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STATEMENT OF
GENERAL MONTGOMERY C. MEIGS
U.S. ARMY RETIRED


BEFORE THE 108TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

26 FEBRUARY 2003
  

This statement reflects my own personal views, those of someone with over 20 years of soldiering in Germany and service in combat and peacekeeping operations in three theaters.  I have not asked the personnel in the Army Headquarter or in my old command, US Army Europe, for data or corroboration of my comments.  I realize that recalling information from memory will probably not be as precise as if I had access to the staff work we did in USAREUR over the last four years as we struggled to reshape our command.  I felt it important to present the members of the Committee with my own views. I wanted to obviate any criticism of my old Service for passing positions to me informally.

The newspaper articles provided me by Committee Staff give a general summary of an intent in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by COMEUR and in the Congress to reshape forces in Europe to a "leaner - meaner force, " reducing troops - particularly Army units, focusing on "power projection platforms" and rotational presence by units.  Realizing that these articles give only an approximate view of the intent, rather than present a brief, I would like to lay out some parameters and questions for analysis.

·    After DESERT STORM, it was obvious NATO would have to transition to meet the realities of the new strategic environment. Unfortunately, our allies have not backed their promises for new military capability with their euros.   Simultaneously, the watershed in information systems and miniaturization meant that the revolution in the integrated capability of new technologies and associated capabilities in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Sensors and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) promised great change in how our forces would be organized, trained, and equipped.  NATO governments could do more to modernize and transform their forces.  The Army in Europe has taken advantage of new developments in C4ISR and has become more strategically agile to a degree not widely understood here back home.

·    With Bosnia and Kosovo behind us and with German and other NATO troops in peace enforcement duty in Afghanistan, however it is critical that the US continue to help reshape the alliance and keep it viable.  NATO is a vital strategic asset for the United States. How else do we get the support of nineteen nations we saw in Operation ALLIED FORCE?  How else do we get the support of the majority of NATO nations that are supporting  us in our position on Iraq?  If NATO is reduced to a hollow shell, the strategic center of gravity for the use of military force by European nations will shift to the European Union, a forum and sovereign decision authority potentially strongly influenced, some might say powerfully so, by France and in which the US has no seat and only an indirect voice.  In addition, Russia has for decades attempted to limit and to undermine NATO.  We should not inadvertently hamstring our most important alliance.

·    The German Chancellor's position about the use of force to remove weapons of mass destruction from and to initiate regime change in Iraq derives from the importance of the Green Party in his governing coalition and anti-establishment sentiment and antipathy toward the US in the "neu Laender," the states in the Federal Republic that formerly constituted East Germany.  In the Fall and early winter of last year, I spoke privately with many senior German officials from both sides of the aisle, CDU/CSU and SPD/Green.  Their sentiment about the Chancellor's position vis-a-vis Iraq and the US and his refusal to soften it after the election ranged from discomfort to deep and serious frustration.  There was great concern about the US-German relationship.  Ironically, the Chancellor has sustained an unprecedented reversal in the recent state elections in which the CDU opposition in Hessen and Lower Saxony gained absolute majorities.  I know for a fact that last December the senior officials of the CDU in both Laender were uncertain of any victory, let alone a landslide.  Granted German public opinion does not now favor a military solution in Iraq and the recent election results in the Laender stem from disillusionment with the SPD/Green economic policies.  But the majority of Germans want a close relationship with the US.  In this overheated moment, should we not be wary of overreacting to a national leader who is clearly sailing against the political winds in his own system?

·    The general policies outlined in the pieces provided to me for this testimony will actually hurt the interests of three states or Laender who have been steadfast friends of the US and of our troops: Rheinland Pfalz, Hessen, and Bavaria.  Ironically, removing forces from Europe will have little impact at the national level, but it will be felt severely in states and counties where we are welcome and have training opportunities we are not allowed off post in the US and where there is great concern about the impact of the current Chancellor's policies on the Trans-Atlantic Alliance and in particular, US - German relations.

·    Though not well known, as part of its transition, over the last four years USAREUR pushed for a lighter force structure in Europe and made it clear that we were ready to restation forces eastward if the investment capital was available.  Restationing forces in the new NATO countries makes great sense operationally in that it would put them closer to likely problem areas.  The training areas in the new NATO countries are vast and these nations are much more friendly to on post and off post training than either Germany or the US.  But the likely locations have advantages and disadvantages.  First, one can move more quickly from Germany by rail to, say, Turkey than one can move forces by sea from the US.  Second, our training facilities in Germany are first rate.  To duplicate them in a country which could only offer real estate would be costly.  In addition, Baumholder until now, the likely site of a Stryker Brigade intended for USAREUR, lies next to Ramstein, the Air Force's intermediate staging point for the EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs.  Putting the Stryker Brigade in a country in Eastern Europe means replicating to some extent the capability at Ramstein that is now being upgraded at a cost of around $300 Million.  Granted, it makes sense to distribute our forces to locations from which they can always deploy efficiently on either US unilateral, NATO, or other operations involving coalitions of the willing, but shifting the airbases and railheads comes at a heavy additional cost

·    The idea of six month rotational tours for units recalls the Army's use of rotational brigades in Europe in the mid-Seventies.  I encourage the members of the Committee to obtain and read the RAND Arroyo study of that experience. 

