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STATEMENT
OF
DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA
DIRECTOR, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS
NEW YORK, NY
BEFORE
THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER
19, 2002
Mr.
Chairman, distinguished members,
I
will comment briefly on two points.
1) The status, goals, and extent of Iraq's
WMD programs specifically the nuclear. And
2) How Iraq acquired the technology
necessary to sustain these programs.
The
Status, Goals, and extent of Iraq's nuclear
weapon program.
I
believe that the testimony of Richard Spertzel
and David Kay covers well the biological weapons
and the nuclear weapons angles. However I wish
to add some observations relevant to the nuclear
weapons program and the Iraqi system in dealing
with weapons in general.
The
nuclear weapons program is now almost complete
waiting for the enrichment sector, which makes
90% of the program to finish its job and put
together a working production facility. The
bottlenecks in the enrichment are already
resolved. German sources provided Iraq with
classified reports and a working unit in the
centrifuge enrichment technology. This can
reduce the time needed for research and
development for a country like Iraq by at least
ten years. The whole centrifuge technology was
acquired for a little over a million dollars.
This included state of the art carbon fiber
cylinders. The recent announcement of
interception of large orders for aluminum
cylinders indicate that the process of putting
together large enough units for full production
is not complete yet. At the same time it also
indicates that Iraq has already bypassed the
initial testing and possibly pilot plant stage.
Also Iraq always use duplicate sourcing of
materials and supplies which may mean that it is
already in possession of enough materials for a
small scale production facility. My estimate is
that Iraq may be in actual production in two
years with enough accumulated product for two to
three nuclear weapons in three years. The
problem however remains that we are dealing with
a series of indicators but no first hand
witness. This I will deal with later in this
statement.
Iraq
never seriously attempted to acquire nuclear
fissile materials from outside sources by
smuggling or other means. Though this may have
changed since I left in 1994 but my belief is
that this is a serious program, and is designed
to turn Iraq into a nuclear power with credible
nuclear force and as such systematic build-up of
its capability was embarked on for over twenty
years with no change of goals or purpose. This
make it one of the most intensive single-minded
objectives of the Iraqi regime. It dwarfs many
times over both the BW and CW programs combined.
By the time I left hiring was intensive
especially among college graduates in
engineering and science. A program declared
publicly by Saddam created a series of graduate
groups trained in nuclear and other weapon
technologies dedicated to working in the program
after graduation. This step among others turns
the university system which is forced to award
degrees based on classified research unseen by
its faculties into an integral part of the Iraqi
WMD industry. On the other hand Atomic Energy
Establishment (AEE) teams were turned into
civilian contracting entities that actually
engage in contract work for the civilian sector.
They helped rebuild Iraq's civilian
infrastructure including power stations, oil
refineries and telephone exchanges. This
achieved two purposes. On the one hand Iraq can,
and did claim that these are now civilian sector
entities unrelated to the WMD program. On the
other hand by working with other government
establishments they can incorporate the best of
these establishments into their work. There were
complaints from the various sectors that AEE
took away so many of their engineers that they
had a hard time getting their work done. Even
important sectors such as oil and power
generation were not immune. One result of this
is the unavailability of scientists and
engineers that the Iraqi government can claim to
be transferred from the military industry and as
such not available to the inspectors. Also it
means that Iraq has integrated its WMD into its
civilian sector turning Iraq into one giant WMD
factory.
I
wish to point here that Dr. Spertzel's hunch
about the role of Iraq's intelligence agency
the Mukhabarat in the WMD program is right.
Iraq's
BW program was started under an organization
created by Mukhabarat called al-Hazen. In 1985
as an advisor to AEE I was asked to visit
al-Hazen to check on their computer work and see
if they need help in setting up their computer
network. I was familiar with the early phase of
al-Hazen and its late director Merwan al-Sateda.
A Palestinian with Yasser Arafat connections he
was a fellow physicist. The center started as a
military research and development organization
that have extensive cooperation with the U. of
Arizona. It
was run by the Iraqi Mukhabarat and as such was
independent of any oversight by other government
organs such as the Ministry of Finance. Later
after being accused of pilfering 20 million
dollars Merwan was jailed and later killed by
Saddam and the center dissolved to be opened
later with a new mission: development of
Iraq's BW program.
Iraq's
Mukhabarat is the creation of Saddam Hussein. It
was founded on the premise that Iraq's
security starts abroad. As such it had units for
assassination, terror, use of poisons and
biological agents against Iraqi dissidents and
an extensive experimental program in all means
of terror and intelligence tools. Even Atomic
Energy was not immune from their power. They
infiltrated AE and took under their wings many
of its staff at will. As such we were aware of
some of the developments going inside this
terrible organization. Later I acted as a
liaison with this agency regarding their
acquisition of proscribed nuclear materials and
presumably classified reports. I found it to be
corrupt, deceitful and totally without human
values.
