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STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN
VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES NAVY

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 21, 2003   
 

Introduction

Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished Committee members, I am extremely pleased to testify before you this afternoon, along with my Service counterparts, to discuss a topic of paramount importance to our military and to our nation.  Reconstituting our forces is one of Admiral Clark's top priorities and is clearly tied to his focus over the past three years of ensuring a ready Navy.

It is through the enduring and exceptional support of this committee and Congress over the past few years that we have been able to return to our nation unprecedented levels of readiness.  This return is evident in the sustained readiness that has been exhibited by naval forces on the world stage for some time now.  In March 2003, 70% of the ships in the fleet were underway including eight carrier strike groups and nine expeditionary strike groups all being forward deployed.  Today, we continue to support the simultaneous execution of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom though at greatly reduced deployed force levels.

While it is important to make note of these recent accomplishments, it is equally important that we quickly reconstitute our force, so that, if necessary, we have the capability to surge naval forces again, to repeat a similar employment of the bulk of our force.  I appreciate your foresight in addressing these issues and affording me this opportunity to discuss our plans in order to develop and sustain a rotational force with global surge capability.

This is a good news story from the Navy perspective.  We are well on track to reconstitute and reset the forces, and have also clearly identified those areas in both our FY 2003 and FY 2004 supplemental requests where support would be beneficial.  I will detail these areas later.  Accelerated maintenance timelines have been aided by the return of much of the force and application of the resources already provided.  Through careful balancing of the workload at our ship and aviation depots, we have maximized the capacity of our existing infrastructure to support depot level maintenance.

To Constitute and Set the Force

As you may be aware, we have adopted a philosophy of talking in terms of force "constitution" vice "reconstitution" to place emphasis on the fact that we must constantly push ahead with our transformational goals and to highlight that we can no longer afford to view achieving the past "steady state" of the force as the end game.  We've divided our constitution planning into three distinct time frames: near-term, mid-term, and long-term.  The near term piece of constitution is what we have elected to define as "setting the force."

I understand the Committee's primary focus today is to examine our near-term efforts at maintaining our force readiness at a state at or above that which we enjoyed prior to the recent period of surge operations.  In that respect, I would like to focus, then, on this "setting the force" piece which covers our efforts to sustain and improve our current capability.  It includes effectively maintaining our ships and aircraft to be prepared to redeploy as required to support the continuing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and to meet the needs of our deterrence, swiftly defeat, or win decisively strategy.

Requirements

To properly "set the force," our planning included a detailed review of logistics, national presence requirements around the globe, required life cycle maintenance, and personnel tempo considerations.  Primary concerns were the adherence to U.S. defense strategy and our need for flexibility in support of ongoing GWOT efforts.  Our planning also ensures the Navy will be positioned to meet our defense strategy, not simply by providing traditional asset availability to Combatant Commanders, but by delivering tailored capabilities that will best meet their needs.  In addition to Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups, tailored packages might include Surface Action Groups (SAG), consisting of a mix of Combatant platforms (CGs, DDGs, Amphibs etc.), or SSGNs in the near future.  Their specific missions could focus on Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO/LIO), Coastal Surveillance, ISR, major Theater Exercises/Demonstrations, Bi-Lateral operations, Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations, and theater strategic engagement.  A recent, instructive example would be USS IWO JIMA (LHD 7) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) embarked, providing the tailored capability necessary to support peacekeeping efforts in Monrovia, Liberia.  The full ESG capability was not required - but the right force at the right time was ready and performed superbly.

Current Status and Projections for Setting the Force

I want to assure you the Navy's "setting the force" phase will be largely completed in FY 2004 with a combination of funds already appropriated for FY 2003 and FY 2004 plus the FY 2004 supplemental.  The pending FY 2004 supplemental request will support a return to readiness for ships currently deployed, which may stay on station longer than their normal rotation cycle depending on the needs of the Combatant Commanders.  I say "largely complete" because, although we will have achieved our objectives in the areas of ship and aircraft depot maintenance, one or two specific capabilities, Naval Coastal Warfare for instance, will not be as robust as we'd like to adequately support defense planning requirements for a couple of years.  The same is true for shortfalls in the area of specific precision-guided munitions, such as the GBU-12 and JDAM-84.  Because we have funded maximum production for these critical munitions, we are rebuilding our inventory levels necessary to support a sustained combat effort.   Rather than focus on these few exceptions, I would like to direct my remaining comments to the preponderance of what we will confront in the next 12 months as we "set the force."

Operation and Maintenance Figures

In this context there are two primary components to consider: one being the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) requests that fund depot maintenance and the other being our investment requirements for the future.  First, in FY 2003 the emergency war supplemental  (IFF) financed $2.1 billion of our depot maintenance requirements.  These funds have been used to maintain our ships, aircraft, equipment and materiel at a pre-deployment readiness standard or better.  Funds were applied to depot maintenance for ships, aircraft, and equipment that were deployed longer than planned and, as such, incurred wear and tear beyond normally projected maintenance levels.  Examples of these extended deployments include USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72), which was deployed for 10 months; USS CHEYENNE (SSN 773), which was deployed for 8 months; and USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70), which was deployed for 8 ½ months.

