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STATEMENT BY

MARSHALL BILLINGSLEA
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CONCERNING
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ACQUISITION

APRIL 1, 2003

 

MR. CHAIRMAN, Congressman Meehan, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate your invitation to testify before the committee to update you on the progress we are making in prosecuting the war on terrorism, and to describe for you the strategy we are implementing today, along with the significant implications that strategy has for the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Special Operations Forces (SOF).

I do ask your indulgence today.  As we are in open session, and I am not well-equipped to answer any specific questions regarding Iraq, I am going to stay away from any issues that might have bearing on ongoing operations (although I will try to provide a little context regarding the role of Special Operations Forces in that conflict).

The Bottom Line

I will give you the bottom line at the outset.  The United States and its allies have made significant progress in destroying and disrupting key parts of the international terrorist network with which we are at war.  Al'Qaida is an organization under great stress, with a leadership that seems increasingly less able to plan multiple large scale attacks because they are focused on the more immediate problem of evading coalition capture. 

USSOCOM has been a key player in that effort, and is working hand-in-glove with other parts of the U.S. government and with coalition partners.  The President's FY04 budget initiates a significant transformation of USSOCOM into a supported combatant command for the war on terrorism, and alleviates a number of the mounting problems incurred by such a high OPTEMPO for the Command.

However, having given you this assessment of al'Qaida, I hasten to add a key qualifier: we are certain that we do not know all of the planning that al'Qaida has already done, and we are concerned that they may have set certain operations in motion before the most recent chain of events leading to Khalid Shaikh Muhammad's capture.  Moreover, al'Qaida and affiliated terrorist organizations have proven capable of regenerating lost parts, and of changing tactics and techniques to adapt to our offensive efforts. 

To put it simply: Al'Qaida and other related terrorist groups today remain intent on conducting devastating attacks against the United States, our friends and allies.  At least some of their planning seems to contemplate the use of chemical or biological agents.  But as the October 2002 attack using an explosives-laden dhow against the French oil tanker in Yemen showed, low-tech, conventional explosives continue to afford terrorists the ability to mount attacks with devastating consequences.

The Nature of the Enemy

Before I describe for you specific progress that we have made to date, I first need to explain to the Committee how we perceive the international terrorist network.  Once I have sketched that out for you, you will be able to see how we are targeting key strands of this network.

Al'Qaida is perhaps best viewed as part of a spider web.  At the center of the web are a number of terrorist groups - dozens actually, of varying sizes with varying agendas.  Al'Qaida and its proxy groups, such as the IMU in Uzbekistan, and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and EIJ in Egypt, and various Algerian, Chechen and other radical groups.  From this core of the network spread tendrils around the globe.  They reach deep into those rogue states that the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Secretary of State have labelled as "state-sponsors of terrorism" (i.e., Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, and North Korea).  The web reaches deeply into the ungoverned and less-governed zones of the earth, the triborder area in Latin America, parts of Yemen and Pakistan and Afghanistan, certain of the islands of the Philippines and Indonesia, parts of Lebanon, Somalia, and other parts of Africa.

The web attaches itself to thousands of points, reaching into foreign educational systems - the madrassas.  It is woven throughout religious institutions, where terrorists posing as religious scholars use their mosques to spot and recruit suicide bombers, or generally use the pulpit to spread hatred and venom against the United States.  It has spread into non-governmental organizations, and charities, that are used as Trojan Horses to move people and finances around the world.  The tendrils creep into certain banks and the hawallah system, and into various media outlets.  The tendrils are also interwoven with other transnational "webs."  There are linkages to weapons smuggling, and drug running rings, and to proliferation networks.

The web, frustratingly and worrisomely, reaches well into friendly nations.  Nearly every NATO partner has uncovered one or more al'Qaida cells.  In fact, the terrorist network reaches right into our own backyard, into America.  As the President mentioned in the State of the Union address, Buffalo is but one city that we have discovered to be penetrated by the al'Qaida network. 

