Military

STATEMENT BY IAN BRZEZINSKI

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

APRIL 29, 2003

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to take part in this hearing on NATO enlargement.

We are grateful for the leadership that you and this Committee have provided on this matter - leadership that has contributed significantly to fulfilling the vision of a Europe that is undivided, secure and free.

When Assistant Secretary of Defense Crouch testified before this Committee on March 13th, he thoroughly reviewed the results of the Prague Summit, to include the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force, the Command Structure Review, and the invitations to seven NATO aspirants. Since that hearing, NATO took the important decision to take on the command, coordination and planning of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan later this year. This was a historic step that brought NATO operations well out of their traditional geographic domain and underscored the important role NATO can and should play in global affairs.

Today, I would like to share with you the Department of Defense's evaluation of the seven countries invited to join NATO and how their membership in NATO will enhance the Alliance’s security and military capability.

On March 26th, the accession protocols for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed in Brussels. This is an important milestone in this round of enlargement, and I think it might be useful to review principles that serve as the foundation for our support for enlargement and more broadly our security relationship with Europe. While Assistant Secretary Crouch reviewed these principles last month with the Committee, they are so integral to the rationale and vision behind enlargement that they bear repeating.

The first principle is a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. NATO enlargement is the cornerstone of that vision. An undivided Europe, whole and free, will be a better partner of the United States in global affairs.

The second principle is that the United States and Europe exist in the same global security environment. Before them lie the same opportunities, challenges and dangers. Of the latter, none is more urgent and lethal than the nexus of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist organizations and terrorist states. Cooperation with Europe is vital to the global endeavor underway to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, their communications and their sources of financial and material support.

The third principle is that NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for military cooperation with Europe, and NATO promotes among its members common defense policies and doctrines and integrated force structures. This level of military integration is found nowhere else in the world.

Finally, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the forward presence of the United States military. In fact, U.S. forces forward deployed in Europe were some of the first to take up positions in the war against Iraq. It is with these principles in mind that we advocate NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s Open Door policy.

Our support for the NATO aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, and more recently in the war against Iraq.

What can we draw from these experiences? First, over the last decade, these seven invitees have been acting as de facto allies. They have demonstrated by risking their own blood that they not only understand the responsibility of NATO membership, they embrace it. Second, these seven invitees bring real capabilities to the table. Indeed, together the seven add to NATO strengths over 200,000 troops in arms.

The NATO invitees all have niche capabilities and specialties that will allow them to contribute militarily to the Alliance immediately upon accession. In fact, the invitees are already contributing many of these niche capabilities, such as special operations forces, demining, and explosive ordnance disposal, to U.S. and NATO missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the Iraq theatre.

Moreover, through their contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans and in the global war on terrorism, their defense establishments have developed a better understanding of how NATO and NATO Allies conduct military operations. Clearly there is still much work to be done to bring their militaries up to the standards we expect of our NATO members. But my experience in working with these countries shaping and implementing their defense reform programs shows that they are making very good progress and will continue to do so.

Mr. Chairman, in the travels that I and my colleagues undertook to these democracies, we've looked at two questions. Will this candidate strengthen the Alliance's ability to protect and promote its security, values and interests? Can we be confident that this candidate’s commitment to democracy and the Alliance’s responsibilities and values will be enduring?

From my vantage point, I believe the answers to these questions is yes for all seven. This conclusion is based on their conduct as de facto allies, and it is based on the soundness of their defense reform programs, multi-year endeavors that provide insight into out-year plans and intentions.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide the Committee with some background on the defense reform efforts of each of the seven invitees. The President’s Report on these invitees, provided to the Committee in March, provides more detail on each country.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria has demonstrated its ability to operate with U.S. and Allied forces by contributing a light infantry company for security of HQ SFOR, deploying engineer and mechanized detachments in KFOR, and sending one transport aircraft to NATO Balkans operations. Bulgaria provided overflight and basing for six U.S. KC-135 tankers at Burgas for OEF and deployed a 32- man NBC detachment in ISAF. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, Bulgaria has provided 1 NBC company, overflight rights, and basing at Burgas for six U.S. KC-135 tankers.

Bulgaria expects to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense through 2007; it spent 3.13% in 2002 and 2.84 % in 2003. Its management of its defense resources has improved through the introduction of a sound Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). The types of niche contributions that Bulgaria would bring to NATO include: special operations forces, engineers, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense, helicopter and transport aviation, and mine-sweepers.

