STATEMENT OF
GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
U.S. AIR FORCE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ON FORCE RECONSTITUTION
Introduction
Chairman
Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished
Committee members, it is both my honor and
privilege to sit with my Service counterparts
to testify before you this afternoon on such a
serious and important matter.
Successful reconstitution and resetting
of
Background
In
terms of Air Force readiness, Congressional
attention, particularly from this Committee,
paved the way for the substantive increases we
saw in our ability to prosecute this
nation's National Security Strategy over the
past few years.
The renewed emphasis on such programs
as spare parts, depot maintenance, and
munitions stockpiles laid the foundation for
readiness and mission capable rates that our
Air Force has not seen in some time.
At the same time, your Committee's
increases to our flying hour, training, and
general Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
funding made it possible for our force to
remain the most proficient Air Force in the
world. In
short, because of the improvements that
Congress supported over the past few years,
the Taliban and the Ba'athist regime of
Saddam Hussein picked the worst possible time
to confront the
Our Objective
We
can look back as far as the Continental Army
and trace
Today,
we are in a different situation.
First,
we are still engaged with very dangerous
enemies throughout the globe.
We must replenish our stocks, our
people, and our ability to project power
around the world.
Being prepared to deliver precise
effects anywhere at anytime as part of a joint
and/or coalition force is a top priority.
Second, we must rapidly incorporate our
lessons learned and implement those changes to
maintain our combat edge.
As we remain engaged, our current
opponents, as well as would-be adversaries,
are watching and learning from the new
As a framework, the Air Force's objectives for resetting and reconstituting the force fall into three broad categories. Our requirements will:
-
Restore our equipment to combat effective state required to fight in the future;
-
Incorporate lessons learned by enhancing existing platforms or integrating technologies that proved valuable; and
-
Equip USAF forces currently engaged in stability operations with the tools necessary to accomplish the mission.
Restore/Reset for the Future
To
achieve the mission of defending the
Incorporating Lessons Learned
The Air Force has learned some valuable lessons with regard to tactics, training, and equipment during OIF and OEF. Rapidly incorporating these lessons into the force will make current operations much more effective and will provide real-world experience for improving our future force. Supplemental funding for Global Hawk enhancements, the integration of Advanced Sensor Pods, Special Tactics Combat Controller equipment, and further implementation of the highly successful Blue Force Tracking system are examples of quick assimilation of new warfighting lessons.
Current Operations - the New Reality
As previously mentioned, we opened thirty-eight new bases in support of OIF and OEF. These bases were not only used to execute Air Force missions, but were the home to joint forces and numerous coalition activities. These bases required everything from Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources sets for housing, workspace, hangars, and shop space to fuel bladders, pallets, Aircraft Refueling Vehicles and aircraft ground equipment. The ongoing stabilization operations in support of the Coalition Provisional Authority require our forward presence in Iraq and thus will require civil engineering equipment, air conditioners, medical equipment, hand tools, and even heavy construction equipment. All of this was, or is in the process of being transported forward and consumed. When these items are taken out of home unit stocks it affects the combat capability of that unit. It is this impact that the Air Force is attempting to mitigate. In the future, operational necessities will probably not include all of these bases and materiel requirements. At some point, select bases will be put in WRM or caretaker status. The Air Force, as it has done at numerous bases thus far, will re-evaluate the equipment that should be left at the base in case of future contingencies and the materiel that can be moved to active bases.
The Road Ahead
While 7.3 of our 10 Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) worth of capabilities are globally engaged, resetting the force is an Air Force imperative. For efforts in this area to be successful, we must focus on reconstituting capabilities, not just commodities. Beyond just equipment, Air Force warfighting capabilities depend on training and a sustainable battle rhythm for the entire force. Synchronizing these aspects with the equipment reconstitution will ensure our combat readiness.
Currently, the Air Force plans to return to pre-OIF AEF rotational cycles by March 2004. At that point, we expect our fighter and bomber force will be ready to resume normal rotations and we will have completed the repositioning of our war reserve stocks. By March, we also expect that most equipment and consumables within Unit Type Codes will be reconstituted. However, even with our aggressive efforts to reset certain low density/high demand capabilities, our Expeditionary Combat Support, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets, and Security Forces, will not meet the March goal due to sustained combat operations and training backlogs.
-
With our goal of ensuring combat readiness, it is important to understand the magnitude of successfully reconstituting the force in terms of cost and time. For each of our services it is imperative that we examine four specific questions this Committee has asked:What is the cost/time to repair equipment at the unit and depot level of maintenance?