As you can see, this is a very different type of enemy that threatens the American people today.  The adversaries of the Cold War - generally speaking - had a statist structure with centralized command and control, and a leadership structure which could be targeted frontally, and linearly.  This network has none of those characteristics. 

The spiderweb of loosely-organized terror groups has no single, integrated command structure.  While the leadership of some key organizations can be eliminated, those organizations do not necessarily cease functioning.  We have seen cells either continue to operate quasi-independently, or begin to coordinate with other terrorist organizations.  Specific terrorist organizations themselves have flexible lines of control that - in some cases - make senior operational coordinators interchangeable with various cells.  By that I mean that they can supplant one another in event of capture, and persist in execution of operations.  Likewise, these organizations are capable of replacing lost leadership by nominating operatives and elevating them in stature.  Obviously, key arrests can, and do, disrupt terrorist attacks.  But some of the groups in the international network (and al'Qaida in particular) have proven themselves exceptionally patient and deliberate.  We have seen instances where the planning for an attack was temporarily suspended after an arrest or death, only to resume a few months later with new personnel leading the charge.

Bringing to Bear All Elements of National Power

Clearly, when faced with such an adaptive organization, we cannot apply pressure sporadically or unevenly.  It has been necessary for us to engage, quite literally, in a "full court press," bringing to bear all elements of our national power.  Striking at this network has necessitated an unprecedented level of cooperation among U.S. defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic agencies.  There has been much commentary by those who have followed U.S. counter-terror efforts over the years regarding the transformation that has happened within the United States government, and over the strong unity of purpose that we all have in prosecuting the global war on terrorism.  Likewise, the galvanizing effects of the September 11^th attacks, and the subsequent Bali bombings and other events, have given rise to an unparalleled level of cooperation on a global scale between the departments and agencies of numerous foreign governments, acting both in concert with the United States, with one another, and on their own.

There is truly a global coalition against terrorism.  That coalition has had some stunning successes.  I must say at the outset that diplomacy has proven an essential tool in the war on terrorism, not only in maintaining coalition cohesion, but in facilitating the direct apprehension of key individuals.  Our colleagues at the Department of State, within Ambassador Cofer Black's office, and at embassies around the world, are on the front line in the war on terrorism.  In our estimation, within the Department of Defense, they are doing a superb job.  In particular, I commend to members of the Committee, and to your staff the recent testimony given by Ambassador Black before the House International Relations Committee.  His testimony provides the diplomatic context to the Defense Department assessment I am providing you this afternoon.

Denial of Sanctuary

As I noted in my description of the terrorist network, the groups that are today conspiring to commit mass murder of American and allied citizens operate overtly out of a handful of terrorist sanctuaries.  The United States government is systematically draining those swamps in a denial of sanctuary campaign.  Afghanistan was the first such territory, post-September 11, that the United States liberated from the grasp of terrorist organizations.  In losing Afghanistan, al'Qaida lost its ability to continue using the enormous, two-decades-old infrastructure of paramilitary training camps scattered throughout the country. 

Those camps, begun as a largely secular, ad hoc indigenous reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, morphed over the ensuing decades into a hodge-podge of Islamic-fundamentalist facilities churning out a network of Arab mujahideen who earned their spurs in the Afghan-Soviet conflict and then returned to their homes to foment wahhabist insurrection in their native lands.  The more extremist elements of that mujahideen network can be found scattered throughout the international terrorist network, though obviously some mujahideen did not ever, and do not today, subscribe to the wild fanaticism of a Bin Laden, or to his terrorist tactics.

