STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOSEPH W. RALSTON, U.S. AIR FORCE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

JUNE 19, 2002

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).   As Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, my job is to ensure USEUCOM fulfills its missions to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, promote regional stability, advance U.S. interests in the Theater, and enhance transatlantic security through support to NATO.   These tasks are interdependent and mutually supportive.    

USEUCOM’s support to NATO encompasses an array of activities. Beyond providing forces to NATO, we also participate in Partnership for Peace (PfP), a multilateral program that promotes interoperability and cooperation between 19 NATO allies and 27 non-NATO partners. Far from a Cold War relic, NATO demonstrated its continued strategic relevance by invoking Article 5, the mutual defense pledge in the Washington Treaty, for the first time in its history – the very day after the horrific attacks of September 11^th.   Furthermore, it has continued to adapt to the changing global security environment by adjusting its command and force structures, expanding its membership and developing new relationships with Russia and other former adversaries. NATO’s continued success in preserving stability in and around Europe, its evolution in the face of the changing global security environment, and its determination to counter emerging threats ensure that NATO will meet future challenges as successfully as it met those of the past. 

NATO’S PAST SUCCESS

The North Atlantic Treaty established an alliance that has endured over half a century.   During its first forty years, NATO manifested the political will and military capability to deter the Soviet threat; provided for the rearmament of Germany within a framework acceptable to her wartime foes; and linked, through capable, forward deployed forces and nuclear deterrence, the United States to the security of Western Europe. This stable security environment, combined with the Marshall Plan, facilitated a rapid economic recovery and the subsequent growth of Western Europe into our largest trading partner. Eventually, the Soviet Union, its planned economy overtaken by the vibrant markets of the Alliance, collapsed along with the Warsaw Pact. 

Without a common foe, some argued, NATO would lose its reason for existence, yet the member nations chose to continue their Alliance, and to transform and adapt it to new circumstances. Like the original 12 signatories of the Washington Treaty, numerous newly independent nations looked to NATO as a source of stability in an uncertain world.   The newly independent nations were linked to NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, followed by the establishment of PfP in 1994, and, later, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 

NATO’S CONTINUED CONTRIBUTIONS

The attacks of September 11^th, NATO’s rapid response immediately thereafter, the commitment of its members, and NATO’s stabilization of ethnic conflict in the Balkans affirms its continued relevance in the face of new threats. Also, NATO’s development of new relationships and preparation of new members for eventual entry into NATO through PfP provide a critical foundation for the future. 

War on Terrorism

The last 50 years of NATO cooperation ensured that despite speaking different languages and relying on different equipment, allies could successfully operate together in armed conflict. This success comes from the multinational experience afforded by training, operating and participating in NATO’s various joint commands and military exercises. This interaction has been key to bringing a number of commitments to fruition, and has provided the U.S. with the network of relationships needed as a foundation to coordinate an international response to terrorism.  

Although Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is not a NATO operation, NATO nations as well as non-NATO partners are providing substantial equipment, capabilities and personnel to the fight against terrorism. NATO nations, not including the United States, have contributed approximately 418,000 allied troops to the U.S. Central Command in support of OEF and other operations in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT).   Fourteen NATO nations are currently operating in Afghanistan, and young men and women from seven of these nations are involved in armed combat. 

These allies are providing invaluable air reconnaissance, air refueling, cargo handling, close air support, mine clearing and medical capabilities to the effort. All of the NATO allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases and refueling assistance, and all have stepped up their individual intelligence efforts.   Less visible but equally important are the cooperative intelligence efforts and information sharing occasioned by the invocation of Article 5, which has provided numerous leads in the campaign against terrorism.   Allies such as Germany, Spain, Turkey, France, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom have assigned liaison officers to the USEUCOM Counter-terrorism Joint Planning Group (JPG). The JPG is playing a critical role in developing and executing the Theater Counter-terrorism Campaign Plan to include the on-going maritime interdiction operations and the Georgia train and equip program.   Throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility, Allied nations have provided increased security around U.S. facilities. They have improved our security in time of crisis while reducing our costs. In sum, the Alliance continues to play an enormously valuable role for the United States. 

