Military

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

17 April 2002

by William E. Odom, LT GEN, USA, Retired

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

        Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you to discuss the wisdom of NATO enlargement. You have asked me to present an overview of the strategic context in which the next round of enlargement is being considered this year. 

Historical Perspective

        Let me begin by offering some historical perspective. Europe's security needs today are similar to those of the period right after World War II. The end of the Cold War, like the end of that war, left a band of weak European states from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean, more connected by wars and ethnic conflicts than by cooperative relations, mutually suspicious, and uncertain about how to pursue postwar reconstruction.   The debates in Europe about creating NATO at that time ignored the Soviet military threat while focusing more on economic reconstruction and fear of Germany. Even the United States saw the Soviet threat as more political than military until the outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950. The initial purpose of the alliance, therefore, was not to "keep the Russians out," but "to keep old enemies in Western Europe from drifting back toward war" while proceeding with economic recovery.

         Reconstruction in Western Europe, therefore, succeeded dramatically because traditional enemies – France and Germany – cooperated in the European Coal and Steel Community which was soon eclipsed by the European Economic Commission, based on the 1957 Treaty of Rome.   This story is well known, but we tend to forget that it was only possible because the United States took a hegemonic role in the North Atlantic Alliance and maintained large military forces in Europe.   This effectively made NATO a surrogate for a supranational political-military authority that could keep the peace, something modern Europe has never been able to do. Although the ensuing five decades have produced the European Union, this organization is a long way from being able to assume the governing role that NATO has played.       

Contemporary Problems

        Today's parallels to 1949 are striking when we consider Eastern Europe. Again, we see a band of states from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean in economic distress, mistrustful of their neighbors because of nationalism and ethnic tensions, and uncertain about how to proceed. Their problems, however, differ somewhat from those faced by Western Europe in the 1940s and 50s. Rather than the destruction in war suffered by Western Europe, they confront a different kind of destruction, namely, the devastating legacies from Communist party rule, command economic systems, and Soviet hegemony. Let me describe each briefly.

        -- Communist party rule. The Soviet regime-type had as its core a single dictatorial party tightly embracing the secret police and military officer corps. The post-communist leaders in these states mostly come from these old organizations, which socialized them in ways that are inimical to Liberal democracy and market economies. Some are able to change sufficiently to play a positive role in the new political and economic systems, but many are not. The problem was different in Western Europe where the Nazi and fascist elites were deposed and destroyed. No Nazi Party was left to compete in elections. The old communist elites have not suffered the same fate; they survive in large numbers and lead successor communist parties and communist-like parties, actually winning office in a case or two. I am not suggesting that the communists are likely to re-establish durable communist regimes throughout the region (although Belarus and Moldova have such regimes, Bulgaria had one for a couple of years). They have neither the public support nor the organizational discipline necessary, but because they play a significant role in the politics of these countries, they obstruct and slowdown progress in effective reform.

        -- Command economic systems.   The old economic system in all of these countries squandered capital in unprofitable investments for four decades, making most of their industries unviable in a market economy. Perhaps more troublesome are the institutional legacies of command economies. Western Europe did not lose its old legal and economic institutions, but in Eastern Europe the communists destroyed them, such as they were; thus they must be rebuilt today. This is a much bigger challenge than anything faced in Western Europe after 1945.

        -- Soviet hegemony. The effects of Soviet control over these countries were many, but the residue of a few of them is especially worrisome. A few former party, military, and intelligence officials, now well-placed within the post-communist regimes, still have personal connections with their old Russian counterparts. Not only does this allow Russian intelligence officers to make political trouble in these countries, but it also permits cooperative criminal activities with Russian intelligence and criminal circles. Western European communist parties after WW II, of course, caused some, but not all, of the same problems we see today in Eastern Europe.

        -- Nationalism and ethnic tensions. Not something attributable to Soviet influence, these problems are most conspicuous in the breakup of Yugoslavia. To presume, as critics of NATO enlargement have done, that only Yugoslavia is afflicted by them is a dangerous illusion.

The history of Europe from the Protestant Reformation right up through WW II is a record of religious, ethnic, and nationalist strife.   England's border with Scotland saw continuous war from 900 to 1746 with two brief pauses. No border in the Balkans can match that record!

It is frequently said that peace is now permanent in Western Europe, but such a claim may be premature. European leaders would have laid the foundations for future wars in 1990 had not the United States overruled them. Lady Margaret Thatcher and President Francois Mitterand struggled to prevent the reunification of Germany. Suppose they had succeeded. Germany probably would have reunited anyway, quitting NATO and expelling US troops, being furious at Britain and France, and more beholden to Moscow than Washington. That might also have allowed the Warsaw Pact to survive.   British and French handling of the Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s actually contributed to the spread of civil war in Yugoslavia. Unlike in the case of German reunification, the United States did not become involved and overrule until much too late.

