Military

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Europe, thank you for this opportunity to discuss United States priorities in Europe. I will try to do that, sharing the perspective of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, I would first like to congratulate you on your election as President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly. Your active participation in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since 1987 has been a powerful reflection of America’s commitment to NATO. Your leadership has catalyzed numerous Assembly policies – many of which have been adopted by NATO. NATO enlargement is but one important example.

At the outset, let me step back and reaffirm the underlying principles that are the foundation of this Administration’s defense relationship with Europe.

First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. Both America and Europe need each other. An undivided Europe, whole and free, and allied with the United States is America’s natural partner in global affairs.

I realize, of course, that there are differences between the United States and a few of our European Allies regarding how best to handle Iraq’s persistent defiance of United Nations resolutions mandating the disarmament of Iraq. These differences are not to be minimized, but they do not define the totality of the relationship between Europe and the United States nor the strategic imperatives of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the same threats, and they both face the same opportunities in the changing global security environment. The nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist organizations, and terrorist states present an urgent and lethal danger to both North America and Europe. Cooperation with Europe is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, communications, and sources of financial and material support. Despite differences with some Allies on Iraq, I am pleased to report that all our European Allies and partners are making important contributions in our undertaking to take down the scourge of terrorism.

Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe. Moreover, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of a forward presence of United States military forces. Today, approximately 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are deployed in Europe, and they enhance both America’s and Europe’s security.

It is with the foregoing in mind that I wish briefly to update the Committee on the Department of Defense’s activities in Europe, particularly those concerning NATO, the Balkans, and Russia.

Those who have recently questioned America’s commitment to Europe and NATO only need to look to the Global War on Terrorism. The relevance of this relationship is demonstrated each day by the fact that U.S. and European soldiers are sharing dangerous risks together in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. The swiftness with which this coalition brought an end to the Taliban regime and introduced freedom back into Afghanistan is rooted in over fifty years of NATO joint planning, training, staffing and operations that can be found no where else in the world.

Over its years of existence, NATO has repeatedly adapted to changes in the international security environment, and it will have an important role to play in the future. This year NATO took the historic step to support the lead nations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a step that brings the Alliance well out of traditional geographic domain.

At the Prague Summit last November, Allied heads of state responded to the tremendous change we are experiencing in Europe’s strategic landscape and the global security environment. They approved an historic agenda featuring the extension of NATO membership to seven Central European democracies, a new focused capabilities initiative, and strengthened relations with Russia, Ukraine and NATO Partners.

In Warsaw in June 2001, President Bush declared: "I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings...As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom." The decision by NATO’s Heads of State and Government at Prague to invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to begin accession talks with the Alliance is an essential step towards a complete Europe.

The U.S. has been very supportive of the 7 NATO invitees. Our support is matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute. We are asking these 7 invitees to make difficult decisions regarding defense reform, involving increased defense spending and tough choices on personnel reductions and base closures. We will work closely with the invitees throughout the accession process and beyond, to accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities enabling them to become contributors to transatlantic security.

The next step in the accession process will be the signing of the accession protocols on March 26^th in Brussels. We hope that all 7 will have completed the necessary requirements to sign the protocols on that date.

Even prior to their accession into NATO, these 7 countries have been acting as de facto Allies through their contributions and participation in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, and ISAF. Without being exhaustive, I will give you some examples of their important contributions. All 7 have contributed forces to SFOR and KFOR. Bulgaria hosted U.S. KC-135 refueling aircraft; Lithuania deployed 37 Special Operations Forces personnel to Afghanistan; and Romania contributed a 400-man infantry battalion in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. To assist with ISAF, Estonia deployed 2 explosive detection dog teams; Latvia will send medical personnel; Slovakia deployed a 40-man engineering unit; and Slovenia has donated equipment to the Afghan National Army Training Project.

The door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants -- Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia -- are continuing through NATO’s Membership Action Plan to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the future goal of Ukraine’s complete integration into Europe. We must not allow Ukraine to remain outside of Europe’s political, economic, and security institutions.

Foreign Ministers from NATO and Ukraine met during the Prague Summit and agreed to a substantive action plan that includes goals in areas such as political, economic, and defense reform. On a bilateral basis, the U.S. continues to assist reform efforts within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The focus is on developing a professional force that is interoperable with U.S. and NATO forces.

The decision at the Prague Summit to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) will provide the Alliance with both a capability to deploy a force that can address the entire spectrum of NATO missions quickly, as well as focus capability improvements. We believe that, for the U.S. and its Allies to fight together effectively in NATO, the Alliance has a requirement for a credible force that is lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice (5-30 days). This force should be able to conduct forced entry into a hostile area. It should be self-sustaining, capable of fighting alone for 30 days. It should be able to serve as a stand-alone force or as an initial entry force that prepares a theater for follow-on forces.

