Military

Opening Statement of Rep. Doug Bereuter
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Europe

Hearing: NATO and Enlargement

April 29, 2003

I open this hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe and welcome our witnesses and our guests. Today, we will examine the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to admit seven European countries to full membership in the Alliance and the qualifications of those seven nations.

Our witnesses today are Mr. Robert Bradtke, deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, and Mr. Ian Brzezinski, deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO affairs.

As two of the officials most closely involved in the enlargement process, they will testify on developments in the enlargement process since last November’s Prague Summit and the progress that the seven accession countries — Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — have made since then in meeting the criteria for membership.

The decision to admit former communist nations from Central and Eastern Europe into the Atlantic Alliance is one of the great successes of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It is a bipartisan success, promoted by Republicans and Democrats in the Congress and by both the Clinton and Bush administrations.

Enlarging NATO is certainly nothing new; during the Cold War, the Alliance enlarged on three occasions, admitting Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain. But the decision to admit Europe’s new democracies to the Alliance that until recently had been their adversary was an important, even historic, change.

Ten years ago, when voices in the Congress first promoted this idea, it may have seemed a questionable initiative to many Members of Congress; yet five years ago, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, it certainly was not as contentious as many observers expected.

Nevertheless, the opponents of enlargement found no shortage of supposed reasons as to why it was imprudent to extend NATO’s umbrella of stability and security to countries just emerging from four decades of Soviet occupation and communist misrule.

Opponents of enlargement argued that newfound freedom would result in these countries reopening old disputes and fomenting ethnic conflict, dragging the United States into border conflicts and civil wars. In reality, the prospect of NATO membership led nations to bury long-simmering disputes and to focus on strengthening their democracies.

It also was argued that admitting former Soviet allies would alienate Russia and create a new dividing line in Europe. In reality, NATO’s relations with Russia have never been better, and NATO’s open-door policy has helped bring the European continent closer together.

Furthermore, these opponents argued that the cost of defending new allies in Central Europe could cost more than a hundred billion dollars, with the United States picking up most of the tab.

In reality, their politically tainted analyses were off by a factor of a hundred, and enlargement costs the United States less than thirty million dollars a year, on average — a relatively small price to expand the reach of NATO and of Western democracy to a broad swath of Central and Eastern Europe.

Opponents of enlargement argued that adding new members would lead to less cohesion in the Alliance, as additional countries would make it more difficult to achieve the consensus that NATO requires for decisions.

In reality, it is several of our long-time allies who created a crisis in the Alliance in February when they temporarily blocked NATO action requested by Turkey to plan for its defense.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic played a constructive role; it was France, Germany and Belgium who initially obstructed the decision and called into question NATO’s cohesiveness and its very commitment to defend an ally.

In fact, the admission of the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has reinvigorated the Alliance. With their recent history of life under communist rule, they appreciate the importance of safeguarding freedom, both in Europe and around the world, and they have provided evidence that they share our commitment to promote liberty and oppose tyranny.

The most recent example of this came in Iraq. Polish special forces were on the ground in Iraq, fighting alongside their American, British and Australian counterparts. Though numbering only a couple of hundred, they participated in the capture of the port city of Umm Qasr, the first city seized by coalition forces. Our Czech allies provided a contingent of chemical weapons defense specialists based in Kuwait, a skill at which they excel. And our Hungarian allies hosted the training facility for Iraqi opposition forces.

While our three new allies have been of great help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the peace operations in the Balkans, it is true that their integration into the Alliance was not an unqualified success.

We saw some backsliding on their commitments once they joined the Alliance in 1999, most notably in the case of Hungary. While enlargement has been a net gain for NATO, there have been concerns of free-riding allies, though they would not be the first European countries to shirk some of their obligations to the Alliance.

NATO has learned from the most recent round of enlargement and has worked with the incoming countries to ensure that they can contribute to NATO from day one of their membership. The Membership Action Plan, or MAP, allowed each candidate country to work with the NATO staff to create a roadmap to membership. While the MAP is not a checklist for admission — that remains the prerogative of member governments and legislatures — it has helped the candidate countries develop reasonable defense plans that will make NATO stronger.