A dramatic manifestation of NATO’s relevance and commitment to the GWOT was the deployment of part of NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control System to patrol America’s skies. This deployment constituted the first time NATO forces crossed the Atlantic to defend the United States. Some 830 crewmembers from 13 allied nations contributed to this successful operation.   Allied aircrews logged over 4,300 total flying hours while patrolling the skies over American cities in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE before returning home on 16 May. NATO’s standing naval forces are making another important contribution to the war.   These forces are patrolling the Mediterranean to detect and prevent terrorist and terrorist support movement and thereby impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our European allies. Up to a dozen ships have simultaneously taken part in this operation, titled ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. This force routinely shares important information with the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which often uses the information in the conduct of maritime interdiction operations.

 Balkans Operations

The operational employment of NATO forces to solve a major European security problem in the Balkans, outside the territory of NATO member nations, confirms the enduring value of the Alliance in quelling threats unleashed by nationalist, ethnic or religious violence. While NATO’s multinational effort in the Balkans continues to enjoy success, many hurdles remain before this troubled region can be considered safe and secure.   NATO is involved in two distinct and unique missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, each with its own successes and challenges.   In Bosnia we have a political framework through the Dayton Accords.   In Kosovo we do not have a similar political framework.   Bosnia is complicated by an ethnic reality that has three highly dispersed and intermingled groups with few common interests; Kosovo, on the other hand, is overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian with a small number of non-Albanian minorities, mostly Serbs, in numerous enclaves throughout the province. In Bosnia the police forces have in many ways remained separate ethnic fiefdoms, while in Kosovo, there is an effective police-training program that provides an increasingly effective, internally recruited force on the street. 

     The success to date of the Allied effort in bringing stability to Bosnia is reflected in the ongoing reduction of Allied forces needed, from a high point of 60,000 in 1996 to today’s total troop strength of approximately 16,000.   In 1996, 33 percent of those troops were U.S.   Within the last eleven months alone, we have reduced U.S. forces by 1,850 troops. U.S. forces now total approximately 2,500, or about 15 percent of the Stabilization Force’s (SFOR) total strength. One of the ways we have been able to reduce the American footprint is by capitalizing on rapid reaction combat service support units from neighboring NATO countries.   For example, the Hungarians are keeping an engineer unit ready to respond to contingencies in Bosnia, thereby freeing a similar American capability to return to its home station. The U.S. force will be downsized even further by the end of the year, in conjunction with an overall reduction to SFOR.  

     The fundamental challenge that remains in Bosnia is to establish the rule of law and promote confidence in indigenous law enforcement institutions. Consistent with this objective, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that met in Brussels in December 2001, underscored the importance of a seamless transition from the United Nations (UN) International Police Task Force (IPTF) currently facilitating the development of a professional police force in Bosnia to a more robust, follow-on mission. There is widespread acknowledgement in the international community that the follow-on police effort should be part of a larger mission that would address all elements of the rule of law, including prosecutorial, judiciary and penal system reform. The creation of an indigenous police force, backed up by reformed prosecutorial, judiciary and penal systems, will enable the Bosnian government to effectively assume responsibility for maintaining a safe and secure environment that currently depends largely on SFOR’s presence.   On 18 February 2002, the European Union General Affairs Council (GAC) took the first step in meeting this requirement by adopting a resolution for a Police Mission (EUPM) to replace the IPTF at the end of the latter’s mandate on 31 December 2002.  

While we do not have an agreed political framework in Kosovo, progress is measurable and the security and economic indicators are generally moving in the right direction. Thirty-three contributing nations maintain approximately 35,000 troops on the ground in Kosovo (KFOR), with the U.S. contributing 15 percent of the force on average, or approximately 4,800 troops.  Military progress promises to allow us to reduce U.S. and NATO forces in the near future. The UN International Police Force continues its efforts with 51 nations contributing approximately 4,500 police officers. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Kosovo Police Service (KPS) School graduated its 18^th class on 30 March 2002, and has placed over 4,600 new multi-ethnic officers on the beat since opening its doors in September 1999. This latest class graduated almost 300 cadets, including 32 from smaller municipalities as well as 19 women. The next class of 307 cadets should graduate on 29 June 2002.   The ultimate goal of the KPS effort is to replace the UN contract force, turning police responsibility over to the citizens of Kosovo entirely. 