Potential missions cover the spectrum of operations and could include: deployment as a stand-alone force that is reacting to an immediate crisis; deployment as a proactive force package, prepared to accept follow-on NATO forces; peacekeeping or peace support missions; or service as an initial entry force for a large-scale deliberate operation that secures lines of communication and points of debarkation and prepares a theater for force flow.

We have agreed to develop and implement the NRF with a view toward an initial operational capability for training of October 2004, and full operational capability by October 2006. The NRF will be commanded by a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters (HQ) which will be able to draw from a rotational pool of air, land, and maritime forces that can be available on short notice, be tailored for specific missions, and be able to deploy anywhere to conduct the full spectrum of operations as decided by the North Atlantic Council. The forces participating in an NRF rotation will be on a high state of readiness and will train together under the CJTF HQ that will command an actual operation. The forces that participate in the NRF rotations will be the first beneficiary of the new capabilities initiative. The NRF will become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats we face.

At the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment as part of the Alliance's continuing effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment. Individual Allies made political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control, and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions (PGMs) and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. In preparing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, particular attention was devoted to the potential offered by multinational projects and various forms of role sharing and role specialization. These mechanisms offer advantages in terms of cost effectiveness (e.g., through economies of scale) and also provide a way for smaller countries to make significant contributions in demanding capability areas that might otherwise be unaffordable to them.

Many of our European Allies have consistently failed to meet agreed upon NATO defense obligations. Failure by Allies to fulfill the Prague Capabilities Commitment would jeopardize the future success of the NRF. Allied contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment in order to be effective.

At Prague, Heads of State and Government approved the broad outline of a streamlined and more effective command structure. Specifically, NATO agreed to establish two new strategic-level commands, one operational and one functional.

The Allied Command for Transformation will be located in Norfolk, Virginia, close to U.S. Joint Forces Command so that we can better ensure that U.S. and European forces transform together. The Transformation Command will also have a footprint in Europe. The strategic commander for transformation should be responsible with Allied Command Operations for ensuring that NATO has a pool of forces available that is ready, deployable, sustainable and militarily capable to perform the full range of missions that may challenge the Alliance. A Senior Officials Group (SOG), established by Defense Ministers and co-chaired by myself and my counterpart from the Netherlands, has been making good progress in leading the effort to develop recommendations for NATO Defense Ministers approval at their meeting in June.

In response to the changing global environment, NATO has streamlined the previous "Cold War" command structure by eliminating unnecessary headquarters and creating a command structure that is deployable and capable of conducting joint operations. In the new structure, NATO will reduce the number of second level commands from 7 to 3. Third level commands will be reduced from 11 to 6. And the number of Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) will be reduced from 10 to 4 static and 2 deployable.

As the European Union has developed its Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the U.S. has worked to ensure it is done in a cooperative way, and results in Europeans providing more for Europe’s security, as we have urged for decades. A breakthrough for the NATO-EU relationship came last December, when the EU committed to terms for "participation" by the non-EU European NATO members in ESDP plans and operations. This cleared the way for NATO to finalize its long-proposed arrangements for the EU to use NATO planning, assets and commands. These arrangements, known as "Berlin-Plus," will serve important U.S. and NATO interests by anchoring EU planning and operations in NATO, avoiding wasteful EU duplication of NATO assets, and promoting ESDP compatibility with NATO capabilities and procedures.

In this connection, the EU has offered to take over NATO’s small military monitoring mission in Macedonia. Any transfer of NATO’s mission to the EU can only occur, however, once the NATO-EU arrangements are in place, to ensure the EU operation would be consistent with NATO command and control, and once NATO has decided to end this mission. There also needs to be Macedonian support for the mission and its objectives. (The current NATO operation does not include U.S. forces, although there are 17 U.S. personnel on staff at NATO HQ Skopje.)

U.S. forces have been engaged, together with our NATO Allies, in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans since 1995. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s military efforts in the Balkans -- SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo -- has been important. Having gone in together with our Allies, the President has committed that we will go out together as well. In this regard we have successfully accomplished most of the original military tasks. The stationing of our forces need not be indefinite. We seek to hasten the day when NATO's remaining forces can be withdrawn, while ensuring that the region does not return to conflict or become a safe haven or way station for terrorists. The key will be to provide better support for civilian governance and institutions, in particular by promoting the rule of law and apprehending persons indicted for war crimes and promoting economic growth. By doing so, we will break the cycle of dependency and allow the people of the Balkans to take responsibility for their own security.

