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STATEMENT BY
GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 21, 2003   
 

Introduction

Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the stance of our Army and state of readiness. 

I also want to take this opportunity to thank the committee on behalf of the magnificent men and women of our Army for, your continued support as they execute the global war on terrorism.  Your concern, resolute actions and deep faith in America's sons and daughters are widely recognized throughout the rank and file of our service.

What I plan to do today is first, review the current Army posture, and talk about some of my observations from my recent visit to Iraq and Kuwait.  I will then cover some of the new initiatives concerning force structure and transforming the Army while at war.  I will close with a discussion of how we are resetting our force, how Reset impacts funding and resources while executing the global war on terrorism, and finally the outlook for future Army commitments around the world.

Current Posture

Today the Army has 355,000 soldiers deployed in over 120 countries worldwide.  Approximately 160,000 of those soldiers are overseas on 12 month, unaccompanied short tours.  The vast majority of which are engaged in combat operations in the United States Central Command area of operations.  Over the next several months between January 2004 to April 2004, approximately the equivalent of ten and a half divisions worth of forces will either be deploying to or redeploying from our overseas missions including, Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Southwest Asia, the Stabilization Force and Kosovo Force in the Balkans or the Multi-National Force and Observers mission in the Sinai.  This time frame will feature the largest movement of United States forces since World War II.  Couple that with the mobilization of over 127,000 combat-ready National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers, and you can see that this is an unprecedented moment in our Army's history.  But despite this high operations tempo (OPTEMPO), we must continue to modernize and maintain our campaign readiness to meet the challenges of the future.

Our Army is a trained, ready and dominant land campaign force for the combatant commander.  The main force behind our staying power is the Soldier--the centerpiece of all we do.  I recently had the privilege to visit with these great soldiers and their commanders two weeks ago in Kuwait and Iraq.  They are focused and determined to win the war on terror and set the conditions for a stable Iraq.  They understand their mission, and willingly undertake their role with pride and determination each and everyday while in harms way.  What they ask is simple; they want the continued support of the American people, and they know they will have it throughout the duration of our missions around the world.

As my trip to the Operation Iraqi Freedom Area of Operations unfolded, I witnessed truly remarkable feats that I can classify as nothing less than miracles given the situation that initially emerged following the end of major combat operations.   In Mosul, within the 101^st airborne division sector, I saw a thriving city back on its feet.  The streets were jam packed with commerce, people were freely moving about their daily business and most notably taxicabs were present everywhere.  In Tikrit with the 4^th Infantry Division, I witnessed the progress our military is making there.  The lights were back on, police forces were graduating at a remarkable rate, and the local educational institutions--to include three colleges--were back to regularly scheduled classes for 20,000 students.  In Baghdad I had the opportunity to visit one of our combat medical units that was operating in a newly refurbished Iraqi hospital.  Our soldiers were treating both American soldiers and Iraqi citizens.  Side by side on the same floor.  Before I left for Kuwait I had a visit with the CJTF-7 staff and Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez.  Thanks to your continued support they are doing an absolutely superb job in this dynamic, changing security environment.

Readiness and Training 

The situation in Iraq is challenging.  Yet, throughout my visit I was struck by just how well our combat training centers and institutional education programs have prepared our combat ready leaders, leaders who are mentally agile and can think asymmetrically.  Leaders at all levels, from sergeant through the general officer ranks, are engaged in this complex mission where each day their decisions have strategic impacts on the units, the Iraqi people and the enemy.  The Army's programs have been and will continue to be the cultural drivers for the future-a place where leaders will learn not what to think, but how to think jointly, expeditionary and strategically.  The Army's system for maintaining a trained and ready force, which was forged over the past two decades, has provided the basis for our ability to master the transitions from war to stability and support operations and back to war when required.  These are difficult tasks to master individually, a high level art when performed simultaneously and not trained on the fly.  We have taken the lessons learned from our experiences in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Somalia, and the Balkans to develop our training azimuth, and we are doing the same now with lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq-all being trained at our Combat Training Centers. 

Our combat formations now preparing at home station to deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom will benefit from a full spectrum train-up, either at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana or the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hoenfels, Germany. The realistic training is based upon the lessons we have recently gleaned from our Phase III decisive combat operations and our ongoing Phase IV operations to forge recovery and security within Iraq.  The training will be tough, demanding and relevant.  We have a moral obligation to ensure we train and equip our soldiers for the rigors of combat operations.  This will require sacrifice not only by the soldiers, but also for their families, communities and employers who continue to support those in uniform.