        In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia provides a picture of what will inexorably occur there over the next several years without NATO enlargement. The Hungarian minorities in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, Poles in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, the Roma in several countries, Turks in Bulgaria, and Albanians in Macedonia are other potential sources for ethnic strife and wars throughout the region. The Czech government recently used the old Sudeten German issue to sour its relations with Berlin. And Russia's province of Kaliningrad, part of old East Prussia, is a potential source of many problems.

        Why have most of these "sleeping dogs" not barked, or not barked louder? Because prospective NATO members do not want to spoil their prospects for admittance. Without that hope, some of their leaders would feel free to exploit these issues for domestic political purposes.

Anyone who objects to enlarging NATO, therefore, should be obliged to explain how we are to deal with the plethora of problems that these four legacies have bequeathed Eastern Europe if admitting new members is ruled out.   Still, we must face the question, how much enlargement go and how fast?  

How Much to Enlarge and Why Now?

        The answer to how much is at least five countries, although seven would be better. Thereafter, a long interval should precede any additional enlargement. The answer to "why now" varies.

        The Baltic states have been very successful in their political and economic transition programs. Latvia, having the largest Russian minority, faces more difficulties but has made impressive progress. Bringing them into NATO will help sustain what is being accomplished in these countries.        Some observers insist that the Baltic countries are militarily indefensible. This judgment is wrong on two counts, technical and strategic.   On the first count, given the great lethality of US and NATO forces against the greatly deteriorated Russian military, a local defense is highly feasible in Estonia, the most exposed of the three countries. On the second count, Berlin was indefensible during the Cold War, but the strategic context prevented a Soviet attack on it. The same holds for the Baltic states today. If Russia invaded them, it would risk general war with Europe and the United States. The strategic question, therefore, is the defensibility of Europe, not the Baltic states. Thus the indefensibility objection is a red herring, not to be taken seriously.

        Romania and Bulgaria can arguably be given a higher priority than the Baltic states, not because they are better prepared. Far from it. They face large internal difficulties. Romania, surprisingly, has done more to get ready for NATO membership after its disappointment in 1998 than most observers expected. The key reason for including both countries now is stability in the Balkans.

        Bosnia and Kosovo are terrible problems, but compared to civil war in Macedonia, they could look small. It most likely would lead to the country's breakup, which could bring Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, and Greece into a conflict there. In other words, a general Balkans war could arise from it unless NATO creates a framework for maintaining security in the entire Balkans.   Making Romania and Bulgaria NATO members is the most obvious way to begin, because it puts NATO astride all countries there rather than entangled on one side or the other. This probably explains why Turkey and Greece are uncharacteristically cooperating to support Romanian and Bulgarian admission.

        Slovenia and Slovakia might as well be included if these other five countries are.   Slovenia is well-prepared, but Slovakia needs to make greater progress. 

The Russia Factor     

After the dire warnings about Russian reactions to the first round of NATO enlargement failed to materialize, new ones should not disturb us this time. Russia is now conciliatory toward enlargement, and for very good reasons.

        Stability and economic prosperity in the states of Eastern Europe are very much in Russia's interest.   Civil war and poverty are not. Russia lacks the military power to prevent the latter and the economic power to provide the former. Only a US-led NATO has both. Several Russian political and economic leaders have come to recognize this, especially Putin, who seems determined to integrate Russia's economy into the West.

Then why not include Russia in NATO? First, its policies in the CIS and Chechnya are incompatible with NATO membership.   Second, it is too big and its problems too intractable for Putin to achieve broad Russian integration with Western economies any time soon. Third, inside NATO Russia would periodically play a spoiling and blocking role that could fatally weaken the alliance. Fourth, the seven states now seeking membership want security against Russia. Russian membership, some of them have warned, would be dangerous for them.   We should not underestimate their fears as an important subjective political factor.

All of these reasons argue strongly against upgrading Russia's link to NATO beyond the 1999 "founding act." Until Moscow uses this connection constructively for several years, it would be unwise to allow it greater access to NATO deliberations and policy discussions. 

Whither NATO?

        Serious questions need to be raised about where NATO is headed with enlargement. Will it lose its vitality? Is it being diluted so that it amounts to little more than OSCE?   Does it really have a mission today?   Is NATO being displaced by the EU's moves to take over responsibility for Europe's security?

        Dilution is a danger if more than the seven candidates now being considered are admitted.   That must wait until the present prospective members are successfully integrated into NATO. Experience already gained from the three new members shows that it takes time. For example, the Czech Republic is creating serious problems, especially with the increasing signs of unpunished criminal activities by high-level government officials. No doubt, some of the candidates for admission this year will prove troublesome once they become members.   Still, dealing with these problems is a major reason for enlargement.   If the Czech Republic were outside of NATO, our leverage for solutions would be less.

        At some point, however, troublesome new members could prove more than NATO can handle.   For that reason, the alliance ought to consider amending the treaty to establish rules and procedures for expelling members that have become a danger to NATO from within.