In Bosnia, the original force deployed in 1995 consisted of 60,000 troops, with 20,000 Americans. Today, SFOR consists of roughly 12,000 troops from 36 nations, including about 1,800 Americans.

In Kosovo, the original force deployed in 1999 consisted of 47,000 troops, of whom 7,000 were American. Today, KFOR consists of roughly 27,000 troops from 34 nations, including about 3,000 Americans. Given the progress that has been made on the ground, further reductions in U.S. forces are anticipated this year as conditions continue to improve.

As the situation on the ground further improves, NATO and the U.S. will continue the forward looking transition from force deployments to more normal security cooperation activities and initiatives to cement integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures.

September 11th showed us that the United States and Russia have common threats and that both sides have much to gain from cooperation. We are making progress in confronting global challenges together. We now seek a broad relationship with Russia – one based not only on security issues, but also on cooperation on economic, political, technical, and scientific issues.

Our new strategic relationship with Russia is not based on an agreement or treaty, but is a change in the way we do business based on openness, cooperation in areas of common interest, and honest dialogue in areas where we disagree.

We won’t always agree, but this should not provoke a crisis in US-Russia relations. For example, we didn't agree on our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, but, contrary to the predictions of some, after we withdrew our relationship not only survived, but was strengthened by the candor and openness of our approach towards Russia.

There have been other positive developments between our two countries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has moved our nations toward a more flexible approach to strategic nuclear weapons reductions that is better suited to our relations. The U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security (CGSS) held its first meeting last fall. The meeting was held in Washington, D.C., in September 2002 between Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, and the Russian Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. This Group also met with President Bush and National Security Adviser Rice. The meeting allowed for high-level consultations on regional and security topics.

During their Summit last summer, President Bush and President Putin also agreed to look for ways to cooperate on missile defense. There is an ongoing working group on Missile Defense that was established at the CGSS meeting. The working group is exploring possible areas for missile defense cooperation as well as an expansion of our existing missile defense exercise program.

Despite progress in our relationship, Russia continues to pursue some policies contrary to U.S. interests, including: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive technologies and "gray arms" activities resulting from a failure to strengthen export-control regimes. Furthermore, we are opposed to violations of Georgian territorial sovereignty, and we continue to press Russia for a non-military, political solution in Chechnya.

The U.S. must try to reinforce positive developments and influence the strategic decisions that Russia will make. Thus, our security cooperation seeks to increase Russia’s understanding – particularly within its military -- that the United States does not pose a threat to its sovereign interests. A clear measure of the success of these efforts will be that Russia ceases developing strategies, plans, and capabilities that treat the United States as a probable adversary.

We have worked in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established last May, to improve security cooperation among Russia, our NATO Allies, and ourselves. Through the NRC, we seek security cooperation with Russia through practical, concrete projects. The NRC is focused on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness, combating terrorism, mil-to-mil cooperation, and civil emergency preparedness exercises.

Turkey

Turkey’s hesitation to cooperate fully with us as we prepare for possible war against Iraq is disappointing, but does not irreparably damage our relationship. The U.S. and Turkey have a deep, longstanding relationship – especially in the defense area -- which we expect will continue both bilaterally and through NATO. Turkey has made significant contributions to other aspects of the Global War on Terrorism, including leading Phase II of ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The existence of this democratic, Islamic state straddling Europe and Asia is important to the security of the U.S. and NATO, and we are working with our NATO Allies to provide the appropriate defensive measures as requested by Turkey.

U.S. Force Presence in Europe

When the President asked Mr. Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he asked him to review our defense posture and circumstances around the world. DoD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for reorienting the U.S. global military posture in light of changes in the international security environment, the war on terrorism, and DoD's new strategy, particularly the imperative to deter forward in critical regions around the world. We have been examining our posture and presence broadly, across the globe, to include Europe, east Asia, central Asia, and southwest Asia. This work is ongoing.

While reviews of our defense posture have been part of the normal routine for decades, the security environment has changed -- especially in Europe. The nexus of terrorist states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and the global reach of terrorist organizations all make it prudent for serious study of the best use of our military forces in Europe.

Our approach is to: establish a presence appropriate to each region; increase capabilities to act promptly and globally in response to crises; and strengthen the command structures to support our strategy. Any presence changes would put a premium on flexibility and forward access, not new, large, permanent bases. We recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and will consult closely with Congress, Allies, NATO, and relevant partners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you or the Committee have.