The loss of those camps had an immediate and obvious impact on al'Qaida.  Gone were the training facilities, and the chemical and biological research laboratories they had created, along with some of the equipment they had procured.  The leadership now is scattered, and trustworthy communications are much harder to have.  But the loss of Afghanistan has had a deeper, intangible effect on terrorist organizations that is hard to describe.  There no longer is an equivalent place where aspiring young terrorists can go to demonstrate their commitment to fundamentalist extremism, and to receive a rigorous physical and operational regimen.  The camps of Afghanistan had a deep, unifying psychological effect on the international terrorist network, as operatives trained in the same camp claim a bond of "kinship" and unity of purpose that cannot be easily replicated when those camps have been destroyed.

Of course, al'Qaida and other terrorist groups continue to find sanctuary in other countries, and are seeking to set up new camps.  Iraq is one such place.  We are now in the process of denying al'Qaida and other terrorist groups sanctuary there.  At a very early phase of the campaign in Iraq, the United States struck multiple terrorist training facilities and encampments in Iraq.  The facilities, run by an extremist Kurdish organization called Ansar al'Islam, had become over the past year and a half, safe-haven to several al'Qaida operatives and home to part of al'Qaida's chemical warfare program.  In the months prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Ansar camps had grown with foreign fighters seeking an opportunity to conduct terror attacks against the United States.  It is difficult to say, at this stage, how much damage has been inflicted on Ansar al'Islam and al'Qaida.  In total, we believe there to be more than a dozen terrorist groups operating from sanctuaries in Iraq.  Our goal is to eradicate their presence from this country. 

Finally, al'Qaida and other key terrorist organizations operate in the ungoverned areas of the earth, in between the seams of civilizations and governance.  And we are striking at those terrorist concentrations when and where we find them.

Degrading Terrorist Finances

Denial of sanctuary is but one aspect of the campaign.  Degrading terrorist finances also is crucial.  Degradation of finances translates into a degradation in operational capability.  For instance, without funds, terrorists cannot move around as easily or as quickly.  Weaponry on the black and grey markets, especially explosives, still takes a fair amount of cash, and there are always living expenses and other costs that have to be defrayed.  The Secretary of State, working with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, and with the law enforcement and intelligence communities, has taken steps to freeze the assets of, block travel by, and criminalize relationships with, 36 different foreign terrorist organizations.  Sixty entities have been listed under Executive Order 13224, and 48 groups have been designated pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act.  These legal tools, taken in conjunction with a number of international legal instruments, provide a critical basis for working with the global financial community to block assets, and to expose and dismantle terrorist-run or terrorist-penetrated non-governmental organizations, charities, and banks. 

That said, it does take a great deal of money to conduct terrorist operations.  Tens of thousands of dollars, not even hundreds of thousands, are often all it takes to spin up a cell to commence operational planning.  That is why the freezing of more than $100 million in terrorist finances is so significant.  Equally important, we have been able to identify several key terrorist financiers, and take steps against them.  The al'Qaida financier, Hawsawi, has been captured, as have some key couriers and al'Qaida "bag men."  Further, some parts of al'Qaida's Southeast Asian network of front companies, NGOs, and bank accounts have been rolled up.  The United States continues to track the activities of other key financiers in the Middle East, and are pressing key coalition members to take greater steps to curtail their activities.   

Disrupting Terrorist Leadership

The United States and coalition partners also have made progress in systematically reducing terrorist rank and file, and in capturing or killing terrorist leadership and senior operational planners.  Since September, 2001, more than 55 terrorist leaders and planners have been captured or killed.  In the past six months alone, there have been more than 30 arrests and seizures in 20 different countries, not counting ongoing U.S. military operations in various countries.

Two prominent al'Qaida, Muhammad Atef and Abu Ali al-Harithi, have been killed.  Several other prominent operatives, such as al-Nashri, Abu Zubayda, Ramzi bin al'Shibh, al-Libi, and al-Jazairi are in custody.  And, of course, the terrorist we believe was the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, is now under coalition control.

