Military

The Future of Transatlantic Relations—A View from Germany

STATEMENT
Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Europe
US House of Representatives
Washington, DC

Hearing on the Future of Transatlantic Relations—A View from Europe
Testimony of Dieter Dettke
Executive Director, Washington Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Tuesday, June 17, 2003
 

INTRODUCTION

For Germany, a country in the center of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance has always been and will continue to be a crucial security lifeline.  Precisely because of US-leadership after World War II, the Atlantic Alliance provided protection without submission and today: NATO is still alive, whereas the Soviet empire collapsed and the Warsaw Pact is gone.  Freedom and common values—democracy and human rights in particular—just as much as a common threat have kept the Alliance together in the past despite political differences and economic conflicts.  As a result, Germany is united and Europe is whole and free today.  This remarkable, historically unique achievement of the West is also a solid foundation for a European-American partnership in the future despite the deep rift over the war in Iraq. As far as Germany is concerned the transatlantic relationship is not heading for separation. To be sure we will have to address a number of differences beyond the Iraq issue but they are manageable. The long-term prospects for the transatlantic relationship are actually quite good.  There are a number of global and transnational issues that can best be addressed in a joint European and American effort: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, trade, development, climate change and energy just to name a few.  In view of the new threats and different security requirements after September 11, NATO will have to make adjustments too, but there is no reason to believe that the alliance will not be able to succeed in taking on a common agenda in the future.

A good start to overcome the transatlantic rift has already been made.  The unanimous vote in the UNSC for Res. 1483 and the lifting of UN-sanctions against Iraq is an opening for European-American cooperation in the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq.  Fortunately, the war was short and not too costly as far as loss of human life is concerned.  This will help in the difficult task of building the foundations of a liberal democracy in Iraq.  Immediately after the war began, on March 20, 2003, despite his opposition to the use of military force in the conflict with Iraq Chancellor Schröder committed Germany

He also expressed his willingness to support the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq under a UN-umbrella.  Resolution 1483 which Germany supported is now the legal foundation for the international community to contribute to reconstruction and institution building in Iraq.

I

Robert Kagan’s advice that it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world is probably a good hypothesis to start with in order to find out how deep the transatlantic rift is in reality.  For it follows from his realist’s school argument that artificial disagreements should also be ruled out.  It is true that we had difficulties before the war in Iraq and these differences also reflect larger issues such as a changing pattern of attitudes and values.  The Iraq conflict revealed that we do have a conflict of world order concepts.  Europe has indeed reached a post-national stage in its history and is quite willing to pool its potential and to live with rules that chip away at individual national sovereignty. But Europe is not an empire and still far away from common power, let alone power projection. 

Robert Kagan is right to point out the differences between European and American thinking with regard to world order concepts, in particular the European preference for policies of persuasion rather than coercion.[1]  However, the concept of power and weakness can also be misleading because it suggests a permanence of divergence that is not necessarily warranted.  A closer, more detailed look at the structure of European and American power reveals that Europe is not all about weakness and America is not all about strength.  Even though the United States is by far the strongest military power ever, with a global reach far beyond any empire in history, and is dominant not only politically but also culturally, the US is no less vulnerable in economic terms than Europe or any other economic power.  Whereas military power can be controlled nationally, economic power is beyond full national control. Economic power relies on markets and therefore is much more amorphous and less tangible than military might.  Europe is in the same league as the United States on the level of economic power and to some degree even capable of matching US power. Finally, under the conditions of globalization, quite a number of issues are transnational in nature (the environment, drugs, crime, trafficking in persons) and inevitably need international cooperation for successful solutions.  Although the US can go it alone militarily, it is much more difficult to achieve American economic objectives unilaterally. 