·    If forces in Korea and Europe are put on a rotational basis, will the structure of the Army and Air Force be able to sustain the PERSTEMPO involved?  Between them, these two theaters possess about one fifth of the Army end strength, but a much larger proportion of its strength in units.  Ideally over the long term, one would keep the ratio of units at home to those deployed at five to one.  Would we be able to do this in this new strategic environment with the Services at their current end strengths?  If not, are we willing to run the risk of burn out and its effect on retention that might result?  I can recall the impact of VOLAR, the Volunteer Army, a similar sea change in Army culture, on senior non-commissioned officer corps emerging from the Viet Nam experience.  They left the ranks in droves, their exodus in part creating the "hollow Army."  We should be very careful with the Services as heavily burdened as they have been for the last decade, that we do not launch such a major change without a very broad understanding of the potential downsides.  Furthermore, if as officials in the administration have indicated, it is our intent to station two and a half divisions in Iraq for two years, this factor enters the calculation.  Along with the demands of rotating units through Korea and Europe, not to mention other possible contingencies, adding the load of keeping two and a half divisions in Iraq means almost half the Army force structure in units is deployed at any one time.

·    The value of our units in their activities in reshaping the Armies of our friends and new allies in the EUCOM AOR has really not been considered.  With about sixth of the Army's fighting structure, in the last four yearsUSAREUR normally sustained about forty percent of the Army's deployment activity, much of that aimed at work with new NATO Armies and peacekeeping.  Will rotational units be able to sustain that kind of involvement which has been so important to helping the armies of the new NATO countries to pull themselves up by their bootstraps to NATO standards?  By transitioning to a rotational force, do we not give up a tremendous amount of influence in the political/military arena in countries whose forces tend to be Army-centric?

·    Is the Congress ready and willing to provide the investment dollars to purchase the additional assets for strategic mobility needed quickly to move an almost totally US-based force to war and to contingencies?

·    Units in the Army have been run hard since the Fall of the Iron Curtain. It is relatively easy to find field grade officers and senior NCOs with three to five tours in harm's way.   Children and spouses bore much of the strain of that pace.  Many families would se moving to a rotational structure and its obvious implications as a breach of faith.  That sentiment would undermine our ability to keep professionals in the Service.  In particular, if we were to execute this policy, and if we were to move families back to the US while their military spouses were either in a combat zone or returning, the impact on morale would be devastating.

·    Are there not options that save money, allow restationing closer to likely problem areas, take advantage of the value of being "an ocean closer," and that give us the military/political clout forward presence affords?  Force levels in the Army in Europe are down 71% from their pre-1990 levels.  OPTEMPO is off the chart, though sustainable at current levels with investment in quality of life and a continuing pride by our military professionals in what they do.  But there is a limit.  Have we done a truly sound assessment of the cost and benefits of reshaping forward deployed forces, something that we should do and moving to a rotational system, something that has in the past proved unpopular with the troops and may have hidden costs?

·    Can we also really give up the advantages of forward presence?  Could we not replace a significant portion of the heavy units with light infantry or light cavalry units that move more quickly?  That alternative would provide a better fit to likely contingency scenarios as well as forces needed in a large campaign in either the EUCOM or CENTCOM AOR.  Could we not make the current echeloned command and control structure more efficient?  Those changes would entail a significant savings in OPTEMPO dollars.  In the last four years USAREUR obtained approval for closure of a significant number of bases in Germany and consolidation onto posts that could be maintained and upgraded more efficiently.  Could not this pattern continue, especially in the light of the restationing of units eastward?

In summary, there is no question that NATO must transition to meet new needs.  However, can we afford to create a situation in which NATO begins to become irrelevant?  Secondly, have we really assessed in a rigorous and unhurried way the likely hidden costs of a rotational structure as well as its fiscal benefits?  USAREUR's operating budget is just under $2 Billion.  If the soldiers come home, and we continue to pay the bills to train them on the Army's annual plan as well as to rotate them back and forth, to maintain two sets of gear, and to allow them to train on first class facilities in new countries, are we really going to save scarce dollars or must we actually make additional investments in strategic mobility and facilities?  And are we really ready for the loss of influence drastically reducing the forward presence will entail?

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