I suspect, that with Khalid Shaikh Muhammad's arrest, Bin Laden and other key members of al'Qaida sleep less easily at night.  Khalid's arrest is only the latest in a string, following on the January arrests by Spanish authorities of more than a dozen terrorists along with a significant weapons cache; and the February arrests in Italy of more than two dozen al'Qaida "sleepers."  His arrest was, in turn, followed by the March 2003 captures of al'Qaida operatives reported in Kenya.  When you add to this the previous progress made in destroying part of the al'Qaida "Poisons Network" through arrests in London, Paris, and Spain, and some of the progress that has been made in the United States (with arrests in several cities) you see an organization that surely must be feeling the effects of our combined efforts.

Jemaah Islamiyah - a terror group closely tied to al'Qaida -- also is under strain.  There has been an unprecedented level of cooperation between the nations of Southeast Asia in destroying this network.  In the past 6 months, Singapore has rolled up at least 21 JI members; Indonesia has arrested the senior JI spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, the JI Operations Chief (Mukhlas) and a senior member (Kasteri); there have been other key arrests in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, although a key JI figure - Hambali - is still on the run.

I could go on at length through the other groups that comprise the international terrorist network.  Abu Sayyaf which has several links to al'Qaida, has suffered some key losses.  But though the Armed Forces of the Philippines has mounted a major operation on Jolo Island, ASG continues to pose a significant threat in the Philippines, and we are seeing renewed violence from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Communist Party's insurgency - the New People's Army.  Similarly, notwithstanding some significant successes by the Uribe Government in Colombia, the FARC and ELN continue to pose a threat to U.S. citizens, and are holding 3 DoD government contractors hostage, having already executed one.  We also continue to take efforts against the IMU in Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, Hekmatyar and his group in Afghanistan, and numerous other organizations.

Destroying Terrorist Cells

With respect to "terrorist cadre" - the footsoldiers and cell members - more than 3000 operatives have been captured in over 100 countries by the international coalition.  The United States itself today detains at Guantanamo Bay nearly 700 enemy combatants including operatives and mid-level planners encountered on the battlefield.  These enemy combatants are being questioned for information they hold regarding planned future terrorist attacks.  The information they are providing has enabled us to better understand the nature of the global terrorist network - how key organizations operate, build cells, move money and people, and recruit individuals - and thus how to dismantle these groups.  Based on their information, and that extracted from other sources under foreign control, the U.S. has been able to disrupt, or cause to fail, more than a score of planned attacks.

Disrupted Attacks

Failed and/or disrupted terrorist attacks have run the gamut in terms of target and venue, and scope, ranging from the "dirty bomb" (radiological dispersion device) plan against the United States, to plots in Italy, London, France, Germany, Colombia, Israel, Singapore, Morocco, Russia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Spain, and Turkey - to name only a few. 

As an aside, it also is important for the Committee to know that the United States, working with a number of key coalition partners, has been able to disrupt and avert a string of terrorist activities being orchestrated by the Iraqi Intelligence Service using terror groups as proxies.  For instance, in the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group publicly announced the financial support it was getting from Iraq to conduct terror attacks against U.S. nationals.  You may have noticed the large number of Iraqi operatives being evicted or arrested worldwide.  We do not know the extent to which we have stopped Saddam's operatives from mounting terror attacks, but we certainly have thwarted some of their plans.

Ongoing Threat of Terrorism

That said, the United States and its coalition partners have not been able to prevent key terror attacks.  Jeemah Islamiyah's bombing of the Bali resort killed more than 200 innocents, including 7 Americans.  Despite several seizures of car bombs by Colombian authorities, the FARC recently executed a bombing against a club in Bogota, which killed 34 and wounded 150.  Similarly, the bombing of the Synagogue in Tunisia, and the attacks on the hotel in Kenya and the El Al flight, are examples of operations that we were not able to avert.  Moreover, some groups have adjusted their planning to account for our efforts, and have "gone small-scale and local".  The assassination of Lawrence Foley, a US AID employee, is an example; although the Jordanian government recently did catch two of the terrorists involved in that attack, I am pleased to report.  Other examples include the bombings launched by Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and the targeting of U.S. Marines by terrorists operating in Kuwait.  And, as I said at the outset, we know that al'Qaida and other groups continue operational planning for significant terror attacks, and may have some plans nearing the execution stage.