A closer look at the growing European-American values gap also reveals that it is important not to dramatize the differences.  These differences do exist. One only needs to examine differing opinions on social issues, religion, patriotism, family values and sexual orientation.  How much social safety should the government provide?  How to protect the environment?  How to take care of the poor? Should homosexuality be accepted?  How much religious tolerance are we willing to accept?  What about minorities?  The answers to these questions in the US and Europe can differ quite strongly, but in most cases it is more a matter of degree, not principle.  This is even true for the death penalty, which is often cited as one of the most fundamental value differences.  To be sure, a large majority of Europeans is against the death penalty, but the number of people in Europe and the US favoring or rejecting the death penalty is not totally different.  Many Americans have very similar concerns about the death penalty.  Our legal systems differ, but there is no clash of civilizations within the Atlantic Alliance as some have claimed.[2]  In a pluralistic society value clashes are more or less a built in phenomenon.  They are normal.

Add to this the broad areas of value commonality including:

and it is obvious that our differences emanate from a common foundation, and they should be manageable even if at times our interests and values collide.  One example of colliding values is the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The American opposition to the International Criminal Court is hard for Europeans to understand.  They believe that in this case the radical protection of national sovereignty is excessive.  Europeans see the ICC as an institution, which will help create and maintain civility in an era of globalization.

II

From a German perspective opposition to the war in Iraq is a legitimate but limited disagreement with the United States.  It is a policy issue and does not affect the German-American friendship.  The differences began to surface in the spring and summer of 2002 when the German media—often reflecting the domestic debate in the United States at the time—took up the issue of a potential war in Iraq. This occurred during an election year in both countries: German national elections and US mid-term elections.  Election pressures are not the best communication devices. 

It is important to remember that UNSC Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 led to an alliance consensus to disarm Iraq on the basis of a multilateral process administered in the UN Security Council.  However one interprets the quality of this consensus, the Alliance was able to find common ground at this critical juncture. Why it fell apart in the early months of 2003 is the crucial question, which Europeans and Americans will certainly answer differently. 

The German case is unique.  There are many reasons why Germany is so reluctant to use military force, the strongest one being our own history of warfare, militarization, and ultimately German responsibility for WWII and the Holocaust.  Fifty-five million people died as a result.  For a German of my generation to think of war is to think of catastrophe.  This is another important difference to consider in the difficult debate in Germany and the US about the use of force.  During the last decade Germany has come a long way from its civilian power paradigm to a more active policy of engagement commensurate with Germany’s economic and political weight in Europe.  Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer, both men with quite pacifist pasts, prepared Germany for the use of force in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. German public opinion, like almost everywhere in Europe, was reluctant to use military force.  Chancellor Schröder had to go through a vote of confidence in the German Bundestag. The country finally supported his policy course because in both cases fundamental values were at stake:  humanitarian values in Kosovo and existential values in Afghanistan in the fight against international terrorism. 

Only force could help avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo where Serb armed forces used violence against the predominantly Muslim civilian population of Albanian origin.  To stand by and let this happen, as had happened before in Srebrenica and other places in the former Yugoslavia, was neither a politically acceptable nor morally justifiable option.  Kosovo was the first time since WWII that German combat forces participated in a major military operation and the Bundeswehr is still present in Kosovo in fulfillment of a peacekeeping mission. 

Only military force was able to bring the perpetrators of September 11 to justice who were responsible for an apparently civilian, but in essence really a war-like catastrophe.  Traditional police forces and the instruments of law enforcement were utterly insufficient in a country ruled by the Taliban, an extremist and fundamentalist Muslim regime dominated by the same terror organization that planned and executed the September 11 attacks. For this reason Germany decided to participate in this existential conflict, again with substantial military forces. As part of several military operations, Germany has committed about 9,000 troops to the fight against international terrorism:

Together with KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia and Concordia in Macedonia, Germany’s military commitment is not irrelevant. In fact it is the second largest deployment of troops abroad after the US.  In addition to this, Germany has a substantial capacity for post conflict civilian reconstruction.  This capacity played quite an important role in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Serbia, where both the German government and German non-governmental organizations helped in the necessary reconstruction effort, including the strengthening of civil society institutions.

