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STATEMENT
OF
GENERAL (RETIRED) WESLEY K. CLARK
U.S. ARMY
BEFORE
THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER
26, 2002
Mr.
Chairman, Representative Skelton, Distinguished
Members of this Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
This is a Committee that has been
strongly supportive of the men and women in
uniform, and I want to thank you personally for
the assistance and support that you gave me, and
have given so many others.
In
October 1994, Saddam Hussein moved several
Republican Guards divisions back into the attack
positions just north of the Kuwaiti border, the
same attack positions that had been occupied
just prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990. It
was a foolish and to our minds unexpected and
threatening move. We quickly deployed additional
military forces to the region, preparing to
enter a full-fledged battle against Iraq to
defend Kuwait, and we also went to the United
Nations. After
a few tense days Saddam backed off, the
divisions were removed, and we acted through the
United Nations to further tighten the no-fly
zone and regulate Iraqi troop movements.
But
it was a signal warning about Saddam Hussein: he
is not only malevolent and violent, but also
unpredictable.
He retains his chemical and biological
warfare capabilities and is actively pursuing
nuclear capabilities.
Were he to acquire such capabilities, we
and our friends in the region would face greatly
increased risks.
Saddam might use such weapons as a
deterrent while launching attacks against Israel
or his neighbors, he might threaten American
forces in the region, he might strike directly
against Israel, or Israel, weighing the
possibilities of nuclear blackmail or
aggression, might feel compelled to strike Iraq
first.
Saddam
has been pursuing nuclear weapons for over
twenty years.
According to all estimates made available
he does not now have these weapons.
The best public assessment is that if he
were to acquire fissionable material he might
field some type of weapon within two years.
If he has to enrich the uranium ore
itself, then a period of perhaps five years
might be required.
But what makes the situation relatively
more dangerous today is that the UN weapons
inspectors, who provided some assistance in
impeding his development programs, have been
absent from Iraq for over four years.
And the sanctions regime, designed to
restrict his access to weapons materials and the
resources needed to procure them, has
continuously eroded.
At some point, it may become possible for
Saddam to acquire the fissionable materials or
uranium ore that he needs. And therefore, Iraq is not a problem that can be indefinitely
postponed.
In
addition, Saddam Hussein's current retention
of chemical and biological weapons and their
respective delivery systems violates the UN
resolutions themselves, which carry the weight
of international law.
Our
President has emphasized the urgency of
eliminating these weapons and weapons programs. I strongly support his efforts to encourage the United
Nations to act on this problem.
And in taking this to the United Nations,
the President's clear determination to act if
the United Nations can't provides strong
leverage undergirding further diplomatic
efforts.
But
the problem of Iraq is only an element of the
broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished, world-wide war against Al Qaeda, a war
that has to be won in conjunction with friends
and allies, and that ultimately be won by
persuasion as much as by force, when we turn off
the Al Qaeda recruiting machine.
Some three thousand deaths on September
11th testify to the real danger from
Al Qaeda, and as all acknowledge, Al Qaeda has
not yet been defeated. Thus far, substantial
evidence has not been made available to link
Saddam's regime to the Al Qaeda network.
And while such linkages may emerge,
winning the war against Al Qaeda may well
require different actions than ending the
weapons programs in Iraq.
The
critical issue facing the Unites States now is
how to force action against Saddam Hussein and
his weapons programs without detracting from our
focus on Al Qaeda or efforts to deal with other
immediate, mid and long-term security problems.
In this regard, I would offer the
following considerations:
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The United States diplomacy in the United
Nations will be further strengthened if the
Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US
determination to act if the United Nations will
not.
The use of force must remain a US option
under active consideration. The resolution need
not at this point authorize the use of force,
but simply agree on the intent to authorize the
use of force, if other measures fail.
The more focused the resolution on Iraq
and the problem of weapons of mass destruction,
the greater its utility in the United Nations.
The more nearly unanimous the resolution,
the greater its impact in the diplomatic efforts
underway.
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The President and his national security
team must deploy imagination, leverage, and
patience in crafting UN engagement.
In the near term, time is on our side,
and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all
possible. This
may require a period of time for inspections or
even the development of a more intrusive
inspection program, if necessary backed by
force. This
is foremost an effort to gain world-wide
legitimacy for US concerns and possible later
action, but it may also impede Saddam's
weapons programs and further constrain his
freedom of action.
Yes, there is a risk that inspections
would fail to provide the evidence of his
weapons programs, but the difficulties of
dealing with this outcome are more than offset
by opportunity to gain allies and support in the
campaign against Saddam.
If
efforts to resolve the problem by using the
United Nations fail, either initially or
ultimately, the US should form the broadest
possible coalition, including its NATO allies
and the North Atlantic Council if possible, to
bring force to bear.
Force should not be used until the personnel and
organizations to be involved in post-conflict
Iraq are identified and readied to assume their
responsibilities. This includes requirements for
humanitarian assistance, police and
judicial capabilities, emergency medical and
reconstruction assistance, and preparations for
a transitional governing body and eventual
elections, perhaps including a new constitution.
Ideally, international and multinational
organizations will participate in the readying
of such post-conflict
operations, including the UN, NATO, and
other regional and Islamic organizations.
Force
should be used as the last resort; after all
diplomatic means have been exhausted, unless
information indicates that further delay would
present an immediate risk to the assembled
forces and organizations.
This action should not be categorized as
"preemptive."
Once
initiated, any military operation should aim for
the most rapid accomplishment of its operational
aims and prompt turnover to follow-on
organizations and agencies.
If
we proceed as outlined above, we may be able to
minimize the disruption to the ongoing campaign
against Al Qaeda, reduce the impact on friendly
governments in the region, and even contribute
to the resolution of other regional issues such
as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian efforts to
develop nuclear capabilities, and Saudi funding
for terrorism.
But there are no guarantees.
The war is unpredictable and could be
difficult and costly.
And what is at risk in the aftermath is
an open-ended American ground commitment in Iraq
and an even deeper sense of humiliation in the
Arab world, which could intensify our problems
in the region and elsewhere.
I
look forward to answering questions and helping
the Committee assess the costs and risks of the
alternatives before us.
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