That brings me to an important point.  The war on terror has come at great cost to the American people, and our losses on September 11^th were not the last of it.  Since that time, a number of American patriots have given their lives in service of the nation.  Several U.S. departments and agencies have lost people; I mentioned Lawrence Foley.  The Special Operations Community, in particular, has lost several of its best and brightest: to date, there have been 137 SOF wounded, 91 of whom sustained injuries during combat.  Thirty eight SOF have been killed in the course Operation Enduring Freedom and related counter-terror operations.

The Role of Special Operations Forces (SOF)

For the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Forces are at the "tip of the spear" in waging the war against terrorism.  One of the first blows struck in the war against terrorists was the fight to topple the Taliban and deny al'Qaida sanctuary in Afghanistan.  That effort was waged, on the ground, by less than 500 Special Forces personnel.  They mounted an unconventional warfare effort, tied closely to indigenous forces and linked with the United States Air Force, in a way that provided for a rapid, decisive, and crushing defeat of the Taliban's conventional forces.  The operation in Afghanistan was prosecuted by small units that operated with autonomy in a highly fluid environment.  It was won by people who could meld with friendly Afghan forces, who could and would:

• operate without a safety net;

• develop such a rapport that they could trust their security to their Afghan allies;

• live without a huge logistics train to provide equipment and supplies;

• be able to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in an environment where civilians and fighters, Taliban and non-Taliban, and ex-Taliban, were all jumbled together; and

• able to engineer combined arms operations between U.S. B-52s and the Northern Alliance's Soviet era tanks.

There is a reason that SOF were called upon to lead Operation Enduring Freedom, and why SOCOM will be called upon to lead future operations to destroy terrorist networks.  The SOF operator is distinguished from other military personnel by his language capabilities, his extensive overseas experience, his ability to work closely with indigenous forces and to train them, his ability to blend into the fabric of the society in which he operates, his independence and maturity, and an unparalleled degree of training.  These Americans truly are one of a kind - each one.  That is why there are so few of them.  They cannot be mass produced.  Nor can their equipment.  They are one of the nation's most scarce and precious resources, and they should not be employed casually.

But, when we do call on them, as we saw in Afghanistan, and as we have seen time and again in other military operations - we know that the interests of the nation will be well served.

SOF demonstrated their myriad of capabilities during Operation Enduring Freedom - within Afghanistan and simultaneously throughout the rest of the world.  While Army Special Forces conducted unconventional warfare with the Northern Alliance to destroy the Taliban's warfighting capability, other Army and Navy SOF were conducting special reconnaissance and direct action to destroy Al Qaeda.  Army Rangers demonstrated their strategic reach and prowess in night operations.   Air Force and Army special operations aviators performed their intrepid work under conditions where investments in specialized training and equipment produced capabilities unique to SOF.  Air Force Special Tactics airmen transformed the role of SOF by integration of every U.S. Service's airpower into the operation -  their unique ability to "rack and stack" multiple types of aircraft, procedures, and communications frequencies and to bring precision and "dumb" ordnance "danger close" and on target proved crucial to halting and reversing Taliban offensives throughout the countryside, and to crushing Taliban resistance around key cities.  The result of this combined push by SOF was a Taliban uprooted and an Al Qaeda on the run.