Nonetheless this training at home station and our combat training centers is a critical investment.  It will train leaders and soldiers to act reflexively to the variety of challenges they will face in the complex environment in Iraq.  At the end of the day, trained and ready formations save lives.

The One Army Concept

Side by side, the Active Component, Army National Guard and Army Reserve have proven that they are a combat tested and ready team.  The investment made in our Reserve Components has truly been worth the effort.  The Reserve Component has shared an incredible portion of the Army's mission ever since 9-11.  These units arrive ready and trained - a strong indicator of the increased readiness in our Reserve Components since Desert Shield/Storm. 

The Enhanced Separate Brigade concept has yielded outstanding results. Units like the 53d Infantry, Enhanced Separate Brigade from the Florida National Guard provide an example of just how capable these forces are today.  They arrived ready for the fight during major combat operations in Iraq, and they continue to perform magnificently for the CJTF-7 commander.  These soldiers and leaders are performing full-spectrum combat operations each day, and have been instrumental in protecting our force, securing sensitive sites, and protecting our lines of communication throughout the country of Iraq.  We will deploy three more enhanced separate brigades to include the 39^th Infantry Brigade from the Arkansas National Guard with the 1^st Cavalry Division, the 30^th Infantry Brigade from the North Carolina National Guard with the 1^st Infantry Division and the 81^st Infantry Brigade from the Washington National Guard attached to CJTF-7.

To accomplish this we need to have great leadership at the highest levels of our Reserve Components.  The Army is fortunate to have great leaders like Lieutenant General Steve Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Roger Schultz, the Director of the Army National Guard, and Lieutenant General Ron Helmly, as the Chief of the Army Reserve during this time of unprecedented mobilization for the Reserve Components.  When we made the decision to keep Reserve Component soldiers deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom for  "Up to Twelve-Months, Boots on the Ground", to meet the needs of the Combatant Commander, General John Abizaid, and provide predictability to our soldiers, their families and employers, these great leaders devised the training plans that would ensure success, took the word back to the State Adjutants General that the Army National Guard would be in this fight for the long haul, and they supported the decisions of Army senior leadership every step of the way. 

Modular Unit Concepts

Our Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker is determined to improve the joint and expeditionary mindset within the Army as the geopolitical landscape continues to change.  To do that, the Army is committed to the concept of unit modularity.  We will continue to maintain an Army that has campaign, big fight capabilities, but transform unit organizations and capabilities into more modular and tailorable designs.  Modular force designs for combat, combat support, and combat service support units will enable a greater capacity and tailorable force packages that improve the Army's strategic responsiveness. 

The transformation into a more modular force structure will begin immediately in calendar year 2004 with the restructuring efforts of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and upon its return from Iraq, the 101^st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.  The restructuring of these units will make divisions capability-based; creating a force that can better support the requirements of Combatant Commanders and deliver the right Army capabilities at the right time. 

The end state of modularity is to provide a more relevant and ready Army that is stable and expeditionary replacing the forward base.  By transforming the force and the way we do business, we will begin to base units under a concept know as force stabilization.  Force stabilization allows units to train together, deploy together, and reset together to be deployed again if the situation dictates.  Units will have a more reliable training and deployment schedule, and soldiers and families will get a sense of predictability, which has been lacking due to recent operations.

Continued Funding Requirements

Although our initial successes have been tremendous, we must continue to resource our operations with the right equipment to complete the mission in Iraq, and to continue the pursuit of the global war on terrorism.  From soldier systems like Interceptor Body Armor, to force protection measures like Up Armored High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) vehicles and Blue Force Tracker identification systems, to commercially adaptive command, control and communications-battle command systems to replace-one of kind Army equipment, our rapid procurement initiatives are necessary advances we must continue to pursue.  We have continued our modernization campaign to meet the challenges of the future, as evidenced by our recent fielding and the impending deployment of the 1^st Stryker Brigade Combat Team to Iraq.

All of the systems I have mentioned that we have been able to pull forward and down to the soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq have had a tremendous impact on the mission.  These soldier and technological enablers provide the Army the mechanism to close the gap between the current force and the future force.  In doing so we prevent adversaries from negating our deployed commander's ability to see first, act first, understand first and win decisively.  Based on Congressional support for the Fiscal Year 2003 Emergency Supplemental appropriation, the Army was able to pull $3.2 billion worth of soldier and battle command system improvements forward and send them to the field for execution of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle.  We must continue to ensure that all of our forces are resourced with these critical systems so that they will remain fully capable to take on the challenges within the new strategic context in which we operate today.