        The analogy with OSCE is instructive, not against expansion, however, but as a strong reason for not including Russia or increasing its status in Brussels.  

         NATO's mission is a very serious matter, dangerously neglected, especially by the United States. It is really a question of "missions" plural.   Some are new, and some are old. Here is a tentative list:

1. Providing a substitute for a European supra-national political-military authority. This implicit mission remains valid today and for the indefinite future. We need to be more conscious of it without talking more about it. The Europeans know its importance but do not like to admit it. If the European Union achieved a political federation with an effective central government, it might well displace NATO, something the United States cannot oppose, not least because Washington was the original sponsor of European integration.   The danger today, however, is that we could forget this mission while the Europeans create unjustified illusions about EU defense capabilities.   The combined misunderstandings could precipitate a premature US withdrawal from Europe, catalyzing the slow but sure process of growing tensions and instability in Europe. A number of lesser and more specific missions can help avoid such a disaster. The following three are examples.

2. Transforming the political and economic institutions of countries in the Balkans. A new mission, it has been described as a case of previously taboo "out of area operations." The United States has been reluctant to undertake it, classifying it as "peacekeeping," which it is not.   Rather it involves what the United States did during its occupation of Germany between 1945 and 1955. "Peacekeeping" was developed by the United Nations with very specific and limited activities, which cannot create the new institutions needed in the Balkans. Only military occupation and governance can. To evade this mission is to risk NATO's future.

3. Training for coalition warfare. The coalition that fought the Gulf War against Iraq was greatly facilitated by NATO interoperability standards and practices. No other organization but NATO provides the development and maintenance of interoperability essential for effective multi-lateral coalition warfare. If we did not have NATO to provide this service, we would have to invent it.   In a word, NATO needs no direct enemy to justify its existence.   This training mission alone is enough.

        The greatest threat to NATO's future has been US neglect of this mission since the end of the Cold War. It requires a yearly set of large-scale exercises involving multi-national operations.   And those in turn demand a series of smaller scale national level training endeavors to prepare for them. Large-scale NATO "combined" exercises have virtually ceased.   The militaries of the new NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, therefore, have had neither the chance nor the demand to become involved in such training at more than a very low-level.   Their national defense staffs are not forced to become operationally involved on more than very limited small unit operations.   Thus they can drift along with little change from their old communist military practices.

        One of the reasons for the huge gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe is the lack of a regular and demanding combined exercise program.   If, for example, the United States began an annual exercise, projecting three to six heavy Army brigades to Europe, almost entirely by airlift (C-17s can carry M-1 tanks), to participate with NATO forces, that would draw them into demanding operations, showing up their "gaps" and needs for modernization. Their defense ministries could not easily ignore them.

The Cold War REFORGER exercises accomplished this with the Central Front scenarios, but the United States had weapons and equipment already deployed in Europe (POMCUS stocks), making the lift requirements relatively small.   Today, such exercises should involve lifting ALL of the weapons and equipment in very short time periods. A score of fast RO/RO ships and a fleet of 300 C-17s could put two US heavy divisions in Europe in two weeks.

On alternate years, heavy brigades of European forces should be projected on the same high-speed basis for exercises in the United States and Canada. If the United States offered the lift and invited European militaries to "play" in this game, their military commanders would likely jump at the opportunity. The professional enhancements offered and the chance to show their own governments what their real shortfalls are in capabilities for operating with US forces would be powerful incentives to European officers. The new NATO member states would scramble to be the first to participate.

Two major gains could result from such training. First, it would show up the EU's "common security and defense policy" for what it is – little more than a piece of paper. And it would do so without any public comments from US officials, comments that infuriate European leaders without changing their behavior.

Second, the technological gap between US and European forces would likely narrow. Moreover, it does not exist in some areas, something that exercises would force the US defense department to acknowledge. And it would be especially helpful for military reforms in NATO's new member states.

4. Out-of-area operations. The precedent for NATO conducting out-of-area operations has been set in the Balkans, but it remains contentious. In my own view, pushing NATO to become a vehicle for global war on terrorism is neither good for NATO nor for success in that war.   Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's term, "coalitions of the willing," is a better approach. In a few cases, a NATO political consensus for an out-of-area campaign will be possible, but not every time the United States demands it. The interoperability standards and practices learned in NATO, however, can be exploited by coalitions of a few NATO members who do share a consensus on fighting outside of Europe.

Conclusion

Let me end by applauding this committee's efforts to put the case for NATO enlargement – pros and cons – before the American public. Admitting new members is not a step to take lightly. Moreover, if the United States continues to let the alliance drift without leadership and direction, and if it spends more time condemning the EU's military planning than improving NATO's military activities, enlarging NATO will yield few of the results and possibly contribute to the alliance's decline.

I strongly favor enlargement this year not only because it serves a broad range of interests, including those of Russia, Europe, and the United States, but also because it should force the United States to wake up to most of these long neglected tasks.