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STATEMENT
OF
ELIOT A. COHEN
PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
BEFORE
THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER
2, 2002
Thank
you for inviting me to testify today before
you on the question of American policy towards
Iraq. The
argument that I can put to you is easily
summarized: it is that the choice before the
United States is a stark one, either to
acquiesce in a situation which permits the
regime of Saddam Hussein to restore his
economy, acquire weapons of mass destruction,
and pose a lethal threat to his neighbors and
to us, or to take action to overthrow him. In my view, the latter course, with all
of its risks, is the correct one. Indeed, the dangers of failing
to act in the near future are unacceptable. To that end Congress should authorize
the President to initiate large scale military
action against Iraq, and give him the widest
possible latitude in acting - even in the
absence of additional UN authorization to do
so. Let
me describe the nature of our conflict with
Iraq, outline the two strategic options open
to us, and briefly consider the implications
of that choice.
A
famous saying has it that war is a
continuation of policy by other means. In the case of Saddam Hussein, however,
"policy is a continuation of war by other
means." Saddam Hussein has waged war against
the United States and the community of
civilized states since 1991. After the successful conduct of air and
ground operations in January and February of
that year, many Americans thought that the war
had ended. We cleaned up the equipment, brought
back most of the troops, held victory parades,
and congratulated ourselves. The government believed, as did many
observers, that Saddam would surely fall. At worst, UN inspections would finish
the job bombing had begun: the United States
would neuter the regime even if we did not
destroy it.
How
wrong we were. Under the eyes of American soldiers,
Saddam's soldiers massacred Iraqi citizens
hoping for liberation. The UN inspections,
backed as they were by American and foreign
intelligence, and imposed upon an Iraq still
reeling from a battlefield debacle, uncovered
dismaying facts: that the Iraqi nuclear
program, for example, was far more extensive
and advanced than we had known - and that
most of it had escaped destruction. We learned too that Iraqi research on
and production of chemical and biological
weapons were well in advance of anything
suspected before the war. Unlike the case of nuclear weapons,
moreover, even the brave and dedicated
professionals working for the United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) could not
stay ahead of a cunning opponent who intended
to retain these weapons at all costs. Indeed, by 1999 the Iraqi regime had
outmaneuvered us, and negotiated the
replacement of UNSCOM by the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) a far weaker organization
working at arms' length from the United
States and her allies. And UNMOVIC has, of course, been a dead
letter for some time.
To
these undisputed facts add the Iraqi attempt
on the life of the first President Bush,
Iraq's sponsorship of suicide-bombing in
Israel, its ceaseless torrent of hatred and
incitement directed against Americans and the
United States, its hosting of terrorists (to
include the late, unlamented Abu Nidal), and
its training relationship with al-Qaeda. Let us remember above all that on a
daily basis, the Iraqi military does its best
to kill American and British pilots
maintaining the southern and northern no-fly
zones, put in place with UN support. If repeated and brazen attempts to
shoot down American aircraft are not acts of
war, I do not know what is. If we have escaped without loss it is a
tribute to our skill, and his bad luck.
The
United States has been at war with Iraq since
1991. Only
the level of violence has changed, not the
substance of the relationship or the
intentions of the Iraqi regime.
Since
the middle of the 1990's Iraq has been
winning this phase of the war. It has done so despite the best efforts
of American diplomats and soldiers, to include
short campaigns such as operation DESERT FOX
in 1998. Iraq has violated numerous Security Council resolutions and
injunctions with impunity; it has successfully
dismantled the UN inspections regime, which,
unfortunately, was only partly effective in
the best of times. It has slipped out from under sanctions
as well. Today Iraq produces something on the
order of 2.4 million barrels of oil a day, up
from a postwar low of 300,000 barrels, and not
far short of pre-1991 rates.
The
stark facts are that inspections are dead, and
sanctions are dead. They cannot be resurrected. There are too many countries that will
assist Saddam in preventing us from bringing
them back to life. They have multiple motives: greed,
desire to curry favor with Baghdad, anxiety
about domestic opinion, a principled horror of
war, a desire to take the United States down a
peg or two, fear of the precedent set by the
overthrow of this kind of regime or the
consequences that could flow from it. The international argument about
inspections is therefore a sham, a mask for
other concerns and intentions. There can be no question of Iraqi good
faith. It does not exist. Everything
- everything - that a decade's worth of
experience can teach us is that we have only
two choices: deterrence of the regime or its
overthrow.
But
is Saddam Hussein, in the long run, deterrable? He has twice launched ruinous,
unprovoked wars of aggression against his
neighbors; he has attempted to assassinate a
former American president; he has evinced an
unshakeable determination to acquire the most
lethal weapons devised by man; he has shown a
willingness to use them, on civilians first
and foremost, beginning with his countrymen. He is a man who swam to power in a pool
of blood, and who has exercised power not merely with brutality, but
with a sadism notable even by the standards of
the last century. His daily discourse is that of
slaughter, and his deeds match his words.
An
argument from deterrence is a declaration of
faith in the rationality of Saddam Hussein. It is an argument that he will not
fulfill his repeated, specific, and bloody
threats directed against us, his neighbors,
and Israel. It is an assertion that he will refrain
from the use of biological weapons that have
no "return address." It is a contention that he understands
power, justice, prestige, and above all
revenge more or less as we do. It is a belief that is contradicted by
his career, which is one of ferocity,
miscalculation, and destruction.
That
leaves us the choice of war, as problematic as
that may be. What are our prospects in such a case?