The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has published more than 100 regulations with the force of law. They have also appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, with five district courts and some lower courts in operation.   Additionally, 11 international judges and five international prosecutors have been appointed to the district courts, and an international judge now sits on the Supreme Court. With the effort to restore the rule of law, we can commence the process of transferring the internal security of Kosovo back to civilian authority where it belongs.   This is where the military exit strategy begins.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is also an area of ethnic turbulence in the Balkans. In late August 2001, following a NATO-European Union brokered settlement with the country’s four leading political parties, NATO conducted Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST, facilitating the voluntary disarmament of the National Liberation Army (NLA). The international community (IC) moved expeditiously on post-ESSENTIAL HARVEST activities in an effort to continue support for the peace process and FYROM security.   As part of this effort, NATO deployed approximately 700 personnel this past September as part of Operation AMBER FOX.   These 700 personnel, known as Task Force Fox, are now in place, with Germany serving as the lead nation. The Netherlands will assume leadership this month, on 27 June.   These forces provide support to the IC monitors who are working with Macedonian police and military forces to reenter villages that suffered from last year’s conflict. Following a request by President Trajkovski to NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson, the North Atlantic Council recently authorized an extension of AMBER FOX until 26 October 2002.  

     Task Force Fox’s mission is limited.   It provides select intelligence, roving monitor liaison teams, Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and a force to conduct emergency extraction operations should an IC monitor team get into trouble.   It does not guarantee a specific safe and secure environment, provide close protection for the IC monitors, or serve as a buffer between ethnic groups. Task Force Fox is not responsible for the implementation or enforcement of any agreements between the FYROM government and any other party.   In addition to Task Force Fox, the 2,000 NATO soldiers manning the National Support Elements also remain in and near Skopje, along with the NATO Coordination and Cooperation Cell (NCCC). Recently merged into one NATO office located in Skopje, these forces have proven their worth over the past year in providing liaison, operational coordination for border security, and information sharing with the FYROM government.    

Much has changed since NATO sent troops to the Balkans.   Thanks to an improvement in the security environment in the Balkans, the North Atlantic Council recently approved a plan to further reduce NATO forces in Kosovo and Bosnia. SFOR in Bosnia will be reduced from 18,000 troops to approximately 12,000 by the end of 2002 (U.S. forces will be reduced proportionately with other nation’s forces at that time). KFOR, too, will undergo force reductions in Kosovo, and the U.S. contribution will decrease by 20 percent, from a current force of approximately 5,000 to an end of year strength of 4,000. Over the next 12 months, NATO will also develop an over-the-horizon reserve force concept to complement the Alliance’s in place forces. These changes should be complete by mid-2003 and will create lighter, more mobile and more flexible forces that are both cost effective and able to maintain security and stability in the Balkans.  

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

PfP is NATO’s primary military tool for enhancing stability and security in Europe. The PfP program has been a key contributor to the significant democratic progress many nations have achieved both militarily and politically. The inclusion of Partner nations in Balkan operations underscores the payoff of PfP, both in the reform of former communist militaries, and in the relief of the manpower burden on NATO. Partner nations have also made important contributions to OEF and the GWOT.   Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have provided basing and overflight rights. Uzbekistan, a PfP partner in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, has also provided critical support. USEUCOM’s Security Cooperation efforts established the framework to gain and coordinate this support. By improving access, interoperability and intelligence cooperation, our PfP efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to the U.S. and to NATO.  

CHALLENGES

            NATO’s core mission remains the collective defense of its members. NATO must continue to adapt to ensure that it can continue to successfully carry out this mission in the face of new threats.  

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) & NATO Interoperability

In 1999, the member-nation Heads of State recognized that NATO needed to focus on improved capabilities. The Defense Capabilities Initiative was given impetus by the ongoing allied operations in Yugoslavia. Similarly, the events of the last year compelled a renewed focus on interoperable defense capabilities, as several members of the Alliance went to war in Afghanistan.   Following the events of September 11^th, the Alliance clearly recognizes the need to adapt to deal with 21st century threats.   NATO has seen what unarmed airliners can do to a city, and none of the NATO member-nations want to see what weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of transnational terrorists can do. Therefore, it is urgent that the Alliance develops ways to better defend against these weapons and their means of delivery. The best defense is sometimes a good offense, and members have agreed to develop their lift capabilities to get forces to wherever they are needed and sustain them for as long as they are needed. These forces must be able to communicate easily yet securely with one another.   And crucially, these forces must be effective, which means they must have adequate stocks of precision-guided munitions.   Precision-guided munitions have made it possible for a few aircraft to accomplish the destructive effect of an entire squadron of World War II bombers with substantially less losses, less collateral damage and less logistics.   Finally, air defenses are a real threat. Allied aircraft must be able to suppress them to accomplish that precise destructive effect with minimal losses. In summary, NATO should renew their efforts to focus within DCI on missile defense, chemical-biological defense, strategic and operational lift and mobility, command, control and communications systems, precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses. 