Other SOF capabilities have assumed a newfound importance.  We all have heard the term "winning hearts and minds."  SOCOM's Civil Affairs men and women are deployed worldwide long before hostilities erupt.  They also remain long after the guns fall silent to help rebuild the instruments of effective governance.  While the bulk of the mission in Afghanistan has now fallen to the conventional military, the most important part - winning the peace - still is in the hands of the Civil Affairs operators who are working with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department to rebuild a society torn by war and frayed by fanaticism.  Stability of the Karzai government, promoted through consistent and measurable improvement in the quality of life for the Afghan people, is essential to U.S. national security.  The work of the international community, and SOCOM's Civil Affairs personnel, are crucial to that effort.

The work of Civil Affairs in Afghanistan also sends an important message to the Muslim world.  Our quarrel is not with Islam.  Our fight is with terrorists and those who support or harbor them.  By removing the Taliban, we have made life livable, once again, for the Afghan people.  The same will be true for the people of Iraq.  It already is the case for the southern part of Iraq today, as humanitarian aid has begun to flow in.  That is a message that the Muslim world needs to hear and understand.

Which brings me to another invaluable part of the Special Operations Community, the servicemen and women in our Psychological Operations detachments.  These people are spearheading U.S. efforts in a war of words and a battle of ideas.  Their success is fundamental to victory in the war on terrorism.  After all, we can spend endless time and effort chasing terrorist operatives.  Unless we can address the root causes of terrorism, the conflict in which we are now engaged will never end.  On a strategic level, PSYOP programs offset the shrill and distorted propaganda of our adversaries by offering alternative sources of information to those denied the basic rights of freedom of speech and expression.  At the tactical level, SOF capabilities to transmit radio broadcasts, to distribute leaflets and to use loudspeakers provide opportunities for enemy soldiers to surrender and prevent civilians from getting in harm's way.

Now, despite the fact that SOCOM was deeply committed to the Afghanistan theater, in support of CENTCOM, the Command proved that the United States could mount other major SOF-run operations concurrent with, and shortly following, Operation Enduring Freedom.  Some of those efforts are ongoing today.  Activities in the Philippines, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Georgia were a few examples.  Today, with Special Operations Forces heavily committed in Iraq, there nevertheless are concurrent operations being run in Afghanistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa, and SOF advisors scattered throughout numerous other countries conducting indigenous training and facilitating the flow of tactical information for host-nation run operations against terrorist groups.

Transforming USSOCOM

That said, we are learning a number of lessons from the war on terrorism.  Accordingly, the Department of Defense has begun a significant "retooling" of USSOCOM to enable the Command to lead the war effort in an even more effective manner.  Congress will see that re-engineering effort manifested in the President's Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request.  Perhaps the most profound change is a shift in expectation by the Department that USSOCOM will no longer serve as primarily a supporting command, but rather will plan and execute certain key missions as a supported command. 

The change from supporting command to supported command will necessitate some significant funding changes and the addition of certain types of personnel and units.  Additionally, USSOCOM will look to move certain collateral SOF missions - either in part or in full - to conventional branches of the military in order to free up special operators for their primary mission - to wage war against terrorists.

In the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2004 (FY2004), an increase of about 47 percent has been proposed for USSOCOM, totaling approximately $4.5 billion.  This increase includes an additional $391 million for operations and related expenses, and about $1.1 billion in procurement of critical equipment.  These increases facilitate the addition of 2,563 personnel in critical mission areas.  Military personnel costs which are included in the budgets of the Military Departments total another $1.2 billion.

Some of the increase in funding will allow SOF to forward deploy into, and sustain operations in, areas where terrorist networks are operating.  Additional funding also is devoted to investments in critical "low-density/high-demand" aviation assets that provide SOF with the mobility necessary to deploy quickly and to execute their missions quickly, safely and with the necessary low, or invisible, profile.