During the Iraq war Germany kept all its commitments and obligations as a member of the Atlantic Alliance:

Europe was quite willing to participate in the common task of disarming Iraq.  What divided Europe into “old” and “new” as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested—not without condescension, if not even contempt—is in reality a demonstration of the impact of the coalition of the willing-concept in Europe.  It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is going to divide Europe on a permanent basis.  The strong support for the EU in a recent referendum in Poland and the Czech Republic indicates that Europe remains a coveted objective not only for these two countries, but also for those who disagreed with France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the core European countries opposing the war.  The lesson from its failure to come to a joint decision on Iraq is that Europe should not have to make a choice between the Atlantic Alliance and Europe.  German foreign policy so far always succeeded in bridging its commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation—essential for European integration—with Germany’s Atlantic orientation.  Ever since the Franco-German Treaty when German Social Democrats added an Atlantic preamble to the Elysée Treaty of 1963 between Adenauer and de Gaulle, a key role for Germany was to prevent a collision between Europe’s foreign policy ambitions and American policy and interests.  A better understanding  of Germany’s role in Europe, particularly vis a vis France would have helped to avoid the kind of collision that unfolded in late January 2003 when France, Germany and Russia, up to this point rather loosely connected in their opposition to the war in Iraq, firmed up their opposition in view of the massive military build up in the Gulf region.  In view of the size of US and British forces, in combination with open calls for regime change, this strategy in the perception of many Europeans seemed to make war the only possible outcome of the UN-disarmament process.  How much room there was for American foreign policy to influence the position of France, Germany and Russia in the ongoing UN-process in an open question.  Some commentators—on both sides—do not even exclude bad faith from the beginning.  I disagree.  Judging from available facts from today’s perspective this is not the case and in essence it is a mean spirited attack on the transatlantic partnership.  In theory a compromise was possible, yet none was reached. 

Differences over the correct policy in the case of Iraq will most likely persist.  France, Germany and Russia will probably remain convinced that a policy mix of:

could have been effective if given a chance.  Containment worked in the case of the Soviet Union.  In the case of Iraq, containment could have been successful in conjunction with enhanced weapons inspections—particularly if the US would have put its full weight and commitment behind such a strategy. 

Arms control enforcement below the level of war but in combination with pressure on the regime of Saddam Hussein would also have contributed to indigenous regime change, if not immediately, then long-term.  Unfortunately, the UN Security Council did not get a chance to prove its effectiveness in implementing arms control stipulations.  Arms control inspections will be an important part of any future non-proliferation policy.  North Korea and Iran could be cases where the UN Security Council might have to play a key role again.  The German government was also convinced that without war we would have had a better chance to prevent terrorist attacks and to protect our citizens at home and abroad.  In fact, attacks of al-Quaeda or its networks continued after September 11, for example in Djerba, Tunisia; Bali, Indonesia; Riadh, Saudi Arabia; Casablanca, Morocco; and most recently in Kabul, Afghanistan.  The war against terror as of today is far from being won.  The following concerns are also shared by many Americans:

III

In US government circles as well as in the media the concern was that during the German election campaign in the spring and summer of 2002 the Iraq issue was often discussed with anti-American overtones, and led to a new wave of anti-Americanism in Germany.  There is no widespread anti-Americanism in Germany, but a strong anti-war sentiment.  This is illustrated by the fact that more than 200,000 people showed solidarity with the US at the Brandenburg Gate immediately after the attacks of September 11.  And less than twelve months later you saw many people in Germany, Europe and all over the world demonstrate against a war in Iraq. 

Anti-Americanism in Germany has never been a serious or long-term problem despite major policy differences such as the war in Vietnam in the 1970’s or the Missile Crisis in the 1980’s, when it was often difficult to distinguish between legitimate criticism of US policies and anti-Americanism.  Germany is still one of the most pro-American countries in Europe.  Two thirds of the German population or more would still say that they like Americans.  But this generally positive attitude towards America has seen some dramatic changes.  In the past, the vast majority of Germans believed the United States to be the most important partner for Germany.  The US was always seen as more important than any other country, including France.  Since 2001, the number of Germans who see the US as the most important partner has declined from 58 percent of the population in October 2001 to 47 percent in June 2003. In contrast, the numbers for the same question for France have increased from 36 percent to 43 percent.  In May 2002, 88 percent of the German population still believed the relationship between Germany and the US to be good.  Only 9 percent believed it to be bad.  In June 2003 a majority of Germans, 56 percent, believed relations were bad and only 39 percent believed they were good.[3] 

The most recent polls of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, published in June 2003 confirm this fundamental change.  Key developments in the Pew Research Center study of June 2003 conducted from April 28-May 15, 2003 in the US, Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere are:

Seventy-six percent in France, 62 percent in Turkey, 62 percent in Spain, 61 percent in Italy and 57 percent in Germany believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past.  Of course, these numbers are snapshots of reality, but a reality nevertheless.  They can change, but it will take new initiatives to make them change.