A critical linkage exists between capability and interoperability.   The United States would like allies to be able to operate alongside its forces. To do so, they need the capabilities enumerated above, and this is the main thrust of DCI.   But these alone are not sufficient.   Interoperability is also needed. Interoperability allows those forces to exchange services, like communications and navigation signals, data, fuel and weapons. It also allows them to have a common understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures. Interoperability increases the effectiveness of a multinational force on the battlefield, and is the fruit of long years of effort establishing common technical and doctrinal (and linguistic) standards within NATO. Interoperability is not glamorous, and it is not tangible, like a C-17 or missiles, yet it is the glue that makes several national forces able to operate in a coherent way — and it is relatively inexpensive. In an era of flat European defense budgets, this bears mentioning.  

            There has been some mention of asking allies to specialize in capabilities the Alliance needs. For example, NATO has abundant fighter and attack aircraft, but limited airlifters.   While NATO as a whole should increase its airlift capacity, that does not mean that each nation should buy airlifters. It is not cost-effective for smaller nations to buy limited numbers of airlifters because they must also purchase the associated overhead at disproportional additional expense. Finally, some nations have already specialized in certain areas and established themselves as world-class experts, and it makes sense to build upon these accomplishments. The challenge lies in convincing a sovereign nation that its security is better served by not having the full spectrum of capabilities, since its options could be limited.   Nations would need assurances that the capabilities they agreed to forego would be made available to them in case of need.   This adds new relevance to the fundamental Article 5 commitment to collective defense. 

Emerging Threats

NATO plays a key role in ensuring transatlantic security in the face of new threats. Since September 11^th, NATO has acted on its core commitments to deter and defend against threats of aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.   Members have responded to the most immediate and serious threat we face – national and transnational terrorism – and are contributing, as individual allies, to the fight in Afghanistan and around the world.   The threat of terrorism since the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC has galvanized the organization, and the North Atlantic Council’s Communiqué of 14 May following the Reykjavik Ministerial confirms NATO’s “determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as necessary.”  

Even prior to September 11^th, the strategic projection for the global security environment involved increasing uncertainty due to dangerous conditions from the convergence of negative global trends no less threatening to national security than terrorism itself.   Organized crime and drug trafficking, ethnic and religious violence, attacks on our infrastructure, and the proliferation of fissile material and missile components are threats that are an increasing part of the security environment in Europe and around the world.   While such threats will require novel solutions to meet unfamiliar challenges, NATO must also be prepared to deter continuing military threats posed by the strategic and regional forces of other nations, including conventional forces and WMD.  

NATO countries are working together to deal with the threat posed by WMD, and the means of their delivery, either by nations or terrorists. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense.   The Alliance is now working on proposals to develop more effective defenses against biological and chemical weapons.   NATO will continue to adapt its military capabilities to both face these emerging threats and be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks.  

NATO Relationship with the European Union (EU)

            As NATO’s relationship with the EU continues to evolve, it is particularly critical, given resource constraints, that the two organizations develop mechanisms to coordinate each other’s efforts at ensuring peace, stability and prosperity in Europe.   The EU clearly has political, informational and, predominantly, economic tools of international power that can complement NATO’s own political, informational and, primarily, military tools.   The EU remains committed to developing a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) among its members, and the attacks of September 11^th have enhanced that commitment. In our view, ESDP can strengthen Europe’s security posture as long as it is achieved in a manner that is complementary to NATO, not in competition with it.   Both U.S. and NATO interests are best served by a relationship with the EU that results in transparency and cooperation.    

Accordingly, U.S. leadership must continue to assist efforts to harmonize NATO and EU policies and avoid duplication of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) structures and processes. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) should continue to play the central role in military planning to meet crises and contingencies.   If the EU were to create a duplicate planning headquarters, it would only serve to make it more confusing to develop coherent plans and hence, complicate the process of gaining the consensus needed to act.   The EU should also seek to avoid investing limited resources in ESDP capabilities that are redundant with, as opposed to complementary to, NATO capabilities. Equally important is avoiding the imposition of dual mission requirements on units and resources already stretched thin. The best way to do this is to give the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe a robust role as strategic coordinator for both NATO and EU-led operations. 