-
What is the cost to procure new equipment to replace that equipment damaged beyond repair or used beyond economical repair?
-
Are the resources adequate in FY 2003 and 2004 to accomplish this task?
-
If there are unfunded requirements, how will these shortfalls impact future readiness levels?
Equipment Repair
Currently, we are conducting unit-level inspections of aircraft returning from overseas in order to determine whether the asset can be reconstituted locally or sent to depot. This will be the first step in defining the total cost and time to repair equipment at the unit and depot level.
The time that equipment is unavailable to the warfighter and the repair cost varies widely depending on the type of equipment and the extent of damage. For instance, if we find reasons to remove the T56-15 engines on our C-130s, it may take 90 days within the Continental US or as much as 140 days if the aircraft is deployed. Another illustration of the wide ranges of repair times is our MH-53 helicopter. In this case, if we determine that an aircraft is undamaged, the reconstitution period is only 30 days. If the aircraft requires phase maintenance, reconstitution maintenance, and an operational check-out that period could reach from 90 to 160 days.
Actual costs to repair the equipment is similarly difficult to determine and will be dependent on the extent of work that needs to be done. Without knowing the level of inspections required to fully determine a problem, the amount of spare parts required to fix the problems, or the flying hours required for maintenance check-outs, we cannot ascertain the actual costs at this time.
Maintaining combat effectiveness while completing these inspections and repairs is a top priority. To do so, the Air Force plans to use any and all sources of repair to reconstitute critical assets and the location of the work will be dependent on mission need and the type of work being performed. Currently, the Air Force does not foresee any repairs that will significantly impact warfighting unit downtimes.
In terms of depot-level work following OEF and OIF, our major commands have not reported any significant effects on workflow. These conflicts did not cause us to defer large numbers of Programmed Depot Maintenance on our airframes or equipment. Thus far, we have not found any fleet-wide issues that would complicate depot budgeting or scheduling programs. Although the final picture cannot be ascertained until all OIF-deployed aircraft and equipment have been inspected, we believe that the depots have the capacity to handle all reconstitution activities. Currently, the Air Force does not see headroom as a limiting factor nor do we foresee problems complying with the 50/50 requirements. Past decisions to properly capitalize our depots brought us the ability to accomplish these tasks and meet the warfighter's needs. Combined with today's smart decisions on critical sources of repair, the Air Force sees no reason why we cannot resume top readiness rates quickly.
Procurement
The Air Force projects total procurement costs for OIF and OEF reconstitution at approximately $1.2B. We have submitted requests through the Iraqi Freedom Funds/FY03 Supplemental and in the FY04 Supplemental to replace equipment damaged beyond or consumed beyond economical repair, replenish expended stockpiles, and to upgrade some equipment as we replace them.
Operations and Maintenance in FY04
Given our current level of operations in support of OIF, we believe we will need $1.1B in O&M to reconstitute our forces and reset our weapon system fleets. As submitted, DOD's FY 2004 Supplemental request is sufficient to address known reconstitution issues. Specifically, we have requested funding for crucial programs such as:
-
Depot maintenance ($676M)
-
Contractor Logistic Support ($313M)
-
Base Sustainment ($180M)
Risk and the Impact of Shortfalls
However, we must acknowledge that there are some elements of risk, both in Operations and Maintenance and in Procurement activities during this period of reconstitution. The Air Force will have to evaluate this risk during the execution year.
In terms of Procurement, the Air Force will have to accept manageable risk in some reconstitution efforts until they can be addressed in our annual budget request. Although manageable, until our reconstitution efforts are complete, our ability to maintain acceptable mission capable rates and to support future operations could be impacted. However difficult these choices, it is important to pause and state here that in all cases, readiness will be our top priority during this period.
With respect to the Flying Hour Program, as always, we will fly the program and our most critical items will be funded.
Conclusion
The
Air Force, along with each of the members of
this joint team, is proud of our operational
successes over the past two years.
When our President and this nation
called on
The
readiness that made the Air Force contribution
possible was the result of the hard work of
the thousands of airmen and civilians of our
Total Force.
Additionally, our success was a tribute
to this Committee's leadership and its
support at such a critical time in our
nation's history.
Together, we can focus on resetting and
reconstituting our forces for maximum
operational effect against future foes; strive
to integrate our combat lessons learned; and
never forget we are still engaged in
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
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