IV

It is important not to lose sight of the real issue the West will continue to face in the future:  How to deal with and ultimately defeat terrorism.  Transnational catastrophic terrorism is a new threat, which demonstrated its deadly force and determination on September 11, 2001 with the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in Washington causing the death of more than 3,000 innocent people, a greater loss of human life than the military attack on Pearl Harbor.  Terrorist attacks and mass killings by international terror networks using the language of religion for political purposes threaten the entire Western civilization and must be resisted for existential reasons.  In this long and difficult struggle Germany stands shoulder to shoulder with the United States and Jean-Marie Colombani spoke for Europe and the civilized world when he said, “We are all Americans.”[5] This initial commonality after September 11 unfortunately lost ground with the European-American disagreement over Iraq.  Many Europeans in Germany, France and elsewhere, including in European countries whose governments supported the war in Iraq, did not see the conflict with Iraq as part of the war on terror.  If ties between al-Quaeda and the Iraqi government had been proven, Europe would not have hesitated to ultimately support military action. 

The existential fight against terrorism is a complex issue and it will take a long time to free mankind of this new totalitarian threat.  But we have to realize that this threat is very different from the totalitarian threat of the Cold War:

This conflict is much more about the hearts and minds of people than the previous one and it needs to be fought on many levels: politically, economically, culturally and if necessary, but not predominantly, also on a military level. 

To be sure, Europe shares the serious concern about weapons of mass destruction with the United States and in some cases if proliferation continues and even increases, European territory will be at risk too.  That is why particularly non-nuclear European states put so much emphasis on an effective non-proliferation system.  It remains to be seen whether weapons of mass destruction will be found in Iraq.  If the search turns out to be negative, a crucial US argument for the war in Iraq would collapse and reinforce the concerns about the lack of legal authority and legitimacy to use force against Iraq.

V

The strategic reorientation and adjustment of the United States after September 11 allowing asymmetric conflicts, including terrorist attacks, to be addressed more effectively is quite understandable.  In Europe a strategic reassessment is also in the making.  The new German defense guidelines are an example of a new strategic thinking beyond the Cold War and in sync with the new threats, particularly asymmetric warfare like the September 11 attacks, transnational crime, drug smuggling and trafficking in persons.  For the United States, the new strategic focus seems to be the arc of instability that reaches from Latin America, through parts of Africa, particularly northern Africa, the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia.  This could have consequences for US troop stationing in Germany. 

The Bundeswehr now focuses on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory.  International terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation are now major concerns of the German armed forces.  All these issues, according to the new defense guidelines, can only be countered by a comprehensive security concept and a global collective security system.  In fact, the German defense minister stated that German defense now begins in the mountains of Afghanistan.  The United States is not alone in its strategic realignment and some of the European adjustments are quite compatible with American efforts.  However, there is no way that European defense expenditures would ever match the US defense budget dollar for dollar.  It is also not necessary.  More important will be to undertake the necessary restructuring and transformation demanded by the new threats.  To increase defense spending over the next few years will be difficult, given Germany’s and other European countries’ financial constraints.