FUTURE OF NATO

Efforts to evolve NATO’s forces to execute new missions, accept additional members to further enhance European stability, and develop strategic relationships to advance NATO’s principles of peace and stability ensure that its effectiveness continues and its values endure. The Prague Summit will further define the NATO Alliance for the 21^st century – its new capabilities, new members, and new relationships.   The enlargement of NATO is ultimately a political, not a military decision – a country whose military still has a way to go with reform may still be a productive addition to the Alliance.   A case could also be made where a country with a strong military may not be a productive addition due to a lack of adherence to democratic principles. There are nevertheless valid military considerations bearing upon an aspirant nation’s ability to contribute to NATO’s missions. 

Three New Members

At the time of the 1999 accession, an interagency review estimated 10 years would be required for full integration of the new members.   The integration processes that we would expect to be accomplished in the first three years have been largely successful; the new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, are fully engaged in the NATO defense planning process, manning the majority of their NATO staff positions, and are committed to making progress toward providing the forces and resources that NATO is asking of them.   Despite the progress to date, some long-term efforts, such as development of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps or major weapons systems acquisitions, will take longer, perhaps even a generation, before success is fully realized. 

NATO’s new members have made significant contributions to ongoing operations in the Balkans since joining the Alliance. They supported Operation ALLIED FORCE by providing bases, airfields and transit rights for NATO troops and aircraft and their contributions to Balkans operations continue. The combined SFOR/KFOR troop contributions of the new members have historically averaged nearly 2,000 troops. In response to NATO’s April 2000 call for additional reserve forces, Poland quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This planned 60-day KFOR rotation lasted more than five months. More recently, the Czech Republic contributed an additional 120-man contingent to support Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST in Macedonia. 

The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, thanks to their similar backgrounds, have also proven to be excellent mentors to the current round of NATO aspirants.   They are working to extend peace and security eastward.   The Poles are particularly active with military-to-military contacts with Lithuania. The Czechs are active with the Slovaks and Lithuanians, and plan to contribute an artillery battalion to the 2,500-strong Slovak-Polish-Czech Peacekeeping Brigade, which is expected to be ready for duty by 2005. Similarly, Hungary has worked in close cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria. 

The defense budgets for each of the new members have remained strong since accession, despite domestic economic challenges.   For example, the Czech Ministry of Defense was the only ministry to be spared cuts during their recent two year-long recession, and Poland’s six-year defense plan guarantees defense spending at 1.95 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). According to the Secretary of Defense’s 2001 report on allied burden sharing, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, respectively, are ranked 6th, 8th and 11th in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in relationship to the other NATO members. While all defense budgets of all three new members will continue to face pressure from competing needs, they have clearly demonstrated the will to support national defense. 

The three new members are making hard choices about where to spend their limited defense dollars, while maintaining the momentum they have established.   We are watching their progress closely, and find significant challenges lie in areas such as developing a viable NCO corps, implementing an integrated planning, budgeting and procurement process, and modernizing their inventory of Soviet-era equipment. Meeting these challenges will require significant monetary investment over an extended period. Equally important, but not as costly, is continued exposure to Western schools and training, which will help them adapt to Western style thinking, leadership and especially decision-making. 

Costs Associated With Enlargement

With each round of enlargement, the issues of cost and military capability are justifiably debated. As reported by the Congressional Budget Office, the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO reduced the U.S. share of the civil budget from 23.3 percent to 22.5 percent, and the military budget from 28.0 percent to 26.2 percent.   The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget fell from 28.3 percent to 25.2 percent. The allies share the common costs of the 1999 enlargement, which NATO has estimated at $1.5 billion over 10 years, through the military budget and the NSIP.   Of those costs, $1.3 billion is for infrastructure improvements to be paid by the NSIP. The U.S. share would be approximately $400 million — or roughly one-fourth, over 10 years. The payoff resides partly in having airfields and logistics facilities able to support NATO and U.S. operations and exercises. Readiness also improves given the greater freedom of maneuver allowed our forces exercising in these countries. 