Thus
the BW program replaced the research in physics
as priority for Mukhabarat because of its
potential for terrorism. An angle rarely
reported and I found extensive incidents
regarding it when I left Iraq and worked in
Libya from Iraqi expatriates was the use of
humans as disease carriers. Dissidents living
abroad with families in Iraq will suddenly get
the news that their families are allowed to join
them. Before they can obtain their passports
they are usually "inoculated" against some
of the standard infections. There were many
incidents of whole families infected this way
with HIV and other diseases. It should be noted
that any Iraqi infected with HIV was transferred
to a remote region in Western desert called
Salman Hole presumably for treatment. However
nobody ever came back and most were reported
dead within a year of going there. Since HIV is
rarely a cause of death this fast it was assumed
that they were subject to many kinds of
experiments. If smallpox is to be sent abroad
from Iraq one should expect unwitting carriers
being sent to the destination targets possibly
not even Iraqis to achieve deniability.
When
I was transferred to the military industry some
of my workers were questioned about the effects
of radiation and how to cause disease and death
by what kind of radiation sources. Later I heard
of many incidents of people with radiation burns
treated in Iraqi hospitals. Work on the Iraqi
dirty bomb which was tested in 1988 in
Muhammediyat had an Iraqi Mukhabarat angle.
How
Iraq acquired the technology necessary to
sustain these programs.
Iraq
understood that the first step in acquiring
technology is the human element. Thus a large
scale program of government scholarships was
launched that covered all areas of WMD in
addition to other needs. The program was of such
a scale that though most of scholarship holders
never returned those who did were of large
enough number to form the nucleus of its WMD.
This is critical to understand if any use is to
be made of the inspectors to uncover the Iraqi
WMD. Comparison with Iran may explain this
point. Iran
acquired calutron technology for uranium
enrichment from China. Iraq developed its own
much larger program for calutrons from scratch.
Iran attempted acquiring heavy water
technologies from many countries including
Argentina. Iraq did research and development for
more than twenty years to develop its own heavy
water technology. Thus the scientists are
Iraq's main asset not equipment nor
facilities. At the same time Iraq allowed
weapons inspectors to destroy many pieces of
equipments and facilities it refused to give
them full unmonitored access to its scientists.
Inspections became a serious problem when
inspectors in later years began to demand more
access to the scientists. After several
incidents some of which were described in
earlier testimony Iraq began to get more and
more difficult in providing access. Thus the
demand for access to the scientists was the
cause of the
demise of the inspection process in Iraq.
This
points out a critical factor for inspections to
be of any meaning. With little or no human
intelligence about Iraq's WMD inspectors have
little to direct them to the whereabouts of the
Iraqi programs. However if a condition is made
that the scientists are to be made available
outside Iraq together with their families the
story could see an immediate turnaround. All
Iraq's pretexts of no WMD will collapse. Iraq
will expose its hand immediately through flat
refusal to cooperate. The names of all the
relevant scientists are known to the US
authorities. Unmovic already possesses huge
financial resources from its share of Iraq's
oil revenues at its disposal to take care of all
the important Iraqi scientists and engineers
permanently. Iraq's scientists if they chose
to and my guess is that they will can go under
the equivalent of the US witness protection
program paid for by income already under Unmovic
disposal if they agree to cooperate. This is the
test. If Iraq has really no illegal WMD program
it should agree. My bet would be that it will
not. This is the smoking gun everybody is
looking for.
Iraq
was reorganizing its concealment mechanism even
before the defection of Hussein Kamel,
Saddam's son in law. The resulting system took
effect in 1995 by the creation of the
Concealment Organization headed by Saddam's
younger son Qussey within the Special Security
Organization (SSO). The NY Times interview of
the Iraqi civil engineer charged with building
backup sites tell only part of the story. The
defector who brought with him official Iraqi
contracts reports duplicate sites built mostly
underground with specifications that included
lead impregnated concrete and resin covers that
mean radioactive work. A back-up system of
support do the rest. Any inspection process is
monitored carefully as to its intentions. Once a
possible target is identified a special team
with its transport vehicles and technicians will
descend on the target of inspection, dismantle
all equipment and any possible incriminating
evidence and carry it to the back-up site. This
is the more sophisticated version of what
inspectors already experienced through denial of
access and standoffs. Good luck for any future
inspection team that wants to beat this system.
Thank
you Mr. Chairman.
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