Bulgaria’s Reform Plan 2004, based on U.S. and NATO recommendations, foresees a smaller, more agile and mobile force structure, including a rapid reaction force able to respond to deployments within 30 days. Bulgaria is building up its command and control infrastructure with an integrated communications and intelligence information system, an Air Sovereignty Operations Center, and a National Military Command Center.

Further progress is required in establishing systems necessary to provide adequate protection of NATO classified information. Bulgaria is working closely with NATO authorities to complete these reforms in the coming months.

The illicit Terem arms-dealing scandal, which involved the attempted sale of dual-use military equipment to Syria in the fall of 2002, is of great concern to the United States. The Government of Bulgaria cooperated with the U.S. Government in the investigation of this case. Sofia continues to work on reforms that will preclude a repeat of these kinds of sales. The U.S. Government does not consider the Terem case to be closed and will continue to monitor closely the Terem investigation with the expectation that all individuals involved will be held fully accountable.

Estonia

Estonian forces deployed with the U.S. and NATO have included an infantry company that rotates with the other Baltic states in KFOR; a military police unit in KFOR in the Balkans; and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in ISAF in Afghanistan. Estonia has also offered specialized support units for humanitarian operations and a small security team for Operation Iraqi Freedom. These capabilities, as well as military divers, naval mine countermeasures, and cargo handlers, are all examples of niche capabilities that Estonia could contribute to the Alliance. Estonia expects to spend 2% of its GDP on defense though part of this goes to the Border Guard.

Estonia envisions shifting the priority away from territorial defense toward deployable, sustainable forces that can more effectively contribute to the full spectrum of Alliance missions. Under the reform plan, Tallinn is modernizing its tactical communications, continuing upgrades to its air surveillance radars, and improving an airfield to serve as an aerial port of debarkation (APOD). While collective training is currently at the company level, Estonia is developing battalion-plus exercises.

Latvia

Latvia has supported U.S. and NATO missions by rotating an infantry company with the other Baltic States in KFOR, maintaining military police and medical teams with the UK in KFOR, an EOD Team with Norway in the Balkans, and a medical team in ISAF. Riga has offered specialized support for peace enforcement and humanitarian operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Latvia has a legal commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defense from 2003-8, though a significant part of the defense budget goes to the Border Guard. Latvia can contribute niche contributions to NATO that include special operations forces, EOD, military police, naval mine countermeasures, military divers, and cargo handlers.

Riga’s security policy is guided by its National Security Concept and State Defense Concept, while a new Force Structure Review, focusing on a national brigade, is underway. Riga is making significant investment in communications and control structures, including a Joint Operational Command to direct land, maritime, and air operations, the procurement of new tactical radios, and the installation of new air surveillance radars. The Training and Doctrine Command took over all training centers in 2002, and is refining training done at the company level and developing battalion-and-higher training.

Lithuania

Lithuania’s participation in U.S. and NATO missions has included rotating an infantry company with the other Baltic states and maintaining an infantry platoon with the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in KFOR, providing NATO an AN-26 transport for Balkans support, and, in Afghanistan, deploying a special operations forces unit with the U.S. and deploying a medical team in ISAF. Vilnius has deployed medical and cargo handling teams for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lithuania spent 2.16% of its GDP on defense in 2002, though a significant part of this went to support the Border Guard and other non-defense institutions. Parliament has committed spending 2% of GDP on defense through 2004. To support NATO, Lithuania can provide niche contributions that include special operations forces, EOD, field medicine, naval mine countermeasure, and cargo handlers.

Lithuania is revising its Military Defense Strategy following adoption of the new National Security Strategy in May 2002. These strategies will shift the role of its Territorial Forces from combat to primarily host nation support. Much of Lithuania’s military reform effort has focused resources on those units dedicated to NATO responsibilities, including its Iron Wolf Brigade. Vilnius is upgrading its command, control, and communications (C3) with the establishment of a military communications network and acquisition of new air surveillance radars.

Romania

Romania has been involved with U.S. and NATO missions through deployment to the Balkans of 350 personnel -- engineer and military police detachments, an EOD platoon in SFOR, two infantry companies in KFOR, and one infantry battalion in SFOR. Romania deployed a 400-man infantry battalion, a military police platoon, and its C-130 aircraft to Afghanistan. Romanian forces fighting alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan were recognized by both the Secretary of Defense and fellow soldiers from the 82nd Airborne for their skills. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, Romania is providing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense/Consequence Management forces, overflight rights, and basing at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase for U.S. forces.