An additional, discretionary cost borne by the United States is the financing of purchases of U.S. equipment and training through Security Assistance.   The President’s request for FY 03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) combined for the new members is just under $41 million. These grant funds, managed by the Department of State and authorized by this Committee, support important Department of Defense initiatives to improve new member defense capabilities and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, while providing U.S. access to new member militaries, governments, and bases.   Thus, this sum could be seen as an investment, especially since the FMF funds return to American industry in the form of equipment purchases.   I have provided some preliminary considerations, but other DoD organizations will provide authoritative cost forecasts for the upcoming round of enlargement. 

Military Considerations for Enlargement

The aspirants have a common legacy of inflexible operational doctrine and authoritarian Communist defense planning that was unaccountable to the public.   They have dedicated considerable effort to producing new national strategy documents in a transparent way, to garner public and parliamentary support. The aspirant militaries can be broken down into two main categories:   those who inherited a burden of obsolete Warsaw Pact equipment and imbalanced personnel structures, and those who had to build armed forces from scratch. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania fit clearly into the first category.   Slovakia, to a lesser degree, also fits into the first category since it began its existence as an independent nation in 1993, obtaining a disparate mix of one-third of the Czechoslovak armed forces. 

The Baltics fit clearly into the second category, having been stripped bare of all equipment and infrastructure upon the departure of Soviet forces.   Similarly, Slovenia and Macedonia did not inherit any part of the Yugoslav armed forces upon independence. Aspirants with legacy militaries have struggled to downsize equipment and personnel while restructuring their forces according to their new strategic situation.   Aspirants without legacy militaries have concentrated on recruiting sufficient qualified personnel and acquiring a coherent mix of equipment. 

Areas of concern common to both categories, on which they have made good progress, include English language capability, legal arrangements in support of operations, the ability to secure classified information, infrastructure to support NATO deployments, NCO corps development and quality of life for troops.   All are financially constrained in their reform efforts by small defense budgets, which compete with other national reform priorities. 

Aspirant Military Capabilities

As U.S. European Command’s military contribution to the decision making process regarding which aspirants the United States will support for admission to NATO, we have been tasked to provide the Secretary of Defense with an assessment of each aspirant’s current military posture.   In making our assessment of their progress and current status, USEUCOM focused on four primary areas: strategy and force structure, defensive capabilities, legal and legislative issues, and security procedures.  

Strategy and Force Structure.   Sound national security and military strategy documents, effective interagency resource management, rationalized force structures, personnel management, and English language capability are top-level indicators of military potential. The aspirants are currently revising their military force structures to combine immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and main/territorial defense forces, with national resources, to include funding, focused on the first two.   In all cases, transition requires painful personnel restructuring, and its success will be indicative of a sound National Military Strategy.   Personnel management includes accession, knowing what specialists you have and need, a balanced rank structure, an effective NCO corps, quality of life and professional education. These are the building blocks of a quality force.   Similarly, English language proficiency is the foundation of NATO interoperability, since proper communications depend upon common language.  

Defense Capabilities. Defense capabilities, aligned according to the NATO DCI categories, are the heart of preparedness and proof of sound planning and budgeting.   The bottom line is: can they deploy a reasonably sized force, sustain it, communicate with it, protect it, and fight effectively with it? USEUCOM assessed the aspirants’ ability to deploy a small (company-sized) light infantry unit in support of NATO and their ability to sustain, protect, communicate and fight with that force. We consider this size effort to be the smallest reasonable capability expected of any NATO aspirant. We evaluate each aspirant’s effective engagement ability, which includes a basic ability to fight, on the offense and defense, in varying conditions of daylight, weather, terrain, etc. The aspirants have focused funding on equipping and training elite units in the short-term, expanding to the entire force in the long-term. In evaluating an aspirant’s ability to engage effectively, we closely examine the capabilities of their land, air and maritime forces.   We also measure the survivability of the aspirants’ forces and infrastructure to ensure the military can continue to fight once attacked.   Finally, we evaluate each aspirant’s Consultation, Command and Control capability (a NATO term synonymous with the U.S. term “Command, Control, Communications and Computers” or C4), through reliable and secure communication and information systems strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of forces.   Aspirants have been investing in this area and have benefited from comprehensive C4 studies accomplished by USEUCOM and the USAF Electronic Systems Center.