When the Alliance members voted at the Prague Summit to admit the seven incoming allies, they did so with the understanding that their defense reforms were incomplete.

These seven countries have developed plans that will enable them to defend their territories in cooperation with NATO and that will let them contribute to Alliance missions. Many of them are focusing on niche capabilities that will fulfill shortfalls in Alliance requirements. But it is important to emphasize that these seven countries must maintain their commitment to implement these reforms.

They have continued to implement their reforms since the Prague Summit last November, when they were invited to join NATO, and since they signed the accession protocols on March 26. Now, they must continue this reform process through the ratification process, through the accession process next year, and beyond.

Even before they become full Alliance members, though, we have seen the benefits that NATO and the United States will reap from having them as part of the Alliance. Most notable was the contribution that Romania made to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, when it sent a 400-strong mountain battalion to fight alongside U.S. forces in the Afghan mountains where al Qaeda and the Taliban took refuge.

Similarly, Lithuania contributed a 40-member special operations team. Bulgaria also made an important contribution to U.S. efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, hosting U.S. Air Force tankers that refueled combat aircraft taking part in both operations. In fact, that base has proven so valuable that there is talk of establishing a permanent U.S. presence there, a proposal that the Congress will evaluate closely.

In addition, Bulgaria and Slovakia both sent chemical weapons defense teams to countries bordering Iraq. The three Baltic states have contributed engineers, medics, doctors, and ordnance disposal teams to both operations. And Slovenia has sent troops to the Balkans peace operations to free up U.S. forces. These seven countries had pledged even before the Prague Summit that they would act as "de facto allies." We see from their actions that they have done exactly that.

Of course, there are still a few concerns about some of these countries. Crime and corruption are cited as concerns in Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia, but all are to be commended for progress in this area, especially Bulgaria's 2001 judicial reforms.

Romania has a legal and administrative framework in place for its anti-corruption campaign, but political will is needed to implement reforms. Likewise, while reforms are underway in Latvia and Slovakia, more work remains to be done.

In addition, some concerns have been raised about the potential handling of classified information in Bulgaria and Romania, particularly the concern about hold-overs from the communist-era intelligence services, which were instruments of communist repression. These countries state that they have effective vetting procedures in place.

On balance, however, these are stable democracies that will help build a stronger North Atlantic Alliance. They are committed to NATO and its collective defense guarantee because they have recent memories of living under repressive dictatorships.

Having fought so long and hard to gain their freedom, these nations know how precious freedom is and how fundamental the defense of freedom remains.

These are nations ready to defend their freedom and that of their allies. We are fortunate to call these countries our allies.

The House of Representatives has long supported the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, dating back to 1994. Most recently, the House and Senate last October passed the Freedom Consolidation Act, a bill that I introduced in support of continued NATO enlargement. An overwhelming majority of this chamber — 372 in favor versus 46 against — endorsed "the vision of further enlargement of the NATO Alliance."

According to the U.S. Constitution, it is the Senate that must give its advice and consent to the treaty protocols that will enlarge the membership of the Alliance. On May 8, the fifty-eighth anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, the Senate is expected to vote on whether these seven countries — Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — should become part of the Alliance. I believe and, certainly, I fervently hope that the Senate will give its advice and consent to the ratification of these protocols.

Our two witnesses have played an important role in the NATO enlargement process for the past several years.

Mr. Robert Bradtke has served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs since August 2001. A thirty-year veteran of the Foreign Service, Mr. Bradtke’s extensive experience includes tenures as acting assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, executive assistant to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in London, and executive secretary of the National Security Council.

Mr. Ian Brzezinski has served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO affairs since November 2001. For seven years before that, he served as a senior staff member in the Senate. He worked for Senator William Roth from 1995 to 2000, including Senator Roth’s term as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and he was the Secretary of the Senate Delegation to the Assembly. He went on to work for two years on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I look forward to their testimony.