Romania’s current defense spending is 2.3% of GDP, and Bucharest is committed to at least 2% GDP through 2007. Romania’s niche contributions to NATO could include mountain troops, unmanned aerial vehicles, military police, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense.

Romania’s reform plan "Objective Force 2007," which incorporates U.S. and NATO defense recommendations, gives priority to improved interoperability and combat effectiveness of active and deployable forces. Bucharest is streamlining and modernizing its command, control, and communications (C3) arrangements through a functional Air Sovereignty Operations Center, the fielding of a NATO- compatible secure data management system. It is also moving its Navy headquarters to Bucharest from Constanta to integrate more fully its joint command, control, and communications (C3). Like Bulgaria, Romania is restructuring its military away from large, heavy Warsaw Pact-era forces toward smaller, light and more mobile units that will be better able to serve in NATO operations in the future.

Slovakia

Slovakia’s force contributions to U.S. and NATO missions have included an infantry company in KFOR, transport helicopters and a platoon in SFOR, an engineering platoon in Bagram, Afghanistan, and a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense team in Kuwait to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Slovakia is spending 2% of GDP on defense, with Parliamentary commitment to maintain a level of at least 1.9% of GDP. Slovakia’s niche contributions to NATO can include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense, special operations forces, construction engineering, humanitarian demining, and field medicine.

Slovakia’s reform efforts are guided by its Force 2010 defense plan, developed with the assistance of a retired U.S. general officer. Implementation of the plan is on track, with Parliament assuring needed financial backing. A centerpiece is the immediate reaction brigade, 5th Special Forces, which is being outfitted and trained for NATO-led operations. Slovakia installed a modern Air Sovereignty Operations Center, deployed new three-dimensional radars, and is improving the capacity for secure communications at all levels of military operations. Bratislava is making good use of U.S.-provided IMET and FMF for training, including English language training and officer professional development. Slovakia is making significant progress in personnel reform, especially in reducing senior officer ranks and establishing a competent NCO cadre.

To support U.S. and NATO missions, Slovenia provided an infantry company in SFOR in the Balkans and donated weapons/ammunition for 3 battalions of the Afghan National Army.

Slovenia’s defense spending is currently 1.6% of GDP on defense, which will increase incrementally to 2% of GDP by 2008. In October 2001, the Government of Slovenia decided to purchase a VIP government aircraft, at a cost equal to about 10% of one year’s defense budget. This would have been a diversion of resources away from far more urgent combat-related procurement priorities. Because of the magnitude of this purchase, the U.S. government relayed its strong concerns to the Slovene government regarding this purchase, noting the need for the Government to remain focussed on its defense reform efforts and other procurement priorities. Noting U.S. concerns, Slovenia purchased a less expensive aircraft, re-allocating the funds "saved" to purchase a multi-use helicopter for border control and rescue missions, a purchase with enhances Slovene counter-terrorism efforts.

For its niche contributions to NATO, Slovenia’s specialized capabilities can include mountain warfare, humanitarian demining, military police, special operations forces, and field medicine.

Slovenia’s defense reform plan, "General Long Term Development and Equipping Program," covers reforms through 2007. The focus of this effort is the 10th Battalion, the unit Slovenia is tailoring for NATO-led operations. Slovenia has developed a modern Air Sovereignty Operations Center, and its secure communications capability is improving. Ljubljana has developed good Host Nation Support facilities, including the port of Koper, a mountain warfare training center, and its NATO (English) language training facility. The Slovenian military is professionalizing its forces by 2004. Key military positions are occupied by U.S. trained officers, from 2nd Lieutenant through Colonel.

For those aspirants not invited at the Prague Summit, the door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants -- Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia -- are continuing to participate in the Membership Action Plan and to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the goal of Ukraine’s integration into Europe - an integration that will not be complete as long as Ukraine remains outside of Europe’s key political, economic, and security institutions.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to conclude on one final point: we cannot forget that these democracies still have fresh memories of foreign domination and totalitarianism. With that comes a special appreciation for what it takes to protect the core values and interests of the Alliance. It explains in part their commitment toward the responsibilities that come with membership in an Alliance that brought down the Berlin Wall, that helped end the Soviet Union, and helped make these countries free. It explains why these democracies have sent their men in arms to stand with U.S. forces in often dangerous missions over the last decade and why I am confident they will continue to do so as NATO Allies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared to answer any questions the Committee may have.