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STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL ESSEX
DIRECTOR, PLANS AND PROGRAMS
HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

BEFORE THE
PROJECTION FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AIR REFUELING TANKER REQUIREMENTS AND STATUS OF TANKER FLEET

JUNE 24, 2003   
 

Chairman Bartlett, Congressman Taylor and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.    General Zettler and I are proud to come before you to discuss the Air Force's aerial refueling requirements, the status of the KC-135 fleet, and our current plans and programs in the fiscal year 2004 budget request to upgrade and sustain the aerial refueling fleet.  My testimony will discuss the tanker requirement and our current plans and programs in our 2004 budget request.

At an average age of over 40 years, the KC-135 fleet is the oldest combat weapon system in the United States Air Force (USAF).  As this tanker fleet ages, ensuring warfighters have the required capability to perform their wartime mission is a growing challenge.

Tanker Requirements

The baseline requirement for the Air Force's contribution to air refueling is defined in the Tanker Requirements Study for Fiscal Year 2005 (TRS-05), completed February 2001.  Air Mobility Command (AMC) conducted TRS-05 in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD (PA&E)) division.  The study was conducted to determine both aircraft and aircrew requirements in the near term.

The total requirement is based on mission roles and scenarios to support the National Military Strategy.  The National Military Strategy during the timeframe of the study was based on supporting the prosecution of two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (2 MTW). 

Requirements were quantified for mixes of the following scenarios:  Major Theater War scenarios in Southwest Asia (SWA) and Northeast Asia (NEA), the support of the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), and President and SECDEF-directed Special Operations Forces missions.  To prepare for a possible shift in the National Military Strategy, a Small Scale Contingency scenario was also included in this mix.  The Major Theater War scenarios were those used in the Mobility Requirements Study for Fiscal Year 2005 (MRS-05).  OSD and the Joint Staff initiated MRS-05 to examine the appropriate mix of end-to-end lift assets and their required support infrastructure needed to achieve the National Military Strategy.  Although sizing tanker force structure was beyond the scope of the MRS-05, the study served as a major driver of tanker force structure requirements. 

For many of these scenarios the requirement is predominantly based upon the two basic refueling missions carried out by tankers:  the strategic mobility mission (deployment of combat and combat-support aircraft to theater) and the warfighting mission (employment of refueling assets to support strike aircraft on combat missions).  Some tankers (KC-10s) were also used in the airlift role during periods of non-peak demand to augment airlift in MRS-05.

The Air Force refueling fleet is made up of KC-10A (59), KC-135E (133), and KC-135R (411) aircraft (FY02 fleet structure).  In order to make an "apples-to-apples" comparison, a common metric is needed to describe the effectiveness of these various aircraft.  TRS-05 and other tanker force structure studies discuss the air refueling requirement in terms of KC-135R-model equivalents.  The conversion factors used to obtain these equivalencies are strongly based on offload capacity but also take into account tanker compatibility with receivers as well as boom demand of the warfight scenarios.  Table 1 identifies these capabilities in R-model equivalents.  Table 2 provides the air-refueling inventory in terms of R-model equivalents for the current tanker inventory.
 

Aircraft Type	Factor	Equivalent
1 KC-135R	1.00	100% of KC-135R
1 KC-135E	0.84	84% of KC-135R
1 KC-10A	1.95	195% of KC-135R

 

Table 1: R-Model Equivalencies

 

Aircraft Type	Total Aircraft	R-model Equivalents
KC-135R	411	411
KC-135E	133	112
KC-10A	59	115

 

Table 2: R-Model Equivalencies for current inventory

 

The results of TRS-05 identify a need for 500-600 R-equivalents "available" on a daily basis to meet the wartime requirement.  "Available" is defined as aircraft not in a "school house" capacity or depot-possessed.  TRS-05 assumes these "available" aircraft meet and maintain the AMC standard mission capable rate (MC Rate = 85%) during wartime, leaving 15% as non-mission capable (NMC).  In terms of mission capable aircraft, the requirement ranges from 425 to 510 mission capable R-equivalents (600 x 85% = 510; 500 x 85% = 425).  It is important to note that this is a wartime mission capability.  Day-to-day peacetime maintenance management practices often do not sustain a fleet wide MC Rate of 85%.  Applying peacetime actual MC Rates does not accurately portray the wartime capability of the air refueling fleet.

Since TRS-05 was completed, the world has changed and so has the National Military Strategy.  The new NMS changes from a 2 MTW approach to a 1-4-2-1 force-planning construct described below.