Resetting the Army

After conducting a strategic assessment and incorporating lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have further defined how to set the force for success.  This assessment will be applied to troops that are preparing now for rotations into theater.  We have designed a process of reconstituting our current equipment by undertaking a rigorous long-range plan known as Reset for short.  This plan requires intensive resourcing, repair and overhaul of our ground equipment and aircraft, and prioritization and streamlining of our facilities and personnel to support these efforts. 

Additionally, our Reset initiatives required the establishment of long-term Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom plans for stability and support operations.  As we expect sustained operations to now be the norm, these plans include establishing force rotation plans for on-going operations, and reestablishing and restructuring Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) to better support Combatant Commanders.  The Reset program also has direct ties to posturing the Army into the Office of the Secretary of Defense integrated global presence and basing strategy, and serves as a catalyst for our own Army transformation and modernization plans.

The plan to reset the Army is not cheap, and it will be ongoing for the foreseeable future.  With the current inductions of our ground and air fleet into Reset and Recapitalization programs, we will be hard at work on this process for at least three years.  In the long run, the investment will pay off for we will have a force of sustainable, modernized equipment that will allow us to meet our global commitments now and in the future.

Your continued support of future years defense plan outlays and supplemental budgets to support our ongoing operations, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, is critical if we are to expect our units to continue their remarkable performance.  In the near future, the Army requires your support to quickly enact the FY 04 supplemental funding request [A1]  to meet our global commitments, take care of soldiers and their families and win this global war on terror.

Cost of Repairing Equipment to Reset the Force

As I mentioned the Army Reset Plan costs are significant.  The goal is for all returning units to achieve a sufficient level of combat readiness within six to eight months of their arrival at home station.  The basic repair plan incorporates the use of both Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) based depot, installation and commercial repair facilities.  The Army Materiel Command (AMC) estimates that approximately five to eight percent of equipment repairs to achieve unit level technical bulletin standards will be conducted in theater.  Additionally, numerous damaged wheeled vehicles will be repaired in theater to expedite return to APS sets. 

The Army's Reset Task Force has studied the reset issue and determined the repair requirements for all Operation Iraqi Freedom one units.  This workload consists of approximately 1,000 aviation systems; 67,000 communications & electronics systems, 2,500 combat/tracked vehicles, 26,000-wheeled vehicles, 400 missile systems, and about 250,000 various other systems.  The Army estimates the costs to start us on the road to repairing  to meet 10/20 unit technical bulletin standards is provided in the FY 04 supplemental.  [A2] The same is true for the costs to support depot level repairs and other costs associated with operations and maintenance.  Initial funding to support depot maintenance operations should not be an issue. The Army believes that in Fiscal Year 2004 the risk associated with funding and executing the depot maintenance program is manageable.

Replacement and Battle Damaged Equipment

The procurement of new equipment in support of resetting the force consists of replacing battle damaged equipment and equipment determined to be uneconomically repairable.  We also expected that as we inspect and repair equipment we will discover additional equipment to be uneconomically repairable.  [A3] We will work to replace these systems and continue to support our programmed unit rotations for the foreseeable future-a period of at least three years.

Conclusion

In closing, I am pleased with the current status of our Army.  I am proud of our soldiers and their leaders as they continue to perform remarkably as I witnessed first hand during my recent visit to the Iraqi Freedom Area of Responsibility (AOR) and around the globe.  The One Army concept has yielded nothing but success as our Active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve forces execute the global war on terrorism.  We appreciate and look forward to the continued support Congress provides the Armed Services - America's sons and daughters - who are serving selflessly throughout the world and who continue to make America safe and free.

I look forward to the opportunity to participate in this session and answering any of the questions you may have.

 [A1]OMB cannot clear any statement which does not support the President's Budget requests.  This sentence current commits the administration to future supplemental requests.  The administration has made no decision regarding future supplementals.  <

 [A2]OMB cannot clear any statement which does not support the President's budget requests.  This statement details requirements that are still be evaluated for inclusion in the FY 05 President's Budget request.

 [A3]OMB cannot clear any statement which does not support the President's budget requests.  This statement does not support the FY 04 Supplemental request.