Legal and Legislative. Aspirants are aware that legal obstacles to reinforcement of, or transit by NATO forces, as well as to deployment of national forces in support of NATO, can be prejudicial to accession.   Accordingly, they each have goals oriented at easing restrictions in this regard. Their progress in this area is important if they are to contribute appropriately to the Alliance. 

Security. Finally, USEUCOM looked at each aspirant’s ability to protect classified information, both physically and within electronic systems.   The appropriate internal security mechanisms must be in place to prevent the compromise of Alliance intelligence and information.     

            The military assessments of the aspirants, based on the criteria in these four major areas, continue to be updated and provided to the Department of Defense. It would be imprudent to view the information obtained from these assessments in isolation. Rather, they will be combined with other inputs from a number of other organizations both inside and outside of DOD to determine the President’s recommendation on which aspirants the United States will recommend for an invitation to NATO membership.  

New NATO Relationships with Russia

As NATO transforms its military capabilities and enlarges its membership, it is simultaneously redefining its relationship with Russia.   The NATO-Russia relationship was originally based on the 1997 Founding Act, which outlined broad areas of political and military consultation and cooperation, and when mutually agreed, joint decision-making.   For the past five years, NATO and Russia have developed annual Work Programs involving a wide array of issues to include nuclear confidence and security building measures (CSBM), defense reform, terrorism, arms control and regional security. In the military sphere, NATO-Russia cooperation and consultation has centered on the two peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and advancing Russian participation in PfP and “In the Spirit of PfP” training activities.   Over the past three years, there has been a measurable improvement in Russian willingness to cooperate in these NATO-related military activities as evidenced by the Russian Navy’s participation in BALTOPS 01 and Russian participation in a five-day Russia-U.S.-U.K. war game last month.   Over the past few years, high-level consultations by NATO and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Defense have improved mutual understanding and advanced our military to military cooperation in SFOR and KFOR. 

After September 11^th, the shared threat of international terrorism has been an impetus for further political, diplomatic and military cooperation among the allies. After six months of negotiation, on 28 May, NATO Heads of State and Russian President Putin signed an agreement in Rome to establish new NATO-Russia Council.   This new council will replace the Permanent Joint Council, but does not alter the goals, principles and commitments set in the 1997 Founding Act.   The new council will identify and pursue opportunities for joint action, but will not impact on the Alliance’s ability to act independently.   The NATO-Russia Council provides a new mechanism to enable broader political and military consultation, cooperation and joint actions.   The new council will specifically address enhanced cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergency cooperation, and assessing new threats and challenges.   It is hoped these political developments and areas of enhanced cooperation will open a new chapter in NATO-Russia military relations and significantly advance European security and stability. 

CONCLUSION

NATO is evolving its military capabilities, enlarging its membership and developing new relationships to meet future challenges.   NATO’s members recognize that past success does not guarantee future relevance; all organizations must adapt to changing circumstances and NATO’s Cold War victory does not, in itself, justify its continued existence.   Thanks to 50 years of day-to-day military interaction between NATO allies and non-NATO partners, these militaries now share common languages, doctrine and techniques.   This military interoperability helps ensure NATO’s effectiveness, and sets the groundwork for NATO to realize its potential in the future.    

The strong integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed, given the needed resources.   As for the next round of enlargement, it is important to consider the potential cost of not enlarging. The aspirant nations have put forth a strong effort in good faith toward becoming members, and have taken political positions in support of the Alliance in recent conflicts. Their elected officials have made membership an important part of their public agenda and sought to increase public support for NATO. From a military standpoint, we should continue to foster and promote the outstanding cooperation and support we have enjoyed in terms of troop contributions to ongoing operations and the use of infrastructure and transit rights. 

NATO’s overarching objective of opening up the Alliance to new members is more than just an expansion of NATO’s military influence or capabilities, or altering the nature of its basic defense posture. Rather, NATO seeks to enhance stability in Europe as a whole.   NATO's prompt invocation of Article 5 for the campaign against terrorism, the contributions NATO has provided to this protracted war, the benefits to be realized from its new members, and new relationships now being developed demonstrate the strategic flexibility that makes NATO as relevant and viable in the post-September 11^th world as it was during the Cold War.   Transformation of its capabilities, enlargement of its membership, and continued development of new relationships will ensure that NATO’s best days are yet to come. I will be pleased to provide the Committee with any additional information it may require on these or any other matters of concern.