the UN Secretary General to
achieve a settlement before Cyprus signs the EU accession treaty April 16 so
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would enjoy the benefits of EU membership.
We were deeply disappointed that the Secretary General's talks with the two
leaders in The Hague did not result in an agreement to put his plan to referenda
in both communities. We regret in particular that Mr. Denktash refused to allow
the Turkish Cypriots to decide for themselves on their future. Despite this
setback, the U.S. remains committed to seeking a just and durable settlement to
the Cyprus problem.
In Northern Ireland, we wholeheartedly support the UK and Ireland in their
efforts to push the peace process to a new level of stability. Prime Ministers
Blair and Ahern have just concluded marathon sessions in this regard with the
parties. Northern Ireland Assembly elections have been rescheduled from May 1 to
May 29 to give time for reflection and discussion within the parties and
communities. We urge the leaders, communities, and people of Northern Ireland to
seize this opportunity to build on the success of the Good Friday Agreement.
In the Caucasus, the United States serves as a Co-Chair along with France and
Russia of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this role, the U.S. continues to pursue
actively a comprehensive, mutually acceptable settlement to the conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijian over Nagorno-Karabakh. With presidential elections in
both countries this year, neither side currently is willing to make the
politically difficult compromises necessary to negotiate a peace agreement.
However, the Co-Chairs continue their efforts in the hope that the Armenian and
Azerbaijani leaderships can find the political will needed to reach a permanent
solution to this conflict.
Regarding the conflict in Abkhazia, the U.S., as a member of the UN Secretary
Generals Friends of Georgia Group (FOG), continues to work with France,
Germany, Russia, and the UK to pursue a comprehensive, negotiated settlement
that respects Georgias territorial integrity.
At the other corner of Europe, we have been promoting regional cooperation in
Northern Europe under the Northern Europe Initiative and the U.S. Baltic
Charter. Active U.S. engagement in Northern Europe will continue as the Baltic
States move into NATO and the EU and the region becomes more prosperous and
secure. We are crafting an updated U.S. approach that recognizes much has been
achieved in the Nordic-Baltic area through multilateral cooperation, and builds
on this success. We anticipate focussing on three major substantive areas:
political security, healthy societies/healthy neighborhoods, and our trade,
investment, economic and business ties.
Global Issues
As NATO and other European institutions enlarge, we have been acutely aware that
a Europe whole, free, and at peace can function only if it is truly a community
of shared values. For that reason, the United States has pressed hard for
continuing progress on issues left unresolved from the Holocaust, World War II,
and the communist era. We have encouraged property restitution, we recently
assumed the Chair in Office of the International Task Force on Holocaust
Education, and we have strongly supported the holding this year of an OSCE
Specialized Meeting on Antisemitism.
Enhanced defense and security cooperation and intelligence sharing must be
buttressed by societies committed to democratic principles such as those in the
Final Act in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A number of
European countries have concluded agreements with us under Article 98 of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), ensuring that U.S. citizens would not be
surrendered to the ICC. Moreover, we are continuing efforts with our
trans-Atlantic partners to address problems that respect no borders, such as
HIV/AIDS and infectious disease, narcotics trafficking and environmental
degradation.
We are working with our partners in Europe and Eurasia to combat the growing
problem of trafficking in persons. This grave, transnational human crime is
something we can only eliminate by working together. Governments from Western
Europe to Central Asia have passed important legislation to outlaw trafficking
and have cooperated with each other on the prosecution of these traffickers. We
are also encouraging prevention of trafficking through public awareness and
protection of victims, both in destination countries and upon return to home
countries. We have encouraged governments and NGO's - both integral partners in
this fight - to share expertise and resources to respond to the criminal aspect
of this tragedy as well as the needs of the victims. Most recently, we concluded
the congressionally mandated international conference on sex trafficking here in
Washington, D.C. Over 300 participants from the region attended.
Success in addressing transnational problems is more important than ever in
pursuing Americas trans-Atlantic agenda. Stable countries able to withstand
terrorist and other threats are based on respect for the rule of law, human
rights, religious freedom, and open media. Stable countries have vibrant civil
societies. They are committed to the principles of free market economies.
Resources
On the management side, we are also addressing the needs of our diplomats who
represent us overseas. Appropriate and secure facilities are critical to
operational success. We continue our work with the Bureau of Overseas Building
Operation to press forward with building projects in our region. In FY03 we
expect that four New Embassy Compounds will be occupied and four new projects
initiated. As our nations priorities and policies develop and change, it is
essential that adequate funding be made available to allow flexibility in our
building plans. Rightsizing and controlling growth are an integral part of our
facility planning process.
As we further engage on the war on terrorism and as the number of EU and NATO
members and aspirants continues to grow, Mission activities and workloads
increase commensurately. Through the Secretarys Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
(DRI), additional staff are being deployed to posts throughout the region. In
January the DRI provided 23 positions for EUR, and we expect to receive
additional positions when the FY03 phase of the DRI is fully implemented.
We have a highly dedicated group of people working in our missions. They are
keenly aware that their contributions to promote U.S. interests are important,
particularly during these challenging times. Heightened worldwide tensions have
increased the need for contingency planning and actions, taxing already strained
resources. Despite facing greater personal security concerns for themselves and
their families, employee morale overseas is good. It is essential, however, that
we continue to support our staff and their families with improved workplaces and
housing and through incentives and other means of recognition.
The entire State Department is carrying out this important work around the
world. To do the job effectively, we need adequate resources. I appreciate your
taking the time to listen to my testimony today, and I will be pleased to
address your questions.
NEWSLETTER
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