Additional funding is requested to fix command and control shortfalls in both equipment and personnel that could have potentially diminished USSOCOM's ability to simultaneously prosecute a variety of expanded missions.  The increases will allow USSOCOM to provide both a strategic planning and operations capability for missions launched from the United States, and to run operations via the several Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) that are now dual-hatted, with responsibilities to both the regional combatant commander and to USSOCOM.  In addition, several of the TSOCs will receive additional personnel and equipment to support the continuing war-level pace of the activity in theater.  For example, we plan to begin forward basing of additional SOF units and mobility platforms in CENTCOM, including Navy SEAL teams and Army and Air Force SOF aviation units, although specific basing decisions have not been finalized.  In toto, the TSOCs will receive 232 additional personnel and additional command, control and communications equipment.

Also, we are allocating funding to sustain equipment that was acquired in the Fiscal Year 2002 supplemental.  Some additional equipment and sustainment costs associated with transfers of personnel from the service departments to USSOCOM will also be covered by the increases in funding. 

The Equipment

Several critical equipment acquisitions are being put into motion with FY2004 increases.  The budget will mitigate a shortage of critical aviation assets, including through the life extension or modification of existing platforms.  Specifically, USSOCOM will begin modification of 16 additional CH-47s into MH-47Gs, fund an MH-60 service life extension program which will improve the avionics and give those airframes another 20 years of life, accelerate the MC-130H aerial refueling modifications, continue the modification of 4 C-130s into AC-130U gunships, and weapons kits and ammunition for 10 additional MH-60 Defensive Armed Penetrators.  I will note that the MH-47E has proven a workhorse in offensive combat operations, but that the handful of available platforms have taken a beating.  More than half of the MH-47 fleet has been destroyed or damaged at some point, and there is a great deal of "tired iron" in the USSOCOM inventory at this stage.  When you measure your assets in 1's and 2's or even 10's, as USSOCOM does, the loss of a single system can have far-reaching effects.  Fixing USSOCOM's mounting aviation problems that are accruing simply due to the high OPTEMPO of counter-terror operations is a top priority within this budget.  And because we know to expect future loss of systems and platforms, we have begun planning an attrition reserve for the Command.  

There is other additional funding which allow the procurement of new capabilities.  The FY2004 budget begins a long overdue modernization of PSYOP media production, broadcast and leaflet delivery systems.  U.S. PSYOP capabilities have proven their worth in Afghanistan, and now in Iraq, and we are going capitalize upon the recent revolution in telecommunications technology by providing the Command with a research and development program to demonstrate the utility of technologies such as satellite radio and UAVs for PSYOP messaging.

The People

I mentioned earlier in my testimony the exceptionally high caliber of individual who serves as a SOF operator.  Recruiting, training, and retaining this kind of person is a constant challenge for the Department of Defense and the Command.  Increases in funding will allow USSOCOM to increase by an additional 2,563 personnel in FY2004 for an end strength of 49,848 personnel.  About one-third of the uniformed personnel are in reserve component units.

In addition to personnel "adds" for key operational planners in Tampa, and with various subunified commands (SOCs), additional manpower is applied to existing units to increase SOF's responsiveness and provide continuous forward-staged assets. Many of the additional numbers will support the Army's aviation crews who specialize in flying combat troops behind enemy lines.  Additionally, more than 1,200 forces will be forward-deployed operational, support and command and control elements.

The increases will also allow for the addition of new units, including the establishment of a unit to coordinate trans-regional PSYOP activities as well as additional Civil Affairs units (an asset stretched very thin by current OPTEMPO), support units and an aviation unit.  In FY2004, USSOCOM will add a reserve Civil Affairs battalion, an active Civil Affairs company, an active MH-47 aviation battalion, and an active PSYOP company.  In FY2005, USSOCOM plans to add an active Civil Affairs support company, an active regional PSYOP company, four reserve regional PSYOP companies, and two special operations support companies.  

Recruiting, training and retaining SOF will not be without challenges.  Several initiatives were implemented over the past year to improve the effectiveness of these efforts.  While we continue to track this issue closely, and are particularly watchful of retention metrics, our analysis to date indicates that the Command will have the right numbers to sustain the SOF forces the nation needs.  Training instructors and the number of training slots available have increased for Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP training.  A recruiting initiative was launched in which new Army recruits can sign up for Special Forces directly, rather than awaiting selection from a conventional unit.  This is an option that has not been possible since 1988.  Also, special pay and bonuses were implemented to improve retention in highly specialized areas and units. 