It
is unwise to forecast costs and casualties: I
recall the debate before the Gulf War of 1991,
and how completely wrong such estimates turned
out to be - even those made by the
government. To forecast war plans is even more misguided: if one is wrong
one is foolish; if one is right, one is
something considerably worse than foolish. Nonetheless, there are some relevant
points to be note.
First,
the Iraqi military is today a shadow of its
former self. A third the size it was in 1991, poorly
equipped, demoralized, haunted by memories of
its last encounter with the United States, it
cannot be anything like the machine we faced
in 1991 - which, of course, crumbled under
our attack.
Second,
in recent times, the United States military
has consistently surprised observers and
indeed itself. Before the Gulf, Yugoslav, and Afghan wars we were told that
our armed forces faced unprecedented
challenges that they could meet only at great
cost if at all. In each case, they achieved their
objectives more effectively and and
creatively, and with greater economy in the expenditure
of blood than anyone could have imagined. In a future resumption of intense
hostilities with Iraq, the same is likely to
be true, in ways in that no outside obsserver
can predict.
Third,
the lesson of recent wars is that coalitions
are not ends but means, and a fixation with
international consensus leads to feeble
strategy. In the current context, the United
States would like the support of many
countries, but needs the active cooperation of
a handful - Kuwait, some of the Gulf States,
and one would hope Turkey, Jordan, and
possibly Saudi Arabia. Our British and Australian allies
provide valuable military assistance, and
confirmation of the view that Saddam is indeed
an implacable menace. Beyond this, the chances are very good
that once our intention to act becomes clear,
other states will find ways of signing on with
us, for a variety of more and less worthy
motives.
Fourth,
the Ba'athist state is a regime held
together solely by fear. When the time comes that Iraqi officers
and soldiers, secret police and functionaries
no longer anticipate retribution by the
regime, they will cease to operate on its
behalf. As
the American military confronts the threat of
chemical and biological weapons and urban
warfare - the most difficult challenges in
such a campaign - we must remember that
fact. If
individual Iraqi officers know that they will
suffer harm only if they obey Saddam's
orders, they are unlikely to do so. Surely, military planners know this
fact and will make use of it.
Saddam
Hussein has been given many last chances. Indeed, announcing the beginning of
operation DESERT FOX in December 1998
President Clinton said that he had given
Saddam his "last chance." Some may persuade themselves that
Saddam should have more "last chances."
Some will even suggest that the United States
should defer action until next year - and
the year after that, and the year after that. And if we follow such a course, one day
it will be too late, and as a regional nuclear
war erupts, or as plague rages in our cities,
we will wonder why we did not act. The real question is not "why now?"
but "why not years ago?"
Almost
as important as regime change is what follows.
Almost as important, because the truth is that
even if Saddam is succeeded by a brute, we can
expect him to be a chastened brute, who knows
the consequence of confronting the United
States. But
America can and should aspire to more. To be sure, we are not by temperament
or preparation well suited to exercise a kind
of colonial administration for long periods of
time in the Arab world. It would be absurd to expect transition
in Iraq from totalitarian rule to Jeffersonian
democracy. But it should be possible to establish
a regime that would be authoritarian, perhaps,
but moderate, a regime that would safeguard
basic civil and religious rights, that would
free the Iraqi people from fear, that would
maintain the unity of the country without
threatening its neighbors, and that might pave
the way, in the long run, for a modern,
limited state. Such an achievement would have
beneficial consequences well beyond Iraq,
including in our war against Islamic
extremism. By itself, the United States cannot
remake the Middle East; but it can do much to
help the peoples of that part of the world to
do so. It
cannot force Arab societies to come to terms
with modernity, but it can aid those embarked
on that enterprise. The United States can support with its
prestige and power liberals of all stripes,
secular and religious alike, and foster
decent, even if not entirely free governments. In this indirect but crucial way the
overthrow of Saddam will contribute to the
larger American contest against Islamic
extremist violence.
There
are other connections between September 11th
and our war with Iraq. There are some ties between Baghdad and
al-Qaeda that have become more apparent in
recent days, and in all likelihood more that
the intelligence community does not yet
understand or that it has buried in secrecy. There is a deeper link as well. After September 11th
Americans now have a visceral, rather than a
theoretical understanding of what a massive
assault on American civilians in the heart of
our great cities feels like. We know what it smells like. The
horrors of that day have made Americans more
realistic than others around the world who -
like so many well-meaning people in the
century just past - would prefer to close
their eyes and pretend that a mortal threat
does not exist. Americans have paid a terrible price
for seeing things more clearly than once we
did.
I
therefore urge you to support a resolution
giving the
President the authority to conduct a campaign
aimed at the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein
regime; that you not tie it to UN resolutions;
and that you not condition our action on the
acquiescence of countries that may wish to prevent
us from acting. We have lost strategic surprise: at
this point Saddam has to know that we are
coming. By
granting the President discretion you may help
him to retain some measure of operational
surprise, which will contribute to our
forces' chances of early and complete
success. You will, most importantly, thereby reduce the casualties
these young men and women may suffer.
Let
me conclude with one last thought. It is the nature of partisan politics
to sharpen the differences between parties,
even on matters of foreign policy. Yet for a variety of reasons, there has
been a common policy on Iraq for a full decade
from the end of the first Gulf War. Both Republican and Democratic
administrations put a wary reliance on
containment. That policy has, finally, failed. But throughout, American leaders have
shared an understanding of the ultimate
issues. Again,
in the words of President Clinton: "The
hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in
power, he threatens the well-being of his
people, the peace of his region, the security
of the world. The best way to end that threat
once and for all is with a new Iraqi
government, a government ready to live in
peace with its neighbors, a government that
respects the rights of its people." However one judges the success of his
administration's policies, President Clinton
had the assessment right. The time has come to act on his words.
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