But there is also concern in Europe about the direction of the new strategic doctrine. By adopting a doctrine of preemption, meaning that the traditional concept of self-defense, which relied on deterrence, no longer applies for the United States, America seems to shed basic principles of international law.  Waiting to be attacked—keeping the experience of the September 11 and the devastating consequences of catastrophic terrorism in mind—is, as President Bush stated, indeed bad security policy and strategy.  However, without changing the Charter of the United Nations the legal consequences of the doctrine of preemption would be quite dramatic.  Article II (4) of the Charter of the United Nations clearly states:

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

It would be a good idea to initiate a reform process of international law as well as the UN system so that the new threats, particularly terrorist threats, could be dealt with more effectively.  The US decision to use military force against Iraq without a UN mandate is often defended with the argument that in Kosovo—knowing a UN mandate could not be obtained—NATO did intervene.  This is not quite the same situation and does not necessarily support the argument that an intervention in Iraq should have been supported by America’s European allies.  Not only was the rationale for war in the case of Iraq different. It was also a different category of war.  Kosovo is a case of coercive diplomacy.  Iraq is a classical war.

After WWII the international community considered the UN-ban on wars of aggression as an important step forward to a more civilized world order.  Preemption, however, borders on illegality. One can safely say that prevention in general is part of the concept of self-defense.  The meaning of prevention is obviously an act to remove a clear and present danger, an example being the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility of Osirak in 1981.  Preemption, however, is at best an act of putative self-defense, e.g. taking action on the assumption of a threat that might not even be real.  Putative self-defense is a dangerous concept, because it removes all practical legal hurdles and inhibitions to wage war.  Europe is not against prevention.  In fact prevention in a civilian context is an important development tool.  European powers have demonstrated their willingness to act preventively, for example in the case of Kosovo. Our differences reside in the concept of preemption.  It would be better not to adopt a questionable concept of putative self-defense without at the same time changing the UN Charter.

Another even more important issue is that by adopting a policy of creating coalitions of the willing depending on which issue is at stake, the United States creates a dual world order where the UN, NATO or other multilateral institutions can be replaced at any given moment by a coalition of the willing.  The result of a wider use of this concept would mean that a coalition of the willing can be super-imposed upon the UN, NATO or any other multilateral institution.  Europeans, after many devastating conflicts, came to the conclusion that to give away the right to wage war—the right of self defense notwithstanding—is a major step forward and not an encroachment upon national sovereignty.  By replacing permanent allies with ad hoc coalitions of the willing the United States would give up an enormous amount of normative power—rule setting capacity or soft power—for a narrow purpose.[6]  Coalitions of the willing—willingly or not—will waste away existing permanent institutions.  As a result, maximum flexibility for the United States would come with a high price.  It is not only the loss of American normative power that is at stake here.  Maximum flexibility for the US can also be a source of new instability.

VI

It is not difficult to put together an agenda for transatlantic cooperation.  In the recent past, several think tanks and experts both in Europe and the US have made a number of suggestions for renewed and strengthened transatlantic cooperation.  The G8 AIDS initiative launched at the most recent G8 meeting in Evian, France is also an agenda item for transatlantic cooperation.  And there are more, for example in the area of energy policy, particularly renewable energy.  Another idea is to create a whole new architecture for the transatlantic relationship ushering in a new Transatlantic Charter.  In order to solve the current transatlantic crisis architectural designs, however, should not be our first priority.  There are many urgent problems that need to be addressed.  In addition to Iraq a primary concern is the stability of Afghanistan.  Stability in this war-torn country is far from assured.  It might be necessary to increase substantially the security commitment of the anti-terror coalition.  So far only the city of Kabul enjoys a measure of protection that allows the current provisional government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai to function.  The rest of the country is still not at peace.  And even in Kabul, al-Quaeda attacks are possible.  Warlords are still a real threat.  Germany and the Netherlands have taken over the leadership of ISAF.  This will end in August after which the lead function will be handed over to NATO and NATO assets.  The open question is how to create long-term stability in Afghanistan.  The Provincial Reconstruction Trams (PRT) may be the answer to this question.  Germany sent a team to Afghanistan to address the question of a possible German participation in the PRT.  A decision will be made on the basis of the team’s report after its return.