Possible Transition of SOF Mission Tasks to Non-SOF Forces

Additionally, two other issues need mention: the possible transition of certain mission tasks traditionally done by SOF to other military forces, and the evolving operational relationship between USSOCOM and the Marine Corps,.

The question about a possible trade-off between effectiveness in execution of "core" SOF missions and fulfilling all the responsibilities set out for USSOCOM in Title 10 is not new.  Still, the centrality of SOF in the war on terror, and USSOCOM's lead military role, again give that question renewed importance.  Simply put, should SOF be responsible for certain mission tasks during wartime when other parts of the military can assume those roles? 

It is not a question of whether certain tasks are essential for the U.S. military to undertake and perform to the highest standard, but rather whether SOF have to perform that mission in all cases.  One of the primary purposes of explicitly outlining the missions of USSOCOM in statue was to ensure that these particular missions were the responsibility of a single, unified entity. 

The combination of a joint environment, and the specialized capabilities that are hallmarks of SOF, have made USSOCOM an innovator or incubator for new techniques, missions, organization, and technologies.  Over time, as the big services have grasped the utility of USSOCOM innovations, the entire U.S. force structure has benefited.  Much of what is developed for SOF becomes the norm in the conventional military as missions and technologies evolve.  An example is Theater Search and Rescue, which is a core competency and a USSOCOM mission, but one which has been adapted and assumed by many other parts of the military.  Air Combat Command, for example, retains its own theater search and rescue capability that is fully supported by the Air Force and does not depend on USSOCOM. 

As the process of innovation and dissemination continues, and the missions and capabilities that were once unique to SOF become evident elsewhere in the military, it is reasonable to reexamine whether primary responsibility for certain tasks can be divested.  We do not have an answer to this question, yet, but I assure the Committee that the Office of the Assistant Secretary for SO/LIC - together with the Command - is looking at this very hard.

The Marine Corps

The relationship between the Marine Corps and SOF continues to evolve in a very healthy direction.  For the first time in history, USSOCOM and the Marine Corps have established a construct for joint warfighting.  A Marine detachment is in a one-year proof of concept phase that began last fall.  On October 1 of this year, we expect it will be fully integrated into a Naval Special Warfare Squadron and serve there on a rotating basis.  Additionally, last year, SOF and the Marines began joint wargaming exercises called "Expeditionary Warrior," which focuses on cooperation (with naval support) in combating terrorism and counter-proliferation contingencies.

As USSOCOM assumes its role as a supported command in the war on terrorism, and can draw on all services' assets in a theater of operation, the joint capability being established between the Marines and SOF will undoubtedly grow.  We can expect that we will realize ways in which such cooperation is possible or even essential. 

In Closing.

We are making progress, and are "taking the fight" to terrorist organizations wherever we can find them.  SOF are in the vanguard of that effort, having proved their mettle, and value to the nation, during Operation Enduring Freedom and numerous other operations.  That said, the pace and intensity of our operations cannot be diminished or relaxed in any way, at any time. 

If given any respite, al'Qaida and other groups will rebuild themselves and strike in ways ever more horrific.  Each element of SOF has a role to play in the sustained campaign against al'Qaida and other terror networks or states, from deconstruction of terrorist cells to reconstruction of societies in Afghanistan, and in a future, liberated Iraq. 

Although this posture already has stretched and tested the limits of the current force, the Administration is bringing to bear additional resources, is forging new partnerships, and may transition some missions to ensure that SOF resources are not depleted during the global campaign.  With that assessment, and with a request for your support for both the President's FY04 budget and the Supplemental - which is urgently needed by the Command.  I am prepared to take any questions that you might have.