Of equal importance, these additional funds were also used to expand the scope of many planned availabilities to bring ships and aircraft to their proper state of current readiness to prosecute the GWOT.  Similarly, we accelerated the depot maintenance for seven additional ships, originally unplanned based on former operation schedules, so that they would be ready to deploy again if required.  By the fourth quarter of FY 2003, it became apparent that due to depot activity loading, we would not be able to execute all of the combined President's Budget $6.2 billion baseline and $2.3 billion in supplemental funding provided.  Consequently, we returned $216 million to the IFF.

For FY 2004, our current supplemental request includes an additional $775 million for depot maintenance in addition to the $5.8 billion appropriated for President's Budget FY 2004 to permit an increase to the planned maintenance levels for our next group of deployers, as well as to perform depot maintenance on five ships that were rescheduled for maintenance availabilities from FY 2003 into 2004.  Specifically, $600 million of the additional depot maintenance requirement is for ship maintenance and $175 million is to support aviation requirements.  

Capital Investment and Procurement Requirements

The second part of "resetting the force" is the Investment aspect.  Here, the Navy requested FY 2003 supplemental funds to "reset" by addressing equipment losses and operational expenditures, which depleted levels of munitions and other expendable items.  Our most critical requirements, such as Tactical Tomahawks, Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOWs), and ammunition and bomb kits were adequately funded.

Navy FY 2003 needs were divided into a "Resetting the Force" piece and an "Expenditure Replacement" piece.  Given that the recently enacted FY 2004 DoD Appropriations Act approved by the Congress included a $3.49 billion rescission to IFF, Navy anticipated that it would not receive the $184.5 million "Expenditure Replacement" piece.  Therefore, we included those high priority items in our FY 2004 supplemental investment request which includes items such as:  aircraft procurement spares ($59M), other procurement outfitting spares ($27M), explosive ordnance equipment ($25M), F/A-18 ancillary equipment ($13M), re-outfitting fleet hospitals ($13M), command and control equipment ($6M), and Ready Reserve Force ($24M). 

The FY 2004 supplemental has within it a critical request to procure additional EA-6B outer wing panels ($55M).  The EA-6B Prowler is an old air frame which must be retired at the earliest possible time.    It  is  also  my  most  expensive  airplane  to 

operate when all costs are factored in.  The EA-6B requirement is of particular note as the increased utilization of this low density/high demand asset as well as their average age of 20.7 years has driven fatigue life to the point where we must replace a total of 54 outer wing panels to maintain inventory levels necessary to meet operational requirements.  In addition to the $55 million currently included in the FY 2004 supplemental investment request, $30 million is required to buy additional outer wing panels ($15M) and accelerate center wing section production ($15M).  The center wing section acceleration is critical to keep this item from becoming a pacing item for the EA-6B.  The Navy is examining ways to realign available resources for this purpose.  This additional funding will return the EA-6B inventory to pre-OIF levels in about 24 months.    The table below summarizes our request.

While we are clearly on the right track to optimize employability of our forces, some pieces of "setting the force" will not fall into place until critical investment items are made, like the E/A-6B outer wing panels.  In the meantime, we will continue the execution of mitigation strategies that have allowed us to remain responsive and flexible.  The same is true as we work to increase our precision-guided munitions' inventories to levels required for any future contingencies.

Additional Constraints to Consider

I am aware that there is always interest in how the 50/50 requirement impacts our depot maintenance requirements.  In FY 2003, this did not pose a problem nor do we expect any difficulties in FY 2004 in either the aviation or the ship depots.  Having said that, I continue to have some concern for the health of our ship repair industrial base, which must be very carefully managed and balanced if we are to continue to sustain our ability to surge with greater flexibility as is our intent under the Fleet Response Plan.  As the number of contracts for new construction and major repairs has dwindled over the years, so has the industrial capacity that we had come to rely upon in the event that we needed to surge.

In FY 2004 we will execute to maximum capacity in our Naval Shipyards causing the Fleet to prioritize workload and adjust availability start dates and durations.  To improve our responsiveness to future reconstitution requirements, a Shipyard Transformation Plan was developed by senior public and private shipyard personnel.  The Transformation Plan will add flexible capacity to our ship repair industrial base and reduce total cost through improved resource sharing among the public and private nuclear capable shipyards.

Final Thoughts

In closing, I would like to again express my appreciation for the support of this Committee that has brought us to this point in our present operational success.  Thanks as well for the support already demonstrated by asking the right questions about what will be required to ensure continued future success of our Nation's naval forces.  The Navy shares your concern for resetting the force at proper readiness levels and has identified the necessary elements of providing that force to the Nation when it is called upon again.  We have learned important lessons in OEF and OIF and we know our Navy's future requires both rotational deployments and "surge" capability.  We have a good plan, we are investing well, we have a patriotic and exceptionally capable industrial base.  We are changing for the future in terms of our ability to create options for the President, who directed us to "be ready."

Again, I wish to thank the Committee for offering me the opportunity to appear before you here today.  I am very happy to answer any questions you may have.