1 - Defend the United States (Homeland Defense)

4 - Deter aggression and coercion in four critical regions

2 - Swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping major conflicts

1 - Upon President's direction, win decisively against one of the two major        conflicts

A new mobility study to include air refueling requirements is needed to further refine the requirement to support this strategy.  In the meantime, TRS-05 remains the most comprehensive and widely accepted analysis of current tanker requirements

Sortie Generation Capability

While TRS-05 defines the traditional air refueling requirement in terms of "Available KC-135R Equivalents," that metric does not fully capture the impact of the increased crew ratio (and the resulting higher sortie generation capability) found in the FY04 PB, which incorporates a reduction of 68 KC-135E aircraft. Although no defined tanker requirement exists at this time in terms of sortie capability and no absolute measure of sortie capability relative to a requirement is possible, the relative sortie capability loss between the various fleet options can be compared to illustrate the relative impact of the fleet reduction in conjunction with the crew ratio increase.

The analysis conducted used the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) Sortie Generation Model to fly the fleets represented by the current inventory and the FY04 PB 68 KC-135E reduction.  The analysis compared the maximum wartime sortie generation capabilities of the current KC-135 fleet to that of the FY04PB position, which calls for a reduction of 68 KC-135E primary aircraft authorized (PAA).  This analysis is important because simply examining aircraft tails or equivalents, discounts improvements in aircraft utilization created by increasing crew ratios and per aircraft maintenance manning. 

The optimal crew ratio is one where the capability of the total crew force equals the capability of the aircraft fleet.  Historically, the KC-135 crew ratios were set at 1.36 Active Duty and 1.27 Air Reserve Component (ARC) to perform the single integrated operations plan (SIOP) mission.  Multiplying this ratio by the number of PAA gives a total crew force.

The Tanker Requirements Study (TRS-05) identified both a tanker aircraft and crew shortage.  The TRS further recommended a 1.75 crew ratio for the KC-135.  A lower crew ratio limits the capability of the fleet based on available aircrews.  Increasing the crew ratio to approximately 1.75 balances aircraft and aircrew capabilities.

Results of Sortie Generation Model

For the FY04 PB position, the 68 KC-135E reduction, many aircrews are re-invested in the remaining tanker fleet, matching aircraft and aircrew capability.  The Air Force will increase crew ratios for the remaining tankers as follows:

	FY03	FY06
AD	1.36	1.75
ANG	1.27	1.8
AFRC	1.27	1.5

In addition to retaining the crew force, maintenance per aircraft will also be increased to support higher utilization rates on the remaining aircraft.  This minimizes the effects of retiring aircraft to the warfighter. 

Current plans and programs in the FY04 budget request

The current plan and program in the FY04 PB request is to reduce the AF PAA inventory by 68 KC-135E models between FY04-06.  Under the 68 KC-135E reduction, 61 KC-135Es are retired and 7 are transferred to flyable Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) reserve.  48 R-models will flow from the active duty fleet to backfill 48 retiring Air Reserve Component E-models.  Additionally, the ARC will reduce by an additional 20 PAA (13 aircraft retire, 7 remain as BAI).  The Total Force picture is a reduction of 68 PAA.  In FY04, this equates to a reduction of 44 KC-135E aircraft; 37 PAA and 7 BAI.  The impact of this reduction in aircraft to the capability of the tanker fleet will be mitigated by increasing the crew ratio from its current value of 1.36 to 1.75.  Increasing the crew ratio results in a higher sortie generation capability.

In FY04 the Air Force will also continue with several modification and sustainment efforts to the KC-135 fleet, including the Global Air Traffic Management modification to the R-model fleet with planned completion in FY12.

The FY04 PB submission recognizes the USAF's requirement to fulfill their charge to organize, train, and equip the force-multiplying capability of air refueling for the combatant commanders.  Faced with a thirty-year recapitalization process, upward spiraling annual maintenance/operations costs, and downwardly spiraling annual availability, the USAF has assessed the cost and benefits of retiring the oldest, least capable air refueling tankers, and reallocating their aircrew and maintenance personnel to increase the availability of the remaining KC-135 fleet. 

Conclusion

A decision to reduce 68 KC-135Es is a smart risk management step.  Increasing maintenance costs and decreasing reliability and maintainability, in light of future expectations, have already reached the point where it no longer makes sense to continue investing limited resources to keep the oldest and least capable KC-135E tankers flying.  Corrosion damage is driving bills that the USAF has not budgeted for and, in the end, would only be an interim fix.  Reinvestment of resources generated by reducing the KC-135E fleet by 68 aircraft allows for increased crew ratio and flight hours on the remaining tankers.  These changes give us higher utilization rates on the remaining fleet, mitigating the impacts of retiring aircraft.

I appreciate the support provided by Congress and look forward to working with this Committee to best satisfy our warfighter needs in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for the record.