The Alliance potential could also be brought into play for the necessary peacekeeping tasks in Iraq under a UN-umbrella.  Since the Prague Summit an evolutionary process is underway within NATO to strengthen the European pillar.  This evolutionary process is essential in order to apply NATO’s full weight in the long struggle for peace and stability in Europe and beyond.  The EU will take over a number of peacekeeping operations that no longer require the hardware of a military alliance.  Europe’s hybrid security and defense forces can step in where NATO’s military assets are no longer required or are needed elsewhere.  The first step in that direction took place in Macedonia where NATO’s responsibility has been seamlessly transferred into the hands of EU forces.  Bosnia is a potential next transfer opportunity from NATO to EU forces.  An EU operation, backed by a UN mandate, is taking place in the Congo today where a genocide of major proportion happened without the international community even taking notice.  Yet it ranks as one of the worst cases of genocide since 1945.

The EU is now on its way to creating the first modern constitution of a confederation with strong institutions.  This unique post-national effort of pooling national sovereignties is in itself an important contribution to peace and stability in Europe.  The United States should recognize the enormous potential for stability and economic progress embodied in the work of the European Convention and the process of enlargement and should take the advice not only from Europe, but also from many Americans: let Europe be Europe.

In a unipolar world, multipolarity can hardly be a threat for the United States.  Today, multipolarity is at best an aspiration or a preference for a different world order.  Whether multipolarity can create a more stable and secure world order than the present system is an open question.  Not every multipolar system must be by definition more stable than unipolarity.  More importantly, multipolarity is the result of a process of power distribution.  It is impossible to claim multipolarity and it is important to realize that multipolarity is not a question of will, but rather an issue of capability.  For the stability of an international system—multipolar or unipolar—multilateralism is the more important principle.  Without multilateralism, NATO and the UN cannot function and a European Confederation would not work either.  Rules are essential for stability and so are permanent allies.  This is what the US as a superpower should be interested in, too.

CONCLUSION

On April 29, shortly after the military operations in Iraq ended and the transition to civilian restructuring began, four European countries—France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, core participants of the original integration process in Europe—met to consider their own situation and at the same time the situation of Europe after the war in Iraq.  This “Belgian Chocolate Summit”—as it was nicknamed in the press—did not take place under the best circumstances, time-wise or otherwise.  Its background was a mixture of high politics and low politics.  Low politics was involved because of pending elections in Belgium and a perfect opportunity to help the sitting government add to its prestige by holding a high-level meeting with enormous media attention.  In this respect the meeting was indeed successful.  The high politics aspect was much more important, though, because this small caucus meeting of like-minded governments favoring deep integration including a European Security and Defense Union was an excellent opportunity to provide the European Convention with some basic concepts for deeper integration, particularly in the area of defense.  In the US, this meeting of the four countries which opposed the war raised quite a few eyebrows.  The assumption was that this core Europe would try to design a European foreign policy not based on Atlanticism but anti-Atlantic Gaullism.  The fear in Washington was indeed that the Four would be willing to give up the strategic partnership with the United States.  The communiqué, however, states quite the opposite, namely that “the transatlantic partnership is a fundamental strategic priority for Europe,” and continues, “that this partnership is a precondition for security and world peace.”

Chancellor Schröder sees the initiatives that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg started on April 29, 2003, not as an effort of decoupling, but rather as an effort of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance through a more efficient European pillar.  Despite much American concern, it is safe to say that the strategic objective of the Four is the strengthening of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.  It is the old two-pillar concept first suggested by President Kennedy that drives the ambitions of the Four, and this is not a bad concept for a strong Atlantic Alliance in the future.  For it is true that we do not have too much America.  We have too little Europe in the Alliance.  The revival of the old idea of a European Security and Defense Union is hardly a strategic challenge for the United States.  On the contrary, it will emphasize compatibility with NATO activities, including Rapid Reaction forces.  The only new message from the “Belgian Chocolate Summit” is the creation of a nucleus of collective capacity for planning purposes of the European Union.  It remains to be seen how far this nucleus will advance in reality.  The transatlantic context of all European operations—if the plan of the Four is going to be implemented—will be maintained. The Nice Summit created the foundation for NATO compatibility of European Forces.  If the results of NATO’s Prague Summit are implemented and Europe gets its constitution for the enlarged European Union, the Alliance will be much better prepared for the future and it will be a change for the better.